Nuclear Discussion - Nukkad Thread: 13 Apr 2008
mmm.. you guys are taking the real deterrence away, by not by arguing about the various claims, but taking positions as to who is right and who is wrong among yourselves. i am not seeing discussions here leading to any derivations or a solid analysis that presents the view points rather nukenood-rakshaks bashing each other.
we would miss the arguments in these mud-slings if we do not do an analysis by comparing points and somebody does come up with a more plausible answer as to where and what it is. since, i guess that would be not presented for keeping the deterrence itself away and thus, the thread value as such.
oh.. duh! its nukkad anyway with a qualifier. perhaps its time to change the name of the thread back to series numbering and take things subjective with a more disciplined objectives.
there would be many who would feel a carpel tunnel and time & energy cost, navigating to come to this thread. i hope, nukenood rakshaks keep the browsers energy levels higher by not having to read thru some really unthoughtful posts.
one may not be a good writer or poster like me, but one could keep it simple to the fact, we the regular thread lurkers don't have to feel this way.
we would miss the arguments in these mud-slings if we do not do an analysis by comparing points and somebody does come up with a more plausible answer as to where and what it is. since, i guess that would be not presented for keeping the deterrence itself away and thus, the thread value as such.
oh.. duh! its nukkad anyway with a qualifier. perhaps its time to change the name of the thread back to series numbering and take things subjective with a more disciplined objectives.
there would be many who would feel a carpel tunnel and time & energy cost, navigating to come to this thread. i hope, nukenood rakshaks keep the browsers energy levels higher by not having to read thru some really unthoughtful posts.
one may not be a good writer or poster like me, but one could keep it simple to the fact, we the regular thread lurkers don't have to feel this way.
I decided to post this as author's group has very big mailing list.
I have never been able to understand the reason as to why some well meaning people in India, interested in India's progress, should oppose the so-called nuclear deal.
So far as India is concerned, it's merely a passport to nuclear commerce which is now totally denied to it (and it badly needs uranium -- very urgently -- because most of its atomic power projects are functioning far below capacity on account of shortage of the material -- vide the following article by a former Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission http://www.indianexpress.com/story/289768.html).
America may have some leverage under the Hyde Act ONLY and ONLY if India signs a contract with a US company to buy nuclear materials or nuclear technology. Once the whole process is through, why should India deal with an American company at all?
The point is that France or Russia or any other country CANNOT sell nuclear material or technology to India unless and until the process is completed.
Once the process is over, India can decide to deal only with countries other than the US which are in NO WAY bound by the Hyde Act.
US corporates will then find that they cannot sign any contracts with India unless they get their lawmakers to suitably amend the Hyde Act. Otherwise they will get NO business.
So, it will be a case, as far as India is concerned, of heads I win, tails you lose.
If you have a comment, please post it at http://usindiafriendship.blogspot.com/
Ram Narayanan
US-India Friendship
http://usindiafriendship.net/
http://usindiafriendship.blogspot.com/
lets put it this way, as we had put it eons back. the current political setup in India has certain boo-boo, and it requires certain constitutional amendments to rectify it. the current GoI furthermore has no simple majority to sign big deals, especially matter of strategic importance though many a intl agreements are done without any parliamentary debates. However, most of such agreements were done by govt in power that did had a simple majority. Besides, the current gov is so arrogant to have this done thru a joint parliamentary panel., and they have to answer many a questions rather and not say its taken care of. its about the hows and don'ts that we want to know the we wanted in our civilian plans, rather the deal word alone.
Just thinking out loud. 2/3rds of India is under 35 years of age. Does anyone know, what does this segment of the population think of this deal. After all this is the segment of the population that will benefit the most by the carrots in this deal.
My distinct impression is, this generation (Y) may call a Bharat Karnad (usually put in the maximalist camp) somewhat restrained and conservative in his approaches on national security and nuclear policy and doctrine.
My distinct impression is, this generation (Y) may call a Bharat Karnad (usually put in the maximalist camp) somewhat restrained and conservative in his approaches on national security and nuclear policy and doctrine.
From that post of Dr. M. R. Srinivasan:vide the following article by a former Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission http://www.indianexpress.com/story/289768.html).
Perhaps this has been discussed earlier, if so pardon me. The PU from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. Since FBRs are not under safeguard under the separation plan, what gives? Or am I missing something?If India manages to overcome the opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal and moves ahead, it can import natural uranium from Africa, central Asia, Canada, Brazil and maybe Australia too (if they change their policies). This would enable us to put up 10,000 MW of additional PHWRs (making a total of 20,000 MW). More importantly, India can import some 20,000 to 30,000 MW of Light Water Reactors (LWRs) from Russia, France, US (with Japan collaborating with the US). The plutonium produced in the Indian-built PHWRs and the imported LWRs can both be used as fuel in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs).
