LTTE Order of Battle, June 2000

B.Raman · Post by **B.Raman** » 29 Jun 2000 14:15

Mr.Roshan. I read yr. note with great interest. This represents the position on which date?Do U know of any website which gives data on this subject periodically? Can I chat with U on this subject?

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 29 Jun 2000 21:18

Roshan,Thanks pal.. BTW Admin.. please archive this thread. B.Raman,Sir, happy to see you(on the board), and my rather belated congratulations on your appointment to the NSAB.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 29 Jun 2000 21:40

Quite an arsenal by modern standards.It would be interesting to calculate how much this would approximately cost.I mentioned in another post that it is time that terrorist outfits like the LTTE were taken into consideration by defence planners in the Asia-Pacific region.The LTTE if these figures are true,possess a greater number of ships and armed small craft than many other island nations.To counter this,the SL navy is obtaining Israeli Gabriel missile armed Saar class vessels.This is a significant development.The IN and Coast Guard will consequently also have to beef up the capabilities of their vessels patrolling the area of conflict.

Prof Raghu · Post by **Prof Raghu** » 30 Jun 2000 07:13

Roshan, A minor historical correction. Ellala (aka Elela Singhan) was actually Rajaraja's commander - he commanded the force sent to Lanka. He also was the one who agreed to Dushtagamanu's request for one-on-one combat (wrestling). D was much younger than Ellala, and of course had a cause, so he won; the graceful Tamil commander thereupon gave D his kingdom.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 30 Jun 2000 08:31

A very good open source attempt Roshan.A few miscellaneous items you should add to the list ; GPS navigation units.50 (12.5mm) Browning Machine GunsRPG series weapons at very least in the high hundreds.Carl Gustav 84mm rocket launchers various light machineguns of Soviet and Chinese origin (the latter mostly captured from the SLA)field comunication radios.Communications interception and monitoring equipment. Lots and lots of stripey uniforms supposedly designed by Prabakharan himself. Very similar to SEAL uniforms in Vietnam. Comabatants all have personal webbing. The Stingers were suggested in one report as having been acquired via the PKK from Greece which license manufactures them. Difficult to beleive given the weak Kurdish success at bringing down Turkish aircraft. Perhaps they only arranged the contacts. JEM, looking for a pet project to sink you teeth into? The shipping estimates orginate from a recent Lloyd's List report.Another partially built mini submarine was discovered by Thai authorities at Koh Si-rae in Phuket in April of this year. The estimates of assault weapons are definitely on the very low side.The MBT and MBRL numbers are also probably also low. I've heard MBT figures between six and eight. The SLA has not been able to account for all of it's equipment, but that doesn't mean they are in Tiger hands AND in working condition. [This message has been edited by Johann (edited 29-06-2000).]

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 30 Jun 2000 08:48

Recent report in WSJ, and at <A HREF="http://www.eelam.com," TARGET=_blank>www.eelam.com,</A> says that a cargo ship, escorted by Super Dvora gunboats, was sunk/damaged and abandoned after an LTTE boat loaded with explosives rammed it. The ship was to resupply the SLA "trapped" in Jaffna....The eelam.com report speaks of a "flotilla" of LTTE gunboats. I am very curious how such "flotillas" can survive for so many years, under the eyes of an enemy air force which has total air superiority. Has the ground fighting just stopped? Is it now a seige situation? [This message has been edited by narayanan (edited 29-06-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 30 Jun 2000 09:45

Roshan, it was worth the wait.. BTW do you have any estimate/information about the structure of the LTTE? I saw one a very long time ago in India-Today but that is obviously no good today... so would like to hear anything you have to say about it. I don't know about the others but I'd appreciate the SLA orbat as well so when you do have time please put it on the thread.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 30 Jun 2000 10:51

A Very Commendable Effort Roshan,the holdings of the SLAF interested me a lot. Obviously they have come a long way since 1988, when the only opposition the Mirage 2000s expected were the turboprop Siai Marchettis. (I hope I got the spelling right).Of Particular interest is the Four F-4 phantoms. When did the SLAF Acquire them?

Rupak · Post by **Rupak** » 30 Jun 2000 11:02

RoshanGood job.I should point out that there are Pakistani AF officers helping with maintaining the SLAF transports esp C-130s. Two Pakistani engineers were part of the team that took delivery of ex-RAF C-130s last month. See the latest AFM for details!

