Bharat Rakshak

me too..me too...danke!!!

read few pages..very interesting...danke shon...

Meanwhile R. Prasanan, writes in The Week:

Dragon's Teeth



The analogy of Dragon's Teeth is to that in Greek mythology of Jason and the argonauts. The dragon's teeth spout armed soldiers where they are sown.

If his above report is correct assessment, than it means India needs to increase the troop presence in J&K. Withdrawing AFSPA etc are non-starters.

<clapping>..very nice write up by Prasanan...seemed like Tom Clancy's stint..

OT here...I have to admit that this Kashmir violence will help India build up its troops presence in the valley as a reinforcement...AFSPA will never go...BJP will tear chidu's lungi if that happens.

nice read, indian media should give more coverage to these views. May be its a long ask but
Pakistan, China must leave Gilgit-Baltistan

The chinese and pakis have seriously been making too many dubious moves when it comes to our territory. Reminds me of a telugu quote"sommu okkadidhi sokku inkokkadidhi"

Good proverb. We did a real mistake of not giving couple of RS and LS nominated members from POK when they requested us.

Finally, some plain speaking and interesting nuggets of information. And lot of hyperbole.

From the article:



So, please put the worry of Chinese suddenly emerging from shadows and from behind rocks to overwhelm the IA. I will even take 48hours notice for Mechanized Division with a pinch of salt. To begin with, what is the definition of 'into Tibet' here? And from where? We're talking here about hundereds of tanks and APC and mobile and towed artillery. Unless, these troops are sitting in heart of tibet and on constant standy and at some comfortable distance (that is not too long) from their final deployment locations, those 48hours is an absurd figure. Case in point - look at the locations of PA Strike Elements, distance from border, wonderful lines of communication, short distance from where to recall troops and time to mobilize.

And as for 10 Divisions in a month into Tibet - we can match that. And which also means that these will be followed very closely. You cannot hide 10 Divisions in Tibet. But what about the acclimatization? And one assumes that there are forward dumps for 10 Division worth of troops. POL+rations+stores. Good good. Nice targets for the IAF and IA missiles.

As for the airlift, what is the timeframe of dropping a Division worth of Paratroopers? A brigade worth of drop is still a good capability, though. Something we lack.



Only djinn power or Han equivalent can do this feat. Four Divisions in a day anywhere? Sure, moon is made of green cheese.



How does transporting 50K men same as transporting 250K men and material? And there were reports of major snags in this very exercise. Will dig up the link.



Contradicts himself.



He has mixed up the numbers completely.

Earlier IV Corps had 21/5/2 Mountain Divisions. III Corps had only 57 Mountain Division.

Post new raisings and realignment of AOR, IV Corps has 21/5/55(new) Mountain Division. III Corps has 2/56(new)/57 Mountain Division. XXXIII in Sikkim has 17/20/27 Mountain Divisions. 23rd ID based in Ranchi should be considered as given in case of conflict. That is 10 Mountain/Infantry Divisions. Plus, the news about Mountain Strike HQ for NE - this will add at least another two more Divisions. IMO, III Corps is more for defence of Eastern AP and Burma border.

Could the stone-pelters have PRC support by any means? Looking at them raging about k oran burning in US?

They would however not show their hand openly. They are probably pulling the strings through Rawalpindi.

But throwing stones at acts in US will cause displeasure in US. Wont the Hurriats funding be cut off? Can someone analyze the envoy's speech to discern any changes?

^^^^
unlikely h..rats funding will be cut off.
the book burning event is a one off event. Any faithfool will gladly meet his 72 for this. easy to instigate and difficult to prevent in the abduls. it is a certain no go areas of cooperation.

The moment someone makes a demand of augmenting autonomy by moving "foreign policy" into state subject of JK, that is when the red line would have been crossed. Someone is trying to replicate the Nepal model here.

Till now, the Kashmir issue has received only limited attention by Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM). Probably a conscious effort is being made to align the 'Kashmiri Azaadi' movement to Global Jihad. Pakistan could have thought, that that is the only way, Pakistan can get more help from other Muslim nations.