SaiK brother you post whatever comes to your mind without any fact checking. Most of your comments up here are even not technically correct.SaiK wrote:lets put it this way, as we had put it eons back. the current political setup in India has certain boo-boo, and it requires certain constitutional amendments to rectify it. the current GoI furthermore has no simple majority to sign big deals, especially matter of strategic importance though many a intl agreements are done without any parliamentary debates. However, most of such agreements were done by govt in power that did had a simple majority. Besides, the current gov is so arrogant to have this done thru a joint parliamentary panel., and they have to answer many a questions rather and not say its taken care of. its about the hows and don'ts that we want to know the we wanted in our civilian plans, rather the deal word alone.
Boo-boo?
Constitutional amendments?
Govt can't survive without having majority for a single moment what are you talking about? Every working central govt always enjoys majority parliament support by design, the govt falls the moment it looses majority.
There is no legal requirement nor any precedence for govt to discuss/get approval on foreign policy matters/deals from parliament in India
If parliament panel is needed for everything than what is the need for having a cabinet and govt
Every decision of GoI has explicit, de-jure and clear majority parliament support by design of the system.
The first one is not under safeguard because we need it for research and other purposes but some of the future ones would most certainly be put under safeguard to utilize the plutonium from safeguarded PHWR/LWR reactors.NRao wrote:From that post of Dr. M. R. Srinivasan:vide the following article by a former Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission http://www.indianexpress.com/story/289768.html).
Perhaps this has been discussed earlier, if so pardon me. The PU from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. Since FBRs are not under safeguard under the separation plan, what gives? Or am I missing something?If India manages to overcome the opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal and moves ahead, it can import natural uranium from Africa, central Asia, Canada, Brazil and maybe Australia too (if they change their policies). This would enable us to put up 10,000 MW of additional PHWRs (making a total of 20,000 MW). More importantly, India can import some 20,000 to 30,000 MW of Light Water Reactors (LWRs) from Russia, France, US (with Japan collaborating with the US). The plutonium produced in the Indian-built PHWRs and the imported LWRs can both be used as fuel in Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs).
Katare,Katare wrote:The first one is not under safeguard because we need it for research and other purposes but some of the future ones would most certainly be put under safeguard to utilize the plutonium from safeguarded PHWR/LWR reactors.Perhaps this has been discussed earlier, if so pardon me. The PU from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. Since FBRs are not under safeguard under the separation plan, what gives? Or am I missing something?
AFAIK, FBRs are not plug-and-play on the civilian side, as the U needs to be enriched much beyond the 20% allowed under 123. In other words, whole 123 and NSG- agrement will need to be renegotiated to allow enrichment commensurate with FBR needs.
The whole exercise of limiting U enrichment to a specific %ge was introduced after Indian pushback on non-exclusion of FBRs in civilian side, so as to make it impossible for India to plough back FBRs into civilian power generation scene after FBR and 3rd gen reactor techs are fine-tuned by India.
I have been following this thread with interest. It is saddening to see such divisive and acrimonious postings between knowledgable and highly contributing members. Also, while so much is being bandied by both sides, we still don't see the economics of N-power vis-a-vis gas (coal has been covered, but AFAIK, potential of using the huge gasbeds has not been taken into account).
Will the imported reactors be sufficiently cost-effective to provide electricity at ~2 INR/ KW (Dabhol comes to mind)? Why would private sector (read Tatas and Ambanis) put in their money to support financial white elephants? Would GoI provide sovereign guarantees and/ or put in major chunks of money? I don't think that without a strong cost benefit analysis (assumptions are for N-sectoral risk factors to be quite high for India), the imported reactors would ever land in India.
Will the imported reactors be sufficiently cost-effective to provide electricity at ~2 INR/ KW (Dabhol comes to mind)? Why would private sector (read Tatas and Ambanis) put in their money to support financial white elephants? Would GoI provide sovereign guarantees and/ or put in major chunks of money? I don't think that without a strong cost benefit analysis (assumptions are for N-sectoral risk factors to be quite high for India), the imported reactors would ever land in India.
Katareji,
I am not sure where you got your info from that FBRs will be placed under safeguard. Going way back I recall AK making the arg that he wants them to be plug-and-play. Then came this:
Feb 2006 :: ‘The Fast Breeder Programme just cannot be put on the civilian list’
I have not read up on the separation plan, but from what little I googled just now the West is complaining enough to make me believe that the FBRs are not under safeguard......will check on that when I have more time.
My recollection is that India was concerned about West trying to "steal" FBR techs - the main reason for not placing them under safeguard.
OK. Let us assume that they are placed under safeguard, even then is it not true that the enriching techs being allowed under 123 is not more than 20%? FBRs need much higher %age as far as I can recall (not a techie).
I am not sure where you got your info from that FBRs will be placed under safeguard. Going way back I recall AK making the arg that he wants them to be plug-and-play. Then came this:
Feb 2006 :: ‘The Fast Breeder Programme just cannot be put on the civilian list’
I have not read up on the separation plan, but from what little I googled just now the West is complaining enough to make me believe that the FBRs are not under safeguard......will check on that when I have more time.
My recollection is that India was concerned about West trying to "steal" FBR techs - the main reason for not placing them under safeguard.
