Turkey News, discussions, India Turkey Relations

[JE Menon]

Indeed. Although they're getting into Tunisia gradually as well.

In Lebanon, I don't expect them to get an upper hand on the Europeans - there is a strong underlying but rarely expressed anti-Turkish sentiment among both the Christians and the Muslims.

[ramana]

I heard that there is demographics at play in the desire of Turks to be in EU. The rumor was that the majority of the elite are the children of the jannisaries and other Europeans. And thus they want to belong to Europe. However if Neo-Ottomanism rises forget about that.


population breakdown in Turkey:

http://countrystudies.us/turkey/24.htm

[Johann]

I heard that there is demographics at play in the desire of Turks to be in EU. The rumor was that the majority of the elite are the children of the jannisaries and other Europeans. And thus they want to belong to Europe. However if Neo-Ottomanism rises forget about that.


population breakdown in Turkey:

http://countrystudies.us/turkey/24.htm

That's absolutely right. Turkey is a melting pot, with the majority of 'Turks' the assimilated descendants of various mixed converted peoples - Greeks, Slavs, Kurds, Armenians, Georgians, Latins, etc. Which is why they don't look much like Uzbeks....

Many of the "Young Turks" who drove the modernisation and Europeanisation processes from the 19th century onwards were "Rumelians", i.e. Muslims from the European side of the Ottoman Empire. It was very similar in Egypt - Mohammed Ali who led Egypt's modernisation between Napolean and the British was Albanian.

In the days when janissaries were recruited through the 'Boy Tribute' of Christians from the Balkans, they often kept close ties to their families and their home villages once they could. It was quite common for someone who had risen up the ranks to real power to return and build something nice for them; a road, a market, baths, something.

[Rony]

What is the origin of the Turkish Anatolian people? Which race they belong to ?

Ancient Turkey was originally the homeland of the Hitites, a middle eastern people who were cousins to the semites, although, shorter and sturdier. Most of Turkey in fact was dominated by the Hitites until their empire fell. Their glory days were over, but as a people they survived. Western Turkey was home to Greek colonists, one colony eventually prospering and becoming the fabled city of Troy, which was destroyed by the Myceneans.

The Myceneans of Sparta, in turn, were invaded and enslaved (turned into the helot class) by a band of Dorians who went on to become the more famous warlike Spartans. Karma's a b*tch, what can I say. So anyway; despite the Myceneans destroying Troy, the other colonies survived, grew, prospered and spread throughout the rest of Turkey and began breeding with the local Hitites, so thus, ancient Turkey was a mixture of Greek and Hitite elements, that is why some Turks look Greek.

Then the Persians took it over, they really liked that land, and so they sent colonists, and they too decided to breed with the Locals, so now the Turks are a mixture of Greek, Hitite, and Persian. But then Greece under Macedonian rule wanted revenge against the Persians, and Alexander the Great overran it, and conquered the Persian empire. And many Greeks decided to stay in Turkey, so once again the now mixed Hitite, Persian, and earlier Greek mixed turks, mixed with the more recent Greeks.

But then Alexander's empire fell and then Rome rolled along, and they largely left it alone and decided not to breed with them although, there were a small handful of Romans who really liked the country so they stayed there and intermarried, but not in significant numbers. Seeing the prosperity of Anatolia (Turkey), many slavic tribes escaping the depredations of barbarians from the north, the ancestors of the Vikings the Rus, decided to move south.

So now the Hitite, Greek and Persian mixed Turks, mixed with some Slavs. But then Rome in a typically guido fashion pissed off too many people and thus those people decided Rome should burn, so they burned it. And then Attila and his Huns decided to more or less finish the job, although, Rome was already finished by then. The central asiatic hunish hordes really like Anatolia, and so, a band of them stayed, and the Hitite, Greek, Persian and Slavic mixed turks, decided to breed with them. And thus now the turks are mixed Hitite, Greek, Persian, Slavic, and central asian hunish.

But then finally the Byzantine empire fell, and a band of people from Turkmekistan decided to make that place their home, and like the huns they were also central Asian. And thus, the Turks decided to mix with the locals, who were Hitite, Greek, Persian, Slavic, central Asian and Hunish, and because it was a really nice country some Arabs decided they too wanted to join along, and so the turks became a mixture of Hitite, Greek, Persian, Slavic, central Asian and Hunish, in ADDITION to Arabs.

But it doesn't end there. As if that wasn't enough, people from Kurdistan and the Caucasus mountains, not to mention eastern European balkan origin Janissaries, decided to mix with the turks. Thus, the turks are a mixture of Hitite, Greec, Persian, Slavic from two different fronts, central Asian from two different central asian tribes, and finally, Persian and Arabic.

In other words, the Turks are REAL mutts, not like some american airhead who says "oh, I've got austrian, german and Italian in me; I'm such a mutt! tehee!" Give a freaking break man; you're only a mut if you are mixed with different peoples, like for example, the Turks. The Turks, are only linguistically related to the current residents of Turkmekistan who, appearance wise, look nothing like modern Turks. The Turks are a mixture of the above mentioned middle eastern people but it doesn't end there; one of the peoples the hitites warred against, were a band of Celtic warriors originally from central Europe. So....... they also have a little bit of Celtic in there.

Again, Turks are only related to the people from Turkmekistan, linguistically. Appearance wise, genetically speaking, they are only partially related to them, so many empires, so many peoples have settled in Anatolia, later called Turkey, that it doesn't belong to any one race, and all races who have ever lived there, lived in relative harmony with one another with the exception of their relationship with the Kurds.

[krisna]

Geopolitical Journey, Part 5: Turkey

Since World War II, many Turks have immigrated to Europe, where they have failed to assimilate partly by choice and partly because the European systems have not facilitated assimilation. This failure of assimilation has created massive unease about Turkish and other Muslims in Europe, particularly in the post-9/11 world of periodic terror warnings. Whether reasonable or not, this is shaping Western perceptions of Turkey and Turkish views of the West. It is one of the dynamics in the Turkish-Western relationship. Turkey’s emergence as a significant power obviously involves redefining its internal and regional relations to Islam. This alarms domestic secularists as well as inhabitants of countries who feel threatened by Turks — or Muslims — living among them and who are frightened by the specter of terrorism. Whenever a new power emerges, it destabilizes the international system to some extent and causes anxiety. Turkey’s emergence in the current context makes that anxiety all the more intense. A newly powerful and self-confident Turkey perceived to be increasingly Islamic will create tensions, and it has

The question of the hidden agenda of the AKP touches its foreign policy, too. In the United States, nerves are raw over Afghanistan and terror threats. In Europe, Muslim immigration, much of it from Turkey, and more terror threats make for more raw nerves. The existence of an Islamist-rooted government in Ankara has created the sense that Turkey has “gone over,” that it has joined the radical-Islamist camp.

This is why the flotilla incident with Israel turned out as it did. The Turks had permitted a fleet to sail for Gaza, which was blockaded by Israel. Israeli commandos boarded the ships and on one of them got into a fight in which nine people were killed. The Turks became enraged and expected the rest of the world, including the United States and Europe, to join them in condemning Israel’s actions. I think the Turkish government was surprised when the general response was not directed against Israel but at Turkey. The Turks failed to understand the American and European perception that Turkey had gone over to the radical Islamists. This perception caused the Americans and Europeans to read the flotilla incident in a completely unexpected way, from the Turkish government’s point of view, one that saw the decision to allow the flotilla to sail as part of a radical-Islamist agenda. Rather than seeing the Turks as victims, they saw the Turks as deliberately creating the incident for ideological reasons.At the moment, it all turns on the perceptions of the AKP, both in Turkey and the world. And these perceptions lead to very different interpretations of what Turkey is doing.

Turkey is a country that maintains relations with Iran, Israel and Egypt, a dizzying portfolio. After an interregnum of nearly a century, Turkey is new to being a regional power, and everyone in the region is trying to draw Turkey into something for their own benefit. Syria wants Turkish mediation with Israel and in Lebanon. Azerbaijan wants Turkish support against Armenia in Nagorno-Karabakh. Israel and Saudi Arabia want Turkish support against Iran. Iran wants Turkey’s support against the United States. Kosovo wants its support against Serbia. It is a rogue’s gallery of supplicants, all wanting something from Turkey and all condemning Turkey when they don’t get it. Not least of these is the United States, which wants Turkey to play the role it used to play, as a subordinate American ally.

There are no moves that Turkey can make that will not alienate some great power, and it cannot decline to make these moves. It cannot simply depend on Russia for its energy any more than Poland can. Because of energy policy, it finds itself in the same position as the Intermarium, save for the fact that Turkey is and will be much more powerful than any of these countries, and because the region it lives in is extraordinarily more complex and difficult.

Nevertheless, while the Russians aren’t an immediate threat, they are an existential threat to Turkey. With a rapidly growing economy, Turkey needs energy badly and it cannot be hostage to the Russians or anyone else. As it diversifies its energy sources it will alienate a number of countries, including Russia. It will not want to do this, but it is the way the world works.

The next 10 years will not be comfortable for Turkey. It will have problems to solve and battles to fight, figuratively and literally. But I think the answer to the question I came for is this: Turkey does not want to confront Russia. Nor does it want to be dependent on Russia. These two desires can’t be reconciled without tension with Russia. And if there is tension, there will be shared interests with the Intermarium(Intermarium — Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and perhaps Bulgaria) , quite against the intentions of the Turks. In history, intentions, particularly good ones, are rarely decisive.

One of the future great powers by friedman.

[Muppalla]

The following wikileak provides one of the interesting perspective about Turkey. Not a revelation from India's pointbut good for learning and I am posting in full.
WHAT LIES BENEATH ANKARA'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

INTRODUCTION/COMMENT
--------------------

¶1. (C) There is much talk in chanceries and in the international media these days about Turkey's new, highly activist foreign policy, which unquestionably represents a transition not only from prior governments, but also from the AKP regime before the Gaza/Davos events, and before the ascent of Ahmet Davutoglu as Foreign Minister in April. Some commentaries are upbeat, but others, including many experts and editorial writers in the US, have expressed concern. The ruling AKP foreign policy is driven by both a desire to be more independently activist, and by a more Islamic orientation. Frankly, rational national interest, particularly trade opportunities and stability considerations, also drives Turkey's new slant. Major challenges with us in the coming months include the direction of Turkish-Israeli relations, the fate of the Protocols with Armenia, and the Turkish posture vis--vis Iran.

