Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch

[Satya_anveshi]

Hope Is Not a Strategy

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Looking at the global security situation today, do you see greater chances for peace or do you see more wars?
Jones: This is a very historical time we are living in and we had a century-defining moment...

SPIEGEL ONLINE: ...the 9/11 attacks.
Jones: Now we understand better the various threats we face -- the threat of climate change, of our energy sources, the threat that terrorism brings, a world in which the haves and the have nots are more starkly defined than before. The poor countries are striving to rise into the globalized world and, I believe, the developed nations are beginning to understand that if they don't address their issues seriously, these countries may be the Afghanistans and Pakistans and Iraqs of the future.

Why is this inbreeder talking about irrelevent things in the context of 9/11? I think the follow up question to him should have been, are you saying 9/11 was an inside job?

[Johann]

Started reading Woodward's book. First chapter is mostly BRF stuff but is maslafied to impress new President.

Lets see where the beginning begins.

Reason why I say is to call it Obama's War is wrong. Its GW Bush, Clinton, Bush Sr, Reagan and even Carter's war. For it all started with peacenik Jimmy Carter egging Bhutto to destabilize the Afghan dictatorship.

Jimmy Carter: Starting the fire in Afghanistan

Ramana,

Carter was sworn in in January 1977 and Bhutto was deposed in July 1977; they did not really overlap in power.

Afghanistan was a non-issue for the Americans until the April 1978 "Saur Revolution" led by communist Afghan Army officers. Even so the Carter administration did not attempt any sort of confrontation with them - Carter was still in his Dovish phase but that changed in the next year.

They were not really drawn in until jihadis kidnapped the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, Adolph Dubs in February 1979 - he was killed in the botched DRA attempt to rescue him.

The Khalq faction of the Afghan communist party in power at this time was very violently anti-American in their rhetoric, and some people in the administration, especially Brzezinski became convinced that this whole thing was an execution that had been engineered by the KGB and carried out by the Afghan communists. Its after that point that they start to talk to the Pakistanis about what might be done together against both the Afghan communist government and their Soviet advisors.

The real irony is that it is possible that the PA/ISI might well have been one to have supported the kidnapping - after all they allowed their allies in the Jamaat-e-Islami to attack US diplomatic facilities all over Pakistan and burned the embassy down to the ground 9 months later in November.

The PA at this point had real problems with the US, and with Carter in particular; he had placed nuclear sanctions on Pakistan over Kahuta, and had supported the isolation of Pakistan over Bhutto's sham trial and execution.

The PRC on the other hand committed to Zia well before the Americans, and far less hesitatingly. There were PLA guerilla warfare experts training Afghans in FATA and NWFP camps by the end of 1978.

[svenkat]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Linda_Norgrove

The article may be deleted soon.

Within 24 hours of her abduction, contact was made with a group claiming responsibility.[17] Mohammed Osman, a Taliban commander, and other Taliban commanders reportedly insisted Norgrove would be handed over only in exchange for Pakistani Aafia Siddiqui, called "Lady al-Qaeda". They tried to use Norgrove as a bargaining chip to secure the release of Siddiqui, who had been sentenced to jail for 86 years in the U.S. in September 2010 for the attempted murder of U.S. agents and soldiers

Linda Norgrove, a British aid worker, was taken hostage in Afghanistan in September 2010. On 8 October 2010 she was killed

IT is now acknowledged that she was killed by US forces while they were trying to rescue her and not by her captors.

Dear Johann,

Should Britain now invade the US for the 'lapse' of its security forces?

Your marvellous reasoning was just about as convincing.

[Kapil]

Guys,

I am sorry if this has been discussed before but I am thinking about this question:

Looking at the present turmoil in the Af-Pak region, when will it become imperative for India to wade into Afghanistan with a peacekeeping and stabilizing force? And lose blood?
And,what are the best contours for an engagement like this? Unilateral? US-Nato led? Afghan invitation? And what kind of an action can trigger our involvement there?

Remember,we are content to let soldiers die in UN ops. More questions later.



I will be cross-posting this on other threads .Mods feel free to prune and set up a new thread for this if reqd.

Cheers

Kaps

[RajeshA]

Looking at the present turmoil in the Af-Pak region, when will it become imperative for India to wade into Afghanistan with a peacekeeping and stabilizing force? And lose blood?

There is not going to be any 'peacekeeping' or 'stabilization' force for Afghanistan from India. If the Americans could not make a dent there even after pumping in 355 billion USD and with 1323 US soldiers dead, why would India want to do that?! That is where one goes if one has utmost national interests on the line or one has a death wish. It is easy to go in, but far more difficult to come out.

And,what are the best contours for an engagement like this? Unilateral? US-Nato led? Afghan invitation? And what kind of an action can trigger our involvement there?

No contours. No engagement. No involvement.

Remember,we are content to let soldiers die in UN ops. More questions later.

Nobody is content to let our soldiers die. Where ever we send our forces, we see to it that it is not a place where they would be targeted simply for being Indians.

[Pratyush]

the only way going into Afghanistan will make sense will, if India goes all berserk and demonstrates to the elements which support the Taliban, that, any support for the Taliban will result in a complete erasure of the local population.

If India is not going to think in those terms then don't even think about going into Afghanistan.

JMT

[ramana]

Two posts....

Chopping up India into small little pieces is the wet-dream of the West,that is the rogue elements within western establishments,those who want to "contain" India,etc.,etc.Right from Independence,the idea was that India would have Hyderabad,Travancore and J&K as independent entities within the new Indian union,entities which with western infleunce would be enough to "contain" India on three sides of the compass,with the Portugese in Goa being the fourth.We well know of the insidious attempts to bring about this scenario whcih was foiled in the main by Patel and Nehru.Having two halves of Pak also hemming in India both on the east and west,with little Ceylon amenable-or so they thought,remaining a WOG bastion,India would be encircled with states friendly to the west in the post WW2 scenario.We now know from released western documents that the Soviet threat was a gigantic fraud,Stalin had no idea at all of "conquering" Europe,which enabled the US to begin the Cold War,a means of "containing" Russia and its republics in the SU.

However,using Pak as a "chisel",the attempt to prise away J&K by fomenting internal insurgency has been a plot with two godfathers,the Paki establishment,still burning with a desire to extract revenge for '71 and Bangaldesh-this was amply revealed in the interviews with Mush-a-rat and the attempts of the west who have long been advocating that the GOI succumb to the Hurriyat's wishes.The "bad cop" is Pak ,which uses the gun and the "good cop" is the west-US mainly,which wants the "soft option" of the Hurriyat to do their needful later on when we succumb to pressure from all sides.It is on record that the US wanted an independent J&K as a base,so that they could launch their ops into China and the Islamic republics of the SU.

Now the interesting fact to emerge from Gen.Bandicoot's interviews is the so-called failed "deal" that he and ABV almost achieved.Some time ago,I met a prominent Paki man in the know,who told me that the verminous mastermind of Kargil had almost achieved his goal at Agra.The "commando" revealed as much in the interview,that he wanted "an open border",making the LOC "nonexistant" between POK and IHK (Indian Held Kashmir as the pakis/army call it),where Pak would have a say in the governing of the Valley! he said that india was finding it difficult to "make adjustments" also on the border.Thus the verminous scoundrel wanted to achieve across the table-with western pressure upon India,what Pak has always failed to achieve on the battlefield.This was one of his main aims when he launched Kargil,to get the west to sit on India's head and compromise on Kashmir.

Now if the LOC was made "open",allowing the Kashmiris to move across it unhindered,it stands to reason that both India and Pak would or could be equal trustees of whatever parts they held (POK and J&K),each looking after security of their two parts as they have done so for decades.But what Mush-a-rat wanted was for India to give up its right to govern the valley exclusively,something that no Indian leader can ever accept as it would be treason of the highest order.In rality,once the Pakis got their nose,sorry...their foot, into the Valley,it would only be a matter of time before the Valley slipped into Paki pockets!