An effort is being made to fuse the two together - Global Islamism and Pakistani Nationalism. Another aspect is that Pakistan has been only been able in a very limited way to recruit Indian Muslims for terrorism in India. Kashmiri Muslims are a group, over which Pakistan has a larger influence, and considering that they live within the borders of India, it would be far easier to use them for terrorism within India than infiltrating Pakjabis for the cause. Mumbai 26/11 received a lot of attention and the culpability reached the doors of Pakistan. This time Pakistanis are looking for terrorism in India where KMs are held responsible.

Moreover, Kashmiri Nationalism was found to be wanting as a call - the Azaadi slogan seemed to have lost its strength. So it was deemed important that KMs are totally radicalized and Wahhabized so that they can be better used.

PRC may or may not have supported the plan.

Dark days lie ahead, because GoI allowed the Wahhabization to take place unhindered.

Our own Neros remain quite as Rome burns.

Very sad to see lack of basic leadeship at this blatent provocation. Perhaps strategic silence to deny any chance for the opponent to consolidate.

I hope the leadership is think hard and long on the bharatiya-interests that made them what they are today.

Bharat has done aranyavas for 12yrs followed by 1 yr ajnatavas since 1998. Time has come for Partha to show his valor as Uttarakumara falters.

On the contrary it will only vindicate the stand taken by massa based Dhimmis (who have mixed up liberty/freedom with appeasement). Hurriyat's funding comes from non gobmint based organizations (Hawala being a major source) moreover if J&K issue is resolved Unkil will loose out on a major issue which it can exploit to assert itself in the sub continent.

Chinese soldiers in Gilgit-Baltistan

That terrain does not look so formidable at all to conquer and lay siege to, if it indeed is Gilgit-Baltistan.

Bade I have a confession to make
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/wp-content ... 60x276.jpg
http://offroadpakistan.com/pictures/khu ... jerab9.jpg

Now you need to confess to the veracity of the location too, else IA would look like sissies complaining about lack of resources to take over this beautiful flat countryside.

Google chacha gave a better results. Gilgit does not look as bad at all to live in peace and harmony.
http://www.views.pk/gilgit-hunza
http://www.concordiaexpeditions.com/pak ... ilgit.html
http://www.itspakistan.net/pakistan/gal ... er_jpg.htm

That terrain is most probably part of the valley system and the only flat and low lying area (relatively)- the pic has a water body. I'm guessing it is a river.

All the major towns in these areas - starting from Leh to Shyok to Skardu to Gilgit are located in these valleys.The problem is reaching these valley floors. They are surrounded by steep mountains along all side. Any conflict in these high areas is basically jumping from one town/valley to another and along the course of the rivers and certain mountain passes. It makes the approaches predictable as well as restricts the concentration of troops and material which can be moved.

Please see the location of Skardu here:

http://wikimapia.org/#lat=35.3117634&lon=75.5845642&z=11&l=0&m=b&search=skardu

Follow the Skyok river from Skardu eastwards and you'll see that one enters Indian Turtok Sector and thence, Nubra Valley and Thoise. Similarly, if you follow Indus River in South-East direction (which meets Shyok river short of Skardu), you'll make your way to Leh along the Indus River Valley. Troops in Batalik Sector ( on this route) guards this entry into Leh. As you follow the Indus, another route branches off to Kargil via Shingo River, which is tributary of Indus and flows along the Kargil Town. All these routes were taken by PA in 1947-48 to attack the Kargil, Nubra Valley and Leh garrisons.

So folks are posting psy-ops pix to score points?

Posting psy ops to make a point, not score a point. That is a pretty good photoshop job. Nobody would have known if I had said nothing and this point scoring comment would not have appeared.

Selig Harrison's writing is denied by Pakistan and is believed by others. One photograph of Chinese soldiers in the area would be a psy ops victory.

India has humint in the area and I believe that if Chinese soldiers started making inroads we would certainly have more info - so I personally don't know what to make of what Harrison says.

However - photographs and psy ops could cause anger in Pakistan/POK and that is what I would like to see. In fact I believe that it is essential for members of the Google earth community to post family photographs of Mount Golapankutty in North Arunachal Pradesh/ Han Occupied Tibet- but that is OT here.

Bade once you get to 5000 meters all looks nice. It's getting there that is the issue. The location of the mountains is Google - Khunjerab.
Karakoram highway
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nq8_txPcZR4

Shiv, for sure one look at wikimaps or google earth shows the relative gradients like mandlebrot's fractals. So yes there are steep inclines in places, but large flat valleys even if at 5000+m above msl with human settlements to be viable. So it cannot be as bad as even Siachen or any glacier points.

