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RajitO wrote:...The Indian Navy’s experience of operating carrier battle groups goes back a long way....
Rajit - Both articles by Arun Prakash & Sushil Kumar do not state IN official doctrine. They're only explaining to the public in a non-official capacity on the raison d'etre for aircraft carriers. Because Navy has to fight for funding with GoI and hence the need to evangelize the benefits of aircraft carrier with the decision makers & the general public.
It would be foolish to intepret public evangelization articles as official doctrine.
Incase you missed the point, I'll repeat - in US Navy, Carrier Battle Group (sea to sea) or Carrier Strike Group (sea to land) is a doctrine, based on certain capabilities, and not just the composition of the fleet.
Vikramaditya & later Vikrant will lead to significant growth in capabilities over what is currently available, and certainly equal, if not better than China, Russia, UK, France, Italy & Spain.
However, V + escorts will not offer the span & depth of capabilities that a US CBG brings to the battlefield, nor cover the full spectrum of operations, nor have sustainability.
Once V runs out of ammunition for its aircraft, like BVR AAMs, CC AAMs, AShMs, PGMs & unguided bombs, it has to come home or run circles at sea.
Viraat + 1 destroyer + 1 frigate + 1 tanker in 1993 cost the exchequer INR 1 Crore a day at sea, as per our FA & CAO those days.
While we're financially much better today, navies like Russia & France take their carriers out only for training & operations to keep personnel skilled, rather than deploy at full capability. That too operations like Afghanistan & Libya with completely permissive Air Defence environments where handful of fighters fly & drop handful of laser guided bombs.
We've grown in capabilities, as much as, if not better, than others, but still not there yet.
For example, Brazil operates an old aircraft carrier & some old aircraft, and can add a couple of escorts, but realistically, will that force last half an hour against 16 BrahMos fired from INS Kolkata or 12 Shourya's fired from INS Arihant? Will it really be a battle group?
tsarkar wrote:
Vikramaditya & later Vikrant will lead to significant growth in capabilities over what is currently available, and certainly equal, if not better than China, Russia, UK, France, Italy & Spain.
However, V + escorts will not offer the span & depth of capabilities that a US CBG brings to the battlefield, nor cover the full spectrum of operations, nor have sustainability.
Once V runs out of ammunition for its aircraft, like BVR AAMs, CC AAMs, AShMs, PGMs & unguided bombs, it has to come home or run circles at sea.
Viraat + 1 destroyer + 1 frigate + 1 tanker in 1993 cost the exchequer INR 1 Crore a day at sea, as per our FA & CAO those days.
While we're financially much better today, navies like Russia & France take their carriers out only for training & operations to keep personnel skilled, rather than deploy at full capability. That too operations like Afghanistan & Libya with completely permissive Air Defence environments where handful of fighters fly & drop handful of laser guided bombs.
We've grown in capabilities, as much as, if not better, than others, but still not there yet.
For example, Brazil operates an old aircraft carrier & some old aircraft, and can add a couple of escorts, but realistically, will that force last half an hour against 16 BrahMos fired from INS Kolkata or 12 Shourya's fired from INS Arihant? Will it really be a battle group?
Beautifully explained tsarkar-ji. That may well explain the raison d'etre for large OPVs of the Saryu class...underarmed, but so much cheaper to operate and show the flag on a regular basis.
tsarkar wrote:
Incase you missed the point, I'll repeat - in US Navy, Carrier Battle Group (sea to sea) or Carrier Strike Group (sea to land) is a doctrine, based on certain capabilities, and not just the composition of the fleet.
The terms have nothing to do with the tasking of the groups. The USN basically just renamed the carrier battle groups to carrier strike groups (CNO guidance 2003).
tsarkar wrote:
Incase you missed the point, I'll repeat - in US Navy, Carrier Battle Group (sea to sea) or Carrier Strike Group (sea to land) is a doctrine, based on certain capabilities, and not just the composition of the fleet.
The terms have nothing to do with the tasking of the groups. The USN basically just renamed the carrier battle groups to carrier strike groups (CNO guidance 2003).
From Wiki:
Carrier strike groups comprise a principal element of U.S. power projection capability. Previously referred to as Carrier Battle Groups (a term still used by other nations), they are often referred to by the carrier they are associated with (e.g., Enterprise Strike Group).
and
In modern United States Navy carrier air operations, Carrier strike group (CSG) has replaced the traditional term of carrier battle group (CVBG or CARBATGRU).
And, would not a merchant ship work as a dry cargo ship? Would not be a proper replacement, but in a push-comes-to-shove situation?
Also, why could such ships not pay a visit to a closer friendly port and replenish (granted I am assuming plenty of commonality here)?
In any case, the need to build up basing agreements is for such purposes too. Unless I am totally mistaken a V could venture into the SCS (as an example) and visit a V'Nam port to top off in all respects.
AH,if you've been following the debate before and since the VikA arrived,and the enhanced responsibilties and blue water ops envisaged outside the IOR of the IN,now poss. with the VikA and her more powerful air contingent,you will understand.The debate has also touched upon IN doctrine,whether we are planning to emulate the US and its Mahanian dominated thinking or have other plans and doctrine of our own.The increasing bi-lateral ties with other regional navies and the IN's foray into the Indo-China Sea with basing agreements in Vietnam are new developments,mirroring China's attempts to encircle India.
US carrier task forces are the means by which the US can conduct its expeditionary warfare anywhere on the globe and for prolonged periods.They have been the principal instruments of war that the US has used in its wars during the Cold War and post CW conflicts in the 21st century.Supported by a huge logistic chain ,and the ability to use shore facilities of friendly nations and regional allies,the CBGs/CSGs of the USN have spearheaded the aerial campaign against the "enemy".The foll.quote from warships,where the UK was criticised for failing to provide the RN with the neccessary carrier forces,etc.,to emulate the USN in its expeditionary warfare ambitions.
On the same day the UK government unveiled plans for a new Strategic Defence Review, which will no doubt scrutinise the
validity of the Royal Navy’s future carrier programme, in the northern Arabian Sea the newly arrived USS Ronald Reagan launched
air strikes in support of US Marines fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.The targets of the F-18 Hornets were several hundred miles from the ocean, but, as far as the big carrier US Navy is concerned, well within the littoral zone. Meanwhile, the US Marines, who
had the previous week launched their biggest helicopter-borne assault since the Vietnam War - using aircraft that are an essential element of their assault carrier-based Expeditionary Strike Groups - were making good progress as they advanced in Helmand.
Surely there was no better illustration of the essential wisdom behind the expeditionary warfare rationale that was the main
outcome of the UK’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR), than the lesson provided by USN carrier-based strike jets and
American marines last month. However, in the more than ten years since SDR, the British government has failed to equip its Navy
and its marines, or even Army, with the same scale of reach so amply wielded by the Americans as they took the lead in Helmand, a battle zone previously the primary responsibility of UK forces.