We now have thanks to Mush-a-rat,conclusive evdience if that was ever needed,that to the Paki military,they will never stop trying to prise away J&K from India using any means,especially terror which they say is a legitimate tool to use.In such a situation,it is now incumbent upon the GOI/MEA to lobby foreign govts. to stop all arms sales to Pak which only uses these arms to wage war against India,overtly and covertly.The US especially MUST be told that their foreign policy in the region is immoral,immature and irresponsible,arming Pak to the teeth and expecting them to "play peace" with India! They hope to achieve this with India's weakest ever PM at the helm of India's fioriegn policy,the man who apologetically brought in Baluchistan into the "equation",as if there had to be a trade-off between Indian and Paki terrorism! This expose of the Paki army's everlasting intent,should be a wake-up call for the defence establishment and the PMO which should abandon all "talk of talks" and treat pak as it dseserves as a rogue state that should be "quarantined" diplomatically and militarily.Any country that acts otherwise with Pak,will be trated by India as my enemy's friend and thus by default, our enemy.

and

To get a rather quick glimpse into the colonial arrogance of US in demanding that India compromise its interests, so American interests in AfPak can be secured, read this which has quotes from Christine Fair.

Talking about why the Haqqani network must be defeated and US distate for seeing them in power in Afganisthan

In short, the Haqqani network has a lot of American blood on its hands.

So far so good (never minds that Haqqani network also has Indian blood on his hands). But now, refering to TSP support for these murderous terrorists, what is US position including that of Christine Fair?

So given all this, the logical thing to do might be to focus on the Pakistan-India problem. After all, if you remove Pakistan’s fears of India as a threat, maybe the Pakistanis will stop working against American interests in Afghanistan?

Professor Fair argues that because India is on the ascent, and will be even stronger militarily and economically in 10 years than it is now, the Indian government has no reason to negotiate seriously with Pakistan over the host of issues that bedevil the two adversaries now, when it can throw its weight around much easier later.

So how convenient. It is not required to confront TSP to stop supporting the evil that was the very rationale of waging war in AfPak. Rather, since Amercian interests are so supreme, India must give in to the very same evil that US will will not. "Fix" TSP's problems with India. "Focus" on the "threat" India poses to TSP. The condescension is breathtaking and risible were it not so tragic given the damage such a worldview does to India.

This is where I wonder whose side is MMS on? Since he has such a huge fan following in the west, can he not get their ear and explain to the big white boys responsible for AfPak, that the evil US faces, and the evil India has been confronted with past 60+ years is the same. One cannot "fix" the evil, one cannot "focus" on TSP's paranois visa vi India. The evil must be eliminated, lock, stock, and barrel.

[Johann]

IT is now acknowledged that she was killed by US forces while they were trying to rescue her and not by her captors.

Dear Johann,

Should Britain now invade the US for the 'lapse' of its security forces?

Your marvellous reasoning was just about as convincing.

Sarcasm is good, but careful reading and thinking is better. My post was not about what 'should' happen in an ideal world, but how things played out in the world we live in. I regard the sequence of events as they took place as a tragedy for both Afghanistan and the world at large.

Now for your hypothetical - If the US and UK were in a titanic global struggle with each other for 50 years, then the mutual suspicions about a tragic accident involving a citizen - and this was an ambassador the country's official representative, not a random NGO worker - could indeed spark a spillover of conflict to a new theatre. That is the paranoia that protracted mutual conflict brings. I'll pose a hypothetical of my own for you; Imagine for one second if some relatively unknown Maoist faction in Nepal took the Indian ambassador hostage, and he was killed in the rescue effort by a Nepali government that had recently made anti-Indian statements, and on top of that it turned out there were ISI or PLA advisors attached to the rescue unit? What gut conclusions would many Indians draw about who was responsible?

In the case of 'Spike' Dubs death the bigger context was that this was the time when the detente established in 1972 was breaking down, starting with the collapse of dialogue over the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the Warsaw Pact, as well a number of flashpoints all over the world where new communist governments had come to power like Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia followed by large-scale Soviet airlifts of weapons and Cuban troops.

The Soviets for their part did believe that the "correlation of forces" had changed since American withdrawal from Vietnam, the prevalance of leftist youth movements worldwide, and the election of a dovish Carter, and that detente would be preserved even if they pushed forward a little bit. Carter had run for election in 1976 on the basis of de-escalating the Cold War. He argued that detente was durable, which he took to mean that the Soviets had an interest in preserving the status quo; right-wing Republicans like Goldwater and Democrats like Henry Jackson had mocked such ideas as naive. Carter's transformation from dove to hawk had much to do with feelings that he had in fact been naive and taken advantage of, and so the pendulum swung the other way. Unfortunately although Carter has been a genuine advocate for peace in his retirement, he has been hypocritical in glossing over his hawkish 1979-1980 phase.

After the Cold War officials and academics from both sides working together have got together to try to understand what was going on, and its clear a similar kind of thing was going on in Moscow, only more so. The Americans assumed the Soviets were instigating the radicalism of the radical Pashto speaking Khalq faction of the Afghan communist Party, but the Soviets were having such trouble getting obedience from the Khalqis radical-left interpretation of communism that they started to assume that Amin, the head of the Khalq must have become an American agent when he studied in Columbia, never mind he was a student radical in the days when students at Columbia were busy marching against everything and burning American flags.

In other words, both superpowers were radically wrong in their interpretations of local and regional events, seeing them as manifestations of the other's 'hidden hand' and projecting them as part of the global struggle. In both cases superpower intervention without meaning to ended up enabling the most radical local elements - the Soviets with the Khalq, and later the Americans with Hekmatyar. While the superpowers both paid a huge price, its nothing compared to the price paid by the Afghans.

Some of the lessons I would draw is that;
a) There is a strong streak of radicalism endemic in the Pashto speaking areas, which can express itself in ANY ideology, whether communism, Islamism or Afghan nationalism. Ideological mentors will often be unable to control how that radicalism manifests itself.

b) Pakistan learned under Zia back in 1979 that encouraging its Islamist allies to attack the USG pays very well, and is the only way to get nuclear sanctions lifted.

c) Be very, very careful about drawing local events in to a larger state-driven pattern.

[svenkat]

Johann,
It is obvious that I did not mean seriously what I wrote.

You were trying to suggest that the murder of US Ambassador was the final straw for hawks like Brezizinski.While at the same time suggesting ISI might have been the real culprit.

Surely the Americans must have tried to find those who were behind the murder.A little bit of googling shows that Time(an American mouthpiece) called it a perverse tragedy-Islamists murdering the US ambassasdor to show opposition to Soviets.

And men like Brezizinski with history going to Poland etc needed little reason to tie Soviets down.There were other Cold war reasons which we need not go into.

You very definetely suggested that the West and Americans were innocent bysstanders who were pulled in by rhetoric and an assasination.I will leave it at that.There was cold war logic,nothing less.

My sarcasm was directed at you because India faces collateral damage and has faced collateral damage from Paki delusions which has tacitly been supported by West all along.You will feign ignorance assuming a pretentious neutrality.So,it is not this one post.

America plays a cold game to protect its interests,based on its morality,world view and perceived self interests.I and you are nondescript indviduals who matter zilch in this game.Because this is BRF and unless the moderators restrain me,I have every right to call your weasel stuff which ignores the Wests perfidy(in our view),glosses over the real motives of TSPA and its benefactors.

Ofcourse,no personal offense meant.

[Johann]

You were trying to suggest that the murder of US Ambassador was the final straw for hawks like Brezizinski.

...You very definetely suggested that the West and Americans were innocent bysstanders who were pulled in by rhetoric and an assasination.I will leave it at that. America plays a cold game to protect its interests,based on its morality,world view and perceived self interests.