RohitVats says the valleys were used by Pakistan to reach close to Kargil/Leh with even less sophisticated equipment 60 years ago, so the reverse can also be done albeit with lack of element of surprise needed, but hopefully supported by overwhelming air power.

One of the things I was told (during and after the Kargil war) by my late cousin Wingco Suresh is that the "heights" between India and Pakistan can be reached from the Pakistan side by relatively gentler slopes that allow yaks/pack animals higher. On the Indian side the fall is steep - and so the climb too is steep - and hence the difficulty faced by the Indian army in Kargil. It is just a geographical quirk that both sides are not symmetrically steep/sloping. Will try and find online links for this info..

Something that bothers me about this relative incline being asymmetric, is that the direction seem to be all wrong. We learn from school days that most rivers originate in the mountains and flow to the plains.

In the case of rivers that originate in the PoK areas, it flows westwards to drain into the Arabian sea, unlike the major rivers that run through the Indian plains which originate in the eastern part of J&K. Hence, the local incline as we move west along the valleys at least must be favorable to us. For the Pakis to get to Kargil/Leh in '48 must have been an uphill walk against the gradient, no ?

Kargil war of recent times was different as the fights were to capture the peaks. Maybe, the strategy to retake PoK should to be avoid the peaks and go the valley way. The peaks are to be pulverized using air-power.

peaks are only held for observation purposes, so that artillery and air power can be directed onto troops on the low lying areas. highly effective as we have seen in the kargil case

the valleys almost always will have a choke point, perhaps a narrowing of the mountains, perhaps a river crossing. any penetration in strength will have to pass through these choke points. any approaches will have to come over passes or narrow roads

defending these is considerably easier than taking them, especially if you have moved in armour or materials for strong defensive positions. the high altitude restricts or prevents helicopter movement, infantry flanking attacks means physically climbing over very difficult mountain terrain, where resupply of critical ammunition becomes a problem

whilst the 1947-48 mujahids did indeed advance along here, i doubt very much if these were strongly contested. it appears that they advanced rapidly by sweeping past 'police units' and then paused to loot and rape baramulla, and then a nunnery outside srinagar. that in itself provided the window for the IA airlift to reach srinagar and consolidate defences

Lalmohan saar, thank you for highlighting the difficulties in these hi-alt operations succinctly. This is what I was alluding to in my posts earlier.

If you observe the language used to describe any sector in these areas - the word complex is used. As in a system of interlinked features. The Valley floor and mountains and ridges around it. The defender can and will sit in high ridges around these valleys to prevent you from passing through and outflanking him. And you will have to fight uphill to get the enemy to vacate these ridges dominating the valley floors.



There were not more than 1000 PA troops and iirc, mostly from Gilgit Scouts. I will write more on this later.

Bade - look at the river origin map below.

The rivers originate in Himachal Pradesh. Not Kashmir. The Northern rivers (Indus/Shyok) stay in the high mountains as the descend westwards onto POK.

The peaks overlooking Kargil are an uphill walk from Pakistan. They are an uphill climb from India. The peaks are the same, The approach from the west happens to have more gentle slopes and paths. Supplies are easier from Pakistan.

In 1947-48 the attacks on Srinagar were part of Op Gulmarg with lashkars imported from NWFP. But for Kargil it was the locals - the Gilgit scouts.



Larger image
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... _river.svg

there can be zero appreciation of military operations without a solid understanding of physical geography
at the macro and micro levels

^ No one is denying that fact. But complete emphasis on geography is also equally unnecessary, given the unalterable nature of geography. Didn't PRC/PAK overcome the difficulty of terrain in building and maintaining KKH against high odds. If this region is important to Indian Interests it is worth the price.

NA covers >72,000 Sq.KM area and I am highly confident that IA can find suitable strategy to surmount the challenges and achieve victory.

Beyond a call for specialized equipment and sound strategy (both operational and logistical) the geography cannot be an excuse for the intention and preparedness given the geopolitical importance of this theater.

the most effective way is to cut the supply lines from the plains to the mountains

Probably. But that would amount to offensive attacks and Paquis would respond in the same way they would in case of a all-out war.