The USNI Proceedings in its latest issue has a feature on the future and surface warfare shape.One key point mentioned is the complexity and cost of modifying old warships,upgrading them when they are not of modular construction.Critics of the Gorshkov /VikA deal should read this to understand the difficulties faced in such a task,especially remodelling a cruiser-carrier of 45K t ,an exercise in retrospect grossly underestimated in cost,time and complexity.
The full article also mentions the huge cutbacks in numbers of warships being built from planned numbers.Just 3 DDX from two doz.,half the number of LCS planned and that the Arleigh Burke class of DDG would remain the backbone of the surface fleet.Carrier ops have been drastically cut down with only 4-5 carriers operational at any time,details posted earlier.Air groups slashed.
The Future (Beyond 20 Years)
While two decades from now may seem like the distant future, decisions we make today will determine capability and capacity of the 2034 surface Navy. With this in mind, some assumptions about what that world will look like are in order.
• The world will be more multi-polar than it is now, with the United States, China, Russia, India, Brazil, and the Eurozone all vying for resources and for economic, political, and sometimes, military power and influence.
• The United States will maintain powerful naval forces forward, present, visible, and ready to protect and sustain America’s global interests in world of changing power dynamics.
• The volume of ocean-borne trade will dramatically increase.
• Absent conflict, the resources allocated to the Navy in constant dollars will not dramatically rise or decline.
• The overwhelming majority of ships in the 2034 surface force is currently in service or in advanced design stages.
Thinking about the world in 2034 and steered by assumptions such as the ones above, several key attributes present themselves when envisioning the ships that must be acquired beginning in 2028 for delivery beginning in 2035: flexibility, scalability, modularity, and commonality.
Flexibility. We cannot afford to build ships that are retired because they have been outpaced by the threat; rather, they will need to be retired because they have reached the end of their service life. Defined interfaces and modular designs will treat capability as a commodity, enabling continuous modernization to stay one step ahead of the threat. These “designed-in” features will dramatically lower the complexity of modernizing ships, reducing the time spent in overhauls, increasing operational availability, and reducing total ownership cost.
Scalability. Scalability is the quality of being able to increase or decrease capability through common hardware/software combinations. The most important example of this is the air and missile defense radar. While this digital, phased array radar represents a significant performance and life cycle cost improvement over SPY-1, we are designing-in scalability so that it can be fitted on future small combatants, big deck amphibs, and next generation carriers—providing commonality savings in logistics, maintenance, and training.
Modularity. Modularity is represented in today’s surface force primarily by the mission modules associated with the LCS. In this case, modularity is achieved by building ships with the ability to accommodate mission packages—essentially integrated cargo—that can be removed and replaced pier-side in a short period. A future version of modularity starts with a new way of building ships, a method in which common functional building blocks are arranged in different combinations to create platforms of differing capability mixes. One “class” of ship could have several variants, as determined by modules inserted during new construction. Within those modules, defined interfaces and rapidly reconfigurable spaces will enable developers to constantly respond to Fleet needs without intrusive and complex shipyard availabilities.
Commonality. We must begin to treat capabilities as commodities, leveraging government defined physical and data interfaces to achieve commonality across the surface force wherever possible. We must break the link forever between the “combat system” and the “ship” so that we can achieve efficiencies of scale associated with the elimination of excessive variation in our ships, irrespective of the class. Where the submarine force or the naval air forces have already fielded capability we need or desire, we must integrate it wherever possible. We must strive to achieve commonality not simply in the things we buy and build, but also in the things we design. Design specifications, then, should be standardized wherever possible and re-used unless a substantial business case exists to the contrary.
We will define requirements for rapidly reconfigurable shipboard spaces during this period, enabling future surface ships to undergo more efficient and less costly modernization periods. The intrusive nature of current modernization efforts costs too much and takes too long to complete. The extensive cutting of bulkheads, the movement of major equipment bolted and welded to decks, overheads, and bulkheads, and the creation of holes in the skin of the ship to enable such efforts, will be largely replaced by ships designed with moveable and reconfigurable spaces, planned and efficient paths for the movement of equipment, and strategically placed hull portals which enable equipment removal and insertion. Making the move to modularity will further allow us to maximize the service lives of our ships as we will be able to update the combat systems equipment to more easily and affordably keep pace with rapidly advancing technology.
Setting the Next Generation Up for Success
Change is never easy, and building our future surface force with the above attributes will require a good deal of cooperation among the Congress, the Navy, and industry in the years ahead. We simply cannot continue to defend business as usual and hope to remain a powerful, globally arrayed Navy. Looking internally, we must more closely align the requirements generation and validation processes with existing and future acquisition processes to achieve program stability and design-lock early on, eliminating wherever possible increased, self-imposed cost and turbulence. Industry, too, must change certain behaviors that cause it to focus first on what it might lose from the changes sought and instead begin to determine how it will incorporate, improve, and profit from them.
Rear Admiral Rowden is the Director of Surface Warfare Division (OPNAV N96). He has served in cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft carriers in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. His most recent sea assignment was commander, Carrier Strike Group 11, and commander, USS Nimitz (CVN-68) Strike Group.
Reg. standardisation,it was common practice by the Soviets during the Cold War.I've mentioned earlier how the same VDS sonar on the Pauks was used by Kamov ASW helos for their dipping sonars .Missile craft were powered by marine versions of jet engines.The philosophy of design and operational use differed with the two superpowers,reflecting their industrial and doctrinal differences.US weaponry was generally more sophisticated,more refined quality of manufacture ,whereas Soviet products looked crude,but were tough and easy to operate in the field,requiring less maintenance.
The USN article also mentions the new tech that will be featured on USN warships from the next decade onwards ,laser weaponry and rail guns with vastly extended range for their kinetic projectiles.The UCLAS UCAV would also be of size similar to Tomcats earlier operated aboard USN carriers.This is a much larger size than the current X-47B drones being tested from USN carriers and would indicate a much larger internal weapons bay ,in fact it would be a smaller version of a stealth bomber.
RajitO.. another sign of a grownup is to know when to stop. I have seen enough of armchair warriors and pretenders on this forum. I was only politely telling u to listen when a grownup is explaining things and not argue for argument sake.
tsarkar..quite understand what u wrote. With the long legs that IAF has with heavy fighters, mid air refuelling etc. why on earth would navy risk carrier borne a/c to strike land targets ( wrt pakistan) when it will have its hands full to protect itself and the fleet? and wrt China , land strike from carrier borne a/c is a total non starter IMHO.
Do not know (granted I am an armchair guy), but I sense a change in thinking out there. For one "IOR" seems be expanding beyond what we consider traditionally consider IOR.
Was "amphibious" or "LPD" mentioned in the doctrine (I do not know)?
As far as I know the doctrine has been published twice in the past 10 years - the last one in 2009. Considering all that has transpired in various areas, it just cannot be current.
On France and Russia not using their carriers - they have no reason to use them as often, RoI is low. Yet, India spends a ton on Siachen. Come the day India has to spend 2 crore per day, she will.
