China Military Watch

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 13 Jun 2009 19:31

Addl troops for Arunachal infrastructure: Gen Kapoor
http://www.stratpost.com/addl-troops-fo ... gen-kapoor
Arunachal MP calls for focused study of China
http://www.stratpost.com/arunachal-mp-c ... y-of-china

sum · Post by **sum** » 13 Jun 2009 21:49

Sanjay wrote:

The artillery is just about adequate at present though not ideal.

Sir, since you are highly knowledgeable in these matters, i am willing to breathe easy ( a bit) and share your optimism...

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 13 Jun 2009 22:22

Sum, we want the best and always the best. Sometimes the IA shoots itself with that attitude. We could have had our own 155 some time ago and it isn't too late now. Start with the Metamorphosis. Right now what you have are a mix of 130s and 105s which are reasonable performers.

sum · Post by **sum** » 13 Jun 2009 22:27

Sum, we want the best and always the best. Sometimes the IA shoots itself with that attitude. We could have had our own 155 some time ago and it isn't too late now. Start with the Metamorphosis.

Given the current dilly-dallying over indigenous products (though not completely unwarranted), that metamorphosis doesn't seem to be happening leaving the country as the final loser.
When the IA is ready to relent, DRDO does something. When DRDO relents, the neta/babu class puts a spoke in the wheel and the cycle continues.

Anyways, here is the article about the delay:

Ban on defence firms will delay artillery upgrade: Army Chief

New Delhi: Army Chief General Deepak Kapoor said today that the Defence Ministry’s ban on dealing with Singapore Technologies (ST), which is being investigated by the CBI in connection with the corruption charges against former Ordnance chief Sudipta Ghosh, will delay Indian plans to acquire light howitzers for the artillery.

“Till the time the CBI is able to carry out detailed investigation,” said Kapoor, “there will be a delay. To that extent, it will affect the acquisition of ultra light howitzers.” He was speaking on the sidelines of a defence function in the capital.

Interestingly, the Singapore-based firm is the only vendor offering its “Pegasus” gun to the Army for its requirement of ultra-light howitzers needed for deployment in mountainous regions. With the only other contender, BAE systems, backing out of the contract, the ST gun was the only one available that met the Army’s requirements.

ST was banned after its name figured along with six other firms in the CBI inquiry against former Director General of Ordnance Factory Board Sudipta Ghosh. The defence ministry has put all dealings with the seven firms on hold till the CBI completes its probe.

This is the second major blow for the Army’s artillery modernization plans after South African giant Denel was blacklisted in 2005 for allegedly paying kickbacks in a deal for anti-material rifles for the Army. General Kapoor also said today that the much-awaited comparative trials between the indigenous Arjun tanks and the Russian origin T 90 mainstay tanks of the Army will take place in October.

Ramanean · Post by **Ramanean** » 13 Jun 2009 23:08

The problem with these Defence establishments is

Always alleged Corruption scandal surfaces only we are about to acquire it

We need to investigate
a)Whether these alleged scandals are real?
b)Whether these are created by our hostile neigbours or companies that lost the bid..

Sanjay · Post by **Sanjay** » 13 Jun 2009 23:48

Delay hits modernization it does not affect improvements in how the IA uses existing assets.

Metamorphosis is one weapon where the IA really blew it. One of the Soltam upgrades that the IA was so keen on suffered a barrel explosion causing fatalities. I am led to understand there is some legal recourse being sought.

vsudhir · Post by **vsudhir** » 14 Jun 2009 01:00

Chinese Sub collides with sonar array towed by U.S. Navy ship

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- In what a U.S. military official calls an "inadvertent encounter," a Chinese submarine hit an underwater sonar array being towed by the destroyer USS John McCain on Thursday.

The array was damaged, but the sub and the ship did not collide, the official said. A sonar array is a device towed behind a ship that listens and locates underwater sounds.

The incident occurred near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines.

The official, who declined to be named because the incident had not been made public, would not say whether the U.S. ship knew the submarine was that close to it.

However, the Navy does not believe this was a deliberate incident of Chinese harassment, as it would have been extremely dangerous had the array gotten caught in the submarine's propellers.

The Navy has complained in the past that Chinese vessels, including fishing boats, have deliberately tried to disrupt U.S. naval activities in international waters near China. In one widely publicized incident in March, five Chinese vessels maneuvered close enough to the USNS Impeccable to warrant the use of a fire hose by the unarmed American vessel to avoid a collision. The Navy later released video of that incident.

