Bharat Rakshak

Rye,

We have not set redlines on things like that. We have simply said that we will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Beyond that we have said nothing.

What the Pakistanis do to damage their national health in the pursuit of unrealistic alliances with foreign powers is hardly under our control.

Vijay J. wrote:


I am not sure whether there is something more sinister that motivates this entire discussion, given your tone, and so I am going to shut up now, since it is not my intent to make the GoI's job harder than it already is, since you are insinuating that words said here have real-world repercussions.

If there are serious troubles looming, then being silent will be the best contribution to this debate, and indeed such a debate in public is foolish if it supposedly destroys our ability to deter.

Vijay:

The way I see it, since India has not drawn any redlines, pakistan is always probing, pushing the envelope. They started with Khalistan, moved over to JK, have killed family members (including kids and women) of military personnel, killed Amarnath yatris, attacked the parliament, carried out scores of bomb blasts, armed attacks in Indian cities, attacked akshardham and RJB, attacked our financial infrastructure, torched a train compartment full of people, carried out kargil, instigated riots, defiled hindu and muslim holy places, killed Indians in ones and twos, then tens and then hundreds. They have killed military personnel, civilians, women, kids, retired servicemen. They have killed from all strata of society, from all religions, castes, states and they continue to do so. They may be under the impression by now that there is no such redline.

Rye,

Are they probing? or are they desperately trying to get some sort of momentum for their unrealistic ideas?

If they probe, and we probe back? then what?

Have you heard of the story of Hiranyakashapu, or perhaps Bhasmasur?

Thanks for this timely reminder. I would also submit that we need a certain degree of openness to debate as to articulating the nature of the engine and the track.

Jeez, kid. What grade are you studying in? kindergarten??

If you want to start a thread about Israeli resolve or technical capabilities, feel free to do so on IDF or here. And we can talk about it. This is a NFU/FU thread for India. I damn near snorted my morning coffee when you indulged in your juvenile tit-for-tat a few pages ago. And of course, lets also not forget the international jewish financial interests aspect of your comment. BTW, is there a similar international hindu financial interest? Just curious.

To answer your self-proclaimed "pointed" comments, let me similarly put forth some "pointed" comments of my own.

First, some facts.

India has tested what five or six devices.
Israel has apparently tested none. Lets go further and say unequivocally that it has tested none.

Now, lets look at the credibility of these nukes.

There is no doubt in the arab mind or the shite for that matter that a nuclear attack on Israel will invite a retaliatory holocaust for islam. The sauds will be fried before they can hike their skirts to board their private jets. As for that the mohammad-in-a-jad. So will he.

And guess what. The US can do whatever it wants. There will be nothing to stop Israel from letting loose its dogs of war. The whole ME will be a giant parking lot.

So, lets see the net outcome.

We have India, with a proven nuclear arsenal, but whose credibility to use that arsenal is in doubt by porkis in general. There are even a few indians here who at least agree that in case of a P-JDAM, the decision to retaliate against porkistan may well be hamstrung by political considerations and pressures both internal and external.

And we have Israel, without a proven arsenal, whose will to retaliate and inflict a extremely disproportionate nuclear retaliation against the islamic regimes of the ME is in no doubt in the minds of its enemies.

At the risk of repeating myself ad nauseam, despite which you dont seem to get the gist of what i am trying to say or wont get it, i do not doubt Indian courage per se. I do doubt the resolve of your politicians who in the very recent past have made comments such as "porkistan is also a victim or terrorism" and a prime minister who has accepted an invitation to travel to porkistan in the backdrop of the recent terror bombings in Bombay cannot but be seen as asinine by at least this Israeli.

I also have no doubt that in the event of a clear outbreak of war were porksitan to use nukes, India would respond decisively. I do doubt that the GOIn would do so in the event of a P-JDAM.

And if it tickles your giblets to have similar doubts about Israel, well tough luck. Your argument represents the classic manifestation of Shiv's my shirt is torn/your fly open kinda argument. Instead of arguing the credibility of Indian political will (and no one here is doubting India's technical ability to strike back at porkistan) to effect a quick and decisive response against a P-JDAM, you instead like a kindergartner argue that "fine, i dont believe israel has it either."

Not only that, you start bringing in your President Kalam and international jewish financial interests.

BTW, not sure if you have, but i have actually read Prez Kalam's India Vision 2020. And he is without doubt that only moslem i have ever admired in my 50-odd yr existence on this planet. In fact, if your moslems were like your Prez, at least acouple of threads on this forum would lose their rationale to exist.

The thread is about NFU/FU. And credibility goes to the heart of any nuclear doctrine. As i mentioned earlier, you or we for that matter, have to adopt a strategy that DETERS to begin with, even the thought in the minds of our enemies of using nuclear weapons against us. And again, credibility goes to the heart of that deterrence. We may well take out most of the ME in a retaliatory strike, but that is no consolation at all when the cost is 5 million jewish citizens of Israel. What good does a nuclear wasteland do for me when Eretz Israel no longer exists??

So, it matters not if the world things that our actions are excessive or disproportionate. What matters is that the regimes in the ME know that they are playing with fire if there is ever a nuclear strike against Israel. And towards that end, the destruction of islamic holy places (and the sauds in general) are legitimate targets PRECISELY because such a retaliatory threat nullifies the islamic jehadi assumption that their religion will survive while mine perishes.

Vijay J. wrote:


After all these analysis of the paki mindset, do we have to ask? And if we have to ask, how smart are we?

