IMVVHO, IA/IAF cannot fight Naxals simply because they lack the kind of resources and intelligence assets.
NE/J&K officers often complain abt intel quality; so when the push comes to shove R&AW and IB continue to copy-paste while jawans/SOG do the dirty work on their own.
The three articles below imvvho give a good perspective about the challenges facing IA:-
With regards to our army
hopefully not fighting Naxals I found the following
wiki useful:-
The final PAVN triumph was aided by numerous weaknesses and failures in South Vietnamese forces and leadership.
Thieu's "hold everywhere" strategy in the months before the Northern offensive stretched ARVN forces too thinly and withered away any central reserve. Ongoing corruption and incompetence dogged and demoralized the ARVN rank and file. For example, rampant inflation wiped out the inadequate wages of troops that already had little medical care available. In a society where regular full-time soldiers and their dependents made up about 20% of the population, this amounted to widespread impoverishment of important segments of South Vietnamese society. Desertion rates after the American pullout approached 25% of total force strength, reductions that were not made up when the end came. Of the total 1,000,000 men theoretically mobilized for defence (including about half a million militia), only about 10% were direct combat troops{{Is SSC still a great idea, when so many CPOs are there?}}.
If IA loses a single battle in an ambush, Naxals will proclaim the revolution as being valid and then follow Mao and Stalin.Of course,they shall not succeed but then nobody can stop a Alexander Perensky idolizer or a Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme follower.
The second piece is an
editorial by former vice chief Lt.Gen. Oberoi:-
The situation reminds this writer of the battlefield message sent by a General to his Emperor: “Am surrounded both sides. My centre cannot hold. Situation excellent. I shall attack.” Will the new Army Chief, who had cut his professional teeth in a proud and valorous regiment, replicate this by being proactive? The citizens, who have a great affection for the army, do expect it from him.
..
The military also needs to modify the concept of being apolitical. The army’s long standing stance of keeping a distance from the leaders of political parties other than those of the party in power needs to be modified. In a parliamentary system like ours, policy is formulated by all parliamentarians despite differences of the opposition. After all, the Parliament Standing Committee on Defence and similar other committees are all-party bodies. Consequently, though remaining apolitical, the army needs to apprise and discuss its concerns with the political leadership across the board. This would not reduce the apolitical nature of the army, about which it is justifiably so proud.
In South Asia, this institutionalized effort has not yielded any benefit,with many cases ending in nightmares.
However, cross recruitment between retired/retiring Foreign,Police and Army officers did yield results in the past.
Finally, a conclusive analysis posted on
Broadsword regarding Officer Shortage:-
Today, as the new chief implicitly accepts, the army has become a personality cult where officers either conform to the inclinations of the boss or get weeded out. Originality and eccentricity, those priceless attributes of a successful military leader, have been rendered extinct by a dull, humourless routine that is set --- Congress Party fashion --- by what the boss thinks his boss wants.
..
Blocking any radical change is thetribal ethos of the Indian Army. An officer belongs first to his regiment or battalion; only after that is he an Indian Army officer. An army chief’s first duty is towards the regiment and battalion that nurtured him; reforming the army conflicts with the role of regimental patriarch.
..
Today, 63 years after independence, the military has no promotion manual; policy exists only in a constantly revised torrent of letters from the Military Secretary’s branch.
..
the institution of the COAS would be greatly strengthened by transparency and the absence of discretion in promotions and postings. It would also free army chiefs from accusations of prejudice; a lever that MoD officials --- and in one well-known case, a defence minister --- have successfully employed to demand favours for their own candidates.
Hence, imho IA already faces an internal three front war with threat of more police duties applied as a stick -
.Politicization :- Creating a bureaucratic approach to all things, thus a machine eveready for any order without thinking.
.DRDOification :- All projects and threats to security rushed to IA/IAF at first go, the forces reciprocate by thrusting all minute equipment needs onto research labs without investigation.
.RSVPs for VIPs only - The forces esp. police/CPOs must respond to costume changes needed by netalog - "Wherever,Whenever".
CPM the corrupt thugs must be better than Naxals as liberation of Lalgarh must be made to prove.
Similarly, our inept JK state govt. needs votes hence IA/BSF/CRPF/AFSPA must move out pronto and the Centre be shown as liberator by inaugurating dams (under heavy security cover) without JK contributing a single paisa.
Thus far, Armed Forces have stubbornly not yielded."One Rank,One Pension" is made to sound like "Ein Reich, Ein Fuhrer" - this perception must go.
Regarding promotions, if chiefs are not given the duty, then two routes seem plausible:- a tri-service officer below flag rank is given this duty with chiefs consulted (the officer is a political appointee) or a judges like collegium is formed comprising of retired and serving officers who nominate their successors and select vice chiefs (TSPA seems headed here).
Both scenarios are not very welcoming in thought.
Captains select their team.Period.
JMT