Bharat Rakshak

Cross-post from EVM thread.

vera_k:

Relevant to this thread. The article posits that trojans cannot be ruled out unless chips are manufactured in a secure facility.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/science/27trojan.html?_r=1&8dpc







All the more reason to add a paper trail to the EVMs. If the Americans are having so much trouble keeping Trojans out of their equipment, our odds are worse given that the chips are not manufactured in secured Indian facilities.


--------------------------------------------------

Has there been any thought given to this in Indian Defence Acquisitions? Do people eager for kick-backs from abroad ever think about Trojans?

^^^ Excerpts from the above cited article:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

But as military planners have come to view cyberspace as an impending battlefield, American intelligence agency experts said, all sides are arming themselves with the ability to create hardware Trojan horses and to hide them deep inside the circuitry of computer hardware and electronic devices to facilitate military attacks.

In the future, and possibly already hidden in existing weapons, clandestine additions to electronic circuitry could open secret back doors that would let the makers in when the users were depending on the technology to function. Hidden kill switches could be included to make it possible to disable computer-controlled military equipment from a distance. Such switches could be used by an adversary or as a safeguard if the technology fell into enemy hands.

A Trojan horse kill switch may already have been used. A 2007 Israeli Air Force attack on a suspected partly constructed Syrian nuclear reactor led to speculation about why the Syrian air defense system did not respond to the Israeli aircraft. Accounts of the event initially indicated that sophisticated jamming technology was used to blind the radars. Last December, however, a report in an American technical publication, IEEE Spectrum, cited a European industry source in raising the possibility that the Israelis might have used a built-in kill switch to shut down the radars.

^^^ Another post from the EVM thread that is very relevant to the issue of trojans in Defense equipment: viewtopic.php?f=2&t=5008&p=762830#p762830

India's New Defence Policy to Open $100 Billion Market
TOI

Have we started making 155M shells yet or still importing ?

Mahindra Satyam bags Saab deal



Ankit

Swedes invaded today....

Signing of new defence MoU, civil nuclear cooperation, anti-terrorism coop, environmental coop, etc.


Swedish trade minister at defence industry summit looking at new camo

x-post from corruption thread:

Contracting with the MoD: stealing lollipops from babies
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/2009/11/ ... ipops.html


The Hawk assembly line in Bangalore. HAL claims that BAE Systems has failed to provide drawings, jigs, and parts according to the agreed schedule. BAE Systems denies the charge.

by Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 3rd Nov 09


If India’s military eventually plumps for primarily American equipment, a major reason will be: soldiers, sailors and airmen are completely sick of being gypped through poorly-framed acquisition contracts that entirely favour the foreign suppliers.


Take India’s contract with BAE Systems, UK, for 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), a billion dollar procurement that took 18 years to finalise. That contract, it now emerges, was framed so poorly that today --- with HAL Bangalore blaming BAE Systems for failing to properly transfer technology --- India’s Ministry of Defence can do nothing to twist BAE Systems’ tail.


The MoD now finds that the Hawk contract contains no provisions for liquidated damages in case BAE Systems defaults on its obligations. And, in an act of inexplicable generosity, India’s MoD paid BAE Systems an unprecedented “up-front” amount of 30% of the contract value; such a payment seldom, if ever, exceeds 15%. Now, with more jet trainers needed and the production line facing delays, fresh inquiries have gone out to global manufacturers, restarting procurement afresh.


Why do such fiascos routinely occur? Astonishingly, because India’s MoD does not have the legal experts needed for negotiating and framing complex defence contracts. The MoD’s forlorn Legal Cell, manned by 10-12 lawyers on deputation from the Ministry of Law, comes up during the framing of every defence contract against a battery of specialised contracting experts, an integral part of the establishment of every global arms vendor.


This year, the Indian MoD’s beleaguered and inadequate legal team will oversee capital expenditure of more than Rs 50,000 crores. When the MoD finalises its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), these less-than-legal-eagles will have to negotiate and frame a single contract worth Rs 50,000 crores. Supplementary contracts will be needed governing offsets worth half that value again.


Within the MoD, alarm bells have long been sounding. The Solicitor General and the Attorney General have been approached for help in accessing top-class legal advice. But, so far, there has been no response.