Kakarat · Post by **Kakarat** » 14 Jun 2009 07:26

MP seeks IAF base in Arunachal
Sushanta Talukdar

GUWAHATI: Arunachal West MP Takam Sanjoy has urged Defence Minister A.K. Anthony to set up an Indian Air Force base in Arunachal Pradesh and fund the mule tracks and porter tracks in the State along the Indo-China border.

Mr. Sanjoy told journalists here that Mr. Anthony had assured him that eight defence airports would be opened and two more Army divisions deployed in the State. The State government on June 9 handed over eight Advanced Landing Grounds of the State to the Defence Ministry.

He told Mr. Anthony that massive development work undertaken by China along the border was a matter of great concern, and India should embark on a similar project in Arunachal Pradesh. He also drew Mr. Antony’s attention to the Arunachal Pradesh government’s plan for raising four battalions of Arunachal Scouts, similar to the Ladakh Scouts.

Mr. Sanjoy alleged that a Chinese government official had objected to the sanction of $60 million by the Asian Development Bank to Arunachal Pradesh for a watershed management project. He called on Union Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee to immediately depute senior officials of the Finance and External Affairs Ministries to take up the matter with the ADB.

Mr. Sanjoy called on Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi and Meghalaya Chief Minister D.D. Lapang and held discussions with them about strengthening the North East Congress Coordination Committee. He proposed that the committee play a vital role in finding a solution to Assam’s long-pending border disputes with Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalya and Nagaland.

Kritavarman · Post by **Kritavarman** » 14 Jun 2009 09:36

In recent time I see many changes the way GoI is dealing with chinus, is the threat level too high so the urgency of act is needed or is it a preparation for grand finale? Seems in a year or two unkil will be finished with their operation in south asia leaving our neighbours in west, in complete mess and ripe time for final show on tibet and north east by IA? Or is it related to a fear of losing nepal to chinus, or plans to get hold of little dragon land? I am completely confused, any grey heads on chinu military watch, kindly enlighten me

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 14 Jun 2009 09:52

A few days back I had the opportunity to speak to a gentleman from Arunachal. He had made the trip from the Nathu-la border, and has traveled quite a lot in the hills.

He confirms the infrastructure on the chinese side, as viewed from several points in Arunachal is quite good. Says at one point he had to trek with his group for nearly a week to get to the hill where a border lay, in north-east Arunachal.

another point he makes is - Chinese outposts even along the border have a 'factory' where their soldiers make electronics or some product for the defense factories that the PLA seems to run. Along with soldiering, the Chinese soldier is also a factory worker, working for some CEO general.

kancha · Post by **kancha** » 14 Jun 2009 10:15

[quote="p_saggu"

another point he makes is - Chinese outposts even along the border have a 'factory' where their soldiers make electronics or some product for the defense factories that the PLA seems to run. Along with soldiering, the Chinese soldier is also a factory worker, working for some CEO general.[/quote]

That's a very interesting bit of info. One wonders what would be the priorities for these so called soldiers - doing regular "soldierly" activities such as patrolling / firing practices / weapon maintainence, or working their a$$es off to meet the production targets for the Generals. Do they manage to get adequate rest to be fit in case of an emergency?

That might also mean presence of some civilians to supervise the production of the goods.

This is one piece of info that needs to be dwelled and deliberated upon since it is sure to affect the fighting efficiency of the troops.

kittoo · Post by **kittoo** » 14 Jun 2009 12:28

Kritavarman wrote:In recent time I see many changes the way GoI is dealing with chinus, is the threat level too high so the urgency of act is needed or is it a preparation for grand finale? Seems in a year or two unkil will be finished with their operation in south asia leaving our neighbours in west, in complete mess and ripe time for final show on tibet and north east by IA? Or is it related to a fear of losing nepal to chinus, or plans to get hold of little dragon land? I am completely confused, any grey heads on chinu military watch, kindly enlighten me

I seriously doubt that we have capabilities of doing some final show in tibet. One thing that is correct is that Unkil has to go sometime and it looks like it will be sooner than later.
I also don't think that China will try to takeover Nepal. They have no grounds for it. What they WILL do is to take Nepal on their side by diplomacy and money, which they are really good at. They will do that but then India can't do some military action in Nepal just because of that.
As someone else said, it's just because the puppets of China (left parties) are out of govt. and thats why all this is happening. The threat was always there.

sevoke · Post by **sevoke** » 14 Jun 2009 12:49

p_saggu wrote:A few days back I had the opportunity to speak to a gentleman from Arunachal. He had made the trip from the Nathu-la border, and has traveled quite a lot in the hills.

