CT & COIN Operations in India: News, Images and Discussion

vivekmehta · Post by **vivekmehta** » 17 Jun 2010 19:17

Go for the HEAD.

this should be strategy. everyone know that there most of middle and upper level leadership is corrupt. money plays a big part now. they have moved far away for any ideology . ideology is only there to be preached at lower level ,
development will help but to start that ground needs to be cleared . i dont thing once pressure start unfolding on they they will fight like a unit . ultimate looser will aam janta . they will be pressed hard at both ends . they wont get any thing , when money will start flowing in name of development . netas who dont even show there face now will be back in force to get there pie .

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 17 Jun 2010 22:09

http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=13028
thats a huge number,,
seems like the official figure of maoists cadr (50000 to 1 lakh) is wrong ?

Shameek · Post by **Shameek** » 17 Jun 2010 22:34

Debal wrote:General army can't do much harm to them because they used to melt down among common people very quickly & we can't do a all out war like Srilanka, so, a very well planned and managed vertical operation line of development and armed option should be opted.

What does 'vertical operation' mean?

First flash them out sector wise with para forces in heavy numbers, start social development work and then go offensive in guerrilla way by well trained army commandos in forest warfare.

First you say army cant do much, then you say use paras and army commandos trained in forest warfare. You mean to flash (flush?) them out of the forest using paras and then use these other jungle commandos for what?

But, GOI hv to take the call immediately in a very well planned way, any hasty reaction would not be effective.

Take the call immediately and yet hasty reaction would not be effective. Contradiction?

Debal · Post by **Debal** » 18 Jun 2010 15:02

"Vertical Operation" means simultaneous action of Law & order restoration & social/economic development.

Yes, typing error, I mean "flush". General infantry is not trained for forest warfare specially against forces like Maoist but commandos get training of that level Like "Greyhound" force or "Cobra".

"Hasty Decision" means deployment of army infantry or air force without much planning/intel/training.

Almost the same way army is thinking too, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/news ... wsid=13028

Shameek · Post by **Shameek** » 18 Jun 2010 23:01

Debal wrote:"Vertical Operation" means simultaneous action of Law & order restoration & social/economic development.

Easier said than done. The second cannot happen until the first is successful. Else you end up with dead civilian contractors and soon no one wants to do any more 'development' there.

Yes, typing error, I mean "flush". General infantry is not trained for forest warfare specially against forces like Maoist but commandos get training of that level Like "Greyhound" force or "Cobra".

Ok. You mentioned paras and army commandos earlier and hence my question. The Greyhound and Cobra forces are not a part of the army.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 20 Jun 2010 18:42

Centre may amend AFSPA, Army could lose cover

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 23 Jun 2010 07:38

IAF: Recall UN mission choppers for Anti-Naxal ops

Amid proposals for using helicopters for movement of paramilitary forces during anti-Naxal operations, the IAF has suggested to the government that its 15 choppers deputed for UN peacekeeping forces may be called back as it has constraints of resources.

The IAF has made it clear that it has no reservation in helping police and paramilitary forces in evacuation but is hard-pressed for helicopters as most of them are deployed for various operational requirements.

The Air Force has told the government that if it were to assist in anti-Naxal operations, it would require more helicopters, according to Defence Ministry sources.

In this context, it has suggested that the 15 MI-17 helicopters deputed for UN peacekeeping missions in three African countries may be called back, they said. "The option of calling back the choppers from foreign duties is still under consideration of the government," the sources added.

..................................
At the same time, the IAF has kept four MI-17s in Raipur on standby in case these may be required for evacuation purposes in anti-Naxal operations in Chhattisgarh.

shukla · Post by **shukla** » 23 Jun 2010 07:42

Craig Alpert wrote:IAF: Recall UN mission choppers for Anti-Naxal ops

(X-post)

IAF's request to recall choppers from international UN missions being interpreted as 'reluctance'..

Govt may hire helicopters from overseas to combat Maoists

After facing stiff resistance from the Indian Air Force (IAF), the ministry of home affairs is considering hiring heavy-lift helicopters from foreign firms for quick movement of paramilitary forces and aerial surveillance in areas hit by Maoist insurgents.

“If the air force cannot give it to us, we will go the private sector. If still not available, we will go outside (to foreign countries). All options are open before us,” a senior home ministry official said on condition of anonymity.

