India Nuclear News and Discussion 23 July 2008

[fanne]

Rangudu Sir,
I hope I have not offended you in anyway. Moreover my intention is not to engage anyone in 1-1 discussion. So if you think that I cross into your 'private' space, please let me know and I would edit out my response to you.
Thanks,
fanne

[Gerard]

The Pakis seem to be expert at this, with thousands and thousands of centrifuges.

From ayatollah blog
note SWU of massa's centrifuges vs fauji types

Code: Select all

Basic Parameters of Contemporary Centrifuges
Type 	P1 	P2 	Russia 	URENCO 	US
Rotor Material 	Al 	MS 	CFRC 	CFRC 	CFRC
Speed (m/sec) 	350 	500 	700 	700 	>700
Length (m) 	1-2 	1 	<1 	3-4 	12
kg SWU/yr 	1-3 	5 	10 	40 	300

[Rangudu]

fanne ji,

No worries here. Things have been heated on this topic here. Let's get back to the topic. My only request to you is to take a step back and lay out the specific things you abhor about this deal/process.

Regards.

[fanne]

Amit dear,
I have better things to do then splitting hairs with you. The way you have interprated my posts simply shows that you are more interested in what we use to call in our college days - 'bakwas' (well there was a very politically incorrect word, but I will let that pass). Either you lack comprehension ability (which I doubt), or you deliberately misinterpret fact to suit your purpose (which I suspect). In either case I will not try to correct you (and yes not ignore you either, when I think I should comment I will).
Thanks,
fanne

[samuel]

Samuel,

It is good to be on guard and it's even more important to know your history.

However, there's a fine line between being on guard and being paranoid. Being on guard crosses this fine line when there's a distinct lack of self confidence.

All I say we wait till Sept5 to see the revised draft. If it cross our red lines we walk. If it doesn't then we do the deal.

I'll be in the forefront of folks crying foul if the Indian Govt agrees to the revised NSG draft which cross the well defined red lines that have been explicitly outlined.

OK, we'll be right back where we are on the 5th, no problem! On another note, I personally think paranoid is how nation-states continue to survive. Ain't no such thing, IMHO of course, as a bindaas power. Thank you for reminding us that we are on the same side.

To fanne, don't know what it is fanne, but the longer I stay here in the US, the more clear it gets to me how we (as in India) was screwed and keep going on in the same pattern. I certainly hope this deal helps us i.e. sva-tantra, svabhiman, and sva-raj to be sure. All deals that help enhance that, fine, great. I'd be happy to take the psych to another thread, if this is truly a broader phenom.

[ramana]

amit, I believe you have an action from R. Once that is completed we can start a new thread. Thanks, ramana

[ShauryaT]

2. The IAEA agreement, while not perfect, is acceptable and has been so accepted.

Not by everyone yet. There are some so called paranoids there, on whom at least I can completely entrust India's strategic interests, in all its dimensions.

It comes down to this. Remember the agreement with Canada to use their reactor only for "peaceful" purposes and then the PNE. Now, legally India could claim they were clean. Even the US legal experts could not come to a final verdict on the issue. However, practically speaking, India was a pariah as far as nuclear commerce was concerned. These agreements have that quality.

[sraj]

4. The 123 Agreement was simply the Hyde Law (this one takes the cake, actually, for distortion of reality).

Hyde Act binding on India, says Nicholas Burns

Former American pointsman of the Indo-US nuclear deal Nicholas Burns says the 123 Agreement is "absolutely" consistent with the controversial Hyde Act and that US can terminate the pact if India conducted atomic tests.

Burns' latest comments that Hyde Act was binding on India came on the eve of the crucial meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna to consider the India-specific nuclear safeguards for approval.

Burns, who stepped down in March and was appointed as a special envoy to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on the deal, also stressed that the US has in place "the right measures to protect" its interests by retaining the right to terminate the agreement.

Burns however said during a panel debate at Brookings institutions it was highly unlikely that India will conduct a nuclear test in future.

The remarks of the former US pointsman to the deal was immediately lapped up by the CPI-M which said it stood vindicated in opposing the deal.

"The utterances of Burns clearly shows that India cannot escape the provisions of the contentious Hyde Act of the US, linking suspension of nuclear fuel supply to future atomic tests by India," CPI politburo member Brinda Karat told reporters in Pune.

"When this agreement was negotiated, it was fully including the 123 Agreement consistent with all provisions of the Hyde Act. And the United States would retain, of course, under our law the right to implement every aspect of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954," Burns said in response to a query on corrective measures.

"What rights would the United States have under a hypothetical if India did x,y or z? All those rights are in place. We have the right to termination if we want to... if it comes to that. It probably would not," Burns said.

[samuel]

Could someone pls explain to me why India needs enrichment technology (for uranium, I mean, not for ppl)? The Pakis seem to be expert at this, with thousands and thousands of centrifuges.

What is the ENR that is causing so much heartburn? Why can't it be developed in India? I thought it was just a question of mass-producing centrifuges?

