RayC Sir,RayC wrote:The basic issue of India’s interest in SE would be, apart from cultural and economic reasons, the need to check the threat of China.
While the threat from China from the land is well taken care of, it is the sea that is freewheeling and it is here that China can jeopardise India’s national security interests.
One has to realise that there is a fine difference between Doctrine and Strategy.
Many thanks to RayC for his detailed analysis. Actually, in the "strategic scenario" thread, IO itself was the basis of analysis. But because of the relative lack of apparent and immediate military or defence presence of India in the western IO, the African IO littoral nations, the presence of US/western bases in the wesetrn IO, the current delicate power balance and relative lack of Indian presence in the strategically important stretch from the IO end of the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf, as compared to SE Asia prompted me to focus this thread on SE Asia.RayC wrote
It is important to not be myopic.
One should not look merely as SE Asia, but the Indian Ocean Rim or Region.
That is where the action is!
Efforts also should be made to check the growing Chinese military buildup in the Indian Ocean region, a senior Defence Ministry official said, noting that China already has a base in the Coco Islands, leased from Myanmar, from which it monitors India's ballistic missile testing range. Indian defense planners have been told that India's Sunda-Banka, Lombok-Makassar and Ombai-Wetar straits are becoming strategic sea passages much like the Strait of Malacca, Defence Ministry sources said.
A senior ministry official said India and Indonesia have been strengthening their defense ties for some time, and the two countries have even explored the possibility of joint production of weapons and military equipment.
The two countries have also discussed joint patrols by Indian and Indonesian warships in the Strait of Malacca, the region's favored sea route for large ships, including oil tankers from the Arabian Gulf.
An Indonesian diplomat said that Jakarta is interested in buying the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile, jointly developed by India and Russia. Indonesia also is interested in the co-production with India of radars, electronic equipment and artillery weapons, the diplomat said.
). It was named by a SE Asian prince, when he for the first time saw a lion on that island. But don't know how true this story is.Malaysian maybe Indic, but they take great pains to not to mention and instead wipe out the Hindu past.Lalmohan wrote:Malaysians are culturally Indic (and I mean the intrinsic Malay culture despite its arabic overlays). The Chinese influence is very strong but only culturally, any communist influences of the past have been stamped out. the real danger is wahabbi money funding madrassahs and unpleasant clerics, and there is a natural constituency for that sort of thing amongst the more orthodox of the east coast. there needs to be more soft power projection in the region, as well as strong gunboat diplomacy. Singapore will be a key partner in this equation.
This is from the British legacy. The British policy of keep various ethnic and religious community together and ruling them over centuries has morphed into this post-colonial "secular state".brihaspati wrote:An interesting aspect of the Malaysian political thinking is the Rahmanian doctrine of a "secular state with a state religion". In Malaysia, this curious doctrine is implemented as a supposedly "secular state" which has an officialy recognized "state religion of Islam". We have to remember that the proponent of this doctrine was the founder of the OIC and a host of "Islamocentric" organizations in areas which we normally consider out of theological concerns - such as finance etc.
The "secular with a state religion" doctrine is interesting in the sense that the Islamic world at least has an example of a state which is both "secular" as well as acknowledging the supremacy of one faith over all others from the viewpoint of the state.
Is it surprising that a "secular state with Islam as state religion" is actually wary of collaborating militarily with India?
Malaysia before Mahatir was a real secular country.brihaspati wrote:An interesting aspect of the Malaysian political thinking is the Rahmanian doctrine of a "secular state with a state religion". In Malaysia, this curious doctrine is implemented as a supposedly "secular state" which has an officialy recognized "state religion of Islam". We have to remember that the proponent of this doctrine was the founder of the OIC and a host of "Islamocentric" organizations in areas which we normally consider out of theological concerns - such as finance etc.
The "secular with a state religion" doctrine is interesting in the sense that the Islamic world at least has an example of a state which is both "secular" as well as acknowledging the supremacy of one faith over all others from the viewpoint of the state.
Is it surprising that a "secular state with Islam as state religion" is actually wary of collaborating militarily with India?