He confirms the infrastructure on the chinese side, as viewed from several points in Arunachal is quite good. Says at one point he had to trek with his group for nearly a week to get to the hill where a border lay, in north-east Arunachal.

another point he makes is - Chinese outposts even along the border have a 'factory' where their soldiers make electronics or some product for the defense factories that the PLA seems to run. Along with soldiering, the Chinese soldier is also a factory worker, working for some CEO general.

Seems like the gentleman overstretched his imagination and more importantly Nathu La is in Sikkim; it has nothing to do with Arunachal. All hills are not the same, IMO you have been misinformed by the "gentleman".

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 14 Jun 2009 14:21

sevoke wrote:
p_saggu wrote:A few days back I had the opportunity to speak to a gentleman from Arunachal. He had made the trip from the Nathu-la border, and has traveled quite a lot in the hills.

He confirms the infrastructure on the chinese side, as viewed from several points in Arunachal is quite good. Says at one point he had to trek with his group for nearly a week to get to the hill where a border lay, in north-east Arunachal.

another point he makes is - Chinese outposts even along the border have a 'factory' where their soldiers make electronics or some product for the defense factories that the PLA seems to run. Along with soldiering, the Chinese soldier is also a factory worker, working for some CEO general.
Seems like the gentleman overstretched his imagination and more importantly Nathu La is in Sikkim; it has nothing to do with Arunachal. All hills are not the same, IMO you have been misinformed by the "gentleman".

The post says that the gentleman is from Arunachal. not that Nathu La is in Arunachal.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 14 Jun 2009 14:41

I think we need a detailed information of the chinese capability,force numbers ,bases,firing points etc, alongside the Indian and nepalese border and at least 500 km away from the border. As this will be the first strike capability that the chinese have ,whenever they start their aggressive maneuvers .
Even if they have backup from mainland,the first strike core should remain same or with smaller changes.
Very little is known about their attack capability on Indian soil besides few missile launch sites ,. A basic assumption would be enough for assessment. Although this thread is to have an information on them , but we need a well compiled and approximate data on that, to solve the purpose. Only gurus can help in this ,because they know which source(s) are correct.
Whenever chinese decide to go for it, they will come in huge numbers,as India's capability had increased after the war lessons,particularly the air force is already deciding the role it will have to play .
Therefore their density(numbers) and installations(arms, ammunition ,plaf strength around border) should not be less or moderate, but a wild guess is that these should be substantial ,which has to be known.

Singha · Post by **Singha** » 14 Jun 2009 16:33

http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/ ... 0220090613\

China sub collides with array towed by U.S. ship: report
Fri Jun 12, 2009 9:21pm EDT

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A Chinese submarine accidentally collided with an underwater sonar array being towed by a U.S. military ship, CNN reported on Friday, quoting an unnamed military official.

The incident occurred on Thursday near Subic Bay off the coast of the Philippines, according to the CNN report.

The destroyer USS John S. McCain was towing the array, deployed to track underwater sounds.

"The John S. McCain did have a problem with its towed array sonar. It was damaged" on Thursday in Subic Bay, a Pentagon spokesman told Reuters in a telephone interview.

arunsrinivasan · Post by **arunsrinivasan** » 14 Jun 2009 16:35

This is about China's nuclear submarines, trust this is appropriate for this thread.

China’s SSBN Forces: Transitioning to the Next Generation

China’s undersea deterrent is undergoing a generational change with the emergence of the Type-094, or Jin-class, which represents a substantial improvement over China’s first-generation Type-092, or Xia-class, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). Launched in the early 1980s, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) single Xia-class SSBN (hereafter Xia) has never conducted a deterrent patrol and is equipped with relatively short-range (1,770 km) JL-1 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles). In contrast, China may build five Type-094 SSBNs, which will enable the PLAN to conduct near-continuous deterrent patrols, and each of these second-generation SSBNs will be outfitted with 12 developmental JL-2 SLBMs that have an estimated range of at least 7,200 km and are equipped with penetration aids. Although the transition to the new SSBN is ongoing, recent Internet photos depicting at least two Jin-class SSBNs (hereafter Jin) suggest that the PLAN has reached an unprecedented level of confidence in the sea-based leg of its strategic nuclear forces. Indeed, China’s 2008 Defense White Paper states that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is enhancing its “nuclear counterattack” capability [1]. With the anticipated introduction of the JL-2 missiles on the Jin and the deployment of DF-31 and DF-31A road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), China is on the verge of attaining a credible nuclear deterrent based on a 'survivable' second-strike capability.

