I quote a description of Battle of Panipat from Baburnama to see if Artillery had an impact on it :Airavat wrote:All your examples are from much later in history, when both of us are in agreement that Indian cavalry had learned to overwhelm artillery, which is why cavalry reigned supreme in India till the 18th century.peter wrote:Evidence is not strong for your claim. Bunch of examples to the contrary:
The central point is whether artillery was a surprise weapon when first used on the battlefield, and whether it had an impact on the battles of Chaldiran, Panipat, Khanua, and Gogra?
I fail to see how any historian can credit Babur's artillery for his victory at Panipat.(Preparations for battle)
While we were marching on in array of right, left and centre, the army was numbered ; it did not count up to what had been estimated.
At our next camp it was ordered that every man in the army should collect carts, each one according to his circumstances. Seven hundred carts (araba) were brought in. The order given to Ustad 'Ali-quli was that these carts should be joined together in Ottoman fashion, but using ropes of raw hide instead of chains, and that between every two carts 5 or 6 mantelets should be fixed, behind which the matchlock men were to stand to fire. To allow of collecting all appliances, we delayed 5 or 6 days in that camp. When everything was ready, all the begs with such braves as had had experience in military affairs were summoned to a General Council where opinion found decision at this : Pani-pat is there with its crowded houses and suburbs. It would be on one side of us ; our other sides must be protected by carts and mantelets behind which our foot and matchlockmen would stand. With so much settled we marched forward, halted one night on the way, and reached Pani-pat on Thursday the last day (29th) of the second Jumada (April I2th).
(u. The opposed forces)
On our right was the town of Pani-pat with its suburbs ; in front of us were the carts and mantelets we had prepared ; our left and elsewhere were ditch and branch. At distances of an arrow's flight sally-places were left for from 100 to 200 horsemen.
Some in the army were very anxious and full of fear. Nothing recommends anxiety and fear. For why ? Because what God has fixed in eternity cannot be changed. But though this is so, it was no reproach to be afraid and anxious. For why ? Because those thus anxious and afraid were there with a two or three months' journey between them and their homes ; our affair was with a foreign tribe and people ; none knew their tongue, nor did they know ours.
People estimated the army opposing us at 100,000 men ;Ibrahim's elephants and those of his amirs were said to be about 1000. In his hands was the treasure of two forbears. In Hindustan, when work such as this has to be done, it is customary to pay out money to hired retainers who are known as b:d-hindi. If it had occurred to Ibrahim to do this, he might have had another lak or two of troops. God brought it right ! Ibrahim could neither content his braves, nor share out his treasure. How should he content his braves when he was ruled by avarice and had a craving insatiable to pile coin on coin ? He was an unproved brave he provided nothing for his military operations, he perfected nothing, nor stand, nor move, nor fight.
In the interval at Pam-pat during which the army was preparing defence on our every side with cart, ditch and branch, Darwlsh-i-muhammad Sdrbdn had once said to me, "With such precautions taken, how is it possible for him to come?" Said I, "Are you likening him to the Auzbeg khans and sultans? In what of movement under arms or of planned operations is he to be compared with them ?" God brought it right ! Things fell out just as I said !
(v. Preliminary encounters)
During the 7 or 8 days we lay in Pani-pat, our men used to go, a few together, close up to Ibrahim's camp, rain arrows down on his massed troops, cut off and bring in heads. Still he made,no move ; nor did his troops sally out. At length, we acted on the advice of several Hindustani well-wishers and sent out 4 or 5000 men to deliver a night-attack on his camp, the leaders of it being Mahdi Khwaja, Muhammad Sl. Mirza, 'Adil Sultan, Khusrau, Shah Mir Husain, Sl Junaid Barias, 'Abdu'l-'aziz the Master of the Horse, Muh. 'All Jang-jang, Qutluq-qadam, Treasurer Wall, Khalifa's Muhibb-i-'all, Pay-master Muhammad, Jan Beg and Qara-quzl. It being dark, they were not able to act together well, and, having scattered, could effect nothing on arrival. They stayed near Ibrahim's camp till dawn, when the nagarets sounded and troops of his came out in array with elephants. Though our men did not do their work, they got off safe and sound ; not a man of them was killed, though they were in touch with such a mass of foes. One arrow pierced Muh. 'All Jang-jang's leg; though the wound was not 'mortal, he was good-for-nothing on the day of battle.
On hearing of this affair, I sent off Humayun and his troops to go 2 or 3 miles to meet them, and followed him myself with the rest of the army in battle-array. The party of the nightattack joined him and came back with him. The enemy making no further advance, we returned to camp and dismounted. That
night a false alarm fell on the camp ; for some 20 minutes (one gari) there were uproar and call-to-arms ; the disturbance died down after a time.