Well, I would not be sure.brihaspati wrote:RayC,
I know that at least one prominent Malay "nationalist" was trained at the DehraDun military Academy, and went on to serve the British-Indian Army during WWII. Post-war, he was active in "nationalist" politics, and joined up with "Tunku". But even when Tunku was gradually morphing into his more "Islamized" avatar, this ex-Dunian tried to maintain a strong public voice against "ethnic identity based" politics.
Do you reckon, that those of Indian origin but jumped on the Malay Islamic bandwagon, would actually work against Indian interests to prove their "loyalty" (the age old "a new M* is a voracious beef eater")? A certain line of Indian thinking relies on the "Indian" origin connection.
On the other hand, as the previous example may suggest, direct military training/education under Indian auspices could be a better option?
brihaspati wrote:RayC,
hopefully I am not offending you by mentioning Rajnarain Bose (from another thread, a host of characters have been mentioned in "Sei somoi" - and one of them is your maternal grandparent), of young Bengal. In his autobiography, as far as I remember, he explicitly writes about Mughlai meat dishes and alcohol shared by his father who had tried to wean the son away from overdoing it. He also describes drinking in public etc. But this young "Bengal" turned to Vaidic religion and joined the Brahmo movement. In fact almost all of the "young Bengal" in their later life turned back with a vengeance to their "roots" or a modern "reinvention" of their roots. I have reasons to know intimately about some others of the group, so am aware of that "reversal" very well - a fact not much highlighted.
However we do not see similar phenomena in those who converted into one of the Abrahamics. Thus in the Malay case, it is possible that the secondary reversal does not occur.
!) and so life goes on!
I had already zeroed in. Caste by birth is not important and is only one opportunistic interpretation of religious allegory. The same allegory of the Purusha-shukta can be equally interpreted to mean "individual as society" - that the same person cultivates different gunas ascribed to different castes, and all equally necessary to be a complete human, so that all "varnas" reside within the same individual. 
). What is the result of tolerating all that goes on under the name of "internal affairs" by the Myanmarese junta? It is important not to give the purely military justification of tackling insurgency to basically alienate the democracy movement in Myanmar, and then jeopardize the long term strategic and military interests in the region.The OVL and GAIL bought 20 per cent and 10 per cent stake respectively, in A1 and A3 blocks in Myanmar. Together these blocks have proven gas reserves of about 4.5 trillion cubic meters feet (TCF).
India pursued import of natural gas from Myanmar through Indo-Myanmar Gas Pipeline Project and Government of Myanmar issued a letter of intent in 2004, acknowledging that GAIL was preferential buyer of gas from A1 and A3 blocks. Further, an MoU was signed between India and Myanmar in March 2006.
However, a year later in February 2007, Myanmar Government and Petro-China signed an agreement under which gas from these two blocks was sold to China through the pipeline route.
GAIL impressed upon other partners and Myanmar Government that the pipeline offer was still the most competitive and offered optimum value for them due to proximity of India to these fields. However, Myanmar Government is going ahead with its decision to sell the gas to China, Deora added.
The jinxed pipeline project faced problem from day one. First Bangladesh, through which the pipeline project was to pass, put up tough conditions linking it to several other bilateral issues. Dhaka had demanded trade and power corridor to Nepal and Bhutan and measures to reduce Bangladesh’s trade deficit.