Recent Developments

The U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) assesses that China will build a “fleet of probably five Type-094 SSBNs . . . to provide more redundancy and capacity for a near-continuous at-sea presence” [2]. A variety of Chinese publications suggest that the SSBN forces of France and Britain—which have four vessels each, with one at sea at all times, two in refit, and one under maintenance—may serve as models for China and hence reinforce the aforementioned indications of its plans. One Chinese source, however, suggests that China will field six Type-094 SSBNs, divided into patrolling, deploying and refitting groups [3], with another assessment suggesting that these groups will comprise two SSBNs each [4].

It is clear that at least two different hulls have already been launched, based on unusually high-resolution internet and commercial satellite images that have emerged of one Jin in port at Xiaopingdao base, south of Dalian, two Jins in the water and perhaps one emerging from production at Huludao base east of Beijing, and one at a newly-constructed submarine facility at Yalong Bay near Sanya on Hainan Island. The images of the facility on Hainan Island provided some hints as to the PLAN’s SSBN basing plans. Indeed, the photo of the Jin at Yalong Bay suggests that the facility may be the base for China’s future SSBN forces.

Development Motives

Many Western analysts have focused on the 'survivability' issue to explain China’s decision to proceed with the development of the Jin and the JL-2. Given the potential vulnerability of Chinese SSBNs to detection by adversary attack submarines and the challenges of locating dispersed road-mobile missiles, however, it would certainly seem that Chinese decision-makers must also have been considering other factors, including missile defense, international prestige and inter-service politics.

Chinese strategists appear to calculate that a nuclear dyad, composed of land-based strategic missiles and SLBMs, or possibly a triad incorporating nuclear-armed PLAAF bombers as well, is required to enhance the credibility of China’s nuclear deterrent in line with the requirements of the “effective counter-nuclear deterrence” posture discussed in recent Chinese publications. Chinese analysts assert that an SSBN is “the most survivable type of (nuclear) weapon” [5], and hint that it may allow China to deter third party intervention in a regional conflict. Citing the development of the Jin, one Chinese source states, “If a war erupts across the Taiwan Strait one day, facing the danger of China waging nuclear war, it will be very difficult for America to intervene in the cross-strait military crisis” [6]. The authors interpret the Chinese comments here to mean not that China would be likely to launch nuclear weapons first in response to U.S. intervention in a China-Taiwan conflict, but rather that Chinese analysts believe strong SSBN capabilities would enhance its deterrence posture by causing Washington to think twice about intervening in a conflict in which escalation control might be difficult.

Another potential explanation for the investment in the development of the Jin is that Chinese planners believe SLBMs launched from certain patrol areas might complicate U.S. missile-defense interception efforts. A Chinese analysis states that SSBNs “are more capable of penetrating [missile] defenses” [7].

Yet another plausible explanation for the decision to deploy the Jin is that Chinese leaders may view the ships as symbols of China's emerging great-power status. The other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—France, Britain, Russia, and the United States—all have modern SSBNs in their fleets, and Beijing may see the deployment of its own as a way to enhance its international prestige. This certainly appears to be true of nuclear-powered submarines in general. Indeed, former PLAN Commander Admiral Liu Huaqing and others have stated that nuclear submarines represent one of China’s clearest claims to great power status [8].

Still another possible explanation is inter-service politics. Although the politics of China’s defense budget process are opaque to outsiders, it seems reasonable to speculate that the PLAN leadership may have pushed for the development of the Jin to ensure that the navy would have a role to play in the strategic nuclear-deterrence mission.

Operational Challenges

Notwithstanding the considerable progress reflected by the launching of at least two Jin SSBNs, the PLAN still faces at least three key challenges before it realizes a secure seaborne second-strike capability: reducing the probability of detection; at-sea training of commanders and crew members; and coping with the nuclear command-and-control issues associated with the operation of SSBNs.

Chinese observers are well aware of the challenges of avoiding detection, as reflected by their analysis of capabilities allegedly demonstrated during the Cold War vis-à-vis Soviet submarines. Subsequent-generation submarines are generally significantly quieter than those of earlier generations, so it may be expected that China has made progress in quieting its submarines as well. Nevertheless, the Jin is still a second generation SSBN, and those of other nations have faced significant acoustic difficulties.

