Bharat Rakshak

Could we keep this for a fortnight or so? If we have to prune there are any number of threads.
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Deccan Chronicle, Oct.2, 1999
Matter of time before India is recognised as
N-power: Expert
New Delhi: The nuclear weapon nations are likely to co-opt India into the non-proliferation order once
they realise that denuclearisation of the country is not possible, according to Indian Defence Studies and
Analyses director Air Commodore Jasjit Singh.

“A democratic India is too big and diverse to be coerced into accepting ad hoc measures and
politico-economic pressures that would lead to its denuclearisation,” Cdr Singh writes in a book released
here.

According to the defence analyst, the efforts to reimpose the non-proliferation agenda on India are likely
to raise the broader question of the nuclear weapon States having avoided all commitments to
disarmament.

“Once the weapon states start to realise that efforts at reimposition of the non-proliferation order through
denuclearisation of India are not going to succeed (even if there is a change of government in New Delhi),
then it is likely that efforts will be made to co-opt India into this order,” Cdr Singh says in an article in the
book South Asia and Its Eastern Neighbours.

The book is edited by former foreign secretary Muchkund Dubey and Nancy Jetly, Professor of South
Asian Studies at the School of International Studies of the Jawaharlal Nehru University.

She is also chairperson of the Centre for South, Central, South-East Asian and Southwest Pacific Studies.
In the event of efforts to co-opt India, “there is an obvious risk that India might give in to the temptations
of being a nuclear weapon State and join the club for whatever value it would provide, the defence analyst
writes in the article titled Current Challenges in Asia.

There have been some signals from New Delhi that it is willing to consider arms control measures like the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, although signing the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty is ruled out, Cdr Singh says.

However, the issue is not merely whether India gets co-opted into a world of seven or eight nuclear
weapon States, but whether the international community will now at least be more sensitive to the urgency
of negotiating a global treaty for the abolition of weapons, he says.

The book deals with the future scenario for India vis a vis the world powers as a nuclear weapons State. It
also focuses on the strategic stand that India has to take in its efforts to retain its nuclear weapons State
status under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty regime that is to come into force by next year.

He talks of the Asia-specific scenario where China and Pakistan have nuclear arms, the United States
maintains a nuclear weapons presence in the Indian Ocean apart from lending its nuclear umbrella to Japan
and other South-East Asian countries.

Excerpt from Jasjit Singh's July 99 article in IDSA.It is important to note that he starts of with repudiating the prestige argument that Stephen Cohen is so fond of citing as the reason for India going overtly nuclear.<P>Kaushal<P>Why does India require nuclear weapons?<P>India does not require nuclear weapons for prestige or status although nuclear weapons have been seen as the currency of<BR>power since Hiroshima. Our prestige will be governed by our ability to solve our problems successfully. The issue of<BR>national security in relation to nuclear weapon threat is one of those myriad problems. For a country pursuing an<BR>independent foreign and security policy, potential challenges posed by existential and specific nuclear weapons threat can<BR>be adequately addressed only (i) through global abolition of nuclear weapons or (ii) by reliance on nuclear deterrence to<BR>ward off such challenges. The latter could be autonomous or provided by military alliance (as is the case for a large<BR>number of countries).<P>The Indian leadership had decided long before independence that the country would pursue an independent and non-aligned<BR>foreign and defence policy.8 Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Cold War was neither the sole nor the most critical<BR>reference point of non-alignment which emanated and grew in a wider complex of national and international factors in the<BR>post-World War II period. The central factors that pushed India toward overt nuclear weapons deterrence can be summarised<BR>broadly under seven heads (not necessarily in that order): <P>1. The China Factor. Historically, India has had to formulate its nuclear policy in the context of those of the nuclear<BR>weapon states, with China as a central factor. India's policy from the beginning has had to cater for a fundamental<BR>competition with China, which undoubtedly poses by far the biggest strategic challenge. This imperative requires that we<BR>continue to build close and cooperative relations with China. But, at the same time, we also need to take prudent<BR>precautions for a possible reversal in that process at a future date so that the situation of 1962 does not repeat itself.9<BR>Some of the elements that need to be borne in mind are:<P>l The historical strategic and ideological motivations that resulted in China's aggression in 1962 may not have fully<BR>dissolved.<P>l Persisting territorial dispute where China occupies 48,000 sq. km. of India territory and claims another 94,000 sq. km.<BR>(comprising one of the constituent states of the Indian Republic). <P>l While China signed an agreement with India in 1993 for both countries not to use their military capabilities against each<BR>other, it is not entirely clear what will be the status of this commitment in times of tension and crisis, especially in<BR>territories which China claims and depicts as Chinese territories. This is made more complicated by China's declared policy<BR>in a different context where it is completely unwilling to renounce the use of force for "reunification" and treats<BR>reunification as the "sacred duty of the PLA."<P>l The continuing inability of China to resolve the internal tensions related to Tibet and Xinjiang (on India's border)<BR>creates its own dynamics of potential problems. It needs to be recalled that worsening of the situation in Tibet in the<BR>late 1950s was a major factor leading to conflict beween China and India. There are still 150,000 Tibetan refugees in India<BR>who have been showing signs of restlessness. Future instability because of the Tibet situation cannot be ruled out, and<BR>unlike 1962, China is a nuclear weapon state with a modernising arsenal.<P>l Conventional and nuclear force modernisation has been progressing at a fast pace, especially with access to Soviet/Russia<BR>military technology since 1992.<P>l Continuing strategic uncertainty of how China (a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council) might use its composite<BR>power in future. This (economic, political and military) power has been growing almost dramatically in the past two<BR>decades. <P>l Transfer of nuclear/missile systems and technology besides conventional arms to Islamic countries of Southern Asia. In<BR>particular, proliferation of missiles and nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan which continued after China acceded to the<BR>NPT in 1992, has been a source of serious concern for its short and long-term implications for India's security.10<P>l China shows signs of responding to the Western-North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) strategy of NATO expansion,<BR>ballistic missile defences (BMD), etc. by enhancing its strategic military posture.<P>l Over 96 percent of China's nuclear forces and ballistic missiles have relevance only for its immediate neighbours. <P>2. Enhanced Nuclear Proliferation. Nuclear proliferation has increasingly flowered during the 1990s:<P>l Iraq was almost successful (and may well have been if the Gulf War did not take place when it did) in its acquisition of<BR>nuclear weapons in violation of treaty obligations with technology transferred from NPT member countries, mostly from West<BR>Europe and North America.<P>l North Korea pursued a clandestine nuclear programme in violation of its treaty obligations and was seen to be rewarded<BR>with nuclear power reactors. Iran is suspected by the West of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme in spite of its NPT<BR>commitments. Saudi Arabia was also reportedly pursuing nuclear ambitions at one time. <P>l China and France violated solemn assurances to exercise the "utmost restraint" in nuclear testing to validate plans for<BR>new warheads. China, in fact, was cynical in carrying out a nuclear test within hours of giving this assurance (at the NPT<BR>Extension Conference), while France regressed from its earlier moratorium. <P>l Nuclear delivery systems, especially ballistic missiles, have been transferred by China and North Korea to Pakistan,<BR>Saudi Arabia and Iran.11 On April 6, 1998, Pakistan fired a nuclear capable intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM)<BR>across its populated areas with the US responding only with mild "regret" compared with strong pressures brought to bear on<BR>India by the G-7 to give up its indigenous missile programme.12<P>l Pakistan reached successful nuclear weaponisation by 1987 although it had manufactured and tested a nuclear device in<BR>1983.13 This test is believed to have been carried out in Lop Nor in China. Over the years, evidence has emerged of<BR>significant transfers of nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan from the West as well as from China.<P>l China has continued to proliferate nuclear weapons technology even after it acceded to the NPT in 1992. A US Senate<BR>Committee report in January 1998 stated: "China is the principal supplier of weapons of mass destruction and missile<BR>technology to the world, and US government efforts to turn Beijing against international proliferation have met with little<BR>success"14 (emphasis added). <P>l Information has now emerged in the United States that design data with regard to all seven types of sophisticated US<BR>nuclear weapons has been transferred over the years to China through espionage. In specific, millions of lines of computer<BR>codes, extremely valuable for computer simulation and design of new sophisticated warheads, leaked from Los Alamos<BR>Laboratories to China in 1994-1995. The implications of this proliferation have yet to be fully assessed.<P>3. Eroding Prospects of Disarmament. The end of the Cold War unfortunately demonstrated a negative trend and the withdrawal<BR>of the international community in general and the weapon states in particular from the commitment to global nuclear<BR>disarmament. Permanent extension of the NPT without firm commitments to disarmament, submissions to the World Court by the<BR>weapon states, unwillingness to hold the fourth UN Special Session on Disarmament, blocking opening of negotiations for<BR>disarmament at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), even abolishing the post of under secretary general for disarmament<BR>(recently recreated), and a host of other indications clearly demonstrated the unwillingness of the nuclear weapon states<BR>to move firmly towards global abolition of nuclear weapons. For India, if a nuclear weapon-free world was not likely or<BR>feasible, the only other option to ensure its security was through acquisition of nuclear weapons.<P>4. Dominant Strategic Doctrines. The dominant strategic doctrines of the major powers mostly started to re-emphasise the<BR>role and likely use of nuclear weapons even in non-nuclear situations. Russia resiled from its earlier commitment of<BR>no-first-use and defensive doctrine and has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons than ever before. NATO has<BR>continued to shy away from a no-first-use commitment in spite of dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and<BR>dramatic degradation in potential conventional capabilities of its possible adversaries. China has moved toward the<BR>doctrine of "limited deterrence." NATO's new strategic concept and corresponding nuclear doctrine reaffirms the doctrine<BR>for an expanded role of nuclear weapons.<P>5. Post-Cold War International Order. The post-Cold War strategic environment inevitably disturbed the earlier balance but<BR>in the absence of any over-arching ideological or strategic challenge, it was expected to become more benign and<BR>cooperative. This has turned out to be restricted to the Vancouver to Vladivostok order which isolates countries south of<BR>the NATO cooperation area. Devaluing of the UN system and unwillingness to institute reforms in tune with the altered<BR>geo-political realities and evolving a more cooperative international order has forced countries outside the alliance<BR>system to think more seriously about autonomous national capabilities. Efforts to impose unipolarity (even if supported by<BR>like-minded countries) has increased apprehensions about the international order managed more by denial regimes and<BR>punitive action than democratic values. The effect of the new strategic environment is increasingly narrowing national<BR>sovereignty. India's efforts at cooperation did not bring about adequate understanding of its security concerns. It was<BR>increasingly forced to rely on its national options. <P>6. Threat to Nuclear Option. The most critical impact of aggressive non-proliferation (and counter-proliferation) without<BR>disarmament during the 1990s came to pose an extremely serious threat to India's policy of keeping its nuclear option open.<BR>India faced a dual challenge after 1990 to which it had to either submit and go down the slippery slope to being disarmed<BR>without any solution to its security concerns, or cross the threshold that it had preferred not to for three decades:<P>l A basic challenge since 1964 was of how to build strategic capabilities at the very minimum level as an interim measure<BR>while working for global nuclear disarmament. This policy took the shape of keeping the nuclear option, not weaponising,<BR>and working for disarmament. It was perhaps not adequately appreciated that this was a policy of restraint. <P>l To this was added a second challenge since the beginning of the 1990s, of protecting the policy of restraint from the<BR>Western liberal democracies (led by the USA) targetting this policy in pursuit of their own agendas. India was specifically<BR>targetted under these non-proliferation policies thus creating a threat to the continuity of the policy of keeping the<BR>option open at the non-weaponised level.<P>7. The CTBT Deadline. The negotiated draft of the CTBT as it emerged in June 1996 not only violated the original mandate of<BR>the 1993 UN General Assembly, but failed to address India's concerns. India, therefore, indicated its unwillingness to sign<BR>the CTBT but made it clear that it would not come in the way of the treaty coming into force. However, in violation of all<BR>norms, the international community brought forth a draft at the end of July that sought to impose the CTBT on India through<BR>the stipulation of Article XIV, making India's (among others) signature essential to the treaty coming into force.<BR>Concurrently, an implicit threat of punitive action was held out in the shape of "measures" to be taken if the treaty did<BR>not enter into force three years later. Thus, the CTBT clock timed to September 1999 was ticking whereby India could face<BR>punitive measures if it did not sign the CTBT even if it did not weaponise. This created a time- bound imperative for<BR>declaration of weapons capability. The BJP's assumption of power facilitated the decision which was further propelled by<BR>the Ghauri intermediate range ballistic missile test by Pakistan to which the US responded with only mild regret.15<P>Selective Non-Proliferation sans Disarmament <P>Not only has nuclear disarmament been seen in India as the only comprehensive and durable non-proliferation instrument, but<BR>nuclear disarmament has been a key strategic and security goal for it. India's preferred option, not unsurprisingly, was to<BR>keep the nuclear option open as long as feasible, not weaponise, and work for disarmament which would eliminate the roots<BR>of the nuclear security dilemma. This was mostly ignored or perhaps not understood in the Western world as a strategy of<BR>restraint. But it seems to have been seen more as a policy of weakness and a challenge to the non-proliferation order which<BR>was being expanded and deepened. For India, an "open option" represented an optimum policy which minimised costs and<BR>maximised capabilities.16 But after 1990, stimulated by the Iraqi quest for nuclear weapons,17 the weapon states, partly to<BR>protect their own weapon status, set out with renewed vigour on the path of non-proliferation, seeking to roll back India's<BR>nuclear programme. The basic logic of the renewed focus of non-proliferation may have been global in nature, with selective<BR>targetting of the "rogue states," but India was also specifically targetted although the international community was polite<BR>enough not to refer to India as a "rogue state"! <P>President Clinton's policy of "cap, reduce and eliminate" nuclear capabilities in South Asia implied that eventually the<BR>two countries would have to give up their nuclear capabilities and that "the present policy was merely a way station on the<BR>road to complete regional disarmament (without any commitment to applying such a policy to existing nuclear-weapon<BR>states)"18 (emphasis added). But since Pakistan had pursued a policy based on the premise that it will do whatever India<BR>does, the US policy essentially targetted only India. <P>The intense pressure brought to bear on India (which had not proliferated, unlike some other states) after 1991 was<BR>premised on the same logic while successive governments of the United States had acquiesced in Pakistan's clandestine<BR>nuclear weapon programme, at least since 1981. Eminent and knowledgeable Pakistanis claim that a mutual understanding has<BR>existed between the United States and Pakistan since 1981 that the former will not raise any hurdles in the latter's<BR>nuclear weapon programme in return for Pakistan's willingness to be a "front-line state" against the Soviet Union in<BR>Afghanistan.19 While approving the military-economic aid in 1981, the US Congress put some conditions which are revealing.<BR>The Congress specified that the aid will be suspended "if it (Pakistan) transfers a nuclear explosive device to any<BR>non-nuclear state or receives a nuclear device from any country or detonates such a device."20 By the same stipulation,<BR>acquiring nuclear weapon wherewithal from another country or making its own bomb would not come in the way of US<BR>military-economic assistance! Very clearly, the language approved by the US Congress ensured that some non-proliferation<BR>goals related to securing non-transfer of a nuclear device to and from Pakistan would be pursued. But it seems to have<BR>accepted as legitimate Pakistan's own programme and access to nuclear weapon technology from other countries without any<BR>negative step by the US as long Pakistan did not import or export a "nuclear device" or carry out a test!21 Even in 1997,<BR>the focus of obtaining assurances from China regarding non-transfer of nuclear and missile technology in future was in<BR>respect of Iran, and Pakistan was conveniently left out of the formulation in spite of credible reports emanating from<BR>senior officials of the United States that China had transferred nuclear weapons technology (including 5,000 ring magnets<BR>for uranium enrichment for weapon purposes in 1995). "American officials were less concerned with promoting regional<BR>stability, or influencing regional strategic decisions over the long run, than in getting treaty (NPT, etc.) adherence in<BR>the short run."22<P>The US intelligence community had concluded by early 1983 that Pakistan had acquired the wherewithal to create a nuclear<BR>deterrent.23 US CINC CENTCOM, in a testimony to the Senate in June 1983, had even stated that Pakistan's going nuclear<BR>would be a "good thing." It was the 1985 legislation that plugged this loophole, but a way out was found quickly through<BR>the Pressler Amendment to continue US assistance without any hurdle up to the point Pakistan would actually possess a<BR>weapon. It is also not surprising in this context that the United States further legitimised Pakistan's clandestine nuclear<BR>weapon programme when it re-opened military supplies under the Brown Amendment in 1996. These weapons had been embargoed<BR>because US laws did not allow their delivery after the US president was unable to certify in 1990 that Pakistan does not<BR>have a nuclear bomb.<P>The most flagrant violation of the NPT came from a recent NPT entrant, China, when it supplied nuclear weapons technology<BR>to Pakistan. Some of this was transferred before 1992 and hence did not violate the treaty obligations since China was not<BR>a party to the treaty till then. But that does not condone what has been its role as an irresponsible proliferator. The<BR>transfers after 1992 certainly undermined the NPT severely. More important, the issues involved highlighted the fact that<BR>few will say or do anything when a permanent member of the UN Security Council with a veto power violates treaty<BR>obligations. <P>The flowering of proliferation represents a negative trend compared to the accession of South Africa, Argentina and Brazil<BR>to non-proliferation norms and regimes. The most significant maturing of the proliferation process was that of Pakistan<BR>which acquired nuclear weapons know-how and technology from Europe and North America in the 1980s and received substantive<BR>assistance in terms of technology transfers from China in the 1980s and 1990s. Till 1971, Pakistan possessed only a<BR>primitive level of indigenous nuclear science and technology. But acquisition of technology from external sources helped it<BR>to acquire nuclear weapons. In pursuit of its national strategic objectives, the United States abandoned its<BR>non-proliferation objectives in Pakistan after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. <P>It is in this context that the core logic of India having kept the option to make nuclear weapons open and final<BR>nuclearisation has been the continued possession of nuclear weapons by the five acknowledged weapon states, China standing<BR>out in the process because of historical experiences and continuing territorial disputes. The heightened focus by the<BR>international community led by the five nuclear weapon states on nuclear non-proliferation without disarmament, the broader<BR>strategic uncertainties, especially those regarding how an increasingly powerful China might use its power24 and the<BR>emergence of another nuclear weapon state, Pakistan, through processes which flagrantly violated the established<BR>international norms and treaties for nuclear non-proliferation while the international community was unable or unwilling to<BR>do anything about it, have added to the basic rationale for the nuclear policy.25