If Bhasmasuran puts his hand on his head and also takes out the person standing nearby, then the person nearby needs to exhibit more caution and paranoia, if they have an iota of self-preservation, and not stand around making idle chatter with Basmasuran's relatives over the cellphone on how to get Basmasuran to lower his hand away from his head.

OK, so the doctrine, be it NFU or FU or ambiguity is primarily a matter of managing perception.

With that in mind, what would be the impact of a nuclear / thermonuclear test conducted in the paradisical Vale?

(a) physical impact--ecological, seismological etc--controllable / manageable? Or is it going to bring the Himalayas crashing down?
(b) perceptional /symbolic impact
(c) other aspects?

Rye, I have to say after being at the painful end of much prodding, it does seem like it. I cant judge if thats a good or bad omen though either in the more immediate context of this topic or from what this forum has usually served. A subtle transition happening perhaps...

Back in good old days, No Baki Jernail will do the morning namaz without threatning to Nuke Kafir Indians. The threat is now unheard for quite few years. Does this mean Bakis are dettered now or there has been change in Intent or capabilty.

Sadler,

You refuse to learn.

Israel's actions are not disproportionate, that is some fiction that helps young Israelis sleep at night. The actions are barely proportionate when you adjust for the population, Israel suffers grevious losses far in excess of what it inflicts on its enemies. The only time Palestineans suffered similar losses was at the hands of Mohammed Zia ul Haq in the Black September uprising. Israel has yet to demonstrate anything that I might term disporportionate.

I have no interest in disrupting IDF. That is not my intention here, I am simply trying to get you to stop behaving in a way that I find patently offensive and uncalled for by an Israeli.

There is very much an international Hindu financial interest. You have friends in Amsterdam, and so do I. You have people in manhattan so do I. I have Infosys you have Amdocs. Please remember our software people openly send our PM emails asking him to reduce the pressure on Pakistan in 2002 and you have heard about self hating Jews. If that helps you understand all the better.

The key words in your post are "Arab mind", the Persians are not "Arab"! Ask Mofaz and Katsav what the differnce is.

The North Korean test has implications for Israeli security that go beyond those for India's security. The presence of Iranian representatives at the test suggests that Iran has significantly improved its access to data from a real nuclear test. Remeber the Pakistanis had no interest in giving the Iranians much due to the Shia-Sunni angle, this has changed now with the entry of DPRK.

It is now a fight between equals.

At this point what should Tel Aviv's response be? Sit around on American assurances that the data from North Korea's test is not sufficient? Or believe that Muslims in Iran cannot be competent enough to test a nuclear device on their own? Just as someone believed that Muslims would not attack during Ramzan?

Today Bush may face a terrible choice between New York and Tel Aviv, what will Tel Aviv's stance be? Did you notice how the American media played up anti-Israel views during the operation in Lebanon? Can you count on America to be 100% allied with Israel? Besides sitting and waiting for a repeat of the Yom Kippur War what is Israel's current policy?

Do you really believe that the greatest pressure on India after a Pakistani covert nuclear strike will from India's muslims who will live in terror of uncontrolled rioting? or will it come from the same high priests of American non-proliferation that currently shackle Israeli national security policy?

I don't think you understand what I am saying, our "resolve" to use the damn thing will be limited by the same factors that limit your "resolve" to test what you have. And if this limits your resolve to test, what can be said of your resolve to use? from here it doesn't look credible, what to say of Ahmednijad's point of view.

On technical grounds the Iranians are now neck to neck with you, your test that never happened near South Africa and their test that never happened in North Korea. What are the implications of this for your physical security? How many rocket attacks has Hamas carried out after the North Korean test? Can you tell me what will be on the next katyusha?

I am one of those Indians who grow sick tired of Eurocentric Israelis who talk like they know something. These people think they can tell Indians what they should do in their country. They talk down to Indians sounding like some passed over colonial powers in Europe.

People like you should really know when there is such a thing as talking too much.

Yes my shirt "looks" torn but I suggest you zip your fly and walk away before I point out that something besides your shirt is torn.

At risk of repeating myself, unlike you I have no obligation to believe fiction that is perpetrated in the name of maintaining Israeli security. I will keep my peace if you will. I have said as much as I need to for now.

Vijay J., it is better to just openly state what lines of discussion are not acceptable rather than pass subtle hints and start flaming when people do not get those hints. The direct approach usually gives better results.

Rye,

I am a poor communicator, see how badly I am doing with Sadler.

I have been saying directly to everyone here that don't keep saying Government has no balls, it gives the wrong idea, but everyone is dancing to their own tune.

Yes it does (have balls), but the public perception is those dont count because the owner himself has stopped feeling them even while hands are in pocket .

The problem with GOI is that TSP has succesfully propagated the myth that a Nuke parity exists between India and TSP and the Indian sub continent is Nuke flash point.
The oNly hand GOI now has is to keep murmuring muted response to every grave provaction through proxy jihadi war.

Hang on, let's see if we can get some useful information beyond all the confrontation here.

Sadler, I have a few questions about Israel's nuclear policy. Though no doubt, the parallels with India's security concerns are few and far between... there may yet be something illuminating to be derived from a discussion of this.

My questions:

1) Why does Israel not test? What are you REALLY concerned about avoiding in the aftermath of a test? American disapproval, international opposition... you already go ahead and do what you want in spite of those. Why do you think that testing will hurt you critically while what some may see as far more controversial acts (e.g. bombing Lebanon) have not?