The complexity of a defence contract is virtually unparalleled. A “standard contract” is rarely feasible because the usage of each piece of equipment is radically different. Being an international contract, reaching agreement on arbitration is always difficult, especially considering confidentiality and non-disclosure arrangements. Defining “force majeure” is extremely important, especially when governments can invoke national interest during the execution of a contract. The MoD’s civil servants deal routinely with such issues, but without the benefit of solid legal advice.


India’s military has long suffered from flawed and inconsistent contracting, especially with Russian suppliers. Since the early 1980s, India’s strike corps --- the tank units that would spearhead a thrust into Pakistan during war --- have faced frustrating shortages of on-board fitment equipment that an ethical defence vendor would supply as a part of the contract. In an instance that generated much resentment, India’s first T-72 tanks were supplied by Russia without the tarpaulin covers that keep out dust and rain. When the military asked for tarpaulins, Russia demanded a supplementary contract, eventually supplying them at highly inflated prices.


In some contracts, especially those involving the supply of “strategically important” equipment, the vendor has the leverage to ignore his contractual obligations. Russia’s shakedown of India over the cost of the Gorshkov is an example of the limitations of any contract. Linking the Gorshkov sale with the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, Russia dismissed the initial price as “unreal, a mistake”, and demanded a renegotiated price. But, in most defence procurements, a good contract guarantees satisfactory supply as well as a healthy buyer-seller relationship.


US defence companies are confident that the experience of contracting with them --- with no hidden costs, superb product support, and a “partnership” approach towards the Indian users --- will make a big impact on the Indian military. So far, contracting with the US has been relatively smooth, but it is still too early to tell.


The MoD’s lack of capability in defence contracting is just one, especially worrisome, dimension of a broad systemic incompetence in procuring defence equipment. As a Group of Ministers in April 2000, numerous committees and, most recently, an excellent CAG report pointed out, the MoD has failed to put in place a functionally specialised acquisition organisation to handle a task that is clearly far beyond current capabilities.


But instead of a coherent system, procurement continues under 13 different agencies, each reporting to a different functional head. Contracts, after they are concluded, are managed by four different agencies with very little co-ordination among them.

What makes anyone think that US will not do such a thing to India ?

For the final contract the US company will bring more lawyers then engineers or feence analysts or what-ever-they-may-be-called

[/quote]


Take India’s contract with BAE Systems, UK, for 66 Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers (AJTs), a billion dollar procurement that took 18 years to finalise. That contract, it now emerges, was framed so poorly that today --- with HAL Bangalore blaming BAE Systems for failing to properly transfer technology --- India’s Ministry of Defence can do nothing to twist BAE Systems’ tail.


The MoD now finds that the Hawk contract contains no provisions for liquidated damages in case BAE Systems defaults on its obligations. And, in an act of inexplicable generosity, India’s MoD paid BAE Systems an unprecedented “up-front” amount of 30% of the contract value; such a payment seldom, if ever, exceeds 15%. Now, with more jet trainers needed and the production line facing delays, fresh inquiries have gone out to global manufacturers, restarting procurement afresh.

[/quote]
Charity begins at home, eh ?

NO
Try to get a contract with any GOI company. Try and get advance payment. They will begin with a minimum 30 days credit i.e. they will pay 30 days AFTER THE GODS ARE ACCEPTED.

Of course for capitol equipment no Indian supplier may agree to this payment. But at the most he will get 10% advance and balance against delivery.

Does any one remember the Karsan fertiliser case ?

GOI imported urea from a Turkish company whose local agent was the son of a very high politician. The State Bank worked over night, over time to establish a L/C for 100% advance payment. I do not know how many kilograms of urea was finally delivered
[/quote]




Why do such fiascos routinely occur? Astonishingly, because India’s MoD does not have the legal experts needed for negotiating and framing complex defence contracts. The MoD’s forlorn Legal Cell, manned by 10-12 lawyers on deputation from the Ministry of Law, comes up during the framing of every defence contract against a battery of specialised contracting experts, an integral part of the establishment of every global arms vendor.