I would like to know that too because I think we really are interested in reprocessing tech. I don't think there is a problem with bringing our reprocessing technology out into the inspection side, except that exposing our technology may be a no-no, especially considering the speed with which that technology will vanish. In that case, if we are going to have a closed fuel cycle on the safeguard side, so as to not just take, make, waste $$, our insistence on ENR not be denied is well-justified. Plus, if we really have been wasting time on the so-called military side, maybe we'll learn a thing or two from the safeguarded cycle? Dunno, just guessing.

[amit]

amit, I believe you have an action from R. Once that is completed we can start a new thread. Thanks, ramana

Ramana Ji,

Maybe I'm being a bit dense here. But I did not understand your post!

[ramana]

amit,

Thank you for the initiative. Can you help summarize the most up to date criticisms of the deal as we head into NSG Phase-2? I was hoping that we can have a discussion largely filtering out the noise but the emotions are such that even people like sr are resorting to personal attacks. Regardless, let's at least get the points on the table. From what I can glean:

1. The possibility of NSG waiver talking of "consultations" in the context of an Indian n-test is worrying. I made a point that so long as consultations are mentioned without explicitly mentioning an Indian test, as was done in the 123, we should be okay.

2. ENR denial or quasi denial is another sticking point but what are the redlines here other than an explicit denial?

What else?

Thanks, ramana

[amit]

Amit dear,
I have better things to do then splitting hairs with you. The way you have interprated my posts simply shows that you are more interested in what we use to call in our college days - 'bakwas' (well there was a very politically incorrect word, but I will let that pass). Either you lack comprehension ability (which I doubt), or you deliberately misinterpret fact to suit your purpose (which I suspect). In either case I will not try to correct you (and yes not ignore you either, when I think I should comment I will).
Thanks,
fanne

Fanne,

Apologies for splitting hairs with you.

It just that I think the N-deal is complex enough to understand without bringing in extraneous points.

I'm under no illusion that the US of A is out to do India a favour by doing this deal. It will screw India if it could.

However, I do think the folks on our side of the table are aware of that and pretty savvy themselves.

Ultimately two or more countries do a deal out of self interest. The deal occurs when the self interests match. There will always be a give and take in this. The question is are we comfortable with what will have to "give" in order to "take" what we want?

It would be nice if we could confine our discussions on these two "give" and "take" options.

JMT

[amit]

Thanks, ramana

Oh I see. I'll see what I can do.

Thanks!

[sraj]

2. The IAEA agreement, while not perfect, is acceptable and has been so accepted.

Not by everyone yet. There are some so called paranoids there, on whom at least I can completely entrust India's strategic interests, in all its dimensions.

It comes down to this. Remember the agreement with Canada to use their reactor only for "peaceful" purposes and then the PNE. Now, legally India could claim they were clean. Even the US legal experts could not come to a final verdict on the issue. However, practically speaking, India was a pariah as far as nuclear commerce was concerned. These agreements have that quality.

I agree that the IAEA agreement leaves open several critical areas to different interpretations. My comment on IAEA was in the context of comparing it to the 123.

This was evident even during the August 1 IAEA Board mtg in the statements of el Baradei, Kakodkar, and Governors representing different countries, which are now all on record. These statements will be valid material for use when an international body is called upon to rule on a particular provision disputed between India and the IAEA (such as 'corrective measures') -- much like Constitutional issues are decided by the Supreme Court taking into consideration the intent of the framers, as gleaned from the available record of the preceding discussions/debate in the Constituent Assembly/Parliament.

That is why I have argued on several occasions that India's membership of the UNSC on par with the P-5 is the only way to mitigate the risk of self-interested interpretation/resolution of a dispute by a UNSC whose members will naturally be driven by their geo-political interests.

It is interesting to note that US support for India's UNSC membership was very much on the table both before the MMS July 2005 Washington visit, and during Bush's March 2006 New Delhi visit. In fact, MMS expressed confidence in an interview with Charlie Rose (on PBS) before the Bush visit that there would be an announcement on this during Bush's visit. One of only two questions Indian journalists were allowed to ask Bush in Delhi was about this. Bush, of course, responded with some mumbo-jumbo. Since then, the issue seems to have disappeared from the agenda.

It is my view that the status quo powers are getting a huge benefit by bringing India into the tent (including India voluntarily committing to adhere to MTCR, NSG, and not export ENR technology). The tragedy of this deal is that India has not been successful in getting adequately compensated for providing this huge benefit to all the status quo powers.

So we have this ridiculous spectacle of:

i) India's commitment not to export ENR is taken for granted, but we are still arguing whether the world will provide ENR to India.
ii) India's commitment to adhere to NSG guidelines (including future changes over which India will have no say) is taken for granted, but we are still arguing under what conditions and with what limitations NSG will sell stuff to India.
iii) India's commitment to adhere to MTCR is taken for granted, but the Hyde Act mandates that US will still impose MTCR restrictions on India. Under MTCR rules, that translates into all members of MTCR maintaining MTCR restrictions on India.

Would you negotiate such a one-sided agreement in any other walk of life?

We need to closely study Chinese actions and behavior over the past two decades and why the West practically begged them to join all these groups as a way of trying to encourage China into becoming 'a responsible stakeholder in the international system'.

