The IAF History Thread

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 25 Jun 2009 17:10

AoA.. may nayakuddin get his 'piece'. That was a neat article and terrific photos. You would think we have seen them all by now.

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2009 17:30

I chanced upon the following article about the B-57 Canberra (the American vesrion of the Canberra that served in the IAF)

http://www.defencetalk.com/b-57-canberra-17109/

Some of the comments surprised me - especially comments about design faults etc that the Americans corrected. But after "correcting them" the American Canberra seems to have had a dismal safety record.

On the other hand I seem to recall that the Canberra had a long an illustrious service record in the IAF.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 28 Jun 2009 18:01

cant read any of the comments shiv.

But the point stands - the B-57 had way more improvements over the B(I)58 version employed by the IAF. Crew Safety, Avionics, Armament Delivery mechanism - you name it - The B-57 was better in all the areas. Its actually a wonder we lost fewer Canberras in Combat than the B-57s lost by the PAF.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 28 Jun 2009 18:38

self deleted. see next post.

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 28 Jun 2009 19:48

^^^ rahul, please put the missing comma in the right place and the doctor's statement is just fine

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 28 Jun 2009 20:04

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 28 Jun 2009 20:08

Jagan wrote:cant read any of the comments shiv.

But the point stands - the B-57 had way more improvements over the B(I)58 version employed by the IAF. Crew Safety, Avionics, Armament Delivery mechanism - you name it - The B-57 was better in all the areas. Its actually a wonder we lost fewer Canberras in Combat than the B-57s lost by the PAF.

Sorry - I did not mean "comments about the article", I mean comments in the article itself.

What you state is exactly what I m talking about. If the B-57 had so many improvements over the old canberra, how come its US record was so poor and the record of the British Canberra in India and Australia (AFAIK) so good?

Something does not match up..

Let me throw in a taunt.. is it possible that in the case of the B-57 all the "improvements" were more hype and American self image of "We are the best and all that we do is an improvement?"

Are there some hard stats to match the reputation/rhetoric?

from Wiki:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B-57_Canberra

The B-57A was not considered combat-ready by the USAF and the aircraft were used solely for testing and development. One of the aircraft was given to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) which fitted it with a new nose radome and used it to track hurricanes. The reason for such limited production was that the distinctly British B-57A was considered unfit for USAF service. Particularly contentious were the odd cockpit arrangement and the lack of guns, the British Canberra having been designed as a high-speed, high altitude bomber rather than for close air support. The definitive B-57B introduced a new tandem cockpit with a bubble canopy, the engines were now started with a pyrotechnic cartridge, the airbrakes were moved from the wings to the sides of the fuselage for increased effectiveness, the controls were now boosted, four hardpoints were fitted under the wings, and the aircraft was given gun armament in the form of 8 x 0.50 in (12.7 mm) Browning machine guns in the wings, later replaced by 4 x 20 mm M39 cannons. The first B-57B flew on June 18, 1954. The aircraft initially suffered from the same engine malfunctions as the RB-57As and several were lost in high-speed low-level operations due to a faulty tailplane actuator which caused the aircraft to dive into the ground. The USAF considered the B-57B inadequate for the night intruder role and Martin put all aircraft through an extensive avionics upgrade. Regardless, by the end of 1957 the USAF tactical squadrons were being re-equipped with supersonic F-100 Super Sabres. The complete retirement was delayed, however, by the start of the Vietnam War.

This story is quite different from the excellent reports I heard about the Canberra's handling in the IAF. Except the fact that you had to be a contortionist to actually get into the aircraft and the pilot was hot and exhausted by the time he got in. And oh yes - there is the little matter of ejection seats IIRC

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 28 Jun 2009 22:53

While I cant speak for the technical reliability of the aircraft - ruggedness of the engines, aircraft etc, In terms of its effectiveness as weapon system it was certainly better than the RAF Canberra in my opinion.

