rohitvats wrote:I have wanted to rebut this idiotic proposal for some time and finally, I have time today. Before falling hook-line and sinker for anything with “peace” written on it, one should at least look at the entire thing in detail - as they say, beware of the Greeks bearing gifts. The same applies to Pakistanis in double measure.
Some ground rules first. Folks should critique something based on a certain vision this operational plan works under. If the vision of a “political agreement”, to move towards peace in a piece meal fashion is not accepted, for WHATEVER reasons, good or bad, and then the critiques are all pointed towards some other envisaged vision that guides the writings then the critique of the operational plan becomes pointless. It is no longer the critique of the plan, but a critique of the vision of the political agreement or its assumptions thereof.
The report is a set of operational procedures or a template through which modalities of “demilitarization” of a “disputed” area can be achieved. It assumes, there is political agreement to achieve the same. The strategy presented in the paper is based on several principles:
1. There should be general adherence with the provisions of the Simla Agreement
Translation: Any violations of it shall be protected with the full might and force at disposal to restore status quo ante.
In fact looking at Kargil, even though I am critical of the decision to stay only on our side of the LoC, it established one fact very clearly. India shall uphold the sanctity of the LoC, achieved post Shimla agreement – at ANY cost. So, there is credibility behind this statement. It means, once an agreement is signed the full might and force of the GoI shall be used to uphold it. The actions we have taken at Siachen – even if militarily unwise as per some, is based on the Shimla principle (even if there is some technical violation due to very practical reasons of the same by India).
2. An agreement for disengagement should be without prejudice to current or future agreements associated with Pakistan’s and India’s border with China
Translation: No decision is being made on the LoC. On whether it goes North West of NJ 9842, stays along the ridge lines of Saltoro or joins north east at KKP. If TSPA agrees to something like this, post AGPL ratification, it should be looked upon by India as a win and acknowledgment of the IA’s ground held on the back of its sweat and blood.
A disengagement agreement should enable the civilian and scientific use of the Siachen area under international arrangements.
Translation, any violations post demilitarization shall have some international recognition as they were operating in the area based on the envisaged “political agreement”, even if, these international organizations have no role in its enforcement. Also, it is an enabling provision, meaning both parties should request such “civilian” involvement, participation is non-binding and can be withdrawn at any time. It enhances the “recognition” of any agreement entered into by the parties, especially between parties with such high levels of mistrust on each other.
Back to critiques by rohitvats:
The biggest draw-back of the above proposal is that it plays to PA strength in terms of geography and there is de jure acceptance of Pakistan claim to the glacier. What some on this forum naively believe to be an exercise in "de-militarization" of Siachen is in fact reversing the clock to pre-1984 days and indirectly accepting disputed nature of Siachen and claim of Pakistan to the area - PA is trying to do through peace negotiations what it could not achieve militarily.
I think the demilitarization plan itself is without prejudice, since the UZ and include areas both east and west of the NJ9842 going north, however I would like some adjustment in these lines. As far as dejure acceptance to the glacier claim is concerned, TSP claims the entire state just like we do!
1.The Uninhabited Zone - Please look at the southern boundary of the Uninhabited Zone (UZ) – this is exactly along the claim line of Pakistan as far as the Siachen Glacier is concerned. It runs from NJ9842 to KK Pass in north-east. This is how the maps and atlases used to show Siachen area before we went up the glacier in 1984. By showing AGPL along Saltoro as western part of the UZ, it shows the dual claim to the area and de-facto establishing it as disputed territory – it is India which is the biggest looser here. In spite of us doing all the hard work and suffering in terms of money and manpower, we end up with reversal of status quo so assiduously achieved over the years.
The assumption being the status quo of holding the ridge is acceptable to us? No territory that we hold is being given to Pakistan. The principle here is the Glaciers should be demilitarized as a trust building exercise to achieve bigger peace objectives along the LoC. It may provide a template for the entire LoC. I agree, the UZ line should not go all the way to KKP (am not concerned on TSP claims). It should end where the Shaksgam line ends, a little west and clear of SSN. It will uphold the principle of the UZ for the Glaciers.