[samuel]

i) India's commitment not to export ENR is taken for granted, but we are still arguing whether the world will provide ENR to India.
ii) India's commitment to adhere to NSG guidelines (including future changes over which India will have no say) is taken for granted, but we are still arguing under what conditions and with what limitations NSG will sell stuff to India.
iii) India's commitment to adhere to MTCR is taken for granted, but the Hyde Act mandates that US will still impose MTCR restrictions on India. Under MTCR rules, that translates into all members of MTCR maintaining MTCR restrictions on India.

This is illuminating.
Would the right way be to see if India and the US can find a way to partner in various economic and even defense agreements, some sort of CBM, then onto UNSC, before we do a nuke agreement. Would progressive taxiing, so to say, be the right approach before such a relationship can be expected to take off? I mean, in the context of US-India relations, this deal comes out of the blue, like telling someone you really love them after one date and there's been no sex yet. The US just shows and says, we want to take you to the moon and we just say, wow! cool! my stud?

S

[Arun_S]

We are overlooking a very simple fact; I don't think we are yet ready for a strategic relationship with the US. If we had one, US would provide us data to simulate New clear pathakas ( as it did with its strategic allies like UK and France), or provide covert support like with Israel, or simply overlook transfer of tech like China. None of this is happening; in fact we are prodded and asked to give more. This does not look like friendship between to able powers or a strategic relationship. It is more like an entrapment. It is done by a government that does not enjoy any support in India on 'nationalistic' ground. It is de facto headed by a foreigner, by a leader who has not yet won even a mayor's post, whose patriotism has been doubted by many (from Jaswant Singh to Cong's own backroom boys), who has in the past starved the newclear program of funds......anyway this does not inspire confidence.
Now some many years from now when we are more formidable, I am sure we can make a far better deal, more acceptable to us, until then there is no need. The sky is not falling, why the rush?
rgds,
fanne

I was going to post similar viewpoint on "signs of when a relationship is Strategic". I see no signs of Strategic relationship with US.

Thanks for speaking your and my mind.

[Karan Dixit]

NZ denies blocking India's nuclear dream

http://www.stuff.co.nz/4670950a12.html

[Rupesh]

'Legislating The Hyde Act Internationally Isn't The Right Way'

US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs on the hurdles that await the US-India nuclear deal, Pervez Musharraf's resignation, and developments in Kashmir.

ASHISH KUMAR SEN ON RICHARD BOUCHER
US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher, in his spacious sixth-floor office in Washington, discusses with Ashish Kumar Sen the hurdles that await the US-India nuclear deal, Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf's resignation, and developments in Kashmir. Excerpts from an interview conducted two days before the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was to meet to consider granting India a waiver for participating in nuclear commerce.
New Zealand has expressed reservations about the nuclear deal. Will a second NSG meeting be required to get its approval?

There are a lot of people who say we probably will [need a second session]. We do not know for sure until we have the meeting. I think what's important is that both we and the Indian government have been working on two levels. First, we understand that this is different from your standard nonproliferation activity. So a lot of countries have a lot of questions about where this deal fits in the general nonproliferation framework that we have got and whether it contributes to that framework. We think it absolutely does and therefore we want to go forward with it. Countries are going to have questions. India has been answering a lot of those questions. We have been answering a lot of those questions. So I am not surprised to hear countries say they have questions and issues that they want to discuss.

We have also been talking to countries on a more political level. I think people do understand the outlook of India upon its own future. Clean energy for economic growth is an important factor for a lot of people. Carbon emissions is an important factor for a lot of people. India's cooperation more broadly with the West is an important factor for a lot of people. And so I think countries are looking at it at both levels -- both the technical and nonproliferation level and the political level – and we have been trying to keep that dialogue going and would like to do so all the way through. Secretary of State [Condoleezza Rice] was in New Zealand not too long ago and she talked to them there.

India wants a "clean and unconditional" waiver. Is it realistic at this point?

We'll have to see. Countries are going to want to raise issues and get questions answered and record their views in terms of their own policies, their own commitment to nonproliferation and making nonproliferation work and so we may have to look for ways to allow people to express themselves without in any way hampering or impinging the cooperation with India. We will have to wait and see what people say. We will certainly push as hard as we can for a clean exemption and if anything needs to be considered we will consider it together with India.

House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, Congressman Howard Berman, recently wrote to Secretary Rice to remind her about the Hyde Act provision and a House resolution that asked the U.S. president to ensure that there would be immediate termination of all nuclear commerce by NSG states with India if the latter were to undertake a nuclear weapons test. But the waiver draft the Unites States has submitted to the NSG doesn't impose such a condition on it. How do you intend to allay Mr. Berman's concerns?

