RamaY wrote:^
Rohitvats ji
Thanks for the information. I never claimed that I am knowledgible in military affairs. I am just asking questions. Please be patient with me.
IA has always wargamed the 2-front scenario in every contigency - it is but obvious that they should do so. The pertinent point is this - what has been India's capability to meet a two front scenario and what objectives would it set for itself. The objectives would have been limited earlier - but with newer raisings and more potent force structure - the envelope of objectives would be that much greater.If IA wargamed a two-front war as early as 1959 and made appropriate recommendations, the fault completely lies on political leadership and state of economy. Lets give the benefit of doubt to the political leadership till say year 2000.
Can you please tell me what does 40K Crores or USD 10 Billion (assuming 40:1 X-change rate) buy for the Services the size of Indian Armed Forces? And what was the state of the Armed Forces post the 'lost decade' of 90s? Why did COAS General Malik made the statement that we'll fight with whatever we have?AFAIK starting sometime in 1998, the NDA govt allocated about Rs40,000 crore towards capital expenditure for armed forces. How many items IA procured since then towards its preparedness? (This is not rhetorical question). In addition to that GOI has been allocating funds for various procurement programs.
I think there are enough - but is that why IA cannot take NA in a jiffy? No, that is not the case.I agree that majority of delays are from GOI side. Are there any instances the armed forces delayed the procurement process for non-technical reasons?
It is the job of the Service Chiefs to tell the GOI about their opinion of the matter - Manekshaw did that in 1971 and ensured we did not end up with egg on our face. Another COAS made a bold plan to take NA in 1987 - the political leadership chickened out. IA lined up enough firepower to thrash PA in June 2002 - Political leadership again backed out.In all these scenarios, the feeling I get is that it is always the fault of political leadership or terrian. A million person strong army always needs $0'B equipment and atleast 5 year preparation time to do anything. I question this premise, causing the takleef.
Sir, what is the basis of your assumption about Strike Corps being converted to 8 IBGs? (that is what you meant, right?).abhik wrote:on simple pooch, if the existing strike Corps(3 in no.) are being made into independent divisions(8 in no.) then why a new whole strike Corp instead of strike divisions?
Sir, you ask a very deep question and to be honest, I don't have an answer.ramdas wrote:Rohitji,
What is the likely outcome of a two-front attack by Chn-pk say, next year ? I learn from posts by some here that Oct-Dec is the only feasible time for that...Is a repeat of 1962 likely in that case ? Some say the gap now is worse than in 1962...or will it drag into a long and bitter conflict ?
As for nuke deterrence, if enough A-III's are inducted, we shld be able to keep chn out of an active shooting war, given the right political leadership
You have answered your own question.ramdas wrote: 1) What rational reason do you have to believe that this is extremely unlikely to happen ?
<snip>
The only thing that can save us is the clear will that faced with a use vs lose condition for our nukes, we shall use them...even the puny deterrent we have now, would probably damage China's economic rise substantially.
Mostly noise from cold start ... like this INDIA’S NEW "COLD START" WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWEDrohitvats wrote:Sir, what is the basis of your assumption about Strike Corps being converted to 8 IBGs? (that is what you meant, right?).abhik wrote:on simple pooch, if the existing strike Corps(3 in no.) are being made into independent divisions(8 in no.) then why a new whole strike Corp instead of strike divisions?
Anyway I'm not really aware how much this has been implemented....Media, reports indicate that the new “Cold Start Strategy” visualizes the use of eight “integrated battle groups”...
There is no clarity on the composition of IBG nor how they are going to materialize.abhik wrote:
Mostly noise from cold start ... like this INDIA’S
NEW "COLD START" WAR DOCTRINE STRATEGICALLY REVIEWED
The idea is to provide a 'punch', a 'fist'. By placing them under one Corps HQ, the same is achieved. These are seperate from holding Corps on LAC - which are also being beefed up with respective Mountain Divisions.But my contention was if your are raising one corp(comprised of say 2 divisions and some more) worth of strike forces, then why not divide the two between two geographical areas i.e N.E and J&K, surely that would give more flexibility?