There are several changes to the airframe (namely a revolving bomb bay door that acted as the bomb rack on the reverse side as well) that made it faster to arm (Faster turn around time between sorties) and faster during weapon delivery (higher bomb run speed, I think atleast 100km faster, thus lesser vunerability to Ack ack) . It had enough avionics to do rudimentary terrain mapping - thus helping navigation and even blind bombing very much. It also had integral wing mounted guns to do air to ground strafing - which was not there in IAF canberras. Night time Visibility is said to be much better under the 'fighter style' seating. then there was the added safety in ejection seats for both crew members.

chetak · Post by **chetak** » 28 Jun 2009 23:27

Quote from

Martin B-57 Canberra
The complete Record
Robert C Mikesh

CANBERRA - B-57 COMPARISON

My first close look at this new airplane came at Langley
AFB, Virginia in October 1954, when O.E. 'Pat' Tibbs,
director of flight and Chief Test Pilot for The Glenn L.
Martin Co, flight demonstrated the B-57B to our unit. This aerial
exercise was far more spectacular than the one given at Andrews
AFB in February 1951, the one which clinched acceptance by the
USAF of the Canberra design. Tibbs was not confined to a set or
timed demonstration as was the case at Andrews, and the broad
range of speed and maneuverability of the airplane was unbeliev-
able unless seen. That afternoon, following the morning demon-
stration, Tibbs held an introductory and background briefing about
the development and flight characteristics ofthe B-57. This evolved
around his flight testing of the English Electric Canberra that was
initially on loan to the Martin Company for that purpose. Reading
from prepared notes, Tibbs' captivating and dry-humored story
began to unfold:
Reaching approximately 30,OOOft with the Canberra, 1in-
creased the speed until it reached .83 Mach. At this point, be-
cause of severe roughness, I decided to discontinue further in-
vestigation of speed as I was somewhat dubious about the Brit-
ish method of determining limit buffeting values. It seems to
me that probably it was based on the point just before the air-
plane completely disintegrated.'
Pat's briefing went on after our uneasy laughter, covering our con-
cern, had subsided:
'Now, the B-57 aircraft you see on the line and that you
saw flying this morning resembles the Canberra Ijust described
when I evaluated it in 1951. But believe me, gentlemen, there
is no resemblance in the performance today of the two aircraft
as far as the high speed characteristics are concerned.'
The alleged difference was not by accident. Originally, when the
Air Force purchased the design rights of the Canberra, they had felt
that little or no time for further aerodynamic 'clean-up' of the Mar-
tin-built product would be needed to match the stated performance
of the British Canberra. However, with the advent of jet engines,
the time had come where power out-put was exceeding the struc-
tural capabilities of airframes. In the case of the B-57 and British
Canberras, if left at full throttle, especially at the lower altitudes,
the airplane would reach a speed where it would disintegrate in a
matter of a few short minutes. This point was being met at a low
Mach number because of air flow buffeting before the aircraft
reached the stipulated speed limitations, and the consequences did
not augur well for the new Canberra. The British tried to cure this
roughness at high speeds by increasing the strength of the fuselage
skin. Tibbs jokingly described that approach as 'merely armor plat-
ing it, mainly just so they could live with the roughness.' But there
was underlying concern in his voice. The cause of the problem had
to be detected before the right solution could be made.
In tight fc:mation with another B-57, Tibbs watched the lead
aircraft as they approached and exceeded .81 Mach at 40,OOOft to
see where the trouble might be. The test aircraft had been provided
with a series of strings or tufts secured along the skin to visually
indicate areas of turbulent air. By the gyrations of the tail, the prob-
lem area was obvious. 'I couldn't help but wonder how much of
that an airplaue would withstand before tail feathers would begin
to part,' Tibbs continued. 'I loosened up my formation as a malter
of self-preservation while we came back on OUf airspeed!'
A temporary fix was tried by covering and wrapping all the
openings in the tail and aft fuselage section with tape. In the case of
the B-57 design, it had an adjustable stabilizer used for trim. To
allow for this movement, a large open slot at the attachment point
to the fuselage was necessary, and this was the area of most turbu-
lence. Air was going in through the fuselage members, reversing,
and so forth, and was probably causing the trouble. A second flight
test was made which revealed a marked improvement. All B-57s
were then equipped with snug-fitting covers for these gaps, yet free
movement of the stabilizer was allowed. Aft fuselage bulkheads
were also sealed to further resist free passage of air in and around
the inner structure. This was acclaimed as the greatest contribution
by the United States to aerodynamic design improvement for both
the British as well as the American built Canberras.
The obvious question was often asked at the conclusion of most
of 'Pat' Tibbs' briefings: 'What differences did you note in com-
paring the flying characteristics of the British Canberra with that of
the initial B-57Aswhich were hardly distinguishable from the British
counterpart?'
Prepared with an answer, Tibbs often started like this:
'Due to the Americanization, many think we have lost
much performance over the British airplane. They usually in-
dicate that they are sure we have installed a lounge, a bar, a
ready room and so forth aboard, which would completely ruin
the airplane. Well, let me say right now, nothing could be fur-
ther from the truth. I can detect no difference between the two
aircraft in take-off, climb out, cruise, etc - no changes. At first
ours was just as rough, if not more so, as theirs until cleanup.
Control forces are slightly lower on the B-57s than on the
Canberra. This very desirable condition probably stems from a
belter aileron sealing job obtained in converting from British
to American standards, plus the fact that the three control sur-
faces - elevator, ailerou, and rudder - have slightly lower spring
rates in the tabs.
'The greatest advantage with our airplane was the Martin
rotatable bomb bay door. The Canberra has a speed limitation
of 350kts lAS for opeuiug its bomb bay, even though the doors
slide up inside the fuselage. Ours could be opened at its maxi-
mum indicated airspeed of 500kts lAS with no adverse effect.
In general, the performance of the B-57 is equal to or belter
than the English Canberra in every category that we have tested
up to this time (1954).'
Tibb's opinions were not always shared by his English Electric coun-
terparts, however. Tibb's overstatement in his briefing on perfor-
mance was understandably for morale and sales purposes, but com-
parisons as stated were accepted as being exaggerated. According
to Roland Beamont, former chief of flight test for English Electric,
when reiterating this story to him about the differences in the two
aircraft had this to say:
'As you know, I flew flight envelope and performance tests
on the '57A and B models and found level performance iden-
tical and no improvement on buffering from the gap-seal modi-
fications which we considered to be cosmetic. All Canberras at
Warton were tested to .84mafter the prototype Canberra struc-
ture was cleared to .86m.Above that, a strong nose-down pitch
occurred which could not be held until recovery below 15,OOOft
and at lowerMach. The buffet above .83 was heavy, but caused
no problems. Control pressures were the same with both Brit-
ish and Americm models.'