A naval arms race with India [by China] is not a likely outcome. First and foremost, the country’s naval power will remain tied up with Taiwan until a settlement with the island has been reached. Whereas enhanced capability in the East and South China Sea does weaken the readiness to deal with the proximate Taiwan; a shift of attention towards the Indian Ocean will certainly do so and is therefore not an option. Secondly, there is still a huge difference between naval deployment in the Eastern and South China Sea on the one hand, both considered historical spheres of influence, and the Indian Ocean on the other hand, where apart from the expedition by Zheng He in the 14th century, China does not dispose of any plausible legitimation to explain to its neighbours why the area should also historically belong to its maritime area of interest. Even countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh would respond to such a posture with distrust. Thirdly, it is doubtful that the People’s Republic would render itself more vulnerable to an Indian sea denial operation by sending its fleet westwards of the Strait of Malacca. If a major crisis occurred, a Chinese naval counteroffensive would be an easy prey as they would inevitably have to sail through the narrow straits of Southeast Asia. Even submarines could easily be detected if they navigated from the shallow waters around Indonesia into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, even if the Chinese navy were to succeed in overcoming the Eastern Naval Command, thanks to the strategic depth India’s Western Naval Command would still be able to block oil supplies from the Persian Gulfs for days, weeks, if not months. In any case, costs for a Chinese counter-operation would be too high, so it looks more plausible for the People’s Republic to try to raise the costs India would incur were it to deny access, and simultaneously to reduce its dependence on the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. Instead of building-up naval presence in South Asia to balance India, it would be easier to deter the country in other ways: along the border, via Pakistan, etc. In addition, China could diversify its supply lines.
Haven't understood as to what you mean by military - education influence.Anyway, it would be enlightening to know what you thought of the military-education-in-India influence as a future way, (for SE Asian nations) even if the WWII generational features are no longer available.
brihaspati wrote:Here is a EU-speak on naval scenario in SE Asia :
http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/documents/AP ... ilemma.pdf
A naval arms race with India [by China] is not a likely outcome. First and foremost, the country’s naval power will remain tied up with Taiwan until a settlement with the island has been reached. Whereas enhanced capability in the East and South China Sea does weaken the readiness to deal with the proximate Taiwan; a shift of attention towards the Indian Ocean will certainly do so and is therefore not an option. Secondly, there is still a huge difference between naval deployment in the Eastern and South China Sea on the one hand, both considered historical spheres of influence, and the Indian Ocean on the other hand, where apart from the expedition by Zheng He in the 14th century, China does not dispose of any plausible legitimation to explain to its neighbours why the area should also historically belong to its maritime area of interest. Even countries like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh would respond to such a posture with distrust. Thirdly, it is doubtful that the People’s Republic would render itself more vulnerable to an Indian sea denial operation by sending its fleet westwards of the Strait of Malacca. If a major crisis occurred, a Chinese naval counteroffensive would be an easy prey as they would inevitably have to sail through the narrow straits of Southeast Asia. Even submarines could easily be detected if they navigated from the shallow waters around Indonesia into the Indian Ocean. Moreover, even if the Chinese navy were to succeed in overcoming the Eastern Naval Command, thanks to the strategic depth India’s Western Naval Command would still be able to block oil supplies from the Persian Gulfs for days, weeks, if not months. In any case, costs for a Chinese counter-operation would be too high, so it looks more plausible for the People’s Republic to try to raise the costs India would incur were it to deny access, and simultaneously to reduce its dependence on the shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. Instead of building-up naval presence in South Asia to balance India, it would be easier to deter the country in other ways: along the border, via Pakistan, etc. In addition, China could diversify its supply lines.
Notwithstanding the votaries here who are against anything British and attempting to decry them as promoting Raj mentality, they (the British) were real sharp customers, to use an American phrase.brihaspati wrote:RayC,
my questions was in the context of the Malaysian nationalist who had joined the British Indian Army and been trained at DehraDun before the WWII. He had been a strident voice for anti-racial position in stark contrast to Tunku, and later Mahathir.
You had responded by saying that the WWII military men were a different category. I was interested in exploring the effects of having SE Asian youth trained in Indian military academies, and getting a better or more even handed attitudes in the military leadership in the area - as far as attitudes towards religion, race etc are concerned.
When one has to analyse, everything counts!brihaspati wrote:RayC thats a paper from EU - from a Brussels based thinktank. But it may also represent US sensitivities.
It is a British policy and for several decades Indian foreign service was handling policies which the British govt would have done. The relationship of the Indian state with other states in the neighborhood was set by the Colonial British and Indian state follows even till date.brihaspati wrote:India, under Nehru, transferred the Coco Islands to Burma in 1954. What is this consistent pattern in Nehru about giving or donating territory to other countries? Can we have confirmation about this transfer and possible motivations in Nehru? (Source : Prakash Nanda and Zhao Nanqi, “Unified Command: Strategic Significance of the
Andamans,” Statesman (New Delhi), 18 October, 2002.)