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 30 Jun 2000 13:39

Here is what i have about the SLA.. it is culled mainly from the Sunday Times. SL-NSC. a. Minister or more than one minister of cabinet rank(Most likely: Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (Public Administration, Home Affairs and Plantation Industries)) b. Deputy minister in charge of Defence.(Gen Anuruddha Ratwatte). c. Secretary to the President (Kusumsiri Balapatabendi)d. Secretary to the ministry in charge of Defence.(Chandrananda de Silva)e. Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)(Gen. Rohan de S. Daluwatte)f. Commander of the Army (Lt.General Srilal Weerasooriya)g. Commander of the Navy(Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera)h. Commander of the Air force (Air Marshal Jayalath Weerakoddy)i. Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku.j. Director General of Internal IntelligenceIntelligence Units.Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Counter Subversion Unit (CSU), Terrorism Investigation Division (TID), Crime Detective Bureau (CDB), Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII) Directorate of Military Intelligence Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) Other Officers of Relevance. 1) Rear Admiral Daya Sandagiri (Chief of Staff, Sri Lanka Navy) 2) Air Vice Marshal Donald Perera (Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Air Force). 3)Additional Director General of the Directorate of Internal Intelligence (DII), T.V. Sumanasekera 4) DIG (CID) Punya de Silva 5) iGP(R), Frank Silv, DG Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DFI)Structure Gen. Rohan Daluwatte, (CDS) Overall Commander of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, Chairman of the Joint Operations Bureau( coordinates Army, Navy, Air force, and Police). Lt.General Srilal Weerasooriya (Commander of the Army). Major General Lionel Balagalle(Formerly Army Chief of Staff, Deputy Commander of the Army). Maj. General Janaka Perera, Overall Operations Commander (OOC)(North) Jaffna also CAS. Major General Sarath Fonseka (Security Forces Commander, Jaffna, formerly DGGS Colombo) Major General Chula Seneviratne(Former Force Comm. Jaffna, presently Director General General Staff (DGGS), Colombo) Major General Neil Dias,Former Commander, Security Forces, Wanni, also DyCAS, and Commandant Volunteer Force(SLAVF) (HQ at Pelawatte/Battaramulla). Maj. Gen. Nihal Marambe, (Overall Operations Commander, Colombo (OCC)(South)) Maj Gen. A.K. Sooriyabandara (Army's Master General Ordnance, presently heading a Court of Enquiry into the loss of equipment in Wanni)Brigadier K. B. Egodawala, officiating GOC of the 54 DivisionBrigadier Sivali Wanigasekera (Formerly GOC 55 Div, Presently GOC 53 Div replacing Maj. Gen. Sisira Wijesuriya who is sick)Brig. Hiran Halangoda (name appears in connection with Weli Oya/Manal aru, a former Cdo he is presently believed to be commanding the 55 Division)Brigadier Gamini Hettiaratchi (Formerly(GOC) 53 Div, presently GOC of 22 Division Trincomalee.) Brigadier Palitha Fernando (military spokesperson). Brigadier Sunil Tennekoon (?? targetted by a suicide bomber Minstry of Social Services? possibly a CT expert.)Brig. Mohan Rockwood (Brigadier, General Staff, Jaffna) Brigadier C.J. Ranaweera, Army Headquarters.Brigadier D.U. Munasinghe (Principal Staff Officer, HQ SLAVF.)Brigadier P. Pannipitiya, (Brigadier GS, Security Forces Headquarters, Jaffna.)Brigadier K.D.A. Perera, Deputy Logistics Commander, Headquarters Logistics Command. Brigadier M.D.R. Peiris Director, Engineering Services. Brigadier M.R.W. de Soysa AQ at Security Force Headquarters Wanni, Additional Director (Welfare) at Army Headquarters Brigadier M.L. Jayaratne Brigadier AQ at Security Forces Headquarters in Wanni.Brigadier R.W.W.M.H.N. Halangoda Deputy General Officer Commanding 21 Division. Brigadier D.V.S.Y. Kulatunga, Deputy GOC, 55 Division.Brigadier K. J. N. Senaweera, Military Secretary.Brigadier Nissanka Wijesinghe Director Plans, Director, Operations at Army Headquarters. Brigadier N. A. Jayasuriya, Deputy Commandant, Army Command and Staff College. Brigadier Colvin Jayaratne.(?? CT Expert?)Colonel S.M. De A. Rajapakse SG staff, officer officiating commander, headquarters 223 Brigade.Col. A.M.B. Peiris Col GS at Headquarters 11 Division.Colonel Roshan Silva,(Formerly CO of the Air Mobile Brigade.)Col. Piyal Abeysekera, Commander, 221 Brigade in TrincomaleeCol. Rajitha Silva, Commander for 513 Brigade, Colonel Bhatiya Jayatilleke, Commanding Officer of 541 Brigade Col. Leonard Marks, Commanding Officer, 542 BrigadeColonel Lalith Daulagala, Commanding Officer of the 546 BrigadeLt. Col. H.N.B. Herath (RHQ, Military Intelligence Corps and function as officiating Commanding Officer, Directorate of Military Intelligence.)Lt. Col. V.R.L. Anthonisz officiating commander, Headquarters 524 Brigade.Lt.Col. S.A.A.L. Perera (Deputy Commander, HQ 513 Brigade).Lt. Col. N.A.J.C. Dias officiating commander of Special Forces Brigade.Lt.Col. R.V. Konavinna Reserve Headquarters as Centre Commandant 22 Div. Lt. Col. V.U.B. Nanayakkara, officiating Colonel GS at Directorate of Operations, Army Headquarters. Formations of the SLA in the Jaffna Region. 51 Inf Div. (Jaffna,remote posts withdrawn to Palaly.) 513 Bde(Jaffna). 52 Inf Div.(Presently at Kilali) 523 Bde(Kilali) 524 Bde (??) 53 Inf Div.(Formerly-Elephant Pass)Special Forces Group (2 Bn SF (Used to hang around Vakarai))Air Mobile Brigade 533 Brigade. (5 bn of the Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI)(used be around Batticaloa)534 Brigade. (3 Bn Ceylon Light Infantry (CLI)) 54 Inf Div.(Formerly-Elephant Pass, presently-Kilali) 541 Bde(used to be at Iyakachchi until it got overrun.. dont know if there were any survivors.) 542 Bde(used to be at Iyakachchi until it got overrun.. dont know if there were any survivors.) 543 Bde(Formerly at Paranthan presently ??) 544 Bde(Formerly at Paranthan presently ??) 546 Bde(Formerly at Paranthan presently ??) Divisional List just north of Vavuniya. (these formations participated in NEERECHIDU (OP WATERSHED) and subsequently pushed back by LTTE and the 55,56 Div assets got badly mauled, so their commanders were fired). 55 Inf Div.(Formerly-Kanakarayanlulam presently- North of Vavuniya) 2bn Gajaba Regiment (GR) (Ex- oddusudan) 8bn of the Vijayaba Infantry Regiment(VIR) 3 bn Sinha Regiment (Nedunkerny). 56 Inf Div.(Formerly-Kanakarayanlulam, presently north of Vavuniya) 561 Brigade(??) 20 Bn Sri Lanka National Guard, 11 Bn of the Gemunu Watch. 15th Volunteer Bn of the Sinha Regiment. 563 Bde.(??)Divisional List SLA south of battle zone. 21 Inf. Div (Mannar) 212 Brigade (Mannar). 22 Inf Div. (Trincomalee) 221 Bde (Trincomalee). 223 Bde(??)11 Inf Div (Colombo)112 Bde(Colombo)*****SLAVF (Battaramulla or at Pelawatte)4 Engineer Rgt. and that's all i have at present. [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 02-07-2000).]