OK. Let us assume that they are placed under safeguard, even then is it not true that the enriching techs being allowed under 123 is not more than 20%? FBRs need much higher %age as far as I can recall (not a techie).
The FBR does not need enriched uranium as a fuel. It uses the Pu from the PHWRs as its feedstock.ShibaPJ wrote:AFAIK, FBRs are not plug-and-play on the civilian side, as the U needs to be enriched much beyond the 20% allowed under 123. In other words, whole 123 and NSG- agrement will need to be renegotiated to allow enrichment commensurate with FBR needs.
The issue of enrichment relates to the driver fuel needed for the AHWR which will utilize India's thorium reserves.The whole exercise of limiting U enrichment to a specific %ge was introduced after Indian pushback on non-exclusion of FBRs in civilian side, so as to make it impossible for India to plough back FBRs into civilian power generation scene after FBR and 3rd gen reactor techs are fine-tuned by India.
As far as I understand it, the way things stand now is that the weapons program can proceed... however the 3rd stage cannot utilize imported uranium because of the enrichment issue. So imported uranium will be used in a supplementary cycle for power generation via LWRs etc. The existing domestic uranium reserves can then be dedicated to:
1. Building up adequate stocks of driver fuel for the AHWRs.
2. Fuelling the 8 reactors for the strategic program.
Unless, after some time, as the IAEA/NSG become more comfortable with the AHWR fuel cycle, enrichment is allowed to the extent necessary to fuel the 3rd stage.
The Idev quote above needs to see the NRao quote below that occured a bit earlier in the posts.The FBR does not need enriched uranium as a fuel. It uses the Pu from the PHWRs as its feedstock.
Isn't the FBR program supposed to be based on Thorium and hence make us free of having to import U?Perhaps this has been discussed earlier, if so pardon me. The PU from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. Since FBRs are not under safeguard under the separation plan, what gives? Or am I missing something?
Drevin,Drevin wrote:The Idev quote above needs to see the NRao quote below that occured a bit earlier in the posts.The FBR does not need enriched uranium as a fuel. It uses the Pu from the PHWRs as its feedstock.
Isn't the FBR program supposed to be based on Thorium and hence make us free of having to import U?Perhaps this has been discussed earlier, if so pardon me. The PU from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. Since FBRs are not under safeguard under the separation plan, what gives? Or am I missing something?
Cetainly Nrao is correct in that Pu from imported reactors cannot be used in the FBR unless the FBRs are under safeguard. However, India has unsafeguarded PHWRs as well and the fuel from that can be used as feedstock for the FBR and in that case the FBR need not be under safeguards.
The AHWR (3rd stage) is based on Thorium, but Thorium is not a fissile material and hence needs a *spark/kerosene* to set it off. That *spark* is where one needs enriched uranium as a driver fuel.
See, the thing is that a lot of these fuel cycles are unique to India e.g. nobody in the world is running a AHWR, so the IAEA/NSG is naturally leery of exactly what India is upto in the AHWR fuel cycles i.e. fuel composition, utilization, components of the spent fuel etc. etc.
Similarly, a lot of different kinds of fuels can be used in the FBR... it depends on what one is using the FBR for. In India's case, it is fairly easy to deduce what will be the fuel and what will be end use.
That in essence is my recollection (from a few years ago) of what AK has been harping about and his reason/s not to place FBRs under safeguard.See, the thing is that a lot of these fuel cycles are unique to India e.g. nobody in the world is running a AHWR, so the IAEA/NSG is naturally leery of exactly what India is upto in the AHWR fuel cycles i.e. fuel composition, utilization, components of the spent fuel etc. etc.
Similarly, a lot of different kinds of fuels can be used in the FBR... it depends on what one is using the FBR for. In India's case, it is fairly easy to deduce what will be the fuel and what will be end use.
This is THE reason why AK in particular has been on the tail of IAEA. I recall one of his speeches (in Vienna IIRC) where he essentially stated that the IAEA has nothing to give to India!! And, this post, perhaps, explains in greater detail what he meant.
Anyways, more l8r. Need to run.
Good progress IMHO (swant sukhaya). Sorry.
Katare, imho, the left is technically a non-player, and exists because of the power equations for an alliance. Exactly as posted by shaurya et al, we would miss many a democratic citizens in voicing their choice.
Defects, and correcting the defect is all I was talking. We dont have a perflect setup, right now or a perfect team to take this up.
Defects, and correcting the defect is all I was talking. We dont have a perflect setup, right now or a perfect team to take this up.
Shiba,ShibaPJ wrote:Katare,Katare wrote: The first one is not under safeguard because we need it for research and other purposes but some of the future ones would most certainly be put under safeguard to utilize the plutonium from safeguarded PHWR/LWR reactors.
AFAIK, FBRs are not plug-and-play on the civilian side, as the U needs to be enriched much beyond the 20% allowed under 123. In other words, whole 123 and NSG- agrement will need to be renegotiated to allow enrichment commensurate with FBR needs.