If a carrier is not needed for Pakistan or China and not for invading Maldive, then what is it there for?
Like I said, there is a change under way. And, India will be India. I do not find any need to compare India to anyone. But, neither is she the old India os even a few years ago.
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Capabilities-wise, it does appear it will very difficult for IN to operate effectively in South China Sea, unless we have an operational base there. You need to have good AWACS support (beyond Ka-31 detection range), you need to have long-range ASW patrol, and you need replenishment of arms & ammo for the aircraft.
In the Indian Ocean, things will be a little better. Because of relationships with Seychelles & Mauritius, it may become feasible to base AWACS and patrol aircraft there.
Good thing though, is that Chinese will have similar issues when operating in Indian Ocean. They may get fuel replenishment, but very few (like TSP) will base their AWACS and allow ammunition replenishment. Others will not - they know that when elephants fights, ants tend to get trampled.
"When the requirement is there, for example, in situations where our country's interests are involved, for example ONGC ... we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that," Joshi told a news conference.
And, as I had mentioned earlier, FON is perhaps the biggest issue for India in the SCS:
"It is one of the most important international waterways and freedom of navigation there is an issue of utmost concern to India because a large portion of India's trade is through the South China Sea," said Brahma Chellaney, analyst at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi.
Am I missing anything?
IN has been "deployed" in the SCS since 2000 (per reports).
Not for combat ops. Not to take on Chinese fleet. And we didn't didn't send our fleet. Deployment there was a show of flag.
I respectfully submit that other than US, no other navy has the capability to put in a CBG or a taskforce in another country's area of operations for _combat_ operations.
When you get close to your adversary's home, the odds become enormous. You need to counter the adversary's land based aircraft, limitless supply of missiles etc. In case of China trying to operate in BoB, they will need to be aware of pincer strike from Sukhois based in A&N and Indian mainland, potentially dozens of Brahmos'es deployed and camouflaged in A&N, long range shore based radars etc. Same thing goes to India operating in SCS.
>>With the long legs that IAF has with heavy fighters, mid air refuelling etc. why on earth would navy risk carrier borne a/c >> to strike land targets ( wrt pakistan) when it will have its hands full to protect itself and the fleet?
carrier borne a/c offer flexibility in striking moving and opportunity targets. as it is, we are not overly blessed with LACMs and even the biggest ships like P15A will just carry a single salvo of 16 brahmos. the smaller ones like talwar have no LACM.
once you fire there is a week long voyage back to base to reload, while a carrier can pickup fuel and bombs at sea.
a good mix of a/c & LACM is nedeed - neither is a golden bullet. none of our SSK will carry nirbhay and only arihant has the tubes for it - a bare 3 subs by 2025.
plus the potential of a strong attack from the south on their hitherto secure decadent AWACS bases like jacobabad and quetta will surely stretch the PAF over a wider arc and relieve units elsewhere. no more free lunch of concentrating 75% of their best units in northern sector facing punjab.
also if the idea is to put the PN on the bottom, isnt it more efficient to have Mig29K go after them with ASMs than send the IN units within range of their land based sorties armed with harpoons and exocets. as it is, the PN surface units will disappear swiftly toward saudi ports and their submarines will submerge. pickings will be lean for Asuw. ASW and AAW will be the only game if we get in range.
>> and wrt China , land strike from carrier borne a/c is a total non starter IMHO.
but we still need carriers to attack their naval units in the south china sea itself instead of letting the problem boil over into our backyard as usual. and these will no doubt have to deal with land based flankers as well.
its a tough situation, but we face tough and many enemies.
2.Fed up with Russian grub for so long,the crew are trying to catch some fish with a trawl.
3.Paki spies caught trying to come aboard being fed to the sharks!
Wanted to respond earlier but my account wasn't activated by Bradmins at that time. Sorry for bringing this up again.
Long time ago I saw a WWII movie about Atlantic convoys, I think the movie name is "Action in the North Atlantic (1943)" don't remember exactly. In that movie the lead ship in the convoy drops a marker (wooden arrow) tied to a line so that the ship behind it know the distance to keep. There was scene where a sailor on the following ship spots the marker and shouts out, skipper of that ship orders to slow down (reduce by 5 turns or something like that).
Could it be that the lines Viky is towing are markers to indicate the distance to the ship following it? or they use more modern techniques (like laser distance finder, radar etc) to keep their positions in the convoy?
did the movie scene happen at night or day?
at night the murmansk convoys sailed in blackout mode and radio silence. even smoking on deck was forbidden as U-boats could search for miles using powerful binoculars. I think they maintained a set speed and heading unless the convoy leader radioed new instructions and stuck to it even amidst a attack, leaving behind damaged or sinking ships for the RN escorts to come back to later for survivors. sometimes u-boats managed to surface right in the middle of passing convoys take a few shots and then escape before the escorts chased them down.
the death of the U-boat came when radars were invented to spot their snorkels from 20km away and PBY catalina and B24 liberators would rush over and drop depth charges.
Singha wrote:did the movie scene happen at night or day?
I think it was day but severe fog hampered the visibility. Yes I saw the NatGeo program on the Atlantic war (Convoy: War For The Atlantic) which has great detail about the cat and mouse game played by U-boats and allied Navy ships.
OT & Newbie question, how do modern warships keep their positions in convoys (those placed very closely eg. for Photo sessions). Do they have visual cues or only follow the electronic means (Radar and radio chatter)?
I realize its quite the flavor on BR to put words in people's mouths and then have verbose posts rebutting artificial arguments. This has been pointed out by me to you earlier.
Please carry on regardless, the only reason I responded was to save you the trouble of swinging at windmills. Doubtless it will be a lost cause.
srin wrote:Not for combat ops. Not to take on Chinese fleet. And we didn't didn't send our fleet. Deployment there was a show of flag.
I respectfully submit that other than US, no other navy has the capability to put in a CBG or a taskforce in another country's area of operations for _combat_ operations.
When you really come down to it, not even the US does it vis-a-vis China. Here is virtually the same point made earlier on this thread in a similar context to a different poster.
RajitO wrote:
NRao wrote:
I find the Vikrant to be too small for the ground realities, which I feel have changed dramatically since the past 10 years.
What a surprise then that the IN thinks the same too, hence the different specs for IAC-2.But maybe even that is small for people on this thread.
Despite having 90k tonnes plus carriers the US still relies on bases in the Pacific, FDNF in Japan, plus its allies to keep China in check.
Are we going to be sailing up the Taiwan Straits tomorrow? These ground realities need to be defined in more layered and complex terms of the prevailing realpolitik than the Tom Clancy-ish scenarios that keep surfacing on this thread.
By presenting an artificial argument that the IN by its lonesome is going to take on the Chinese in a full spectrum conflict with its carriers, we detract from the quality of discussion by engaging in all kinds of red herrings that result as a consequence of that fundamentally flawed assumption.