¶2. (C) Does all this mean that the country is becoming more focused on the Islamist world and its Muslim tradition in its foreign policy? Absolutely. Does it mean that it is "abandoning" or wants to abandon its traditional Western orientation and willingness to cooperate with us? Absolutely not. At the end of the day we will have to live with a Turkey whose population is propelling much of what we see. This calls for a more issue-by-issue approach, and recognition that Turkey will often go its own way. In any case, sooner or later we will no longer have to deal with the current cast of political leaders, with their special yen for destructive drama and - rhetoric. But we see no one better on the horizon, and Turkey will remain a complicated blend of world class "Western" institutions, competencies, and orientation, and Middle Eastern culture and religion. END INTRODUCTION.

COMPONENTS OF POLICY
--------------------

"The Traditional Western"

¶3. (C) Turkish policy today is a mix of "traditional Western" orientation, attitudes and interests, and two new elements, linked with new operational philosophies: "zero conflicts" and "neo-Ottomanism." The traditional still represents the core of Turkish foreign policy, and is centered on cooperation and integration with the West. Its core is NATO, the customs union with the EU, and most significantly, the EU accession effort. This all began with the Ottoman effort to emulate the European great powers, and was propelled powerfully forward by Ataturk. Nevertheless the country was on the sidelines in World War II. It was only the threat of the USSR, and the dominance (and outstretched hand) of the US, that led to the "Turkey we know": tough combat partner in Korea, major NATO ally, US anchor in the Middle East. Much of this continues.

¶4. (C) Europe is by far Turkey's most important economic partner in terms of investment and trade. The EU accounts for 42 percent of Turkey,s total trade, while the US accounts for a bit less than 5 percent. While the US is much less important in terms of trade statistics, it remains important in various sectors (e.g. energy,aviation, military), and in various ways. NATO is essential to and much respected by Turkey. (Note: The fact that "only" about one-third of the Turkish population in one poll see NATO as important to Turkey's security is actually a plus; on any poll Turks usually are overwhelmingly negative about any foreign engagement or relationship. But we should not be too sanguine here since support for NATO has been halved over the past decade. End Note) The military is armed by the US, and Turkey recognizes that many fires in its back yard -- from Iraq to Afghanistan and Pakistan -- can only be solved by close cooperation with and acceptance of US and NATO leadership. Finally, even AKP leaders know that much of their allure or "wasta" in the Middle East and elsewhere stems from their privileged position in key Western clubs. This traditional orientation may be shaken, or reduced, but as it has both significant buy-in by elites of all philosophies, and many concrete advantages, Turkey will not abandon it.

"Zero Problems with Turkey's Neighbors"

¶5. (C) But this Turkey is trying to "post-modernize" itself. One major area of AKP effort has been to resolve problems with Turkey's immediate "near abroad." This effort stands in contrast with the "traditional" Turkish policy of letting these frozen conflicts fester, and is much more compatible with US and European interests. The list of Turkish initiatives under the AKP is impressive: accepting the Annan Plan in 2004 to resolve Cyprus, continuing the 1999 rapprochement with Greece, the opening to Armenia culminating in the signing of recognition protocols, warming and productive relations with both Baghdad and Erbil (the latter complemented by significant reforms in Turkey's relations with its own Kurdish population). The signature accomplishment of this policy is the wooing of Syria. While this road to Damascus in fact was paved by Syria's accommodation of prior Turkish governments' demands (relinquishing claims on Turkey's Hatay province, expelling Ocalan), it is touted by the Turks as a game-changer. As noted below, they have leveraged it to tackle a number of regional problems, from Lebanon to Iran.

¶6. (C) While this new approach is to be applauded, there is a fly in its ointment. Little of true practical and final accomplishment has been achieved. Cyprus is still split (albeit the fault, at least in terms of the Annan plan, lies more with the Greek Cypriots and the EU); tensions with Greece in the Aegean continue; the Protocols with Armenia have not been ratified due to Turkish concerns about Nagorno-Karabakh; Iraq's instability and the KRG's unwillingness to do more against the PKK raise questions about the sustainability of Turkey's constructive Iraq policy; the rapprochement with Syria has not really produced any Syrian "flip" away from Iran. Granted, Turkey is dealing with some of the world's most difficult actors, and facing stiff opposition at home to making more concessions, but the proof of this pudding is yet to be seen.

"Neo Ottomanism"

¶7. (C) The idea of Turkey using its cultural and religious links to the Middle East to the advantage of both Turkish interests and regional stability is not new with the AKP, but has been given much more priority by it, in part because of the Islamic orientation of much of the party, including leaders Erdogan, Gul, and Davutoglu. Moreover, the AKP's constant harping on its unique understanding of the region, and outreach to populations over the heads of conservative, pro-US governments, have led to accusations of "neo-Ottomanism." Rather than deny, Davutoglu has embraced this accusation. Himself the grandson of an Ottoman soldier who fought in Gaza, Davutoglu summed up the Davutoglu/AKP philosophy in an extraordinary speech in Sarajevo in late 2009 (REF A). His thesis: the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has been ravaged by division and war ever since. (He was too clever to explicitly blame all that on the imperialist western powers, but came close). However, now Turkey is back, ready to lead -- or even unite. (Davutoglu: "We will re-establish this (Ottoman) Balkan").

¶8. (C) While this speech was given in the Balkans, most of its impact is in the Middle East. Davutoglu's theory is that most of the regimes there are both undemocratic and illegitimate. Turkey, building on the alleged admiration among Middle Eastern populations for its economic success and power, and willing to stand up for the interests of the people, reaches over the regimes to the "Arab street." Turkey's excoriating the Israelis over Gaza, culminating in the insulting treatment of President Peres by Erdogan at Davos in 2009, illustrates this trend. To capitalize on its rapport with the people, and supposed diplomatic expertise and Ottoman experience, Turkey has thrown itself into a half-dozen conflicts as a mediator. This has worked well, as noted above, with Iraq, and was quite successful in the Syrian-Israeli talks before Gaza. Turkey has also achieved some limited success on Lebanon and in bringing Saudi Arabia and Syria together. As noted below, however, this policy brings with it great frictions, not just with us and the Europeans but with many supposed beneficiaries of a return to Ottoman suzerainty. Furthermore, it has not achieved any single success of note.

WHY THE CHANGE?
---------------

¶9. (C) Various factors explain the shifts we see in Turkish foreign policy beyond the personal views of the AKP leadership:

-- Islamization: As reported REF B, religiosity has been increasing in Turkey in past years, just as has been seen in many other Muslim societies. The AKP is both a beneficiary of, and a stimulus for, this phenomenon. However, bitter opposition within Turkey against domestic "pro-Islamic" reforms (e.g., head scarves) has frustrated the AKP, and a more "Islamic" or "Middle Eastern" foreign policy offers an alternative sop for the AKP's devout base.

-- Success: Despite its problems, Turkey over the past 50 years has been a success story, rising to the 16th largest economy and membership in the G-20. This, along with its extraordinary security situation compared to all other regional states, and democratic system, encourage a more active -- and more independent -- leadership role in regional and even global affairs.

-- Economics: one secret of Turkish success has been its trade and technology-led economic growth. This growth is in good part thanks to its customs union with the EU, by far its biggest export market, and resulting investment from the EU, as well as decades of technology transfer and educational assistance from the U.S. Nevertheless, with exports to the EU down due to the 2008-2009 crisis, Turkey is looking for new markets, particularly in the hydrocarbon rich Arab world, Iran, Russia, and Caucasus/Central Asia. They have money, and strong import demand, and Turkey is dependent on them for its oil and gas. These countries, however, (along with China-another Turkish export target) tend much more than the EU and North America to mix politics and trade. To some degree the West thus is taken for granted and economic priority is directed towards relations with the Middle East and "Eurasia."

-- Civilians ascendant: Erdogan's political success - together with a number of messy scandals resulting in public investigation - has meant that the Turkish General Staff now plays a much smaller role in defining Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey's support to NATO is still strong, but it now lacks the suspicion of Russia which the cold-war instinct of General Staff brought to the mix.

-- EU disillusionment: Both popular and elite Turkish opinion has recently grown much more pessimistic about eventual EU membership -- or even its value. The reasons for this are complex, but include the shifting mood in Europe towards Islam, the replacement of "pro-Turkey" leaders in France and Germany by Sarkozy and Merkel, both decidedly cool towards Turkey's EU membership, and a sense in Turkey of distance from and lack of sympathy for Europe.

-- Relativization of the Western anchor. An op-ed in the Financial Times by Gideon Rechman on January 4 noted correctly the tendency of the "young giants" -- South Africa, Brazil, India, and Turkey -- to pursue Third Worldish policies and rhetoric even while benefitting enormously from the globalized trade and international security created and maintained by the "West." That certainly characterizes Turkey. With the end of the cold war, relative success in the struggle with the PKK, and the "taming" of Syria, Iraq, and (at least from Turkey's point of view) Iran, Turkey's need for NATO and U.S. security is reduced. Its dependence on Western trade, investment, technology transfer and educational exchange remains critical, but is regarded as a "free good" that Turkey deserves and does not have to expend effort for. Relations with its various new friends in the North-East-South or on the other hand require effort which is facilitated by some downplaying of Turkey's Western anchor.

DAVUTOGLU DISCONTENTS
---------------------

¶10. (C) The AKP's new approach to international affairs receives mixed reviews inside and outside Turkey. It is not a major factor in the AKP's relative popularity, but several elements of it (unfortunately, those we are least happy with) do appeal to voters. Criticism of Israel post-Gaza is overwhelmingly popular, and the relatively soft Turkish position on Iran -- a country about which many Turks are skeptical -- is presumably helpful with a narrow, but for Erdogan's electoral fate important, group of Islamic voters associated with former PM Erbakan.

¶11. (C) Nevertheless, many in Turkey's large westernized elite see the Islamic Outreach as a complement to the alleged AKP plan to Islamize Turkish society, and complain bitterly about their country's losing its western moorings. The Nationalist segment in Turkey, mobilized most by the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), sees the AKP's compromises on Armenia, the KRG in northern Iraq, Cyprus, etc, as a betrayal of diaspora "Turks" (the Iraqi Turkomen, Azeris, Turkish Cypriots, etc) and charges that the AKP is trying to replace the Republic's organizing principle of "Turkism" with the broader Islamic "Umma." The Republican People's Party (CHP), the lead opposition party, attacks AKP foreign policy relatively ineffectively with a mix of MHP-like nationalist rhetoric and "abandoning the west" criticism.

