As an American citizen whose appearance and passport allowed her to blend into Western society, LaRose represents one of the worst fears of intelligence and FBI analysts focused on identifying terrorist threats. She is one of only a handful of women to be charged with terrorism offenses in the United States, national security experts said.
worst fears is when Japs and Koreans put on soosai vests and start shouting AoA!!and it continues thus.The federal government has awarded more than $107 billion in contract payments, grants and other benefits over the past decade to foreign and multinational American companies while they were doing business in Iran, despite Washington’s efforts to discourage investment there, records show.
That includes nearly $15 billion paid to companies that defied American sanctions law by making large investments that helped Iran develop its vast oil and gas reserves.
For years, the United States has been pressing other nations to join its efforts to squeeze the Iranian economy, in hopes of reining in Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. Now, with the nuclear standoff hardening and Iran rebuffing American diplomatic outreach, the Obama administration is trying to win a tough new round of United Nations sanctions.
But a New York Times analysis of federal records, company reports and other documents shows that both the Obama and Bush administrations have sent mixed messages to the corporate world when it comes to doing business in Iran, rewarding companies whose commercial interests conflict with American security goals.
Many of those companies are enmeshed in the most vital elements of Iran’s economy. More than two-thirds of the government money went to companies doing business in Iran’s energy industry — a huge source of revenue for the Iranian government and a stronghold of the increasingly powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, a primary focus of the Obama administration’s proposed sanctions because it oversees Iran’s nuclear and missile programs.
MARCH 10, 2010 12:00 A.M.
Artificial Stupidity
The American education system focuses more on politically correct crusades than intellectually correct arguments.
Many of today’s “educators” not only supply students with conclusions, but promote the idea that students should spring into action because of these prepackaged conclusions — in other words, vent their feelings and go galloping off on crusades, with neither a knowledge of what is said by those on the other side nor the intellectual discipline to know how to analyze opposing arguments.
When we see children in elementary schools out carrying signs in demonstrations, we are seeing the kind of mindless groupthink that causes adults to sign petitions they don’t understand or, worse yet, follow leaders they don’t understand, whether to the White House, the Kremlin, or Jonestown.
A philosopher once said that the most important knowledge is knowledge of one’s own ignorance. That is the knowledge that too many of our schools and colleges are failing to teach our young people.
It takes a certain amount of knowledge just to understand the extent of one’s own ignorance. But our “educators” have given assignments to children who are not yet a decade old to write letters to members of Congress, or to Presidents, spouting off on issues ranging from nuclear weapons to medical care.
Washington A top US Army official has raised concerns over the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan triggered by extremist groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT).
Addressing the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Lt Gen. Francis Kearney, Deputy Commander, US Special Operations Command, said while America is taking steps regarding preventing any terrorist activity on its soil, it is also worried about militants’ aim of spreading bloodshed across the globe.
This is so silly. If he really fears that he should lean on TSP to crack down on LeT and not whine about it in US Congress. Instead he and his ilk want India to be restrained while LeT attacks India, while being controlled by TSP Army.kenop wrote:US worried over LeT triggering Indo-Pak warWashington A top US Army official has raised concerns over the possibility of a war between India and Pakistan triggered by extremist groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT).
Addressing the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Lt Gen. Francis Kearney, Deputy Commander, US Special Operations Command, said while America is taking steps regarding preventing any terrorist activity on its soil, it is also worried about militants’ aim of spreading bloodshed across the globe.
American journalists do not mind if India sinks billions of dollars in improving commercial ties with US. The hypocrisy is appalling.While New Delhi's goal of diversifying its energy supplies and moving away from coal may be admirable -- in 2003, coal was estimated to account for almost 70% of India's energy consumption -- you've got to question the wisdom of sinking billions of dollars into improving commercial ties with Russia when your country's per capita GDP puts you in the bottom quartile of the world.
New York University's Subhash Khot, a theoretical computer scientist and associate professor in the department of computer science at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, has been named to receive the National Science Foundation's 2010 Alan T. Waterman Award. Khot is working in an area called "Computational Complexity," which seeks to understand the power and limits of efficient computation.
The U.S. government has previously associated the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT--"Army of the Pure") primarily with the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir and has viewed the group as less inimical to U.S. interests than al-Qaeda, although the U.S. State Department has listed the LeT as a Foreign Terrorist Organization since December, 2001. In my testimony, I will argue that the U.S. must develop policies that approach the LeT with the same urgency as that which the U.S. deals with the threat from al-Qaeda. Given the potential for LeT-linked terrorist cells to conduct a Mumbai-style attack here in the U.S., Washington must pursue policies that contain and shut down the operations of this deadly organization. This will require close cooperation with the Pakistani government, which has in the past supported the LeT, and only recently and haltingly begun to take steps to rein in the group's activities.