Mandeep · Post by **Mandeep** » 30 Jun 2000 17:11

This is really good stuff! Imagine the threat to India! And our politicos want the LTTE to be given power in our backyard!! Beats me how their brain processes work!

B.Raman · Post by **B.Raman** » 30 Jun 2000 21:19

Thanks. An amazing collation. I take my hats off to U.I wish GOI agencies R as systematic.

Nikhil Shah · Post by **Nikhil Shah** » 30 Jun 2000 21:41

<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Good Job! BUT, unless you have published your material somewhere and copyrighted (in which case you need to provide a refenrece), everything posted on BR is a BR Copyright.

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 30 Jun 2000 23:10

At the moment there is a lull before the storm.July 23rd approaches.That is the infamous date when the 1983 anti-Tamil riots took place after 13 Sri Lankan soldiers were blown up in a land mine attack in the north.To those who went through it and survived,it is an experience etched in one's memory.The next LTTE offensive is expected on or before that date.Meanwhile,for the first time in ages,the moderate Tamil party,the TULF,many of whose members have been exterminated by the LTTE,have called for the LTTE to talk peace and not wage war.So far,the TULF have been so brutalised by the LTTE,that it's leadership has been unable to say this before. Not that the LTTE is going to respond at all to this call.It holds the other Tamil groups in utter contempt,it only indicates that there is some momentum on the political front.Today is the deadline for the govt and opposition to agree upon a devolution package,which the SL President is putting all her efforts behind.Once a pakcage is spelt out,it is hoped by the govt that the moderate and anti-LTTE groups will support it,thus cutting the political ground from under the LTTE's feet.AS the days go on with Jaffna still in govt hands,the SL govt hopes that it can restore the military strength of the Army sufficiently to withstand further LTTE attempts to take Jaffna.It remains to be seen as to who has the upper hand.Interestingly,it is the naval battles that are becoming more crucial to the result of the battle on land.Both the govt and the LTTE are attemtping to use the sea to resupply their forces and prevent each other from gaining the advantage at sea.The SL govt has lost 4 Super Dvora attack craft in the recent fighting.The arrival of larger missile armed corvettes is eagerly awaited by the SL navy.It remains to be seen whether with more advanced warships and aircraft,whether the SL forces can gain the advantage against the LTTE.With regard to the LTTE's arsenal,years ago a diplomat told me that it amazed the Indian establishment the quantity and range of the LTTE's arms ,that were captured by the IPKF.It was far more than what the LTTE was given by Indian agencies.The size of the LTTE's arsenal is so great within Sri Lanka alone,that even a very small percentage of it could cause tremendous havoc within Tamilnadu alone.No one has forgotten the Meenambakkam airport bombing by the LTTE.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 30 Jun 2000 23:56