¶12. (C) But it is in the EU that the Erdogan foreign policy of late has run into the heaviest of sailing. To some degree European angst at Turkey's "new direction" is viewed as an excuse to pummel Turkey to score domestic points among anti-foreigner elements. But there is real concern in Europe, made manifest by the Rasmussen NATO SecGen issue last April. Europeans were furious with Turkey's presentng itself as the "Islamic" voice or conscience in NATO, having consulted with Middle Eastern States before talking to its NATO allies. Extrapolating that behavior into the even more diversity-intolerant EU is a nightmare. Erdogan's foreign (and domestic) policy orientation conjures up not just a clash of Christianity and Islam, but the spectre of a "meld" of Europe and the Middle East, and of Europe's secularlism with oriental religiosity. Davutoglu and others argue that Turkey's "success" as a coming Middle East power makes it more attractive to the EU -- giving Europe a new foreign policy "market" through Turkey. While some in Europe appear interested in this idea, ironically including Turkey EU membership skeptic France, this does not seem to carry much weight in most European capitals, let alone populations.

¶13. (C) Finally, not all of the ex-Ottomans look with fondness on their past under the Pashas, or yearn for Turkey's return. Reaction among many in the Balkans to Davutoglu's Sarejevo speech (REF A) was quite strong. In the Middle East itself, the Arab street might applaud Turkey's populistic and essentially cost-free support for more radical elements, but it's not particularly appreciated by rulers (although Turkey seems to have made some progress with Syria, brokered a rapprochement between President Bashir and Saudi King Abdullah, and has had some role in resolving the Lebanon cabinet stalemate). Sooner or later, though, Turkey will have to produce results, take risks, commit real resources, and take hard decisions to augment a policy now consisting mainly of popular slogans, ceaseless trips, and innumerable signatures on MOUs of little importance. The experience with Iran, which despite significant Turkish verbal support and wooing, appears uninterested in granting Turkey any concessions, or agreeing to a Turkish lead in mediation efforts, is telling.

THE PROBLEM FOR THE US
----------------------

¶14. (C) Turkey's new foreign policy is a mixed bag for us. Having regional heavyweights take on burdens, thereby relieving us, has long been a desired goal of US policy, but it comes with a certain loss of control. Nevertheless, on a whole host of key issues of supreme importance to us -- Afghanistan and Pakistan, cooperation in and on Iraq, NATO efforts (although a leading Turkish role in Missile Defense will not be easy) -- Turkey is a crucial ally, and our use of Incirlik, Habur gate, and Turkish airspace for our Iraq and Afghanistan operations is indispensible. Its "zero conflicts" initiatives, which have moved Turkey forward on more of the key bilateral spats -- Cyprus, Greece, Kurds, Northern Iraq, Armenia -- than we have seen with any other Turkish government, also support U.S. interests.

¶15. (C) Nevertheless, these latter issues illustrate two problems. At least in Turkish eyes, on this complex of issues the US , especially the media, interest groups, and Congress, default to a "blame Turkey" posture regardless of whatever it does. Second, Turkey has repeatedly run into trouble actually consummating these various openings -- the Armenian protocols being the best example, but continued overflights of Greek islands and domestic opposition to the Kurdish opening are also relevant. What we fear is that this inability to bring to conclusion foreign policy initiatives will affect not just the above, but most Turkish policy, given the over-extension of Davutoglu and his team, and a tendency to substitute rhetoric for long term investment of diplomatic, military, and assistance capital. (Fortunately, Afghanistan/Pakistan and Iraq are the two major exceptions to this tendency.)

¶16. (C) The greatest potential strategic problem for the US, however, and the one that has some of the commentators howling, is the Turks neo-Ottoman posturing around the Middle East and Balkans. This "back to the past" attitude so clear in Davutoglu's Sarajevo speech, combined with the Turks' tendency to execute it through alliances with more Islamic or more worrisome local actors, constantly creates new problems. Part of this is structural. Despite their success and relative power, the Turks really can't compete on equal terms with either the US or regional "leaders" (EU in the Balkans, Russia in the Caucasus/Black Sea, Saudis, Egyptians and even Iranians in the ME). With Rolls Royce ambitions but Rover resources, to cut themselves in on the action the Turks have to "cheat" by finding an underdog (this also plays to Erdogan's own worldview), a Siladjcic, Mish'al, or Ahmadinejad, who will be happy to have the Turks take up his cause. The Turks then attempt to ram through revisions to at least the reigning "Western" position to the favor of their guy. Given, again, the questioning of Western policy and motives by much of the Turkish public and the AKP, such an approach provides a relatively low cost and popular tool to demonstrate influence, power, and the "we're back" slogan.

¶17. (C) This has been, so far, manageable, if at times high maintenance, in the Balkans and Mideast, although the damage to Israeli-Turkish relations remains serious. If the Turks are genuine in their desire to draw Syria away from Iran, and if they begin achieving real success rather than telephone books worth of questionable protocols, then that will be of benefit to us all. But with Iran itself it is a different story. REF C describes the background to the Turkish relationship with Iran, one more complicated than with their ex-Ottoman Arab and other subjects. Trade/hydrocarbon interests, Turkish aversion to sanctions stemming from the first Gulf War, Erdogan's vocal "third worldism" and certain domestic political considerations all push Turkey in the wrong direction. Unlike with many of the other issues, however, Turkey will have to stand and be counted on Iran, in the Security Council, with MD, and in implementation of UN or US sanctions. This will have a profound effect on relations second only to the fate of the Armenian protocols over the next year.

Jeffrey

[AjitK]

Is Erdogan's Success Pulling Turks Away from Europe?

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to win a third term in Sunday's election. His hunger for power may be bad for Turkey's democracy, but he has helped transform the country into an economic powerhouse. The once-promised EU membership seems increasingly irrelevant for the rising power.

It is time for Europe to rethink how it actually wants to treat this powerful and difficult neighbor: to take it seriously and align itself with Turkey, stall it for another 20 years or tell it that it has nothing in common with Europe and its predominantly Christian and Western orientation. It is time to take stock of the situation, because the parameters of one of the most torturous and protracted European debates have changed fundamentally in recent years.

'Turkey and Europe Need Each Other'

SPIEGEL: Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, also a very emotional man, told SPIEGEL that Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe.

Davutoglu: That's not an emotional but a very rational statement. Just think of energy security. Do we need Europe to satisfy our demand for energy? No, we need Iraq, Iran and Russia. The Europeans, on the other hand, depend on the Anatolian corridor to get oil and gas. The truth is that we need each other. It's the only way we can prevail against powers like China and India. We should both ask ourselves the question: Where does Europe's future lie?

SPIEGEL: At the moment, many are also asking themselves where the future of the Middle East lies. Did you anticipate the unrest in the Arab world?

Davutoglu: Yes, undoubtedly. Ten years ago, I wrote in my books that there are two historic anomalies in the Arab world: the colonialism of the 20th century, which divided Arab societies, and the Cold War, which contributed to the establishment of autocratic regimes in the region. A transformation like the one the Soviet bloc experienced in the 1990s didn't happen in the Arab world. But now change has come.

SPIEGEL: And what is Turkey's position on this change?

Davutoglu: We have formulated two principles. First, the Cold War is over once and for all, and it's time for change. Second, the transformation has to happen peacefully. These two principles apply to all countries in the Middle East.

[krisna]

Erdogan triumphs in Turkey's election

Based on a preliminary count, Prime Minster Tayyip Erdogan's party scored some 50 percent of the vote, and was set to win around 327 seats in the 550-member parliament, less than the 330 needed to send a new constitution to a referendum.

The strong showing by Kurdish independent candidates – 35 appear to have won seats – will give them a potent voice in parliament and pile pressure on Erdogan to address their grievances. Despite recent cultural and linguistic reforms, Kurdish politicians have become increasingly bold in their calls for autonomy and civil disobedience. The government's goal is to end a separatist conflict which has killed more than 40,000 people in 27 years but for now there is no end in sight to the violence.

[Agnimitra]

MKB's paean heralding the second coming of the Ottoman imperium, complete with usual anti-West apologetics:

Erdogan leads Turkey - and the Middle East

The heart of the matter is that Turkey is reaching unprecedented heights of economic prosperity and is a land at peace after several decades of strife, bloodshed and chronic political instability. The contrast couldn't be sharper with its neighborhood, which is passing through great upheaval and uncertainties.

Turkey's economy grew at a rate of 9% last year, second only to China's among the Group of 20. The economy is already the world's 17th largest and growing income is beginning to percolate and give people hope of a better tomorrow.

Today, Turkey borrows more cheaply than Spain; a far cry from the not-too-distant past when it used to hold a begging bowl before the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Yet, it also showcases the IMF's success. Turkey has been one of IMF's biggest borrowers - US$25 billion in the past decade - but is well-poised to pay back its debts by 2013. The contrast with Greece, a pristine European Union (EU) member country, is at once obvious.

Unsurprisingly, a Turkish name that spontaneously sailed into view as a terrific candidate for the vacant post of managing director of IMF was of Kemal Davis, who nursed the sick Turkish economy at a critical phase when it was in intensive care. Arguably, it would have been a bitter pill to swallow for EU member countries if a brilliant Turkish wizard were to be employed to restore their economies to recovery.

[...]

[Erdogan's] Personal charisma was certainly a factor, as there is no one today in Turkish politics who can even come up to his shoulders in sheer stature as a statesman. It is a saga that becomes the stuff of an absorbing political biography - a long journey from the backstreets of a Black Sea town to Ankara via Istanbul, from a prison cell to the office of the prime minister, from rabble-rousing Islamism to consensual politics, from a Turkish politician to a towering regional figure who might very well end up in the years ahead moulding the New Middle East in a far more enduring and humane way than the Ottomans from Suleiman the Magnificent could manage through centuries.

There are two Erdogans in evidence. In his first term, as he began the project to roll back the Turkish "deep state" and to ease the country of its dogmatic notions regarding the essence of secularism, he knew he was taking on a formidable challenge and a vicious backlash was to be expected.

So, Erdogan resorted to the politics of moderation and became a "centrist". He made great tactical use of Turkey's EU membership bid to push forward his reform program. This approach helped him form a rainbow coalition of large industrialists, Islamist conservatives and liberals, Kurdish nationalists and sections of the intelligentsia which were, per se, antithetical to the politics of Islamism.