Flight demonstrations were no easy task as evidence by 'Pat'Tibbs'
sweat-soaked flying suit after landing at Langley. The B-57 did not have
control boost and was a heavy airplane to maneuver at low altitude. The
ground crew seemed more interested in removing nose hatch to reload
starler cartridges for the nexl start, than to steady the makeshift ladder for Tibbs.
For some inexplicable reason, the B-57 suffered a nose-up trim
change at a lower Mach number than its British counterpart. This
was only cured by fitting a small spoiler along the full span of the
upper surface of the horizontal stabilizer.According to G.M. Hobday,
English Electric's representative at Martin at the time:
Fallowing the morning flight demonstration and a well earned shower,
'Pat'Tibbs discussed in great detail with future Canberra flight crews
the handling qualities of the B-57. 0/ interest to most listeners was his description of differences between the British-made Canberra and the
Martin B-57. This was the briefing room of the 500th Bomb Squadron at
Langley in October 1954 at which the author was in attendance.
'Without exception, the clean-up of the Martin built prod-
uct including the stiffening of the rear fuselage, the sealing of
the aft fuselage bulk heads and the stabilizer gaps evolved from
British work and was in fact passed on through me to the Mar-
tin Company. There was in agreement that any improvements
in design by either party should be passed on to the other.'

shiv · Post by **shiv** » 29 Jun 2009 08:12

Thanks Jagan and Chetak

There may be a lesson here for all jingo-enthusiasts.

It goes to show how an "improved" and "better" version of an aircraft may have a poorer and shorter service record based on the requirements and operating doctrine of the end user in question. In the case of the B 57 - even with all its improvements it continued to have problems even while it failed to meet the USAF's requirements. I think production was stopped early and support probably ended sooner rather than later. The PAFs B-57s were retired in 1985, while the IAFs Canberra's continued to play a role even up to the Kargil war.

The other point is the unknown role played by the economies of military industrial complexes with geopolitical moves. For example if a major US aerospace company finds that one of its aircraft models is not meeting expectations, or is likely o be superseded by another type (from a rival industry), the former may be able to exert pressure on the government of the day to use their model for "export" or as "aid" to "friendly countries". For this it is essential to maintain the "facade" that the old model is still better than anything else available.

