Bharat Rakshak

^^^Please do tell us what is what you said has been substantiated by above article.

^
The need for air-mobile armed brigades and the feasibility of acquiring them with in 5 years.

The repeating story is how difficult it is to develop such forces; because military leadership is too slow to make decisions which are further delayed by politicians.

My position is vindicated in terms of the need for it, the technical/financial feasibility of that idea and the key hurdle to it, which is lack of military/political leadership (not money or technology or the strategic need as people argue)






P.S: Note that I got this idea with hardly 2-3 years of exposure to BRF. My question is why "it appears" that our military leadership lacks vision to look forward on Indian security needs (20-30 years) and understand external threats (geopolitical trends) for what they are. I sincerely hope that it is my perception at fault.

What is the possibility that Russia provides India with overt support in case of a 2-front war? May be lease a few transport, fighter aircraft, tanks, etc? Would they allow access to their bases for re-fueling or supplies? How would Indian air base in Tajikistan play a role, if any? Can India open other offensive fronts (including amphibious) from other directions?

Would be interesting to hear points of view..

Thank you for again showing that you've no idea of what you'are talking about.

The point that you'd raised earlier when "PLA in Northern Areas" story broke was about how we could take NA in a jiffy if we had political and military will. And you were disabused of that notion.

And there is nothing as 'armed airmobile brigade'. In case you wanted to mention 'airmobile armored brigade' - there is no such formation - not even in mighty US Army.

As for the military leadership - the Mountain Strike Corps concept was drafted by the military leadership in mid-1980s....that is more than 25 years before....It is only now that Indian Political leadership has woken to the issue at hand. So, please rid yourself of ungracious comments about the lack of vision and other such nonsense about the IA high command.



Don't give yourself too much importance. Those who live, eat, sleep and breathe Indian Security evey day are not as incompetent as you'd make them to be. The issue was about Political leadership and lack of funds. What the IA intends to implement with this concept of Mountain Strike Corps - integral airmobile assets - is extremely expensive. A single Airmobile brigade with its complement of lift+attack helos will cost couple of thousand crores, if not more. So, this will not only take time but money as well. For an Army which is trying to make up for years of neglect and shortfall in almost all areas - this is a big task.




Please do tell me what has 'thinking' about equipment got to do with procurement of the same? Or are we to think that in case IA top brass had 'thought' about these concepts and equipment, they would have been here?

Because the Mountain Strike Corps concept and associated structure has been cleared by the GOI - has it occured to you that IA would have prepared the whole blue print of the concept from manpower to equipment to deployment locations to planned use (broad sense)? And that the process of equipment purchase will begin once clearance is received from GOI and funds are made available?

The first MSC has been approved under 11th Defense Plan - 2007-2012. So, only now after receiving the permission from GOI will raising of new formations start - the Corps HQ, the Division HQs and identification of existing units which will be transferred to these formations. Plus, the raising of new regiments/battalions - to cater to the increment in overall number of troops. So, the Formation Headquarters and their troops will be ready by 2012.

It is the new stuff which will take time - like M777, newer helicopters and additional stuff like mortars, rifles etc to make up for stock which would have been transferred to these formations. These things can happen only after GOI approves them and not before - irrespective of that fact that Generals may have thought about them.

Good thing is this - if this Defense Plan sees a new MSC plus complement of twonew Mountain Divisions - the next is likely to see some more - my guess estimate is at least one MSC+complementary divisions plus another two Mountain Divisions. That will be increment of 8 divisions in total.



The only thing that "appears" from above is that you're quick to lay the blame at the feet of IA without trying to check the facts or reading up on the subject matter. Sad to see that even after 2-3 years on BRF - you've not picked on the aspects of military issues.

Just for your reference, and so that you don't repeat this nonsense again, Indian Army (Eastern Command) as early as 1959 - when preparing for the China contigency looming large - had prepared for two-front war and war gamed the Pakistan response from East Pakistan towards West Bengal. And has factored China in every equation since then in case of Indo-Pak shooting match.

^

Rohitvats ji

Thanks for the information. I never claimed that I am knowledgible in military affairs. I am just asking questions. Please be patient with me.

If IA wargamed a two-front war as early as 1959 and made appropriate recommendations, the fault completely lies on political leadership and state of economy. Lets give the benefit of doubt to the political leadership till say year 2000.