Training is another potential challenge for China’s emerging SSBN force. Although digital training and simulations can be useful, the only way other nations have become proficient at submarine operations is by taking their boats to sea. Chinese naval exercises have increased in sophistication in recent years and currently encompass such categories as command and control, navigation, electronic countermeasures, and weapon testing. Moreover, Chinese submarine patrols have increased in recent years—the PLAN conducted 12 patrols in 2008, twice as many as in 2007 [9]. This increase in patrols and the overall priority accorded to China’s submarine force development suggest that the PLAN’s submarines are now able to range farther afield on a more frequent basis. Indeed, the evolving missions and growing capabilities of the Chinese submarine force “create the conditions for Beijing to opt for an increased submarine presence in the Western Pacific east of the Ryukyu Island chain” [10].

While the trajectory of training specifically relevant to deterrent patrols remains opaque, the PLAN is striving to improve the rigor and realism of education and training across the board. Within this context, submarines have clearly been an area of emphasis and the PLAN is using a variety of methods to prepare its sailors for future wars. Official Chinese publications note, for example, that various types of simulators have been used to improve submarine training.

Establishing and maintaining secure and reliable communications with SSBNs constitutes another major challenge for any country that desires a sea-based deterrent. Chinese military publications emphasize that the central leadership must maintain strict, highly-centralized command and control of nuclear forces. China’s submarine force has reportedly employed high-frequency (HF), low-frequency (LF), and very-low-frequency (VLF) communications, and researchers are working on a number of technologies that could be useful for secure communications with submarines, as reflected by recent publications discussing the prevention of enemy detection of transmissions between submarines and shore-based headquarters units. Ensuring the ability to communicate with SSBNs in an environment in which an adversary may attempt to disrupt its command and control system could be a critical challenge for the PLAN. It remains unclear, however, to what extent centralized SSBN command, control, and communication is possible for China across the range of conflict scenarios.

Beyond the problem of ensuring secure and reliable communications, the deployment of SSBNs also entails use-control challenges. Given the strong emphasis on centralized control of nuclear forces that is evident in official Chinese military and defense policy publications, it seems highly unlikely that the PLAN would conduct deterrent patrols without effective use controls. Presumably, China will strive not only to develop a communications capability that is robust enough to ensure at least one-way wartime connectivity between Beijing and the Jin-class SSBNs, but also to minimize the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch by implementing some combination of technical and procedural controls.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding the recent series of revelations about China’s emerging SSBN force, at least four questions that have major implications for the future of China’s sea-based deterrent remain unanswered. First, there is the issue of how many SSBNs China will ultimately build, which will influence China’s ability to conduct continuous or near-continuous deterrent patrols. Second, it remains unclear whether China will attempt to create bastions for its SSBNs in areas close to the mainland or deploy them to more distant patrol areas—a decision which will no doubt be informed in part by the capabilities of the JL-2 SLBM, which remains under development. Third, little is known about China’s plans for coping with the command and control challenges associated with the deployment of a sea-based deterrent force, which could influence crisis stability. Fourth, authoritative Chinese sources refer to “joint nuclear counter-attack campaigns” in which the Second Artillery’s nuclear missile force, PLAN SSBNs, and nuclear-capable Chinese air force bomber units would all participate, but it remains unclear to what extent China will actually integrate its emerging SSBN force into a joint strategic nuclear deterrence capability [11]. While these uncertainties remain, the investment already made in SSBN hulls and shore facilities indicates that the program represents a major effort to move beyond the ill-fated Xia and take China’s nuclear deterrent to sea. In addition, the emergence of photos showcasing at least two Type-094 submarines—which reflects Beijing's apparent willingness to allow Western analysts to see them—may signal a new level of confidence on Beijing’s part, and perhaps even a nascent recognition that modest increases in transparency could actually support rather than undermine China’s strategic interests.

sevoke · Post by **sevoke** » 14 Jun 2009 17:42

The post says that the gentleman is from Arunachal. not that Nathu La is in Arunachal.

Tell me something I don't know. He says he made a trip from Nathu-La...to do you know where? He mentions Nathu-La and talks about Arunachal and "hills". Many old generation Indians tend to lump together NE territories as "hills" and the southern four states are just "south" because they are too geographically challenged.