Headley Investigations
The arrest of Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley in the U.S. in October 2009 provided a major breakthrough in the Mumbai attack probe and shed fresh light on the operations and objectives of the LeT. On October 2, 2009, U.S. authorities in Chicago arrested David Coleman Headley (also known as Daood Gilani) for conspiring with LeT in Pakistan to conduct attacks in India, and for plotting an attack on the Danish newspaper that first published cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in 2005. Headley had apparently traveled frequently to Pakistan, where he received terrorist training from the LeT. He allegedly scouted the sites of the Mumbai attacks as well as sites for subsequent attacks in India, including the National Defence College in New Delhi and two well-known boarding schools. Headley's alleged co-conspirator, Pakistani-born Canadian citizen Tahawwur Rana was also arrested in the U.S. in mid-October 2009.
The findings from the Headley investigations have awakened U.S. officials to the gravity of the international threat posed by Pakistan's failure to crack down on terrorist groups, including those that have primarily targeted India. U.S. officials had previously viewed the LeT solely through an Indo-Pakistani lens rather than as an urgent international terrorist threat. The Headley investigations appear to be changing the way the U.S. government views the LeT. U.S. State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Daniel Benjamin, for instance, recently said that the Headley investigations show the LeT has global ambitions and is willing to undertake bold, mass-casualty operations.
Most troubling about the Headley case is what it has revealed about the proximity of the Pakistani military to the LeT. The U.S. Department of Justice indictment that was unsealed on January 14, 2009 names a retired Pakistani army major, Abdul Rehman Hashim Syed, as Headley's handler, and Ilyas Kashmiri, a former commando with Pakistan's elite Special Services Group, and now leader of the Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami, as the operational commander behind the Mumbai attacks. While the allegations do not specify that serving Pakistani army or intelligence officials were involved in the attacks, they reveal that the Pakistani army's past support and continued facilitation of the LeT contributed to the terror group's ability to conduct the assaults.
The revelations from the Headley investigations prompted fresh U.S. demarches on the Pakistani government to crack down more forcefully on the LeT. Just before the one-year anniversary of the attacks, and perhaps in response to this increased U.S. pressure, Pakistan finally charged the seven LeT operatives in an anti-terrorism court. Pakistani authorities have not charged LeT leader Hafez Muhammed Sayeed, however, even though Kasab has indicated thatSayeed gave his blessing to the attackers before they departed Pakistan. In fact, on February 5, 2009, Sayeed reportedly addressed a crowd of around 10,000 in Lahore, Pakistan, where he called for additional attacks on India. Eight days after Sayeed's speech, terrorists bombed a German bakery in Pune, India, killing nine and wounding dozens of others. Indian Home Minister P. Chidambaram last week criticized Pakistan for allowing Sayeed to make provocative anti-Indian statements, especially after the Indian government had provided information on his role in the Mumbai attacks.[2]
The degree of control that Pakistani intelligence retains over LeT's operations remains an open question. Some Pakistani officials claim that al-Qaeda has infiltrated the LeT, implying that Pakistani officials were not involved in the planning and execution of the Mumbai attacks, and that elements of the LeT were "freelancing." Regardless of whether the Pakistanis did or did not have control of the group that carried out the Mumbai attacks, they are now responsible for taking actions that seek to ensure the LeT and its affiliates are incapable of conducting additional attacks. The appearance of LeT leader Hafez Muhammed Sayeed at a public rally casts grave doubts about Pakistan's commitment to reining in the group's activities.
LeT Ambitions and Links to International Terrorism
The U.S. government has viewed LeT primarily through an Indo-Pakistani lens and calculated that the group did not pose a direct threat to U.S. interests. This view is short-sighted. LeT leaders themselves view the group as part of a global jihad movement and seek not only to undermine India but also to attack any countries they view as threatening Muslim populations. The LeT's operational focus has evolved considerably over the last several years. Throughout the early and mid-1990s, the LeT focused primarily on attacking Indian security forces in Kashmir. By the late 1990s, the LeT began calling for the break-up of the Indian state. In 2001, the LeT and another group, the Jaish-e-Muhammed (JeM), attacked the Indian parliament in the heart of New Delhi, precipitating a military crisis between India and Pakistan and demonstrating the LeT's ability to put the subcontinent on the edge of a potential nuclear catastrophe.