The whole exercise of limiting U enrichment to a specific %ge was introduced after Indian pushback on non-exclusion of FBRs in civilian side, so as to make it impossible for India to plough back FBRs into civilian power generation scene after FBR and 3rd gen reactor techs are fine-tuned by India.
Reprocessing restrictions are only on imported fuel as per my understanding and there is no restrictions on using highly enriched domestic uranium in safeguarded reactors with Pu derived from other safeguarded reactors as long as no spent fuel is taken out of the safeguarded reactors.
its india's choice and matter of details as to how and if use any of FBRs in safeguarded environment.
In my understanding, the reprocessing rights were facility based (IAEA safeguarded or not). Was there a clear note on this after the murky separation list was available on the public domain?
Was there an amendment to 123 to ok reprocessing of desi-Pus from IAEA-safeguarded-Indian FBRs with out restrictions?
Was there an amendment to 123 to ok reprocessing of desi-Pus from IAEA-safeguarded-Indian FBRs with out restrictions?
Rao sahib,NRao wrote:Katareji,
I am not sure where you got your info from that FBRs will be placed under safeguard. Going way back I recall AK making the arg that he wants them to be plug-and-play. Then came this:
Feb 2006 :: ‘The Fast Breeder Programme just cannot be put on the civilian list’
I have not read up on the separation plan, but from what little I googled just now the West is complaining enough to make me believe that the FBRs are not under safeguard......will check on that when I have more time.
My recollection is that India was concerned about West trying to "steal" FBR techs - the main reason for not placing them under safeguard.
OK. Let us assume that they are placed under safeguard, even then is it not true that the enriching techs being allowed under 123 is not more than 20%? FBRs need much higher %age as far as I can recall (not a techie).
Thanks for bringing that article back to my memory, gold mine of information right from the most reliable source.
It's clear that Kakodkar would not compromise or even yield a pico-inch of ground on '50 year 3 stage program' that gives us future self reliance in fuel cycle. Namstubhayam sir for standing up to all kind of pressure and protecting India's long term interests.
For that he needs Breeder out of safe guard (definitely the first one and may be few more but I don't think he is completely against building some in civilian sector at future date when tech is matured).
He needs some AHWR/HWR 'power rectors' (he doesn't want to call them civilian reactors) out of safeguards to feed the breeder(s). This makes sense, if these reactors are connected to grid on commercial scale they are paying for themselves which enables him to make more and larger for the same amount of money.
He wants to maintain the primacy of domestic 3 stage fuel linkage in long term while welcoming additional capacity in civilian sectors.
At the time of this article I think USA was trying to arm twist negotiators to put breeder and all of the future civilian reactors into safeguard which made him go ballistic.
So what is not clear to me from the interview is -
He and the interviewer repeatedly used the word "Breeder" as in single noun, are they planning to make more breeders (I think they are)
Is he opposing all of the future Breeders to be kept out of safeguard or just the ‘breeder’? If yes what could be the logic behind that beside IP issues?
Am I right in assuming that even if we keep all of the future breeders out of safeguard still we'll be able to buy/build reactors that can consume Pu in civilian sector?
Not that it's a good idea but we should also be able to sell Pu back to USA/Fr etc like Russians are selling their weapons grade Pu for commercial use to USA?
From: Dec, 2006 :: India’s Nuclear Separation Plan: Issues and Views
this:
This conflict is what makes this a weak deal.
When MMS approached Bush, the intent was to accept India as a NWS. Bush pretty much agreed (perhaps he did not even understand the issues - is he capable?). But when the deal for being formulated it went through the ringer and that is what we have today.
The deal will not allow any foreign techs to be used in the FBRs - which is what India NEEDS (not want). What is this deal worth if it does not +vely impact the FBRs? AND, India needs to control the FBR.
AK had stated that the FBRs will ultimately be open.....but, only when India says so.
BTW, that report above was made to the US Congress!!
this:
The two deal makers have ALWAYS had a conflict of interest, have NEVER brought this to the surface - to frankly and openly talk about the issues and therefore have had conflicting results/deal. Which is what brought about the "kick the can" theory. Specially on the Indian side this is rather evident - we can (as opposed to "will do") do this and that.To U.S. officials, facilities associated with the fast breeder reactor program, which could produce plutonium for weapons in the future, reportedly would be key to get under safeguards, particularly if the United States wants to cooperate with India in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership program.5 To Indian officials, however, the fast breeder reactor program is key to the future of India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle and must be kept out of safeguards for maximum flexibility and energy independence.6
This conflict is what makes this a weak deal.
When MMS approached Bush, the intent was to accept India as a NWS. Bush pretty much agreed (perhaps he did not even understand the issues - is he capable?). But when the deal for being formulated it went through the ringer and that is what we have today.
The deal will not allow any foreign techs to be used in the FBRs - which is what India NEEDS (not want). What is this deal worth if it does not +vely impact the FBRs? AND, India needs to control the FBR.
AK had stated that the FBRs will ultimately be open.....but, only when India says so.