The strategy of stooping to conquer paid off and Erdogan presided over what is arguably one of the most transformative periods of Turkish history. Turkey is indeed a vastly different country compared to what it was in 2002 when the AKP first came to power.

During his second term in office from 2007, Erdogan turned out to be a different man. He was much more assertive and confident, borne out of the awareness that he was no longer leading the party of the underdog - AKP had become a Turkish "establishment" party par excellence.

He saw no further use of his "centrist" coalition. As a prominent columnist put it in the Hurriyet newspaper:

"Moderation brought the AKP popularity. Yet the more popular it became, the more the AKP felt it could ignore centrist consensual politics and the liberal vision of EU membership. In due course, the party abandoned the EU process and instead started to go after those who disagreed with it, including the media and the courts.

"Ten years later, Mr Erdogan still has the support of Islamist-conservatives, but the rest of his coalition has abandoned him. Liberals have left the AKP for its lackluster commitment to Europe. Large businesses are disheartened by heavy-handed treatment of secular companies by the AKP."

The criticism is somewhat uncharitable. The EU didn't help matters with Germany and France in particular making it abundantly clear that Turkey's hopes of taking habitation in a common European home would always remain a pipedream. The AKP reacted to the EU's arrogance of politico-cultural superiority.

What lends enchantment to the view is that it is all going to be Erdogan's and Turkey's choice - a choice that will be made not because of American or European pressure. (The deep-rooted "anti-Americanism" in Turkey is as intense as in Pakistan with only 10% Turks viewing the United States favorably.) Second, the entire Muslim Middle East is curiously watching the choices that Erdogan makes in his third term.

Erdogan is well-placed to plant an iron signpost for the road that the Muslim Brotherhood can take in Egypt or Jordan; what quintessentially Shi'ite empowerment can mean within a democratic framework in Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait or Bahrain without the Muslim psyche having to tear itself apart; how despite Arabism, the Middle East can still pull on excellently well with the West, as Erdogan indeed is doing, despite being an Islamist and a proud Turk.

[Agnimitra]

Turkey recalibrating regional role

While an uneven response to the Arab Spring has threatened Turkey's "neo-Ottoman" foreign policy, the violence in Syria could be most damaging. Along with the prospect of more refugees and a revival of Kurdish issues, Ankara's high-stakes balancing act of chiding the Bashar al-Assad regime while courting the opposition could undermine its role as champion of regional issues.

MKB uvaacha:
Turkey cools down tempers over Syria

Turkey grudgingly accepted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's vague reform pledges on Monday, warning however that they are "not enough". Though Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has blasted the crackdown by Damascus as "savagery", Ankara's diplomats are ramping down tensions over the crisis. Turkey knows Assad's position is not as threatened as the West suggests, and that it will be left carrying the can should anarchy erupt.

[Agnimitra]

Similar to Shiv ji's line of thinking about TSP's economic-cultural catch-22 situation w.r.t. India...

Economy alone can't explain success

The success of the "Turkish model" is not only down to the recently re-elected Justice and Development Party's economic achievements, it is also a result of the nation finally reconciling its historical ties to Muslim countries with its Westernization drive.

[shyamd]

Adm. N Verma was in Turkey for 4 days. Came back few days ago. Nothing much in the press. His visit comes after Army gen was in Turkey.

[Agnimitra]

تجمع کارکنان بی‌بی‌سی در اعتراض به بازداشت خبرنگار این رسانه در تاجیکستان

BBC Mid-East correspondent arrested in Tajikistan.
Tajik authorities claim he has links with Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

The journalist's name is Urmonboy Usmonov. Turkic.
Tajikistan has Turkic minorities, but majority Iranic.

HuT has a big base in Londonistan.
Turkish Gulen Movement (Hizmet) also has several schools in Tajikistan.

How closely is Gulen movement related to HuT?

[shyamd]

Gulen is pro US - CIA backed.

[Samudragupta]

Gulen is pro US - CIA backed.

What is the US interest in backing Gullen...the same person and his network have been used to permanantly push Turkey towards the Islamic lap.....

[shyamd]

They use it as a base of covert ops and are seen as fairly liberal promoting religious tolerance. CIA uses it in central asia to talk to extremist groups, infiltration etc. There are a few well documented cases of individuals being taken to guantanamo and arrests on terror charges by FBI - but many were released with the intervention of former CIA people.

[Rony]

The Kurdish case

Few of us may realize it, but 850 delegates from North Kurdistan recently declared democratic autonomy in Amed (Diarbakir), proclaimed as the capital of North Kurdistan. They invited all Kurds to regard themselves as Kurdistani citizens. The area the autonomy claims constitutes a substantial portion of southeastern Turkey.

Ankara waxed furious. The world couldn’t possibly be more oblivious.

The Kurds are indigenous folk arbitrarily overlooked by the powers that artificially carved up the Mideast after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire post-World War I. Not only were Kurds denied recognition and independence, but they were divided among Turkey (an estimated 20 percent of Turkey’s overall population), Iran (7% of Iran’s population), Iraq (20% of Iraq’s population) and Syria (9% of Syria’s population) – the latter two being synthetic political concoctions created by Britain and France, respectively.

The lack of elementary Iraqi and Syrian cohesion is reflected in internal strife to this day.

According to prevalent mythology, the international community deems self-determination the natural and inalienable right of each nationality. That, at least, is the pretext for the worldwide clamor for a Palestinian state.

Swept aside are reservations about the rather recent origin of claims to a separate Palestinian national identity, along with the fact that Palestinians are indistinguishable from their neighbors in language, religion, culture and every conceivable marker of ethic uniqueness.

National designation, we are told, is subjective. If any collective regards itself as worthy of self-determination, then self-determination is its due. Yet this principle is hardly applied with universal even-handedness. Evidence of bias abounds even without bringing in pervasive animus to the very notion that the long-suffering Jewish people merits sovereignty just like far younger and less distinctive ethnicities.

The Kurdish case clearly underscores such double standards.

Far more numerous than Palestinians, they’re estimated at between 30 million and 35 million. They form an obvious separate nationality, non-Arab, with its own culture and readily distinguishable language (a subcategory of the Iranian branch of the Indo-Iranian group of Indo-European languages.) They were around far before any Arabs had learned of the Palestinian moniker, and the Kurds struggled for independence long into the 19th century, before the advent of Arab nationalism. They established the short-lived Republic of Ararat in 1927 but it was soon vanquished. Both Turkey and Iran cruelly suppressed numerous Kurdish uprisings. Kurds are still fighting for their freedom.

The contrast between how the world treats the Palestinians and the Kurds couldn’t be more marked. Palestinians are spoiled with international succor and are pampered financially. They were offered an independent state back in 1947 but rejected it, preferring to destroy the twin Jewish state instead.

Practically the entire world has come round to backing Palestinian statehood again and awaits with fevered anticipation the unilateral quest for recognition of Palestinian independence at the UN General Assembly in September.

The unilateral declaration of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey, however, was greeted with deadly silence. The world couldn’t care less. It doesn’t glorify the Kurdish nationalist drive, doesn’t offer it diplomatic assistance, doesn’t shower it with indulgent cheer-leading in the media and doesn’t fund Kurdish separatists, and has denounced what’s perceived as Kurdish terrorism but has abided anti-Kurdish ruthlessness in four countries for many decades.

In short, a nation that meets many more prerequisites for self-determination than do Palestinians – and other Mideastern constructs of yesteryear’s Western imperialism - keeps getting a very raw deal. The Kurds fail to elicit even a modicum of the sympathy so liberally accorded the Palestinians.

Nonetheless, potential new opportunities now beckon to the Kurds. They enjoy semi-autonomy under the Americans in Iraq (though there’s uncertainty about the post- American future), Syria is rocked by instability, and partial alleviation of Damascus’s oppression emboldens Iranian and Turkish Kurds as well.

Perhaps this is the time for bolder Israeli foreign policy, especially in view of Ankara’s ongoing antagonism toward Israel (our wishful thinking for Reccep Tayyip Erdogan’s rethink not withstanding). We have little to lose – certainly not Turkey’s friendship.

There’s no reason not to express un-stinted Israeli support for Kurdish self-determination – as we did for South Sudan’s. This isn’t merely the right thing to do as quid pro quo for Turkey’s own conduct, but because the Kurds deserve it.

[Agnimitra]

When diplomacy is never saying sorry

There is, for example, the Syrian crisis. It was a major incentive for both Israel and Turkey, which are Syria's neighbors, to pursue a reconciliation, since it threatens to destabilize the entire region; the only way to avoid a serious spillover would be for regional powers to act together and with determination.

Syria was likely also on the mind of the United States as it pushed Jerusalem and Ankara to mend fences. The Syrian upheaval is gradually sliding toward a proxy conflict between Iran and the United States and its allies; even a possible Turkish military intervention is reportedly in the works.

The Iranian nuclear crisis is also at a critical point. The United States clearly is eager to resolve any outstanding issues between its allies in this moment.

On the other hand, however, stands Turkey's desire for a prominent role in the Muslim world. After the fall of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, Ankara arguably received a boost in this ambition. Still, it is reluctant to challenge its other main competitors - Saudi Arabia and Iran. It has domestic troubles of its own, including a restive Kurdish population, and an economic crisis that is bound to be exacerbated by the problems in Syria and the rest of the Arab world.

A cheap way for Erdogan to get credit with the Arab street is to pick a fight with Israel; the more symbolic the fight, the better. The Mavi Marmara incident seems like a gold mine in this respect, and this likely explains a large part of the Turkish reticence to accept anything less than an apology.

[Agnimitra]

Turkey: Military chiefs 'resign en masse'

The chief of the Turkish armed forces has resigned, along with the heads of the army, navy and air force, according to media reports.

The reason for the resignations of Gen Isik Kosaner and the other heads remains unclear.

There has been a history of tension between the military and the government of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan in recent years.

Gen Kosaner is reported to have met Mr Erdogan several times in recent days.

[Samudragupta]

So Turkey going firmly under New Caliphate....street is winning against the barrack and is changing the barrack....

[sanjeevpunj]

^^^ Serious issues these.Turkey's role in International politics as a mediator between Islamic hardliners and the west, will effectively reduce after this.Our great L K Advani visited Turkey with great hopes, now he will think twice about going there.When an Army Chief resigns,one can expect anything from mutiny to coup to civil war.