Singha wrote:did the movie scene happen at night or day?
the death of the U-boat came when radars were invented to spot their snorkels from 20km away and PBY catalina and B24 liberators would rush over and drop depth charges.
OT/ON
...there was also the small matter of U-110's failed scuttling by Lt. Cdr. Lemp in may 1941, which led to the Engima machines being captured by the Brits and the resultant loss of surprise, so critical to all U-boat ops.
OT/OFF
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I think its visual in day..there was a glancing collision between a supply ship and a in warship as the ships came too close together and the water flow sucked them together iirc.
Rajit,etc.The IN's doctrine quoted was taken from an article written by none other than Adm. Arun Parakash (retd) ,"India's Maritime Options",VAYU 6/13.I quote:
"The IN has taken serious note of Sir Julian Corbett's conviction about the impossibility of a war being decided by naval action alone" . The Indian Maritime Doctrine has clearly stated in 2009..."that military objectives are inextricably linked to events on land".
Last edited by Philip on 16 Jan 2014 19:06, edited 1 time in total.
I realize its quite the flavor on BR to put words in people's mouths and then have verbose posts rebutting artificial arguments. This has been pointed out by me to you earlier.
Please carry on regardless, the only reason I responded was to save you the trouble of swinging at windmills. Doubtless it will be a lost cause.
srin wrote:Not for combat ops. Not to take on Chinese fleet. And we didn't didn't send our fleet. Deployment there was a show of flag.
I respectfully submit that other than US, no other navy has the capability to put in a CBG or a taskforce in another country's area of operations for _combat_ operations.
When you really come down to it, not even the US does it vis-a-vis China. Here is virtually the same point made earlier on this thread in a similar context to a different poster.
RajitO wrote:
NRao wrote:
I find the Vikrant to be too small for the ground realities, which I feel have changed dramatically since the past 10 years.
What a surprise then that the IN thinks the same too, hence the different specs for IAC-2.But maybe even that is small for people on this thread.
Despite having 90k tonnes plus carriers the US still relies on bases in the Pacific, FDNF in Japan, plus its allies to keep China in check.
Are we going to be sailing up the Taiwan Straits tomorrow? These ground realities need to be defined in more layered and complex terms of the prevailing realpolitik than the Tom Clancy-ish scenarios that keep surfacing on this thread.
By presenting an artificial argument that the IN by its lonesome is going to take on the Chinese in a full spectrum conflict with its carriers, we detract from the quality of discussion by engaging in all kinds of red herrings that result as a consequence of that fundamentally flawed assumption.[/quote]
the last time i heard some one saying something like that last para .. ''actually means' ..sir., i think what you are saying is b$$$ s$$$ but nice way of saying it regardless
Philip wrote:Rajit,etc.The IN's doctrine quoted was taken from an article written by none other than Adm. Arun Parakash (retd) ,"India's Maritime Options",VAYU 6/13.I quote:
"The IN has taken serious note of Sir Julian Corbett's conviction about the impossibility of a war being decided by naval action alone" . The Indian Maritime Doctrine has clearly stated in 2009..."that military objectives are inextricably linked to events on land".
More on the subject later.
Ummm...I an frankly at a loss to understand what you are trying to get at.
This is Arun Prakash in 2013 quoting Mahan.
Having established India’s historical maritime credentials and the criticality of our maritime security to national survival, let me change tack from Panikkar to Mahan and seek the latter’s wisdom regarding the purpose of sea power.
Opinion can always be supported by cherry picking specific data points. Analysis typically becomes robust by including multiple data points that are a representative sample of the stuff out there.
The laundry list of US influence on the IN that I pasted before is what's out there. Analyze it FWIW, dismiss it - what will be, will be.
Rajit,there is no "cherry picking" here.In the article,the Adm. has compared the various maritime/mil doctrines from Mahan to Clausewitz and has said that the IN has already put forth its maritime doctrine in 2009.The article was in the context of a debate between "Continentlalists and Navalists",in the Indian media,suggesting that using naval warfare in the IOR,we could checkmate China (who had a distiinct advantage in infrastructure,etc.) in the Himalayas,while we were better off in the IOR.The counter-view "rejected" the Mahanian solution owing to the complexity of trade-warfare or even a naval blockade in the contemporary environment.It said that basing strategy upon China's naval vulnerabilities would be foolhardy as we also had vulnerabilities elsewhere.Secondly,China was actively trying to reduce its SLOC vulnerability by building up strategic fuel reserves on land and land-linkages through Central Asia.
He added that the IN has already given serious consideration (not to Mahan) but to Sir Julian Corbett and his conviction as posted above,repeated. "The IN has taken serious note of Sir Julian Corbett's conviction about the impossibility of a war being decided by naval action alone" . The Indian Maritime Doctrine has clearly stated in 2009..."that military objectives are inextricably linked to events on land".
This is a clear enunciation of the preferred doctrine ,spelt out in the 200( doctrine,that "the nation's political objectives ...and thus military objectives --are inextricably linked to events on land...therefore,whatever concepts the maritme forces adoptmust directly or indirectly impact affairs on land"
Nevertheless,with the force multipliers and "game changers" as Adm.Prakash describes the Vikramaditya (with its MIG-29Ks able to exercise sea control and boost power projection over the shore),ATV,Chakra,(non-US origin assets by the way) naval sats (GSat-7),etc.,the IN is developing into a stronger force that will allow it dominate the IOR,its own backyard,plus offer security assistance to smaller nations that request it,more he says in the form if training,etc.,as we are seeing with Vietnam,training their submariners to operate Kilos.It will also give us the ability to project power in some measure beyond the IOR into the Indo-China Sea since Vietnam has allowed us to use the port of Nha Trang as a base for the IN.
I am amused at your attempts to "shoehorn" the notion that the IN has adopted a Mahanian doctrine (which may be what the USN adheres to) or suggesting that the IN is accepting the US's "laundry list". India and the IN are not "dhobis" to Uncle Sam! That thinking comes from a servile and inferior mentality belonging to a lackey.No matter if some want us to be dhobis to the Yanquis!
Even in the hey-day of Indo-Soviet relations during the Cold War,India never under Mrs.G allowed the Soviets naval facilities at all,preserving our independence and soveriegnty in defence and foreign affairs during which time we dismembered Pak in style!
In the ultimate analysis,it is India that should be the "magnet" as I've said before for other nations to gravitate to,so that an Indo-centric strategy and security apparatus ,a "Pax Indica" will predominate in the IOR safeguarding India's fundamental interests in general and maritime interests in particular.
Philip wrote:I am amused at your attempts to "shoehorn" the notion that the IN has adopted a Mahanian doctrine (which may be what the USN adheres to) or suggesting that the IN is accepting the US's "laundry list". India and the IN are not "dhobis" to Uncle Sam! That thinking comes from a servile and inferior mentality belonging to a lackey.No matter if some want us to be dhobis to the Yanquis!
Even in the hey-day of Indo-Soviet relations during the Cold War,India never under Mrs.G allowed the Soviets naval facilities at all,preserving our independence and soveriegnty in defence and foreign affairs during which time we dismembered Pak in style!