BTW, that report above was made to the US Congress!!
per discussions and analysis sometime back, we did revise that Pu from FBRs would not be enough to drive for the generation of Th232->U233, that is required for 3rd stage. No way, there were discussions that we are self sufficient with fast neturons seeing 50 years down the line, and abundant enough to export to aKhans. Thats too much of a thought. Firstly, we have not even identified to satisfy the needs, and we are in dearth of PUs., should we say, exporting back used PUs after being used in safeguarded FBRs, and furhter reprocessed for AThWRs., then there is something to it. We can assure the safe passage of spent fuel back to the originator or IAEA specified / controlled entity for their headache. I am sure, this is not an issue for us.. The issue was we were denied reprocessing to certain levels that would be useful for our 3rd stage[limited by the 20% rule], and we would not be able to dedicated 3rd stages to IAEA since we can't have reprocessing rights. Perhaps, an amendement has happened to reprocessing rights, after the 123 announcement.
this happened because of the self-Godized-babooze who even get a kick from chai-biskoot, think they know everything about everything cause they can't read in between lines and don't understand aKhan englicks.John Snow wrote:This deal in its current form is a sub prime deal which will for ever hurt us period.
It started all very well, almost like having a free lunch with uncle but the auntie in the kitchen (congress) was Hyding to adding poison perfume to the masala.
Sorry to butt in. I also received similar (if not same) e-mail from Ram Narayanan. My gut feeling is that this guy (Ram) is sold out to unkil, and carries out psy-ops on behalf of unkil. he occassionally sends e-mails giving a little boost to india's ego, but eventually asking for servitude to unkil. Typical 'brown sahib' mentality. I read his e-mails with amusements.darshan wrote:I decided to post this as author's group has very big mailing list.
I have never been able to understand the reason as to why some well meaning people in India, interested in India's progress, should oppose the so-called nuclear deal.
So far as India is concerned, it's merely a passport to nuclear commerce which is now totally denied to it (and it badly needs uranium -- very urgently -- because most of its atomic power projects are functioning far below capacity on account of shortage of the material -- vide the following article by a former Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission http://www.indianexpress.com/story/289768.html).
America may have some leverage under the Hyde Act ONLY and ONLY if India signs a contract with a US company to buy nuclear materials or nuclear technology. Once the whole process is through, why should India deal with an American company at all?
The point is that France or Russia or any other country CANNOT sell nuclear material or technology to India unless and until the process is completed.
Once the process is over, India can decide to deal only with countries other than the US which are in NO WAY bound by the Hyde Act.
US corporates will then find that they cannot sign any contracts with India unless they get their lawmakers to suitably amend the Hyde Act. Otherwise they will get NO business.
So, it will be a case, as far as India is concerned, of heads I win, tails you lose.
If you have a comment, please post it at http://usindiafriendship.blogspot.com/
Ram Narayanan
US-India Friendship
http://usindiafriendship.net/
http://usindiafriendship.blogspot.com/
When narendra Modi's visa was rejected, I asked him if that was unkil's way to foster closer Indo-US relationship, and his asnwer was going around the bush, without giving any clear-cut answer. On another occassion I asked him why doesn't unkil make an exception about Hyde act for India; and again his answer was"ummmmmm....". To me this guy is a total sell out.
It is the big business and their lobby which has targeted such people as Ram Narayan. This deal has the lobby of the big business and their lobby which met many lawmakers in DC to pass the Hyde Act. There was nobody who knew what was being passed in the Hyde Act among the Indian lobby people. They just said it was good for the business.Kati wrote:
Sorry to butt in. I also received similar (if not same) e-mail from Ram Narayanan. My gut feeling is that this guy (Ram) is sold out to unkil, and carries out psy-ops on behalf of unkil. he occassionally sends e-mails giving a little boost to india's ego, but eventually asking for servitude to unkil. Typical 'brown sahib' mentality. I read his e-mails with amusements.
When narendra Modi's visa was rejected, I asked him if that was unkil's way to foster closer Indo-US relationship, and his asnwer was going around the bush, without giving any clear-cut answer. On another occassion I asked him why doesn't unkil make an exception about Hyde act for India; and again his answer was"ummmmmm....". To me this guy is a total sell out.
It has been a while since I poked my nose into these things, but here is something I found that is rather concise and perhaps even to the point:
[url=http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/20 ... _India.asp] Feb 14, 2008 :: Rice’s Pledge to Make Global Rules on Nuclear Trade with India “Consistentâ€
[url=http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/20 ... _India.asp] Feb 14, 2008 :: Rice’s Pledge to Make Global Rules on Nuclear Trade with India “Consistentâ€
OK got some breather to respond some main issues.
2. Kanson stated "Your claim of 20-25KT appears to me as mischievous". I do not see anything mischievous about this. In fact, as I see it Kanson's recent posts are tainted with intellectual and personal dishonesty, and cheap gamesmanship, while occasionally covering his motives with effusive exaggerated obfuscations.