Even after the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, U.S. officials tended to view the LeT (and the JeM) as less threatening to U.S. interests than al-Qaeda, despite well-known links between these groups and international terrorism. For instance, shoe bomber Richard Reid apparently trained at an LeT camp in Pakistan; one of the London subway bombers spent time at an LeT complex in Muridke, Pakistan; and al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubayda was captured from an LeT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. But the LeT links to al-Qaeda go back even further. In 1998, the LeT signed Osama bin Laden's fatwa for Muslims to kill Americans and Israelis. The revelations from the Headley investigations that the LeT in coordination with the Harakat-ul-Jihadi-Islami planned to attack the U.S. Embassy and Indian High Commission in Bangladesh around the one-year anniversary of the 2008 Mumbai attacks should help convince U.S. officials that LeT ambitions include hitting U.S. targets.
Highly skeptical about US doing anything as suggested! All is for consumption of mandarins of MEA, who are going gaga over unkil waking up and turning a new leaf in dealing with pakis!U.S. Policy Moving Forward
It has been a failure of U.S. policy to not insist Pakistan shut down the LeT long ago. U.S. officials have shied away from pressuring Pakistan on the LeT in the interest of garnering Pakistani cooperation against targets the U.S. believed were more critical to immediate U.S. objectives, i.e., al-Qaeda shortly after 9/11 and the Afghan Taliban more recently. But overlooking the activities of LeT in Pakistan is equivalent to standing next to a ticking time bomb waiting for it to explode.Furthermore,given that the LeT has cooperated with al-Qaeda and shares a similar virulent anti-west Islamist ideology, it makes little sense to believe one can dismantle al-Qaeda without also shutting down the operations of the LeT.
U.S. officials have begun to acknowledge the importance of Pakistan pursuing more consistent counterterrorism policies, rather than relying on its past tactic of fighting some terrorists, while supporting others. U.S. Defense Secretary Gates argued in a recent op-ed that ran in the Pakistani daily The News that seeking to distinguish between different terrorist groups is counterproductive. U.S. Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair elaborated on this point when he testified before Congress on February 2, 2010 that, "Pakistan's conviction that militant groups are strategically useful to counter India are hampering the fight against terrorism and helping al-Qaeda sustain its safe haven."
To degrade the overall international terrorist threat emanating from Pakistan, the U.S. must convince Islamabad to confront those groups it has supported against India. The Mumbai attacks and subsequent Headley investigations reveal that the LeT has the international capabilities and ideological inclination to attack western targets whether they are located in South Asia or elsewhere. The boldness and sophistication of the Mumbai attacks demonstrate that Pakistan needs to take decisive action to neutralize the LeT before it conducts additional attacks that could well involve western targets and/or precipitate an Indo-Pakistani military conflict. More specifically the U.S. must:
* Closely monitor Pakistani actions to dismantle the LeT. Merely banning the organization has done little to degrade its capabilities. The U.S. in collaboration with other allies must increase pressure on Pakistan to take specific steps like denying the LeT leaders the ability to hold public rallies, collect donations, and engage in paramilitary training on Pakistani territory.
* Avoid conveying a message that the U.S. is more interested in some terrorist groups than others, which only encourages the Pakistani leadership to avoid addressing the issue of confronting the LeT. Washington should repeat Defense Secretary Gates' message about the futility of trying to distinguish between terrorist groups that share more commonalities than differences.
* Convey to the Pakistani leadership that the U.S. will monitor closely India's military posture toward Pakistan as it dismantles groups like the LeT. {Am sure only this recommendation will be fully implemented nah is already being done}
Check this report too.Amber G. wrote:^^^ Thanks for the above, it is an excellent source and will be very helpful. (Whenever I can, and for what ever it's worth I try to write letters and educate US congressmen).
Thanks again
Other PSRU Publications
The following papers are freely available through the Pakistan Security Research Unit
• Report Number 1. The Jihadi Terrain in Pakistan: An Introduction to the
Sunni Jihadi Groups in Pakistan and Kashmir
Brief Number 42. Pakistan's Tribal Areas: An Agency by Agency Assessment
Brief Number 43. Towards a Containment Strategy in the FATA
Brief Number 44. British Islamism and the South Asian Connection
Brief Number 45. India Pakistan. Friends, Rivals or Enemies?
Brief Number 46. Failed Take-Off: an Assessment of Pakistan’s October 2008
Brief Number 47. Pakistan’s Army and National Stability.
Brief Number 48. One or many? The issue of the Taliban's unity and disunity.
Brief Number 49. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan: Ideology and Beliefs
Brief Number 50. Civil Society in Pakistan: Stake Holders in a Contested State
Brief Number 51. A Review of AfPak and the Ongoing Challenge of Pakistan
Brief Number 52. At the Precipice: Is Pakistan About to Fail?
Brief Number 54 Insurrection, Terrorism, and the Pakistan Army
There's no stronger signal that the Obama administration's neglect of India is starting to have real foreign-policy consequences.