OCRed from the Hindu<P>DEFENCE STRATEGY MUST LOOK BEYOND PRESENT THREATS - PANT (HINDU 2 OCT 1999)<P>India's economic policy should further its defence and foreign ~ policy interests and vice-versa while the country's defence strategy must look beyond present threats and capabilities, the planning Commission Chairman, Mr. K. C. Pant, said here today."A holistic approach to security demands that the nation strengthen both Its economy and its defences and that defence policy, foreign policy, trade policy and internal security policy all buttress each other," Mr. Pant said. He was delivering the Sardar Patel memorial lecture on "dimensions of India's security concerns" at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration here. Mr. Pant said the various strands of policy should reinforce -each other to maximise the effectiveness of national policies. "India's economic policy has to further its defence and foreign policy Interests and vice-versa" he said. The biggest lesson of Kargil, he said, was that a unilateral desire for peace was not enough and du rable peace could come only if India was strong enough to deter aggression and maintain internal security with requisite capabilities. "Our defence strategy must look beyond present threats and capabilities. In a period of declining defence outlays, India has to wisely spend its resources to shore up Its defences. It should be ensured that~at lack of resources do not affect current military preparedness, research and develop ment and self-reliance in key areas, he said. Indian policy and strategy had to be dynamic and should adapt to and gain from the emerging world order by exercising the right choices in every situation, he said. "A country of India's size, with about one-sixth of the world's population, cannot be a global player If it lacks adequate defences against external aggression, blackmail or interference," he said. Pointing out that some major powers were trying to con~fine India in a narrow sub-continental power equation with Pakistan, he said because of its size and location, India's security concerns and interests extended to regions far beyond its immediate neighbourhood.The issue of cross border terrorism, a major internal security problem before the country, had assumed a new dimension with the direct threat of 'jehad' by Saudi terrorist mastermind Osama Bin l.aden, he said. "This requires a different level of preparedness. More and more countries, who are affected by Islamic fundamentalist groups, are likely to coordinate their efforts to combat the growing scourge of global terrorism," Mr. Pant said. Referring to violent activities of Left extremists in And hra Pradesh and Bihar, he said internal security problems could not always be dealt with as mere law and order problems. "It is necessary to uncover their roots and take remedial measures. National security is intimately linked to poverty alleviation," lie said.Rapid economic development, declining disparities in income and well being~ between regions and individuals, curbing population growth, restoring the credibility of the administration and progressing steadily towards equality of opportunity were necessary to combat the maladies of cynicism, social disharmony and despair on which the forces of disorder thrived, he said."India has to rapidly modernise its physical infrastructure, provide a reasonable quality of primary health care and provide at least elementary education to all to develop its human capital," he said. Another core Issue of national security, Mr. Pant said, was how India protected and promoted its economic and commercial lnterests under the World Trade Organilsatlon (WTO). "All WTO member countries will soon have to re-adjust their laws relating to trade matters to conform to WTO rules. In the short run, such readjustment's could cause economic dIslocation and create socio-political unrest," he said. Food security end energy security were other critical dimensions of national sectirity, he said. "The impact of substantial increases un oil prices and, more importantly, 0n political and economic alignments or frictions, need to he monitored closely and contiuously by India with a view to ensure energy security for the countty at an affordable price," he said. India's future could not be Secure unless various policies and programmes were blended into a harmonious national vision, with each component seeking to strengthen the other parts. Mr. Pant added. PTI<P><BR>