We have got a dialogue going with people in our Congress including Congressman Berman. Some would like to see all the provisions of the Hyde Act legislated in some international fashion. We don't think that is the right way. We think, in a sense, that it limits not only our president but other countries and how they react to things. Secretary Rice has said that what we seek will be consistent with the Hyde Act.The Hyde Act requires us to do things, but that doesn't mean we will have to rewrite the Hyde Act and get everybody else to agree to it. I think we will be explaining this to the congressman and having this discussion in Congress as well as internationally. There will be nothing in the NSG (waiver) that is going to violate the Hyde Act. The most important thing the Hyde Act does is that it enables this cooperation and that is the goal of going to the NSG -- to enable this cooperation.

So then does the draft placed before the NSG not completely reflect the Hyde Act?

We are not trying to take the Hyde Act and get the nuclear suppliers to sign on to it. Our goal is to allow this commerce the way the Hyde Act allows this commerce and to do so in a manner that is not in any way inconsistent with our own obligations to our Congress. There are members who feel very strongly about this. Just as I said countries have legitimate questions, I think members of Congress will have legitimate questions and we will just have to go through the process of answering those and working with them.

Section 2 (g) of the US draft to the NSG applauds India for "continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear test..." Is this a condition for NSG countries to do nuclear commerce with India? In other words, should India undertake a nuclear test, are NSG countries committed to terminating nuclear commerce with India?

So far this is a discussion document. It is a proposed draft for the nuclear suppliers and we'll have to see what people want to talk about and frankly that remains confidential. We're going to have this discussion with the nuclear suppliers and not in public.

In what tangible ways does this draft commit India to furthering NPT goals?

Having India alongside the nonproliferation effort, having India as a partner with the countries of the NSG, having authorisation for the countries to cooperate with India makes India a contributor to the nonproliferation effort in a way that they are not currently. India has good export controls, and India is committed to maintaining good export controls. India is vigilant when it comes to nuclear technologies, putting in place safeguards agreements, separation plans and I think those are all steps forward in nonproliferation. I think the NSG decision would acknowledge that it's a good thing to have that kind of cooperation with India.

Once the NSG approves the deal can India commence nuclear trade with NSG members or does it have to wait for the U.S. Congress to approve the deal?

That depends on how the NSG exemption is worded and so we will have to see how that is worked out. Our hope is to do things expeditiously. To move expeditiously as we have in the IAEA board, to move expeditiously in the NSG and with some understanding from our Congress to move expeditiously there so that there is no question of some people going ahead of others.

Has India given any assurance that it won't commence commerce without US Congress' approval of the deal?

That hasn't been an issue. We are both trying to make it all work out together. If there is some difference down the road we will have to discuss it at that time.

Given the current congressional calendar there does not appear to be enough time to meet the 30-day requirement in Congress.

Under present plans, the Congress does not plan on being in session for 30 days. We have to get the whole thing done. One of the more interesting lines in Congressman Berman's letter is that it will be hard for lawmakers to expedite this if they don't get a whole solid package. So that will be our first goal, to get a solid package up to Congress.IAEA board, NSG decisions...India is taking a lot of steps under the joint statements and we need to get all that package together under the Hyde Act and be able to present it to Congress in early September. That is an enormous amount of work and that is what we are doing now. If we do that, then there will be another enormous amount of work -- talking to people in Congress and trying to see if there is not some procedure they can use or some change or some way that they can do this expeditiously just as we have gone to others and asked for expeditious action.

Does that include calling a lame-duck session of Congress?

That's a matter the Congress has to decide. They are not planning on doing that right now. They have to decide to do it. We can ask them to consider th
is and they are going to have to find a way to do it.

India's side of Kashmir is in ferment again…

There are a couple of things about Kashmir. We have watched as Pakistan and India have achieved a lot of progress both on confidence-building measures and on putting forth ideas on how to stabilize the place for a longer term -- how to resolve the issues. We have encouraged that process and both sides have come forward with very statesmanlike steps. We don't want to see that lost. We would like to see that continue. We have been concerned about some of the incidents recently along the LoC as well as some violence that has occurred in Jammu and Kashmir and we feel that everybody needs to pay attention to calm things down and get back to solving the problems. So far India and Pakistan have managed things well. Both sides tell us they want to continue to move along those lines along with other steps to improve the relationship.

Do you feel the U.S. needs to play a bigger role in the region?

We are not trying to insert ourselves where people don't want us. I think looking back on the last couple of years, India and Pakistan have done very well on their own. Our job is to continue to encourage that process.

You talked about action along the LoC. Has the U.S. noticed an increase in cross-border infiltrations?

There have been some incidents that have been widely reported along the LoC. I don't have detailed information to start ascribing blame but I think it is worth saying there have been more incidents recently along the LoC than they have in quite a while. Therefore both sides need to focus on making sure that we are not seeing problems along the LoC.

Many in South Asia feel the U.S. ditched Pervez Musharraf, and it is one of the important reasons why he had to resign. The U.S. has lost an ally. Has his departure in any way changed the challenges you face in the war on terror?

Pakistan has been a complicated situation for a long time now. We tried to work with that situation on a fundamental basis -- and that is that in the long run democracy is the best foundation to fight extremism. We worked with President Musharraf. In the war against terror, he has been a good ally. But he also understood last year that it is time to move toward a democratic election. And with all the twists and turns and problems associated with that, we got there. We got a credible election and a new government. I think we recognised, with the outcome of the election, the need to work with the new government. That is what we are doing. That's why Prime Minister Gilani was here a couple of weeks ago and we had some good conversations with him. We want to work with him across the
board. That's our goal -- to work with the democratic government of Pakistan across the board.