Of course what you say is true. This is not unique to India alone. All N powers face this challenge. As i said, the N war business is more of a gamble than actually conducting war. That is the gamble India willing to take. While China was explicit in proclaiming any attack on her N weapon will be retaliated with N weapon, India's NFU policy is not such aggressive. The argument is that it creates enough space for "sorting out things" in the conventional realm than resorting to Nuclear war.ramdas wrote:Dear Kanson,
Indeed deploying A-II in arunachal is a good signal on one hand. Two issues, however, exist. One inextricably links conventional to nuclear conflict when chn is involved (more so in a two frnt situation):
1. The nuke deterrent in the form of A-II deployments may be vulnerable to conv. attack, esp. in a sitn where our conventional inferiority is worse than in 1962. This factor is more pronounced in a two front situation. What if the nukes are in danger or being lost in conv. enemy action ? In other words, a use it or lose it situation ? Our doctrine must make clear that faced with such a situation, or faced with large territorial losses to a conventionally stronger adversary, we would use nukes irrespective of the ensuing repurcussions. This threat, if credibly conveyed, would go a long way in making the other side avoid pushing us into a corner, or trying todisarm us, etc.
Yes, more testing is needed and this problem stated is common for any missile. But the picture doesn't ends with Agni-II. We have China specific Agni-III and then Agni-V, Shourya and so on. These missile development and deployment acts as deterrent is my opinion.2. A-II has had reliability issues in 2009. Of course, the May 17, 2010 test did restore some confidence. More testing is needed. After all, why are Prithvi type missiles tested nearly 50 times, Brahmos 20 times, while we are stingy with tests of the Agni series ?
Yes, Agreed. If you have noticed, our development was continuous except for the brief period during emergency. Right after testing the first device, we separated Tritium in late 70s. Tried to test FBF device in early 80s under IG. Started Thermo- Nuclear program and future gen N weapons program during mid 80s. To be precise I think, it is the year 1985. A paper presented in 80s that was linked in this forum shows that we are interested in bunker buster too. Weaponised the device from late 80s. Upgrade the weaponisation from one version to another throughout the 90s(WOP by Chengappa). If my memory is right, the book reported upto 3 generation of weaponised devices in the Indian arsenal during 90s. Gulping the CT, we generated more nuclear material for the bumb from 90s through 00s from civil reactors. And going by the "rumour" the "development" was noted and quoted still 2008, the year marked a decade from POK-2 test. So if you go by the yardstick, our development was continuous and with the available information there is no need to show concern on quality or quantity of the N arsenal. Of course, even if you believe in Dr. Santanam's assertion, as the research is continuous, you can expect that the noted problem if any could have got solved. Minimality and Credibility are acrobatics with words needed for sipping tea with foreigners while denying to share the exact figures of our N arsenal, in my opinion.3. A deterrent that is credible today need not stay so,unless constant efforts are on to improve it qualitatively and, in our case where a small arsenal is involved, quantitatively. that tsp is itself may end up having a larger arsenal means that we must go for a large quantitative upgrade as well. We have stressed too much on minimality of the deterrent. the stress should be on credibility. in general, the more paranoid the state is on these matters, the better.
ramdas wrote:Dear Kanson,
1. While the N-war business is indeed not about conducting war, it should not be viewed as a gamblling game/sport. It is about serious uncompromising preparation. Is that evident in our case, as of the next one year ? Explicitly, or implicitly, it must be made clear to chn/pak that faced with a use/lose situation with our nukes, we shall use. Deploying A-II (our only deterrent as of now) in a forward area without the political will to take the above mentioned stand is like the 1962 "forward policy" backed by zer strength. We know the consequences of Chacha Nehru's idiocy at that time.