K.S replies to DND critics......<BR>TOI 10/4/99 Editorial section<BR>A Credible Deterrent <P>Logic of the Nuclear Doctrine<P>By K Subrahmanyam<P>THE Indian nuclear doctrine recommended by the non-official National Security Advisory Board has predictably generated a national and international debate. It is not surprising that most of the comments reflect the subjective mindsets of the commentators more than an objective and dispassionate analysis of the doctrine in the current international security paradigm. That will no doubt apply to the present writer himself. <P>With that caveat, let us try to look at the doctrine in terms of existing realities. One commentator has said that except for the no-first-use doctrine, the rest of it could have been written in the Pentagon. One would like to see the Pentagon coming out with a commitment to credible minimum deterrence. If ever we reach that stage, the world would surely be on the way to a realistic move towards nuclear disarmament. Today for many Americans who pride themselves in leading their country towards disarmament and who have a lot of admirers among the anti-nuclear lobbyists in India, reducing their stockpile to zero means bringing it down to 200 warheads. On the basis of this standard, perhaps the Indian nuclear deterrent will be less than zero. It is, therefore, difficult to understand the logic that the Indian nuclear doctrine advocates an open-ended nuclear arms race. <P>Three Pillars <P>The whole world knows that there are very severe constraints on the availability of fissile materials for India. Even those who advocate for India an arsenal of medium power size -- there are not many such advocates -- talk about building it over decades. Those who talk about an arms race evidently do not pay much attention to these constraints and appear to assume that India could replicate what other nuclear powers did. The entire Indian nuclear doctrine stands on three pillars -- no-first-use, credible minimum deterrent and civilian control.<P>All other components of the doctrine, survivability, strategic triad, punitive retaliation in rapid response and shift from peacetime deployment to fully employable forces in the shortest possible time are all strict mathematical derivations from the above three basic principles. They are not a copy of western doctrines because they do not subscribe to war fighting as the West did, they do not involve delegation of powers and they rule out first-use. If these basic differences are understood, then one would know that the Indian nuclear doctrine is as different from the western doctrines as chalk is from cheese. <P>An arsenal can be kept as minimum as possible only if its survivability can be assured against repeated attrition attacks. No one envisages in these days the high density attacks with hundreds and thousands of warheads. The minimality of the arsenal is related to its survivability and hence the need for a strategic triad including sea-based systems. There is no reason why even a modest arsenal of 150 weapons cannot be distributed over aircraft, mobile missiles and sea-based assets. The Americans, the British and French are going to have the bulk of their deterrent sea-based and they do not consider that as provocative.<P>No doubt sea-based assets are costly. Here again one has to take into account the likelihood of nuclear submarines proliferating and their being equipped with sea-launched cruise missiles. The Americans have shown the way with extensive use of sea-launched cruise missiles -- the Tomahawks. Nuclear hunter killer submarines are likely to be deployed by more countries and India cannot deny itself such systems unless there is a global non- discriminatory treaty banning them, which does not seem to be very likely.<P>Nuclear Adversaries <P>The core of deterrence, especially for a country which commits itself to no-first-use is its ability to carry out punitive unacceptable retaliation. This is not cold war language but the appropriate language to communicate to the nuclear warriors who believe in the use of nuclear weapons first. Unless one opts to allow his society and nation to be destroyed in a cold-blooded first strike by the adversary and not do anything to deter him, it is logical to make it clear to such nuclear adversaries the consequences of his resorting to a first strike. The word unacceptable damage does not carry today the connotations of the MAD (Mutual Assured destruction) age of Robert MacNamara and Zbigniew Brezinski. It is now recognised that one bomb on one city is unacceptable. Therefore, those who believe in wielding nuclear weapons to intimidate other nations and in the first-use of nuclear weapons have to be deterred by spelling out the consequences of their actions. <P>The Indian nuclear doctrine totally rejects the western approach to nuclear theology as is evident from the preamble and the last section which reiterates Indian commitment to disarmament. India was compelled to go nuclear because of the obduracy of nuclear weapon powers, the legitimisation of nuclear weapons by the international community and the rising trend in interventionism by the industrialised nations in the affairs of the developing world. It became necessary to protect the autonomy of decision- making in the developmental process and in strategic matters which are inalienable democratic rights of one sixth of mankind living in India. <P>Facts and Logic <P>The Indian nuclear doctrine aims at providing India a credible minimum deterrent at an affordable pace of expenditure to create uncertainty in the minds of would-be nuclear intimidators, aggressors and interventionists that those actions against this country would not be rational options. Most of the misunderstanding about the nuclear doctrine arises from transposing to this country the ideological expansionist aims of the cold war adversaries. Britain and France, two democracies, could only build very modest arsenals with defence expenditures of around five per cent of gross domestic product under cold war conditions. <P>The only democratic country which could go in for an irrational open-ended arsenal was the richest country in the world -- the US. Not even the most ardent advocate of building Indian military power advocates more than four per cent of GDP for defence and he is not likely to get much support from the Indian public and Parliament for that. No country in the world can build an open-ended arsenal on less than three per cent of GDP which level India is still to reach. Therefore, there is absolutely no risk of this eminently sensible, extremely logical and moderate nuclear doctrine leading to an open- ended arms race. If rhetoric of hype is shed and established facts and logic are used, it will be possible to have an early national consensus on this vital issue.

Not a news article, but have you folks seen the general global increase in temperature recently?<P>Kosovo promises to be the beginnings of the Balkans once again.<P>In Germany/Austria, the left is getting hit hard. Schroeder is being decimated. Right wing/Neo Nazi parties coming in?<P>Chechnya, etc. - there is a also strong resurgence of nationalism in Russia. Those terror bombings really misfired.<P>India- Right wing resurgence<P>Pakistan - beyond right wing- fundamentalist victory??<P>China - moderate, economically oriented factions such as those headed by Zhu Rongji seem to be losing ground to more hardline groups. Taiwan "crisis".<P>Australia- SE Asia - East Timor.<P>Afghanistan slowly poisoning the whol;e of Central Asia.<P>Indonesia in general. If Indonesia reacts to E Timor by arming up, chances are Malaysia and singapore will do something too.<P>A republican (right wing) PRez. in the US.<P>A more pro-active military policy by NATO & Associates without the enhancemnents in defence budgets to project force in more than two, maybe three hot spots.<P>Looks like some fun times ahead.<P>Peeyoosh

Maybe you know about this site before, anyways<BR>India and Israel Evolving Strategic Partnership<BR> <A HREF="http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/40pub.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/books/40pub.html</A>

New Delhi: India is ready to sign the CTBT after the new government takes over but it would not be forced into it, a top government official said in an interview to a TV programme on Sunday, reports our correspondent.<BR>National security advisor Brajesh Mishra also told Star News Hindi programme Ravivar that India had cancelled the sixth nuclear Pokhran test after scientists told the government that they did not need any more data. He said, "I can reveal this for the first time that our scientists told us after the fifth explosion that we did not need any more data, so we cancelled the sixth explosion." <BR>He said this was an indication that India was ready to sign the CTBT.

<BR>Excellent article from KS. We, of course, expect nothing less from him.<P>Some comments of mine follow:<BR>There is no reason why even a modest arsenal of 150 weapons cannot be distributed over aircraft, mobile missiles and sea-based assets.<P>I think this indicates that a 150 weapon arsenal is consensually the lower bound. The 400 weapon figure is more likely to be a final figure.<P>There is a little inconsistency in KS's opinions. He says:<BR>Therefore, those who believe in wielding nuclear weapons to intimidate other nations and in the first-use of nuclear weapons have to be deterred by spelling out the consequences of their actions. <P>This indicates that he believes a nuclear deterrent is only for the purpose of deterring the use/threat of use of nuclear weapons against India -- which is consistent with the DND, and India's historical stand. However, he makes use of:<P>India was compelled to go nuclear because of the obduracy of nuclear weapon powers, the legitimisation of nuclear weapons by the international community and the rising trend in interventionism by the industrialised nations in the affairs of the developing world. <P>Indicating that India's DND is a deterrent agains interventionism. Now, this is a valid thesis only if interventionism comes with overt or covert threat of use/use of nuclear weapons. What we have seen in Iraq, Sudan, Afghanistan, Timor, Yugoslavia etc is that this threat of use is not made, or if made is only made in response to a first threat from the nation intervened in (i.e., Iraq, Yugoslavia).<P>This goes to to the fundamentals of the IND -- what exactly constitutes grounds for an Indian use/threat of use of Nuclear weapons. IOW, will an armed (Non nuclear) invasion by a nuclear state invite the use/threat of use of nuclear weapons by India. The case of Pakistan and China may be considered here. I don't believe that KS has dealt with this, except in the passing, nonetheless this needs to be thrashed out clearly.<P> No country in the world can build an open-ended arsenal on less than three per cent of GDP which level India is still to reach. <P>This is a baseless assumption. No country *has* built such an arsenal, does not imply that no country *can* build one. Ultimately such an arsenal is a function of how much money you can throw at it. This in turn is a function of how large your government/economy is. There is nothing economically sacrosanct about 3% of GDP.<P>

