This is the text of the document titled "Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan" tabled in Parliament on March 7, 2006:
Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of
July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan
The resumption of full civilian nuclear energy cooperation between India and the
United States arose in the context of India’s requirement for adequate and affordable
energy supplies to sustain its accelerating economic growth rate and as recognition
of its growing technological prowess. It was preceded by discussions between the
two Governments, particularly between President Bush and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh, of the global energy scenario and the long-term implications of
increasing pressure on hydrocarbon resources and rising oil prices. These
developments led to the announcement in April 2005 of an Indo-US Energy Dialogue
that encompassed the entire spectrum of energy options ranging from oil and gas to
coal, alternative fuels and civilian nuclear energy. Through the initiation of a
sustained dialogue to address energy security concerns, the two countries sought to
promote stable, efficient, predictable and cost effective solutions for India’s growing
requirements. At the same time, they also agreed on the need to develop and deploy
cleaner, more efficient, affordable and diversified energy technologies to deal with
the environmental implications of energy consumption. India had developed proven
and wide ranging capabilities in the nuclear sector, including over the entire nuclear
fuel cycle. It is internationally recognized that India has unique contributions to
make to international efforts towards meeting these objectives. India has become a
full partner in ITER, with the full support of the US and other partners. India also
accepted the US invitation to join the initiative on Clean Development Partnership.
2. Noting the centrality of civilian nuclear energy to the twin challenges of energy
security and safeguarding the environment, the two Governments agreed on 18 July
2005 to undertake reciprocal commitments and responsibilities that would create a
framework for the resumption of full cooperation in this field. On its part, the United
States undertook to:
- Seek agreement from the Congress to adjust US laws and policies to achieve full
civil nuclear energy cooperation.
- Work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil
nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to
expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at
Tarapur.
- In the meantime, encourage its partners to consider fuel supply to Tarapur
expeditiously.
- To consult with its partners to consider India’s participation in ITER.
- To consult with other participants in the Generation IV International Forum with a
view towards India’s inclusion.
3. India had conveyed its readiness to assume the same responsibilities and
practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries
with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. Accordingly, India for
its part undertook the following commitments:
- Identifying and separating civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in
a phased manner.
- Filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the IAEA.
- Taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards, and
- Signing and adhering to an Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear
facilities.
4. Other commitments undertaken by India have already been fulfilled in the last
year. Among them are:
- India’s responsible non-proliferation record, recognized by the US, continues and is
reflected in its policies and actions.
- The harmonization of India’s export controls with NSG and MTCR Guidelines even
though India is not a member of either group. These guidelines and control lists have
been notified and are being implemented.
- A significant upgrading of India’s non-proliferation regulations and export controls
has taken place as a result of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of May 2005. Inter-
Ministerial consultations are ongoing to examine and amend other relevant Acts as
well as framing appropriate rules and regulations.
- Refrain from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do
not have them and supporting international efforts to limit their spread. This has
guided our policy on non-proliferation.
- Continued unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, and
- Willingness to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty.
5. The Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, recognized that India is ready to assume the
same responsibilities and practices as other leading countries with advanced nuclear
technology, such as the United States. India has an impeccable record in nonproliferation.
The Joint Statement acknowledges that India’s nuclear programme has
both a military and a civilian component. Both sides had agreed that the purpose
was not to constrain India’s strategic programme but to enable resumption of full
civil nuclear energy cooperation in order to enhance global energy and environmental
security. Such cooperation was predicated on the assumption that any international
civil nuclear energy cooperation (including by the US) offered to India in the civilian
sector should, firstly, not be diverted away from civilian purposes, and secondly,
should not be transferred from India to third countries without safeguards. These
concepts will be reflected in the Safeguards Agreement to be negotiated by India
with IAEA.