2. As A-III, A-V get deployed, the deterrent gets more credible. This is very true. More so once the MIRV variants start coming out. I myself believe that if all goes as per schedule with no political delays, in 5 years, we should be immune to the two front scenario,conventional inferiority notwithstanding. But this is in the future (even if it is the not too distant future).
3. As of today, are A-III deployed ? From what I know, it is in production, ready for induction. Is there open source evidence that these are actually deployed ? For instance, going by what we saw with A-I, there shld be two more user trials before evidence pf deployment surfaces.
4. Same as 3, with Shourya. It seems to have gone underground after the 2008 tests. None in 2009-2010 as per open source.
I just shared my views. Professionals at SFC and higher command knows more about the weakness and strength and being professionals we can take it that they fully know to play the game well.ramdas wrote:Dear Kanson,
1. While the N-war business is indeed not about conducting war, it should not be viewed as a gamblling game/sport. It is about serious uncompromising preparation. Is that evident in our case, as of the next one year ? Explicitly, or implicitly, it must be made clear to chn/pak that faced with a use/lose situation with our nukes, we shall use. Deploying A-II (our only deterrent as of now) in a forward area without the political will to take the above mentioned stand is like the 1962 "forward policy" backed by zer strength. We know the consequences of Chacha Nehru's idiocy at that time.
A-iii is ready for induction. That mean it has completed the development. So it is ready for deployment if the situation demands. Any improvements if any that is sought out throu' user trial can be added later. Shourya test trials was not even reported so it could follow the same route.2. As A-III, A-V get deployed, the deterrent gets more credible. This is very true. More so once the MIRV variants start coming out. I myself believe that if all goes as per schedule with no political delays, in 5 years, we should be immune to the two front scenario,conventional inferiority notwithstanding. But this is in the future (even if it is the not too distant future).
3. As of today, are A-III deployed ? From what I know, it is in production, ready for induction. Is there open source evidence that these are actually deployed ? For instance, going by what we saw with A-I, there shld be two more user trials before evidence pf deployment surfaces.
4. Same as 3, with Shourya. It seems to have gone underground after the 2008 tests. None in 2009-2010 as per open source.
manum wrote:
http://www.youtube.com/watc
Too time consuming
, have to leaf through every damn page yourself and press download. Any quicker way available?actual locals are of course Indian Citizens and non locals now being settled there are to kicked out to Pakiland.RamaY wrote:Rhetorical question ...tejas wrote:Once you take POK what do you do with all the ROP population who live on (infest) the land ?
India has 2nd largest muslim population.
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh may have told the country’s parliament last month that he doesn’t expect an attack by China, but India’s military is taking no chances.
The world’s second-largest army, which celebrated its 64th Army Day on January 15, is on the cusp of implementing a major transformation in its organizational structure and war strategies to meet a possible combined threat from China and its ally Pakistan.
The change follows more than half a decade of annual exercises involving one of India’s three strike corps and a desert corps, which have engaged in operations to fine-tune a strategy that would enable India to take Pakistan by surprise.
Under this concept, the defensive corps close to the border with Pakistan have been re-designated “pivot” corps, and have been handed enhanced offensive elements under integrated battle groups (IBG) that consist of division-sized forces comprising armor, artillery and aviation assets designed to swiftly hit Pakistan before the strike corps, located deeper inside India, would be able to mobilize.
This is supposed to offer India the so-called “cold start” option, under which the IBGs would swing into action in less than 48 hours.
Speaking to me for Indian broadcaster NDTV last week, Indian Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh explained the concept, although he refrained from actually referring to it as “cold start.”
“Our aim was to make the army more agile, more lethal, more responsive, and networked army that is able to meet with the future threats,” he said. “To that extent, certain steps were laid down. One of the things we looked at was the restructuring of our organizations into groupings that will take place in battle. So, we have validated these. Certain changes have come about because of our validation in test bedding. These are coming into effect.”