An opinion article from B.Raman about Taliban, Laden and India. One thing to remember about Laden is his fight is with the forces that have occupied Islamic holy places and is a reverse of the Crusades. If he tries to fight against India it dilutes his stance and could lead to problems. BTW, if I recollect the Pak reporter was also in Outlook's payroll- Yusuf Rahimzai(?). <BR>I dont if any one remebers but I had posted some months back in a thread discussing Laden and his alleged threats, my son's comments that they do not fit the pattern and are probably some misinforamtion.<BR>---------------------<BR>BIN LADEN, TALIBAN & INDIA<P> The first reference by Osama bin Laden to India was made at his press<BR> conference at Khost in Afghanistan on May 26, 1998, at which he<BR> announced the formation of the International Islamic Front For Jihad Against<BR> the US and Israel. In response to a question from a journalist (only<BR> Pakistani journalists were invited), he said that he would have loved to join<BR> the jihad in Kashmir, but the Pakistani authorities would not permit him.<P> Thereafter, he has not referred to India in any of his statements or<BR> interviews. However, there have been references to his attitude to India in<BR> statements made by Pakistan-based mercenary elements and their<BR> organizations operating in Kashmir and other parts of India and in<BR> pamphlets and posters purported to have been issued by him, which keep<BR> periodically circulating in Peshawar in the North-West Frontier Province<BR> (NWFP) of Pakistan. It would be difficult to vouch for their authenticity.<P> Significantly, neither Osama nor the Taliban of Afghanistan, which protects<BR> him, has ever made any comments which could be interpreted as<BR> anti-Hindu or as indicating their support for the designs of the<BR> Pakistan-based mercenary organisations to extend their jihad from Kashmir<BR> to other parts of India in order to "liberate" the Muslims of India from the<BR> control of the Hindus.<P> There have been many verified statements of Osama saying it was the<BR> sacred duty of the Muslims to kill the Americans, the British and the<BR> Israelis, but there has been no such call for killing the Indians or the<BR> Hindus.<P> The past anti-India comments of Osama and the Taliban were restricted to<BR> supporting the right of the Kashmiris to self-determination .The Taliban has<BR> been very critical of the alleged Indian assistance to the pre-1992 Afghan<BR> Government of Najibullah and to the troops of the Northern Alliance led by<BR> Mr.Ahmed Shah Masood.<P> It has repeatedly denied Indian allegations that its volunteers were active in<BR> Kashmir. It admits the presence of a large number of Afghan mercenaries in<BR> Kashmir, but contends that these are the followers of Gulbuddin<BR> Heckmatyar, of the Hizb-e-Islami, who is now reported to be living in Iran.<P> According to the Taliban, Heckmatyar's followers have been operating in<BR> Kashmir along with the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), the militant wing of the<BR> Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and they masquerade as members of the Taliban in<BR> order to have it discredited in the eyes of the world as a terrorist<BR> organisation.<P> The Taliban says that while it would have liked to assist the Kashmiri<BR> people, it would not be in a position to do so till it establishes control over<BR> the whole of Afghanistan.<P> The HM underwent a split last year, with an anti-Heckmatyar, pro-Taliban<BR> and pro-Osama group forming a separate organisation called Al Badr. This<BR> group was very active in assisting the Pakistani troops during the recent<BR> Kargil conflict and is estimated to have suffered the largest number of<BR> casualties among the Mujahideen groups.<P> The available information on the Al Badr is still scanty and one cannot say<BR> with certainty whether Taliban members are active in the organisation.<P> The past statements of Osama and the Taliban were remarkably free of any<BR> anti-India and anti-Hindu venom of the type one finds in the statements of<BR> the Pakistan-based mercenary organisations such as the<BR> Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Markaz Dawa Al Irshad and its militant<BR> wing, the Lashkar-e-Toiba .The Taliban is more strident in its criticism of<BR> Iran than of India.<P> The Taliban leaders, while strongly defending their Islamisation drive and<BR> their attitude to women and the Shias, have been taking pains to dispel the<BR> impression that the Taliban has been exporting armed Islamic fanaticism to<BR> India, China, the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Chechnya and<BR> Dagestan.<P> According to Taliban circles, Pakistan-based mercenary organisations such<BR> as the HUM, the Markaz and the Lashkar, which have been behind much of<BR> the violence in the Southern Philippines, India, Xinjiang in China, the CARs,<BR> Chechnya and Dagestan, are allies of the Taliban and Osama in the fight<BR> against the Northern Alliance of Mr.Masood, but this does not mean that<BR> the Taliban has been supporting their jihad in those countries.<P> In its most comprehensive statement to-date on this subject (September<BR> 20,1998), the Taliban stated as follows: " Afghanistan and India had friendly<BR> relations in the past. We don't have any diplomatic ties now, but we won't<BR> mind resuming relations with India as, at least, we won't have to contend<BR> with an enemy India. By backing the puppet communist regime in<BR> Afghanistan, India lost all sympathies of the majority of the Afghan people<BR> and it appears rather difficult to forget all that. We obviously support the<BR> jihad in Kashmir and sympathise with the Kashmiri people. It is also true<BR> that some Afghans are fighting against Indian troops in Kashmir. The<BR> Taliban has not sent them…We have no intention of exporting our jihad or<BR> revolution to any country."<P> In the context of this past attitude of the Taliban to keep open the<BR> possibility of a rapprochement with India, it is not surprising that it has<BR> hastened to deny the report disseminated in September by the "Jang", the<BR> anti-India Urdu daily of Pakistan, that Osama has declared a jihad against<BR> India.<P> After the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani authorities have launched a<BR> mischievous Psywar campaign that to secure the support of the<BR> administration of the US President, Mr.Bill Clinton, during the conflict, the<BR> Bharatiya Janata Party-led Government of India had offered its services to<BR> the US as its surrogate in the USA's campaign against Islamic<BR> revolutionary forces and that the US has been given facilities in the Kargil<BR> area from which it can mount a clandestine operation against Osama.<P> There have also been suggestions from the Pakistan-based mercenary<BR> organisations that in addition to the US, Israel and the UK (the UK was<BR> targeted by Osama after it joined the US in bombing Iraq in December),<BR> Osama should also target India which, according to them, has started<BR> collaborating with the US in its anti-Muslim policies.<P> Thus, there is an ill-disguised attempt by the Pakistani intelligence<BR> agencies and the mercenary groups supported by them to have India<BR> projected as a willing surrogate of the US which should be brought on<BR> Osama's hit list. Hence, despite the denial by the Taliban of any declaration<BR> of a jihad against India by Osama as alleged by the Pakistani media, a<BR> more effective monitoring of the activities of the already-identified and other<BR> likely sympathisers of Osama in India would be necessary.<P> Of the Pakistan-based organisations which are members of Osama's<BR> International Islamic Front for Jihad against the US and Israel, the HUM and<BR> the Lashkar are very active in Kashmir. The Lashkar also has a presence in<BR> other parts of India as far down South as Hyderabad. These organisations<BR> also have links with extremist organisations in Banglasdesh.The<BR> pro-Osama Al Badr is not a member of the Front, but is active in Kashmir.<P> Any threat from the pro-Osama elements in India could be not only against<BR> Indian interests and targets, but also against those of the US, Israel and<BR> the UK. Osama's men have in the past shown a marked preference for<BR> massive explosions outside infrastructure targets, such as Embassy<BR> buildings, military training establishments etc. Osama has also publicly<BR> announced in January ("Time", January 11) his interest in the procurement<BR> of weapons of mass destruction for possible use in his terrorist operations.<BR> These aspects have to be kept in view while planning counter-measures.<P> At the same time, India should test out the sincerity of the Taliban's<BR> interest in a non-adversarial relationship with India by maintaining a line of<BR> communication with the Taliban leadership through their office in New York.<BR> Its professions of innocence should be tested out and not dismissed out of<BR> hand.<P> The USA too, while taking strong action against the Taliban's support to<BR> Osama and its violation of human rights, has at the same time maintained<BR> a dialogue with the Taliban leadership through their New York office and<BR> during the visits of US officials to Islamabad.<P> We should not put all our eggs in the Burhanuddin Rabbani-Masood<BR> basket. It would be unwise to assume that the Taliban leadership is a<BR> Pakistani puppet and hence beyond redemption. After all, many<BR> Pakhtuns---of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan--- had been the traditional<BR> supporters of India and one should not rule out the possibility of there being<BR> many elements in the Taliban leadership which feel suffocated by the<BR> present too close an embrace with Pakistan. <P> India has had a long history of fruitful mutual counter-terrorism(CT)<BR> co-operation with the US in the form of exchange of information, expertise,<BR> visits of CT experts etc. The foundation for this was laid by Rajiv Gandhi<BR> during his visit to Washington in June,1985. The pre-1998 Governments of<BR> India had rightly kept this co-operation secret.<P> In an unwise departure from this policy, the present Government has been<BR> publicising such co-operation as was seen during the recent visit of some<BR> officials of the CT Division of the US State Department to New Delhi. This<BR> could act as a red rag to the bull and prove counter-productive. (29-9-99).<P> B.RAMAN<P> (The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India<P> and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. E-Mail:<P> corde@vsnl.com )

At the risk of hijacking this thread -- the Austrians just elected an ultra-right wing party to lead them.<P>Europe is in political turmoil, without good economic times who knows what the future holds for them.

Mehta is not an idiot, then why does he behave like one?<P> <A HREF="http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/oct/04ashok.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/oct/04ashok.htm</A> <BR>General Ashok K Mehta <BR>India's nuclear deterrence is not country-specific<P>India's draft nuclear doctrine has sprung some surprises. It is not what it promised to be, simple and Indian. It is the consensus, some say fragile consensus, of the National Security Advisory Board members without any inputs from the armed forces or other government departments. <P>It is woven around three principles: minimum nuclear deterrent, no first use and maximum restraint. In other words, a minimum nuclear deterrent with maximum strategic restraint. The draft nuclear doctrine has pre-empted the country's ongoing strategic defence review and, therefore, is only the framework for a nuclear deterrent strategy. Even that assumption may be premature as the new government will decide on the entire bandwidth of nuclear issues relating to CTBT, NPT and FMCT. <P>This politically well-timed document has certain features which are different from the initial pronouncements of the government. It was said that the Indian nuclear document will be home-grown, avoid the pitfalls of other nuclear weapon states and the deterrent itself would be small in size, simple in structure, credible, survivable and retaliatory. Further, the capability would be purely defensive to ward off nuclear coercion or blackmail, yet, give the country the strategic space, autonomy and reach in guarding its national security interests. Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh had also said that India would not reinvent the doctrine of the Cold War. <P>(Mehta merely asserts that the DND is "different" but does not give any facts. In fact, his description of what we were promised is quite similar to what the DND delivers)<P>Before India and Pakistan carried out their nuclear tests, a covert non-weaponised nuclear deterrent had already been in place for nearly a decade. In the last one year, Jaswant Singh and US Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbott, in their eight rounds of talks, are believed to have come close to resolving the contentious issues. But differences persisted over quantification of the minimum nuclear deterrent, the posture and conditions for India joining the CTBT. <P>The five-page draft Indian nuclear doctrine is laid out in eight parts: a preamble, objectives, nuclear forces, credibility and survivability, command and control, research and development and disarmament and arms control. <P>On the face of it, the nuclear doctrine is no different from the one adopted by other nuclear weapon states. <P>(This is again an example of baseless, bald faced assertion. KS has demolished this nonsense in his piece. The question is *why* is Mehta doing this?)<P>Initially India had named China as the reason for its nuclear tests. The doctrine however says the deterrence is not country-specific. It does not quantify or explain what is minimum about the deterrence. In fact, it is pegged on the triad of land, sea and air-launched nuclear weapons, which is a typical western not 'Indian' model. What is missing from the doctrine paper are the command and control mechanism, involvement of armed forces, the cost of the nuclear deterrent and linkages with ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. <P>(Again, Mehta either betrays his bias and his lack of reading comprehension or something far, far worse here.)<P>Yet, this is the first positive short step in the long march to attaining the nuclear capability goal. <P>The debate on the draft nuclear doctrine may have just begun. The reaction from western and other nuclear weapon states has been unexpectedly critical. The most shrill critique of the doctrine has come from the US. It has reverted to the pre-test rhetoric that it will lead India in the wrong direction, possession of nuclear weapons will give India less, not more, security and lead to an arms race. <P>China, which had maintained a studied silence after its initial bitter attack, has repeated the call for India to adhere to the UN Security Council Resolution 1172, which is virtually a cap and rollback. The G-8 group of countries and Japan have also reacted negatively. Only Russia has been even-handed. <P>In a tit for tat, Islamabad reported that its nuclear doctrine is being finalised and has described India's as an ominous development and a challenge and affront to Pakistan and the international community. Pakistan had assumed that the US had managed to persuade India not to operationalise its nuclear weapons capability. It has warned that it would be forced to follow suit and the growing conventional imbalance would intensify Islamabad's dependence on nuclear weapons to deter aggression. <P>Coming on the heels of the Kargil war, the draft nuclear doctrine has taken the lid off the nuclearised subcontinent. Initial US reaction suggests its determination to cap India's nuclear capability at the non-operational level. Pakistan appears willing to accept this status and join the CTBT. India has indicated it is prepared to discuss the doctrine. India is equally determined to go ahead with the development and induction of the Agni serial programme, though it too is willing to enter the CTBT under certain conditions. At present India's nuclear weapon-delivery capability is rather rustic. The next phase of the nuclear doctrinal war will see the international community and Pakistan arrayed on one side and India probably isolated on the other.

He has to get his stuff published. The publications are controlled by left-leaning pundits. Also they have not thought the problem through as we in the forum have. WE discuss the issue on daily basis. They discuss only every week at IIC or IHC on Lodhi Road over chota/bada peg.<P>His article has its faults because he does not say how it is different from what he was thinking. I believe the crux of the problem for all these chaps is, they were under the impression that DND would propose some vague separated system. The timeliness of retaliation clause of the DND implies it is not so. This has got them in atizzy. The US would like non-opeartinal posture as it would suit them fine. A weapon is one when payload is integrated with delivery system. The NPT definition is for weapon states. If there is non-operational posture ergo it does not violate the NPT. I think after TSP has been proclaiming its intent not to sgn a NFU pact, it is suicaidal and irresponsible to go for a separated system. It was OK in the times of recessed deterrence as there was ambiguity. However after the startegic balance was broken after the Ghauri test, it becomes necessary to remove the opaqueness and put forward a more patent deterrent posture.<P>The important contribution of this article is the terms of reference of the Talbott-Singh talks. US seems to want non-opeartional posture for S. Asia. TSP was willing to go along. This explains some of the talk coming from Rubitin- we are disappointed as it will have tit-for tat response from Pak etc. It also means TSP is busy revising its Doctrine and explains the delay in making it public.

I find Joshi's statement interesting:<BR>the CTBT and NPT continue to be discriminatory by their basic framework and India will not be part of these treaties as long as the anomalies are not worked out". <P>I don't know how much Joshi knows about these treaties, but the fact is that no part of the *treaty* itself can be "worked out" -- therefore if he finds the treaty discriminatory he is implying that India will *never* sign it.<P><BR>

Joshi may sound as an khaki shorts idealogue, but he is a Prof of Modern Physics and does know the intricacies of the subject. What he is talking about are accomodation outside the treaties- defacto recognition instead of dejure. For instance the NSG round of sanctions are part of national legislation and do not stem from NPT.<BR>Please watch next issue of BRM. Plan is to tackle the issue of squaring the circle.<p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 05-10-1999).]