“We are waiting for the CCS (cabinet committee on security) decision on this. We will see how much they are giving us. The home ministry will then take a call on hiring from outside,” the official said.

Marut · Post by **Marut** » 23 Jun 2010 09:21

From the url in the post above

Govt may hire helicopters from overseas to combat Maoists

“If the air force cannot give it to us, we will go the private sector. If still not available, we will go outside (to foreign countries). All options are open before us,” a senior home ministry official said on condition of anonymity.

Stupid but genuine question: I am not understanding what is the modus operandi of the forces in using helos?

Where exactly are they planning to deploy these helos? If they are going to ferry forces close to the jump off points then they are very likely to be attacked. If so, then what about the liability for the helos that will come from pvt sector or foreign sources? If they are using the helos to transport the forces to certain nodal areas before they are sent off to their designated jump off points then why do you need helos in the first place. They can reach by train and truck with some time delay of course. But then the force buildup is unlikely to sudden so why the need for helos? Or is there something I have missed since I haven't followed this topic intently for sometime now.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 24 Jun 2010 07:11

Colonel martyred in Lolab encounter

Colonel Sood received a tip off at around 8.45 p.m about presence of militants in Saiwan village, less than 500 away from the camp of 18 Rashtriya Rifles he commanded. Immediately, he rushed to the village with a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) to lay cordon around the house, the sources said. They said the officer got a call on his mobile when he was approaching the area, where the militants were hiding. Colonel Sood's telephone conversation gave away his position and the militants opened fire in his direction.

Incidentally, the officer's family-his wife and 11-year-old daughter -- were in Srinagar on a vacation. They were returning home to Delhi in a few days time but had to carry home the dead body of their most beloved person. The coffin of Colonel Sood, draped in the national Tricolour, was flown to Delhi this afternoon along with his wife and daughter. He was given a tearful farewell with full military honours.

andy B · Post by **andy B** » 24 Jun 2010 07:17

^^^

They said the officer got a call on his mobile when he was approaching the area, where the militants were hiding. Colonel Sood's telephone conversation gave away his position and the militants opened fire in his direction

This doesnt make sense to me does this mean that those pigs had equipment to triangulate his position electronically?

I think there is definitely more to this than meets the eye...?

sum · Post by **sum** » 24 Jun 2010 08:53

Andy-ji,

forget triangulation and all hi-funda stuff. It seems to be more acase of the mobile ring tone/subsequent conversation which alerted the militants towards the direction of the sound and they blindly fired towards it killing the colonel in the process..

VikB · Post by **VikB** » 24 Jun 2010 11:26

this is a very very saddening news.

RIP

Prabu · Post by **Prabu** » 25 Jun 2010 12:45

Search party's shoukld be more careful in future. Let us learn from costly mistakes. RIP.

Sanku · Post by **Sanku** » 28 Jun 2010 22:58

http://www.dailypioneer.com/265612/LOC- ... illed.html

LOC gunbattle: 5 militants, 3 jawans killed

Five armed foreign militants were killed on Monday and three armymen lost their lives in a fierece gunbattle that broke out along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kupwara sector of Jammu and Kashmir.

Acting on a tip off, troops picked up the movement of a group of infiltrating militants in 104 forward location along LoC in Kupwara belt and launched an operation, triggering the encounter, a senior army official at Udhampur-based Northern Command told PTI tonight.

Five foreign militants and three army jawans were killed in the gunbattle which was on when reports last came in from the area.

narmad · Post by **narmad** » 28 Jun 2010 23:15

Sanku
LOC gunbattle: 5 militants, 3 jawans killed

Seems the Militants are better trained and equiped then earlier times.
They dont die easy these days.
The training camps need to be neutralized to prevent deaths of our soilders.
Its very saddening to see that we cannot do anything about it.

sumits · Post by **sumits** » 30 Jun 2010 03:10

26 CRPF personnel killed in Maoists attack in Chhattisgarh

vivekmehta · Post by **vivekmehta** » 30 Jun 2010 09:20

its not ending .CRPF needs to be pulled up , they cant give these kind of victories to them so easily ...