In terms of the impact on the Indian subcontinent and the IAF - the F-104 Starfighter was seen as a game-changer in favor the PAF. But as a long term investment - the F-104 remained a widow maker that soon went out of service. It's "competitor" the MiG 21 on the other hand - went on to make history despite gaining a reputation of its own (in Indian media) as a widow maker. The Folland Gnat fizzled out in the RAF, but went on to become a legend in the IAF.

But there may be an additional factor - the factor of "indigenous manufacture/assembly". Even if an aircraft is not necessarily "the best" (although all aircraft sellers advertise their maal as the best) - the prospect of continuing revenue from an older model may force the original designer/manufacturer to keep reinvesting money earned to update a model and keep a good business going. I am sure that is what aided India and the original manufacturers in terms of the Gnat, the MiG 21 and the Jaguar.

The overall lesson that need to be kept in mind is that mindless comparisons of specs of fighterX versus fighter Y may be completely pointless in the long term. The issue is vastly va-aastly more complicated than that.

krishna_j · Post by **krishna_j** » 19 Jul 2009 13:28

Just came across an interesting article written by Phil Camp in the March 2009 issue of AFM - Migs In Indian Service.

Phil is renowned for his accuracy ,original research and leg work on IAF bases as opposed to some well known arm-chair contributors like Jon Lake etc

Its on a brief evolution of Migs in indian Air Force from the 60's till now - though limited by magazine size constraints , there are some nice photos , order of battle , some first person pilot accounts - nice topic for someone to expand into a bigger monograph or book

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 20 Jul 2009 20:10

A bit OT , but relating to MM Alam's claim to have shot 5 IAF ac ,that too in just 30 seconds, may be taken as a truth , provided

1. All f86 sabres(which he was also flying on that war) have gun camera, is applicable to his sabre as well.

2. paf provides videos of the full operation if not,then those kills to show how that thing was done,. ([perhaps, a 30-40 sec video/footage does not compromises operational secrets) .

I heard an Israeli pilot saying that they cant hide anything from their bosses,wrto operations while flying sabres because the gun camera footage were used for debriefing in 1967,1973 wars ,.
I guess paf still possess those gun-camera footage .

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 22 Jul 2009 04:40

Recommended Reading on Alam

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Histo ... pter5.html

http://www.defencejournal.com/2001/september/alam.htm

In our book IPAW65, we give credit to Alam for four kills and note that there is a disagreement about Kacker.

The more recent book "Flight of the Falcon" by Air Commodore Sajjad Haider (PAF) hangs M M Alam out to dry by insisiting Alam may have got four and not five - and that too because everyone is charitable in giving a combat accident (Rawlley) as a kill to Alam.

Sree · Post by **Sree** » 22 Jul 2009 11:21

shiv wrote: ... There may be a lesson here for all jingo-enthusiasts.

It goes to show how an "improved" and "better" version of an aircraft may have a poorer and shorter service record based on the requirements and operating doctrine of the end user in question. ...

... The overall lesson that need to be kept in mind is that mindless comparisons of specs of fighterX versus fighter Y may be completely pointless in the long term. The issue is vastly va-aastly more complicated than that.

Jagan Garu, Dr Shiv, Chetak:

Interesting articles, on the Canberra vs the B-57 - thanks for posting. I agree with most of Shiv's points in his post partly quoted above, about factors other than pure improvement needs driving upgrades - the history of aircraft manufacturing is full of examples of upgrades ordered for other reasons, including all those that Shiv has mentioned.

In the case of the Canberra vs the B-57, a lot of the differences seem to be down to the differences between accepted engineering practices in the UK and the US at the time - Wg Cdr Roland Beamont was so steeped in British engineering and test-flying practice, he would have easily made the tiny adjustments required by the British approach to engineering, which (at the time) could sometimes be a bit Heath Robinson-ish. Engineering practices in the two countries are much more closely aligned now - partly thanks to the Japanese, of course!

And there are numerous, numerous examples of pre-upgrade aircraft variants being preferred by the aircrews and maintenance crews!!

But I will back one point of Jagan's - the US modification to give the Canberra navigator / WSO an ejection seat of his own is one that every last IAF Canberra aircrew member would probably have wanted! The British arrangement (and they had something similar in the Valiant) should have been regarded as unacceptable. Canberra aircrew paid the price, for this piece of design genius.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 22 Jul 2009 17:11

Jagan wrote:Recommended Reading on Alam
.........