Actually, no. Please read my two posts together, and Ramana's post before it. I was talking about both Carter specifically, and his administration as a whole which was elected in part on a commitment to easing Cold War tensions. It actually didn't have many hawks, nor was it well disposed to Pakistan.

- Carter had a huge political investment in detente; Brzezinski was pretty much on the sidelines until Carter came to believe the Soviets were taking him for a fool somewhere in the middle of his first term. He came to believe the same thing about revolutionary government in Iran as well after its proxies took the US embassy hostage and negotiations went nowhere.

- People *are* emotionally affected when a colleague is killed, and they do blame people. US diplomats on the ground had pleaded with the Afghan interior ministry not to attempt a rescue since they doubted their ability to succeed; they agreed but carried out the operation anyway, apparantly on the advice of their KGB advisors. Dubs was well known and liked within the State Department, and his death did have an effect, especially when taken together with the erosion of the civility of detente era interaction between the Soviets and Americans. When the Afghan communists took power in 1978 the Carter administration did not cut off aid (administered by the State Dept.) to Afghanistan, or treat it as a hostile state in the spirit of detente. That changed immediately after the Dubs affair. The Afghan Communist state was treated as hostile from that point on.

Although policy over the long term is more structural, emotions can and do affect analysis and policy at critical junctures.

There was cold war logic,nothing less

The breakdown of detente is something I've already pinpointed as the source of mutual suspicion, but this suspicion has a reality-distorting effect that can dangerously skew sensible calculations of what national interests really are.

Do you *really* think that getting involved in Afghanistan served EITHER superpower's interests? Or did they both let paranoia get the better of them? Is paranoia not an emotion?

The reality was that local players like Iran, Pakistan and the various Afghan factions were pursuing their own agendas, while the superpowers only saw each other.

What made the Americans get involved in 1979? The idea that the Soviets had built anti-American government. What got the Soviets deeply involved in Afghanistan? The idea that the Americans had used Iran and the ultra-left Khalq to build an anti-Soviet government. They were both completely wrong, and yet completely convinced at the top.

Surely the Americans must have tried to find those who were behind the murder.

You mean who was behind the kidnapping; you would be surprised. Never mind the kidnapping, torture and murder of William Buckley, the CIA Chief of Staff in Beirut. Many signs pointed to Hezb'allah acting on Iranian orders but instead the USG chose to pursue the Iran-Contra deal.The Americans have never found or named who actually ordered the destruction of their embassy in Beirut in 1982, or the USAF barracks in Dhahran in 1995.

The Americans had virtually no intelligence assets in Afghanistan at the time - that's how much of a backwater it was, and relations with Pakistan were difficult.

The Khalq faction of the Afghan communist government claimed that the group that carried out the kidnapping was the Tajik Setam-i-Milli, and they blamed not the Pakistanis, but the Parcham faction of the Party who they claimed were allied with the group. The Parchamis were the faction closer to Moscow.

India faces collateral damage and has faced collateral damage from Paki delusions which has tacitly been supported by West all along

The Carter administration had a *very* poor relationship with Pakistan, one that was borderline hostile, even after Ambassador Dubs killing in February. Nuclear sanctions were imposed on April 1979.

So hostile in fact that there was an NY Times story on 12 August 1979 that reported that the Carter administration was considering military options against Kahuta. The Pakistanis took it seriously enough to deploy Crotale SAMs to the site.

So blaming the Soviets certainly did not automatically and instantly translate in to cooperation with Pakistan in Afghanistan.

This is not a question of 'glossing over' anything - instead I think everyone ought to really look at events to understand just how weird the US-Pakistani relationship has been since Bhutto and Zia, and the specific ways it interacted with the larger Cold War.

You will feign ignorance assuming a pretentious neutrality.So,it is not this one post...Because this is BRF and unless the moderators restrain me,I have every right to call your weasel stuff which ignores the Wests perfidy(in our view),glosses over the real motives of TSPA and its benefactors.

Oh yes, I can see there's no chance of me pulling the wool over your eyes! Well its a dashed good thing there's so many people here to expose me for what I *really* am!

I do love the people who are convinced that there are no such things as honest differences of opinion on the forum, or that decision-makers always know exactly what they are doing with god-like clarity, or that the West is always the most important actor anywhere, or that they're always thinking of India when they do things. How simple the world ought to be! And how frustrating must it be when reality plays to a different script!

p.s. I'd love to know what I glossed over about the Pakistanis

[ShauryaT]

There is not going to be any 'peacekeeping' or 'stabilization' force for Afghanistan from India.

Agreed. But, mostly due to a lack of capability and political will.

If the Americans could not make a dent there even after pumping in 355 billion USD and with 1323 US soldiers dead, why would India want to do that?! That is where one goes if one has utmost national interests on the line or one has a death wish. It is easy to go in, but far more difficult to come out.

Our utmost National Interest is served by keeping Pakistan encircled and by the dominant exploitation of Iran's energy resources. Do you know that every TSP agreement with the US, has a foot print called "No Indian involvement in Afghanistan". Clearly, TSP considers Afghanistan and the denial of space to India in its utmost national interest. To keep Afghanistan stable, it is imperative that Pakistan is broken and the Durand line erased. To keep India stable, it is imperative the TSP's rent seeking real estate is eroded.

And,what are the best contours for an engagement like this? Unilateral? US-Nato led? Afghan invitation? And what kind of an action can trigger our involvement there?

No contours. No engagement. No involvement.

The weak shall not rule the earth!

[RajeshA]

There is not going to be any 'peacekeeping' or 'stabilization' force for Afghanistan from India.

Agreed. But, mostly due to a lack of capability and political will.

No, mostly lack of geographical access, lack of secure supply lines and astute political thinking. Application of military force has to be a well thought out decision. Some open ended engagement in some quick sands of attrition is hardly a wise decision.

If the Americans could not make a dent there even after pumping in 355 billion USD and with 1323 US soldiers dead, why would India want to do that?! That is where one goes if one has utmost national interests on the line or one has a death wish. It is easy to go in, but far more difficult to come out.

Our utmost National Interest is served by keeping Pakistan encircled and by the dominant exploitation of Iran's energy resources. Do you know that every TSP agreement with the US, has a foot print called "No Indian involvement in Afghanistan". Clearly, TSP considers Afghanistan and the denial of space to India in its utmost national interest. To keep Afghanistan stable, it is imperative that Pakistan is broken and the Durand line erased. To keep India stable, it is imperative the TSP's rent seeking real estate is eroded.

By all means, India should be involved. India can train Afghans in their millions and give them financial support to carry out their war in Afghanistan, but India should not send Indian forces into Afghanistan.

And,what are the best contours for an engagement like this? Unilateral? US-Nato led? Afghan invitation? And what kind of an action can trigger our involvement there?

No contours. No engagement. No involvement.

The weak shall not rule the earth!

True, they wouldn't.

But weak are also those who allow themselves to be made weak through senseless and useless wars.

[ShauryaT]

No, mostly lack of geographical access, lack of secure supply lines

So, IOW, if that "capability" exists, you would support Indian involvement and consider it to be worth it?

[RajeshA]

No, mostly lack of geographical access, lack of secure supply lines

So, IOW, if that "capability" exists, you would support Indian involvement and consider it to be worth it?

No, astute political will will rebel against it!

[Pratyush]

Rajesh,

If the political will is astute then there is no reason why India should not go into Afghanistan. If TSP has been pacified. In that I agree with the "western experts". That the road to peace in Afgannistan runs through Islamabad. India must take down TSP and alter the political boundries of the Subcontinent once more. This was done in 71, it has to be done again. India simply has no choice any more.

If it allows the TSP to continue to exist then, it deserves what it gets from the TSP and the west / PRC. The currency of soft power is credible if it is backed up by hard power. There can be no better demonstration of hard power other then the demolition of the TSP.