2.All this while, we’ve maintained that Pakistan had undertaken cartographic aggression by showing alignment from NJ9842 to KK Pass in eastern Karakorum. It was to negate this alignment actually taking shape on ground that we went up the glacier – and to buttress the point that the alignment ran “thence north to the glacier” from NJ9842.By accepting any such alignment of the "Peace Park" we make our claim to the region as a matter to dispute - contrary to the position held all this while.
The dispute already exists. I am not worried about their claims. They have that since 1947. I think the UZ should end on the west, where the Shaksgam meets the Karakoram and not at KKP. On the west, I wish we apply the same principle of the glacier and take it further west towards K2. That is why, I asked my question. What was India’s cartographic expression of the line going north?
3.By including the original claim line into the picture through this ‘peace proposal’ PA intends to get the foot back into the door.
If I am a Paki cynic, I would say by including Dansam in the CZ, India desires to occupy Dansam so that Indian forces can come down from the ridge lines and India will back stab eventually, just the way Siachen was pre-empted on some excuse. Forget the validity of the actual events, for they will never get resolved. My point is fear, uncertainity and doubt cuts both ways. Pakistan has reason to fear not us.
4.In any future negotiations on the subject, this southern boundary of the UZ will come back to haunt us.
Assuming monitoring fails and that we shall not cross the LoC and that we shall not use Air assets to cover for the geographical nature of the deep Nubra Valley.
5.The Civilian Zone – This part of the argument takes the cake. I am bit surprised, and saddened, that someone like GK agreed to this part and is proposing this along with an ex-PA officer. Look at the sheer chutzpah of the proposal. The CZ impacts the security angle of two sectors. Let me explain in parts:
a.Khalsar-Sasoma-Warshi axis – the main access route to the glacier for Indian Army - As per the proposal, no military activity is permitted in the Civilian Zone. For India, the CZ extends from Warshi (south of Dzingrulma) to right up to Khalsar (where Shyok and Nubra meet). So, Indian forces recede by almost 70kms from their base camp – the Siachen glacier is further 76kms from the base camp in Dzingrulma. So, in all IA moves down by good 140kms from the present positions. This is reaching the same status as in 1984 or pre-1972 even.
Khalsar-Dzingrulma itself is about 70 KMs. This is not an exercise of measuring who moves by how much. The intent here is to provide a buffer to the UZ. Is there any reason for the forces to be in the Khalsar-Warshi axis, except for Siachen? The driver for the 70 KM CZ in this axis is the topology of the region and nothing else.
b.Let us compare this with the withdrawal by the Pakistan Army – from Dansam (east of PA 323 Siachen Bde HQ at Khaplu) to Ghyari is ~30kms and from Ghyari to Bilafond La would be another 15kms. And this is not as the crow flies but actual distance. So, a side with more difficult access to the Siachen (with up to 3 weeks marching time from base camp) retreats more than 3 time the distance than PA which has much easier access to Siachen and much better infrastructure. PA troops can reach Ghyari by road and thence, it is 15kms to Bilafond La – Indian troops reach Dzingrulma by road which 40kms from the Lolofond Glacier – this glacier leads from Siachen to Bilafond La. Anyone who controls Bilafond La can ensure that no opponent can move further up the Glacier.
Dansam will be part of CZ. So no forces are stationed there. Monitoring at access control points takes care of any troop movements in the CZ and especially in the UZ shall be detected. There is only one way to beat India at this game, it is through Air superiority, which they shall never have. Oh, forgot, or If India is caught sleeping. If we goof up, we cross the LoC and make them pay!
c.In short, if tomorrow yellow matter hits the fan, IA will move 40kms from base camp to strategically important Bilafond La through more treacherous terrain while PA will move 15kms from base camp at Ghyari through much easier terrain.
Assuming all monitoring fails and we are sleeping at the wheels and Pakistan has the wherewithal to stand up to our forces!
d.The Conway Saddle – this is the most absurd part of the entire proposal. For India to access and maintain Siachen there is only one South-North axis along the Siachen which begins at Dzingrulma. Which means that Indian soldier manning the area opposite Conway Saddle in northern most part of the glacier begins his journey at base camp. Indian controlled area consists of Sia La pass on Saltoro and Indira Col, Indira Saddle and Turkestan La along the Karakorum mountain axis.