You're so vehement in denouncing a military alliance with the US or granting them naval bases, that the reader almost forgets the fact that no one has suggested a military alliance or transfer/sharing of naval bases.
In the ultimate analysis,it is India that should be the "magnet" as I've said before for other nations to gravitate to,so that an Indo-centric strategy and security apparatus ,a "Pax Indica" will predominate in the IOR safeguarding India's fundamental interests in general and maritime interests in particular.
There's the little matter of the behemoth to our north - second largest economy in the world, soon to be the largest. An entity who has decades old but still live disputes with India that are nowhere close to being resolved, primarily because of the former's intransigence. A country who's military gap over India continues to grow every day.
And your policy recommendation vis a vis China is to have 'frank talks' with it. I would suggest you reevaluate your priorities.
If you've followed my posts from the last century on BR,I have been warning everyone for aeons about the insidious infiltration of the Chinese in Sri Lanka,the abdication by the GOI of its vital interest there,PRC's growing influence in the Maldives (see the Maldivian Pres' interview on Latitude Times Now TV) and even in Mauritius where we have an Indian security adviser to the PM of Mauritius.
I've also advocated doubling the strength of the MSC in the Himalayas,plus increasing the fleet on IN subs to at least 36,to deal with China's 80,Pak's 12+,Saudi 24 planned apart from sundry subs of other nations,and increasing the sqd. strength of the IAF by cost-effective acquisitions which augment numbers.In foreign arms acquisitions,I've always recommended "horses for courses",that which suits our needs best .
On another td. a poster said that the US has a "laundry list" for the IN (to which I said that we aren't the US's dhobi) ,so don't say that none are advocating a US-Indo joint military alliance ,in fact the US refers to India in its military writings as its "western hinge" in securing the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" region! More than the pro-USA lobby on BR it is the actions of the GOI that is shocking,abdicating its foreign and defence policy to Washington. Upon whose pressure did MMS bring in "Baluchistan" at Sharam-al-Sheikh? Who has been pressurising the GOI to compromise with Pak on Kashmir? Who has yet to hand over Headley/Gilani to us? Who once called Indians "b*stards" (Kissinger)? "The rapists are all vegetarians"? Who has given in 2013 Pak $15B in aid despite its terror connections?
Lastly,what is the harm in talking mano-a-mano to China,"talking turkey",or Beijing Duck? We (pun intended) "duck" the issue of China's arms,N-weapons assistance to Pak,atrocities in Tibet,attempted string of pearls in the IOR,interfering in Sri Lanka and simply accept Beijing's suzerainty over much of Asia particularly in our own backyard,Ar.Pradesh claims,etc.Even on the issue of stapled visas we cringe and kowtow.Forget about the intrusions into Indian territory and the GOI concealing the facts,nature and depth of the intrusions.It doesn't want to panic the nation at a time when we are under-prepared.Understandable.Despite all of China's perfidious behaviour,we cringe and kowtow.Unless we stand firm rock hard,they will continue with their aggression.As one famous analyst said many years ago,"the Chinese will keep pushing and pushing with their bayonets until they meet hard steel".
PS:As for giving the US bases on Indian soil,of course I'm vehement! Who wants to compromise Indian independence and sovereignty for the sake of a bunch of boorish,ignoramuses (DK affair) and losers,now retreating from Afghanistan after Iraq,as they did from Vietnam decades ago?! Unlike MMS,I'm no ex-WB/IMF lackey.
Secondly,we should build upon our strengths,especially in the IOR where the IN is the most powerful littoral navy apartf rom our mil. strength as a great power.India's geographical advantage ,our land mass intruding into the IO like a dagger-"an unsinkable aircraft carrier" as I've always maintained,if leveraged ,will be the magnet to which lesser powerful and friendly nations will gravitate towards India.That is why bi-lateral naval exercises with nations we choose,is far better than multi-lateral exercising with specific nations who are all part of a US led military alliance. We then get branded as being part of the "posse" which brings with it the "equal and opposite reaction".
India has the ability to keep China firmly at bay behind the Himalayas ,not us being boxed in behind them and prevented from exercising our genuine role in Asia,if we will it.If we think defeatist,we will be defeated! Look how little Vietnam- a nation of peasants, defeated in turn the French,the Yanquis and then the Chinese too!
Her primary mission is the delivery of supplies to enable the arrival and assembly of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The T-AKE transfers cargo — ammunition, food, fuel, repair parts, ship store items and expendable supplies to Marine and joint forces ashore.
Under that comes: Dry Cargo/Ammunition ships
_________________
As a FYI, found this in a word doc:
INS Shakti, one of the Indian Navy's biggest ships and built by the Fincantieri Shipyard in Italy. She can carry 15,000 tonnes of different varieties of fuel for ships and aircraft and 500 tonnes of dry cargo, including ammunition and provisions for the fleet to take up multiple ship replenishment operations simultaneously. It also has workshop facilities to provide frontline support to fleet ships and can operate heavy helicopters. It is equipped with state-of-the-art sensors an electronic warfare suite, most of it being indigenous. It was designed to operate as a command platform.
IN has two of these ships: Deepak (class) and Shakti. A third would perhaps complete the picture for three carrier groups? (Never mind the fact that the Italians cheated by using substandard steel for the hulls - to get L1 - per CAG.)
Philip wrote:If you've followed my posts from the last century on BR,I have been warning everyone for aeons about the insidious infiltration of the Chinese in Sri Lanka,the abdication by the GOI of its vital interest there,PRC's growing influence in the Maldives (see the Maldivian Pres' interview on Latitude Times Now TV) and even in Mauritius where we have an Indian security adviser to the PM of Mauritius.
I've also advocated doubling the strength of the MSC in the Himalayas,plus increasing the fleet on IN subs to at least 36,to deal with China's 80,Pak's 12+,Saudi 24 planned apart from sundry subs of other nations,and increasing the sqd. strength of the IAF by cost-effective acquisitions which augment numbers.In foreign arms acquisitions,I've always recommended "horses for courses",that which suits our needs best .
On another td. a poster said that the US has a "laundry list" for the IN (to which I said that we aren't the US's dhobi) ,so don't say that none are advocating a US-Indo joint military alliance ,in fact the US refers to India in its military writings as its "western hinge" in securing the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" region! More than the pro-USA lobby on BR it is the actions of the GOI that is shocking,abdicating its foreign and defence policy to Washington. Upon whose pressure did MMS bring in "Baluchistan" at Sharam-al-Sheikh? Who has been pressurising the GOI to compromise with Pak on Kashmir? Who has yet to hand over Headley/Gilani to us? Who once called Indians "b*stards" (Kissinger)? "The rapists are all vegetarians"? Who has given in 2013 Pak $15B in aid despite its terror connections?