How that can be accomplished can be debated. But the end result must be accepted. If India is to take a prominant position in the International relations.

Once the TSP is under controll. Controlling Afghanistan become easy.

More over, it also gives us unristricted access to the resource rich CAR. Along with the opportunity of re-establishing the Silk route.

JMT

[ramana]

Well others also thing along the lines of controlling TSP:

MAKE A SOUTH ASIA COMMAND

Bruce Riedel

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... a?page=0,4

South Asia is the epicenter of terrorism and the most dangerous place in the world today: Pakistan is a fragile state with what may be the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal; India is an emerging great power, but one with precarious internal rifts; and Afghanistan is just struggling to survive. Yet the U.S. government is alarmingly unprepared to engage with the region -- even at the most basic organizational level. Instead of treating South Asia as a whole, the U.S. national security establishment has carved it up into an array of parts: In the military, Central and Pacific Commands each have a piece of the region, and, more confusing still, the desks at the State Department and the National Security Council that handle "AfPak" are separate from those that deal with India. This may make the Indians happy -- they don't want to be linked with failing states -- but it makes no sense for the United States.

If Barack Obama is to really get serious about the region, he needs to create an executive bureau for Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan -- one that spans across the U.S. government. Good organization does not guarantee good policy, but a poorly constructed bureaucracy is almost always a recipe for bad policy. A new military command that puts Pakistan and India in the same theater would help enormously in improving U.S. strategic thinking about South Asia. No longer would one commander talk to the Pakistanis and another to the Indians; the Pentagon would have just one voice. And likewise for Foggy Bottom: An empowered assistant secretary of state for South Asia could travel regularly on diplomatic missions between Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

Obama was right to recognize that the Afghan war could not be effectively prosecuted without dealing with Pakistan. But it's foolish to think that Pakistan can be effectively assisted without dealing with the issue that dominates its own strategic calculus: India.

and

CHANGE THE RULES OF THE GAME IN PAKISTAN

Ashley J. Tellis

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2 ... ?page=0,10

Ever since Islamabad reluctantly joined the U.S. campaign against terrorism in 2001, it has consistently pursued a strategy of running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. To this day, Pakistan's security services continue to support various terrorist and insurgent groups -- such as the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, and Hezb-i-Islami -- that attack Afghan and U.S. forces in Afghanistan, even as Islamabad continues to extract large amounts of aid from Washington.

...

Yet both the Bush and Obama administrations have tolerated Pakistan's duplicity with regard to counterterrorism, primarily because the country remains the principal artery for transporting U.S. cargo -- food, water, vehicles -- and fuel delivered to Afghanistan. And, as the recent border closings by Pakistani forces have shown, the Obama administration must implement a Plan B that denies Pakistan the ability to hold the coalition at ransom: It must begin by planning to move larger quantities of supplies through the northern distribution network that runs from Georgia through Azerbaijan, to Kazakhstan, and then Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. Although U.S. forces now receive more supplies through this route than they did before, the dependence on Pakistan is still substantial -- and so consequently is Islamabad's capacity for blackmail.

As a complement to increasing reliance on the northern route, U.S. assistance to Pakistan (totaling roughly $18 billion in civilian and military aid since 9/11) should be tacitly conditioned on Islamabad's meeting certain counterterrorism benchmarks. For starters, all transfers of major military equipment to Islamabad should be contingent on Pakistan ceasing support for militant groups that threaten coalition and national forces in Afghanistan. More extreme (and hopefully unnecessary) options would include expanded drone and air-power operations inside Pakistani airspace. Or -- and this is certain to catch Islamabad's attention -- more open support for Indian contributions to Afghan stability.

The most important problem is that suddenly challenging Pakistan after a decade of acquiescence to its mendacity is tantamount to abruptly changing the rules of a game that Washington and Islamabad have gotten used to: It could result in even greater Pakistani obduracy and further support for its jihadi proxies. Although that is certainly an unpalatable possibility, the bitter truth is that the current state of affairs -- in which Washington indefinitely subsidizes Islamabad's sustenance of U.S. enemies -- poses far greater dangers to the United States. The Obama administration must make the difficult choice now and show Islamabad that the rules of the game have changed.

[Lalmohan]

to get what it wants in afpak and to prevent further attacks on the US homeland, it is in unkil's interest to create as chaotic a civil war in pakistan as possible - and progress the balkanisation
riddle me that ye beltway bandits

[svinayak]

MAKE A SOUTH ASIA COMMAND

Bruce Riedel

]South Asia is the epicenter of terrorism and the most dangerous place in the world today: Pakistan is a fragile state with what may be the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal; India is an emerging great power, but one with precarious internal rifts; and Afghanistan is just struggling to survive. Yet the U.S. government is alarmingly unprepared to engage with the region -- even at the most basic organizational level.

Rumors can be started with such simple sentences and false image and false reality can become an accepted fact.

[svinayak]

to get what it wants in afpak and to prevent further attacks on the US homeland, it is in unkil's interest to create as chaotic a civil war in pakistan as possible - and progress the balkanisation
riddle me that ye beltway bandits

A war between Pakistan and all its neighbors is also acceptable for US policy since this will tie down the Paki resources and its ability to damage US homeland. Even a war with India - Pakistan will put all its resource including civilian into readyness to face the showdown.
This diversion will help the US policy in the region and long term goal of control of region by creating wars and fires.

[abhischekcc]

If the US favors a war between paki and India so much, why do they spend so much time and effort to prevent one??

[Mort Walker]

^^^I don't think unkil favors a war, but to use TSP to checkmate India, then use India to checkmate China. This ensures there are no significant economic or strategic adversaries for unkil in the long term. Or who else will buy their debt to finance the deficit spending lifestyle?

[RajeshA]

Freedom to America Solution

There are many suggestions doing the rounds as to what USA should do in AfPak - the Blackwill Solution, the Biden Solution, etc. From the Indian PoV, what India would like is either

1. America increases the radicalization of Pakistan to such an extent that the Pakistani Taliban and the Pakistani Army get into a good fight, keeping the Jihadis at home and not in Kashmir.
2. America gets into a direct war with the Pakistanis finishing off Pakistani Army for good.

As long as America sits in Afghanistan, this possibility is still open. So India should make use of it. The question is how?

America needs Pakistani cooperation in their GWOT, but they are not getting it. Instead they are getting Pakistanis training and funding the Afghan Taliban to take on American forces in Afghanistan. America wants to retaliate against the sanctuaries in Pakistan but cannot, because of American dependence on supply lines through Pakistan. So America needs to free itself of dependence on Pakistan for land access to Afghanistan.

Here is the deal. India helps America free itself of the dependence on Pakistan for supplies. How?

USA allows India a free hand to trade and deal with Iran. India can build an oil refinery in Iran and in Kazakhstan, and supply petroleum products to Central Asia and Afghanistan. USA builds big gasoline and diesel storage facilities in Northern Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, so that at any given time, it is not dependent on Pakistan. India can supply refined petroleum products to these facilities.

Besides that USA funds construction of railroads and highways in the region with American money, and India does the building. We build a railroad networking Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan in Indian Broad Gauge (1,676 mm). If the Europeans are willing to transfer and give technology to India for high-speed railway, then India could do that in that way also.

Also India helps build the infrastructure for transporting stuff into Afghanistan through the Western route - Turkey (or Greece, Bulgaria, Black Sea), Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan (or Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), Afghanistan. NATO can also use the railroad through Russia.

By allowing India to trade with Iran, India uses the Chahbahar Port and the Zaranj-Delaram Highway to transport non-military material to USA in Indian Trucks plying in Iran.

Why would Iran cooperate? Well it would give them a lifeline if there is a refinery working in Iran. They too get refined petroleum products. Secondly, India and Iran can agree that even though America should not stay in the region for long, it is important that America weakens the Taliban and Pakistan before leaving. There both have similar opinions.