Kanson states:
Added later: 1.B. One comment on that BR Missile article by Shri Santhanam was "but America has capped Indian ability to realize and mount that small TN payload on its missiles with this India-US civil nuclear deal". So yes if India validated that TN weapon either by explicit test or ICF/LIF that shape size will be real and credible.
2. As will be noticed, I have used the term 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the S-1. It is an accepted fact by most credible sources that the boosted fission primary of S-1 worked flawlessly. Bearing this and the present ground realities/facts in mind, these hypothetical designs could be construed as comprising of the S-1 primary with a re-designed secondary, which would provide a TN device in the range of 300 kT, quite easily. This exercise, however will require further tests, backed up by extensive ICF/LIF experiments and simulations.
3. RC's statement of ~200kT is surely based on package/weight constrain (in his head), and there are higher/lower yield configns possible that with different pkg/weight constrain. For eg. addition of active material on the case material is a known method to increase yield (as used by US weapon on its Cruise Missiles) albeit its involves using expensive material that is not most efficiently utilized.
4. It is not difficult to determine that 40-60kt Fusion yield allows a lot of interesting yield possibilities for various mass and fissile material mass combinations. And yes the 300kt is a sweet spot in that. Of course it does require nuclear physicists to ensure high energy design issues and engineering is taken care of.
Notwithstanding the deluded claims (and obtuse threats)made by a newly formed group of "wise folks" who now target the BRF while sitting in a rabbit's hole, the testing and validation of existing nuclear weapons designs is one of the objectives/mandates of the US-National Ignition Facility at LLNL and other experimental/simulation facilities; in addition to experiments on the "fissionless trigger" and hybrid magnetic plasma pinch/implosion systems (see http://www.awe.co.uk/set/Secondary_Physics_b8743.aspx, https://lasers.llnl.gov/missions/nation ... /index.php, etc.).
Thus, my statement explicitly stating that nowhere did I ever state a glowing tribute to S-1 as being a tried and tested TN device stands vindicated. So much for Kanson's perception of mischievous intent/logic.
ldev states:
2. Incidentally, if appropriately modified, the S-1 primary by itself, can safely provide a boosted fission device with a yield in the range of 200-250 Kt. However, creating a National deterrent based on the working part of a failed overall test (S1's objective as a TN device failed, and the working part here is the boosted fission primary ) hardly constitutes sound judgment. These devices are not stand-alone and transparently modular designs, and are coupled in a complex manner. Though from the mess that S1 was, this part seemed to have worked well.
"Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder". Similarly
Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, that stems from evidence/demonstration of working weapon.
Finally, one can not finish without a mention of ldev's statement on 4-13-08:
1. PKI has claimed a test yield of 8 KT against a design yield of 10 KT. He has the gone on to label POK-1 as an unqualified success (see http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html and www.iisc.ernet.in/currsci/jul102001/72.pdf). I have stated that the test yield was around 12 KT. The 20-25 KT was the design yield which differs from the test yield. This is based on GoI press release and AIR news broadcast in and around 74 to 75 where 20 to 20+kT was bandied around. Also it is a reasonable assumption that POK-1 objective was to replicate the design parameters of the Nakasaki device. Note that I am not holding either PKI or RC up as paragons of virtue and honesty! However, PKI was correct on S-1, while RC was correct on POK-1.Kanson wrote:If i'm not wrong, on POK-I PKI gave the value as low as 8KT, again Raja Ramanna later claimed that the design tested was weaponised. Your claim of 20-25KT appears to me as mischievous. No offence though
2. Kanson stated "Your claim of 20-25KT appears to me as mischievous". I do not see anything mischievous about this. In fact, as I see it Kanson's recent posts are tainted with intellectual and personal dishonesty, and cheap gamesmanship, while occasionally covering his motives with effusive exaggerated obfuscations.
Kanson states:
1. Yes, my Agni 3 page does indeed contain the statement "The primary warhead for the Agni family would be a 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the Shakti-1 (Pokhran-II) test in 1998." These are hypothetical designs, based on the analysis and interpretation of available information, while providing leeway for possibly exaggerated official claims. Anybody would agree that even venturing to place designs that even remotely pass off as actual configurations on a website, would be unwise.Kanson wrote:Thats a huge understatement. RC said the yeild can be upto ~ 200kt, but you increased that stock to 300 Kt And all the latest agni 3 diagrams show them equipped with TN device whereas no offical statement indicates any particular device. Thats stamped your signature that TN is authentic. No two ways about it.
Added later: 1.B. One comment on that BR Missile article by Shri Santhanam was "but America has capped Indian ability to realize and mount that small TN payload on its missiles with this India-US civil nuclear deal". So yes if India validated that TN weapon either by explicit test or ICF/LIF that shape size will be real and credible.
2. As will be noticed, I have used the term 200-300 Kt fusion weapon based on the S-1. It is an accepted fact by most credible sources that the boosted fission primary of S-1 worked flawlessly. Bearing this and the present ground realities/facts in mind, these hypothetical designs could be construed as comprising of the S-1 primary with a re-designed secondary, which would provide a TN device in the range of 300 kT, quite easily. This exercise, however will require further tests, backed up by extensive ICF/LIF experiments and simulations.