Jagan sir, its an excellent article,well researched as well, but I havent seen it earlier on BRF,.
Some interesting things that I found

Admittedly, confirmation of Alam's claims has been difficult to obtain, despite close-range observation of his encounter by several PAF pilots, and some gun camera evidence. Nearest of these observers was his wing man, Fg. Off. Masood Akhtar, who, protecting his leader's tail, clung like a leech throughout the action.

Amongst earlier examples of clumsy propaganda was a photograph purporting to depict an Indian Hunter on fire but later identified as cut from a training film showing a Pakistani Sabre firing rockets against practice ground targets.

It means they cooked up the gun camera evidence as well

,this is a non-professional act from an air force ,

It's even more surprising to find out why they were so desperate to prove that such impossible ever happened ?

A bit OT once again,.. It took me 3-5 minutes to read Alam's account of that day,and It would take that amount of time for anyone to read it, I wonder how he could have done that in 30 seconds

Probably Shiv sir was right about alam's clock

krishna_j · Post by **krishna_j** » 22 Jul 2009 23:38

One more article on Alam - his first person account to an historian on aviation "aces"

http://babriet.tripod.com/articles/art_mmalam.htm by Jon Gutman Sept 1998

Kaiser Tufail's seems the most authentic and well researched of the lot

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 23 Jul 2009 03:56

The old MiG-25 sortie to photograph the eclipse

http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/07/av ... se-in.html

Air Marshal S Mukerji, Air Officer-in-charge Personnel (AOP) at Air Headquarters was the then Commanding Officer of IAF’s only Mig-25 Squadron, christened – Trisonics, based at Bareilly. Then a Group Captain, Air Marshal Mukerji had this rare opportunity to fly the Mig-25 on that day to film the Sun’s corona from an astounding altitude of 80,000 feet, straight from the Stratosphere.

“We flew at Mach 2.5 in the path of the eclipse at 80,000 feet along the planned central axis of the eclipse over Neemkathana, near Agra”, recalls Air Marshal Mukerji of his historic sortie that finds a mention in his flying log book plainly as - ‘Supersonic Profile’. Weather and other visibility were not any constraints, he says, as clarity at stratospheric levels is far better than that nearer ground.

With a manual Hasselblad camera mounted above the instrument panel, a special lead and button provided to the second pilot, Wing Commander YS Babu seated in the front cockpit, the duo with special solar filters on their visors flew straight towards the Sun for a minute and twenty-four seconds, clicking never-before images of the spectacle, during the total solar eclipse.

Photo & Text Courtesy Wg Cdr Tarun Singha/IAF

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 26 Aug 2009 12:10

Seems just like yesterday, but heck its 22 years already.

Induction of the MiG-29 into the IAF - c.1987

Plus

A Vir Chakra Double (VrC and Bar)

Sree · Post by **Sree** » 26 Aug 2009 12:28

^ Very nice, Jagan Garu ... Hard to believe it's been 22 years! (And the IN is still waiting for their naval variant!!)

I kinda guessed whose medal group it was, before clicking on the image and seeing his name ... Not that there were many alternatives; my humint sources, about the recent movements of key BR C-in-Cs, helped narrow them down!!

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 09 Sep 2009 00:36

The Royal Indian Air Force at War : An account of Air Operations in South-East Asia

This has to be the most expensive book that I ever bought, atleast in terms of Rupees per Cubic cm of volume!. But well worth it. Published in 1946 by the Directorate of Public Relations, the book is a pinbound volume with about 100 pages of text and photos. Among my collector friends, this is the only copy in the wild. One copy is with the Library of Congress. Another with the British Library. Even USI has only a photocopy. I wonder how many were printed, and if others have copies as well

(I owe you one - eBay!)

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 16 Sep 2009 05:30

http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/daw ... -stuff-499

The right stuff
By Ahmad Faruqui
Monday, 14 Sep, 2009 | 01:10 AM PST

IN my last piece, I analysed how Pakistan’s foray into Indian Kashmir in August 1965 spun out of control and turned into an all-out war with India on Sept 6. I drew on an interview with Air Commodore (retired) Sajad Haider. This column concludes that conversation.

Haider’s squadron, Number 19 based in Peshawar, earned five gallantry awards during the war. It flew over 630 operational missions and destroyed 15 Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft on the ground. Among the PAF squadrons, Number 19 also destroyed the highest number of Indian tanks and armoured vehicles.