From TOI, 10/6/99...........<BR>Way to go people! Sometime back there was a thread to write to Rep. Lewis about som eof the measures being considered here.<BR>US panel paving way for sanctions waiver <P> By Ramesh Chandran<P> The Times of India News Service<P> WASHINGTON: After days of tough negotiations stretching into the<BR> night, the Senate-House Conference on the Department of Defence<BR> Appropriations Committee was finally applying the finishing touches to a<BR> contentious package on Monday. <P> The future of the sanctions imposed by Washington on both India and<BR> Pakistan, following their May 1998 nuclear tests, rests on this package.<BR> Barring last-minute surprises, indications are the package would include a<BR> permanent or a multi-year waiver authority for the President to review the<BR> sanctions. <P> A pruning of the ``entities list'', no repeal of the Pressler Law but a<BR> possible waiver of three critical sections of the Glenn Amendment relating<BR> to sales of military wares and dual-use technology, and military financing<BR> are other components of the package. Should these sections be waived,<BR> both India and Pakistan would benefit. <P> Congressional sources said that lawmakers were poised to hammer out<BR> the package after much passion and heat over the future of the F-22<BR> Stealth fighters. The deal, they said, may come up as early as Friday for an<BR> ``up or down'' vote which in Congressional jargon means vote without<BR> amendments on the floor. <P> The relief for India and Pakistan on the sanctions was first attached to the<BR> Defence Appropriations Bill at the Senate level by Senator Sam<BR> Brownback, in an astute manoeuvre last July. The House of<BR> Representatives, however, had no matching provisions (language) on the<BR> Indo-Pakistan sanctions. The lawmakers from both the chambers then<BR> formed what is known as the `conference' for the Defence Appropriations<BR> Committee to reconcile the differences between the two chambers. <P> The sanctions ought to ideally have been under the foreign and not<BR> defence affairs - in the realm of the Senate foreign relations committee or<BR> the House international relations committee. When the House panel<BR> extended the current law - Brownback-II which allows the waiver for one<BR> more year, the Senate in its authorisation Bill had no similar language.<BR> This lack of defining focus led to a legislative logjam. <P> Agreements were finally reached, thanks to the efforts of House<BR> international affairs committee chairman Benjamin Gilman and House<BR> defence appropriations committee chairman Jerry Lewis. <P> Ultimately, if the package goes through without last-minute hitches, it<BR> would be a triumph for a fine coordinated effort - at least this time around<BR> - for the representatives of corporate America, especially the US-India<BR> Business Council, the lobbying firms employed by the Indian Embassy,<BR> the activism of the Indian American community and the Congressional<BR> Caucus on India and Indian Americans, all of whom waged a sustained<BR> behind-the-scenes campaign to ensure the relief on sanctions was<BR> successfully passed. But veteran observers warn that such packages may<BR> still fall apart in last-minute glitches. They were, therefore, guarded in their<BR> optimism.

ramana:<P>Implicit in that (ready to sign CTBT if the "goodies" are right) is the belief that we do not need any further testing, either for development of new generation nukes, or for minaturization.<P>I am opposed to this, because CTBT represents a legal framework legitimizing the present imbalance of global power. Acquiescing to this will have grave repercussions for our future and that of our children and as long as nuclear weapons remain a currency of power.<P>

Yes it is bothersome to rule out further testing for ever. <BR>However consider that <BR>- India plans second strike doctrine <BR>- has tested a range of devices- .5 to 45 kt. I am ignoring the other lesser ones. <BR>- RC seems to know his stuff and has passed the torch to younger scientists in the establishment by involving them in the POK-2 round.<BR>- The Goa herald article states they can scale the results of S-1<BR>- Any test which results in criticality > 1.0 will lead to lot of unnecessary problems<BR>- the charge that India is not spearheading the disarmament drive is untenable when the majority agreed to the indefinte extension of NPT. What can you do when those who backed you backed out?<BR>The matter at hand is to ensure defacto and then dejure status for the Indian posture as the world slowly learns to accept it. And also provide estoppel for sub-critical tests as needed by condicuting one before assenting to the four letter treaty if it passes.<P>I am also thinking that if the treaty does not EIF then what steps are to be taken by the signing nations- some kind of resolution or act of parliment which has a weasel clause similar to supreme national interest clause (empwering the national leadership to conduct any required tests) in order to have a defacto test moratarium the world over.<BR>

Now that a new cabinet is about to be formed for the GOI, let us discuss the issues that have to be addressed before joining the world norms on nuclear treaties.<BR>SANCTIONS:<BR>* There are the sanctions on nuclear power equipment. From POK-1 days.<BR>* Economic sanctions - unilateral by US and opposition to lending international financial institutions(IFI)<BR>* There is the US sanctions on technical entities. IISc, ISRO etc.<BR>* US sanctions on Indian military- IMET, LCA etc.<BR>TECHNICAL:<BR>* There is the matter of corrupted seismic readings leading to doubts about S-1.<BR>- This does not mean it did not work. Only that as credibility is reduced need more inventory. My arguement is you need more of them to scare a would be 'buri-nazar' type, than if it is well known that it works. Its like if every one knows you have a shotgun, they will be more hesitant than if the global cop goes around saying you probably have a musket and it could be rusty. Especially if the 'buri-nazar' type has been ceritified by global cop and is also a totalitarian state.<BR>* There is the matter of RC's assertion about full yield being greater than S-1. Again if it could become credible it could require less inventory. <BR>I am not saying testing is the only way. For instance, it could be a blue ribbon panel from super cop saying we had a technical interaction with those guys and are convinced that they can do what they claim.<BR>* There is the matter of adjusting the DND to take into account any comments and insight from the reviewers.<BR>* There is the matter of adequate fm stocks.<BR>* There is the matter of a stockpile stewardship program. Doesn't have to be large scale as US- they have more challenges. But should be comprehensive.<BR>Please add as you feel necessary.<p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 07-10-1999).]

Guys<P>I don't know if you have seen this piece from the WP.<P>. . . The Next President Will Pay the Price<BR>By George Perkovich<P>Thursday, October 7, 1999; Page A35 <P>If the Senate eventually fails to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,there will be another victim besides the one Senate Republicans intended.For it is not only President Clinton who will be harmed by the action but the person who takes office as president--and many Republicans presume it will be one of their own--in 2001. The new president will face nuclear shock waves around the world, bereft of bipartisan support when he most<BR> needs it.<P>Here are some likely scenarios:<P>* India will probably conduct more nuclear weapons tests. India's nuclear scientists and hawkish strategists want a sophisticated arsenal, ranging from small tactical weapons to huge hydrogen bombs. They also wish to overcome doubts about the technical performance of the weapons tested in May 1998. More tests would satisfy them and their potential military "customers" that they can mimic the great powers.<P>Conversely, ratifying the test ban treaty would tether the nuclear hawks and allow India to concentrate on the economic route to major powerdom.India's leading statesmen, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, recognize this and want to avoid a costly and dangerous arms race. A Senate rejection of the test ban treaty would undermine these statesmen and badly complicate increasingly vital US-Indian relations.<P>* Pakistan would match India test for test. This would lead to the kind of arms race that Presidents Reagan, Bush and Clinton have sought to block<BR> in the subcontinent. Lest an arms race seem inconsequential, it should be<BR> recalled that India and Pakistan just battled in Kashmir. The fighting came<BR> closer to erupting into an all-out war and possible nuclear escalation than<BR> was reported. If more testing occurs and hawks in both countries are<BR> unleashed, defense spending will increase. Pakistan will move closer to<BR> bankruptcy. This will heighten the risk of Taliban-like groups gaining power<BR> in Pakistan, metastasizing cells of intolerance, aggression and<BR> anti-American terrorism that would bedevil the next American president.<P> * While China has signed the test ban treaty, it will not ratify it if the United<BR> States doesn't. China assumes that rejection means Republicans want to<BR> conduct more nuclear tests; otherwise, why wouldn't they ratify? In this<BR> case, China will make preparations to resume nuclear testing, especially if<BR> India conducts more tests. China possesses only some 20 long-range,<BR> single-warhead missiles capable of striking America. This poses no serious<BR> threat to the U.S. deterrent. China has conducted some 45 nuclear<BR> explosive tests, the United States 1,030. The test ban is valuable precisely<BR> because it constrains the kind of weaponry advances that the Chinese<BR> military might otherwise wish to make with purloined American design<BR> information.<P> * Japan will face pressure to reconsider its nuclear abstinence if China and<BR> India build up nuclear forces. Test ban opponents in Washington argue that<BR> American ballistic missile defenses should reassure Japan that it does not<BR> need to hedge its bets. However, the Japanese, like U.S. allies in Europe,<BR> recognize the technical and strategic problems posed by inevitably<BR> less-than-perfect defenses. Indeed, Senate rejection of the test ban paired<BR> with aggressive promotion of ballistic missile defenses will prompt China<BR> and Russia to feel that the United States is bolstering its capacity for<BR> nuclear coercion and possible first use. Moscow and Beijing will augment<BR> their nuclear offenses to counter defenses. In this context, Japan (and<BR> NATO allies) will feel more rather than less threatened. The next American<BR> president could then confront a crisis in alliance relations.<P> * Globally, rejection of the test ban will endanger the nuclear<BR> nonproliferation regime. In 1995 the international community agreed to<BR> extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the promise<BR> that the nuclear weapon states would complete a test ban treaty by 1996.<BR> This was the minimal disarmament condition that the world would accept<BR> from the United States and the other nuclear states. The 187 parties to the<BR> nonproliferation treaty will meet next April to review the status of the<BR> treaty. If the Senate rejects the test ban, we can be sure that measures to<BR> tighten nonproliferation controls and maintain sanctions on Iraq will be<BR> opposed by an outraged international community. Instead of being the<BR> champion of nonproliferation, the United States will be seen as the rogue<BR> state of proliferation.<P> Again, isolationists may say, "Who needs the nonproliferation regime? If<BR> we feel threatened by proliferation, we can take care of it ourselves." But<BR> the U.S. interest in keeping countries such as Iran from acquiring nuclear<BR> weapons requires cooperation from states such as Russia and our<BR> European allies in controlling exports. Washington's persuasive powers will<BR> be seriously undermined by roguish behavior on the test ban treaty.<P> Republicans in the Senate who want both to defeat the test ban and elect a<BR> Republican president should be careful what they wish for. If they reject<BR> this treaty they will create conditions that no new president could welcome.<BR> Given that the United States could ratify the treaty and still legally escape<BR> from it if a threat to national security emerged, the next president would<BR> likely wonder, "Whose idea was this?"<P> George Perkovich is the author of "India's Nuclear Bomb," to be published<BR> next week.

Calvin and Ramana<P>Note Perkovich's first scenerio. It is quite relevant to our discussion yesterday.

I think Perkovich is carrying on the usual baloney about scientists pressure etc. In the same breath he is tarring and feathering(Brer Rabbit exression) the POK-2 results. If he is serious about clamping India at its level of knowledge, he wouldnt have done this.<P>Can he truly address the questions that some of the Senate memebers raised in the hearings? I think not. The CTBT should be ratified by US Senate on its merits. Not for muzzling India or TSP. <BR>Also I question his premise that TSP will match every test of India. That would be a low cost way to denuclearize TSP. Unless they get more FM and/or devices from the dragon there is no way this will happen. Also how does he explain the Pu at Chagai? TSP's Khusab reacor was operational only in Oct.' 98 after the tests? How was Pu detected in the Chagai test area? So how does he explain this anamoly?<BR>These half baked Non-prolif chaps have messed up the works and are coming up with lame excuses to justify the rubbish being peddeled. They dont know technology and have meddled with it coming up with unverifiable treaties and are now coming up with tenous reasons to support it.<BR>In para three he is wrong about purloined technology being not yet inducted. China conducted 12 tests in the 90's and five of them are of one type of yield. I think those are the purloined data. (Shades of Sherlock Holmes- Case of the Purloined Papers!)<BR>Also the Pu can be explained only if China conducted further one or two low yield ones at Chagai. <BR>Japan is shielded by the US-Japan defense treaty. Unless Perkovich is thinking of revoking it there is no fear of Japanese tests<P>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 07-10-1999).]<p>[This message has been edited by ramana (edited 07-10-1999).]