6. India’s nuclear programme is unique as it is the only state with nuclear weapons
not to have begun with a dedicated military programme. It must be appreciated that
the strategic programme is an offshoot of research on nuclear power programme and
consequently, it is embedded in a larger undifferentiated programme. Identification
of purely civilian facilities and programmes that have no strategic implications poses
a particular challenge. Therefore, facilities identified as civilian in the Separation Plan
will be offered for safeguards in phases to be decided by India. The nature of the
facility concerned, the activities undertaken in it, the national security significance of
materials and the location of the facilities are factors taken into account in
undertaking the separation process. This is solely an Indian determination.
7. The nuclear establishment in India not only built nuclear reactors but promoted
the growth of a national industrial infrastructure. Nuclear power generation was
envisaged as a three-stage programme with PHWRs chosen for deployment in the
first stage. As indigenous reactors were set up, several innovative design
improvements were carried out based on Indian R&D and a standardized design was
evolved. The research and technology development spanned the entire spectrum of
the nuclear fuel cycle including the front end and the back end. Success in the
technologies for the back end of the fuel cycle allowed us to launch the second stage
of the programme by constructing a Fast Breeder Test Reactor. This reactor has
operated for 20 years based on a unique carbide fuel and has achieved all technology
objectives. We have now proceeded further and are constructing a 500 MWe
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor. Simultaneously, we have launched design and
development of reactors aimed at thorium utilization and incorporating inherent
safety features.
8. Concepts such as grid connectivity are not relevant to the separation exercise.
Issues related to fuel resource sustainability, technical design and economic viability,
as well as smooth operation of reactors are relevant factors. This would necessitate
grid connectivity irrespective of whether the reactor concerned is civilian or not
civilian.
9. It must be recognized that the Indian nuclear programme still has a relatively
narrow base and cannot be expected to adopt solutions that might be deemed viable
by much larger programmes. A comparison of the number of reactors and the total
installed capacity between India and the P-5 brings this out graphically:
Country Number of Reactors Total Installed Capacity
India 15 3.04 GWe (2.8% of the
total production)
USA 104 (103 operational) 99.21 GWe (19.9% of the
total production)
France 59 63.36 GWe (78.1% of the
total production)
UK 23 11.85 GWe (19.4% of the
total production)
Russia 31 21.74 GWe (15.6% of the
total production)
China 9 6.602 GWe (2.2% of the
total production)
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington DC
10. Another factor to be taken into account is the small capacity of the reactors
produced indigenously by India, some of which would remain outside safeguards.
Therefore, in assessing the extent of safeguards coverage, it would be important to
look at both the number of reactors and the percentage of installed capacity covered.
An average Indian reactor is of 220 MW and its output is significantly smaller than
the standard reactor in a P-5 economy. The chart below illustrates this aspect:
Country Most Common reactor Number of such
reactors
India PHWRs 220 MWe 12
USA 69 PWRs and 34 BWRs.
Most plants are in the
range of 1000-1250 MWe
51 Reactors in the range
of 1000 MWe to 1250 MWe
France PWRs of 900 MWe and
1300 MWe size
34 PWRs of 900 MWe and
20 PWRs of 1300 MWe
UK No standard size. AGR is
the most common in the
range of 600-700 MWe
14 AGRs
Russia 3rd Generation VVER-1000
PWRs and RBMK 1000
Light, Water Graphite
Reactors
9 third Generation VVER-
1000 PWRs and 11 RBMK
1000 Light Water Graphite
Reactors
China PWRs 984 MWe Four
Source: Uranium Information Centre, Melbourne
11. The complexity of the separation process is further enhanced by the limited
resources that India has devoted to its nuclear programme as compared to P-5
nations. Moreover, as India expands international cooperation, the percentage of its
thermal power reactor installed capacity under safeguards would rise significantly as
fresh capacity is added through such cooperation.