Here is one more name in the SLG list. the elite Special Task Force of the Police. Its Commandant, DIG Nimal Gunatilake, The LTTE List i have reads as follows. S.P. Tamilselvan, Head of Political Wing of the LTTEKaruna (Field Commander at Wanni, OOC Unceasing Waves III)Commanding/Serving Officers of Military Wing.Karikalan, Jeyam, Ramesh (Formerly Military Wing Commander at Pandiyankulam junction)Rabat,Banu, Nagesh,Theepan(Commander Kilinochchi) Anton, Selvaraj Balraj. (The Commander of the LTTE Task Force which attacked the out of the so-called Vathirayan Box — a rectangular stretch that juts inland between the coastal villages of Mulliyan and Vannankulam.)Kannan.(Allegedly exfiltrated Balraj after elements of 533 and 534 Bde, surrounded him on the A9). Women cadre (again inconnection with LTTE Ops in Wanni). Asha, Durga Malathi. Civilians co-opted to other "units" include 1) the Uthavi Padai (Help Force), 2) Ellai Force (Border Force), 3) Grami Force (village force). Sea Tigers.Birendran Master (Belived to be the Seat Tiger DGMO, Recently participated in an amphibious attack on the Vathirayan Box)LTTE UNITS.(These guys are part of Karuna's OrBat right now)Batticaloa Intelligence Unit, Imran-Pandiyan Unit, Charles Anthony Unit. It'll take some more time to put things together properly and honestly speaking all or any of those names up there are most probably non-de-guerres, also the possibility of many of those people being dead cannot be neglected. The situation is highly fluid. But the following things can be said with some degree of certainity. The LTTE has almost no static formations. It has some regular units, but it raises fresh units pretty much as it needs them, giving them all manner of names. The present LTTE strategy is very similar to a regular army, whereby a reserve of about 1000-1500 is maintian at the time of an attack. The LTTE seems to have a penchant for human wave attacks spearheaded by suicide bombers. There is nothing to indicated a regular system of promoting people.. and ranks appear to be handed out quite generously. Other than these factors, the LTTE has all the hallmarks of a regular army, albeit one in a high state of flux. The Sea and Black Tiger units appear to be elite units of the LTTE, people from other units actually have to petition the high command to join them. The `ranks' offered to Sea and Black Tigers appear to be higher and the Black Tiger Group is very closely linked to LTTE Intelligence Operations which are most likely headed up by Pottu Amman.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 01 Jul 2000 03:12

SLA information. From <A HREF="http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... ID+lk0165)" TARGET=_blank>http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... lk0165)</A> The commander of the army exercises direct operational control over the force. In early 1988, the government announced a major reorganization of the army, creating several high-level posts to accommodate the new structure. Under this revised chain of command, the commander of the army (upgraded from lieutenant general to general) will be assisted by a deputy commander (a lieutenant general) and a chief of staff (a major general). Apart from the Colombo District, which will be under the direct authority of Army Headquarters, the island will be divided into two area commands and twenty-one sectors. Each area command is scheduled to have 12,000 troops under the authority of a major general, with a brigadier as chief of staff. When the reorganization is completed, each sector will have a full battalion of troops dedicated to its defense. The individual regiments (such as the Sri Lanka Light Infantry and the Sinha Regiment) operated independently and recruited their own members. Officers tended to remain in a single battalion throughout their careers. The infantry battalion, the basic unit of organization in field operations, included five companies of four platoons each. Incomplete reports suggest that a typical platoon had three squads (sections) of ten personnel each. In addition to the basic infantry forces, a commando regiment was established in 1986. Support for the infantry was provided by two reconnaissance regiments (one regular, one reserve), two field artillery regiments (one regular, one reserve), one antiaircraft regiment, one field engineering regiment, one engineering plant regiment, one signals battalion, a medical corps, and a variety of logistics units. from. <A HREF="http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... ID+lk0175)" TARGET=_blank>http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?f ... lk0175)</A> In 1988 the police force was divided into three geographic commands--known as ranges--covering the northern, central, and southern sectors of the island. The ranges were subdivided into divisions, districts, and stations, and Colombo was designated as a special division. In 1974 there were a total of 260 police stations throughout the country. In more remote rural areas beyond the immediate range of existing police stations, law enforcement functions are carried out by locally elected village headmen (grama seva niladhari, literally "village service officers"). In addition to its regular forces, the national police operated a small reserve contingent and a number of specialized units responsible for investigative and paramilitary functions. Routine criminal activity was handled by the Criminal Investigation Department under the command of an assistant superintendent of police. More coordinated threats to internal security, such as that posed by the radical Sinhalese Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna were the responsibility of the Countersubversive Division, which was primarily an investigative division. Special operational units included the Commando Squad of the Colombo police and the Special Task Force. The former, a 200-strong riot control force, was established following the anti-Tamil riots of 1983. The Special Task Force is a police field force. It was set up in 1984 with the assistance of foreign advisers (primarily former British Special Air Service personnel under the auspices of Keeny Meeny Services, see Foreign Military Relations , this ch.). Its 1,100-member force was organized into 7 companies and trained in counterinsurgency techniques. It played a major role in the government's combined force operations against the Tamil Tigers in Eastern Province before July 1987. Following the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the Special Task Force was redesignated the Police Special Force, and deployed in Southern Province, where it immediately went into action against the JVP terrorists. Companies of the force also served in rotation as part of the presidential security guard. Until 1984 the police were responsible for national intelligence functions, first under the Special Branch, and later under the Intelligence Services Division. The perceived failure of the Intelligence Services Division during the riots of July 1983 led the Jayewardene government to reevaluate the nation's intelligence network, and in 1984 the president set up a National Intelligence Bureau. The new organization combined intelligence units from the army, navy, air force, and police. It was headed by a deputy inspector general of police who reported directly to the Ministry of Defence. IPCS.(INFORMATION IS DATED 1997) 4 Task force HQ 1 Mechanised infantry brigade 1 Air mobile brigade 23 Infantry brigades 1 Independent special forcesbrigade 1 Armoured regiments 3 Armoured recce regiments 4 Field artillery regiments 4 Field engineering regiments Unit Major General A.K. Sooriyabandara, Army's Master General Ordnance[This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 30-06-2000).]