The transformation study, carried out under Singh while he was commanding the Eastern Army as part of a previous assignment, started validating the concepts from 2010. As the Times of India noted, Exercise Vijayee Bhava (Be Victorious), for instance, practiced blitzkrieg-style operations to hit the enemy hard at short-notice. According to the paper, it essentially revolved around the armor-intensive 2 Corps.
However, the two-month-long Exercise Sudarshan Shakti, conducted in November and December of last year, not only took the concept further, but added several new dimensions to India’s war-fighting theories. For the first time, the Army successfully used its satellites and UAVs to provide a real-time picture and information of the war zone to battlefield commanders.
In addition, real-time links between sensor and shooter were tested, which enabled commanders to make decisions instantly, even as information was being shared among platforms and personnel.
Led and implemented by the Indian Army’s biggest and most lethal formation, the 21 Corps, the exercise witnessed the participation of over 60,000 troops and 300 tanks and brought together all elements – including air power – on one single platform. The air power on display reportedly included combat jets like the Su-30 MKI, Jaguars, MiG-27 and MiG-21, AWACS and helicopters.
But if “Sudarshan Shakti” was meant to authenticate India’s new war fighting strategy against Pakistan, a series of changes in the Northern and Eastern Commands of the Indian Army have quietly taken place over the past four years aimed at reorganizing India’s preparedness against China. As mentioned earlier, two new mountain divisions raised for deployment on the China frontier are now ready, which has added teeth to the Eastern Command and allowed the Army to reorganize a Reserve Corps into a full-fledged formation against China.
The reality is that although India has three “strike” or offensive corps aimed at Pakistan, it still lacks a dedicated offensive formation against China, regarded by the military as the bigger threat. A projected plan to raise a Mountain Strike Corps (since the terrain along the Chinese frontier is super high altitude) is currently pending with India’s Finance Ministry since it involves massive investment, to the tune of over $10 billion dollars, over the next five years. The Defense Ministry as well as the Army HQ is, however, hoping to kick-start the process of raising this formation sooner rather than later.
“At the moment we’re a threat-based organization. We’re moving towards a threat-cum-capability based one. And as the years go by, we will become a totally capability-based force,” Singh told me. “It has various implications like what kind of equipping norms you have, what kind of training that you do, what kind of resources you have to rapidly deploy to various places. So these are things that are being put into effect now, and by the time we see the result, it will take some time. It’s not that overnight we can change something.”
As I mentioned in my analysis following Army Day last year, the latest shift is aimed at strengthening the Army’s capabilities to fight what one general has called a war on “two and a half fronts” – a reference to possible simultaneous confrontation with Pakistan and China in addition to being deployed in a counter-insurgency situation internally.
So far, the four wars between India and Pakistan and one between India and China have been standalone conflicts, but Indian strategic thinkers say a future scenario under which close allies China and Pakistan launch a joint offensive against India is a distinct possibility. The Indian Army therefore wants to be ready for such an eventuality. And the way forward, the Army has concluded, is to become a fleet-footed force capable of quick mobilization and deployment.
According to an Indian military handout, the transformation “envisages seamless integration of available forces without the constraints of inflexible ‘commands.’"
“So far, each command and formation operated well within its prescribed boundaries and deployed the combat as well as support services only within its own jurisdiction,” the handout noted. “The transformation, however, seeks to break down these artificial boundaries to minimize losses and increase optimal utilization of resources. So in the years to come, the Indian Army will move from a 'command-based' deployment to a 'theater command' format where the 'front' or the spearhead will be seamlessly integrated with resources in the "depth" or the rear.”
Most senior military commanders agree that such massive exercises, which put to test both men and machine, help hone the skills of various frontline formations. Inter-services synergy based on advanced technology has been on the rise in the past five years and is therefore a major gain for the Indian military since future wars, whenever they take place, will be swift, short and fought under a technology-intensive umbrella.
Nitin Gokhale is Defence & Strategic Affairs Editor with Indian broadcaster, NDTV 24×7.