AFAIK starting sometime in 1998, the NDA govt allocated about Rs40,000 crore towards capital expenditure for armed forces. How many items IA procured since then towards its preparedness? (This is not rhetorical question). In addition to that GOI has been allocating funds for various procurement programs.

I agree that majority of delays are from GOI side. Are there any instances the armed forces delayed the procurement process for non-technical reasons?

***

There are multiple scenarios where we disagreed. some of them are
- PLA in NA story
- Recapturing POK
- This thread

In all these scenarios, the feeling I get is that it is always the fault of political leadership or terrian. A million person strong army always needs $0'B equipment and atleast 5 year preparation time to do anything. I question this premise, causing the takleef.

Perhaps IA is overstretched in containing internal challenges (NA insurgency, JK, and now Naxals) and didnt have enought time to focus on external threats. All the more reason to solve these problems at their external sources.

>> Perhaps IA is overstretched in containing internal challenges (NA insurgency, JK, and now Naxals) and didnt have enought time to focus on external threats. All the more reason to solve these problems at their external sources.

I object to this notion. IA has been doing counter-insurgency long enough to have evolved a dedicated structure to deal with it, without affecting its primary job, protecting the country from external threats. in any case, right now, in most areas it is the local police that does the boots on the ground act and IA is called in only for critical operations. IA hasn't even been called in against naxals so far.
comments like this assume that the same bunch of people are tasked to do both and hence cannot focus on its primary role because there is COIN to be done. this is simply not true.
we hear similar comments about DRDO, because DRDO is researching fruit juices that keep their state at subzero temp they must be slacking off in critical items like LCA ! as if the same group of scientists work on fruit juices and AESA radar !!

Rohitji,

The India Today article seems to indicate that right now, we are not in a position to face a chn-pak 2 frnt attack...even someone like Retd. Lt. Gen. H. S. Panag on twitter claims that the sitn is worse than 1962....if an attack happens, say, nxt year, a humiliation is very likely to happen....

hope we engage in a total military buildup at all cost...irr.of what happens nxt yr...

RahulM ji

That is my confusion too. Everytime an ignorant person like me makes a "battle cry" to recapture legitimate Indian claim such as POK, all we hear is that

- how difficult the terrian is: as if the terrian is new to India (the funny thing is that our enemies do not seem to have these constraints)
- how far we are from getting the suitable equipment: somehow we are always 5-10 years away from getting the necessary equipment
- costs on economy: without giving any comparitive cost analysis on never-ending terrorist threats and associated internal security costs

After hearing these usal excuses enough times, a novice person like me gets the idea that Indian Armed Forces are either not interested to cross the proverbial laxmana-rekha or they do not have any long-term plan (ofcourse in sync with changing technological and geopolitical trends).

Even when one gives the benefit of doubt to the "strong economy is essential to a strong military" logic, what is the gaurantee that threat scenario is not evolving faster than our economic advancement...

Once you take POK what do you do with all the ROP population who live on (infest) the land ?

Push then into pureland!

>> - how difficult the terrian is: as if the terrian is new to India (the funny thing is that our enemies do not seem to have these constraints)

nope, the enemies have the same problem. in a nutshell, either of the two alternatives "we will be run over easily like '62 " or "we will capture POK/tibet in a week" is wrong. the situation is somewhere in the middle, the enemy cannot dislodge us nor can we dislodge them easily.

>> - how far we are from getting the suitable equipment: somehow we are always 5-10 years away from getting the necessary equipment

well, we can't run away from the truth can we ? the 90's was a lost decade AFA the army was concerned and the 2000's haven't been that much better as far as one critical element is concerned even if we ignore the smaller items.
right now we are at 60:40 or 45:55 situation in terms of balance of power, depending on which adversary you are considering. to see through the aggressive moves of the type you are advocating we would need overwhelming superiority. against pak it will happen eventually, the question is when, not if. against china it is a much more difficult proposition and I do not think we can win an arms race with china in the near future.