Of course, many other PAF squadrons excelled during the war. And no student of air combat can forget the kills scored by Squadron Leader M.M. Alam, the subcontinent’s only ace.

How did the PAF achieve air superiority over the much larger IAF? I put this question to Haider and he said that the PAF enjoyed superior leadership at the top. Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the first Pakistani air chief, had fashioned it into a fine fighting machine.

By early June 1965, the PAF was ready for war. Every tactical squadron “had rehearsed its war role to perfection”. The new air chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan, put the PAF on red alert as he flew over Kashmir on Sept 1. The PAF had honed its pilots to a point where “excellence became a habit and not just an option”. Haider says that the combat proficiency of the PAF pilots was borne out during training exercises in the US and Germany. Some USAF commanders felt that PAF pilots were superior to Israeli Air Force pilots.

Haider says, “We lived, talked, ate and slept with our missions. Professional excellence was also displayed by air defence controllers, maintenance crews and logistic personnel.”

The IAF high command did not have a proper war plan. And its Achilles’ heel was the airfield attack mission. Haider argues that IAF pilots tended to conduct ad hoc operations and did not display the will to achieve their mission objectives since they “were always in a hurry to attack swiftly without aiming accurately”. He faults the IAF high command for abandoning missions for inexplicable reasons and showing a lack of initiative and drive. However, he adds, that the IAF pilots were not lacking in courage.

As an example, he cites the situation that existed when dawn broke on Sept 7. The IAF was poised to launch a series of retaliatory air raids but it woke up to find the “thunder and flash of bombs raining down on the runways from PAF’s B-57 bombers. Several of the IAF raids were delayed till the all-clear sirens were sounded”. But he adds that the operation was also a tribute to the IAF fighter pilots who took the risk of rolling down runways knowing that they were smeared with shrapnel.

Haider says that contrary to the popular impression in Pakistan, the IAF had many good flyers. A pilot flying a subsonic Dassault Mystere IV fighter shot down a Mach 2 Lockheed F-104 aircraft over Sargodha. Two of the very best PAF pilots, Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafiqui and Flight Lieutenant Yunus, were shot down over the IAF base in Halwara by relatively junior pilots flying the Hawker Hunter Mk. 56.

Years later, Haider had an opportunity to compare notes with his counterparts in the IAF. This took place in England with a MiG-21 pilot in 1970 and later in 2007 via email with an air marshal who had commanded a squadron during the war.

Haider says, “Both were eye witnesses to the PAF attack on Pathankot on the 6th where we destroyed 11 aircraft and damaged two. As acknowledged on www.bharatrakshak.com, the IAF thought it was a devastating strike.”

The North American F-86F Sabre aircraft with six half-inch calibre Browning machine guns mounted in the nose was the mainstay of the PAF. But in 1965 this aircraft which had blasted Chinese and North Korean MiG 15s during the Korean War was showing its age. Nevertheless, Haider says the Sabre performed “magnificently in all roles even though it was inferior in power and speed to the IAF Hunters”.

The PAF inventory also included a squadron of F-104 Starfighters. With its missile-like fuselage and small trapezoidal wings, the Starfighter was called the pride of the PAF. I asked Haider whether that aircraft lived up to its reputation. Haider said no, even though that squadron had the best PAF pilots. The reason was that the Starfighter “was unsuited to the tactical environment of the region. It was a high-level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet.”

Even then, the Starfighter was feared by the IAF and Haider opines that it could have been used with “devastating effect against exiting enemy aircraft, low on fuel, deep into our territory and running for life. But over-cautious commanders prevented that from happening”.

Similarly, the Starfighter’s pilots were prohibited from making strafing runs against parked IAF aircraft “because there had been one accident where the pilot crashed for insufficient pullout speed”. He says that the pilots should have been better trained in making low-altitude attacks using the Starfighter’s formidable 20 mm Vulcan Gatling gun which fired 6,000 rounds per minute.

The B-57B light bomber was used by the PAF to carry out high-risk strikes against several IAF airfields. But the extensive damage caused by these raids only came out in 2005, notes Haider, when two Indian writers (Mohan and Chopra) published their account of the air war based on interviews with IAF veterans. The PAF’s bomber pilots remain the unsung heroes of the war.

As one looks back 44 years, it is clear that no one has displayed the right stuff as clearly as those few men who valiantly flew their war-birds emblazoned with the “star-and-crescent on green”. They saved their nation from certain destruction.