12. India’s approach to the separation of its civilian nuclear facilities is guided by the
following principles:
- Credible, feasible, and implementable in a transparent manner;
- Consistent with the understandings of the 18 July Statement;
- Consistent with India’s national security and R&D requirements as well as not
prejudicial to the three-stage nuclear programme in India;
- Must be cost effective in its implementation; and
- Must be acceptable to Parliament and public opinion.
13. Based on these principles, India will:
- Include in the civilian list only those facilities offered for safeguards that, after
separation, will no longer be engaged in activities of strategic significance.
- The overarching criterion would be a judgement whether subjecting a facility to
IAEA safeguards would impact adversely on India’s national security.
- However, a facility will be excluded from the civilian list if it is located in a larger
hub of strategic significance, notwithstanding the fact that it may not be normally
engaged in activities of strategic significance.
- A civilian facility would therefore, be one that India has determined not to be
relevant to its strategic programme.
14. Taking the above into account, India, on the basis of reciprocal actions by the
US, will adopt the following approach:
i) Thermal Power Reactors: India will identify and offer for safeguards 14 thermal
power reactors between 2006 and 2014. This will include the 4 presently
safeguarded reactors (TAPS 1&2, RAPS 1&2) and in addition KK 1&2 that are under
construction.8 other PHWRs, each of a capacity of 220MW, will also be offered.
Phasing of specific thermal power reactors, being offered for safeguards would be
indicated separately by India. Such an offer would, in effect, cover 14 out of the 22
thermal power reactors in operation or currently under construction to be placed
under safeguards, and would raise the total installed Thermal Power capacity by MWs
under safeguards from the present 19% to 65% by 2014.
ii) Fast Breeder Reactors: India is not in a position to accept safeguards on the
Prototype Fast Breeder Reactors (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR),
both located at Kalpakkam. The Fast Breeder Programme is at the R&D stage and its
technology will take time to mature and reach an advanced stage of development.
iii) Future Reactors: India has decided to place under safeguards all future civilian
thermal power reactors and civilian breeder reactors, and the Government of India
retains the sole right to determine such reactors as civilian.
iv) Research Reactors: India will permanently shut down the CIRUS reactor, in
2010. It will also be prepared to shift the fuel core of the APSARA reactor that was
purchased from France outside BARC and make the fuel core available to be placed
under safeguards in 2010.
v) Upstream facilities: The following upstream facilities would be identified and
separated as civilian:
- List of those specific facilities in the Nuclear Fuel Complex, which will be
offered for safeguards by 2008 will be indicated separately.
- The Heavy Water Production plants at Thal, Tuticorin and Hazira are proposed
to be designated for civilian use between 2006-2009. We do not consider
these plants as relevant for safeguards purposes.
vi) Downstream facilities: The following downstream facilities would be identified
and separated as civilian:
- India is willing to accept safeguards in the ‘campaign’ mode after 2010 in
respect of the Tarapur Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing Plant.
- The Tarapur and Rajasthan ‘Away From Reactors’ spent fuel storage pools
would be made available for safeguards with appropriate phasing
between2006-2009.
vii) Research Facilities: India will declare the following facilities as civilian:
(a) Tata Institute of Fundamental research
(b) Variable Energy Cyclotron Centre
(c) Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics
(d) Institute for Plasma Research
(e) Institute of Mathematics Science
(f) Institute of Physics
(g) Tata Memorial Centre
(h) Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology
(i) Harish Chandra Research Institute
These facilities are safeguards-irrelevant. It is our expectation that they will play a
prominent role in international cooperation.
15. Safeguards:
a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to
India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also
reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured
and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18,
2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from
the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to
adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary
conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including
reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several
nations.
b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is
prepared to take the following additional steps:
i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel
supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of
nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which
would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.
ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA
an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over
the lifetime of India’s reactors.
iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India
occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of
friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France
and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel
supply to India.
c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific
safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for
safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian
use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to
ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of
disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian
nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an
appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.
16. This plan is in conformity with the commitments made to Parliament by the
Government.