>> - costs on economy: without giving any comparitive cost analysis on never-ending terrorist threats and associated internal security costs

I agree that it would be good to have a comparative analysis. however there is no guarantee that a war, even a decisive one would put an end to terrorism of all kind. we might have the strength to defeat pakistan but we do not have the strength (yet) to control it. starting a war without a clear idea of the endgame would be a far larger disaster than the situation we face currently.

Rhetorical question ...

India has 2nd largest muslim population.

I request, we do not mix multiple things here. Let us talk one issue at a time.

1. POK
2. POWI
3. Tibet



So the truth is that inspite of $32B Vs $6.41 India is at 60:40 advantage against Pakistan (I hope I am reading the numbers correctly). Assuming Pakistan's NWFP issue is similar to India's JK situation; this seems odd.

On the otherhand, what brings India close to China's capabilities with 1:3 resource disadvantage? Is it similar to India Pak situation?



Can that be an excuse for not being proactive? Who would solve India's problem if not India?

India has never been ready for war leave alone two front war, if war of dossiers and chai pakora qualifies then of course we can even take on the mighty USA . Now I do not believe in spinning scenarios or even doing this bean counting as to how many fighters/tanks or men we can field against China or anyone, however what does serve as a data point is the way we have fought wars in the past, err.. sorry tried to not to fight wars in the past. This thread is a big joke for how can we even talk about fighting a two front war given the way we handled Kargil ? Of course usual suspects can come out with zillions of excuses for the way the fck up was handled and case would be closed but then won't the same flimsy excuses hold true for future ? So why worry have curry.

These thumb twiddlers don't do a squat when a jawan or two gets killed in unprovoked shelling in rajaouri and poonch, if wearing a uniform and being armed qualifies as readiness for war then even a kid who dresses up for fancy dress competition in kindergarten is ready for one.

No Sir, you're not asking questions - you're making uninformed comments and that is what gets my goat.



IA has always wargamed the 2-front scenario in every contigency - it is but obvious that they should do so. The pertinent point is this - what has been India's capability to meet a two front scenario and what objectives would it set for itself. The objectives would have been limited earlier - but with newer raisings and more potent force structure - the envelope of objectives would be that much greater.

As for the political leadership - it is not lost on anyone that we tend to be reactionary in nature. So, it took political leadership 25+years to sanction what was conceived in 1985-86. The requirement and solution has always existed.



Can you please tell me what does 40K Crores or USD 10 Billion (assuming 40:1 X-change rate) buy for the Services the size of Indian Armed Forces? And what was the state of the Armed Forces post the 'lost decade' of 90s? Why did COAS General Malik made the statement that we'll fight with whatever we have?

All the money received so far - and the amount given back to MOF - has been used to get in place the basic systems and get the stock upto warfighting level - which were missing. Remember the Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs Theory - needs, wants and desire? The forces are in the process of balancing the three here. Now that there are funds and political leadership is cognizant of the situation on the LAC - it has authorized the raising of newer formations.

Let me share another anecdote - as per Army Plan 2000, conceived in 1985, Indian Army was to reach very high levels of Mechanization - with something like 3 Armored, 7 Mechanized and 7 RAPID Divisions+10 Mountain Divisions. Had this plan seen the light of the day - Pakistan would have been sorted out in a quick 7-10 days war. The effort to give more teeth to Pivot Corps being attempted now as part of Cold Start - would have already in place.But where do we stand?



I think there are enough - but is that why IA cannot take NA in a jiffy? No, that is not the case.



It is the job of the Service Chiefs to tell the GOI about their opinion of the matter - Manekshaw did that in 1971 and ensured we did not end up with egg on our face. Another COAS made a bold plan to take NA in 1987 - the political leadership chickened out. IA lined up enough firepower to thrash PA in June 2002 - Political leadership again backed out.

As for the requirement of funds and time to prepare - well, unless you provide resources in timely manner, how do you think one is supposed to prepare and execute the task as per own objectives? Can IA launch assault on NA tomorrow if required -Yes, it can. But do we have resources - to take the task to its objective in two weeks - I think not. In one month - may be yes. Can GOI ensure one month time frame to the Services? If the answer is no, then what is required to compress the time frame? Resources - something like Mountain Strike Corps with integral air assault elements. Think of ability to land troops behind the enemy and not slog throug the mountains.

on simple pooch, if the existing strike Corps(3 in no.) are being made into independent divisions(8 in no.) then why a new whole strike Corp instead of strike divisions?