I've been following this interesting folder,very relevant to the new situation after the expected victory for the NDA.There are a few points I'd like to get out of my system before getting into the meat of the discussion.<P>First,I think that it would be a mistake for the NDA to pursue the "foreigner" ban.It would make Sonia a martyr.The courts have just thrown out a suit against her victory too.Though she in my opinion can never be a Catherine the Great,who ruled Russia,movement on this line will inevitably bring in her children-and we know how a pretty face can win votes!What the country needs at any time is a bunch of mature leaders who don't have their hands in the country's till.<P>We are now at the cossroads.ABV is back in the saddle.The pressure has already started to mount.Clinton's new gambit of getting in arms sales to Pak has already started making the rounds.Pak is blckmailing the US-nukes to be sold to the hioghest bidder in the US does not bail it out and supply it with arms.<P>Q 1.What should India do if the US does intend to sell arms to pak,who have only recently attacked and invaded India?This question must be answered by the govt fast and sent to the White House pronto.I would say to Clinton,expect a full scale nuclear testing programme from india if yopu sell a bullet to our worst enemy.Accuse the US thereby of attempting to balkanise idnai.That it wants to do that ois no secret-an independent Kashmir has been it's secret aim,at times not so secret.<P>Q2.How do we withstand the pressure from the west and east,the denmands to sign the CTBT?<BR>China is full of double speak and their demands should be tpublicly thrown into the dustbin while desrcibing in detail China's gameplan against india via it's proxy Pak.It's intelligence coup in the US,swiping the US's nuke secrets are now public knowledge and should be thrown into it's face as well as being posted back to the White House.Countering the European nations demands requires some more finesse in the manner in which we reject their calls.Here we would be wise to once again declare the time bound proposal for total nuclear disarmament that was proposed by Rajiv Gandhi as the ultimate goal,which ALL nuclear powers should adhere to.<P>For signing the CTBT we should demand a total freeze of chinese nuclera weapons,a roll back of pak nuclear weaponry,after all it IS a rogue state cohabiting with N.Korea etc.If the N.Koreans in their economic plight can get Clinton to do a "Monica" to stop their missile tests,imagine what ABV and India can do to sign the CTBT?!!Whatever we do,we shold not under any circumstances reduce our desired strategic deterrent from seeing the light of day adn never sell ourselves short if a worthwhile compromise of some sort is offered that also hits the nuclear hypocracies too.<P>Q4.What about the whole new range of new technologies in weaponry that the US is deveolping,that will have enormous impact a decade or too from now?I see the CTBT as only an attempt by the western powers and hypocracies to suspend the emergem=nce of new threats to their hegeomony before they can develop newer systems which will render the nuclear threat less formidable.<P>Q.5 We can expect new methods of crippling our economic growth for defiance of the major powers.What should be our strategy if they attempt to do so?I forsee an attempt to control/limit our emergnce as an IT giant.<P>That is why,in my opinion,the sooner that we establish the elements of a nuclear triad in operation and declare it so,we would have preempted the asinine calls from the Chinese and Japanese on the one hand (the envious Japanese are now in a radioactive pickle after their recent fiasco,with their intended emergence as a nucler independent power now pushed into the future even farther), and the west on the other,to short circuit our progress into a powerful nuclear weapons state that can defend itself against the other N-states.The govt therefore should take the new mandate as an affirmation that when it comes to india's security there is and will be no compromise whatsoever.It is our sovereign right and if the other powers do not behave and cheat as they have been doing so for decades,India can and must show them the one finger salute.

I've been following this interesting folder,very relevant to the new situation after the expected victory for the NDA.There are a few points I'd like to get out of my system before getting into the meat of the discussion.<P>First,I think that it would be a mistake for the NDA to pursue the "foreigner" ban.It would make Sonia a martyr.The courts have just thrown out a suit against her victory too.Though she in my opinion can never be a Catherine the Great,who ruled Russia,movement on this line will inevitably bring in her children-and we know how a pretty face can win votes!What the country needs at any time is a bunch of mature leaders who don't have their hands in the country's till.<P>We are now at the cossroads.ABV is back in the saddle.The pressure has already started to mount.Clinton's new gambit of getting in arms sales to Pak has already started making the rounds.Pak is blckmailing the US-nukes to be sold to the hioghest bidder in the US does not bail it out and supply it with arms.<P>Q 1.What should India do if the US does intend to sell arms to pak,who have only recently attacked and invaded India?This question must be answered by the govt fast and sent to the White House pronto.I would say to Clinton,expect a full scale nuclear testing programme from india if yopu sell a bullet to our worst enemy.Accuse the US thereby of attempting to balkanise idnai.That it wants to do that ois no secret-an independent Kashmir has been it's secret aim,at times not so secret.<P>Q2.How do we withstand the pressure from the west and east,the denmands to sign the CTBT?<BR>China is full of double speak and their demands should be tpublicly thrown into the dustbin while desrcibing in detail China's gameplan against india via it's proxy Pak.It's intelligence coup in the US,swiping the US's nuke secrets are now public knowledge and should be thrown into it's face as well as being posted back to the White House.Countering the European nations demands requires some more finesse in the manner in which we reject their calls.Here we would be wise to once again declare the time bound proposal for total nuclear disarmament that was proposed by Rajiv Gandhi as the ultimate goal,which ALL nuclear powers should adhere to.<P>For signing the CTBT we should demand a total freeze of chinese nuclera weapons,a roll back of pak nuclear weaponry,after all it IS a rogue state cohabiting with N.Korea etc.If the N.Koreans in their economic plight can get Clinton to do a "Monica" to stop their missile tests,imagine what ABV and India can do to sign the CTBT?!!Whatever we do,we shold not under any circumstances reduce our desired strategic deterrent from seeing the light of day adn never sell ourselves short if a worthwhile compromise of some sort is offered that also hits the nuclear hypocracies too.<P>Q4.What about the whole new range of new technologies in weaponry that the US is deveolping,that will have enormous impact a decade or too from now?I see the CTBT as only an attempt by the western powers and hypocracies to suspend the emergem=nce of new threats to their hegeomony before they can develop newer systems which will render the nuclear threat less formidable.<P>Q.5 We can expect new methods of crippling our economic growth for defiance of the major powers.What should be our strategy if they attempt to do so?I forsee an attempt to control/limit our emergnce as an IT giant.<P>That is why,in my opinion,the sooner that we establish the elements of a nuclear triad in operation and declare it so,we would have preempted the asinine calls from the Chinese and Japanese on the one hand (the envious Japanese are now in a radioactive pickle after their recent fiasco,with their intended emergence as a nucler independent power now pushed into the future even farther), and the west on the other,to short circuit our progress into a powerful nuclear weapons state that can defend itself against the other N-states.The govt therefore should take the new mandate as an affirmation that when it comes to india's security there is and will be no compromise whatsoever.It is our sovereign right and if the other powers do not behave and cheat as they have been doing so for decades,India can and must show them the one finger salute.