[/quote]
Let us subcontract the negotiations and framing of the contract to some Indian company like Reliance or Essar or Birlas or ....

I am sure we will geta good price and excellent payment terms


This year, the Indian MoD’s beleaguered and inadequate legal team will oversee capital expenditure of more than Rs 50,000 crores. When the MoD finalises its choice of medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), these less-than-legal-eagles will have to negotiate and frame a single contract worth Rs 50,000 crores. Supplementary contracts will be needed governing offsets worth half that value again.

Within the MoD, alarm bells have long been sounding. The Solicitor General and the Attorney General have been approached for help in accessing top-class legal advice. But, so far, there has been no response.

The complexity of a defence contract is virtually unparalleled. A “standard contract” is rarely feasible because the usage of each piece of equipment is radically different. Being an international contract, reaching agreement on arbitration is always difficult, especially considering confidentiality and non-disclosure arrangements. Defining “force majeure” is extremely important, especially when governments can invoke national interest during the execution of a contract. The MoD’s civil servants deal routinely with such issues, but without the benefit of solid legal advice.

India’s military has long suffered from flawed and inconsistent contracting, especially with Russian suppliers. Since the early 1980s, India’s strike corps --- the tank units that would spearhead a thrust into Pakistan during war --- have faced frustrating shortages of on-board fitment equipment that an ethical defence vendor would supply as a part of the contract. In an instance that generated much resentment, India’s first T-72 tanks were supplied by Russia without the tarpaulin covers that keep out dust and rain. When the military asked for tarpaulins, Russia demanded a supplementary contract, eventually supplying them at highly inflated prices.

In some contracts, especially those involving the supply of “strategically important” equipment, the vendor has the leverage to ignore his contractual obligations. Russia’s shakedown of India over the cost of the Gorshkov is an example of the limitations of any contract. Linking the Gorshkov sale with the transfer of nuclear submarine technology, Russia dismissed the initial price as “unreal, a mistake”, and demanded a renegotiated price. But, in most defence procurements, a good contract guarantees satisfactory supply as well as a healthy buyer-seller relationship.

US defence companies are confident that the experience of contracting with them --- with no hidden costs, superb product support, and a “partnership” approach towards the Indian users --- will make a big impact on the Indian military. So far, contracting with the US has been relatively smooth, but it is still too early to tell.

The MoD’s lack of capability in defence contracting is just one, especially worrisome, dimension of a broad systemic incompetence in procuring defence equipment. As a Group of Ministers in April 2000, numerous committees and, most recently, an excellent CAG report pointed out, the MoD has failed to put in place a functionally specialised acquisition organisation to handle a task that is clearly far beyond current capabilities.

But instead of a coherent system, procurement continues under 13 different agencies, each reporting to a different functional head. Contracts, after they are concluded, are managed by four different agencies with very little co-ordination among them.[/quote]

But...

But will the legal eagles deliver the goods ? NO

As soon as these legal eagles prepare a contract which is fair (forget about being in favour of India) the defence contractos will go running to their "friend" in MOD / GOI and get the contract amended in their favour. And of course our GOI /MOD would be happy to ensure that the contract is signed quickly so that they get their share

K

kersi saar, please mind the quote tags, its impossible to figure out which is your reply.

SORRY

I do not know what I tried to do !!!! But surely I made a BIG MESS !!!!
K

Book Review of "Arming the Indian Arsenal"
Review by lt. Gen. (Retd) V.R. Raghavan

Check this link http://livefist.blogspot.com/2009/11/dr ... -anti.html
The weapon is remarkably similar to carl gustaf.
I read some where that the army recently acquired MkIII version of the Carl Gustaf.
Is the the same case of NTW-20??

It might be too late to grow bigger than china BUT in a broader perspective nothing is too late.


I expected this back in 1998-99...at least after 10 years things are moving forward.

Local industry needs more time to benefit from Indian procurement revamp
By Jon Grevatt 19 November 2009


The impact of India's updated defence procurement procedures (DPPs) on indigenous defence production will be limited unless the Ministry of Defence (MoD) allows local industries more time to draw up detailed manufacturing proposals, according to a senior academic at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) in New Delhi.