3. RC's statement of ~200kT is surely based on package/weight constrain (in his head), and there are higher/lower yield configns possible that with different pkg/weight constrain. For eg. addition of active material on the case material is a known method to increase yield (as used by US weapon on its Cruise Missiles) albeit its involves using expensive material that is not most efficiently utilized.
4. It is not difficult to determine that 40-60kt Fusion yield allows a lot of interesting yield possibilities for various mass and fissile material mass combinations. And yes the 300kt is a sweet spot in that. Of course it does require nuclear physicists to ensure high energy design issues and engineering is taken care of.
Notwithstanding the deluded claims (and obtuse threats)made by a newly formed group of "wise folks" who now target the BRF while sitting in a rabbit's hole, the testing and validation of existing nuclear weapons designs is one of the objectives/mandates of the US-National Ignition Facility at LLNL and other experimental/simulation facilities; in addition to experiments on the "fissionless trigger" and hybrid magnetic plasma pinch/implosion systems (see http://www.awe.co.uk/set/Secondary_Physics_b8743.aspx, https://lasers.llnl.gov/missions/nation ... /index.php, etc.).
Thus, my statement explicitly stating that nowhere did I ever state a glowing tribute to S-1 as being a tried and tested TN device stands vindicated. So much for Kanson's perception of mischievous intent/logic.
ldev states:
1. That is superficial and hyperbole "Khichidee" {the Indian food}. The S-3 sub-KT device primary goal was to obtain data on the use of reactor grade Pu, as weapon fuel (yes it is public info, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Shakti). This is a completely disjointed issue from the working and authentication of the S-1 primary {a boosted fission stage using WG Pu}, which as stated above, worked flawlessly! How do these two issues coalesce into a coherent argument/conclusion? Ldev needs to clarify and shed some "light" on his statement! Small clear statements will be helpful.ldev wrote:All right, I shall say that the combined results of the sub-kiloton boosted fission S3 device plus the unanimous acceptance by the critics that the boosted fission primary in S1 worked as expected has demonstrated India's expertise in controlling the yield of a boosted fission device. As such, there is a high degree of probability that India's boosted fission warhead mounted on the A3 missile will provide the designed 150-200kt yield.
2. Incidentally, if appropriately modified, the S-1 primary by itself, can safely provide a boosted fission device with a yield in the range of 200-250 Kt. However, creating a National deterrent based on the working part of a failed overall test (S1's objective as a TN device failed, and the working part here is the boosted fission primary ) hardly constitutes sound judgment. These devices are not stand-alone and transparently modular designs, and are coupled in a complex manner. Though from the mess that S1 was, this part seemed to have worked well.
"Beauty is in the eyes of the beholder". Similarly
Deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, that stems from evidence/demonstration of working weapon.
Finally, one can not finish without a mention of ldev's statement on 4-13-08:
This ranks as one of the most astounding statement I have ever come across. While he has since retracted it, one would have expected a better level of cognizance from a person on such a basic and important issue, especially one who has strode BRF with the assumed/presumed air of a "know all".ldev wrote:1. India never claimed to have a TN device. The official press releases from 1998 make references only to a boosted fission device.
Last edited by Arun_S on 15 Apr 2008 00:41, edited 2 times in total.
(An aside. I just heard out, on NPR, and interview with Michael Klare - the author of a new book, "Rising Power, Shrinking Planet". It deals with oil (what else) and the potential battle with Russia AND also China!!!!. I am not too sure what to make of it at this point in time. However, IF what he says is true, then I would not sign this deal at all. Better times are ahead for India without all this fuss.
Very interesting topic that will impact India.)
Very interesting topic that will impact India.)
Is Ldev a mole in BRFArun_S wrote:
Finally, one can not finish without a mention of ldev's statement on 4-13-08:This ranks as one of the most astounding statement I have ever come across. While he has since retracted it, one would have expected a better level of cognizance from a person on such a basic and important issue, especially one who has strode BRF with the assumed/presumed air of a "know all".ldev wrote:1. India never claimed to have a TN device. The official press releases from 1998 make references only to a boosted fission device.
People on verbal diarrhoea here need to get a ****ing brain! For Frak's sake THINK before you pull down your pants and expose your intelligence on a public forum. Surely all this discussion can go on in a private email chat? If deterrence is in the eye of the beholder, it may be important that adversaries behold good quality deterrence, yes? Now connect the dots without involving the Trilateral Commision or the Illuminati (but do involve the notion of unprofessional people in charge of top-secret programs) and make your own conclusions.
Arun_S,
1. Does it matter to an Indian adversary whether a 200kt explosion in one of their cities is an Indian boosted fission or a TN warhead?
2. Does India have a high level of confidence that the S1 primary can be adapted into a 200kt boosted fission warhead? You have already answered this question.
3) Via the sub-kiloton tests has India demonstrated its ability to control yields?
4) Is the range of the Agni 3 (land as well as sub launched) adequate to cover India's immediate adversaries if it is MIRVed with 3 boosted fission warheads?