Sir, what is the basis of your assumption about Strike Corps being converted to 8 IBGs? (that is what you meant, right?).

Rohitji,

What is the likely outcome of a two-front attack by Chn-pk say, next year ? I learn from posts by some here that Oct-Dec is the only feasible time for that...Is a repeat of 1962 likely in that case ? Some say the gap now is worse than in 1962...or will it drag into a long and bitter conflict ?

As for nuke deterrence, if enough A-III's are inducted, we shld be able to keep chn out of an active shooting war, given the right political leadership

Sir, you ask a very deep question and to be honest, I don't have an answer.

For the scenario you paint to develop will require extraordinary developments and I don't forsee that happening.

Rohitji,

Chn-Pak have everything to gain by an attack. Chn puts down a potential competitor for the nxt 100 yrs...and pak no doubt takes any chance to atack India. Especially true of the gap is more than 1962. Maybe, they could force us into a surrnder where we promise not to make any nukes ? Like Japan, except with tsp/chn as masters ? This is possible if the gap is greater than 1962...we can then be forced into a development/human rights mode rather than a mode that pursues nukes/mil power...it will be a huge tragedy for our civilization...

1) What rational reason do you have to believe that this is extremely unlikely to happen ?

2) Regarding the gap : how true is this assertion (even by the likes of Lt.Gen. H.S. Panag) that the gap now is worse than 1962) ? How much of it is rhetoric ?

The only thing that can save us is the clear will that faced with a use vs lose condition for our nukes, we shall use them...even the puny deterrent we have now, would probably damage China's economic rise substantially. A-III and A-V seem to be the key..as they get deployed, the likelyhood of what I outline above recedes....There however, is no substitute for total militarization of our country if we truly have to guarantee our succesfully overcoming all possible challenges...

You have answered your own question.

Shivji,

This is where political credibility and political will is a must......

Mostly noise from cold start ... like this INDIA’S NEW "COLD START" WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED

Anyway I'm not really aware how much this has been implemented.
But my contention was if your are raising one corp(comprised of say 2 divisions and some more) worth of strike forces, then why not divide the two between two geographical areas i.e N.E and J&K, surely that would give more flexibility?

There is no clarity on the composition of IBG nor how they are going to materialize.

As for converting assets of Strike Corps into these IBGs - I think the understanding is that Strike Corps will remain and IBG will be held by Pivot Corps. These IBG will provide offensive capability short of deployment of Strike Corps.



The idea is to provide a 'punch', a 'fist'. By placing them under one Corps HQ, the same is achieved. These are seperate from holding Corps on LAC - which are also being beefed up with respective Mountain Divisions.

can someone name a country other then US

which has dismembered a country (Pakistan), Added new territory ( Sikkim) and dispatched troops for foreign operations Sri Lanka , Maldives . in last 40 yrs.

if answer for this is INDIA . then why do we consider our self so weak. Elephant has started moving may be somemore years and we will definitely be considered in top military powers.

new doctrine on 2 front war already signals the sift in approach from passive defense to aggressive defense. we might not be 100% ready right now but there is a intent and approach to fight two front war .

Some see India through the lens of 1971, others see India from the angle of 1962. Recently there is no spectacular shows to pride with. The constant infiltration, low level fights with intruders for infinity without any solution at sight and China's aggressive posture with shiny toys against not so well prepared status of IA with constant commentary of commanders sharing insights of non-matchable arms race with China gives a negative feeling, in general.

Question to everyone. If suppose we amassed a huge amount of Artillery say 2000(whatever number pleases you) pieces against Pak and another equal or more amount against China can change the nature of two front war? Can the Pak be subdued on the mere show of such Artillery pieces while taking China ? I'm asking such show of might will deter Pak from harbouring any such devious machinations against us while we are engaging China? In that case will this leads to releasing of more men from Western borders for N and NE?

Of course what you say is true. This is not unique to India alone. All N powers face this challenge. As i said, the N war business is more of a gamble than actually conducting war. That is the gamble India willing to take. While China was explicit in proclaiming any attack on her N weapon will be retaliated with N weapon, India's NFU policy is not such aggressive. The argument is that it creates enough space for "sorting out things" in the conventional realm than resorting to Nuclear war.

