I dont know where to post this PDF file about Global goveranance. Moderators please delete it or post it to appropiate thread.
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_p ... e_2025.pdfQuote:
Global Governance 2025:at a Critical Juncture
The United States’ National Intelligence Council (NIC) and the European Union’s Institute for
Security Studies (EUISS) have joined forces to produce this assessment of the long-term prospects
for global governance frameworks. This exercise builds on the experience of the two institutions in
identifying the key trends shaping the future international system. Since the mid 1990s, the NIC has
produced four editions of its landmark Global Trends report. The most recent one, Global Trends
2025: A Transformed World, published in late 2008, noted that momentous change was ahead, with
the gap between increasing disorder and weakening governance structures widening. The EUISS
produced the first EU-level report on the factors affecting the evolution of the international system
in 2006, The New Global Puzzle. What World for the EU in 2025? The report stressed that a
multipolar system is emerging and that matching the new distribution of power with new rules and
institutions will be critical to preserving international peace and stability.
Quote:
The shift to a multipolar world is complicating the prospects for effective global governance
over the next 10 years. The expanding economic clout of emerging powers increases their
political influence well beyond their borders. Power is not only shifting from established powers
to rising countries and, to some extent, the developing world, but also toward nonstate actors.
Diverse perspectives and suspicions about global governance, which is seen as a Western
concept, will add to the difficulties of effectively mastering the growing number of challenges.
• Brazilians feel there is a need for a redistribution of power from developed to developing
states. Some experts we consulted saw Brazil tending to like “old fashioned”
multilateralism, which is state-centered and does not make room for nonstate actors.
• Many of our Chinese interlocutors see mounting global challenges and fundamental defects
in the international system but emphasize the need for China to deal with its internal
problems. The Chinese envisage a “bigger structure” pulling together the various institutions
and groups that have been established recently. They see the G-20 as being a step forward
but question whether North-South differences will impede cooperation on issues other than
economics.• For participants from the Persian Gulf region, the question is what sort of global institutions
are most capable of inclusive power sharing. They bemoaned the lack of strong regional
organizations.
• The Indians thought existing international organizations are “grossly inadequate” and
worried about an “absence of an internal equilibrium in Asia to ensure stability.” They felt
that India is not well positioned to help develop regional institutions for Asia given China’s
preponderant role in the region.• Russian experts we consulted see the world in 2025 as still one of great powers but with
more opportunities for transnational cooperation. The Russians worried about the relative
lack of “transpacific security.” The United States, Europe, and Russia also have scope for
growing much closer, while China, “with the biggest economy,” will be the main factor in
changing the world.
• The South Africans assessed that globalization appears to be strengthening regionalization as
opposed to creating a single global polity. They worried that the losers from globalization
increasingly outnumber the winners.
In addition to the shift to a multipolar world, power is also shifting toward nonstate actors, be
they agents or spoilers of cooperation. On a positive note, transnational nongovernmental
organizations, civil-society groups, churches and faith-based organizations, multinational
corporations, other business bodies, and interest groups have been equally, if not more effective
than states at reframing issues and mobilizing publics—a trend we expect to continue. However,
hostile nonstate actors such as criminal organizations and terrorist networks, all empowered by
existing and new technologies, can pose serious security threats and compound systemic risks.
Many developing countries—which are likely to play an increasing role at the regional and
global level—also suffer from a relative paucity of nonstate actors, that could help newly
emerging states and their governments deal with the growing transnational challenges.