Again, monitoring at key access control points at Askole, can take care of this. What I would want is in the spirit of “demilitarizing” the glaciers this west ward point be moved to the KKH or the K2. Probably too late in the game for that. My issue with Conway Saddle is not military, it is conceptual. I do not think, there is a military issue here. Next point is on that.
e.In case of PA – their axis to maintain this part of the glacier starts from Skardu, goes through Shigar Valley, then to Askole and finally to Baltoro Glacier further east. It has nothing to do with Dansam/Khaplu. PA can literally sit at the snout of the Baltoro glacier and be outside of the so called CZ. When push comes to shove, all that PA has to do is move up in couple of day’s time to capture the area in the northern glacier section – Indian troops will need to move all the way from their base camp – provided they can do that. This is because if PA decides to take Sia La and southern face of Karakoram watershed, rest assured, Bilafond La would have been taken.
PA has easier access to the ridge is a simple fact of geography. To what purpose will PA make a move on this route, which is 80+ KMs from Askole to the ridges. Once there and detected, what is the plan, just to sit there on and stumble upon a conflict. I think, there is a huge but mistaken understanding of the matter. As per Gen Chibber, “we stumbled” upon the Siachen operation. It is not as if we had this great strategy of occupying Saltoro for some great strategic reason and it was the best military plan devised to achieve the same. It was classic myopia of our leadership. IG instructs IA to keep it local and not broaden the conflict. IA takes a technical view of the matter (of the point north of NJ9842) and adjusts to military realities of the ridge. Alternatives such as sitting at Dansam loosely defended at the time are not explored. Ofcourse, all of this is in hindsight and we will never know the full real truth. But from whatever we do know, what is clear is PA simply has no guts or more importantly capabilities to confront the IA, let alone stumble upon the Saltoro like India did. This cannot trust syndrome and FUD should not be taken too far. There is a way to risk mitigate many things, provided political will and capabilities are clear.
So, this is not about ensuring that the guns fall silent and everyone goes back home happy but to bring a dispute back from the status-quo to active discussion level which will be raked in the future. For PA which has been never able to do anything about the Indian on the Saltoro, this is the best possible solution - they will go back and claim that the demilitarization is as per Pakistan's claim on the area and both sides have agreed on the disputed nature of the area.
So, we can then claim that in the future we will look to demilitarize all of the glaciers and make all of the Karakoram a mountain of peace from KKP to KKH. Happy! Talk is cheap, let them claim what they want.
If PA is so sincere about the demilitarization of Siachen, then let them sign AGPL maps and go back to base camp in Khaplu as India would to Dzingrulma - but with a caveat that India can maintain a very small body of troops on glacier/passes to keep monitoring the situation.
Good luck with that proposal. Why does the following monitoring not suffice for a Trust but Verify structure beats me. (except for I know, cannot trust the Pakis)
1. A Joint Monitoring Center at Siari
2. Remote monitoring systems will be established at access control points (ACP) on roads to detect, assess, and report traffic to monitoring stations in Pakistan and India or at a JMC.
On the Pakistani side, they are proposed at
The roads to Goma and the forward bases in Gyari (east of Goma) and Kurma Ding (near Kharkondus) all traverse a bridge over the Dansam River in Dansam (see Figure 18 in GK report). This bridge is an excellent location for an ACP and remote monitoring system. There is little potential for bypass at this location.
The road from Niyil to Askole and the Baltoro Glacier passes through a narrow Shigar River valley. It presents similar opportunities for an ACP near Askole.
3. Remote Sensing through cooperative aerial overflight
4. On-Site inspections for special conditions
5. Satellite based surveillance
Furthermore, both have capabilities to monitor each other’s air space.
I get the do not trust Pakistan message. What I do not get is the FUD, which seems to be more directed at our own leadership. The other message is, a rising India can afford to take risks with a puny Pakistan. Conflict has not worked to further out interests. It is time to give peace a chance.
. This is an even smaller concession than 1.75