If America becomes independent of Pakistan, America would be far more willing to hit the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura within Pakistan, besides other targets within Pakistan. That would drive America into a clash with the Pakistani Army, only the next time America will not back off and apologize for any drone strikes but only increase them. Should Pakistan ever retaliate, it would mean an all out war and America would finish off the Pakistani Army. I know there are those who don't believe that America would be willing to finish off their rent-boy, but in the heat of losses, one cannot discount out an escalation. Pakistanis tend to brag and threaten more than they can deliver, and may be America calls Pakistan's bluff.

The thing is India can spread her wings more into Central Asia at a time when China is going in there big time, we can keep our relationships with both USA and Iran, and we can get America to destroy TSPA, giving us the possibility to take PoK more easily and deal with a broken up Pakistan.

India needs to get into the game. We have lost all means to influence the going ons in a region very important to us. This could be one way to do that. When Obama comes a calling, may be India can offer some advice, on how to make the American Forces independent of Pakistani pressures.

[ramana]

Writing on the wall in Afghanistan

Thank God the Pakistanis have reopened the Khyber Pass to the trucks that carry United States and NATO supplies from Indian Ocean ports to Afghanistan. The Pakistani border closure, which took place in response to an American air strike in the border area that killed a couple of Pakistani soldiers, was lifted after eleven days, following a series of private but official U.S. apologies. For the short term, General David Petraeus gets his supply flow restored. But this incident was no momentary inconvenience. Rather, it is an ominous warning: evidence, if any were needed, of the very thin base of support among the nations vital to sustain the American effort in Afghanistan. When the true volatility of this situation is revealed, the U.S. and NATO war effort will be plunged into a crisis of unprecedented proportion.

The difficulties of war -- any war -- in Afghanistan are immutable and rooted in physical reality. These problems dogged Soviet armies in the 20th Century and British ones in the 19th. They are more deeply embedded in the fabric of the situation than the headaches of Afghan politics, the divergent goals of the Karzai government, rampant corruption, military ineffectiveness, Taliban determination, or the features of a harsh land. Intractable as those things may be, and any one of them could lead to stalemate or defeat in the Afghan war, geography is an equal or larger problem because it limits every facet of American and allied activity -- not only the geography of Afghanistan, but the simple fact that the country has no access to the sea. Afghans live in a landlocked nation nestled in the remote fastness of South Asia.

Every bullet, every artillery shell, all the combat vehicles and helicopters, every MRE, must be brought into the country. The combat zone is not merely thousands of miles away from the United States, it can be accessed only by crossing other countries: Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan. (China also shares a short length of border with Afghanistan but there are no transportation routes there, and Iran, hostile to the U.S., can be excluded.) More to the point, there are but a few road entries into Afghanistan. Similarly, the number of airports in the country that can handle large, long-haul transport aircraft can be counted on the fingers of one hand -- and those too are accessed only by flying over other nations' airspace.

At the other end of the equation, modern armies and sophisticated equipment consume huge quantities of everything from peanut butter to electric batteries. All that body armor and those computer consoles, not to mention shells and rockets, adds up to great weight and volume. Many posts can be reached only by helicopter. Aviation fuel is at a premium, gasoline an equally daunting necessity -- not just for vehicles but for the electric generators that power American bases. Requirements in fact rule out certain kinds of equipment -- few Abrams tanks are in the theater, for example -- vehicles that measure gas consumption in gallons per mile. Concerned about the price of gas for your car? It costs $400 to put one gallon of gas on the ground in certain places in Afghanistan. In 2009, according to Pentagon estimates, allied forces were consuming over half a million gallons of gasoline per day, a figure that nearly doubled before the new "surge" troops began reaching the country. During the Vietnam war the Pentagon calculated that every soldier in-country represented $7,000 in the war budget. For Afghanistan that figure is $1,000,000.

For years, American logistics experts have been wrestling with this conundrum. They have developed a northern route that accounts for slightly less than a third of deliveries to Afghanistan. There are road connections from Turkmenistan, road and rail through Uzbekistan, and air links that depend on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Of course, goods have to reach the front line countries before they can be transshipped. Those nations have their own economies and needs -- restricting spare capacity -- and the inadequacy of the links into Afghanistan poses another constraint. For example, the sole rail line into the combat zone tops out at 4,000 tons per month of capacity, less than 5 percent of the U.S./NATO requirements before they began to increase in early 2009. At that time, approximately 16,000 tons per month were being delivered by air. Contracts have been let for new rail tracks and more airbases in Afghanistan but the earliest these can be finished is late in 2011. The Pakistani road network accounts for half of logistics throughput. Capacity there cannot be much expanded because the roads enter Afghanistan through difficult mountain passes. Given physical upper limits on transport, tonnage requirements constrain the size of any force that can be sustained in Afghanistan. The troop surge will nearly double NATO tonnage requirements. Thus its net effect will be to put GIs in Afghanistan at the very edge of a red zone of supply failure.

Diplomats naturally had to negotiate deals with the front line countries to permit transit of supplies. Most of those averaged a year in preparation. The arrangements with the "stans" largely restrict transit to non-lethal items. That is also true for air overflight rights, and transport of U.S. supplies across intervening nations like Russia, Georgia, Kazakstan, and Azerbaijan. Pakistan then assumes even greater importance because it has countenanced all manner of deliveries. But the truth is that the United States and its allies are at the mercy of a host of uninvolved nations with their own interests--and a major involved one (Pakistan) that has certain purposes which conflict with the American. Already Kyrgyzstan has terminated an American contract for a key airbase on the supply line, relenting only at the price of new aid offers. Others can play at that game too. And the Pakistani road closure demonstrates just how fragile is this support network.

And then there is the opposition. The Taliban have taken to raising a portion of their war budget by charging "safe passage" fees to the truckers who carry American loads through Pakistan. Or the truckers can hire warlord armies--"private contractors"--(some of whom are Taliban or fellow travelers) to guard their convoys. No pay, no play. Taliban attacks regularly destroy a portion of the trucks on the routes north from Karachi. In a major strike on the logistics net, at the end of 2009 the Taliban wrecked 160 of these trucks--only a few more than were destroyed during the period of road closure just ended. The scope for corruption is virtually unlimited, but imagine the ignominy of the United States paying the Taliban to secure the delivery of supplies, money that fuels the fight against GIs who use those supplies to attack the Taliban.

Decades ago, during the transition to John F. Kennedy's presidency, the United States stood at the brink of military intervention in Laos, a landlocked country in Southeast Asia. Outgoing President Dwight D. Eisenhower took Kennedy aside and told him quite directly that Laos was the biggest conflict on his plate. President Kennedy, who could not see any way to conduct war in Laos, instead encouraged negotiations and became a proponent of agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 that neutralized Laos.

An even more disturbing parallel is that of the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842), which bears many similarities to present circumstances. A British army entered Afghanistan from India and installed a friendly ruler in Kabul, only to be sucked into the political and security commitments required to prop up their puppet. When Afghans rose up against the imposed ruler, the British decided to withdraw from the country. At that point, the inability to supply their forces and the harsh land worked against the British-Indian army, which was almost entirely massacred before they could escape.

In the American military, the saw is that captains and majors study tactics, colonels do strategy, and generals plan logistics. But in Afghanistan, American generals have created a logistics nightmare incapable of solution, and then compounded the dilemma by demanding a surge that pushes the deployed force to the very edge of the abyss. Every indication is that the generals are already laying the groundwork to demand that deteriorating security necessitates that the Afghan withdrawal set for 2011 be cancelled or postponed. The Bush administration was happy to start the Afghan war, then sat complacently as the commitment soured. President Obama trapped himself on this dangerous path. To the recklessness of starting the Afghan war, we are in danger of adding the stupidity of not ending it. This conflict has reached the point where the failure modes are many and obvious, and the path to success obscure, under conditions where Americans are at risk. The handwriting is on the wall. To proceed further under these circumstances is to march into folly.