Nihat · Post by **Nihat** » 03 Jul 2010 13:19

Four Pakis gunned down

darshhan · Post by **darshhan** » 04 Jul 2010 18:13

X-posted from "intelligence and national security discussion"

Special intelligence branch of Andhra police is succeeding in neutralising naxal leadership.

http://indiatoday.intoday.in/site/Story ... e-mat.html

Other states could do well to emulate the model.

Aditya Watts · Post by **Aditya Watts** » 04 Jul 2010 19:03

Airavat wrote:Colonel martyred in Lolab encounter

Colonel Sood received a tip off at around 8.45 p.m about presence of militants in Saiwan village, less than 500 away from the camp of 18 Rashtriya Rifles he commanded. Immediately, he rushed to the village with a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) to lay cordon around the house, the sources said. They said the officer got a call on his mobile when he was approaching the area, where the militants were hiding. Colonel Sood's telephone conversation gave away his position and the militants opened fire in his direction.

Incidentally, the officer's family-his wife and 11-year-old daughter -- were in Srinagar on a vacation. They were returning home to Delhi in a few days time but had to carry home the dead body of their most beloved person. The coffin of Colonel Sood, draped in the national Tricolour, was flown to Delhi this afternoon along with his wife and daughter. He was given a tearful farewell with full military honours.

It's always sad to hear such news. What bothers me especially is the fact that high-ranking officers lose their lives in such operations. One one hand I understand their sense for doing their duty but such officers should ideally stay away from the lines as they are supposed to lead the whole group (e.g. battalion). However, I understand that there is a huge shortage of middle-level officers who in such cases should lead such operations in the field.

Gerard · Post by **Gerard** » 08 Jul 2010 04:39

French Army manual Doctrine for Counterinsurgency at the Tactical Level, dated April 2010.
- Lieutenant Colonel François de Jaburn, Troupes de Marine.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/f ... ctrine.pdf

darshhan · Post by **darshhan** » 12 Jul 2010 20:14

Unarmed Mumbai cops led to 26/11 mayhem: FBI

http://ibnlive.in.com/news/unarmed-mumb ... ml?from=tn

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 13 Jul 2010 19:20

How The War On IEDs Is Fought

May 19, 2010: The U.S. Army is applying the same aggressive approach to IEDs (Improvised Explosive Device, a roadside, or suicide car bombs) in Afghanistan as it did in Iraq, and the Taliban are having a hard time adjusting to it. One of the more disturbing American tactics is to aggressively fight the bombers for control of key roads. This means that the army engineers are out on heavily mined roads every day in their specially equipped MRAPs, looking for IEDs to clear. It also means UAVs often patrol the road at night, using their night vision cams to spot Taliban teams burying a roadside bomb. This usually ends badly for the Taliban, as the UAV fires a Hellfire missile, or a nearby helicopter gunship comes over to kill the team. Sometimes there is a nearby rapid reaction team, that goes out and kills or, more importantly, captures members of the team. Dead or alive, the Taliban caught in these situations are valuable sources of information. And information is one thing that is being fought over. U.S. counter-IED tactics concentrate on discovering who is organizing the IED effort, and then going after the key members of that organization. This is done using a combination of powerful computer software, and traditional detective and military intelligence methods.

Take out the leaders and technical specialists (bomb builders) and the IED effort collapses. That worked in Iraq, and it is beginning to work in Afghanistan. These battles tend not to get covered much in the media, but there were many epic struggles in Iraq, which all ended up in the IED gangs going down. It takes time, but the pressure causes the gangs to spend less time concealing IEDS, and building smaller or less reliable ones. As more key people are lost, the IEDs efforts gets sloppy, and the Taliban losses accelerate.

The Taliban, unable to withstand foreign troops in a gun battle, have put most of their resources into an IED campaign. Thus the number of IEDs encountered went from 2,678 in 2007 to about 8,200 last year. But signs of how effective the Iraq counter-IED methods can be are already showing up. For example, in March, there were 989 roadside bombs encountered in Afghanistan, compared to 429 in March of 2009. But casualties are not up by nearly as much, with, 39 foreign troops killed, compared to 28 in March, 2009. IED deaths were 275 last year, but are running at a rate that is only 13 percent higher this year.