Lastly,what is the harm in talking mano-a-mano to China,"talking turkey",or Beijing Duck? We (pun intended) "duck" the issue of China's arms,N-weapons assistance to Pak,atrocities in Tibet,attempted string of pearls in the IOR,interfering in Sri Lanka and simply accept Beijing's suzerainty over much of Asia particularly in our own backyard,Ar.Pradesh claims,etc.Even on the issue of stapled visas we cringe and kowtow.Forget about the intrusions into Indian territory and the GOI concealing the facts,nature and depth of the intrusions.It doesn't want to panic the nation at a time when we are under-prepared.Understandable.Despite all of China's perfidious behaviour,we cringe and kowtow.Unless we stand firm rock hard,they will continue with their aggression.As one famous analyst said many years ago,"the Chinese will keep pushing and pushing with their bayonets until they meet hard steel".
PS:As for giving the US bases on Indian soil,of course I'm vehement! Who wants to compromise Indian independence and sovereignty for the sake of a bunch of boorish,ignoramuses (DK affair) and losers,now retreating from Afghanistan after Iraq,as they did from Vietnam decades ago?! Unlike MMS,I'm no ex-WB/IMF lackey.
The usual laundry list of rants, that would be comical if not so absurd.
Secondly,we should build upon our strengths,especially in the IOR where the IN is the most powerful littoral navy apartf rom our mil. strength as a great power.India's geographical advantage ,our land mass intruding into the IO like a dagger-"an unsinkable aircraft carrier" as I've always maintained,if leveraged ,will be the magnet to which lesser powerful and friendly nations will gravitate towards India.That is why bi-lateral naval exercises with nations we choose,is far better than multi-lateral exercising with specific nations who are all part of a US led military alliance. We then get branded as being part of the "posse" which brings with it the "equal and opposite reaction".
The only country capable of titling the military balance our way is the US. We can probably get the "maldives" to gravitate towards us if we try real hard. The Japanese and S. Koreans, who incidentally are the ones that have the heft both economically and militarily, are firmly in the US camp. In an article posted right here on this forum, Abe was quoted as saying "we're the ones the americans dropped nukes on, wtf are you so shy of america ?". Hell we can't even absorb Japanese investment as fast as they'd like to build us up and you think they'll gravitate towards us to form a pax-indica ? WTF are you smoking ?
As far as "pax-indica", it is indeed the most preferable outcome (The only point in your lengthy rambles that actually made sense). However it ain't happening for a loooong time. That apart, the only preferable dispensation is "pax-americana". There is no other formulation by either a single country or combination thereof that is more to our advantage. No wonder our brilliant foreign policy experts who were busy sniffling at the fall of the Soviet Union, don't wail about a unipolar world anymore. We're going to continue to build bridges with the US, while increasing our options with Japan/SoKo/EU. None of that means we can stay away from uncle's bear hug.
Last edited by KrishnaK on 17 Jan 2014 07:14, edited 1 time in total.
One of the main reasons why "IOR", form an India PoV, will have to include SCS is the vacuum created by the partial departure of US forces from that region. US is under a pivot & re-balance, where the re-balance is forgotten.
Unofficial figures of Indian "Marines", under the sea lift flag, have gone from none to 850 to 3000.
*Japan is talking* of cooperation with India (ever heard that before?) !!!!!!
V'Nam is closer than ever before (in plenty of ways).
Singapore - we all know.
SK, Australia too in the picture.
IN-USN have the highest interaction for the past decade or so. Nothing new there, nor is there any need to "lean" towards the US. Is has been happening within the IN. Saying that is just like saying the sun rises from the east - just an observation.
All this has been happening for around 10 years now.
BTW, whatever happened to the talk of a 1000 ship navy?
And, also BTW, IF China has SLOC interests in the IOR, India has equal SLOC interests in the SCS. No two ways about that.
I see no diff between standing up a strike corps along the Chinese border and talking of IN in the SCS - both to me are the very same. And, like one is happening, the other can happen. Actually what I am saying is that it will happen - India has no choice. Under her own flag, but in cooperation with other flags.
Well CSG or CBG, a MiG-29K with A2G ordinance can land a few well timed punches, if a few Styx could make Karachi shudder, a MiG-29K raid with PGMs would be far more devastating.
I admire your detailed posts. Unfortunately, the suggestions don't seem to be grounded in reality. We finally got one more AC and we are talking of expanded Field of Operations beyond IOR. Is'nt that a little fanciful given that we are unable to contain Chinese expansion into IOR? Talking to the Chinese Mano-Mano? what do they get from this. I worked with the Chinese before and their negotiation is not unlike a knife fight. They will try and browbeat you on each cent - most of the time they win.
Can you (without adding the excerpts from other articles) in less than a paragraph summarize your recommendation on how to best utilize the existing assets that IN can field in IOR? Thank you.
The question is not entirely hypothetical in the view of some experts. Bertil Lintner, a Swedish journalist who has spent years reporting on conflict in northeast India, China, Myanmar and Thailand, believes “it is becoming increasingly clear” that the Indian Ocean “will become the main theater of the Great game East rather than the Sino-Indian border or traditional flashpoints in India’s northeast.”
Lintner, in his latest book, “Great Game East: India, China and the struggle for Asia’s most volatile frontier,” writes, “China has become a player in the Indian Ocean, and it is there to stay.”
AH,Krishnak,guys,"building bridges" with the US,Japan,bi-lateral cooperation with friendly navies,etc. is perfectly OK,provided we do not fall into the trap of getting ourselves entangled into any existing military alliance such as exists and fighting a "foreign war" that fundamentally does not affect our core interests.The US has military "allies" in the Asia-Pacific.It wants the IN to join this alliance and secure its "western hinge" in encircling China and take active part in any spat that this alliance has with China.That would be a recipe for disaster.This would turn us into a vassal state,and in any outbreak of hostilities,playing the role that we did in WW1 and WW2,where millions of Indians were cannon fodder fighting the white man's wars.Instead,as I've said,nations in the IOR in particular,should gravitate towards us,as they once did,taking our lead during the heydays of NAM,that too when we were far weaker militarily than now.A "Pax Indica" is certainly achievable if we have the will to achieve it.We are infinitely stronger now,a nuclear weapons power,a space power,and an economic power that has been weakened in recent times by the greed and corruption of the Cong/UPA regime.This is already attracting "old friends" like Vietnam,whom we are going to train in the art of sub warfare for a start,who've even provided us with base facilities at Nha Trang.Others will follow if we chart our own independent course.US "dependents",like SoKo and Japan,Oz,have to band together because they rely upon Uncle Sam,his navy and his boots on the ground fro their security.He has had bases on their territory from WW2 days!
I've shown the current doctrinal thinking of the IN,explained by Adm.Prakash,where it will conduct maritime ops that secures our goals on land.We have a long ,vulnerable border from the China in the east,from our NEast region to Pak in the west.The US is retreating from Af-Pak and thousands of Paki trained jihadis are expected to turn their attention to India this year.BDesh is in crisis and on our northern borders,we are still very vulnerable to Chinese intrusions,and have been drawing up plans to fight a two-front war where Pak and China orchestrate joint aggression against India.Our priority is to first defend our shores,island territories,secure the IOR and the safety of smaller littoral states friends of ours,with whom we have security agreements,and prevent/counter any large scale naval intrusion into the IOR from China shutting it out in a crisis from using the IOR to wage war against India.