John Prados is a senior fellow of the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, who assists on its Afghanistan Documentation Project. His current book is Vietnam: The History of an Unwinnable War, 1945-1975 (University Press of Kansas).

The writer opposes the war and is using the logisitcs argument against it. He hasn't considered if Zaranj -Chahbhar route run by third parties is viable for the non-lethal supplies.

[ramana]

Also recall the poor Afghan girl who was mutilated and featured on Time magazine cover lately? Well she has a new nose now.

LINK

[Pratyush]

it is one of the images that restores my faith in the future of humanity, I hope that this woman dosenot have to return to the taliban infested country again. If the Khans abandon Afghanistan now they will be condeming hundreds of thousands of young girls of fate that she had to endure.

Or submit to the will of the tribal elders.

[ShauryaT]

RajeshA: The thrust of your post seems to point to a picture, where you want America to fight India's war or you want the US to facilitate what India might wish for? It is not happening. No guts, no glory! We effectively spend a little over 2% of our GDP on our defense. A paltry sum to build any type of capability, beyond basic defense. It is not even enough to overwhelm TSP in a conventional war.

[RajeshA]

RajeshA: The thrust of your post seems to point to a picture, where you want America to fight India's war or you want the US to facilitate what India might wish for? It is not happening. No guts, no glory! We effectively spend a little over 2% of our GDP on our defense. A paltry sum to build any type of capability, beyond basic defense. It is not even enough to overwhelm TSP in a conventional war.

O but America fights others wars all the time. When they got rid of Saddam in Iraq, the Americans did the fighting for the Iranians, and the Kurds. When Americans got rid of the Taliban, they again did the fighting for Iranians. They also drew away the jihadis from India (many would contest this, but then again more were produced). The Chinese had a windfall, because all attention was drawn away and they could rise unimpeded. The Pakistanis made a fortune and avoided bankruptcy. All the Stans are making money from America.

So when America makes war, other countries profit. India too has to think of strategies where we get what we want.

So where guts and glory are good, brains and luck are cheaper!

[ramana]

Another way of putting it is for a strategy you first need an imagination. Strategy is a way to realise your imagination.

[RajeshA]

Writing on the wall in Afghanistan

Every bullet, every artillery shell, all the combat vehicles and helicopters, every MRE, must be brought into the country. The combat zone is not merely thousands of miles away from the United States, it can be accessed only by crossing other countries: Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, or Tajikistan. (China also shares a short length of border with Afghanistan but there are no transportation routes there, and Iran, hostile to the U.S., can be excluded.) More to the point, there are but a few road entries into Afghanistan. Similarly, the number of airports in the country that can handle large, long-haul transport aircraft can be counted on the fingers of one hand -- and those too are accessed only by flying over other nations' airspace.

Contracts have been let for new rail tracks and more airbases in Afghanistan but the earliest these can be finished is late in 2011.

As mentioned by ramana garu, Iran should not be discounted.

Secondly, it is not true that American has to fly either long distances from the West over Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, etc. or is dependent on the Pakistanis.

Pakistan-occupied Kashmir belongs to India. India would permit a friendly country such as USA ( ) to fly through Indian Air Space and over PoK to Afghanistan. No problem.

America should consider giving construction projects to Indians in Afghanistan and the region at large. More chances that they would be done.

[brihaspati]

If the US army overwinters in AFG without beginning reductions and withdrawals now, they are stuck in a Nam like situation and they will have to stick on the ground until they are forced to do a Saigon style evacuation from their bases. The best bet will be to secretly go for supporting Karazai's efforts to make the Talebs part of the gov, which can be touted as kind of semi-resolution and retreat with partial good face then.

The current US war strategy is like just goading and wounding a sly predator but not having the heart to kill it, its next generation, and its habitat. Thi smeans the predator simply gets mad in anger and reproduces madly to eliminate this threat to its predatory lifestyle - the Alien movie would be a part good illustration.

Its not enough to militarily defeat the Talebs, you have to destroy the sources of their sustenance and future regeneration - which in this case means destroying Pak, destroying Chinese penetration in CAR, as well as Iran. Iran will use and collaborate with the Taleb leadership in a common effort to secure American withdrawal.

More importantly the expeditionary force is in two minds from the leadership and future projection angle. No army wins under such strategic thinking.

[ShauryaT]

O but America fights others wars all the time. When they got rid of Saddam in Iraq, the Americans did the fighting for the Iranians, and the Kurds. When Americans got rid of the Taliban, they again did the fighting for Iranians. They also drew away the jihadis from India (many would contest this, but then again more were produced). The Chinese had a windfall, because all attention was drawn away and they could rise unimpeded. The Pakistanis made a fortune and avoided bankruptcy. All the Stans are making money from America.

So when America makes war, other countries profit. India too has to think of strategies where we get what we want.

So where guts and glory are good, brains and luck are cheaper!

America fights when she deems her costs to protect her interests are worth it. Do not take them to be a bunch of fools, who do not know what they are doing. So, what one has to do is to determine if there are interests, sufficient enough for America to deem it worth fighting for in the Af-Pak region. You seem to be saying, how the US can rely on India for access to Afghanistan through PoK/NA, which as you know is not under Indian control and not something that India can wrest at about 2% spending of her GDP on defense.

Strategy is certainly a way to realize your imagination but it will be a poor strategist, who is only looking at how others will till and you shall wish to eat the fruits of someone else's labor? A very stupid laborer would do such a thing.

As far as I am concerned, the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns were based on a very specific set of advisories by men such as Bernard Lewis and Henry Kissinger, who formed the philosophical under pinnings for these campaigns. Read on what their advise was to make sense of the Iraq campaigns. Ignore the execution issues, which may have done more harm than good but separate the execution pit falls rom the strategy and thought process.

As for your examples on how America always fights for others, or others can easily use the US for their ends, I will end with saying do not agree with your understanding there. Luck, makes for a strategy not.

[svinayak]

O but America fights others wars all the time. When they got rid of Saddam in Iraq, the Americans did the fighting for the Iranians, and the Kurds.

Iraq was supported by US for a long time against Iran. They had US trained chemical experts, US quipments, US trained mil people etc which needed to be destroyed.

When Americans got rid of the Taliban, they again did the fighting for Iranians. They also drew away the jihadis from India (many would contest this, but then again more were produced). The Chinese had a windfall, because all attention was drawn away and they could rise unimpeded. The Pakistanis made a fortune and avoided bankruptcy. All the Stans are making money from America.

To avoid fall of Pakistan and total failure of Pakistan they had to intervene. They had to change their previous policy - fake policy of not supporting Pakistan and also change the policy of Pakistan towards Taliban. Taliban is a social engineering project of US military. US has long term goals in Central asia and the book "Grand Chess Board" should give info how serious they are. The location is too important for US to have anybody else control it.

http://www.takeoverworld.info/grandchessboard.html
http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119973.pdf

On hind sight the violent activities of Taliban towards Afgh and their actions against non muslims and others was meant to invoke deep reaction in the world against Taliban and support any military intervention in Afghanistan.

[RajeshA]

You seem to be saying, how the US can rely on India for access to Afghanistan through PoK/NA, which as you know is not under Indian control and not something that India can wrest at about 2% spending of her GDP on defense.

For the air bridge to Afghanistan from the Indian Ocean, USA need not depend on Pakistan's permission.

De jure, Gilgit-Baltistan is Indian territory or at the most disputed territory, but not an area where Pakistan can claim sovereignty. USA can use that area as a bridge to Afghanistan without breaking any international laws or conventions.

As far as Pakistani enforcement of any claimed sovereignty on Gilgit-Baltistan is concerned, that is as far as de-facto control is concerned, I don't think Pakistan would dare shoot at US aircraft.