As the use of IEDs in Iraq moved to Afghanistan, so did all the techniques U.S. troops developed to deal with these devices. In Iraq, the U.S. mobilized a multi-billion dollar effort to deal with IEDs, and that paid off. New technology (jammers, robots), tactics (predictive analysis and such), equipment (better armor for vehicles and troops) and a lot of determination did the job. Gradually, IEDs became less dangerous. In 2006, it took about five IEDs to cause one coalition casualty (11 percent of them fatal). By 2008 it took nine IEDs per casualty (12 percent fatal).

In 2006, only 8 percent of IEDs put out there caused casualties. In 2007, it was nine percent. In 2008, it was less than five percent. The main objective of IEDs was to kill coalition troops, and at that, they were very ineffective. In 2006, you had to use 48 to kill one soldier. In 2007, you needed 49 and by 2008, you needed 79. In Afghanistan, it currently takes 53 IEDs to kill one foreign soldier, and that number is rising.

IEDs are even less effective in Afghanistan, but because they are the main cause of NATO casualties, they get a lot of media attention. In Afghanistan, the enemy started off with one big disadvantage, as they didn't have the expertise or the resources of the Iraqi IED specialists. In Iraq, the bombs were built and placed by one of several dozen independent gangs, each containing smaller groups of people with different skills. At the head of each gang was a guy called the money man. That tells you something about how all this works. Nearly all the people involved with IED gangs were Sunni Arabs, and most of them once worked for Saddam. The gangs hired themselves out to terrorist groups (some of them al Qaeda affiliated), but mainly to Baath Party or Sunni Arab groups that believed the Sunni Arabs should be running the country. You got the money, these gangs got the bombs.

The money man, naturally, called the shots. He hired, individually or as groups, the other specialists. These included scouts (who found the most effective locations to put the bombs), the bomb makers, the emplacers (who placed the bomb) and the trigger team, that actually set the bomb off, and often included an ambush team, to attack the damaged vehicles with AK-47s and RPGs. The trigger team also usually included a guy with a video camera, who recorded the operation. Attacks that fail, are also recorded, for later examination for things that could be improved. Survivors of the al Qaeda defeat in Iraq fled to Afghanistan, where they brought all these techniques with them. But the Afghans did not have the level of training and experience available in Iraq, so the Afghan IED effort got off to a slow start.

It's still the case that the specialists most in demand are the emplacers. This is the most dangerous job, as the roads are patrolled by UAVs, using heat sensors to spot anyone down there in the darkness. Once identified as emplacers, the UAVs shoot fast, and to kill. Needless to say, the highest casualties are among the emplacers. Overall, the Afghans are losing lost more people than the foreign armies are, just in the IED campaign.

Many of these specialist IED teams are independents, and hired themselves out to the money man who paid the best, or had a reputation for not losing people. Some of these teams were found advertising on the Internet. Men in each team got from $50 to several hundred bucks for each IED worked on.

Interrogations of captured IED crew members indicated that most IED teams operated on a two week cycle. During this period, the gang prepared and placed from a few, to a dozen IEDs in one, carefully planned operation. Once the money man decided on what area to attack, the scout team (or teams) spend 4-5 days examining the target area, to see how troops, police and traffic operated. They recommend places to put the bombs, and the money man decided how many to build and place where.

The bomb makers were contracted to build a certain number of bombs and have them ready for pick up by the emplacers on a certain day. The trigger teams were either already in place, or arrived shortly after, the emplacers successfully planted their bombs. Most of the bombs were discovered and destroyed by the police or troops. Increasingly, the trigger teams were discovered, and attacked, as well. This is where a lot of bomb team members were captured. These men often provided information on other members of the team, which resulted in more arrests. Thousands of men, involved with these IED gangs, are being sought. There were always plenty of new people willing to have a go at it. The main reason was money. The opportunity to make a month's pay for a few hours, or days, work, was worth the risk. But there is a serious shortage of people with technical skills to actually build the bombs. As more of these men were killed or captured, there will be fewer bombs, and more of them will be duds. This has already been seen in some parts of Afghanistan, as the local IED gang was busted up, followed by several weeks, or months, of no IEDs.