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 14 Jun 2009 19:19

Putting in Nathu La in the post instead of Bum La is my error.
The gentleman is very much from Arunachal, a doctor in fact and an avid photographer, and has been going along with several trekking missions to the hills / mountains in that state.

sevoke · Post by **sevoke** » 14 Jun 2009 20:08

p_saggu wrote:Putting in Nathu La in the post instead of Bum La is my error.
The gentleman is very much from Arunachal, a doctor in fact and an avid photographer, and has been going along with several trekking missions to the hills / mountains in that state.

Thank you Sir for clearing that up. Does the gentleman have an online photostream or a Flickr. We would love to see the pictures!

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 15 Jun 2009 01:23

sevoke wrote:
p_saggu wrote:Putting in Nathu La in the post instead of Bum La is my error.
The gentleman is very much from Arunachal, a doctor in fact and an avid photographer, and has been going along with several trekking missions to the hills / mountains in that state.
Thank you Sir for clearing that up. Does the gentleman have an online photostream or a Flickr. We would love to see the pictures!

sevoke ji ,you seem to be very concerned about arunachal , taken 3 posts for the sake of where is nathu/bum la,

. can you please tell us something about the chinese strength along the border.

AdityaM · Post by **AdityaM** » 15 Jun 2009 02:38

Saw a new news magazine on the stands today. It had the china threat on its cover. Must confess that i did not read the article. It had more picture than text. But will share here anyways.
Searched and found it online too: http://openthemagazine.com/

The site has the article that can be zoomed & read (which i will do later)

AdityaM · Post by **AdityaM** » 15 Jun 2009 02:53

ok, read it. turns out, its a very general article

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 15 Jun 2009 04:18

Such articles keep on coming but,the red fear storm is rising .
Time to know the chinese before kickng

sevoke · Post by **sevoke** » 15 Jun 2009 06:49

Samay wrote:Such articles keep on coming but,the red fear storm is rising .
Time to know the chinese before kickng

Yeah, lets get to know them and kick them. It's really that simple

Jokes apart, IMHO we should define definite objectives for military strategy, arms procurement and foreign policy which have to be met in the near future. India needs to keep reminding the Chinese about autonomy in Tibet on international fora, be a thorn on their side and administer small doses of "loss of face". Appeasement just doesn't work with them. High profile events like recent Bollywood awards in Macau- practically in their backyard will also give them small panic attacks considering how they like to project themselves as the cultural guardians of Asia.

Gaurav_S · Post by **Gaurav_S** » 15 Jun 2009 13:14

Sri Lanka: Beijing’s Growing Foothold in the Indian Ocean

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 19 Jun 2009 10:03

Presentation on the Chinese Armed Forces
Colonel Dennis Blasko, former US Defense Attache to the PRC, gave this presentation.

Col Dennis Blasko's presentation on the Chinese Armed Forces at Speaks at Whittier College

Part 1

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOGW0HC0v44

Part 2

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4DQ1_ldLBGk

kit · Post by **kit** » 22 Jun 2009 08:04

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr ... 90619.aspx

Not a very good source but this caught my eye

The Chinese military has formidable counterinsurgency experience and recently trained the Sri Lankan army, before that nation’s final confrontation with Tamil rebels.

Can anyone post some material regarding chinese involvement in Sri lanka.If true this will have serious undercurrents against Indian politic despite Rajpakse s seeming bonhomie .

AmitR · Post by **AmitR** » 22 Jun 2009 10:14

kit wrote: The Chinese military has formidable counterinsurgency experience and recently trained the Sri Lankan army, before that nation’s final confrontation with Tamil rebels.

Err what exactly is the experience that the Chinese have in counter insurgency? I thought that they only create terrorists.

k prasad · Post by **k prasad** » 22 Jun 2009 12:53

AmitR wrote:
kit wrote: The Chinese military has formidable counterinsurgency experience and recently trained the Sri Lankan army, before that nation’s final confrontation with Tamil rebels.
Err what exactly is the experience that the Chinese have in counter insurgency? I thought that they only create terrorists.

Of course not... look at the formidable lamas that they are up against for the past 50 years - they are armed with rebirth option and karma guns, and don't use any normal weapons. They are fearsome adversaries, who can be killed by only the most thickskinned and coldblooded forces. It is extremely tough to go up against them. That is training enough for the Chinese forces.

Dubaarah mat poochna...