If the answers to these 4 questions is a reasonably positive yes, what is everyone getting all hot and bothered about in these threads?
As far as the Press Release is concerned, it was something that happened 10 years ago and I am not a walking/talking databank of GOI press releases dating back 10 years.
Acharya,
What is a mole? Is it something that you get on your nose?
1. Does it matter to an Indian adversary whether a 200kt explosion in one of their cities is an Indian boosted fission or a TN warhead?
2. Does India have a high level of confidence that the S1 primary can be adapted into a 200kt boosted fission warhead? You have already answered this question.
3) Via the sub-kiloton tests has India demonstrated its ability to control yields?
4) Is the range of the Agni 3 (land as well as sub launched) adequate to cover India's immediate adversaries if it is MIRVed with 3 boosted fission warheads?
If the answers to these 4 questions is a reasonably positive yes, what is everyone getting all hot and bothered about in these threads?
As far as the Press Release is concerned, it was something that happened 10 years ago and I am not a walking/talking databank of GOI press releases dating back 10 years.
Acharya,
What is a mole? Is it something that you get on your nose?
No. but it does effect which cities it can rain on.ldev wrote:Arun_S,
1. Does it matter to an Indian adversary whether a 200kt explosion in one of their cities is an Indian boosted fission or a TN warhead?
Its a vague question in terms of end capability/result. Sub-kiloton tests only gave India EOS (Equation of state) for various fissile material, and that truly sharpens Indian ability to use those material in its weapon design. So its repercussion is in how that info is used.3) Via the sub-kiloton tests has India demonstrated its ability to control yields?
I urge you to please deeply study & understand Indian strategic environment, now and that which is emerging.4) Is the range of the Agni 3 (land as well as sub launched) adequate to cover India's immediate adversaries if it is MIRVed with 3 boosted fission warheads?
Pls understand the meaning of K.Subramanyam's "It is not a 2-some game" and the scenarios that spin from that, the counter-moves that are open to adversar(ies) and Indian counter to those moves. The lowest common denominator that will emerge is that First use threat to India is global in nature. AND in NO case is it limited to immediate neighborhood. So planning for immediate neighborhood engagement alone makes India a sitting duck to be mauled and raped. And in military/geo-politics the cardinal rule is you dont start a war that you will cant' win. In effect limited to immediate neighborhood range toys, precludes India from entering into war. And those nukes/weapons count as nuke trishankhu.
This was your previous statement.
To put things in perspective from the clutter, RC or offical yeild reads as 12 +or- 2KT . From the same sources you quoted, PKI first claimed 8KT and later corrected to 10KT after the radio-chem analysis of samples from the test site.
And still, my accreditation to your claim of 20-25KT as "mischevious" is still valid. Apart from giving sources as hearsay there is no proof for your claim.
Arun_S wrote:BTW, POK-1 yield was ~12 kT against a design yield of 20-25 KT. This doesn't make it a huge success. So, PKI as team leader of POK-1 was not wrong here. Further, as a weapon, its size and configuration would have made it a major flop.
Thanks for making a correction from your earlier stance of PKI was right to PKI is wrong on POK-I.Arun_S wrote:1. PKI has claimed a test yield of 8 KT against a design yield of 10 KT. He has the gone on to label POK-1 as an unqualified success (see http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/India/IndiaSmiling.html and www.iisc.ernet.in/currsci/jul102001/72.pdf). I have stated that the test yield was around 12 KT. The 20-25 KT was the design yield which differs from the test yield. This is based on GoI press release and AIR news broadcast in and around 74 to 75 where 20 to 20+kT was bandied around. Also it is a reasonable assumption that POK-1 objective was to replicate the design parameters of the Nakasaki device. Note that I am not holding either PKI or RC up as paragons of virtue and honesty! However, PKI was correct on S-1, while RC was correct on POK-1.Kanson wrote:If i'm not wrong, on POK-I PKI gave the value as low as 8KT, again Raja Ramanna later claimed that the design tested was weaponised. Your claim of 20-25KT appears to me as mischievous. No offence though
To put things in perspective from the clutter, RC or offical yeild reads as 12 +or- 2KT . From the same sources you quoted, PKI first claimed 8KT and later corrected to 10KT after the radio-chem analysis of samples from the test site.
And still, my accreditation to your claim of 20-25KT as "mischevious" is still valid. Apart from giving sources as hearsay there is no proof for your claim.
I conducted the dicussion with politeness and honesty, i never made contradicating claims or changed stance to get accused as dishonest or other accusations you heaped on me. When you crossed the limit in asking me whether you are smoking grass..i have no option but to retaliate. For whatever charges you make i too can accuse you under the same charges if you want to continue this game.Arun_S wrote:2. Kanson stated "Your claim of 20-25KT appears to me as mischievous". I do not see anything mischievous about this. In fact, as I see it Kanson's recent posts are tainted with intellectual and personal dishonesty, and cheap gamesmanship, while occasionally covering his motives with effusive exaggerated obfuscations