[Philip]

More on the "Turkish delight"

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldne ... nment.html

Turkey's entire military command quits over row with government
Turkey's entire top brass quit on Friday night leaving one America's strongest military's allies leaderless as the country's Islamic government confronts senior officers for conspiring against the prime minister .

Gen Isik Kosaner, the head of the Turkish armed forces, quit his post along with the heads of the ground, naval and air forces in protest over government pressure to sack scores of serving officers they wished to promote.

The generals had been preparing for a confrontation with Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan at next week's annual promotions board.

Gen Kosaner resigned because he "deemed it necessary," according to a report on NTV. Mr Erdogan had signalled he would block promotions for officers he believed were part of a conspiracy to destabilise Turkey and undermine his government.

The first elected prime minister from an Islamic movement was targeted by a conspiracy known as Sledgehammer, prosecutors have alleged.

Police have drawn up a list of 195 suspect, all retired or active duty members of the military, who had been party to the plot since 2003, the year Mr Erdogan took office.

[Manny]

^^^ Serious issues these.Turkey's role in International politics as a mediator between Islamic hardliners and the west, will effectively reduce after this.Our great L K Advani visited Turkey with great hopes, now he will think twice about going there.When an Army Chief resigns,one can expect anything from mutiny to coup to civil war.

Erdogan has has been pretty wile so far. He has named replacements for all of em. And the Turkish military wing has been clipped. Because the vast majority of the Turks feel its ok. The military which usually enjoys the nations support has failed to impress them THIS TIME.

[Rony]

Turkey’s newly faltering foreign adventures

About this time last year Tayyip emerged as the name of choice for newborn Gazan boys. It came in the wake of the Israeli army’s assault on a flotilla of Turkish-flagged ships, trying to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza, and Turkey’s retaliatory downgrading of diplomatic relations. By standing up to Israel, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s prime minister, became a new hero for the Arab masses.
Alarmed western officials and some Turkey-watchers busily explained that Mr Erdogan had embarked on a neo-Ottoman revival, turning east after France and Germany started building barricades against Ankara’s accession to the European Union. The eastward-turn analysis was flawed then, and is more so now. Yet this year’s chain of Arab uprisings has submitted Turkey’s reassertive foreign policy to the most searching of reality tests. It is far from obvious that the Erdogan government’s vaunted “zero problems with the neighbours” policy passes muster.

When Mr Erdogan and his AKP party were re-elected for the third successive time in June, his triumphalism seemed to know no bounds. The result, he proclaimed, was a victory “for Bosnia as much as Istanbul, Beirut as much as Izmir, Damascus as much as Ankara”. Within days, thousands of Syrians were streaming across the Turkish border, seeking refuge from the savagery uncaged by their president, Bashar al-Assad.

Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, last week flew to Damascus to deliver the umpteenth ultimatum to the Assad regime, as Turkish anger at Syria’s use of tanks started to turn molten. His government has made a heavy political investment in Syria, but Mr Erdogan’s patience has all but run out. Turkey provided Damascus with the gift of a visa-free border and a free-trade agreement with Syria. Mr Assad, in return, has ignored Mr Erdogan’s urging to open up his regime, built around minority Alawite rule, that is now clamping down on Syria’s Sunni majority. This is stoking demand for action inside Mr Erdogan’s own Sunni-dominated party at home too.
Mr Erdogan has zero tolerance of having his policies publicly exposed as hollow. Yet the bigger contest, greater even than the trial of strength between the Assads and their opponents, is between Turkey and Iran, whose alliance with Syria provides Tehran with a gateway to the Arab world.

Turkey, a candidate for the 27-nation EU that also chairs the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference, had hitherto pursued a policy of engagement with Iran that made its western allies nervous. When Turkey and Brazil last year tried to find a compromise on Iran’s nuclear activity, the least Mr Erdogan and Mr Davutoglu were accused of was naivety. Some commentators in the US and Israel deplored what they saw as a nakedly populist play for the Islamist gallery.
Turkey has now become a head-on rival to Iran across the Middle East. Whereas Tehran backs several Shia groups in Iraq including the insurrectionary movement of Moqtada al-Sadr, Sunni-majority Turkey has worked with the Shia, Kurds and minority Sunni ahead of the planned withdrawal of US troops for the end of this year.

When Mr Erdogan visited Lebanon in November, he came armed with a vision of open borders, free trade and integration with Turkey’s dynamic economy. The previous month, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad’s visit had centred on missiles and the militant Shia movement Hizbollah – a premonitory vision of the same conflict that has scarred Lebanon and the region. Even the collapse of Turkey’s formerly close relationship with Israel over Gaza has its upside: the Palestinians now have a champion in Turkey, making them less prey to the schemes of Iran and Syria.

Beyond the most conflictual bits of the Middle East, the AKP’s success in creating a post-Islamist party, a Muslim equivalent of Christian Democracy, is being studied by Islamists in Tunisia and Egypt in an attempt to unlock its secrets. Whatever happens in Syria, Mr Davutoglu is clear what these are. In an interview with the Financial Times in June, he said: “The real principle of our foreign policy is to find the balance between security and freedom” and that Turkey had shown that democracy was now a condition for future stability.
“There are three types of leader in this region,” argued Mr Davutoglu. “Those who see change as a must and want to lead and manage it; those who accept the need for change but who are following rather than leading in the hope of gaining time; and those who are resisting change. The third category will disappear, the second can get by for a time, but only the first category will survive. We are telling our friends in the region we want them in that first category.” Unfortunately there is no indication whatsoever that the Syria of the Assads has got Turkey’s message.

[Agnimitra]

Turkish opposition leader calls Erdogan a "tool of West".

Turkey’s foreign policy in tatters, says Kılıcdaroglu

The leader of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, fired broadside at the government’s policy on Syria, charging that Turkey has become “over-engaged” and a “tool” of Western powers in the while seeking to improve ties with the United States over concerns that Ankara is sliding away from the West.

[...]

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus were a “very wrong” move, Kılıçdaroğlu said, accusing the AKP of using foreign policy issues for domestic consumption.

“It’s obvious that Assad is listening to nobody. He pretends to be listening... The Middle East is a quagmire. Middle East policies cannot be carried out with street talk, with objectives aimed at domestic policy,” he said.

[...]

Kılıdçaroğlu accused the government of not informing the political parties about the foreign policy issues. “They inform the U.S. and others. They hear advice from Western powers, but they do not seek support from us.”

[...]

“They went there for a joint Cabinet meeting, lifted visa restrictions and began construction of a joint dam. The prime minister was greeted with a big applause when he walked in the streets of Damascus.

“Why didn’t they speak of human rights violations at the time? The Western powers now want to punish Syria. And using whom?” he asked, alluding to Turkey.

[...]

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s warning that Turkey’s patience with Assad was running out is reminiscent of “words uttered before a war,” Kılıçdaroğlu said, adding that such outbursts could deal “a heavy blow” on Turkey’s image in the region.

“No doubt, they are trying to mend ties with the U.S. after discussions about Turkey’s change in axis. Now, Syria engagement of Turkey seems to be a tool for this purpose.”

Davutoğlu “went to Libya and took part in an opposition demonstration. What if a Western diplomat joins a demonstration in Diyarbakır one day?” he said.

[devesh]

West believes that ultimately Turkey can be controlled if it starts fantasizing too much. this is why you see so much fan-boy/girl behavior about Turkey. Turkey will be "allowed" to reassert itself and "control" some part of ME. of course, this control will ultimately be beneficial to the West, no matter what all the editorials and opinion pieces say.

[sum]

8 Turkish troops killed in PKK ambush

Kurdish separatists have killed seven Turkish soldiers in an ambush in the country's restive southeast.

The attack took place in the Cukurca region of the predominantly Kurdish Hakkari province, close to the border with Iraq, Turkish security sources said.

A spokesman for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) said it was responsible for the ambush.

"Our forces have carried out an ambush against the Turkish army. Several Turkish soldiers were killed in the clashes, which have been continuing for two hours until now," the spokesman told the AFP news agency.

Ismet Yilmaz, Turkey's defence minister, confirmed the death toll and said Turkish forces would "retaliate in kind".

[ramana]

Iran will start supporting the PKK against the Turks move in Syria.

[shyamd]

TURKISH AIR FORCE CONDUCT RAIDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

[Rony]

Iran will start supporting the PKK against the Turks move in Syria.

Ramana garu, Iran has its own share of Kurdish seperatism and brutally suppresses its own Kurds . Why would it want to strengthen the PKK , even if in the short term that measure might pisses of turkey ? Is it not 'Cut off your nose to spite your face ' kind of measure ?

[shyamd]

^^ Everyone has their own kurdish groups that they use against each other. Even israel.

[hnair]

^^^ how come we dont have one? We should host a few students at some Dilli university and see where it goes..... I mean, that is nice area to have friends

[shyamd]

One day when our strategists realise that they need to be more aggressive.
We should be conducting more aggressive intel operations against our enemies across the border. But no, our intel walla's are instructed to go after terrorists using other legal methods and ultimately bring them to india to face a court of law.

[Rony]

Former military chief confesses flaws in fighting terror in recording

Former Chief of General Staff retired Gen. Işık Koşaner confesses a number of the military's flaws in Turkey's fight against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) terrorism in a voice recording posted online on Tuesday that allegedly features his voice, which comes to confirm earlier claims that the Turkish military had serious deficiencies when it came to counterterrorism.

The recording, posted online on dailymotion.com was removed from the website shortly after it was posted, includes a series of confessions allegedly made by Koşaner, who says during a speech addressing a group of military officers that the situation in the military is “shameful.” “One issue that gets us in trouble is that we are failing to ensure unity of command. Wherever there is an operation or an ambush or whatever, a commander should charge. He should be responsible for that region. We have the very big advantage of being able to receive intelligence from [unmanned aerial vehicles] UAVs. A commander who sees images from an UAV should immediately intervene in the situation,” he said.

The person speaking also admits that the military failed to prevent a 2010 terrorist attack on the Hantepe outpost in Çukurca although UAVs detected the terrorist group in the area 15 minutes before the attack. “We should not commit this fault again,” he said.

Six soldiers were killed when the terrorist PKK attacked the outpost in mid-July. In early August a Turkish daily claimed that Herons informed 30 security units -- including the General Staff -- of every second of the attack, but that security forces failed to take action against the terrorist group.