This issue has to be tackled from multiple angles. Geopolitical, strategic, trade, diplomatic, military etc., The military component is crucial as it gives the necessary backbone to all other channels.

^^^ "ugly stability"
thats what has basically prevented a full blown Sino-Indian conflict for the past few decades

How will they be different from existing SF, except added with ideology. Like the Revolutionary/Republican Guards that are typically needed to defend a 'revolution'.


I do not think IA is in awe of TSPA, or ever was, the reasons for caution are alive in the mil history forum the issues of acquisitions.

To put it in brief, the inherent problem with fanatics is that they they suffer from errors in judgement.

Also, history of warfare is more of leaders that did not heed to caution than those who did. If is understood what is at stake, the need for caution,  will be appriciated. 

Also, the families understand what soldiers signed up for, so nobody is under any illusions, what they expect is, that they do not die needlessly, unnecessarily or carelessly. It is most important the soldiers were given the tools/ equipment/ protections to succeed to beign with. GOI can at any point can say 'SNAFU! beam me up, scotty'.


War does mean casualties. There is nothing worng in the expectation that every other option has been rightfully execrised in the process. The question is not restricted to asking from WKKs, battle plans might be a go /no go on the basis of this analysis. OTOH, to not ask this question before everytime would raise serious red flags.  

Also, keep in mind, there no option for GOI to enforce it's will, as a last resort, beyond IA. To the people with linkages to the services, please, be careful in what is stated, in an accessible forum like BR. Just because a question has been asked, doesn't mean it has to be given a perfect response.

Lastly, I realise, from the various statements that there is a conflict of the vision of India itself, and that it will continue. 

(Ramana sir, added as requested. I was making observations based on the general flow of comments of the thread and directed to all, not just to brihaspati or RamaY. Thanks.)

^ManuT, Please try to include who you are quoting. The thread moves so fast it become difficult to figure out whom you are replying to.

ramana ji,
he is responding to my post.

Fanaticism and "fanatics" are different - one is an ideological state, while other is a permanent feature in an individual. Certain forms of fanaticism can rest in the moment and in a group environ only. But it does seem that a degree of ideological commitment can add an edge when complete elimination and erasure is intended of an enemy.

Ideally the armed forces of a country should reflect the majority sentiments of the country, but in Indian history there has been times when such reflections were not automatically obvious as in the BIA. An esteemed officer in this forum once strongly presented the case that IA has to be a "professional" army which only takes orders from the elected government. But more than that in the course of that debate what emerged was the perception that IA is somehow "different" from the types of "communal divisions" and fissures that apparently exist in the civilian population. So obviously the army thinks and acts on a different note to the general population.

I formally understand the formal logic of "professionalism" quite well, which practically amounts to ignoring or suppressing any ideological considerations in carrying out what the hard and cold objectives have been stated as by the superior command. As you point out that GOI can enforce its authority on the IA and also that IA is the ultimate instrument it can use to fortify its own position.

Therefore I had proposed exploring alternatives to asking and planning for the IA to go into domains for which they have not been given the resources and for which the GOI is not politically prepared - here on this forum. It is putting too much of pressure on a relationship that has worked very well so far. I do not see why seeking to prevent loss of professional soldier's lives is a bad thing anyway. SF is a small proportion of the total outlay. To eliminate Pak one may need something much larger. To prevent Pak from ever reviving the complete dismantling of its ideological apparatus has to be undertaken which may mean elimination of theologians and their functionaries. That probably will need also an ideological commitment to overcome "neutrality" considerations. Moreover a professional army within its internationally recognized operational framework cannot carry out that ideological agenda. Hence the question of "ideologically committed".

I don't understand the problem in not wanting to force one mindset on a completely different one, and create impossible stresses.

The caution and no-caution debate can go on for ages. But OT for this thread.

I was intrigued by the comment on ideological commitment for the armed forces. We can explore it in GDF.

Also Bji I have a question for you in nukkad.

Nothing much to explore saar.

It will mirror that of the general population, warts and all.

This is however a very dangerous road to go casually wandering on. Interested lurkers will cherry pick and quote out of context as is their wont.

This topic is strictly avoided in the Armed Forces and IMVHO it should be avoided here too.

Your call.

Ok.