The way the politics played out for President Musharraf is a matter of Pakistan and that is a matter we have to leave to the Pakistanis.Our interest is that we think he is a friend and deserves to be treated with respect and that any of these processes need to follow an appropriate constitutional format. But how exactly it works out politically after the election is for Pakistanis and that's just the way things happen.

Have any senior U.S. officials spoken with him since he announced his resignation?

Not that I am aware of.

Would the U.S. consider offering Musharraf asylum?

I don't know why people use the word asylum. He's a free man. He can go wherever he wants. It is not really an issue on the table frankly.

Some analysts have suggested there is no concrete evidence linking the ISI and Taliban. But Bush administration officials recently said the ISI had provided "logistic support" in the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Do you have proof of links between the ISI and these terrorists?

I think we all understand that Pakistani policy until 2001 was to have direct links with the Taliban. This goes back to the 80s when we were all together fighting the Soviets. We know the history of this and we know the historical ties have always been there through the 90s and until 2001, and then President Musharraf made a decision to break with the Taliban and to fight terrorism.

I think there has been a continuing effort in Pakistan to make sure that all the organizations, all the instruments of national power, were being used against extremism. That is something that still has to continue. That is the goal: always to make sure that everybody is lined up in the same direction and everybody is using their tools against the extremism that threatens Pakistan, the region and the rest of the world.

How successful was Musharraf in severing those links with the Taliban?

You have seen a lot of change. No country has captured or killed more al Qaeda than Pakistan. You can probably say the ISI as an organization has captured and killed more terrorists than any other organization in the world. At the same time you have to make sure that every organization is lined up in terms of dealing with the national problem of extremism.

Are conditions in Pakistan appropriate to bring about effective changes in the ISI that would help Pakistan as well as facilitate the war on terror?

There are increasing signs of determination to fight terrorism among the politicians, among the army, among other groups in society. I think people thoroughly understand the threat to Pakistan and that's the basis for them to gather their strength and to move forward against terrorism. And that doesn't mean just fighting terrorism but also in terms of economic opportunities, building roads, building schools. A whole lot of things can be done to modernize Pakistan, to integrate the tribal areas and to fight the problem of extremism more broadly. I see more convergence on that in Pakistan.

We are trying to help Pakistan across the board with its problems and help the society across the board with modernisation.

How do you view the Pakistani government's policy of going ahead with peace agreements in the tribal regions along the Afghan border?

What they say is they want to negotiate with tribes to get the tribes on their side. If they are successful in getting the tribes on their side, I think that would be an important thing to do.

But this is also something that Musharraf tried and it didn't work.

Part of what the problem was there was lack of enforcement. If you can cut a deal with the tribes then the tribes have to implement it. And if they don't, there has to be enforcement and I think that was one of the big problems with the September 2006 agreements, and I certainly hope people will learn from that experience and won't repeat it.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A slightly shorter, edited version of this appears in print

http://www.outlookindia.com/fullprint.a ... F%29&sid=1

[Sanatanan]

I would like to know that too because I think we really are interested in reprocessing tech. I don't think there is a problem with bringing our reprocessing technology out into the inspection side, except that exposing our technology may be a no-no, especially considering the speed with which that technology will vanish. In that case, if we are going to have a closed fuel cycle on the safeguard side, so as to not just take, make, waste $$, our insistence on ENR not be denied is well-justified. Plus, if we really have been wasting time on the so-called military side, maybe we'll learn a thing or two from the safeguarded cycle? Dunno, just guessing.

As I see it, the crux of the issue is not the capability in India to establish the requisite process parameters as well as design the plants - be they reactors or enrichment plants or reprocessing plants - of higher capacity, consistent with the number of reactors that might be constructed as per the futuristic power profile to be achieved in year 2050. It is the present desire and projected need to import the required "components and equipment" (basically "hardware"), rather than continue to go forward on their indigenous development, that might be the cause for India's request to US / NSG for allowing ENR via this deal.

Diffusion of technology from the safeguarded side to the unsafeguarded side would depend upon how leak-tight the separation is. My guess is that if at all ENR is allowed, the supplier nations would want very tight and intrusive controls on implementation of the "separation" aspect of the deal.

[RajeshA]

Question for the experts:

Do the NSG rules allow for example, ENR Technology transfer say between Russia and China, or would Areva be supplying nuclear reactors with full fuel life-cycle support to China?

[ShibaPJ]

Folks,
I know, the discussion gets heated up, but can we please live the NRI v/s RI crap and each one's ranking in the patriotism matrix out of this? This discussion is about the deal serving Indian interests and above kind of degeneration seems very inappropriate here.

W.r.t. the Indian red lines, seems Unkil is using the 6 pipsqueaks waliings (they might be cat's paw of PRC) to further it's own agenda of putting in ENR denial, so US companies are not disadvantaged in the subsquent reactor deals. But we won't know till Sep 05th, or till the draft is leaked. So, it is better to hold our horses till that period.