The debt owed by Pakistanis to the PAF is no less than the debt owed by Britons to the RAF. Winston Churchill’s words come to mind: “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few. All hearts go out to the fighter pilots whose brilliant actions we see with our own eyes day after day.”

The writer is the author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan.

Ahmadfaruqui@gmail.com

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 16 Sep 2009 07:06

good read Jagan but hasn't he given into hyperbole at the end ?
what's your opinion of the article.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 16 Sep 2009 07:47

Some hyperbole is to be expected. Its for a newspaper and for 'Defence Day' commemoration .

But, atleast they are willing to re-examine and re-evaluate the true stories of the war, give credit to Indian pilots where it is due . and more importantly, They are more than willing to accept the blame for the war (or pin it on those who dserve it - with Ayub and the Pakistani Army Planners.).

In contrast, I still find 'expert articles' authored by no less than PAF officers that still talk about Alams nine kills and the complete air superiority that the PAF was supposed to have achieved. Exhibit One. Or several Pakistanis who still wont believe that the whole war was planned by Ayub Khan and his cronies. Or who still believe that India crossed the IB without any provocation. (Exhibit Two,

So articles like this will go some way in correcting history on the other side.

rohitvats · Post by **rohitvats** » 16 Sep 2009 14:27

Jagan wrote:Some hyperbole is to be expected. Its for a newspaper and for 'Defence Day' commemoration .

But, atleast they are willing to re-examine and re-evaluate the true stories of the war, give credit to Indian pilots where it is due . and more importantly, They are more than willing to accept the blame for the war (or pin it on those who dserve it - with Ayub and the Pakistani Army Planners.).

In contrast, I still find 'expert articles' authored by no less than PAF officers that still talk about Alams nine kills and the complete air superiority that the PAF was supposed to have achieved. Exhibit One. Or several Pakistanis who still wont believe that the whole war was planned by Ayub Khan and his cronies. Or who still believe that India crossed the IB without any provocation. (Exhibit Two,

So articles like this will go some way in correcting history on the other side.

Jagan Garu, IIRC the gentleman interviewed in the article has writtena book on PAF..Falcon something...which blasts many theories and myths to smithereens....can you please let me know how the same can be bought over the net? I think you mentioned that you have purchased the same...thanks.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 16 Sep 2009 17:10

Sure, this is the book - Flight of the Falcon

http://www.vanguardbooks.com/browse.php ... 1&subject=

shipping doubles the cost of the book.

However for those in India, it is advised to wait for some time as some Indian publisher is importing them and hence considerable savings on the shipping.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 16 Sep 2009 18:38

thx jag.

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 03 Oct 2009 01:08

At the time of the invasion of Portuguese India by the Armed Forces of the Indian Union in December 1961, the NRP boat Antares found himself based in Daman, Vega in the NRP and the NRP Sirius Diu Goa. The launch Vega went into battle with Vampire fighter-bombers of the Indian Air Force, he tried to make an attack on the cruiser INS Delhi Diu that bombing, and sunk with the death of their commander, Lt. Oliveira e Carmo, and two sailors . The Sirius boat was sunk by own crew to not fall into the enemy. The boat Antares managed to escape the Indian squad, coming to Pakistan and then being transported to Portugal.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 03 Oct 2009 03:49

Good one aditya. I would like to share another link http://www.warbirds.in/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15 that has some portugese versions in it

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 03 Oct 2009 11:22

a recent discussion and pics at milphotos.

http://www.militaryphotos.net/forums/sh ... p?t=163901

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 04 Oct 2009 00:48

Looks like Portugal used only commercial airline TAP to operate from Goa ... there was a link somewhere with TAP ops in Goa. Two remaining planes made a heroic escape to Karachi despite a bombed out runway

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 04 Oct 2009 04:43

Aditya G wrote:[

Looks like Portugal used only commercial airline TAP to operate from Goa ... there was a link somewhere with TAP ops in Goa. Two remaining planes made a heroic escape to Karachi despite a bombed out runway [/img]

http://www.colaco.net/1/GdeFdabolim3.htm

Incidentally, Maj. Solano de Almeida, the first pilot to fly under TAIP also piloted the last flight of TAIP out of Goa to Karachi, ferrying the last remaining wives and children of military personnel, flying at a very low altitude to avoid possible skirmishes with the belligerent IAF. This is what Maria Ivonne Quintino Reis, a parachutist nurse, has to say: "I arrived in Karachi on the 13th December, to assist with the evacuation of the families that were being repatriated from Índia… The planes of the TAIP ferried the families to Karachi to be transferred to the planes of TAP, as TAP could not go to Índia due to the expected invasion. The last flight of the TAIP carried families of three military personnel, piloted by Maj. Solano de Almeida, which took off after the invasion of Goa, flying low so as to avoid bombardment in precarious conditions, to Karachi". This flight is mentioned by the Bharat-Rakshak site: "During nightfall, they managed to take off the aircraft from the still damaged airfield and made their getaway to Portugal."