2) If the reason is not American opposition or international opprobrium: then is it because you feel that ambiguity serves you, that you are strategically aided by not even having to address such questions as FU/NFU and spell out a policy. Is this so, and why?

I'd request you to be as analytical as possible on these questions (open to Johann and others as well, BTW). It doesn't do any good to talk about what any individual outside of actual decision making circles in Tel Aviv may want or like to see happen. What would be useful is to analyze the thinking of Olmert and his predecessors (Sharon, and especially Bibi N) on this issue. Hope you understand, no offence meant- Shalom.

In answer to some old questions put to me that I haven't yet got to:

Calvin, I meant "decimate" not in the literal sense of 1/10th, but the more colloquial sense of rendering the TSPA a political nonentity with no ability to exercise any political authority in Pakistan.

Shiv: You know me better than that. Of course the TSPA is so rife with Jihadis that it is impossible to describe it as independent of, or even distinguishable from jihadi tanzeems.

However, when we're talking about such issues as NFU/FU policy, we must take into consideration the world's views ( after all, why even discuss the issue if we're going to completely ignore the international community's reactions?)

The world's views (at least that of the US and its allies who dominate the international community) are:

-TSPA wears uniforms. Jihadis do not. Doesn't matter if the transformation is as simple as taking off one's uniform.

-TSPA has (a very base, very corrupt) but nonetheless a real stake in the Western-controlled international economic order. Even if it is in terms of Jernails' nephews getting to go to Harvard and drive fast cars. Hence, a lever of rationalism exists with respect to the upper echelons, if not all, of the TSPA. With Jihadis (even if they are TSPA out of uniform), no such lever exists at least for the present moment, and establishing one will be very difficult in the present political climate.

-With TSPA there is a status quo involving GUBO, PAL locks, networks of CIA assets etc. which makes it easier (at least in theory) to know what is going on. With Jihadis... much harder to re-establish such a status quo, and impossible to do it at short notice in the turmoil following a nuclear first strike by somebody on Pakistan.

So maybe this is all nonsense, stuff the State Dept. makes up to help them sleep better at night. It has nothing to do with my statement.

My statement was that we have to make sure there are no Paki nukes left to fall into ANYBODY's hands, when considering a First Strike. Not "real" Jihadis, not surviving TSPA/ISI people dressed up as Jihadis, whether or not it makes a difference. Not anybody, period.

The obvious way to effect this is to go with Cheney's 1% doctrine. It doesn't matter that site XYZ in Pakistan is 99% certain to not have a nuke or delivery system hidden there. We must hit it anyway.

In other words, our first strike would have to be a fairly thorough and clinical devastation of Pakistan... there's not even any point thinking about a first use policy otherwise.

Anoop, brilliant idea re: the drills and open practices of city evacuation procedures, etc. This is exactly why the Americans (and Soviets too) made such a huge deal about displaying their readiness to face nuke attacks on their cities in the 1950s, with films for schoolchildren, big signs printed with "radiation shelter", etc. Not any guarantee that these things would dramatically increase the number of survivors... but a political statement that they were ready for anything.

Folks:

Pay attention to what Vijay J is saying.

Just a request* for those members and lurkers who've around long enough to understand whats what. This is important.

*Yes I know his abbrasive style is annoying and no I'm not asking you to stop arguing with him, that is IMO actually a good thing - just pay attention to the GoI angle.

That's all.

The nuclear era was extremely young at that point. There was naive belief in all sorts of things like nuclear propulsion - there were even people sticking radium up noses to treat sinus infections.

By the mid-1960s civil defence (in the 'duck and cover' and bomb shelter sense) lost its credibility. People just knew too much.

Civil defence of that sort wasnt taken very seriously during the tension of the 1980s and late 1970s. On the other hand FEMA did gain real capabilities in disaster management - the same for the Russian Emergency Ministry.

SDI was instead the new magic shield to make people feel better about nuclear war.

VijayJ is implying quite a few things, interesting...

Also another thought. I realize this is the inchoate germ of an idea, maybe far-fetched as such with many holes, but I am curious about it.

France tested their 8000-km range, sub-based M51 the other day... expanding their strategic arsenal's reach very widely. Chirac, on that occasion, referred to Iran and North Korea (!) as putative targets.

There hasn't been a peep out of our favourite Nonprol types in DC. Even the tone of the press coverage was very muted and giving France the benefit of the doubt. It was proposed that the French might use M51s in a "limited strike"... equipped with less than the full complement of warheads, set to go off at high altitudes to create EMP shockwaves. If we had tested such a system, of course, the press would be full of nightmarish scenarios involving millions of burned and twisted babies.

So we have
1) France expanding its nuclear reach dramatically
2) References to Iran and NoKo, perhaps more broadly extendable to "rogue states with nukes".
3) Washington apparently playing along.

What is going on here?

My perforated theory is something like this. The new deterrence paradigm that everybody knows about and nobody officially talks about, is of course the JDAM or something like it. "Non State Actor" gets nuke from a rogue state or a combination of them. Puts in suitcase/bullock cart/shipping container. Boom goes a Western capital, and if the nuke is engineered with fissile material from different sources... nobody can say conclusively where it came from.

The IAEA and other UN-related organizations, in typical fashion will mumble and shuffle their feet. In the absence of clinching evidence as to the source of a nuke used by "non state actors", without knowing which rogue state specifically was responsible... the West will not reach a consensus on retaliating against any one of them. This is what TSP, NoKo, possibly Iran, and of course their common PLC Godfathels are betting on. In the case of the Godfathels, it's an almost sure bet. Right?