[fanne]

Samuel sir,
Though the post was addressed to you, it was not directed against you. Please feel free to add your comments in this thread itself.
rgds,
fanne

[RajeshA]

American demise creates problems for India

When the US fiddles with the rules by T V R Shenoy: rediff.com

The bottomline is that the Manmohan Singh ministry committed a cardinal error in putting all its eggs in the American basket. It was so taken by Washington's blandishments that it forgot that there were 45 nations in the Nuclear Suppliers Group. A decade ago, the United States might have been able to push a deal through, but the America of ten years ago is not the America of today.

[sraj]

i) India's commitment not to export ENR is taken for granted, but we are still arguing whether the world will provide ENR to India.
ii) India's commitment to adhere to NSG guidelines (including future changes over which India will have no say) is taken for granted, but we are still arguing under what conditions and with what limitations NSG will sell stuff to India.
iii) India's commitment to adhere to MTCR is taken for granted, but the Hyde Act mandates that US will still impose MTCR restrictions on India. Under MTCR rules, that translates into all members of MTCR maintaining MTCR restrictions on India.

This is illuminating.
Would the right way be to see if India and the US can find a way to partner in various economic and even defense agreements, some sort of CBM, then onto UNSC, before we do a nuke agreement. Would progressive taxiing, so to say, be the right approach before such a relationship can be expected to take off?

Exactly. I have argued before that the sequencing of this deal is all wrong. It probably constitutes another 'bait and switch' on MMS, since US support for UNSC was very much on the agenda in 2005 and 2006 (and in the run-up to 2005, when Condi Rice and sundry others promised to make India a super-power ).

The US (and more broadly, the P-5) are not doing this out of love for India. India's accomodation is in the P-5's self interest. A tottering non-proliferation regime will be significantly strengthened and have increased legitimacy if India can be brought into the tent. Any nuclear incident anywhere, together with the ongoing North Korea, Iran, and other episodes will bring into serious question the P-5's continued possession of nuclear weapons in violation of their NPT commitments.

UNSC membership as a risk mitigation measure for India to manage the inevitable ambiguities associated with trying to fit it into the existing non-proliferation architecture is a necessity.

This deal is premature if it cannot be linked with UNSC membership. Letting it die may not be so bad.

[RajeshA]

Nuclear Lobby active in Canada {and batting for India}

Emerson, PMO Met Nuclear Reps Before India Vote: Database by Lee Berthiaume: Embassy, Canada

A week before Canada supported an International Atomic Energy Association deal required for a controversial U.S.-India nuclear co-operation agreement to proceed, representatives from Canada's nuclear industry met with Foreign Affairs Minister David Emerson and a policy advisor from the Prime Minister's Office, according to a new lobbying database

[sraj]

As I see it, the crux of the issue is not the capability in India to establish the requisite process parameters as well as design the plants - be they reactors or enrichment plants or reprocessing plants - of higher capacity, consistent with the number of reactors that might be constructed as per the futuristic power profile to be achieved in year 2050. It is the present desire and projected need to import the required "components and equipment" (basically "hardware"), rather than continue to go forward on their indigenous development, that might be the cause for India's request to US / NSG for allowing ENR via this deal.

And is this a good enough reason to make the strategic concessions that India has already made, or which are currently on the table?

[Philip]

We have until May to sort out matters it appears.It gives the govt. enough time to take crucial pro-US decisions in other matters too.

[enqyoob]

IMO, a CLEAN deal is far better than UNSC P-6 membership without a deal. Vetos don't hold water without a few bums to back them up. So I would much rather see a nuke deal (WITH nuke weapons retained) than anything to do with the toothless UN.

BTW, there is no way that a UNSC with veto is going to come India's way by the kindness of others. The only scenario that is even being discussed is a UNSC Permanent Member expansion to include Japan, Germany, India and Brazil, in that order, all WITHOUT veto power. IOW, Prestigious Club membership with zilch additional power.

However, once a nuke power, a no vote by India is as good as a veto, even if India is not even in the UN.

So I would urge ppl not to let their desperate hope to see this deal killed (and hence bring the govt down) become so obvious by arguing that UNSC membership is better than new CLEAR azadi.
***********

Returning to the ENR (what is "N" there? ) my question is what happens if India is "approved" by this gang to import fuel and other stuff, but not to import the ENR. OK, so India has to use some E and R from indigenous technology, and at that point, the E&R plants become opaque to inspecteurs, being outside the deal. Hajaar tons of LEU goes in, hajaar tons of stuff come out, along with a few grams of glowing HEU. Unphortunately, saar, our technology is indigenous onlee, not as efficient as phoren imported onlee, so efficiency eej only 50 percent of imported. Tsk! Tsk! sorry, we cannot account phor other 50 perjent onlee.

This is what China would do.