At the moment China is attempting to secure its own vulnerability due to the concentration of most its industrial base strung out all along its coastline.India is not its main military threat.Its priority is to regain physical control over Taiwan,or use enough pressure for the island to capitulate to it.AS long as Taiwan is propped up by the US,it remains an "island too far". Some years ago during a moment of tension over Taiwan,the USN sailed its carrier task force through the Taiwan Straits,showing the upturned finger to the Chinese.To the Chinese who hate losing face,it was a slap in the face and boot up the backside .But how did they react? They swallowed their pride and ordered 4 Sovremenny class DDGs from Russia equipped with Sunburn carrier-killer supersonic missiles and a large number of Kilo 636 subs.They made strengthening their navy their top priority,realising that they had to have a strong navy powerful enough to challenge the USN in the Pacific to be able to break out of the first island chain.Apart from an all round modernisation and expansion programme,they next developed the anti-carrier BM,well-knowing that the USN's offensive strength lies in its CBGs/CSGs.Using the air bases in the mainland,it ramped up licence and illegal manufacture of Flankers and their clones.With an overwhelming superiority in numbers,Rand studies,etc. showed that US F-22s operating out of Guam would be hard pressed to win an air battle with the PLAAF/PLAN's large numbers of Flankers,etc.Adding to that huge capability,the PRC is now developing two stealth aircraft to give it the extra qualitative edge .For the future,it plans to mimic the USN building its own carriers,based upon the Varyag now the Liaoning, and the intense sub building programme,where two N-sub designs,plus Kilo clones,and other AIP subs of new designs using German engines,are steadily being slid out off PRC yards.
Fortunately for us,the IN with its long experience of being the "Cinderella" of the services,and the wisdom of chiefs long gone,secured its future by establishing the foundation of becoming a builder's navy.A stat was given recently,showing the IN's impressive indigenisation progress.70% in the "float" (hull,basic structure),50% in the "move" (propulsion) and 30% in weaponry,etc. categories respectively.Our yards are full of orders and soon the pvt. yards too should be brimming with activity,building amphib vessels,etc.This is giving us the industrial base and skills whereby we can build a powerful navy and counter China on our own in the maritime sphere.The IN in the next decade,will possess 3 virtually new carriers (The VikA,IAC-1 and larger IAC-2,with a sister ship also an option).Apart from these flat tops we will also posses 4 new amphib vessels,with a significant degree of multi-role capability.They will be able to operate helos of 35t,and if the design is chosen wisely,be able to also operate STOVL aircraft ,even perhaps NLCAs/Sea Gripens,concept shown to the IN last year by SAAB for even the VIraat.Japan will order STOVL JSFs for its so-called "helicopter destroyers",in reality light carriers and are sure to build even larger ones to counter the Chinese.We need at least 3 divs of amphib troops keeping in mind our IPKF role of yesteryear,which could be the basis for a future Marine Corps.
In addition we have our unsinkable carrier,INS India,from where dozens of LRMP and other shore based ASW aircraft will be able to support the surface fleet.The Fleet Air Arm will operate 300 fixed and rotary winged aircraft soon.About 100 Navy MIG-29s and NLCAs (Q mark here) will operate from the carriers.If a naval version of the FGFA is also acquired it would considerably increase the capability of the IN's carrier forces.Add to the IN's air strength is that of the IAF deputed for maritime duties esp. those MKIs located in the Andamans command.All assets linked together in NCW through our dedicated naval sats (GSat-7,etc),UAVs will give us the "eyes and ears" required.Our own strategic and tactical missile strength with LR cruise missiles (Nirbhay),hypersonic BMos,and our own versions of BM carrier-killers Dhanush a modest first,K-15 to follow) A navy bent upon mischief in the IOR against India would do well to think long and hard before embarking upon such a course.The PLAN's surface fleet would be very vulnerable,less so will be its large sub fleet,preferred weapon of choice.
Our glaring weakness at the moment is with the sub inventory.Drastically falling numbers,the fleet almost entirely composed of legacy Kilos ,decades old whose life is being extended with upgrades.Even when the 6 Scorpenes arrive by 2020,they will be too few and somewhat long in the tooth design wise.China will be able to operate at least a dozen subs including nuclear boats,the Pakis will have a dozen+ and the Saudis plan for a huge fleet of 24 U-boats.The silver lining is the arrival of the ATV series and the Chakra Akula-2.In countering the Chinese and to establish a forward presence in the Indo-China Sea,where we will be able to conduct offensive ops against the PLAN,our best bet is to build a large and capable sub fleet,of at least 36 subs,preferably 48.Of these at least 12 should be a combination of SSBNs (securing our strategic deterrence) and SSGNs to take the fight to the enemy.We need a cost-effective sub design for our littoral requirements in dealing with Pak (of much lesser cost than the hideously expensive Scorpenes) that can be built in large numbers.These would be able to defend our long coastline,ports and naval bases primarily,plus another medium sized sub for extended blue water ops that would carry the sub launched BMos.Unlike the carrier task forces,easier to detect,large numbers of IN subs stationed of the Chinese coastline -with logistic facilities available at Nha Trang,would be a considerable problem for the PLAN.
A few years ago,A Russian analyst opined that to counter China,India could be given by Russia large SSGNs like the Oscar class,plus supersonic bombers like Backfires.Acquiring a supersonic bomber (upgraded Backfire) ,as was earlier planned is still an option.It is building the sub fleet at speed that is of concern.Russia is supplying 6 new Kilo 3636.3s to Vietnam within just 6 years,two already completed.Pvt. yards have to also build subs.The ambitious P-75I sub design will take years to arrive,there is a current urgent need that has to be filled.Chinese mil. strategy says that the best way to win a war is applying so much pressure upon an enemy that his will to fight is broken and the war won without firing a shot.We should keep this in mind steadily building up our mil forces,so that the same is achieved.
Philip wrote:AH,Krishnak,guys,"building bridges" with the US,Japan,bi-lateral cooperation with friendly navies,etc. is perfectly OK,provided we do not fall into the trap of getting ourselves entangled into any existing military alliance such as exists and fighting a "foreign war" that fundamentally does not affect our core interests.The US has military "allies" in the Asia-Pacific.It wants the IN to join this alliance and secure its "western hinge" in encircling China and take active part in any spat that this alliance has with China.