Koşaner says in the recording that small military units are too “weak and lack training” when it comes to fighting terrorists, complaining about the inadequacy of some commanders as counterterrorism commanders. “Two terrorists kidnap 30 soldiers. This is a scandal. We cannot go forward if my colleague whom I assigned as the commander of a military unit leaves his weapon and escapes. … Two guys are coming and kidnap 30 of our soldiers. This is impossible. … We cannot work with these guys,” he says.

The voice in the recording also criticizes the way border outposts were constructed and says they are not safe. “When protecting a base or a critical area, the point is to hide somewhere that has been hollowed out. We are putting sandbags on each other and this creates a huge target. … In the Hantepe case, for example, it is even obvious in the UAV images. They [terrorists] easily entered the outpost, right? Is there anyone who watched them? There should be. The man came and threw the hand grenade over the sandbags. Our situation is really a shame,” he says.

‘We shot our own soldier due to lack of training'
The recording, which allegedly features the voice of Koşaner, also confirms earlier claims that a soldier was killed by another soldier due to a lack of military training provided to the soldiers. “One soldier opens fire after seeing a shadow and others too as they thought they were being raided. Did we shoot one of our privates in the head? Yes, we did. Do you know that? Yes, you do. We are at fault,” he says.

The voice in the recording says after mentioning a series of mistakes that the military has begun “working more logically” since last year. “Formerly, we used to deploy battalions to search large areas. We were searching and ten of them were stepping on landmines, whatever was happening to five of them and we found nothing. We just had casualties. So, we decided to take action after receiving real intelligence, contacting the governor, etc., and then taking action,” he says.

Koşaner also confesses that the military planted landmines in an “uncontrolled way” in areas near military outposts and along borders. He says now the military is having difficulty explaining to civilians why these mines were planted. “We should now base everything we do on a legal basis. All eyes are on us. Even minor mistakes are being covered in the media. So, we have to do everything within the law. Our laws, over which we sometimes get angry, in fact gives us the authority we need,” he says.

He refers to the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order (EMASYA), which gave the military the authority to gather intelligence against internal threats and to conduct operations in cities without the approval of the civilian administrations. Signed by the General Staff and the Interior Ministry in 1997, the protocol was abolished on Feb. 4. However, Koşaner says it can be still made use of.

Koşaner, who took over as head of the armed forces in August 2010 and is regarded as a hardline secularist, resigned last month one day before the beginning of the annual Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) meeting in protest of the government's refusal to promote members of the military who stand trial on coup charges. He was replaced by Gen. Necdet Özel.

[Agnimitra]

Former military chief confesses flaws in fighting terror in recording

Very miopic retrospective "confession". Strangely no mention of the indiscriminate violence and repression against Kurdish culture and people which is going to be the cause of the real long-term problem.

Yes, the Turkish Army was clumsy and a failure in their ability to combat the PKK. These days its common in Turkey to air "admissions" or "analyses" of past mistakes under the secularist regimes, before the Gulenist consolidation of power. But their real failure has been the unleashing of violence against the Kurdish masses, and so far Erdogan's "correction" has only been to use and threaten more violence. The "soul searching" confession is only admitting that previous use of violence was not efficient enough!

Especially the village-emptying campaigns of 1992-1995 caused a whole generation of Kurdish youngsters to grow up in slums. Almost 3 million Kurds were displaced as about 3000 of their villages in SE Turkey were attacked. Almost every family has lost someone to Turkish Army brutality. There has been a population explosion amongst these rural Kurds (birthrate over 6?), and that means a LOT of disaffected youngsters who are now in their late teens. Due to having grown up experiencing Turkish brutality, this makes it the most rebellious and nationalistic generation of Kurds in recent history. Even Turks admit that the deaths of Kurdish martyrs attract much bigger funerals than those of Turkish soldiers. Kurds also boycotted the referendum last year. I wonder whether the new found Islamism of Gulenist Turkey along with slight easing of cultural repression will be able to compensate for the forces unleashed. For most of Turkey's Kurds, their issue with the Turkish state has the color of a blood feud.

[Agnimitra]

MKB commenting on the possibility of bracketing Turkey inbetween its Cyprus and Kurdish problems, and launching a broadside...
Israel turns tables on Turkey

Cyprus and Greece have had indifferent ties with Israel, but a compelling commonality of interests is sailing into view, notably in the energy field. A realignment of regional powers is taking place in the eastern Mediterranean, the leitmotif being the "containment" of an increasingly assertive Turkey. The volatile "Kurdish problem" adds to Ankara's concerns.

True to style, Israel is looking around the region for comfort and companionship with anyone who might also have an intractable problem with Turkey - it didn't have to look far across the Mediterranean.

The two-day visit by the Foreign Minister of Cyprus, Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, to Tel Aviv, which ended on Thursday, was much more than a routine call. The minister had just assumed charge in Nicosia and headed for Israel as soon as her customary first visit to Athens was out of the way.

Quite obviously, Nicosia and Athens (which has an ancient grudge to settle with Ankara) put their heads together and assessed that Israeli regional policies are on a remake. Cyprus and Greece have had indifferent ties with Israel, but a compelling commonality of interests is sailing into view. A realignment of regional powers is taking place in the eastern Mediterranean, the leitmotif being the "containment" of an increasingly assertive Turkey.

[...]

The backdrop is easy to understand. Cyprus contracted American oil company Noble Energy to prospect for gas in 350,000 hectares in the eastern Mediterranean, bordering Israel's economic zone where significant gas deposits have been discovered.

But Turkey butted in, saying the hydrocarbon resources also belonged to northern Cyprus (which has been under Turkish occupation since 1974) and Nicosia didn't have the right to exploit resources that belonged to Turkish Cypriots. Turkey threatened to intervene.

Regarding Kozakou-Marcoullis' mission to Tel Aviv, the Foreign Ministry in Nicosia said on Tuesday, "Particular emphasis will be placed in cooperation between Cyprus and Israel in energy issues, and the recent developments in the wider region." Nicosia factored in that the minister would receive a warm welcome in Tel Aviv, which she did from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Shimon Peres.

The statement issued by Netanyahu's office virtually underscored that Israel has a convergence of interests with Cyprus with regard to Ankara's perceived belligerence. Netanyahu said Israel and Cyprus had "overlapping interests". The statement said Netanyahu discussed with Kozakou-Marcoullis "the possible expansion of energy cooperation given that both countries have been blessed with natural gas reserves in their maritime economic zones".

Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman told Kozakou- Marcoullis that Israel "welcomed the exclusive economic zone agreement that was signed between the two countries ... [and] that this was a bilateral issue that must be implemented as soon as possible to enable the initiation of the gas production process for the benefit of both parties and that the agreement was signed in accordance with the rules and rights of international law."

Peres is due to visit Cyprus soon while Netanyahu hopes to visit Cyprus in the near future.

The Israelis are pinning their hopes on Cyprus turning out to be a prize catch, being a member of the European Union, which works by consensus and is shortly expected to evolve a common stance apropos the expected Palestinian move at the United Nations General Assembly session in New York in September, seeking recognition for their "state".

This explosive diplomatic issue haunts Tel Aviv (and Washington) and the stance that Cyprus takes at Brussels could be a diplomatic windfall when the mood in Europe is increasingly empathizing with the Palestinian case for statehood.

Turkey, on the other hand, has taken a firm stand supportive of the Palestine cause. Indeed, the first fracture appeared in the architecture of Turkey-Israel ties when Erdogan snubbed Peres in front of television cameras at the Davos forum some two years ago during a debate on the Palestine problem.

In sum, Israel has every reason politically to throw its weight behind Cyprus in its tiff with Turkey - even if energy security is not compelling enough. The red carpet Tel Aviv rolled out for the Cypriot foreign minister can be seen as Israel's riposte to Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's warning recently that Ankara would show the "necessary response" if Cyprus went ahead with exploration work.

Kozakou-Marcoullis was simply delighted. She told the Jerusalem Post on Wednesday that Cyprus planned exploratory work within the next two weeks: "We have international law on our side. I think Turkey has to listen to the messages being sent by the international community regarding this issue."

She was referring in particular to statements issued by Washington and Moscow in recent days supportive of Cyprus' right to do the drilling in the eastern Mediterranean. After returning to Nicosia on Thursday, Kozakou-Marcoullis stressed, "On the part of Israel, there is complete understanding about Cyprus' positions."

Noble Energy executives met Cypriot Trade Minister Praxoula Antoniadou in Nicosia on Thursday after which the minister said that drilling was indeed starting as scheduled and that "it is indisputable that Cyprus has every right to proceed and take every step needed for exploiting any natural wealth it possesses". Nicosia's confidence rests on the knowledge that it enjoys the backing of the US, Greece and Israel.

Meanwhile, Israeli commentators have also begun rattling Turkey's nerves, already somewhat frayed, over the furious return of Kurdish militancy. Israeli intelligence and businessmen have longstanding contacts with the Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Iraq.

Interestingly, Iran has highlighted lately that Israel could be stirring up the Kurdish pot for Turkey and, therefore, Tehran, Ankara and Damascus would have shared interests in countering the Kurdish separatism that threatened all three countries. Leading Israeli defense specialist David Eshel commented in August about the upsurge of Kurdish insurgency in Turkey's eastern provinces:
The entire Kurdish people could take advantage of the ongoing Arab Spring and prepare the ground for a long-anticipated Kurdistan, linking up with Iraq's ongoing autonomy, the Iranian Kurdish enclave and perhaps even the Syrian Kurdish minorities ... With the Arab world in total turmoil, lacking any orderly leadership, the Kurds could finally achieve their sacred goal for independence, after decades, if not centuries of desecration and oppression ... the ongoing "Arab Spring" could eventually shift into a "Kurdish Summer".
With the dilemma in Ankara growing steadily, the future of Turkey's Kurdish minority is inevitably shifting into national focus. The long unfulfilled quest of the Kurds for independent statehood is not emerging as a major barrier in ... Ankara's relations with the US ... Turkey cannot afford an independent Kurdistan; it would be losing some of its highly strategic and economic assets. In fact, without Kurdish eastern Turkey, the entire nation would break apart.
The most devastating part of Eshel's commentary is his analysis that with the acute ongoing confrontation between the civilian government of Erdogan and the Turkish military, the latter's professionalism and intelligence-gathering capabilities have suffered a severe setback and the Turkish General Staff realizes that any military action in the Kurdish regions would be a "high-risk operation".