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Histo ... ghran.html

17th/18th Dec. Vamp NF X, No. ID608. After landing at Poona, we were ordered off again at about three thirty, (A/C No. ID 608, same crew) to intercept a target aircraft heading in a NNW direction off the coast, we never made contact. This target turned out to be the Super Connie that took off from Dabolim and hugging the deck went to Karachi [1]. Many years later (1985/86) the Captain of that TAIP Super Connie was flying B 737's with Air Malta.

krishna_j · Post by **krishna_j** » 10 Oct 2009 19:38

Jagan wrote:Sure, this is the book - Flight of the Falcon

http://www.vanguardbooks.com/browse.php ... 1&subject=

shipping doubles the cost of the book.

However for those in India, it is advised to wait for some time as some Indian publisher is importing them and hence considerable savings on the shipping.

. for those who are interested - first Indian importer is Pentagon Press in Delhi - .- however they are selling at a steep price of Rs 995 and for some weird reason not listing the book on the web site .

However the book is quite revealing and a must buy - will find out if anyone else is selling the book in India .

Mahendra · Post by **Mahendra** » 15 Oct 2009 15:23

Got this in my inbox from Mullah Nayakuddin.

Latest Scans, courtesy vayu.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 17 Oct 2009 03:08

May peace be upon Nayakuddin. Is he still on forced exile in banned-istan? pass on the shukriyaas to him.

The Mirage article and the Gnat excerpt are yet another example of "Both sides of the coin"

In Kaiser Tufail's article - he writes "The missed strike at Pathankot was repeated by Sqn Ldr Aftab Alam’s formation the next afternoon. This time, all the bombs found their mark on the runway and taxi track. As they were exiting after delivering the attack, Nos 3 and 4 found a Gnat closing in behind them, with guns blazing. Thanks to their swift Mirages, they were easily able to get out of harm’s way."

Now we know its AM SD Mohan in the futile chase

(though have to disagree with the assertion that Pathankot was not hit in any of the raids. AM KDK Lewis articles mention the two close shaves he had in PAF raids on Pathankot)

krishna_j · Post by **krishna_j** » 19 Oct 2009 19:46

Another nugget from AC Kaiser Tufail on the PAF air support for air to ground ops over the Thar Desert in the '71 war

A total of 20 tanks, 63 vehicles, 5 trains, 3 bulk fuel stores and an ammunition dump were claimed by the pilots, according to PAF’s official history . During the course of the tactical air support campaign by the PAF, no aircraft were lost to ground fire. IAF, however, lost three Uttarlai-based HF-24s to vigilant Pak Army AAA while on air support missions in Naya Chor area.

Read the entire article here :

http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/200 ... chive.html

rahulm · Post by **rahulm** » 11 Nov 2009 09:11

Just noticed, an IAF thread similar to IN and Army threads does not seem to exist instead we have LCA and SU30 MKI threads.

Anyway, so this thread seemed appropriate to mention that there is a Canberra on static display at the NDA. Serial number 901? which I will confirm later.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 11 Nov 2009 09:15

^^^
military aviation thread.

rahulm · Post by **rahulm** » 11 Nov 2009 09:29

Much appreciated. Thank you.

rahulm · Post by **rahulm** » 12 Nov 2009 22:40

Its serial number 906. Could not get pictures today as there was a gang painting the static display.

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 13 Nov 2009 01:29

rahulm wrote:Just noticed, an IAF thread similar to IN and Army threads does not seem to exist instead we have LCA and SU30 MKI threads.

Anyway, so this thread seemed appropriate to mention that there is a Canberra on static display at the NDA. Serial number 901? which I will confirm later.

Also notify Jagman at his warbirdsofindia.com website in case he doesnt have this one on his list.