RayC · Post by **RayC** » 22 Jun 2009 13:00

Kritavarman wrote:In recent time I see many changes the way GoI is dealing with chinus, is the threat level too high so the urgency of act is needed or is it a preparation for grand finale? Seems in a year or two unkil will be finished with their operation in south asia leaving our neighbours in west, in complete mess and ripe time for final show on tibet and north east by IA? Or is it related to a fear of losing nepal to chinus, or plans to get hold of little dragon land? I am completely confused, any grey heads on chinu military watch, kindly enlighten me

It is too premature to feel that India has lost its leverage in Nepali politics.

It has been accused of interfrence and indeed India made it difficult for Prachanda to carry out its Maoist agenda and got his to resign and have a PM who is better inclined to India.

It must be remembered that the Marawaris of India controls the economy of Nepal and so India is no pushover, as is the case with the Chinese in Malaysia where because of them, even Mahatir (with Indian lineage) could not force an Islamic agenda, with Saudi influence and money!!

abhischekcc · Post by **abhischekcc** » 22 Jun 2009 14:49

About the Nepali economy:

The country has its own 3 large conglomerates (equivalent to Tata or Birla here). So, marwaris do not necessarily control the economy, although they are a strong force, as are biharis, especially in the trader level.

However, one of the strongest force in Nepali economy, which will never be mentioned, is the Western NGO sector. They are hugely funded organizations - dole out money for 'worthy' causes.

They have the most sought after jobs in Nepal - ahead even of the government or India, and for very good reasons. They pay the best and dole out scholarships to western universities like it is going out fashion. For this reason, they have a hold on the imagination of the middle class in that country.

rkhanna · Post by **rkhanna** » 24 Jun 2009 16:00

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr ... 90619.aspx

Not a very good source but this caught my eye

The Chinese military has formidable counterinsurgency experience and recently trained the Sri Lankan army, before that nation’s final confrontation with Tamil rebels.

Can anyone post some material regarding chinese involvement in Sri lanka.If true this will have serious undercurrents against Indian politic despite Rajpakse s seeming bonhomie

The chinaman supplied the srilankans with everything from A-A missles to APCs and Tanks and ATGM and Small arms and ammunition. Pakistan only being the middleman in the whole process. The list is pretty long and subtantial. Even simple things like IR Supressing Camo nettings were supplied to the SriLankans.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 24 Jun 2009 19:31

rkhanna wrote:
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr ... 90619.aspx

Not a very good source but this caught my eye

The Chinese military has formidable counterinsurgency experience and recently trained the Sri Lankan army, before that nation’s final confrontation with Tamil rebels.

Can anyone post some material regarding chinese involvement in Sri lanka.If true this will have serious undercurrents against Indian politic despite Rajpakse s seeming bonhomie
The chinaman supplied the srilankans with everything from A-A missles to APCs and Tanks and ATGM and Small arms and ammunition. Pakistan only being the middleman in the whole process. The list is pretty long and subtantial. Even simple things like IR Supressing Camo nettings were supplied to the SriLankans.

A permanent base and and a permanent presence of chinese in srilanka is now imminent, and with the rising bondations , better do somethng now or never! A clear warning to lanks may bring some relief and let the MEA sleep another decade.

arjun_vs · Post by **arjun_vs** » 24 Jun 2009 21:23

^^ So Lanka is the latest 'pearl' in the String of Pearls. Who's next....?. Any guesses....?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 24 Jun 2009 23:48

who's left ?

==========
but in all this, there's an unspoken angle. the string of pearls moves by PRC is an outcome to their nervousness that in case of a hostility, India can blockade a large part of china's maritime trade especially its oil supply.
India can cut-off (or make economically unviable) virtually all of china's maritime links with europe africa and west asia if it wants to, with IN's current force level and with the current force level PLAN can't break through the blockade.

Think why, only a small part of PLAN fleet is battle-worthy(merely sea-worthy won't do) on the high seas. and given the naval prowess of china's neighbours (JMSDF, ROKN, ROCN not to mention the USN) PLAN has no other option but to retain a considerable part of its capital assets in the home fleet.
The balance, which PLAN can commit in an expeditionary role would be too little to force IN to lift a blockade.
This status-quo would continue for another 10-15 years at least given the current rate of expansion of PLAN, IN and PRC's adversarial navies.

At most PLAN would be able to use its subs, both conventional and nuclear to harass Indian Naval assets in a sea-denial role but that is unlikely to be succedsful in terms of objectives, namely lifting a blockade.