[NRao]

South Africa urged to block India's nuclear fuel bid

US arm-twisting India over N-deal: Experts

[Rangudu]

http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStor ... yid=396143

Machimura suggests Japan's acceptance of U.S.-India nuclear deal

TOKYO, Aug. 27 KYODO

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura suggested Wednesday that Japan will accept the controversial accord allowing the United States to transfer nuclear technology to India, which is a non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
''Needless to say, Japan supports the NPT regime and does not allow nuclear proliferation,'' Machimura told a news conference. He added, however, that Japan needs to partly accept India's position.

He also said the promotion of nuclear power generation by India will help contribute to the fight against global warming and that a safeguards agreement concluded by India and the International Atomic Energy Agency earlier this month will ensure inspections of India's nuclear facilities.

Negotiations for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, which would include exports of uranium fuel from the United States to India, were concluded last year.

But in order for the accord to become effective, the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group, which regulates nuclear trade, has to agree by consensus to issue an exemption for India to engage in nuclear trade.

[Sanatanan]

And is this a good enough reason to make the strategic concessions that India has already made, or which are currently on the table?

In my opinion, not at all!

(I take it that your question is meant to be rhetorical.)

I was merely trying to express my reasoning as to why India might have voluntarily agreed to get into the quicksand pit dug by the US. I believe my previous posts would bear this out!

[Sanatanan]

US arm-twisting India over N-deal: Experts {Emphasis on the word arm-twisting, mine}

Unfortunately, I am unable to get the appropriate links now, but I recollect having read a report some time back that the US once arm-twisted its way (perhaps not on any issues pertaining to India, but on some other issue) ealier by threatening to walk out of the NSG.

[Rangudu]

N^3,

Yeah let's demand that India become a UNSC member with veto power before we accept anything from the NSG. That's highly practical. Maybe we should also demand that the US transfer about half its GDP to India as a "sign of sincerety" and then demand that TSP be destroyed. For good measure let's also demand that the NPT cutoff date be moved to 1974.

I once knew of a guy at work who made a lot of "demands" such as "I'll not work for people younger than me" or "I'll only work for top-tier clients" while a couple of us quietly worked the system. A few years later the man was laid off and had to "request" that he be rehired and ended up working for us for the same types of tasks he once demanded he not be put on.

Let's not confuse the issue of a clean NSG waiver with rewriting the global power structure. India should and will be prepared to walk away if the NSG waiver crosses our redlines but that doesn't mean that we argue for "my way or the highway"

[Rangudu]

http://upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/ ... enna/7315/

Racism trumps reason at Vienna

By M.D. Nalapat

Manipal, India — Contrary to the expectations of Congress Party boss Sonia Gandhi and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, last week's special meeting in Vienna of the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group ended in deadlock. The meeting had been requested by the United States to approve George W. Bush's quest for a "clean waiver" for the resumption of nuclear trade with India – commerce that had been frozen since India's 1974 nuclear test.

Tellingly, all but one of the countries opposing India were either European, or of largely European stock. The one exception was Japan, a country that prides itself on its people being the "Westerners of the East."

Expectedly, Austria led the Euro-attack against the proposed exemption, reiterating the bloc’s 34-year demand that India be forced to accept full-scope safeguards on all its nuclear facilities, as well as sign on to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. New Zealand, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Finland, Switzerland and Ireland joined hands with Japan in backing the Austrian stand, even though each had been individually made aware by Indian negotiators that any such conditions would result in India walking away from the deal.

Unfortunately for backers of the deal, reports reaching New Delhi suggest that the Bush point person for the talks, Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation John Rood, proved to be less than enthusiastic about securing a clean waiver for India. In this, Rood is following in the path of his predecessor Robert Joseph, who had also been unenthusiastic about the deal. Both are members of the U.S. nonproliferation mainstream that for decades has focused on India – a state that has never proliferated its technology beyond its own borders – while doing little about U.S. policies that have winked at proliferation by Pakistan, China and North Korea.

When Manmohan Singh signed on to a joint statement with U.S. President George W. Bush on July 18, 2005, it was assumed that Washington recognized that the 1.16 billion-strong democracy – which has nearly 300 million English speakers and is rapidly becoming a strategic U.S. ally – had by its unblemished nonproliferation record earned the right to nuclear commerce as "a country possessing advanced nuclear technology."

Clearly, many within the Bush administration disagree, standing with those European countries that have sought to derail the nuclear deal at the Nuclear Suppliers Group, despite India having offered to place 70 percent of its existing reactors under safeguards. Incidentally, both France and the United Kingdom have strongly backed India in the NSG, thus indicating that not all European countries are resentful of India being given a clean waiver by the NSG.

Should the NSG approve a deal already cleared by the International Atomic Energy Agency and nuclear trade with India resume, a future administration would be likely to continue the country's moratorium on nuclear testing, which was announced by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee soon after the 1998 tests. However, should the deal fall through, the way would be clear for the next administration in India to resume nuclear testing and begin to move away from New Delhi's longstanding policy of ignoring lucrative foreign offers for purchase of its technologies.