Mind you, I did not speak of land access, as far as PoK is concerned, so why is India control being required for that?!

You may be a believer in America's intellect as far as their strategy is concerned, I don't share that confidence. They have spent 3 trillion dollars for the two wars, and have hardly attained their mission objectives. They have become indebted to their biggest strategic challenge, China during the course of the last years. Twist as one may, America is losing its position as the sole superpower. That is all idiocy at a grand scale.

India does not have much influence over America in terms of their policies in Asia, simply because we do not create cards to play at a strategy table. It is because we hold very few cards, and do not share an aggressive military history with the other powers of the world, we are not taken seriously. And because America does not hear to Indian voices, one concludes that America is not influencible. It is, just not by India.

The suggestions I made earlier on, had already considered that India does not have much influence over American policy. We cannot change it. What I suggested was, that we simply support their current policy, by creating more room for them in the region. Their current policy already causes some effects, which we can call as conducive to Indian interests. However those aspects of their already existing strategy are not coming to fruition because of their shackles - dependence on Pakistan. That is something India can help with, so that the current American strategy plays out to its full potential, even if they do not succeed in what they set out to do.

[ramana]

Nightwatch 12 oct 2010 writes:

Pakistan: Woodward's book "Obama's Wars" is shaping politics in Pakistan as if a military coup had taken place. It threatens the downfall of elected government because of the bewildering and intemperate statements of Pakistani and US leaders to a book vendor.

An article in The News asserts that leaders have "spilled so many beans about the Pakistani leadership, it is hard to determine how he (Woodward) was allowed to quote officials about events which are only months old, with work still in progress, and making disclosures that could create a turmoil for the political leadership in Pakistan."

"For instance, (according to the editorial) his book reveals that a special force of 3,000 hot pursuit US troops was carrying out operations inside Pakistani territory from the Afghan side, Pakistani airbases were still being used for drone attacks, US just did not trust the ISI, Zardari had stated to CIA chief clearly that civilian deaths did not worry him at all, US would bomb 150 camps inside Pakistan if there was another attack inside US, besides many other details which have never been revealed."

"But the very fact that Woodward has been able to sit with the top leaders in important meetings and has been allowed to write things which were otherwise never released to the public, shows the US leadership was sending clear messages about their intentions and plans."

"Woodward, on page 52, writes that on December 9, before Obama took oath as president, the DNI and CIA chief gave him a briefing listing 14 highly classified covert actions, the nature of those actions, and the written findings from Bush and other presidents. These 14 operations, Hayden (CIA Director) said, included operations in 60 countries, clandestine, lethal counterterrorism operations to stop terrorists worldwide, including drone attacks on camps anywhere."

"How much are you doing in Pakistan, Obama asked. Hayden's response, quoted by Bob Woodward, is revealing. "Hayden said 80 percent of America's worldwide attacks were there (in Pakistan). We own the sky. The drones take off and land at secret bases in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is training people in the tribal areas who, if you saw them in the visa line at Dulles (Washington Airport), you would not recognize as potential threats."

"Giving details of other operations in Iran, North Korea, Turkey, Sudan, Iraq and Jordan, the CIA director made a startling revelation about Afghanistan. Besides the drone attacks, he said, CIA has a 3,000 strong army of Counter Terrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT)."

"This figure was given by Hayden before Obama was inducted as president. Later, the new CIA chief Leon Panetta and National Security Adviser Jim Jones were sent by Obama to Pakistan to talk to Zardari and (General) Kayani after the failed Faisal Shahzad bombing at Times Square in New York and the details of their meetings provide a rare view of how the Americans see their war in Afghanistan and Pakistan and what they intend to do.

"If, God forbid, Shahzad's SUV had blown up in Times Square, we wouldn't be having this conversation, Jones warned. The president would be forced to do things that Pakistan would not like. The president wants everyone in Pakistan to understand if such an attack connected to a Pakistani group is successful there are some things even he would not be able to stop. Just as there are political realities in Pakistan, there are political realities in the US. No one will be able to stop the response and consequences. This is not a threat, just a statement of political fact."

Comment: The Pakistanis have been warned, but Pakistani behavior in response to the 30 September attack shows the warnings have been ignored. The diligence and earnest of US officials are striking contrasts to President Zardari's political evasions.

More troubling for stability in Pakistan is the candor of remarks by high level officials in Pakistan to a book writer whose reputation is built on sensationalism that sells books. The revelations raise serious questions about the motives and judgment of the senior officials. They put lives as well as operations at increased risk.

Apparently most of the decisions involving US operations in Pakistan were made before power transferred from the President to the Parliament. Nevertheless, the agreements are an embarrassment to Prime Minister Gilani and the Foreign Minister who have been vocal in criticizing US cross border operations that Zardari authorized but never bothered to tell his Prime Minister, apparently.

The revelations have just begun to percolate through Pakistani politics. More to follow.

[ramana]

O but America fights others wars all the time. When they got rid of Saddam in Iraq, the Americans did the fighting for the Iranians, and the Kurds.

Iraq was supported by US for a long time against Iran. They had US trained chemical experts, US quipments, US trained mil people etc which needed to be destroyed.

When Americans got rid of the Taliban, they again did the fighting for Iranians. They also drew away the jihadis from India (many would contest this, but then again more were produced). The Chinese had a windfall, because all attention was drawn away and they could rise unimpeded. The Pakistanis made a fortune and avoided bankruptcy. All the Stans are making money from America.

To avoid fall of Pakistan and total failure of Pakistan they had to intervene. They had to change their previous policy - fake policy of not supporting Pakistan and also change the policy of Pakistan towards Taliban. Taliban is a social engineering project of US military. US has long term goals in Central asia and the book "Grand Chess Board" should give info how serious they are. The location is too important for US to have anybody else control it.

http://www.takeoverworld.info/grandchessboard.html
http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119973.pdf

On hind sight the violent activities of Taliban towards Afgh and their actions against non muslims and others was meant to invoke deep reaction in the world against Taliban and support any military intervention in Afghanistan.

Instead of what Nalpat writes here India should let PRC take over the Central Asian landmass.

Its the constant tussle in Asia that lets Europe dominate world affairs since Darius times. Even later the Ottomons and Safavids (in 16th century) exhausted themselves in mutual fights leading the West to rise.

[RajeshA]

Instead of what Nalpat writes here India should let PRC take over the Central Asian landmass.

Its the constant tussle in Asia that lets Europe dominate world affairs since Darius times. Even later the Ottomons and Safavids (in 16th century) exhausted themselves in mutual fights leading the West to rise.

In case the motive for allowing PRC to take over the Central Asian landmass is to give PRC the uncontested domination over Asia, so that the European power can be eclipsed, then I think it is a big price to pay.

In case the motive is to get PRC into a power struggle in Central Asia with the resident powers in Asia - political Islam, Russia, USA or India, then I think it will play out a lot differently.