(Battle of Pani-pat)
(April 20th) On Friday the 8th of Rajab, news came, when it was light enough to distinguish one thing from another (farswaqti) that the enemy was advancing in fighting-array. We at once put on mail, armed and mounted. Our right was Humayun, Khwaja Kalan, Sultan Muhammad Dulddi, Hindu Beg, Treasurer Wali and Pir-quli Sistani; our left was Muhammad Sl Mlrza, Mahdl Khwaja, 'Adil Sultan, Shah Mir Husain, Sl Junaid Barlds, Qutluq-qadam, Jan Beg, Pay-master Muhammad, and Shah Husain (of) YaragI Mughal Ghanchi. The right hand of the centre was Chln-timur Sultan, Sulaiman Mirza, Muhammadi Kukuldash, Shah Mansur Barlds, Yunas-i-'ali, Darwish i-muhammad Sarban and 'Abdu'l-lah the librarian. The left of the centre was Khalifa, Khwaja Mlr-i-miran, Secretary Ahmadi, Tardi Beg (brother) of Quj Beg, Khalifa's Muhibb-i-'ali and Mlrza Beg Tarkhan. The advance was Khusrau Kukuldash and Muh 'All Jang-jang. 'Abdu'l-'aziz the Master of the Horse was posted as the reserve." For the turning-party (tulghuma) at the point of the right wing, we fixed on Red Wall and Malik Qasim (brother) of Baba Qashqa, with their Mughuls ; for the turning-party at the point of the left wing, we arrayed Qara-quzl, Abu'l-muhammad the lanceplayer, Shaikh Jamal Barm's Shaikh 'All, Mahndl(?) and Tmgri-blrdi Bashaght (?) Mughiil\ these two parties, directly the enemy got near, were to turn his rear, one from the right,
the other from the left.
When the dark mass of the enemy first came in sight, he seemed to incline towards our right ; 'Abdu'l-'aziz, who was the right-reserve, was sent therefore to reinforce the right. From the time that Sl. Ibrahim's blackness first appeared, he moved swiftly, straight for us, without a check, until he saw the dark mass of our men, when his pulled up and, observing our formation and array, made as if asking, " To stand or not ? To advance or not ?" They could not stand ; nor could they make their former swift advance.
Our orders were for the turning-parties to wheel from right and left to the enemy's rear, to discharge arrows and to engage in the fight ; and for the right and left (wings) to advance and join battle with him. The turning-parties wheeled round and began to rain arrows down. Mahdi Khwaja was the first of the left to engage ; he was faced by a troop having an elephant with it ; his men's flights of arrows forced it to retire. To reinforce the left I sent Secretary Ahmad! and also Quj Beg's Tardi Beg and Khalifa's Muhibb-i-'all. On the right also there was some stubborn fighting. Orders were given for Muhammadi Kukuldash, Shah Mansur Barlas, Yunas-i-'all and 'Abdu'l-lah to' engage those facing them in front of the centre. From that same position Ustad 'All-quli made good discharge of firing! shots ; Mustafa the commissary for his part made excellent discharge of zarb-zan shots from the left hand of the centre. Our right, left, centre and turning-parties having surrounded the enemy, rained arrows down on him and fought ungrudgingly. He made one or two small charges on our right and left but under our men's arrows, fell back on his own centre. His right and left hands (qul) were massed in such a crowd that they could neither move forward against us nor force a way for flight.
When the incitement to battle had come, the Sun was spear high ; till mid-day fighting had been in full force ; noon passed, the foe was crushed in defeat, our friends rejoicing and gay. By God's mercy and kindness, this difficult affair was made easy for us ! In one half-day, that armed mass was laid upon the earth. Five or six thousand men were killed in one place close to Ibrahim. Our estimate of the other dead, lying all over the field, was 15 to 16,000, but it came to be known, later in Agra from the statements of Hindustanis, that 40 or 50,000 may have died in that battle.
The foe defeated, pursuit and unhorsing of fugitives began. Our men brought in amirs of all ranks and the chiefs they captured ; mahauts made offering of herd after herd of elephants. Ibrahim was thought to have fled ; therefore, while pursuing the enemy, we told off Qismatal Mirza, Baba chuhra and Bujka of the khasa-tdbin to lead swift pursuit to Agra and try to take him. We passed through his camp, looked into his own enclosure (sardcha) and quarters, and dismounted on the bank of standing-water (qard-su). It was the Afternoon Prayer when Khalifa's younger brotherin-law Tahir Tlbriji who had found Ibrahim's body in a heap of dead, brought in his head.
It would seem this was a classic mongol battle, technique used that was perfected by Genghis Khan and his mongol hordes (even earlier used by the Huns also), whereby the archers on horseback came within arrow target distance discharged arrows and retreated followed by another wave and repeat. Artillery is mentioned casually in a couple of sentences. Also the tying of carts as a defence was not an ottoman innovation. Rather the Goths had used it against Romans very effectively. See here for a description of the Goth wagon wheel created from their bullock carts: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... _of_battle
Would anyone know why historians credit artillery for Babur's victory at Panipat? What about the matchlock men he is supposed to have used? Were matchlocks reliable in that epoch?
Also near Panipat it is just plain land. I find it interesting that Babur mentions that Ibrahim's army was cramped to move. A similar description is also used for Jaswant Singh's army at Dharmat. Is this an idiom or a template that was used by mughals in describing the opposing army?
. In the battles of Panipat with I. Lodi and Khanua with R. Sanga artillery was of minimal or no impact. Babur's memoirs say this very clearly. Some modern scholars are also beginning to understand this point.
Thanks for the detailed reply Airavat ji should go into the Good Posts thread.