Funding on a significant scale would be needed to develop an adequate nuclear energy program in the absence of an NSG nod, and trade in such technologies would be a likely route toward mobilizing the funding needed. Ironically therefore, the group that is opposing India's being given any option other than unconditional surrender of its strategic deterrent is playing into the hands of nuclear hawks who are expected to have a muscular voice in the government that will be formed after the 2009 general election.

Given the strong domestic opposition even to the concessions already made by Sonia Gandhi and Manmohan Singh to clinch the deal with the United States, it will not be possible for New Delhi to agree to any further conditions. What the Austria-led group is looking for is an Indian commitment to sign on to the NPT, the CTBT and the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapons state, a position that would reduce to nonsense India's 55-year odyssey toward becoming an independent nuclear and space power.

Clearly, some within the international community are not yet ready to accept a world order in which those of an ethnicity different from themselves be given the same privileges as they themselves enjoy. Unless of course that country be China, which is not only responsible for making North Korea and Pakistan nuclear powers, but which is fawned on by all the countries now opposing India at the NSG.

With others doing its work of preventing a clear waiver to India, Beijing can put on a cooperative mien, hoping that others will derail the consensus needed for NSG decisions to become effective.

When the NSG re-convenes on Sept. 4 to discuss the India waiver, should the Austria-led group succeed in pushing to impose additional – and unacceptable – conditions on India, such actions would be reminiscent of the way in which Moscow's diplomatic nose was buried in the mud in the former Yugoslavia by NATO in the 1990s. And as recent events in Georgia show, eventually there will be payback for those who have not understood that the world they exist in bears little resemblance to the world in the 19th century, when a single ethnic group dominated the world.

This century calls for a close alliance between the countries with European-origin majorities and India, in order to face the twin threats of religious extremism and state authoritarianism. An all-round alliance with India is key even to the continued economic success of Euro-majority countries – yet this baby may be stillborn thanks to Austria and its allies should they succeed in throwing out the bathwater of the NSG's proposed India-specific nuclear waiver. Much more is at stake in Vienna on Sept. 4 than nuclear trade with India.

--

(Professor M.D. Nalapat is vice-chair of the Manipal Advanced Research Group, UNESCO Peace Chair, and professor of geopolitics at Manipal University. ©Copyright M.D. Nalapat.)

[ramana]

I too said the European Nordics are racially motinvated. Need to remind them who the real Aryans are!

[enqyoob]

er.... I hate to have to point this out, but could ppl pls dig out Dr. Nalapat's most recent article on the nuclear deal BEFORE this one?

IOW, if the Oiropeans are "racist" for putting conditions on the NSG waiver, isn't Dr. Nalapat a bigger racist for opposing the deal entirely?

I am not saying the Oiropeans don't have their hangups, but "racism" is a simplistic answer to their "concerns". The main point that blows their case out of the water is that INDIA HAS NOT proliferated nuclear materials, weapons or technology ANYWHERE NEAR as much as they themselves have done.

IIRC, Austria, Belgium and Switzerland are the worthies who proliferated enrichment technology to Pakistan and hence to Libya, Saudi Arabia and (if u r willing to buy bridges sight unseen) to North Korea.

I don't know about NZ, except that their current PM came to power on the GreenPeace platform, and those nutcases do put their lives on the line in such things as putting their rubber dinghies in front of French and American warships on the open sea. You have to respect their concerns, but point out that India is very much on their side, and they need to quit being idiots.

Anyway, Austria is full of ex-Nazis, whose claim to humanitarian concerns etc. is rather suspect, to put it mildly. They should stick to picking Eidelweisses and wishing their country remains "Clean and White" like their stupid song goes.

Switzerland should be threatened with withdrawal of Sonia Gandhi's and Laloo's accounts.

[RajeshA]

Narayanan Ji,
Would you be so kind to offer a few links regarding Austrian Proliferation? General Information (Inline) on the matter would also be welcome.

[Gerard]

er.... I hate to have to point this out,

I was thinking the same thing. By the logic of his previous articles, he should be supporting the European racists.

Or has he finally read the IAEA agreement and the previous NSG draft?

[Manny]

a) Austria and Switzerland are among the most racist countries out there. You should have seen the reaction there when a Black Swiss national was running for public office. They couldn't believe it how a black person would even dare do such a thing.



b) sraj said "That is why I have argued on several occasions that India's membership of the UNSC on par with the P-5 is the only way to mitigate the risk of self-interested interpretation/resolution of a dispute by a UNSC whose members will naturally be driven by their geo-political interests."



Dream on!

Read my lips:

India would never be able to join the UNSC on par with the P-5. This anachronistic thinking of the desis that there is a possibility that they can join the p5 at that level is appalling IMO. Sheesh!

The only way India can contribute to that end is to make sure the UNSC is destroyed not support it and beg to join in.

c). I see people mentioning the partition like that was a bad thing. NOPE..that was not a bad thing...thats one of the best thing to happen to India.

Manny

[ramana]

er.... I hate to have to point this out,

I was thinking the same thing. By the logic of his previous articles, he should be supporting the European racists.

Or has he finally read the IAEA agreement and the previous NSG draft?

He wrote all that before the IAEA draft and once that was agreed to its about rallying round the flag. So one should also keep the timeline in view.