What is the reality?The lack of close supervision caused by the islands isolation prompted the colonial authorities in Calcutta to transfer jurisdiction of the 3 main islands and three small satellite islands to Rangoon, which by then was Britain’s administrative capital in Lower Burma. In 1882 the Coco Islands officially became part of British Burma. When Burma separated from India in 1937 and became a self-governing Crown Colony, the Coco Islands remained Burmese territory. In 1942, along with the rest of the Andaman and Nicobar chain, they were invaded by the Japanese. After Burma regained its independence from Britain in 1948, the Islands passed to the new Union of Burma. A statement by Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes to the BBC in 2003, that Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had ‘donated’ the Coco Islands to Burma in the 1950s, and thus surrendered a vital strategic asset, was incorrect
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coco_Islands
China redesigned and reconfigured the Sea Lion radar system on its own, however, particularly the electric circuits, according to an authoritative source from the Ukrainian Administration of Arms Import and Export.“Anti-piracy operations” have given China’s PLA Navy the best excuse to penetrate the Indian Ocean and station forces there permanently.
As fighting piracy around the Gulf of Aden becomes a long-term mission, the PLA Navy South Sea Fleet is likely to set up a sub-fleet to handle that task – perhaps the “Indian Ocean Sub-fleet of the South Sea Fleet” – and the PLA Navy will become the new owner of the Indian Ocean.
In recent months, Chinese military publications have carried a number of articles stating that “the Indian Ocean does not belong to India.” The intent of these articles is increasingly clear.
While carrying out anti-piracy operations, the PLA Navy’s battleships will gain experience in long-distance maritime combat operations in preparation for the establishment of an ocean-going aircraft carrier fleet. The navy may dispatch other battleships, such as its 054A FFG, on similar missions in the future.
China has a key military objective in dispatching battleships to the Gulf of Aden. The “Chinese Aegis” class DDG it has sent to the region has the most advanced radar detection and C4IRS capabilities, and therefore can conduct effective battlefield monitoring exercises in this region. The Gulf of Aden provides the best geographical environment for the PLA Navy to conduct surveillance on the activities of the U.S. 5th Fleet.
The powerful detection capability of the Chinese Aegis DDG relies on the “Sea Lion” active phased array radar installed on the battleship.
China received some of the sub-systems and technological advice from the Ukrainian Kvant Design Bureau in developing this radar system. This is the bureau that participated in the research and development of almost all major Soviet surface battleship radar systems. This includes the Fregat 2EM 3-D radar, which China imitated from the Russian system, working from a blueprint provided by Kvant.
Vietnam has a martial tradition, and that tradition is in essence anti-Chinese. In fact Vietnam represents India's most potent means to replicate PRC's Pakistan Doctrine.brihaspati wrote:Vietnam has shown willingness to bypass India and buy small arms from Pakistan ignoring cautious protests from the Indian side. I am not saying Vietnam should be abandoned. But, Thailand can be cultivated. One of the primary reasons is the cultural basis of Thailand, and its strong Buddhist foundation. Vietnam on the other hand had a good deal of communist brainwashing and a removal or erasure of older cultural links with India.
Because the thrust here on this thread is the military expansion of India in the SE, it has to be kept in mind that the Thai military is not one of the strongest in the region, and compared to Vietnam, which at least has the pride and memory of fighting successful civil wars and foreign campaigns, is a good target for strategiic military partnership.
Moreover, what appears to be a safe bet, is also recognized by that country. And they will obviously try to bargain on their position. I will post an article ref where the Vietnamese have been subtly urged to play the market.
Brihaspati ji,brihaspati wrote:nuclear cooperation is possible - but now, weapons cooperation will be tricky, after all those agreements with USA. The best is to position nuke capbale fleets on a semi-permanent basis as part of a naval mutual defence treaty in Vietnamese waters. This can include clauses that ensures deterrence on behalf of Vietnam.