Frontline<BR>**********<BR>Arrogant nuclearism <P> What India needs is an urgent Strategic Defence Review to determine its security needs. Instead of this it now has a dangerous doctrine for<BR> nuclear weaponisation. <P> L. RAMDAS <P> However, in the last seven years, whilst much larger number of terrorists have infiltrated into the Kashmir Valley, inflicting tens of thousands of<BR> casualties on civilians, servicemen and police personnel, there is no suggestion that the Indian Army s hould follow the precedent of 1965. Here comes<BR> the nuclear factor. Since both India and Pakistan perceive each other as having nuclear weapons capability, the covert war waged by Pakistan has not<BR> escalated to a high intensity inter-state war because of t he implied risk of a possible nuclear exchange. While Pakistan's nuclear capability has<BR> enabled it to launch a covert war against India, the perception of mutual deterrence has ensured that the situation does not escalate further. This has<BR> resulted in a no inter-state war situation between India and Pakistan for almost twenty-five years. <P> - K. Subrahmanyam in World Affairs Journal, October-December 1997. <P> YES, this is the same K. Subrahmanyam, the Convener of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), who in a 1997 article titled "Covert Operations<BR> pose new challenges for Indian Security" said that there was already a minimum nuclear deterrent working. The only change in the political and security<BR> firmament since then has been that a new coalition government, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, came to office in March 1998 and went on full speed<BR> ahead to conduct the nuclear tests at Pokhran in May 1998. For its splendid contribution, the BJP-led government was rewarded with the limited war in<BR> Kargil, which accounted for the loss of nearly 500 precious lives. We must thank the "Good Shepherd" for his early warning. In our hi-tech post-nuclear<BR> profile th is was the reality of our command, control and communications readiness. We came very close to losing Ladakh and the northern parts of<BR> Kashmir. Without trying to sound too alarmist, there was a real possibility of this conflict escalating into an all-out war, including a nuclear exchange with<BR> all its disastrous consequences. <P> Just as the country was recovering from this traumatic experience came yet another bombshell from the caretaker government - the announcement of the<BR> draft Indian Nuclear Doctrine on August 17, 1999. Many observers have stated that the NSAB's draft had be en with the government for nearly two<BR> months <P> (John Cherian in Frontline, September 10, 1999 and Achin Vanaik in The Hindu, September 4, 1999) but the government thought it fit to release it a<BR> fortnight before the first round of the general elections on September 5. Predictably, the Op position parties were furious, and rightly so. A matter of such<BR> importance should not have been made public by a caretaker government. Having carefully stowed it away for two months, it could have waited until the<BR> next government took office after the el ections. There is little doubt that the announcement was intended to influence voter opinion in the Government's<BR> favour. If ever there was a pre-emptive strike, this was it. There was no question of 'no first use' in this launch. Should a non-BJP governm ent come to<BR> office, it may well have a different approach altogether. <P> Of late we are seeing a lot of this kind of unilateralism. Take the telecom dispensation, which resulted in a loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the exchequer,<BR> or the hurry with which certain appointments of senior civil servants and Governors were made q uite arbitrarily. Or for that matter the utter disregard<BR> shown to the presidential advice on convening a Rajya Sabha session on the Kargil issue, which also demonstrated this arrogant and defiant attitude. The<BR> same government dismissed a Chief of the Nav al Staff on the specious grounds of defiance when he was only trying to call its attention to the regulations<BR> that governed the Navy. <P> This government has specialised in putting the cart before the horse. It did so with the nuclear tests of May last year and now with the Nuclear Doctrine.<BR> At the time of the announcement of the latter, NSAB Convener Subrahmanyam mentioned three things, a ll of which not only are worthy of mention but<BR> warrant some discussion. First: "The NSAB was working very hard at undertaking a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and its report would be finalised in<BR> the next few months." Second: "No estimates on costs to ma intain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent have been worked out." Third, in response to a<BR> question from a mediaperson whether the nuclear button would be in a briefcase with the Prime Minister, he replied: "We are far more advanced than<BR> those with the b lack box with the button." This remark exudes technical superiority. <P> The first thing that the NSAB should have undertaken was the SDR. Had this been done before Pokhran-II, probably there may have been no need for<BR> the nuclear tests at all. Likewise, there would have been no need to evolve an elaborate nuclear doctrine to follow up the mistake of Pokhran-II. Finally, to<BR> support both these decisions, we have to do an SDR. The announcement has certainly not triggered any great enthusiasm as expected. No one even talks<BR> about the bomb or the doctrine. In an article in The Times of India dated September 6, Subrahmanyam laments "that the nuclear doctrine has not<BR> generated any worthwhile popular debate so far, but only criticism and endorsements from a very limited number of commentators. They reflect by and<BR> large the di vide between those who consider a nuclear deterrent necessary for Indian security and those who oppose it. The real debate has to be among<BR> different parties, all of which had over the years sustained the nuclear weapon and missile programmes." If Subrahm anyam himself felt in 1997 that the<BR> "Existential Deterrence" was working, how can he fault these political parties for not being fired by this great release? If anything, they have been angered<BR> by the release of this doctrine just prior to the elections. Presumably, by 'popular' Subrahmanyam means political parties and not the people. People are<BR> more concerned with basic necessities such as water, food, health care, schools, sanitation and jobs. If we see the print and electronic media, the complaint<BR> th at comes through loud and clear is that people's issues are not being discussed at all. Regrettably for the caretaker government, the release of the<BR> nuclear doctrine has, if anything, misfired. <P> STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW <P> What should the SDR address? It should: <P> * Identify national and strategic interests, clarify the bottom line for border management. <P> * Assess the overall strategic environment in the short-, medium- and long-term perspectives. <P> * Evaluate threats to "human security" and "national security" in the short-, medium- and long-term. <P> * Evolve plans and strategies to combat these threats. These should include a broad assessment of the priorities for both human security and other needs<BR> and the allocation of resources. <P> * Given the present capabilities, determine additional weapons/equipment that need to be inducted. <P> * Carry out scenario studies to identify force level and weapon requirements. <P> * Assess whether nuclear weapons are needed or whether the present level of nuclear capability will suffice (see note on Subrahmanyam's statement made<BR> in 1997). <P> * Conduct a cost-benefit analysis, keeping in mind both "human and national security" needs. <P> * Evolve suitable foreign and defence policies to match the above requirements. <P> * Examine the existing structure of the Ministry of Defence and suggest a more responsive architecture. <P> * If the nuclear answer is for the weapon, announce the doctrine, which should be brief and concise. Leave the strategic and tactical details to be evolved<BR> by appropriate agencies. The current doctrine is a three-in-one package. It contains doctrine, str ategy and even some tactics. <P> As this strategic review had not been carried out before jumping into the deep end with Pokhran-II, there is an elaborate justification to achieve maximum<BR> credibility with the launching of a grandiose nuclear doctrine. This is based on a 'triad' of air, land-based and sea-launched weapons. The doctrine goes on<BR> to say in paragraph 2.4: "The fundamental purpose of Indian nuclear weapons is to deter the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons by any state<BR> or entity against India and its forces. Ind ia will not be the first to initiate a nuclear strike, but will respond with punitive retaliation should deterrence<BR> fail." This must be read in conjunction with paragraph 2.5, which states: "India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuc lear weapons against<BR> states which do not possess nuclear weapons or are not aligned with nuclear weapon powers." We have suddenly become so powerful that we are<BR> going to take on not only the nuclear weapon powers but also virtually half this world! T his smacks of irrational and xenophobic thinking. Surely this is<BR> not the kind of credible minimum nuclear deterrent that was originally advocated. This is bound to create the demand for a very large and varied nuclear<BR> arsenal that would give us such a ca pability. The trouble is that the people are made to believe that we have it already - "but it is only in the head". <P> In view of the heavy commitment already made through the two mega decisions, one to go overt as a nuclear weapon state and the other to publicise our<BR> nuclear doctrine, which in short is our nuclear wish list, one can foresee the SDR ending up with 'Situa ting the Appreciation' instead of 'Appreciating the<BR> Situation'. Many of us have the habit of taking decisions guided more by instinct, desire or some preconditioned thinking rather than by mature and<BR> careful analysis of the pros and cons of the situation . Here we have a classic example of the former approach, adopted by the BJP-led government. The<BR> NSAB on its part is busy doing gymnastics to justify these decisions, which were made by leaving the SDR to the very end. Needless to say, this end<BR> product wi ll be tailored to be a perfect fit to make it look as "The Complete Plan". <P> When one reads paragraph 2.1 in conjunction with paragraph 4.1 of the doctrine, two things become clear. <P> * First, deterrence can fail, which is what most of us have been saying all along. <P> * Second, the level and weight of punitive retaliation must be such that it inflicts "destruction and punishment" that the aggressor will find unacceptable if<BR> nuclear weapons are used against India and its forces. <P> ANU PUSHKARNA<BR> Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee with R. Chidambaram, Chairman, Atomic Energy<BR> Commission, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister and Brajesh Mishra,<BR> National Security Adviser. <P> This concept amounts to a tacit acceptance of the failure of the "deterrent theory". The approach of no first<BR> use and punitive retaliatory strike gives one the justification to have a much larger arsenal of nuclear weapons.<BR> The number of weapons could go up even further to cater for "adequate retaliatory capabilities after enduring<BR> repetitive attrition attempts" (see paragraph 4.3). These, when viewed in the context of taking on the U.S. and<BR> half the world - the sky is the limit. This is a doctrine for maximum credible deterrence. <P> UNACCEPTABLE DAMAGE <P> A few words on "Unacceptable Damage". It is perhaps best illustrated by quoting Gen. Thomas S. Power, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Air<BR> Command (SAC), who stated in February 1960: "The closest to one man who would know what the minimum dete rrent is would be (Soviet leader<BR> Nikita) Khrushchev, and frankly I don't think he knows from one week to another. He might be able to absorb more punishment next week than he<BR> wants to absorb today. Therefore Deterrent is not a concrete or finite amount" (Atomic Audit, edited by Stephen I. Schwartz and brought out by the<BR> Brookings Institute, page 22). Nor for that matter is how much is acceptable or unacceptable damage. If this be so, we can easily expect more and<BR> more demands to raise your inventory and therefore stockpile weapons to achieve these conjured-up desires of making the adversary think the way<BR> you do. This nuclear doctrine has shaped the course of an inescapable arms race and is therefore unacceptable. We have not come to t he cost factor<BR> yet, which will say much more. <P> With a concept of multiple adversaries, we will certainly face a very serious problem identifying the source of the attack, especially if it comes from a<BR> submarine. Are we to understand that we will retaliate by attacking all nations which possess missil e-carrying submarines? There seems to be no<BR> clarity as to how we propose to deal with ballistic-missile-carrying submarines of the nuclear weapon states. Is it our intention to have a large nuclear<BR> attack submarine fleet, to 'tag and tail' all ballistic- missile-carrying submarines operating in the Indian Ocean? Hopefully we are not visualising a<BR> replication of the "the hunt for Red/ Blue/ Green/ Pink October". We must get our sights trained properly and not get carried away by "it is only in the<BR> head" t heory. It is extremely dangerous, silly and clearly beyond our reach financially for a long time to come. The U.S. Navy has recently<BR> commissioned the "Seawolf" class attack submarine to 'tag and tail' the Russian "Typhoons" and "Deltas". The cost of one Seawolf is $9 billion, or<BR> Rs.38,000 crores, equal almost to the entire defence budget of India for one year. Do we really want to join this league? We were well served by<BR> "Existential Deterrence" as stated by Subrahmanyam in 1997. Instead of this the BJP has gifted the nation the P3I system (Perennial Penury for<BR> the People of India). <P> EARLY WARNING <P> The command, control, communication, information and intelligence (C4 I2) systems are going to be "robust". Presumably that means that the<BR> Command Post will be in a hardened site with back-up alternative locations elsewhere. The chain of command after th e Prime Minister will also be<BR> designated. In the U.S. this is very clearly indicated. It is enacted by Congress and is a public document. Strange was the reaction of National Security<BR> Adviser Brajesh Mishra when he was asked to specify the chain of comma nd after the Prime Minister: "They have to be kept a secret and could not be<BR> revealed for security reasons" (The Times of India, August 18, 1999). For lending credibility to paragraph 4.3 (sub para 2) of the doctrine, "for<BR> the continuity of nuclear command and control, read in conjunction para 2.6 (e)," regarding the 'will' to employ nuclear forces, it is necessary to<BR> identify the chain of command, including all the successors as for the U.S. practice. The U.S. lists a total of 17 people a fter the President who shall<BR> exercise this command (Atomic Audit, Note 42, page 220). Secrecy in this regard is therefore a misplaced concept. <P> The 'robustness' also envisages excellent communications systems, which must survive a first strike by an adversary. The state of the national<BR> communications system today is pitiable. This is borne out by the fact that the Prime Minister remained unaware of the news of Pakistan's nuclear<BR> tests at Chagai even after the rest of the world had learned about it through the electronic media. The Prime Minister's embarrassment was writ all<BR> over his face as he came to learn about the event on the floor of Parli ament. There ended the great strategic gulf which lasted for precisely 14 days.<BR> We do not have radio communications even to guide drivers of fast trains on the Indian Railways, in order to avert accidents. Many incidents which<BR> could have been avoided had such a facility been available, have not yet led to technology upgradation. We see many accidents on the roads; disasters<BR> are frequent - floods, quakes, gas leaks, the capsizing of boats, and much more. Each time the platitudes are repeated and inquirie s conducted, more<BR> as a yardarm clearing exercise. The reason is simple - because the elites in India have ceased to have a soul. All that the political leaderships is busy<BR> doing at the moment is to hurl cheap and vulgar epithets at one another; they do n ot care at all for the people's needs. <P> TRIAD CONCEPT <P> Rear-Admiral Raja Menon, in an article in The Times of India on August 26, states: "There is a serious dysfunction between minimum deterrence<BR> and a tri-service arsenal. The two cannot go together, and is akin to yoking a horse and a camel together ." Clearly, this is our problem. The entire<BR> doctrine, based on no first use and the acceptance of a significant first strike and punitive retaliation, is dependent on survivability capacity for<BR> retaliation. <P> Aircraft-delivered nuclear weapons and land-based missile systems suffer from high vulnerability and therefore poor survivability in the context of a<BR> no-first-use doctrine. The least vulnerable platform - both for detection and for destruction - is the m issile-carrying submarine. General K. Sundarji,<BR> former Chief of the Army Staff, had proposed an arsenal of 40 atom bombs and a couple of submarines as being enough to meet India's<BR> requirements. Even missiles on surface ships have a much greater survivabi lity factor than land-based systems. This form of vectoring need not be<BR> ruled out. <P> Let us examine the cost factor which has conveniently been overlooked by the NSAB. <P> THE COST FACTOR <P> The book Atomic Audit has many interesting features which are worth noting. Although it has carried out an audit of the U.S. nuclear programme,<BR> the parameters and concepts used apply equally to the Indian programme. The outgo has been listed and a nalysed under several headings. Only the<BR> proportion of costs under each heading is shown, as these are likely to remain the same for the Indian programme, notwithstanding the numbers of<BR> nuclear weapons involved. The breakdown is as follows: <P> * Building the bomb - 7 per cent <P> * Deploying the bomb - 55.7 per cent <P> * Targeting and controlling the bomb - 14. 3 per cent <P> * Defending against the bomb - 16.1 per cent <P> * Dismantling the bomb - 0.5 per cent <P> * Nuclear waste management - 6.3 per cent <P> * Victims of U.S. nuclear weapons - 0.04 per cent <P> * Nuclear secrecy - 0.05 per cent <P> * Congressional oversight - 0.02 per cent <P> C.Rammanohar Reddy, with his modest assumptions of the nuclear arsenal, worked out a figure Rs.50,000 crores over a 10-year period. In view of<BR> the rather ambitious plan outlined in the nuclear doctrine we can easily double that figure, in which case we s hall end up with a demand for a sum of<BR> Rs.100,000 crores to be spent over the next 10 years exclusively for the nuclear deterrent. In other words, Rs.10,000 crores a year. This amounts to<BR> an addition of 25 per cent per annum to the already burgeoning def ence expenditure. With Rs.1 crore we can have 10 primary schools, each for<BR> about 50 children, or 10 primary health centres, or water supply for at least 100 villages with five borewells per village - there are several other<BR> options. A sum of Rs.10,000 cr ores would help provide primary education to all children in the country. <P> DEFENCE EXPENDITURE <P> The Kargil experience has thrown up strange and irrational deductions and consequently avoidable demands. The situation requires a management<BR> of both diplomacy and defence. We need to look at these kinds of options as well. <P> * Defence spending has been inadequate. <P> * We need to raise another corps to defend Kargil. <P> * The Air Force needs more aircraft. <P> * The Navy needs more ships and submarines and aircraft carriers. <P> SHANKER CHAKARAVARTY<BR> Defence Minister George Fernandes. <P> Had the government and the Army been alert and listened to the commanders at the scene of action, Pakistani forces<BR> would never have reached where they did and the entire activity would have been nipped in the bud. These hasty and<BR> ill-advised demands woul d never have arisen. We need to do the SDR fast and come up with a composite and integrated<BR> plan. We will otherwise end up making the same mistake of trying to please everybody and at some cost. We certainly<BR> need to be far more pragmatic and realistic th an that. What about opportunity costs? <P> ECONOMIC COSTS <P> The allocation of resources to ensure deterrence and the associated infrastructure have a penalty in terms of<BR> opportunity costs, efficiency versus effectiveness, capital costs, resource consumption and so on. Even in the U.S., the<BR> huge expenditure incurr ed in the nuclear weapons programme has staggered many Americans. General Lee Butler<BR> says: "Atomic Audit lays bare the staggering price exacted upon the most technologically proficient of the Cold War<BR> antagonists. More important, it begins to expo se the policy, planning, and other operational flaws that undercut both<BR> the logic and implementation of deterrence as perceived by its American practitioners." Maybe there is a lesson here for<BR> the Indian nuclear hierarchy. If a correct appraisal is made of the requirements for human security needs in the SDR,<BR> we shall arrive at the correct balance to be maintained between that and other national security requirements. <P> A POTENTIALLY rich country like India, with nearly one billion people - 38 per cent of them are below the poverty line as per the government's own<BR> statistics, but other estimates put the number of poor people at 750 million - is poised to enter an era of arrogant nuclearism so well articulated by the<BR> Indian Nuclear Doctrine. The architects of this document in the NSAB have not even addressed the cost factor to study the economic impact of such<BR> far-reaching recommendations. Instead of starting with an SD R to determine what was required by way of both human and national security needs,<BR> we are now left with the Hobson's choice of evolving and supporting a nuclear weaponisation programme and its doctrine. Hopefully our countrymen<BR> will put some saner leader ship in place to manage our strategic environment better. Even now it is not too late to disengage from this useless, costly<BR> and totally unnecessary 'evil'. Let us try and craft a whole new strategic initiative and evolve an India-China-Pakistan peace an d security agreement<BR> for the next century. This 'Triad' would be far more effective and much cheaper in the long run. We need to usher in the new millennium with a new<BR> vision and mission if we are not to go down in history as the failed gen eration. <P> Admiral L. Ramdas (retd) is a former Chief of the Naval Staff.