But, going by your argument, if the situation demands, and India is prepared to play that game, India can communicate such change in its N posture as you prescribed directly to China on one to one basis at appropriate time as Pak done to India, than declaring that to whole world by bringing out such policy change openly. By this the change is very specific to China and could be maintained more discreetly instead of raising the alarm. By this, i'm trying to point out, India can play the game in whichever way she wants and was not so heavily burdened by the declared NFU policy which is your point of contention.

Yes, more testing is needed and this problem stated is common for any missile. But the picture doesn't ends with Agni-II. We have China specific Agni-III and then Agni-V, Shourya and so on. These missile development and deployment acts as deterrent is my opinion.

Yes, Agreed. If you have noticed, our development was continuous except for the brief period during emergency. Right after testing the first device, we separated Tritium in late 70s. Tried to test FBF device in early 80s under IG. Started Thermo- Nuclear program and future gen N weapons program during mid 80s. To be precise I think, it is the year 1985. A paper presented in 80s that was linked in this forum shows that we are interested in bunker buster too. Weaponised the device from late 80s. Upgrade the weaponisation from one version to another throughout the 90s(WOP by Chengappa). If my memory is right, the book reported upto 3 generation of weaponised devices in the Indian arsenal during 90s. Gulping the CT, we generated more nuclear material for the bumb from 90s through 00s from civil reactors. And going by the "rumour" the "development" was noted and quoted still 2008, the year marked a decade from POK-2 test. So if you go by the yardstick, our development was continuous and with the available information there is no need to show concern on quality or quantity of the N arsenal. Of course, even if you believe in Dr. Santanam's assertion, as the research is continuous, you can expect that the noted problem if any could have got solved. Minimality and Credibility are acrobatics with words needed for sipping tea with foreigners while denying to share the exact figures of our N arsenal, in my opinion.

Dear Kanson,

1. While the N-war business is indeed not about conducting war, it should not be viewed as a gamblling game/sport. It is about serious uncompromising preparation. Is that evident in our case, as of the next one year ? Explicitly, or implicitly, it must be made clear to chn/pak that faced with a use/lose situation with our nukes, we shall use. Deploying A-II (our only deterrent as of now) in a forward area without the political will to take the above mentioned stand is like the 1962 "forward policy" backed by zer strength. We know the consequences of Chacha Nehru's idiocy at that time.

2. As A-III, A-V get deployed, the deterrent gets more credible. This is very true. More so once the MIRV variants start coming out. I myself believe that if all goes as per schedule with no political delays, in 5 years, we should be immune to the two front scenario,conventional inferiority notwithstanding. But this is in the future (even if it is the not too distant future).

3. As of today, are A-III deployed ? From what I know, it is in production, ready for induction. Is there open source evidence that these are actually deployed ? For instance, going by what we saw with A-I, there shld be two more user trials before evidence pf deployment surfaces.

4. Same as 3, with Shourya. It seems to have gone underground after the 2008 tests. None in 2009-2010 as per open source.

The Shourya is most probably the Agni-V or a variant.

The period from now to about 2015 will be crucial. Its only around 2015 that we might see some major gaps in the armed forces will start to be bridged viz artillery,submarines,aircraft etc etc. China knows that. Some research scholar had pointed out sometime back that there might be a border war with China around 2012. Guess thats the time we will be most vulnerable what with dips in fighter sqns and all.

I just shared my views. Professionals at SFC and higher command knows more about the weakness and strength and being professionals we can take it that they fully know to play the game well.
A-iii is ready for induction. That mean it has completed the development. So it is ready for deployment if the situation demands. Any improvements if any that is sought out throu' user trial can be added later. Shourya test trials was not even reported so it could follow the same route.

sir is it anything regards to 2 front war

M.L.Sali India-China Border Dispute

Published in 1998

Can someone pdf this book?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88RtMNLpX6I

try this...it works

Too time consuming , have to leaf through every damn page yourself and press download. Any quicker way available?

There are many google books down loaders, you choose what suits you...to get a book free of cost, either you go to Gigapedia.org, or you download it from google books the way I suggested...

Time consuming! try buying the book...

actual locals are of course Indian Citizens and non locals now being settled there are to kicked out to Pakiland.