There are few lessons in this,how maoist IED teams could be tackled

Craig Alpert · Post by **Craig Alpert** » 13 Jul 2010 19:44

^^ Great analysis, however would be INEFFECTIVE against Maoists, as they operate in a different TERRAIN... Penetrating through Foilage and the ability to detect them when placing IED's is what's needed in order to scout the terrains that are going to be travelled... Iraq and Afghan roads aren't shroweded with hilly Jungles, and India clearly doesn't have any UAV's capable of targeting humans even if the SAAB radar currently being modified by DRDO chaps were successful in detecting an IED. Capabilities (armed and technolgical ) need to be build up for this to work, without it this is just a DUD... The US spent GAZILLIONS of dollars in trying to defeat IED's and let me tell you something, it took them 4 years and a lot of young/bave soldiers were killed before the US started defeating the IED's...However, finding the Money Man is something they can most certainly use under ANY situtaion.. Kill the techies, and money man, and voila there will be immense pressure on them as they'll have to resort to abducting or other tactics...

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 13 Jul 2010 22:34

The article points out that we need to cut their suuply lines of equipments from all over India and across the borders as well as identify and kill their operational backbone ex.technicians and planners
The beauty of this article is that it is not terrain specific to execute such things against insurgency , we need to ID the IED and its activators .
Once key operational planners and indoctrinators of maoists are executed ,they could be brought to the dialogue and rehabilitated .

Pranay · Post by **Pranay** » 14 Jul 2010 01:26

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 164720.cms

An Army Major was killed and six other personnel including a Colonel injured in Mandhar sector of Poonch in an encounter tonight with suspected Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists.

Major Amit Phunge was killed in the operation while Col.Ajay Katoch of 47 Rashtriya Rifles was injured when the terrorists resorted to heavy fire and lobbed grenades, official sources said.

The Army team had gone to the spot following information that about 15 Pakistan-based terrorists had sneaked in.
The Army cordoned off the area and launched a search operation.

The injured included Dinesh Kumar and Satinder Kumar, Signalmen, Naik Jasbir Singh, Sepoy Samir Kumar and Rifleman Dasharat.

vaibhav.n · Post by **vaibhav.n** » 14 Jul 2010 19:25

Nice Read....

Four-plank strategy to counter Maoism
-S D Pradhan
The one man committee that probed the Dantewada massacre in which 76 security personnel were killed by Maoists on April 6, 2010 has given a number of extremely relevant recommendations with a view to ensure better response from the security forces in future while operating against the Maoists. These suggestions need to be taken up seriously. One only hopes that the lessons learnt from this incident are not lost like those from the Jahanabad incident in 2005 or other similar incidents in the past. However, the larger issue of dealing with the entire movement of Maoism needs more efforts than merely enhancing the capabilities of security forces.

2. The recent controversy generated by the statement of Sri Digvijay Singh on the Home Minister’s approach was extremely unfortunate. This gives the impression that the real issue is making a choice between the two different approaches-development or police action. This is an erroneous thinking. The fact is that a multi pronged strategy including the above mentioned dimensions needs to be adopted to deal with this menace. The counter strategy has to be carefully crafted taking into account the different elements of the Maoist strategy.

3. The Maoists have substantially expanded their area in the last five years- from 162 districts in 14 states in 2005 to more than 200 districts in 20 states at present. What is significant to note is the fact that the Maoists follow a well calculated stratagem to expand their area, which has five phases. The first is the Survey Stage in which the Maoists identify the region where some segments of society suffer from a sense of deprivation as well as the causes for this perception. The second is the Struggle Stage in which the groups of local sympathizers are formed for carrying out an effective propaganda campaign to project that the administrative system is not geared up to address their grievances. The third is the Resistance Stage in which protests are organized through their fronts. The fourth is the Guerrilla Stage in which the armed groups are formed to challenge/eliminate the instruments of the state as well as those who are seen responsible for exploiting the ‘weaker sections’ and minorities or working against the Maoist policies and ideology. In this stage, the Maoists form a people’s guerrilla force and create liberated zones. And the fifth is the Liberated Stage in which the Maoists establish their own governing system. Prior to this stage, the people’s guerrilla force is transformed into people’s liberation army- a step which the Maoists are going to take as per their own announcement.

4. Thus it can be seen that violence, which is the most visible aspect of the threat, is witnessed only in the later stages. The Maoist threat is not limited to areas of immediate violence nor does that threat vanish if there is absence of violence at a particular location for a specified period of time.

