i believe that this is the right thread for this, the following paper would have been the run-of-the-mill democracy khatre mein hai but for the inclusion of the governance as a topic, this would be the actual first step by the west to understand indian stance on many issues
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/defa ... ajpaee.pdf
India has latterly placed more emphasis on promoting global governance rather
than promoting democracy. Particularly notable in this context is a pivoting of the
narrative on democracy promotion to emphasize digital inclusion through digital
public infrastructure (DPI) and the ‘democratization of technology’.
India goes to the polls: attributes of Indian democracy
Ultimately, India’s model of democracy is different to that of its Western
counterparts. Its democracy remains well embedded in Indian society,
as characterized by the Panchayat Raj system of village governance that dates back
over three millennia.5 Dynastic politics is also a key component, rooted in a system
of patronage that can be traced to India’s caste system and the era of princely states.
Most of India’s political parties are dominated by personal identity, revolving around
one or more family or leader. This mix creates a unique political system whereby
a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy co-exists with more indigenous
systems of governance. These attributes of Indian democracy have become increasingly consequential for the country’s foreign policy as India acquires more tools and platforms to engage
with the outside world and project its hard and soft power internationally.6
India’s model of democracy promotion
India’s model of democracy promotion is rooted in a belief held by successive
governments in New Delhi that, as a non-Western, developing country,
it is uniquely positioned to offer positive lessons to fellow democracies in the
Global South.7 Embedded within this narrative is India’s ability to challenge
a supposed trade-off between democracy and development. Speaking in 2005,
India’s then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, noted: ‘our experience of more than
50 years of democratic rule demonstrates how democracy is a most powerful tool
to successfully overcome the challenge of development’.8
Narendra Modi echoed this narrative at the 2023 Summit for Democracy:
India, despite many global challenges, is the fastest growing major economy today.
This itself is the best advertisement for democracy in the world. This itself says that
Democracy Can Deliver.9
India has long been wary of engaging in overt democracy promotion,
concerned that such activities would be perceived as a form of intervention that
challenges the sovereignty of partner nations. In the Cold War era, for instance,
advancing the common interests of developing countries through such groupings
as the Non-Aligned Movement took precedence over democracy promotion. India
has also tended to hold back from calling for changes in non-democratic regimes.
(In some cases, such as Gulf states that are important to India’s foreign remittances
and oil imports, it might be argued that New Delhi’s position is not so far removed
from that of Western governments that have also been ambivalent in their response
to non-democratic behaviours in states viewed as economically and strategically
important.) Even where India has at times taken a principled stance in support
of democracy, geopolitics and security considerations eventually tend to gain the
upper hand. This was evident in the case of India’s position on Myanmar, which
shifted from backing the pro-democracy movement towards supporting the
military junta regime (see below). New Delhi has also been concerned that a more
interventionist approach to democracy promotion in its external engagements
could bring unwelcome scrutiny of India’s own democratic credentials.10
In practice, India’s democracy promotion is often subsumed within development
cooperation and broader capacity-building and technical assistance.11 In pursuing
a more low-key approach to democracy promotion, India’s primary objective is to
uphold the principle of respecting states’ sovereignty and maintaining cordial
relations with other countries – both democracies and non-democracies – in the
Global South. For instance, India has offered practical support for conducting
elections through the provision of electronic voting machines (EVMs) and indelible
election ink.12 India’s indelible election ink, which has been used in Indian elections
since 1962, has been supplied to 30 countries.13 And having used EVMs for its own
elections since 2001, India has provided technical assistance on the use of EVMs to
half a dozen countries.14 India, which holds one of the oldest constitutions in the
Global South, has also provided assistance to several countries – particularly those
that have a shared historical experience as former British colonies –
in constitution drafting.
Since the end of the Cold War, New Delhi has demonstrated greater willingness
to engage in democracy promotion. This has been motivated by a desire for
India to be recognized as a responsible global power through its championing
of issues of global governance. India hosted the World Movement for Democracy
conference in New Delhi in 1999, for instance, and was one of the founder
members of the Community of Democracies in 2000 and its offshoot the UN
Democracy Caucus in 2004. The IBSA Dialogue Forum, established in 2003,
comprising three major democracies in the Global South – India, Brazil and
South Africa – has also sought to strengthen South–South cooperation, although it
has been overshadowed by forums such as the BRICS over the last decade or more.
India has also employed democracy promotion as a means to challenge China’s
self-perceived leadership of the Global South. This is rooted in India’s belief that
while China maintains a lead in its coercive (economic and military) hard power,
New Delhi can challenge Beijing through its more co-optive soft power. The latter
includes the country’s democratic credentials, but also its ‘civilizational’ identity.15
Reflecting this, then prime minister Manmohan Singh asserted in 2005 that:
Liberal democracy is the natural order of political organisation in today’s world.
All alternative systems, authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are
an aberration.1
However, non-interference and sovereignty considerations remain a key pillar of
Indian foreign policy. As such, New Delhi will only pursue democracy promotion
where this is congruent with other geopolitical priorities, such as questions of
India’s international status, its relationship with the US, and/or where national
interests and regional security considerations are at stake. Moreover, India tends
to provide top-down assistance, working with governments (at their request),
rather than bottom-up grassroots support for civil society, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), or rebel or separatist groups. There are no organizations
in India that research and lobby for democracy promotion globally, as do, for
instance, US-based foundations and NGOs such as the National Endowment for
Democracy or Freedom House. While serving as India’s foreign secretary some two
decades ago, the diplomat Shyam Saran noted:
We don’t believe in the export of ideology. We don’t believe in the imposition
of democracy or democratic values on any country. But if there is any interest in any
country about our democratic institutions or in the institutions … we are very ready
to share these with any country.17
India has also become more open in condemning the suspension of democracy
in various countries, although it remains selective in doing so, as shown by its less
vocal stance on democratic reversals or backsliding in countries such as Myanmar
and Bangladesh (see below) compared with others, among them Pakistan and Fiji.
It is important to note that India will support state-building efforts that are
under a UN mandate, and is one of the largest contributors of personnel to UN
peacekeeping operations.18 However, India’s voting record at the UN on issues
of democracy and human rights reflects its wariness and ambiguity as regards
democracy promotion.19
New Delhi will only pursue democracy promotion where this is congruent
with other geopolitical priorities, such as questions of India’s international
status, its relationship with the US (see below), and/or where national
interests and regional security considerations are at stake. Where it perceives
limited added value, India will remain reluctant to weigh in. This means that
where an authoritarian regime does not maintain a hostile attitude towards
India (e.g. Russia or Iran), and/or where a regime is seen as enhancing India’s
national security (e.g. Myanmar or Bangladesh), the government will not push
for democratic change.
Ultimately, pragmatism rather than principle will continue to guide the role
India plays in democracy promotion. Given New Delhi’s ambition to be perceived
as a leader or ‘voice’ of the Global South, India’s preference is for serving as
a positive example to developing economies and extending what it regards
as enabling rather than prescriptive assistance.2