B.Raman · Post by **B.Raman** » 01 Jul 2000 10:18

According to the Americans, while they were liberal in the issue of Stingers to the Afghan Mujahideen through the ISI, they kept a tight control over the issue of replacement batteries. The last Stingers and batteries were issued by them in 1988. The batteries would not be usable after 1992. Unless the ISI and the Mujahideen have cladestinely acquired the batteries from somewhere or managed to extend the life-periods of the bateries issued in 1988, there is very little threat from them.But the Americans always act on the assumption that they might have done this and take precautions as if a threat from Stingers still exists. Any comments?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 03 Jul 2000 00:19

It appears that there is a fundamental assumption with regards to the batteries. Ultimately, we can consider a battery to be a power source that can deliver a certain number of amps at a certain AC or DC voltage.This cannot be that hard for someone with a modicum of chemical or electrical engineering ability to figure out.Is there something that I'm not "getting"?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 03 Jul 2000 00:21

Does anyone want to attempt a psy-int analysis of hte Tigers? Look forward to reading what Roshan, Sainis, Fowler, Johann, and Raman among others have to say.Here is an attempt from IPCS: <A HREF="http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/382-sl-deva.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/382-sl-deva.html</A>

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 03 Jul 2000 00:29

Dear Mr.Raman: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR>The batteries would not be usable after 1992.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Wasn't the IAF helicopter shot down using a Stinger in the first days of the Kargil air war?

Calvin · Post by **Calvin** » 03 Jul 2000 00:33

More from IPCS:Would implications and possibilities of a Tamil Eelam. Narayanan, I'm sure you are chomping at the bit here: <A HREF="http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/383-sl-mano.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.ipcs.org/issues/articles/383-sl-mano.html</A> <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:<HR> What will be the future of an independent Tamil state? Will Eelam be able to survive in the long run? What will be the problems faced by it? <LI>Firstly, the territorial contiguity of Eelam will pose severe problems. It constitutes as demanded by the Tigers, the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, which is roughly 40 percent of its land area and 60 per cent of the sea coast. The Muslims in the Amparai district have ruled out joining a separate Tamil state. Eelam has large Sinhalese majority areas. It is also doubtful whether over 40 per cent the Sri Lankan Tamils, settled in the south will migrate to the Jaffna peninsula. Even if they do, they will have to start life afresh, for which opportunities are very limited. <LI>Secondly, there is fear that Eelam will be ruled by the LTTE in a fascist and authoritarian manner. There are also possibilities of a civil war breaking out over power sharing, considering the bitter rivalries between various Tamil groups. Jaffna Tamils and Batticaloa Tamils differ in “social organisation, economic activity and cultural practices”. There are Hindus and Christians. There are serious caste cleavages. Though there have never been any clashes, relations between the upper caste Vellalas and lower caste Karaiyars and Mukkuvars have never been cordial. <LI>Thirdly, the economic viability of the future Eelam is not encouraging. The major area comprising the ‘Tamil homeland’ falls under the arid zone. It was for this reason that many Tamils moved south in the past. One can argue that the future Tamil State could survive on funds that Tigers get from expatriates and through narcotic smuggling. Can the Tamil Eelam become another apex of the ‘Golden Triangle’? <LI>Fourthly, what will be the nature of relations between the Eelam and partitioned Sri Lanka? It is possible that the two entities will slip back over the, when the Tamil and the Sinhalese kingdoms were at war seeking supremacy over each other. Before the integration of the island by the British into a single administrative unit in 1833, no king was content to rule only a part of the island, as it was considered a single contiguous territory by both ethnic groups. In addition to this historical legacy, the deep-rooted Indo-phobia will in come to play. An independent Tamil state will be considered a satellite of India. <LI>Fifthly, international recognition is important for a modern state to survive in an increasingly interdependent world. The international community does not like any further proliferation of new states. The US was categorical when it asserted that Tamil Eelam would be a “dead planet” without any acknowledgement from the world community. Can a new state afford to take such a risk? <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>[This message has been edited by Calvin (edited 02-07-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Jul 2000 03:50

From the sunday times. from the front page. a picture of a replica of a boat designed by SLAVF 4 Engineer Regt at the Voluntary Forces Head Quarters in Battaramulla.Possible Promotions within the SLA. 1) Major General Lionel Balagalle (to become Commander of the Sri Lanka Army within the next few weeks)2) Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya (tipped for a diplomatic appointment, possibly Pakistan, whose military ruler General Pervaiz Musharaff, was his colleague at the Pakistan Military Academy.(???? hello this is new!!) 3) Major General Janaka Perera. (tipped for CAS SLA)4) Maj. Gen. Neil Dias, the Deputy Chief of Staff, who is Commandant, Volunteer Force, functions from his headquarters at Pelawatte. I have made changes to the earlier post to make it up to date. [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 02-07-2000).][This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 02-07-2000).]