5. The other significant features of the Maoists activities that merit attention are:
* The Maoists, besides consolidating their position in the tribal belt-called the Red Corridor, are working to mobilize unorganized workers and slum dwellers as also intellectual class in urban areas. Students are also coming increasingly in their focus. Three industrial belts have been identified as targets –Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-Kolkata, Mumbai –Pune-Surat-Ahmedabad and Delhi-Ghaziabad-Faridabad.
* The Maoists are opposing developmental projects as a part of their strategy to ensure the continuation of the perception of neglect by the administration and to ensure the growth of unemployment. They project SEZs as neo- colonial enclaves by “big comprador houses and imperialists” where no law of this country can be applied.
* The Maoists claim to have created ‘liberated zones’ where an alternate system of governance is in existence. The’ liberated zones’ are reported to be in the interior areas of Abujhmad and Dantewada. Their judicial system of Jan Adalats is quite well known.
* The CPI (Maoist) is a highly militarized organization. Not only it has acquired highly sophisticated weapons, it has developed capability to manufacture rockets, IEDs, landmines, munitions etc.
* Their attacks on the security forces reflect a high level of training. Earlier, Bhupathi a senior politbureau member had indicated the need to learn from the tactics of LTTE. In accordance with the decision of the 9th Unity Congress they have taken the guerrilla warfare to a higher level of ‘mobile warfare’, while simultaneously continuing the guerrilla warfare operations.

6. Thus, the Maoists follow a comprehensive strategy coordinating all the instrumentalities of revolution: military, political, economic, cultural and psychological-with the ultimate objective of capturing political power through armed struggle. The counter strategy therefore too has to be a multi-dimensional. Each dimension of the Maoist strategy has to be countered taking into account its main elements and the manner in which the Maoists exploit the situation at a particular location. This would not only involve police action to neutralize their “war machine“ and taking up of development projects for the benefit of the tribes and other weaker sections of the society but also adopting sound principals of good governance to address the genuine grievances of people and launching of an effective psychological campaign to counter the propaganda of Maoists. Hence, the counter strategy should have four planks- police action, developmental activities, effective good governance and psychological campaign. All the four dimensions are equally significant and are to be pursued simultaneously.

7. For this, a well coordinated and integrated strategy at the national level should be worked out aimed both at neutralizing the Maoist military machine and preventing the spread of Maoist influence. The current effort of the MHA to evolve a consensus is a right step. The different approaches of states only result in the movement of Maoists from one state to another. In addition, the Maoists dexterously play the “talk card” to buy time for consolidation. Those who are killing security personnel and innocent civilians have to be treated as criminals. The question is can they be treated differently. Others should be brought to the mainstream through suitable rehabilitation schemes and other policies aimed at “winning over their hearts and minds”. These two different groups of Maoists have to be treated differently. Their front organizations, which oppose developmental activities, should be closely watched and their activities should be countered suitably. Only then, we can check their further expansion.

8. Our strategy should also take into consideration those of our actions which had adversely affected the Maoists in the past. Ganapathy, the General Secretary of the CPI(Maoist), had admitted in an interview that the tactics of Andhra Pradesh police and Salwa Judum had considerable adverse impact on the Maoist movement. There is no doubt that our police/security forces have to be trained on the lines of Andhra police force. As this is going to take time, to meet the immediate requirements, experienced and well trained officers from the armed forces should be brought on deputation to police and paramilitary forces. The affected districts should be divided into smaller police districts on the pattern of Punjab for effective police operations. The system recommended by the Kargil Review Committee to ensure steady flow of trained and experienced personnel from armed forces (after 7 years of service) to paramilitary forces should be implemented to strengthen the paramilitary forces. The current capabilities of CRPF are inadequate to deal with the Maoists who today are stronger, better equipped and better organized than ever. A separate wing better trained in this organization needs to be created to deal with experienced and well trained Maoists.

9. As far as Salwa Judum is concerned, it is a good concept. A similar action was taken in Mizoram under Operation Jericho. The villagers were relocated along the roads where protection could be given to them by the armed forces. This substantially contributed in checking the supplies to the insurgents from the villagers. The Salwa Judum system may be reviewed to remove its negative aspects or perceptions. This would also deny recruits to the Maoists- a necessary ingredient to continue the Maoist movement.