Well, what if the West is trying to exercise this paradigm in reverse, with a specific view to a first-strike option?

Say one fine day, a missile flashes out of the Indian or Pacific oceans, and incinerates Slumbad, Pyongyang, Teheran... or Beijing or Shanghai!

Who did it?

DC or Paris COULD have done it... as we know from the M51 test and its aftermath. So could London. Moscow, less likely, but still possible.

In a sense, it's the same thing as if the CIA had been more careful in masterminding the assassinations of Mossadegh and Allende... (or successfully did in the case of Zia Ul haq?) Leaving enough plausible deniability to cover their tracks need not be a useful tactic for "rogue states" alone.

VijayJ,

BS. I may not be an India expert, but i'll bet i know more about India that you do about Israel.

Where the heck do you think we could have tested our nukes?? Do you have any idea how tiny Israel is? Heck, Bombay and its environs are probably larger that all of Israel of today put together. And dont forget that the Israel of today is much bigger than the Israel of '67.

There have been persistent rumors about Israel testing in collusion with (apartheid) South Africa. The nuclear ambiguity is something that is overly cultivated and disseminated for our own purposes. But there is nothing ambivalent about our retaliatory response.

Go ahead and have the last word. We are talking past each other at this point, and i'd rather read the views of other folks here to answer some of my questions than waste bandwith.

the americans don't need plausible deniability. if they have to do it, they will do it openly and in full conviction that they are doing the right thing.

Vijay, to your answers I have more questions!



Can we read them now?

S^2 in a thread a long time ago suggested that JDAM response may come if the TSPA determines that we are "interfering in the internal affairs of Pakistan". IIRC, this was after some major Shia Imam had been assassinated in TSP, and people were speculating about whether India could take advantage of the ensuing turmoil to hasten TSP's demise.

For that matter, can we *really* read the intention of TSP vis-a-vis a JDAM? What will it take? Another Godhra/Ahmedabad? A strong "sarp-vinaash" type offensive within our own territory that hurts the Tanzeems too much? Who knows what Pakistan's redlines are, and should we be waiting around and making guesstimates... or formulate a FU policy with redlines of our own?





Fair enough. But what if the terrorist attack is a JDAM? If we still have a NFU policy, won't it be diplomatically and politically harder to retaliate against TSP at that point, than if we have a stated FU policy?

The dumb, simple answer is yes it would... because then the international community won't be able to beat us over the head with our own "NFU commitment" while "advising restraint". Is that wrong? If it is, why?



Doesn't the overall degree of recession or graduation have a very large bearing on the credibility of the deterrence? Contextually speaking of course. For example... JDAM happens and we still don't mate missiles to warheads, preferring a recessed posture. What does that do to our credibility vis-a-vis responding to a nuclear strike with missiles painted with green star and crescent? What do the Jernails see in such a response... Krishna-Shishupala or a cowardly Yindoo quavering? Every little bit helps or hurts.



How else are uninformed idiots going to become informed idiots?

This is one thing i will answer though. A lot of my knowledge of india comes not only from reading about india but also from jews from India who have re-located either to Israel or the US. They are my primary source of information on culture etc.

You have persistently put words in my mouth. Reading between the lines when there is nothing to read there. Not only that, some of your comments like the international jewish financial interests come straight out of the protocols of the Elders of Zion. When you consistently attributes words and thought to me that i clearly did not express not hint at, that tells me more than enough about you.

About me putting down India/Indians, nothing can be further from the truth. I WANT AN INDIA THAT IS STRONG, ASSERTIVE, ECONOMICALLY AND MILITARILY POWERFUL AND ONE THAT HAS STRONG CULTURAL, SOCIAL, TRADE AND MILITARY TIES WITH ISRAEL. That comes from a personal wish and has nothing to do with geo-politics. So, without anything rational to note, you keep attributing comments and attributes to me (like putting indians down, the kalam angle, intl jewish intestes etc) that reveals only the paucity of your arguments.

My central premise remains unchanged. And FWIW, i hope i am wrong. I hope that there is never a nuclear attack on Indian soil. And in case you did not realize the significance of the previous sentence, let me spell it out for you. I could just as easily have written that i "hope that your leaders nuke the crap out of porkistan." But that would have implied that india had previously suffered a nuclear strike. I love India more than i hate porkis or the followers of mohammad.

I seem to keep repeating myself, which is the perfect time to exit a discussion and learn by reading what others have to say.

Shalom. And Jai Hind.

pakistan's view now is i think that any serious threat across their borders (conventional forces) will be tantamount to a red line

they have reached a state of existentialist crisis - whereby any perceived threat to their integrity will merit a nuclear response. this is i think directed at india. as someone else pointed out, their hatred of india has now reached a focused intensity of far greater sharpness than previous generations

i truly believe that they would prefer to go up in flames for eternity than lose decisively to India

but like the gambling addict they can't resist just one more throw of the dice to wrest kashmir

they have nothing else to live for, why not end it all in glorious flames?

I am not kidding, I think that strategically they have reached this pit of despair (atleast the military junta have)

Sadler, I would be very grateful if you took a crack at my questions. Why does Tel Aviv not go ahead and officially say what you say here and what IDF posters say on IDF... "in the face of imminent nuclear threat we will/will not strike first to obliterate X,Y,Z targets in Islamic nations or capitals?"

Is it because by saying so, you would encourage Islamic nations to acquire nukes? But they already are. Paki nukes are really KSA's property, bought and paid for. Iran is getting nukes and they've already talked of wiping you off the map.