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 03 Jul 2000 07:53

Roshan, a few minor issues; (1)You left out 'KP', head of the procurement executive, from your list of major LTTE personalities.I would suggest that Sainis and yourself begin to list the important members of known LTTE front organisations around the world. These individuals are usually heavily involved in fundraising and propaganda activity, so they tend to be fairly well known in expatriate tamil communitites. (2) There have been a number of individuals supposedly involved in LTTE weapons training. Two Norweigean ex-special forces NCOs are also among them. (3) The actual numbers of foreign advisors SL is in flux. For example, beyond military attache staff, all of the US advisors that you listed were invloved in JCET (Joint Combined Exercise Training) programmes, meaning that they were on the island for a fixed period that is usually measured in weeks at most. Regarding the Stinger; It is license manufactured in Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey, so it's not just American firms that need to be secured. Of these Greece is the most serious concern. Diversions have happened in the past. Qatar illegally and covertly purchased 12 Stingers when Bahrain was sold 70 Stinger laungchers and further sales to the region were ruled out by the US. An ex Deputy Manager of Standard Electric of Greece is said to have provided Stinger data and 2,000-3,000 electronic chips to the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s. What do you think the chances are that every battery produced can be accounted for? Or that the design data is secure? If someone at BR is looking for an interesting open source project, try to find out which companies (and factories) produced the battery for the Stingers official recipients. The allegation that the Greek secret services via the PKK sold 11 Stingers to the LTTE comes from a German born Kurd named Seydo Hazar in an interview with the Observer (UK) in October of 1997. Hazar was recruited by the PKK for his bomb making skills but fled after he worried that he was marked for execution when he expressed concerns about civillian targets and his devices failed. Hazar was quite credible in terms of his PKK involvement, but given his low level the statement regarding the Stingers can not be taken as definitive. The LTTE also actively procures from the arms markets of Afghanistan/Pakistan and have the financial resources to purchase big ticket items such as Stingers. Greek willingness to sell to a terrorist group is also credible. Their secret service's involvement with the PKK is similar to Pakistani involvement with Khalistani groups, as well as tolerating both Arab and locally produced anti American and British terrorist outfits. They have plenty of former ministers with business interests that can best be descried as 'gray'. The LTTE also has significant Greek shipping interests, and there have been previous reports of LTTE links with the PKK.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Jul 2000 10:24

Johann,I thought `KP' and Pathmanathan were the same. Asking for this kind of information could really upset people.. but there is a multitude of tamil sites on the internet so it should be possible to see something. N. The indian aircraft was alleged shot down by an ANZA-12 that is manuf. by KRL. Calvin,The IPCS stuff doesn't have refernces at the end.. so i am wondering if those things are just abstracts. Here are some names from a first glance on the web. From: Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1999. United States Department of State, April 2000Known Front Organizations of the LTTE.World Tamil Association (WTA) World Tamil Movement (WTM) Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils (FACT) The Ellalan Force The Sangillan ForceThe Tamil Tiger site <A HREF="http://www.eelam.com" TARGET=_blank>www.eelam.com</A> mentions the existance of the Political Committee, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam International Secretariat, 211 Katherine Road, London E6 1BU, United KingdomThe secretariat has an executive committee and a Financial Section, which was headed up by Mr. Kandiah Perinpanathan (who was assasinated in Paris Oct.1996). This body does most of the LTTE's international media management.They also run a news paper called the Tamil Guardian. There is also a weekly newspaper :- The "Eelamurasu" whose editor Mr. Kandiah Gajendran (who was also assasinated in Paris Oct. 1996)Vasantha Raja (Location U.K, Status: Functionary in this Intl. Sec., He is also sometimes described as the "ex-chairman of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation")Sinnappu Maharasingam (CHAIRMAN TAMIL ACTION COMMITTEE UK)(http://www.engsoc.carleton.ca/~sutha/) The World Tamil Movement has several offices in Canada, here is a list of them.. <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/canada/wto.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/canada/wto.htm</A> Recently several `Rising Day' Celebrations were held in Canada(Toronto, Montreal, Ottawa) and in Germany(Herne, Stuttgart). TEEDOR(Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation) also appears on several of these sites. It's international office is in the UK. The International Co-ordination Office: TEEDOR 202 Long Lane London SE1 4QB(There is nothing to indicate that TEEDOR involved in the LTTE's other activities but its name is mentioned on every eelam site). This site <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/</A> has a lot of information about the LTTE. It even has photographs of Black Tigers <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/maav ... alute.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/maav ... te.html</A> There are also quite a few photos of VP. <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/image.shtml" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/image.shtml</A> (Man.. the fellow sure likes to be photographed..)Of the photos, these are interesting. (if anyone knows the faces.. lets see if some of our quotable notables are on these photos). <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a17.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a17.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a19.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a19.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a20.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a20.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a22.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a22.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a36.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a36.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a37.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a37.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a38.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a38.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a39.jpg" TARGET=_blank>http://www.tamilcanadian.com/eelam/nl/images/a39.jpg</A> <A HREF="http://www.eelamweb.com/operation/waves3/" TARGET=_blank>http://www.eelamweb.com/operation/waves3/</A> [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 03-07-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 03 Jul 2000 22:29