A bit about the Author:
S D Pradhan has served as chairman of India's Joint Intelligence Committee. He has also been the country's deputy national security adviser. He was chairman of the Task Force on Intelligence Mechanism (2008-2010), which was constituted to review the functioning of the intelligence agencies.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 22 Jul 2010 08:05

Harkatul Mujahideen terrorist from Pakistan killed in Sopore encounter

Troops of 52 Rashtriya Rifles, 29 Rashtriya Rifles and Sopore police started a search operation at Parray Mohalla in Hygam area of Sopore town. The 24-hour long encounter ended this morning. During search of debris of the house, bodies of two militants were recovered. One of the slain ultras was identified as foreigner, Noman, the self styled chief commander of Harkatul Mujahideen.

Noman was involved in militancy for past six years and was the brain behind fidayeen attack at Lal chowk in the summer capital Srinagar on January 7 this year. Noman was also involved in the killing of one police constable and three CRPF men in Sopore bus stand, mother of a lady SPO and head constable of police in Sopore. The security officials have also held the slain Harkat commander responsible for killing of a local Hizbul Mujahideen commander Basharat Saleem in the month of April this year.

click for full photo....all that's missing is the telltale flower in his long hair

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 24 Jul 2010 16:24

Sample of IA armoured vehicles in Srinagar:

More on the "Takshak" here:
http://www.armorinlaggar.com/armored-pe ... rriers.htm

atreya · Post by **atreya** » 24 Jul 2010 18:02

Which is the lead vehicle in the last pic? It says "Arjun" in the front. Is that some sort of name for the vehicle, like Delhi Police PCRs have "Chetak"?

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 24 Jul 2010 18:08

atreya wrote:Which is the lead vehicle in the last pic? It says "Arjun" in the front. Is that some sort of name for the vehicle, like Delhi Police PCRs have "Chetak"?

Casspir.

Army men usually give individual names to their vehicles. Though I wonder if it is an 'official' practice.

Dilbu · Post by **Dilbu** » 24 Jul 2010 19:06

What are those red flags?

Gaur · Post by **Gaur** » 24 Jul 2010 19:21

^^
These pics are of the recent flag march by IA in J&K. Hence the red flags.

Avik · Post by **Avik** » 24 Jul 2010 19:25

^^^^^^^

Those vehicles are part of the column that are carrying out flag marches. Usually, you have those red flags during Flag Marches.

I guess these photos are from the last couple of weeks when the IA was called in to conduct flag marches in J&K.

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 31 Jul 2010 00:03

@RAHUL... here is what i gathered on COBRA commando Ashish Tiwary's death. He was in the group leading the attack on the Maoist camp in Metala forest. The forces were moving in an arrowhead formation, with the COBRAs leading, regular CRPF personnel on the flanks and state police in between. Ashish was among the first to fire on the Maoist sentries. Six rebels were cut down in the first exchange. 15-20 Maoists tried to sneak out as a small group engaged the forces. Ashish went after them but unknown to him a group of Maoists had outflanked the forces on the left flank to give time to the top guns to escape. They fired on the lead commando and that happened to be Ashish. He was shot in the head. The CRPF and Bengal police have recommended him for a gallantry medal.

Surya · Post by **Surya** » 31 Jul 2010 00:17

thanks pmund

Raja Bose · Post by **Raja Bose** » 31 Jul 2010 04:29

pmund, So essentially it seems Ashish Tiwary was killed not during the initial scouting but after contact had been made and some terrorists outflanked part of the police team. The Maoists seem to have top notch training in jungle warfare tactics from LTTE (and God knows who else). Hopefully Brig. Ponwar's school in Chattisgarh is teaching the cops how to avoid falling prey to such tactics and counter ambush drills on how to get out of them.

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 31 Jul 2010 04:55

thanks pmund, how many terrorists escaped ?

also, I saw a picture of the arms recovered, in addition to about half a dozen INSAS and SLR's I think I saw something that looked like a shell, what was it, some kind of IED ?

pmund · Post by **pmund** » 01 Aug 2010 18:06

Rahul, u must have seen some other pic. There were only three service-issue rifles seized -- an Insas (that was carried by Sidhu Soren himself), an SLR and a .303. There were a couple of .315 OFB make (one used by the girl, Mita Karmakar) and two-three countrymade guns. Three pistols and IED making devices were also seized. Ashish, as far as I gather, was not killed at the outset. The first ones to die were the Maoists. Ashish was killed in the second part of the encounter. It is only now that the COBRAs are being used properly in Bengal ops and the results are showing.