Then why not test, and declare openly whether you will or will not use first and give a complete or partial indication of what your redlines are? What advantage does Tel Aviv see in *not* doing so?

And more importantly... question to everyone... why do the Nonprol people in DC encourage Israel *not* to do so? Is it, again, *only* because they fear increased efforts at proliferation among Islamic countries? As I've said, that seems to have diminishing returns, as long as Uncle Jiang's Kitchen is still taking and fulfilling oldels. No nonprol type has the guts to speak out against Uncle Jiang's.

So... is there another, better reason why the Nonprol people (in tacit agreement with DC in general) are *preferring* an ambiguity on the part of Israel? Is this in any way related to their own possible efforts at establishing a kind of ambiguity (see M51 test)?

Is a new cold war shaping up between the US and its proxies v. PLC and its ploxies... only a much more dangerous one, because new paradigms seem to call for ambiguity rather than open statement of redlines and policy? Are nations relying on the more advanced technology available today (as compared to the original Cold War) to reassure themselves that they will be ready for anything despite the new ambiguity?

And in this climate, what does it make sense for India to do?

Lalmohan,
I refer you to Valkan's defense of the NFU in the previous page of this thread, where he asked:



The apparent answer is "no", but that assumes that the entity is not already at risk of not surviving because of other factors, and in this case, the "entity" is not Pakistan but the jihadi fools in the Paki army --- they have never really given a damn about Pakistan.

Rudradev wrote:


Rudradev,

The thought that Israel's nukes are from the US has already been seeded in the minds of the entire middle east. Seems like the last thing, the US SD would want is an open acknowledgement of the same, since that recognition would be really, really, inconvenient for the US w.r.t. its ME policy, because it would provide powerful ammunition for the opponents of the regime in KSA and elsewhere, especially given the rabid anti-semitism in the entire ME. But of course, I am probably speaking out of my hat yet again, so I defer to Johann/Sadler's views on this.

The Nonprol people don't really seem to be too concerned about actual proliferation, seeing their silence about NoKo and Xerox Khan, so their concerns are probably elsewhere.



That is just plain dishonesty and unwillingness to destroy their own careers that they have carefully nurtured for 20 years, it would appear...because they still cannot seem to speak the truth, even after all that has happened in the past five years.

You may have a point, but I daresay it's not the whole story. The fact that Israel has nukes is an open secret. Those who believe that they are American in origin, believe it already. The occasion of Israel testing those nukes might give the anti-Semitic Jihadis a nice opportunity to machao halla for a while, but does it *really* make that much of a difference in the big picture?

So far we have two "negative arguments" for Israel not testing or declaring redlines...(1) it would encourage proliferation in the ME (2) your point, that it would cause an increase in anti-US tensions. Both valid... but I still believe we should think beyond them. Are they reason enough? Or is there more? Note that the second argument could be applied to Israel's Lebanon action as well... that didn't really make the US any more popular in Iraq where it was already having a tough time.

Irrespective of the negative arguments, is ambiguity also serving some purpose and being maintained for its own sake?





Agree with you totally... so what *are* their concerns? What role exactly are they playing in the greater context of determining US Foreign Policy?


[/quote]

True of course, and in fact part of BR apocrypha by now. I still wonder if there isn't more than meets the eye.

The trouble with the US "al-liance" with TSP in GOAT, and their fumbling in Iraq, is that it's got us used to thinking that the US *has* no view of the big picture and no long-term plan to deal with emerging threats. Going by that view, it is indeed easy to see the Nonprol's China silence as more of the same CYA stuff. But yet... is there a bigger picture developing?

We see China having achieved a ring of secondary plausible deniability around itself by having successfully proliferated to NoKo, TSP and Iran (in the case of TSP, almost certainly with tacit US approval). No doubt there are capable people somewhere in DC analyzing this and thinking of how to counter it.

No signs of a policy to counter it are obviously visible. But we do have the M51 test, and we do have Israeli ambiguity. Are these signs of a new deterrence paradigm, aimed at the threats perceived by the PLC/Logue State combination? What mechanism do they point to?

Briefly, i can think of the following reasons for the nuclear ambiguity.

(1) Sanctions: the US would be automatically required by law to impose sanctions on Israel, which would cut of the flow of high-tech weaponry.

(2) An Israeli promise to the US not to be the first to overtly introduce nuclear weapons in the ME.

(3) The ambiguity has served us well to now. Howver, if iran openly declares, my guess is that so will Israel.


A few other points:

The UK and France have had more to do with Israeli nuclear weapons than the US.

Israel would use nukes, although they would be more tactical in nature in the event of impending defeat in a conventional scenario as well. There is widespread belief that Israel had readied nukes during the initial stages of the Yom Kippur war.

Not sure if that answers the questions you posed. Thanks and Shalom.

One additional comment is that Israel is sensitive to US pressure but not so much as some have made out here.

In the event of a nuclear strike against israel, no amount of US pressure would stop Israel as Israel would have ceased to be habitable at that point. So, there is a definite limit to the amount of pressure that can be brought to bear upon Israel.

Therefore, Israel has developed significant second strike capability as well, and most Israelis believe that we have thermonuclear devices as well as boosted fission ones (not that i know what the difference is). The missile (land-based) component is via the Jerichos. Plus, a significant dedicated number of aircraft that can take on a nuclear strike role. The second strike via subs firing cruise missiles fitted with <20 KT warheads. There is some mention of modified harpoons. I am not so sure. They might well have been the first version of second strike capability. My guess would lean towards popeyes.