Eshel anticipated with an ominous overtone that a criticality might be reached soon if Turkish Kurds merged with the seasoned Iraqi Peshmerga militia numbering more than 100,000 fighters. He warned, "Erdogan is facing his yet most difficult challenge." Given Israel's close links with the Kurdish Peshmerga going back decades, Israel could be signaling to Ankara at various levels that it has the means to hit back at Erdogan.

Israeli interests fundamentally lie in creating rifts in Turkey's relations with Iran and its "diplomacy" toward Ankara is constantly working in this direction. The paradox, however, is that Israel knows that neither Ankara nor Tehran can afford any serious drift to develop in their relationship at this juncture in regional politics. But the Israelis are adept at turning paradoxes to their advantage.

The Kurdish problem exposes fault lines that cut across Sunni-Shi'ite tensions in the region. Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad and Damascus have a convergence of interests regarding Kurdish separatism despite being on different sides of the Sunni-Shi'ite divide.

Israel estimates, however, that the Kurdish problem makes Ankara vulnerable to American and European pressure tactic and an exacerbation of this could politically weaken Erdogan and bring him to his knees. Such an estimation may appear fanciful. But the fact remains that on Thursday, in a Kurdish ambush, 15 Turkish soldiers were injured, two of them critically, and since July over 40 Turkish soldiers have been killed by Kurdish insurgents.

Turkish public opinion is becoming concerned about national security and the government's handling of the Kurdish problem. At a delicate time in Turkish politics when Erdogan is navigating himself with gusto to assume office as the head of state in a new French-style presidential system of government, he cannot afford to be seen as ineffectual in meeting the Kurdish challenge.

He has opted for a firm military response. But in Eshel's estimation, the weakened Turkish military will meet more than a match in the Kurdish mountains and the assertive Turkish leadership may well find itself in a quagmire.

[Rony]

The Turks are itching for a fight.

Report: Turkey navy to escort aid ships to Palestinians in Gaza

The Turkish navy will significantly strengthen its presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea as one of the steps the Turkish government has decided to take following the release of the UN Palmer report on the 2010 Gaza flotilla, Turkish officials told the Hurriyet Daily News.

"The eastern Mediterranean will no longer be a place where Israeli naval forces can freely exercise their bullying practices against civilian vessels," a Turkish official was quoted as saying.

As part of the plan, the Turkish navy will increase its patrols in the eastern Mediterranean and pursue "a more aggressive strategy".

According to the report, Turkish naval vessels will accompany civilian ships carrying aid to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

Another goal of the plan is to ensure free navigation in the region between Cyprus and Israel. The region includes areas where Israel and Cyprus cooperate in drilling for oil and gas.

Additionally, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan instructed his foreign ministry to organize a trip for him to the Gaza Strip in the near future.

"We are looking for the best timing for the visit,” a Turkish official was quoted as saying. “Our primary purpose is to draw the world’s attention to what is going on in Gaza and to push the international community to end the unfair embargo imposed by Israel.”

[Rony]

Dont know if this was posted earlier !

Islam 'used' for political gain in Turkey, leaked cables say

Islam in Turkey is not “monolithic” and is politically divided, with both secularists and conservative Islamists trying to manipulate religion’s role in public affairs to their own ends, U.S. diplomats said in a newly leaked cable.

The June 27, 2003, diplomatic cable, released Wednesday by WikiLeaks’ Turkish partner, daily Taraf, also claimed the country’s Religious Affairs Directorate is suppressing Islamic beliefs that do not fit the official version.

The Turkish version of secularism is “180 degrees opposite” of the U.S. version as it is not one embraced by the people and protected by the Constitution but “divinized” by the Constitution and forced on the people, the cable also said.

According to the cable, Turkey’s Religious Affairs Directorate and the institutions within its scope are not separated from the state but are to the contrary, an indivisible part of it.

It noted that the directorate was among the biggest official institutions in Turkey, with 90,000 personnel as of 2003, and that it employs all the imams in Turkey and controls the contents of their preaching. The directorate produces a “Kemalist Islam” that has little to do with the beliefs held in the “less elite” corners of Anatolia, the cable said, adding that the directorate is oppressing forms of Islam, including the pro-secular faction of Alevism, that do not fit the official version.

Fear of millions of ‘potential terrorists’ in Turkey

The Sunni Islamic doctrine has changed so little since the Middle Ages that there is not much difference between the Taliban in Afghanistan and Turkey, the Religious Affairs Directorate’s research office director, Niyazi Kahveci, told U.S. officials during a visit on Nov. 14, 1996, according to another recently leaked cable.

Although the Islamist Welfare Party, or RP, was the larger partner of the coalition in power that year, the pro-shariah community in Turkey was considered a “small minority” – though one that was growing in number – in a Nov. 18, 1996, cable sent to Washington. This approach had changed slightly, however, by the time another cable on the subject was sent to Washington nine years later.

“A leading Turkish national security analyst” told U.S. diplomats that “only 7 percent of Turkish citizens support radical forms of Islam,” a number the poll company ANAR, noted as being the one employed by the ruling Justice and Development Party, or AKP, put at 5 percent. “However, in a country of 70 million [people], even if half a percent of the population supports al-Qaeda-type terrorism, this would mean 350,000 potential terrorists,” the cable read.

Interest in religious communities and Kurdish Islam

A cable sent to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara on July 22, 2009, with the approval of Secretary of State Hilary Clinton asked for intelligence on Turkey’s religious communities and the participation in them by the country’s Kurds. Among the topics Washington requested information on were the largest and most powerful Islamic sects and communities, these sects’ political preferences and membership regulations, the Kurdish population in different sects and whether there is a “Islamic Kurdish resistance” against the “reformist harassments of the Fethullah Gülen religious community and/or the AKP government.

Other questions asked about Turkish Muslims’ connections to the international Muslim community and on what level political and media leaders were encouraging or discouraging anti-Semitic and anti-Christian comments. The WikiLeaks cables released by Taraf do not any cables answering these questions.

[Rony]

Turkey has one-third of terrorism convicts in world

Of the 35,117 prisoners convicted of terrorism in the past 10 years, 12,897 are in Turkey, according to a survey conducted by AP in 66 countries, which account for 70 percent of the world.

The research concluded that laws against terrorism were amended and became more severe, while convictions for terrorism-related actions increased after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.

According to the research, 119,000 people were arrested and 30,000 of them have been convicted for terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. Turkey is at the top of this list with 12,897 convictions. Together, Turkey and China, the runner up with 7,000 convictions, make up half of the convictions around the world. The number of convictions in Turkey in 2005 was 273. However this number rose to 6,345 after Turkey’s law on terrorism was amended in 2006.

AP states that Turkey had been at odds with the Kurdish minority for a long time and gives Naciye Tokova as an example to support the claim. Tokova is a Kurdish citizen living in Turkey who was imprisoned for seven years for holding a banner that said “Free leadership and free identity or eternal fight and revenge.” Tokova did not even know what was written on the banner because she was illiterate.

Recalling the words of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who said Kurdish citizens were treated fairly in Turkey, AP notes that in Turkey, members of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) are perceived as militants by some, while others praise them as freedom fighters.

Effect of the new laws

According to the Milliyet daily, the laws against terrorism became more severe around the world after the 9/11 attacks. However, the definition of the word “terrorist” varies even in different departments of the government in the US, which is the leader country in the struggle against terrorism. China judges everyone who jeopardizes the security of the state as a terrorist and the majority of the people arrested and convicted are Uyghur Turks.

Spain, after struggling with the Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA) terrorist group, which for years demanded the Basque region separate from Spain, managed to reduce terrorism by making the laws against terror more severe. According to a law enacted after the 9/11 attacks, terrorists may be imprisoned up to 40 years. It is thought that ETA has been greatly weakened, as it no longer organizes bombing attacks that claim lives. On average, 140 people are convicted of terrorism in Spain annually.

In Pakistan, the amendments enacted with the help of $1 million worth of aid from the US failed to produce results, as the number of convictions was 1,552 in 2006 but rose to 12,886 in 2009. In terms of the number of deaths due to terrorism, Pakistan is the second country after Iraq.

[Rony]

Were Ataturk Alive Today

As the Republic of Turkey enters its eighty-sixth year it may not be inappropriate to recall that its founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, only played a role in the first fifteen years of its life. Stated differently, he witnessed only the first 18% of what today comprises the Republic of Turkey’s history

There is a minor sub-genre of history which we might term the ‘what if’ school: For example: historians sometimes ask: what would America be like today if on the evening of Friday, April 14, 1865, Mary Todd Lincoln had turned to her husband and said: “Abe, I’ve got a terrible headache. Let’s not go to the theater this evening.” Tonight, I ask your indulgence in taking a short ‘what if’ visit with me through the past eight-five years of Turkish history. Our question at each stage of our journey will be: ‘Were Atatürk alive today, what would he think,’ or, stated differently: ‘If Atatürk were alive today, where would Turkey be?’

We must start with the all too often overlooked fact that when the Republic of Turkey came into being in 1923, it was a far different world than we live in today as we near the end of the opening decade of the 21st century. The multi-national Ottoman Empire, after a six hundred year history, had collapsed. In its final years it had been decimated by twelve years of continuous warfare. From the First Balkan War, through the Italian-Tripoli War, the Second Balkan War, the First World War, and, finally the Turkish War of Independence. The only one of these conflicts that had not ended in total defeat and disaster was the final one, the War of Independence, which led to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. For those of us in the west for whom World War I is recalled as a terrible time, typified by trench warfare, the use of poison gas, and the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, just imagine what our recollections of it would be if it had lasted not just three years, but twelve years.

And, what a cost for the Ottoman Empire and for the peoples of Anatolia. Not only had millions of soldiers and civilians lost their lives, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Arab world, all of which had formed an integral part of the Ottoman polity for centuries, were gone, and with their loss several million refugees flooded into the heartland of Anatolia. By my estimate, if the new state’s population in 1923 stood at 13-14 million people, at least 3-4 million of them had been born somewhere else. Virtually all the newcomers were impoverished refugees who had fled with little more than the shirts on their backs. Nor was their new homeland in a position to do much to help them.