Although the updated DPP - which became active on 1 November - states that the MoD will publish a 15-year plan outlining a "technology perspective and capability roadmap" in a bid to assist industries' planning, Laxman K Behera, an associate fellow at IDSA, told Jane's on 18 November that domestic defence companies need to be informed at a far earlier stage that they have been selected to provide services or equipment.

"The 15-year plan will no doubt help the domestic enterprises to know, much in advance, about the requirements of the armed forces and therefore enable them to draw up a specific proposal. But this is not the end of the story," he said.

Speaking to Jane's on 11 November, Behera said the updated DPPs could provide India's defence industries with a "tremendous opportunity" to develop over the next decade.

However, in his comments of 18 November Behera explained that in order for the DPP's newly created procurement category - which is called 'Buy and Make (Indian)' - to be effective and increase levels of indigenous defence manufacturing the government needs to give industries more time between the placement of an order and the actual delivery of a system or platform.


(Ref: http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdi/j ... _1_n.shtml )

It is not necesaary to grow bigger than China. What is more important is to grow big enough, with big b@$#S, so that we can sock them HARD if they act too smart.

K

YEEEHAAH! Thats a cool $7 million for not one but three years running. And hats off to the FIPB for preventing the creeping re-colonization of India by EADS. I guess importing 100% of most weapons is better than buying them from a 51-49% joint venture with a foreign company.*

In the meantime lets keep enjoying Republic Day watching foreign made weapon systems fly and drive past us. I also look forward to continued defense exports from India such as tents, parachutes, jute ropes and uniforms ( non-digital camo. of course). With people this stupid in gov't. who needs enemies?


*( OK 70% if you believe in screw driver offsets. But more likely 130% pricing to offset the offset).

Terrible news. This could have made L&T a major player in the domestic private defense manufacturing.

The government wants private companies in defense manufacturing but they tie their hands by severely restricting foreign investment in such vital areas.

the thing is that at 29% investments, we would get only screw drivers. most companies would like at least near 50-50 share.

With the exception of French, I most players are likely to come around and work with the rules. In the meantime, GoI might relax a little bit too (offset definition?).

The key is to get one player going successfully, IMHO.

Indian Panel OKs Joint Aircraft Effort With Russia

After 7 long years..atlast,

gurus can anyone clarfy that india is getting 110 MTAs rather than 45 as previosly reported..or is it DDM

I can only hope it's NOT DDM and that better sense has finally dawned on the bean counters that putting off acquisition decision actually cost much, much more in the long run.

3 pacts? Any guesses? Extra Naval fulcrums? Extra MKIs? MRTA? What else?

CM

MRTA, BrahMos Hypersonic CM, MiG-29 upgrade

MiG-29 upgrade? What more is there to be signed? Almost everything has been agreed upon afaik. The upgrades are already underway and a couple of a/c should be ready by 2011.

CM

The prime minister of India does not negotiate nor sign pacts involving tactical weapons.

This link says that, "The P-3C Orion is now a front runner to meet the Indian Navy’s requirement for six Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft."

Didn't we buy 8 P-8A's for ASW role? Then, what is this about?

But, the good thing is that they got our map right.

Probably a mistake on their part. "Our" map is a myth they teach school children who are gullible enough to not question their text books. They should disregard that map and issue more "realistic" maps.

The long range order was met.. ( 8 on order and 8 options )

This is the medium range 6 MPA that IN was looking for. ( 6 looking for + ??? Number of options ). 14 - 20 odd MPA will pretty much secure all of Indian Ocean.

IIRC, Boeing was offering a modified P-8I as the MRMR and was the "front runner" for the deal.

It makes more sense to stick with the aircraft that the IN already has made a commitment to than add another new aircraft to the already limited resources of the IN. With more similar aircraft, training and maintenance etc become cheaper and easier. I don't see why a Long range aircraft like the P-8 cannot be used for "medium" range operations as well given that the P-8's sensor suite is supposed to be much more advanced than the P-3C's and also more versatile. How is the P-3C superior to the P-8 in medium range ASW operations ?

The number for medium ranged MPA was 12. Here's an article with the details:

Medium Range Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft (MRMR) procurement on fast track