Rudradev, there may be a "positive argument" for ambiguity:

Let us consider two hostile parties, A and B, where there is a significant difference in the survivability after a nuclear attack, i.e., an attack on A is likely to cause much more existential damage than an attack on B, even a conventional one. Naturally, to maintain stability, A has to have an edge over B that will restore this imbalance. Now, A has two choices: to hint to B that A has such an edge, or to openly demonstrate that edge over B.

Case 1: B suspects A has the edge but A's stance is ambiguous: The ambiguity in A's stance leaves B with three choices: (a) to not believe A and call A's bluff, but that would require B to have the technology to negate the edge A has over B (b) to consider that A is telling the truth, and either (b1) match A's capability to restore the original imbalance or (b2) accept that A's edge cannot be matched and thus leave the balance as is.

Case 2: B *knows* that A has an edge because A demonstrates capability to B: Now, B knows that A's edge over B is going to last forever, and if B considers A a mortal enemy, then B is going to have to to accept that a much smaller adversary is going to have the edge over B forever and to either (2.1) ignore that and live in peace or (2.2) to consider this an intolerable situation.


In cases, 1.a and 1.b1, the pre-requisite for B to take the route of challenging A is for B to have the human resources and the techonology to match A to restore the "natural imbalance". If B possesses the human and other resources to indigenously match A's edge, then it is just a matter of time before this "natural imbalance" is restored.

In cases 1.b2, B accepts the lack of human resources and techonology and realizes that it is a weakness, and has to have a long-term plan so that B can slip into cases 1.a or 1.b1, failing which B has to accept the "unnatural balance" with A.

In case 2, however, B's desire to match A's capabilities is going to be much more pressing, given the "mortal enemy" nature of the relationship. B would now consider it a much more pressing need to remove the edge A has over B, unless of course, B decides to live in peace with A.

Now let us say that reality dictates B does not have the ability to remove A's edge currently, and is unlikely to even want to create conditions that will result in the removal of that edge in the long run, and also that B would never tolerate a situation where it knows A has an edge over B forever.

A's best gambit is to not force the situation into Case 2. B's best gambit is to try to slip into cases 1.a or 1.b1 (or to follow the Xerox khan option).

Thus A would try to maintain the ambiguity and B would try to work on a plan to acquire the tech edge to match A's edge.

I am not sure this makes much sense, and this analysis may be missing other possibilities, so please feel free to add/subtract, and I can try to redo this analysis.

Rye: interesting post.

I may not have fully understood you though.
If the perception of A by B as a mortal enemy exists, then I don't think B really has the choice 1.b2 (accept that A's edge exists, when A has only hinted and not demonstrated it). What is the real difference between 1.b2 and Case 2 in your model? Is it the political pressure that the citizens of B will mount on their government if A openly demonstrates its edge as in Case 2?

Anyway, here's my take on your model as I understand it... please correct me if I'm wrong anywhere.

Following your premise, A and B are nuclear armed "mortal enemies". B's nuclear arsenal poses an existential threat to A if used, much more so than A's nuclear arsenal poses to B. Therefore A has to come up with SOMETHING (technology, stated policy, actual policy, or whatever) which neutralizes the advantage B has over A.

An obvious real-world application of this model is: India= B, Pakistan=A. Imaginary applications include nuke-armed Iran=B, Israel=A. Also nuke-armed Japan/ROK/US= B, DPRK=A. (Am I being true to your model by casting these nations as "A" and "B" here?)

Maybe it could even be extended to PRC=B, India=A... and USA=B, PRC=A.

Anyway...

In Case 1, A hints to B that it has such an advantage. In Case 2, A actually demonstrates it to B.

Case 1 (A hinting at an edge over , I think, would leave B with three choices...

1.a: Calling the bluff. This is where B says "b@lls, A doesn't have any kind of edge over us", and then *B continues to formulate and act on policy as if A didn't have any kind of edge*. This is a risky path, and I don't think even the most crazy Mullah government would take it without a backup plan.

Rhetoric is another matter... B might SAY they disbelieve A for purposes of public consumption... but it shouldn't be confused with ACTUALLY calling A's bluff.

1.b: B can *formulate and act on policy, henceforward, assuming that A does in fact have an edge*. In three broad ways:

1.b1: as in your model, B acquires the technology to "counter" the greater threat from A that has been hinted at. Example... if a nuclear-armed Iran could buy or build foolproof cross-theatre defence to protect itself from Israel's far larger and more powerful arsenal.

1.b2: B could push A to test and show their hand, thereby gaining diplomatic leverage and decreasing international opprobrium as they pursue either a defensive or offensive counter to A's edge.

This *may* have been what Iran was trying to provoke Israel into with the Hezbollah high-jinks earlier this year.

It is also what was successfully achieved by India w.r.t. Pakistan in 1998 (Pokhran 2 followed by Chagai Hills in Pavlovian fashion). In the Pakistan-India example, Pakistan is "A" because between its use of terrorist proxy war, and its combination of basketcase economy plus jihadi tendencies (what Johann describes as "suicide bomber on hospital bed"), it had cultivated an *image* of being the mad-nuke-bomber-with-nothing-to-lose. From '87 to '98 it was able to blackmail India thus by using hints, i.e. ambiguity.

The 1998 tests by India set in motion a process to end that ambiguity. This had mixed results. It caused sanctions to be clamped which hurt the Pakis much more than they hurt us. It also justified our own tests in retrospect very quickly, once the Pakis had tested.