That the foreign war doesn't fundamentally affect our core interests ?????? Nobody wants a war to take place, not the US, it's allies or us. Inspite of what you believe it is not the US that is precipitating this confrontation. As far our core interests go: If China were to be able to successfully swallow Taiwan it would be a huge setback for us. There would be no end to Chinese aggression and swaggering at that point. Japan and SoKo are one of our biggest investors. That they continue to be in a position to invest in our infrastructure is enormously in our interests. We continue to invest in Vietnam. How is defending that not in our interest ? If a war were to break out, would you just sit with your thumbs up your arse and watch your investments go up in flames ? I totally get the point of not wanting to get into a military alliance with the US. Short of that, we should do everything we can to maintain status quo.
Instead,as I've said,nations in the IOR in particular,should gravitate towards us,as they once did,taking our lead during the heydays of NAM,that too when we were far weaker militarily than now.A "Pax Indica" is certainly achievable if we have the will to achieve it.
The only countries that "gravitated" towards us during the heydays of the NAM were Egypt and Yugoslavia. The rest of the world shook in their boots at this formidable alliance. There is no limit to your delusions. The NAM was a joke as is your post.
I wonder how long before Phillip puts up another one of his gems
We should not fall into the trap that the US the globocop is laying for us, western hinge, we don't have the budget for such grand war fighting plans, blah blah blah blah blah blah blah blah
Pax indica with our NAM allies and maldives blah blah blah blah blah blah blah
We should carry on a frank conversation with China and be ready to take on an economy 5 times our size blah blah blah blah blah blah
INS India the unsinkable aircraft carrier like a dagger into the IOR, Malacca, blah blah blah blah blah blah
Russia Brahmos Arihant Oscar Kilo blah blah blah blah blah blah
Philip wrote:In countering the Chinese and to establish a forward presence in the Indo-China Sea,where we will be able to conduct offensive ops against the PLAN,our best bet is to build a large and capable sub fleet,of at least 36 subs,preferably 48.
Yahan 6 submarine banane mein t4tt3 gale tak pahunch gaye.
Philip wrote:If you've followed my posts from the last century on BR,I have been warning everyone for aeons about the insidious infiltration of the Chinese in Sri Lanka,the abdication by the GOI of its vital interest there,PRC's growing influence in the Maldives (see the Maldivian Pres' interview on Latitude Times Now TV) and even in Mauritius where we have an Indian security adviser to the PM of Mauritius.
Surely folks were aware of the threat from China before your warnings?
I've also advocated doubling the strength of the MSC in the Himalayas,plus increasing the fleet on IN subs to at least 36,to deal with China's 80,Pak's 12+,Saudi 24 planned apart from sundry subs of other nations,and increasing the sqd. strength of the IAF by cost-effective acquisitions which augment numbers.In foreign arms acquisitions,I've always recommended "horses for courses",that which suits our needs best .
I'd like the MSC tripled and sub fleet increased to 54. Unfortunately, our resources are not limitless and the military gap with China will inevitably continue to increase.
On another td. a poster said that the US has a "laundry list" for the IN (to which I said that we aren't the US's dhobi) ,so don't say that none are advocating a US-Indo joint military alliance ,in fact the US refers to India in its military writings as its "western hinge" in securing the "Indo-Asia-Pacific" region!
The US Navy can advocate whatever it wants. Tomorrow, the Danish Navy may start studying the impact of an alliance with India, doesn't affect our policy in the slightest. There's no one in the Indian political-bureaucratic setup or the military or prominent media quarters, or here on BRF that's recommending a military alliance with the US or any East Asian country.
More than the pro-USA lobby on BR it is the actions of the GOI that is shocking,abdicating its foreign and defence policy to Washington. Upon whose pressure did MMS bring in "Baluchistan" at Sharam-al-Sheikh? Who has been pressurising the GOI to compromise with Pak on Kashmir? Who has yet to hand over Headley/Gilani to us? Who once called Indians "b*stards" (Kissinger)? "The rapists are all vegetarians"? Who has given in 2013 Pak $15B in aid despite its terror connections?
The Russians have handed over some 400 Flankers, dozens of S-300 systems, Kilos, Sovremennys and a host of missiles and other enabling technologies. 8 out 10 enemy aircraft that the IAF is likely to face will be powered by a Russian engine.
You're sniffing out nefarious American plots and getting furious about it, but the Russian contribution to the actual tangible threat facing us today, only makes you want to buy even more Russian equipment. What gives?
Lastly,what is the harm in talking mano-a-mano to China
Sounds good. Unfortunately I don't know what it means.
Should the next diplomatic meet be held in an Akhara, with both sides arriving all oiled up wearing loincloths?
What's wrong with the way we've been talking for the last thirty years.
PS:As for giving the US bases on Indian soil,of course I'm vehement! Who wants to compromise Indian independence and sovereignty for the sake of a bunch of boorish,ignoramuses (DK affair) and losers,now retreating from Afghanistan after Iraq,as they did from Vietnam decades ago?! Unlike MMS,I'm no ex-WB/IMF lackey.
What's the point of being vehement about what amounts to a straw man? We're not giving bases to the US. We're not giving bases to Russia or China or Pakistan either.
Last edited by Viv S on 17 Jan 2014 08:17, edited 1 time in total.
the most effective way of taking out big powerful combatants on the surface is a fleet of SSN/heavy-SSK(Soryus) with heavy torpedoes and supersonic ASMs. it will work in the east asian seas and even better in the indian ocean because cheen ASW assets will be limited to on-ship helis only as we can interdict their land based LRMP if they sortie out that far.
we dont need carriers or DDGS to duel in the manner of mediaeval knights.
however for land attack unless you get a behemoth sub like the Yasen(32-40 missiles) or Ohio conversion, a sub brings limited strike power to the table, and can only go at high value, static and prestige targets. a carrier brings more flexibility and staying power.
to me it seems
against Cheen (sea denial posture in the east, sea control in the IOR) - focus on LRMP, ASW and submarines, kamorta class++, nirbhay
against TSP (pound the living crap out of them posture)- focus on ASW and carrier strike power
against Khan baba (deterrence posture)- focus on hypersonic ASBM work with Shourya, brahmos2, brahmos3(air launched) and Agni5+ and TEST NEW WARHEADS
Philip wrote:AH,Krishnak,guys,"building bridges" with the US,Japan,bi-lateral cooperation with friendly navies,etc. is perfectly OK,provided we do not fall into the trap of getting ourselves entangled into any existing military alliance such as exists and fighting a "foreign war" that fundamentally does not affect our core interests.
Do you think China will militarily intervene in an Indo-Pak conflict? Do they care about Kashmir or Siachen or even Afghanistan enough to go to war with India over it?
During Kargil, they took no sides and urged peaceful negotiations, but that didn't stop Chinese troops from exploiting reduced Indian troop strength to push deep into Aksai Chin, building a motorable track running 20km into our side.
Why should we confine our responses to the US and Asian states to a crude dichotomy of either 'bilateral cooperation' or 'multilateral military alliance'?
A few years ago,A Russian analyst opined that to counter China,India could be given by Russia large SSGNs like the Oscar class,plus supersonic bombers like Backfires.
If they don't want payment for it, that's a good option. Unless there's a 'refurbishment cost' added.
but nice way of saying it regardless 