To put it simply, by virtue of her geographical location, India has a considerable strategic leverage over the PRC and the PRC has no alternative but to pro-actively attempt to negate India's advantage.

Hence all this hoopla with the string of pearls !

VinodTK · Post by **VinodTK** » 25 Jun 2009 06:46

China posing new challenges: Mukherjee

andy B · Post by **andy B** » 25 Jun 2009 07:06

Rahul-ul-M-ul-ebil-ul-adminullah

Good post saar,

It made me think that agreed under the current 10 to 15 years the PLAN is gonna have its hands full and over trying to tackle the IN threat in the IOR and hence the string of pearls, but I think even after 10 to 15 years it will still be hard for them due to the following points IMVHO:

1). Given how aware the ROK, Japan, India, and other South East Asian Majors are getting they are also upgrading/expanding their Naval forces to either match up (not possible numerically atleast, technologically definitely and may be more than a match given that ABM defenses are already op on the ROK and Japanese Naval Fleet). So overall the pressure will still be on, given the way the Dragon is percieved amongst these Nations. Looking around all these countries are very effectively using the expansion of the PLAN and the PLA in general to upgrade and expand their own forces and Unkil is not going away any time soon which means major concerns for the PLAN.

2). The way IN is expanding it will not be surprising that in due time (say next 1 or 2 decade at the most) the IN will emerge as the more technologically advanced of the two this will again create a lot of problems for the PLAN especially around the IOR.

3). Agreed that the Pearls have beens set up all around India but realistically the ports in SL, PAK, Myanmaar etc are quite very close to the normal and natural operating rim of the IN and the IAF to a large extent. Thus I would expect these to be shut down naturally in a blockade even in the future given their proximity to the Indian peninsula.

4). As you mentioned the subs will be the main hindrance or annoyance for the IN and I think that is something that needs to be taken care of on a priority basis, once the scorpenes start rolling off hopefully we can also get the second line online asap. Also with regards to the subs there will again be a limited number available to go against the IN and in this time the IN subs can concentrate on tackling the PLAN subs while the surface combatants ensure a blockade IMHO.

5). Once Andaman Nicobar and Lakshadeep get operationalised (if not done already) it is going to create major hassles for the PLAN given their location location location

6). The above bases are ofcourse vulnerable to CM, BM attack but in the timeframe that we are talking you would expect the PAD/Barak LRM to be online and the Indian Armed Forces will be responding in kind (Assuming that DRDO completes the Nirbhay, and PAD projects in time and they are operationalised ASAP).

7). Also people say that the Chinese will attack given their record they already would have if they knew they could pull it off the fact that they havent says something IMVHO. And now that India is getting even more aware it is only going to raise the risk level for the Dragon to play any sort of "direct" mischief again IMVHO.

arjun_vs · Post by **arjun_vs** » 25 Jun 2009 08:07

^^ So RahulM & Andy B sir in the next 10 yrs PLAN can neither enforce a naval blockade nor defend itself from one provided there is no major technological revamping of their old vessels.
But is IN capable of enforcing a naval blockade of both pak & china at the same time considering that we would have to stretch our assets on both eastern & western fronts.........?

andy B · Post by **andy B** » 25 Jun 2009 08:27

^^^ Arjun, me no sir...Rahul is...!!!
I am only a casual observer and the points that I made are just my own observations...!

Now the PLAN is ofcourse able to enforce a blockade but its a lot easier for them to do in areas around south china sea, yellow sea (i think) basically in their own neighbourhood bcoz as Rahul pointed out they maintain their main detterence there...what I took from that is that as the PLAN grows so will the forces that surrounds china read ROK, Japan, USA ityadi. Thus they will have more vessels that will also be technologically better than what they have today but they will also need to keep more near home to maintain detterence levels. Thus there remains a limited force available to tackle IOR again as Rahul pointed out the string of pearls wouldnt exist if they expected to have more than enough resources to tackle the IOR issue and the detterence issue near home.

As far as Pak is concerned the way I see it if the IN decides to say block the IOR then given Pak's location wouldnt it be automatically blocked...now agreed the Pak sub fleet will be the main worry and thats a whole different question.

The IN is concerned with the IOR unlike China who intends to rule the seven seas...

And bcoz China depends heavily on the IOR for all critical energy transport it puts them at peril in terms of ensuring their supplies in case the IN decides to play in the IOR.

The point here is Location, Location, Location...we are blessed with it...lets just hope our Netas let the IN use it to the fullest extent....