However, it also engendered an international media and diplomatic whinefest about the "South Asian Nuclear Flashpoint", reinforcing equal-equal. Pakistan sought to take advantage of this by initiating Kargil in the hope of "internationalizing Kashmir". (It didn't work out that way for Pakistan, but that's a different story).

Also on the negative side for India, it made common knowledge of the fact that Pakistan was a nuclear suicide bomber on a hospital bed with real nukes... a critical fact in determining US policy towards them following 9/11.

All told, it failed to end Pakistan's combination of nuclear and subconventional (terrorist) blackmail against India. However, it has ended up making it less easy for TSPA to support terrorism against India as openly as pre-1998.


In the most general terms, 1.b2 is designed to either show that A does not have the edge or to demonstrate conclusively that it does, thereby depriving A of any advantage that ambiguity might bring.

1.b3: B could go ahead and nuke A with everything it has, and let Ram sort them out After all, A has only hinted, not shown what it has. B is not sure that A would have an advantage, but fears that A might. What B IS sure of, is that with its own arsenal it could finish A existentially. If it struck first, struck hard and without warning. So why not go ahead and use it?

There will be major repercussions for B probably... on the economic, diplomatic, technological, political fronts for sure. Maybe even on the military front, with retaliatory strikes from hyperpowers C and D. So this is also a risky path... but NOT so risky as 1.a which is pure bluff calling.

This is an option B will explore only when other factors regarding its interaction with A cross a tolerance threshold. That is, when the pain of possible repercussions would be less than the pain of dealing with A in its present and capable form.

All told, the Case 1 scenario where A maintains ambiguity doesn't totally secure A. It makes B more insecure, certainly. But unless A can feel absolutely sure that B could (1.b1) never acquire a technological capability that neutralized their edge, or (1.b3) feel tempted to use what it had in order to end the game once and for all, A really hasn't become more secure as a result of its own ambiguity. Has it?

Case 2: A actually demonstrates its capabilities to B.

The outcome of this is of course subjective. In the case of Israel, if they could demonstrate the sub-based 2nd strike capacity that Sadler talks about, that would probably shut Iran and Syria up for good. Which is why I am puzzled that they don't do it.

On the other hand. If Pakistan demonstrated possession of thermonukes, or signed an open agreement with KSA to host their second-strike capability (instead of merely hinting at the existence of such an agreement)... it would certainly push India in one of two directions.

2.a First- B responds to A with capitulation (In India's case, acceptance that Pakistan is untouchable, and has an advantage forever as you said). I don't think this would ever fly in a democracy like India, given what is at stake, but I could be wrong.

2.b Second- this is identical to the 1.b3 scenario. B hits A with everything it has and damn the consequences, because they couldn't be worse than capitulation.

Pakistan is not likely to ever have a true second-strike capability from submarines or any such thing, but if the GOI has reason to believe completely that a second-strike-arsenal-hosting agreement with KSA in the works, we might decide to go ahead and finish Pakistan before it can come to fruition with a massive first strike. Given India's soft-state tendency to comply with international opinion, though... there is no guarantee that the GOI won't choose capitulation over this option. Especially as long as we have an NFU doctrine.

Pakistan is aware of this, and doesn't want to push India to the point where it has to make that choice (perhaps some in the ISI do, but not the TSPA in general as of now).

Instead, even though we pulled a 1.b2 on Pakistan and made them demonstrate nuclear capacity... they continue with "hinting" at more and more "edges"... such as seeding rumours of deal with KSA to host their second-strike arsenal, and suggesting the possibility of a JDAM. They also continue with "demonstrating" more "edges"...whether real or imaginary... such as by firing off "Baburs", Dingdongs, and assorted Gleen-Paintee-Chinee-Delivelee.

Given the behaviour of the MMS government, it is certainly looking as if India is leaning more towards 2.a than 2.b. But of course, there is a wide space in between those extremes, and we haven't capitulated yet.

2.c Third- B can in turn, "demonstrate" its ability to counter whatever advantage "A" has demonstrated that is possesses. I have put this option in for the sake of completeness, because even the US has not been able to carry out an NMD test with sufficient success to demonstrate any such ability.

Have I missed anything? Or have I mauled your original model beyond recognition?

Sadler, thanks for your responses... they are a lot to think about. Given Rye's model, do you still think it would be in Israel's interest to test even if Iran tests? Would you want to be provoked into showing your hand, if ambiguity is working well for you? I ask because Israel is a nation of sensible people, unlike Porki-land which couldn't help testing in response to India's 1998 tests.

Rudradev, thanks for deconstructing the model --- best way to pick holes in it. I came up with the original model based on Israel-Iran, but I like your variation better, since it is more general. Let me try and validate the completeness of this model before saying anything.

Purely my opinion is that we wont test simply because we dont need to. I sure cant back that up from open sources (or any, for that matter). Just my read. The rationale for testing would be go gain additional information to improves Israel's nuclear stockpile. I would guess that we have all the data we need through, ahem.., not-testing means.

So, my answer to that would be no. We wont test because we dont need to. But we will definitely and overtly assume status as a declared nuclear power, the same as India.

Nuclear ambiguity was not something solely intended to please the Americans.

It was seen for a very long time as an essential element of national security, and subject to the highest degree of self-censorship. It simply wasnt something to talk about. Mordechai Vanunu's harsh treatment is a reflection of how seriously nuclear secrecy was identified with Israeli security.