Please ignore Ramdas' political insinuations but concentrate on the technical points that he has raised.

Interesting article, tough to separate the politics from the technical arguments, but here is a response based on a very quick read.<P>"We are far more advanced than<BR>those with the black box with the button." This remark exudes technical superiority. <BR><P>This does not "exude" technical superiority, just a different doctrine. It appears that Ramdas does not "understand" that which he pontificates on.<P>If Subrahm anyam himself felt in 1997 that the"Existential Deterrence" was working [...] <P>Again, Ramdas speaks as though evolution of the IND has occurred in a vacuum. Unfortunately, the Ghauri test changed the nature of deterrrence necessary on the Subcontinent.<P>Surely this is not the kind of credible minimum nuclear deterrent that was originally advocated. <P>Again Ramdas seems to ignore the events of the past year, with unilateral (Wag the Dog) type attacks on Afganistan, Sudan, Iraq, Kosovo and more recently in East Timor. If your deterrent posture does not evolve with the global threat posture that your nation faces, it rapidly becomes irrelevant (and therefore deleterious to your national security).<P>to publicise our nuclear doctrine, which in short is our nuclear wish list, <P>Again Ramdas' politics confuse this thinking. A doctrine is a part of deterrence. There is no credibility if your enemies don't understand the conditions under which your nuclear weaponry will be used.<P>First, deterrence can fail, which is what most of us have been saying all along. <P>This is the obvious contradiction that has faced nuclear weapon logic from day one. Ramdas is not to be credited with any insight here. The problem is that we have to live with this contradiction because the alternative (nuclear blackmail) is *even worse*.<P>Ramdas' comments on "unacceptable damage" are silly to the point of not needing any rebuttal.<P>The cost of one Seawolf is $9 billion, or<BR>Rs.38,000 crores, equal almost to the entire defence budget of India for one year. Do we really want to join this league? We were well served by "Existential Deterrence" as stated by Subrahmanyam in 1997. <P>Ramdas is willfully mixing metaphors to confuse the public. No one has claimed that India ahs a "forward from the sea" policy, or wants to police the world -- which is the sort of policy that requires a Seawolf. Yet Ramdas uses that bogey to discredit something totally unrelated. Ramdas would do well to ask himself whether "existential deterrrence" is in fact valid today -- or even in April of 1998.<BR>

I do not for a moment think that the IN proposes building an equivalent to Seawolf!We do not have that kind of money,but are using innovation to establish our modest triad which will suffice for us.It is a fact that we can build much at cheaper cost than the developed nations.For instance,the recent statement by a Polish officer on how Indian costs were lower than in his own country,the costs of staellite launches etc.,show that we can be cost effective.<P>As far as a nuclear sub is concerned,it is the technology and cost of the reactor and it's related eqpt.,that matters both costwise and effectiveness.The rest remains much the same as with conventional submarines.Adm. Ramdas does know a lot about the IN's future plans,the ATV etc.,being a former CNS.It would be interesting to know whether there has been a change of tack from his days and now regarding the shape of the various projects that he questions.<P>The fundamental point that must be asked of the coincientious objectors who are against nuclear weapons ,is how they expect those nations who feel threatened by the nuclear powers to reconcile themselves to the permanency of nuclear weapons that the nuclear hypocracies want?Do they believe in submission and thralldom?Do they want to bring into force in the next Millenium a "neo-nuclear colonialism"?I wish these objectors like Adm.Ramdas and his tribe of entertaining scribes start demonstrating in front of the embassies of the nuclear states in the capital,or perhaps the chattering elite will not do so for fear of losing their invitations to diplomatic soirees and their liquid refreshment!

From The Pioneer, 10/11/99.........<BR>Nuclear onus on Navy<P> Sat Pal<BR> The draft Nuclear policy document talks of the triad platform, which<BR> means keeping the second-strike nuclear weapons in the air, on the<BR> land, and on-board submarines. It is amazing that the collective<BR> wisdom of all the worthy members of the NSC has decided to ignore<BR> the lessons, which one ought to have learnt from the American<BR> experience of deployment of nuclear warheads.<P> All students of military history are aware that the<BR> Americans were forced to abandon the<BR> land-based missiles, for retaliatory purposes,<BR> due to the phenomenal cost of keeping them on<BR> the move, always, to avoid enemy localising the<BR> launchers. Even if we assume that India can<BR> afford the ?perpetual-mobile? missile<BR> launchers, we cannot ignore the reality that all<BR> land-based missile sites can be destroyed in<BR> ?first-strike? by the enemy.<BR> That is why the Americans and the Russians<BR> have decided to retain, by 2003, only 500<BR> land-based missiles each. Both countries know<BR> that these 500 land-based missiles are sitting<BR> ducks and have agreed to keep 1750 (Russia)<BR> and 1728 (America) missiles on their<BR> submarines. They have also agreed to allow<BR> America and Russia to keep 1272 and 750<BR> weapons respectively on their bombers. By<BR> 2003, France and Britain by tactfully downsizing<BR> their arsenal, will have 300-400 each, and all in<BR> submarines. The same applies to China with<BR> about 250 nuclear warheads.<BR> The US and Russia have decided to keep some<BR> nuclear weapons on the bombers only because<BR> of super-power syndrome they both suffer from<BR> and which India must avoid to be a victim of.<BR> Keeping few squadrons of aircraft which can<BR> launch medium range nuclear missiles are<BR> always better than the submarines for deterrent<BR> purpose, since they can be flown to a country -<BR> as military aid - which is threatened with a<BR> nuclear attack. Our draft nuclear policy is silent<BR> on extending nuclear help to friendly countries<BR> and hence there is no need to have any nuclear<BR> bomber squadrons.<BR> It is quite obvious then that, for a smaller<BR> nuclear striking force, submarine is the only<BR> weapon platform. These days submarine<BR> launched ballistic missiles are as accurate as<BR> land-launched ones and are far less vulnerable<BR> to attack. In modern times, the role of surface<BR> fleets with the Navy is over. Surface ships are<BR> basically meant to transport the Army?s<BR> expeditionary force to whatever place it is<BR> required on other side of the ocean, and then<BR> provide hotel facilities to soldiers and airmen to<BR> the extent possible.<BR> However, a submarine is genuine and true only<BR> if it can maintain its locational secrecy by having<BR> a system of propulsion, which is air<BR> independent. One option, which India decided to<BR> exercise in 1969, is to have nuclear propulsion.<BR> That was the start of the project ATV which was<BR> given the go-ahead by Indira Gandhi in 1969,<BR> after Brezhnev promised her complete support<BR> for the project. Unfortunately, the secret<BR> Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project to<BR> provide nuclear propulsion for the submarines<BR> has been one of the most ill-managed projects<BR> of Independent India.<BR> Although India has the capability to build the<BR> hull - the detailed engineering drawings for<BR> which were sold to India by Russia in 1980 -<BR> and developing/acquiring the necessary sensors,<BR> the ATV project has been stymied by several<BR> system integration problems in trying to<BR> downsize a 190 MW Pressurised Water Reactor<BR> (PWR), to fit into the space available within the<BR> submarine hull. Now after 30 years and<BR> spending more than Rs 2000 crore on<BR> development of the ?indigenous? reactor, the<BR> nucleocrats have decided to buy the Russian<BR> reactor which was offered them in 1969 itself.<BR> The fear is that even when the proto-type is<BR> launched it may be a case of too little and too<BR> late.<BR> Most probably, the vessel - it is not called a<BR> submarine for good reasons - will be able to<BR> dive just to prove that Indian scientists have<BR> bought the design from Russia of a reactor<BR> which can go critical underwater. This cannot<BR> serve as a nuclear weapon platform to provide<BR> India with a second strike capability. In the light<BR> of the military psychology of Pakistan, India will<BR> have to fight a full-fledged war with Pakistan<BR> sooner or later.<BR> In our interest, therefore, the showdown ought<BR> to be later when we have a submarine capable of<BR> performing her strategic role. Her specifications<BR> have to be such that she has a clear speed<BR> advantage on surface ships to maintain<BR> locational secrecy. This can be achieved only if<BR> the submarine has sufficient power and<BR> optimally designed hull and propulsion system<BR> to impart her a speed of 20-30 nautical miles<BR> (Knts) higher than the speed of surface ships.<BR> For this purpose 60 Knts is not considered too<BR> ambitious a speed. Her automation also has to<BR> be of such high calibre that her crew need not be<BR> more than 20 submariners, chosen perhaps from<BR> two million aspirants. To fulfill her strategic<BR> mission she must carry and be able to deploy<BR> atomic and thermo-nuclear warheads on<BR> torpedoes, submarine-to-submarine,<BR> submarine-to-air, and submarine-to-surface<BR> missiles.<BR> India may not be able to exercise her preferred<BR> option of second strike in the event of a nuclear<BR> attack. The gross mismanagement of the ATV<BR> has, therefore, created a ***** in the national<BR> security armour. If the National aspirations, as<BR> envisaged in the draft nuclear document, are to<BR> be met Indian Navy must immediately buy two<BR> nuclear submarines as a stop-gap arrangement<BR> even while a thorough shake up of the ATV<BR> project management is done to put in place a<BR> more professional team.