• Russia - At the moment their strategic partnership is holding. China has shown it can intrude into Russian backyard economically in a big way - through Oil & Gas pipelines and Russia cannot do much about it. Secondly Russia has mutated into an oligarchy, which is happy with selling Oil & Gas and other minerals & raw materials to China, and to some extent defense equipment also. They get to make a fat profit and the Russian State can use the money to prop up its image as an equal of USA. Moreover the Chinese have influence in the Russian establishment. So it seems if Chinese increase their sway in Central Asia, it would not be contested in any big way by Russia. It also depends on Russian-American entente.
• India - India is boxed in in the Indian Subcontinent. Through various strategies of using proxies like Pakistan, having an intimidating missile arsenal in Tibet pointed at India, gaining influence in the Indian political class, moving in in a big way in Myanmar, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, China seems to have constrained India's strategic freedom in the Central Asian landmass. Also India has no land access to Central Asia at the moment.
• USA - USA presence in Central Asia makes USA only weaker, not stronger. China can wait for USA to leave the region out of its own volition. The hunch is the Afghan Taliban are being supported by Pakistan but Chinese have their hand in the game and are behind this policy of bleeding USA a 100%. It is questionable how long USA can stay.
• Ummah - The Chinese have several bonds with the Islamic World.
  1. Pakistan - The Chinese influence over Potohar is immense. Han-Pakjabi Alliance is perhaps China's strongest cards. With this alliance, China has been able to come closer to USA, China has been able to neutralize its biggest challenge in Asia - India, China has also used Pakistani good offices to curry favor with other Muslim countries like Maldives, Bangladesh, Turkey, etc.. An alliance with Pakjab has meant that China need not fear the Islamists to trouble China in Xinjiang. Pakistan is China's trump card, and long after America has dumped Pakistan, China would continue to stand by it.
  2. Anti-Americanism - The wide-spread Anti-Americanism in the Muslim world has meant that the Muslims, who find themselves at the receiving end of American power, have welcomed the rise of China whole-heartedly. Islam has always feared the ideological threat arising from the Occident, and with the relative weakening of Europe & America, the Islamists can hope for more freedom in pushing through their agenda. In fact the Muslims see the Chinese as friends-in-arms as far as America is concerned.
  3. Similarity - The Chinese do not indulge themselves in moral grand-standing. They pose no ideological challenge to Islam. Since the retreat of Maoism-Communism in China, the challenge has faded away. In fact many of their methods are similar. So the Muslims feel comfortable dealing with the Chinese. The Chinese have no Human-Rights agenda and hence all form of dictators in the Islamic World have also no inhibitions dealing with the Chinese.
  4. Supplier-Consumer Relationship - The Muslim countries have virtually zero scientific research & development. I will go so far as to say, they don't have the aptitude for science. So the Muslim countries are happy to trade their Oil & Gas with the Chinese with no questions asked. The Central Asian dictators, Sudan, Iran, etc all have plenty of Oil & Gas and in China they have a market with enough money to spend.

Also the Chinese do not see the need to move into Central Asia militarily. They are getting all they want from Central Asia in the current constellation. In fact they are getting more, than what they would get through occupation. So I don't think PRC would fall into that trap.

[ramana]

So what you are saying is PRC is becoming the dominant power in Central Asia anyway. And recall the "Grand Chessboard"* premise that no major power should be allowed in Eurasia as that will challenge the Europe and the West i.e the leader US itself.

China is rising and on its way up. This is a result of over hundred and fifty years of interaction with Colonial Europe and newly emergent USA from 1840s. The USA has always seen China as its munna. Even when it was weak, it adovcated the "Open Door" policy in China to ensure it was not shut out by the Colonial Europe. It was the US that decided to pull the plug on Koumintang to allow Mao to consolidate China under Communist role. In the past 150 years since then Colonial Europe has shed its colonies and left the space for US. During and after Cold War US resumed its interests with PRC to defeat the new challenge to the West (Soviet Union) and now after the financial meltdown its a duopoly working at cross purposes at times when the issues are bilateral and together when the issues are percieved to be in their interests.

Its all the better that India stands aside and let the rise happen to its max extent. Let China expand into its periphery. The rise will break the duopoly which is harming India. Also its better the rise is diverted to areas that are not inside India. The rise will go on till the demographic trend changes in China and improves for India.

Nothing says that India should consolidate itself and strengthen the idea of India. India should be single minded in cosloidating the idea of India and do its utmost to squash challenges to the idea of India.

* Read Zbig's book linked above or at minimum the synopsis.

[RajeshA]

Its all the better that India stands aside and let the rise happen to its max extent. Let China expand into its periphery. The rise will break the duopoly which is harming India. Also its better the rise is diverted to areas that are not inside India. The rise will go on till the demographic trend changes in China and improves for India.

How would the rise of PRC break the duopoly? May be you mean PRC's economy and military would supersede America's. But then that just makes America a junior partner. Whether America becomes a partner or not of PRC, how does China's rise in Asia help India?

I am of the opinion, China would not be occupying any more territory West to its current borders. It is getting all it wants in spite of it - Oil & Gas, Minerals, Partnership with Islamists to be used against other powers, Transit Routes.

Nothing says that India should consolidate itself and strengthen the idea of India. India should be single minded in cosloidating the idea of India and do its utmost to squash challenges to the idea of India.

With Chinese supremacy in Asia, India would be always on the defensive as far as national consolidation goes. We have Maoists and we have Islamists in our midst. With Chinese support, both movements would only grow. We have been seeing what is occurring in Kashmir. We have also seen how China is dabbling in India's internal issues. They even invited the Hurriyat to China and offered their mediation in Kashmir. That is their gall!

India cannot consolidate on the back-foot. India can use politics to deal with internal problems but Chinese and Pakistani interference means, the chances of success become dim.

To be frank, I cannot really understand this idea of giving China a free pass in Asia.

* Read Zbig's book linked above or at minimum the synopsis.

I have just read tid-bits of The Grand Chessboard. 1997 seems to be a long time ago!
About China ZBig writes:

Similarly, it hardly needs arguing that China is a major player. China is already a significant regional power and is likely to entertain wider aspirations, given its history as a major power and its view of the Chinese state as the global center. The choices China makes are already beginning to affect the geopolitical distribution of power in Asia, while its economic momentum is bound to give it both greater physical power and increasing ambitions. The rise of a "Greater China" will not leave the Taiwan issue dormant, and that
will inevitably impact on the American position in the Far East. The dismantling of the Soviet Union has also created on the western edge of China a series of states, regarding which the Chinese leaders cannot be indifferent. Thus, Russia will also be much affected by China's more active emergence on the world scene.

About India ZBig writes:

In contrast, India is in the process of establishing itself as a regional power and views itself as potentially a major global player as well. It also sees itself as a rival to China. That may be a matter of overestimating its own long-term capabilities, but India is unquestionably the most powerful South Asian state, a regional hegemon of sorts. It is also a semisecret nuclear power, and it became one not only in order to intimidate Pakistan but especially to balance China's possession of a nuclear arsenal. India has a geostrategic vision of its regional role, both vis-a-vis its neighbors and in the Indian Ocean. However, its ambitions at this stage only peripherally intrude on America's Eurasian interests, and thus, as a geostrategic player, India is not—at least, not to the same degree as either Russia or China—a source of geopolitical concern.

I haven't read enough of the book!

[ramana]

The duopoly will be broken or atleast stretched when the Asian hegemon rises . Zbig also says that.
As long as Asian fight each other the West will continue to play one against the other. Thats the lesson from Darius to current times.

When India is about to emerge from the post colonial era, its not useful to get into a competition with an irressitable force while weak. Let the wave roll and take out the others.

[RajeshA]

The duopoly will be broken or atleast stretched when the Asian hegemon rises . Zbig also says that.
As long as Asian fight each other the West will continue to play one against the other. Thats the lesson from Darius to current times.

To be honest, I don't have any love for PRC or for that matter for West from the Strategy PoV. If we get into a rivalry with PRC, the West would laugh. If we let PRC a free ride, PRC would laugh. Somebody would always laugh, so I have decided that one should base one's strategy not on whether somebody laughs or not, but whether we come out stronger or not.

When India is about to emerge from the post colonial era, its not useful to get into a competition with an irressitable force while weak.

Competition would make us strong. There are no irresistible forces. The Vietnamese can give PRC and America a black eye. The Mujahideen can give America and Soviet Union a black eye. PRC can overthrow American domination of the world.

Let the wave roll and take out the others.

The wave is not flowing to the West (Central Asia), or just to East Asia. It is coming right at us, and we cannot simply wave it in a different direction. Our only choice is whether to jump into it or drown under it.

In fact we cannot allow the wave to take down our potential partners in Asia.