This has relaxed somewhat as things have changed.

On the other hand if you have friends among members of the French strategic establishment, they will say that their first nuclear test in 1960 was very close to being an Israeli test as well. Franco-Israeli nuclear collaboration was very close from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s, and it was not one-way.

Of course once France left Algeria in 1962 De Gaulle made the seduction of the Arab and Muslim world one of his top priorities (along with exclusive French leadership of Europe, and establishing detente with the Communist world), and the Franco-Israeli strategic relationship broke down.

The reason the French have a problem with Iran is threefold

- For one thing anti-clericalism is one of the few things the majority of French have been able to agree on since the French revolution through all of the bitter ideological divisions and political upheaval

- Khomeini screwed France - they gave him refuge, but the French were almost as badly hit by Iranian directed bombings, assassinations and brutal kidnappings as the Americans in the 1980s. The French were as deeply involved as the Americans in Lebanon, and far bigger backers of Saddam than the US, and the Iranians punished them for it.

- Islamic fundamentalism, starting with the Iranian revolution has badly undermined the French 'special relationship' with the Arab and Muslim world that De Gaulle so carefully crafted. It has proved to be far more persistantly disruptive than Libya's unfocussed Arab, then African radical third-worldism

It has also presented a serious internal security threat within France that crosses sectarian boundaries. France in the 1980s was the first Western country to face a jihadist terror camapign on its soil. It was Iranian funded - but the majority of foot soldiers were Sunni Tunisians and Lebanese.

Rudradev,

These choices are not static over time, i.e., both A and B try to move from one state to another that provides it more of an advantage over the other. Also, since your original question was about Iran/Israel, I was not assuming that B had the ability to match A's technical edge (i.e., A had nukes and B did not), but we have to consider both possibilities under your general model.



I was actually considering A having nukes and B not having them (because the original question was only in the context of Israel and Iran, where Iran has a proven lack of ability to deploy nukes at the present time), but the more interesting case is both of them having nukes.

You are right that there is a difference between case 1.1b and 2, only if one side has nukes and the other does not. The case when both have nukes is obviously more difficult and interesting. When A has nukes and B does not, and A removes the ambiguity, B's govt. will have to respond to A's challenge, whereas in 1.b2, B does not have the pressure to match A immediately, but only develop capability slowly over time, to assuredly have the advantage over A in the long run.

Maybe both possibilities need to be considered: A and B both have the ability to create nukes, as opposed to, one lacks the ability to create nukes and the other does not lack such an ability. The reason is:
If a country has the ability to create nukes indigenously, then it cannot do so without a steady pipeline of human and other resources to maintain such a strategic program --- for example, NoKo does not fit this bill, since they already fried all their best scientists by exposing them to radiation, and so NoKo's ability to maintain this program is going to decrease over time without outside assistance. Ditto for Pakistan because it is not building a society that can maintain a strategic program. OTOH, India and the P-5 can sustain such a strategic program (as can most of the undeclared european nuke powers).

Also, you are right that we can ignore the third option of A and B wanting peace, because that is a stable equilibrium, independent of the relative sizes/strengths of A and B, and that is not interesting in this context.




True, this maybe why in the India-Pak case, A (Pak.) has decided to neutralize this advantage using terrorism/proxy war. If we consider the US/China scenario, China (A) is following a similar strategy of creating proxies with the intent of neutralizing USA's (B) advantage over it.

I don't quite understand all of the cases in the "both of them have nukes case" yet, so will post it when I understand it better.

please do not forget that when india nukes pakistan a lot of radiation actually flows towards india as well

if pakistan nukes india, china could as well be affected specially from kolkata

the point of nuclear weapons first and foremost is TO AVOID USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

but no-first use policy projects india as a weak country and encourages terrorism that is the only point of debate here

in above discussion,
the following have been classified
B having more nukes than A

B=india A=pakistan
or
B=china A=india
or
B=usa A=china

here india and china are not mortal enemies
usa and china are not mortal enemies

india is not waging a proxy war against china
china is not waging a proxy war against usa

the odd ball is pakistan it can not be trusted
it will get desparate sooner or later to use
(or allow the terrorist to use) the real or dirty bomb

pakistan has done enough damage by becoming
nuclear armed itself then spread it to iran and north
korea

pakistan and its desparation make all the above
theories fly out the window

pakistan must be dealt with extreme ruthless
and rugged threat perception as possible to
keep it contained

Lkawamoto wrote:


Lkawamoto,

Yes, that is understood, but there are countries that do not understand such things, and India is not one of them.

Also, the debate on this topic has shifted from what you are saying to a proxy group of some state exploding a dirty nuke in a large city somewhere in the world. Reality has overtaken principled approaches such as "avoid using nuclear weapons", so that we now have to think of completely new scenarios, where a nuke is exploded, which would then lead the victim of the attack to ask "who were all the entities involved in the proliferation of nukes to the proxy that finally did the deed?"

Lkawamoto wrote:


You are right -- that classification needs to be considered also. These countries cooperate and compete at the same time, while trying to ensure that the competition does not become too powerful an adversary. I don't know how to specify this more clearly, but if you could, that would be great.



China does follow a strategy of weakening its competitors in an indirect way, via proxies. It proliferates to pakistan to keep India tied up, and it proliferates to NoKo to complicate the US's policies in East Asia. Though you are right this is not proxy war -- Pakistan is probably the only country that openly uses terrorism as a foreign policy tool.


Agree with you on everything else you mention about Pakistan really messing up things.