Roshan,I just knew there would be trouble if i put up that list. This is actually why i hate that kind of work. I am taking the student organisations off that list.

Johann · Post by **Johann** » 04 Jul 2000 02:09

Sainis, Roshan, sorry I hadn't see Pathmanathan up there earlier.I was looking at the pictures, and I noticed something interesting- Prabakharan does not wear boots, though I recall earlier pictures of him with them. All images show him loafers (one in socks) even when wearing fatigues, even though his aides wear boots. A possible injury? perhaps combat related? If anyone has any recent video imagery of him walking, look for evidence of a limp, though it might be hard to find. Most did not even realise FDR was wheelchair bound for much of his presidency.Maj. Gen. Deva's IPCS piece on a psychological profile of the LTTE admits the basic problem; not enough information. For example not enough is known for example about how eaxctly their suicide squads are conditioned.Rohan Gunaratna is I would think the one person outside the LTTE with the most detailed and current understanding of the entire organisation, its structure, capabilities, goals and composition. Here are two of his papers. <A HREF="http://www.ict.org.il/articles/ltte2.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.ict.org.il/articles/ltte2.htm</A> and <A HREF="http://www.ict.org.il/articles/tigers.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.ict.org.il/articles/tigers.htm</A> The Canadians and Germans (AFAIK) are really the only Western agencies who have done any serious work, and most of the really deailed information they have is on the financial, smuggling and procurement networks. The Sri Lankans are really in the best position to collect but their intelligence agencies are a sorry lot. Mr B. Raman, would you care to comment on whether the Indian agencies have ben able to put together detailed psych profiles with a useful predictive capability?[This message has been edited by Johann (edited 03-07-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 04 Jul 2000 03:01

Johann,Rohan's articles are very nice. I seem to recall that VP was injured in the leg during some stage of Operation Pawan. Here are some more names. From the Sunday Times.Sri Lankan Velauthan Biganathan who was arrested last year over a shooting incident at an LTTE sponsored sports festival in London has been jailed for five years by a British criminal court.Mr. Biganathan was one of some 30 persons arrested or questioned by police following a shoot-out between rival Sri Lankan Tamil groups at a so-called sports festival organised at Warrant Farm School in Southhall last autumn.A.C. Shanthan, LTTE's London chief, was among those questioned by police. [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 03-07-2000).]

Kuttan · Post by **Kuttan** » 04 Jul 2000 08:34

Just checked <A HREF="http://www.eelam.com." TARGET=_blank>www.eelam.com.</A> Blank. eelam.org:notfound. eelam.net has become an Bollywood news page. Crackdown on LTTE on the internet?

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 06 Jul 2000 05:43

From <A HREF="http://www.eelam.com" TARGET=_blank>www.eelam.com</A> Manivannan Head of LTTE International Coordinating Office Tamil Eelam 'Kalathil' (12-Feb-1997 & 26-Feb-1997) Official Tamil periodical of the LTTE International Secretariat. [This message has been edited by sunil sainis (edited 05-07-2000).]

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 07 Jul 2000 11:29

Prakash · Post by **Prakash** » 07 Jul 2000 21:33

Roshan, Sunil: this is good scholarship; thanks.Admins: it may be useful to archive this info.

P Smith · Post by **P Smith** » 08 Jul 2000 00:38

<A HREF="http://www.itn.co.uk/c4news/home/20000705/Story05.htm" TARGET=_blank>http://www.itn.co.uk/c4news/home/200007 ... y05.htm</A> There's a 5 minute video report of the midget sub captured by Thai authorities - likely the one Johann mentioned.