The vast majority of the country’s Christian minorities, the very groups who in the final decades of the Empire had dominated the state’s economic life as merchants, traders, skilled craftsmen and manufacturers, had likewise been decimated. The Armenians, as a result of the wartime deportations and massacres, had become part of the great Diaspora which took them to the Caucasus, as well as to Europe, the Middle East and the Americas. As for the Greek Orthodox Christians, they too were gone, 1.4 million of their number having been exchanged for 400,000 Turks from Greece in 1923-1924, at the end of the Greco-Turkish War. What remained were the largely illiterate Anatolian peasantry and the urban Muslim classes which consisted primarily of bureaucrats (both civil and religious), tradesmen and the professional military. Nationwide the literacy level was estimated to be less than 5%. In short, Mustafa Kemal, and his revolutionary associates, had very little to work with when they embarked on their nation-building endeavor.

It is within this context that we must evaluate the contributions of Mustafa Kemal Paşa. He started from scratch and planted the seeds for what today has become a strong nation of seventy million plus. He turned a nation of refugees and peasants, whose sole unifying factor was their shared religious identity as Muslims, into a proud Turkish nation state. And he did so with virtually no resources at his disposal.

The one thing he did have going for him was the immense prestige he had garnered in the previous decade: first, as the only Turkish General Staff officer who was undefeated during the First World War, and, second, as the architect of the Turkish people’s defeat of the invading Greek Armies. It was his role as Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa which provided him the means and opportunity to forge a new identity for the amalgam of peoples whom fate had deposited in Anatolia in the wake of the Empire’s precipitous collapse. To meld a ragtag group of refugees, peasants, and urban dwellers, drawn from the once far flung borders of the Ottoman Empire into a new homogeneous nation state was a task which he was uniquely prepared to undertake.

He did so by keeping the message simple: First, the misak-i milliye (national pact) which clearly stated: we have no claim on any other piece of real-estate in the world (no matter how much or how long it may have been an integral part of the Ottoman polity), nor will we give up as much as an inch of what is left. This clearly set the tone for what was to remain Turkey’s sole foreign policy concern for the next several decades. Protect the status quo and make no claims against any neighboring state. This was an act of political genius. He knew that if people began to dwell on what they had lost, i.e., the past, rather than what the future could hold, the experiment in statehood would fail.

Second, he proclaimed that whoever lived within the borders of the new Turkish Republic was a Turk and therefore his concern. Those left outside the borders of the new state (Turks in the former Ottoman territories in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Aegean Basin and the Arab World) were not his concern. This policy, while driven by the hard political realities of the time, was essential to the survival of the new state, a state which had neither the means nor the ability to project itself beyond its borders. Why did he choose this course of action? Once again, for the simple reason that he realized if people focused on what was lost, rather than concentrating upon developing the new state, there would be chaos. Stated differently: he, and, by his example, the Turkish people, focused on the promise of the future rather than the failures of the past.

Third, he, together with a whole generation of similarly minded western educated military officers and bureaucrats, firmly believed that the most significant factor leading to the demise of the Ottoman Empire (along with foreign intervention) had been what they viewed as the corrosive influence of Islam in the empire’s political life. To counter balance this they created: Turkish nationalism. In one fell swoop they replaced the sole solidifying element in Ottoman society, the role of religion as the centuries old lynchpin of identity, with Turkishness. To ensure their success they adopted a Jacobin type secularism which completely replaced the role which religion had long played and relegated it firmly under the control of the state.

The full extent of this radical change is likewise often misunderstood. To call one a ‘Turk’ in Ottoman times had been the equivalent of calling one an ‘uneducated peasant.’ Now suddenly, what had for centuries had been a term of approbation was made the key element of identity. Why? Because he realized that the multi-nationalism of the Ottoman world was likewise a thing of the past. If the new nation were to survive it would be because of the Anatolian peasantry, who not only had mobilized themselves to help drive out the invading entente forces at the end of the First World War, but likewise constituted well over half of the new state’s population.

Finally, along with the twin goals of ‘secularism’ and ‘territorial integrity,’ he added ‘modernization,’ which was comparable to ‘westernization,’ read as: ‘Europeanization.’ This is what the agenda of Mustafa Kemal was in 1923 when he proclaimed the Turkish Republic, and that was what his agenda still was fifteen years later, when he died in 1938.

Mustafa Kemal’s philosophy was relatively simple: a) protection of the new state’s territorial integrity as set forth in the National Pact; b) Turkish nationalism; c) a radical form of secularism which divorced Islam from the pivotal role it had long played in the political life of the Ottoman Empire, and relegated it to a matter of personal choice under the clear control of the state; d) the long-term goal of modernization; and, e) the creation of a strong economy to enable the country to stand on a par with the west.
All the rest of what has popularly come to be known as: ‘Atatürkculuk,’ the slavish devotion to the so-called six arrows, which, while initially set down during his lifetime were set in concrete by his successors, i.e., those who following his death created a cult designed to perpetuate their own right to rule. For, in most cases, their sole claim to legitimacy was the relationship they had enjoyed as confidants and colleagues of the ‘Father Türk.’

This statement, however true it may be, calls for one caveat. That is, that during the last decade of his life Mustafa Kemal had become increasingly intolerant of opposition. The result was that his brilliant cadre of co-revolutionaries, who together with him had helped shape the new state, was sidelined, and increasingly he surrounded himself with ‘yes’ men. This meant, that when he died in 1938, it was not his cohorts of the independence struggle (aside from İnönü) who succeeded him, rather it was a body of men whose sole claim to legitimacy was their closeness to the fallen leader. Even the greatest of leaders have their weaknesses, and this was Atatürk’s.

To ensure the success of his ‘modernization’ goal, as well as to guarantee the selling of the equally new concepts of ‘Turkishness,’ and ‘secularism,’ what I have elsewhere termed a “trickle down theory” was employed. As envisaged, teams of modernized, westernized urban bureaucrats, school teachers and military officers, would descend on the towns and villages of Anatolia, and, by their personal example, guide the rest of the nation in its transformation from a backward illiterate peasantry into forward looking, secular citizens of the new state. Stated differently, what was envisaged was the ‘Istanbulization’ or ‘Ankarazation’ of Anatolia.

Were Atatürk alive today, he would take only a modicum of pleasure at the success this endeavor has enjoyed in the seven decades since his death. For, while on the one hand, the last twenty-five years in particular have witnessed immense strides in the economic and infrastructural development of Anatolia’s town and cities, the aspiration of doing the same in the rural areas has yet to be fully realized. Indeed, the failure of the project’s overall success has, in the past two generations, led millions upon millions of peasants to vote for the promise of a better life with their feet and migrate to the large urban centers of İstanbul, İzmir, Ankara, Antalya and Adana – and even further away to Western Europe.

In so doing they have reversed the goals of the initial project and rather than seeing the ‘İstanbulization’ of Anatolia, we are witnessing the ‘Anatolization’ of İstanbul and the country’s other urban centers. For when the migrants leave their village homes and move to the city they bring their traditional way of life with them. Whether it is their attachment to Islam, or the head-coverings worn by women, they inject their conservative rural lifestyle into the urban setting. They transition to urban life by settling in the giant rings of squatter settlements which surround the cities, and while their world gradually expands to embrace some urban values, it does so in the midst of a milieu of countless others, who, like themselves, are initially lost in a totally unfamiliar world.

As has been the case throughout many parts of the world which have witnessed similar mass rural to urban migration, the newcomers tend to cling tightly to the familiarity of their traditional customs and practices. Politicians, who are only too well aware of the meaning of “one man one vote,” have all too often sought electoral support with steps which have the effect of undermining the ‘secular’ underpinning of the state.

The result is the ‘dual’ Turkey which has come to typify the country’s major population centers. A fully westernized and rapidly growing secular middle class, surrounded by an ever-expanding body of their fellow citizens who do not fully share the basic identity of the Republic when it comes to westernization, secularism or ethnic identity. For the newcomers, in the case of Kurds, also bring a different language and customs, along with a stronger attachment to Islam, when they move westward from the most backward, poverty stricken towns and villages of southeastern Anatolia. The Turkish people are all quick learners, a fact which explains why within a generation or two many of the newcomers do adapt to their new setting, and, while doing so, adopt many of the values which are deeply imbedded in the country’s urban residents.

Likewise, in the years between 1923 and his death on November 10, 1938, one was not a Kurd, a Circassian, a Laz, an Arab, or a member of any other ethnic group from among the forty nine and a half millets (peoples) living within the borders of the newly created entity, that is, the multiplicity of ethnicities which had once comprised the multi-national Ottoman polity. Those former Ottoman citizens whom fate had deposited within the boundaries of the new Turkish Republic, were by definition Turks, or, stated differently, citizens of the new Republic. In the same manner that one’s former status in the Ottoman elite was meaningless in the new political arena, so too, was one’s ethnicity. A citizen of the new Turkish Republic was by definition a Turk and that was that.

Whereas, in the 19th century when an Ottoman of the Muslim faith was queried (as they oft times were) by European visitors as to who they were, their answer would invariably be: ‘Elhamdülillah Müslümanim’ (Praise be to God, I am a Muslim), and if the questioner pressed on and said, ‘yes I know you are a Muslim, but who are you really,’ his respondent might add (if their name was Mustafa): ‘ben Ahmet oğlu Mustafa’ (I am Mustafa the son of Ahmet’), and if the interrogator said: ‘yes, yes, I know you are a Muslim and the son of Ahmet, but who are you really,’ the final answer (if the respondent was from Sivas) would be: ‘ben Sivasliyim’ (I am from Sivas). Try as hard as they could, the questioners could never get their subjects to give the kind of answer they, as Europeans schooled in nationalism wanted, that is, no one ever said ‘I am a Turk.’ Stated differently, for the 19th century Ottoman citizens, identity was first and last a religious one. If that were not enough then it was a personal one and you gave the name of your father. Were that not to suffice, identity was regional and you responded with the name of the town or village you were born in. There the answers ended. The concept that you belonged to some kind of larger national or ethnic group simply did not exist among the Muslims of Anatolia.

In short, Mustafa Kemal took what had been a pejorative and set about convincing those whose identity for centuries had been as ‘Muslims’ or ‘Ottomans,’ that they too (not just the Anatolian peasants) were Turks. While one may question the accuracy of his assertion, you may not challenge what he set out to do. His objective was nothing less than to turn the forty-nine and a half millets (peoples) that found themselves in Anatolia [by the way, in case you are wondering who the half were, they were the Gypsies, who always seem to get the short end of the stick in every society], into a single nation. In short, he clearly recognized that were the peoples of Anatolia to survive in an age of nationalism, it would be as one people, one nation, not as the disparate remnants of a once mighty empire.