Sunil · Post by **Sunil** » 11 Jul 2000 21:57

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 12 Jul 2000 10:35

Here's a gruesome "order of battle",which is more realistic.The reports coming out indicate that major battles are being fought at this time and that losses have been heavy on both sides as govt troops take the offensive to the LTTE. Wednesday 12, July 2000 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Tiger child soldiers ending up in sealed coffins by Amal Jayasinghe COLOMBO, July 11 (AFP) - Sri Lanka's Tamil Tiger terrorists were increasingly forcing boys and girls as young as 10 years to become soldiers, with many ending up in sealed coffins, a rights group said Tuesday. The University Teachers for Human Rights (UTHR) Jaffna branch said the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) had been recruiting more children amid a string of military successes recently. The UTHR in an 18-page report said nine out of 15 children who were recruited from a school in the rebel-held town of Mallavi had died, underscoring the high mortality rate among child warriors. "Unlike in the earlier phases of fighting where small arms played a dominant role, most of the young being killed on the LTTE side are now brought home in sealed coffins as they had been mangled by shelling," the UTHR said. It said more than 1,000 rebel fighters were hospitalised with serious injuries following the LTTE's bitter offensive that eventually saw the fall of the military's main garrison of Elephant pass on April 22. The UTHR, which the Tamil Tigers deem treacherous, also accused the military of extra-judicial killings, torture and failure to punish officers responsible for deliberate attacks against civilians. It accused the security forces of opening fire and killing a large number of civilians when a bomb exploded in the eastern town of Batticaloa in May and blamed the government for not holding an inquiry. The government used censorship to cover up atrocities committed by the troops, the report said. The UTHR also described as a "myth" the claims that civilians supported the Tamil Tigers in areas of the island's north where the government's writ did not run. "There is a big lie that has been sold to the world. The myth that these people wholly support the LTTE is seldom questioned," the UTHR said. The rights group said a hint of what it was like in the Wanni region came from the testimony of people who had a taste of it. "There are human rights violations under the government of Sri Lanka. But here, there is not a shadow of human rights. "This is no more evident than in the manner in which children are recruited for military service," the UTHR said. It said Tigers had burnt the uniforms of 20 school girls recruited recently and forced them to undergo military training, but after a day, five of them pleaded they wanted to return. "These girls were then isolated, taken to a room, stripped, mercilessly assaulted and pushed onto the ground," the UTHR report said. "The punitive violence was administered by senior girls." The report came amid efforts by the United Nations and non-government organisations to stamp-out the use of children in battle zones, including Sri Lanka. A conference on child soldiers in Kathmandu, held in mid-May, warned poverty, ethnic discrimination and social inequality were among the chief reasons for children ending up in combat. "... children are recruited to serve war's ends -- as porters, 'safe' carriers for bombs, couriers, spies and combatants," the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (CSUCS) said. The LTTE told the United Nations in May 1998 that it would stop conscripting children under 17 years of age and would not use people under 18 in combat. The UN has since said the LTTE reneged on its promise and analysts have said northern Sri Lanka provided a fertile recruitment ground for children.

Avram S · Post by **Avram S** » 12 Jul 2000 14:23

Well said Roshan. AS

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 13 Jul 2000 21:38

Saag.org has an update about current situation(JUly'00) in Sri Lanka. <A HREF="http://www.saag.org/notes2/note110.html" TARGET=_blank>http://www.saag.org/notes2/note110.html</A>

Philip · Post by **Philip** » 14 Jul 2000 07:44

Let me nail the lie of Roshan about his "26" yr old LTTE footsoldiers.Here's the latest from Unicef.To any neutral observer,the greatest danger to the extermination of the Jaffna Tamil people is the LTTE itself.I'm sorry,but Roshan's blatant pro-LTTE propaganda makes me throw up. From the Pioneer India. UNICEF slams LTTE on child soldiers Agencies/ColomboUNICEF on Thursday accused Sri Lanka's separatist Tamil Tigers of going back on their promise to keep children out of the island's vicious ethnic conflict and continuing to recruit them to swell rebel ranks.UNICEF representative in Colombo, Colin Glennie, said the UN agency had repeatedly asked the rebel Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to stop using children under 17 years of age in their war against government troops in the north and east of the country."Whenever we meet the LTTE, we raise the question of child soldiers. But they deny using children. We don't have numbers, but we know it is a serious problem," Glennie told journalists.Two days ago, a human rights group, the University Teachers for Human Rights , Jaffna (UTHRJ) accused the rebels of having stepped up their drive to get more children in the northern Jaffna peninsula to join their ranks.The UTHRJ, in an 18-page document, said the LTTE is coercing schoolchildren through intimidation and propaganda to join the separatist struggle, leaving parents distraught and helpless. The intensified drive began after a flare-up in fighting in April-May, when the Tigers launched a major offensive to capture Jaffna Unlike in the earlier phases of fighting when small arms played a dominant role, most of the young being killed on the LTTE side are now brought home in sealed coffins as they are mangled by shelling," the UTHRJ report said.Glennie underscored the trauma of the 17-year-long war that has claimed at least 60,000 lives for a generation of children growing up in its shadow. "Every child in Sri Lanka is affected to some extent by this conflict. It is more acute for children in combat areas," he said."Generally, there has been a deterioration of the situation of children since the Otunnu visit," Glennie said, referring to the May 1998 visit by UN special envoy Olara Otunnu, whose brief was to examine the condition of Sri Lankan children affected by the conflict.Otunnu met LTTE representatives in the northern Vanni district and extracted a promise from them not to recruit children below 17 and not to use anyone under 18 in their military operations. The UTHRJ accused the LTTE of going back on the undertaking barely seven months later.

Bharat Rakshak

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