Thanks to the arduous efforts of the Bush administration, which helped forge the historic Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear accord, India can now engage in the global civilian nuclear trade. Ironically, the Russians are now cashing in on it
Russia's renewed push into the subcontinent stands in sharp contrast to U.S. neglect, which has left many policy makers in New Delhi both frustrated and bewildered. Mr. Singh's state visit to the U.S. in October was conducted with much fanfare. There has been pitiably little effort from Washington to follow up on matters of substance such as cooperative ventures in trade, counterterrorism and military-to-military ties.
Good Indo-Russian relations need not necessarily come at the cost of a robust Indo-U.S. relationship. However, bilateral ties aren't formed or maintained of their own accord. If Mr. Obama continues to neglect India, other powers—many of which see the U.S. has a strategic competitor—will step into the breach. Given all the authoritarian regimes, terrorism and the tenuous economic recovery in Asia, can Mr. Obama really allow U.S.-India relations to backslide into the mutual neglect last seen during the Cold War?
There have been repeated calls for the United States to relax export controls toward India to take into account the transformed bilateral relationship. In brief, the United States maintains some unilateral controls on exports to India based on a number of reasons, including historic nonproliferation concerns. In addition, some Indian entities are on the “Entity List,” which invokes special licensing requirements for entities whose activities have been deemed to increase the risk of diversion to weapons of mass destruction programs and to pose other threats to U.S. foreign policy interests. To put export controls into context, in 1999, 24 percent of total U.S. exports to India required a “dual-use” license from BIS, today that number is less than 0.2 percent. While this number appears small, it is impossible to quantify trade that is precluded due to misperceptions over the reach of U.S. export controls.
Reportedly, the White House has already tabled a proposal to revise U.S. export control policy toward India. BIS Assistant Secretary Kevin Wolf is slated to speak at the HTCG and may shed more light on what has been proposed. The Obama administration should be commended for taking up this unfinished business of the Bush administration: U.S. export control policy should take into account India’s status as a strategic ally. However, U.S. proposals should be matched with reciprocal commitments. India should shed its reluctance to join the multilateral export control regimes, provide substantiation for why its listed entities should be removed from the Entity List, and be more aware of U.S. political sensitivities with respect to certain U.S. licensing requirements. The HTCG should provide a forum for meaningful discussions on these issues and both sides should be prepared to make concrete commitments to move the process forward.
While defense procurement continues to be an important element of the U.S.-India strategic relationship, there are issues which are hindering more robust trade. First, the Indian government has not yet signed the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (AGC), which are crucial to providing mutual logistical support and enabling the exchange of sensitive communications and equipment. Prime Minister Singh faces domestic opposition to these agreements over sovereignty concerns. The United States has historically been dogmatic about such agreements, but they are required under U.S. law in order to sell top-flight U.S. military equipment abroad and enhance cooperation between military forces. The United States and India should conclude these agreements to pave the way for enhanced technology and information sharing, and closer cooperation on counterterrorism and regional and global security efforts.
Second, the Indian government maintains a restrictive “offset” policy which requires that foreign firms selling defense products to India must re-invest up to 30 percent of their investment in India. The purpose of offsets is to enhance indigenous military production capabilities. However, because of historic state involvement in Indian defense production, the nascent private Indian defense production base is not yet equipped to support this magnitude of investment. The Indian government should consider adopting international best practices for offsets by rethinking the scope of where offsets may be reinvested, making the policy more practical for all parties.
After the frisking fiasco involving former president A P J Abdul Kalam on a US-bound American airline last year, the US aviation security department, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has conveyed to its Indian counterpart that it may exempt four to five categories of VVIPs from frisking before entering its aircraft.
The form does not say if that category is human or not)Amber G. wrote:For some non-serious news ... (One more example of == to lurkers wrt to recent Paki incident)
US may exempt some Indian VIPs from friskingAfter the frisking fiasco involving former president A P J Abdul Kalam on a US-bound American airline last year, the US aviation security department, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), has conveyed to its Indian counterpart that it may exempt four to five categories of VVIPs from frisking before entering its aircraft.
What exactly this means? 
It should not be too difficult at all. If the name is Muslim name and is not Asian Indian then he is "other" which is Pakistan Muslim. BD also fall into the same bucket. Then they triangulate other information such as credit purchase and phone calls to establish what is the mental make up that "south asian"Amber G. wrote:
(Guess If I was a census taker, I'd like to count all Pakistani's accurately too)
Paki are counted in pet category as census is taken for human head count only. Btw it will be interesting to know the increase in Indian- American population.lets hope it crosses 1% mark and 2 % mark with $ contribution can bring quite a bit political clout.Amber G. wrote:While filling out US Census form, just noticed, that in the boxes for "race" we have explicit place for "Asian Indian" (No "south Asian") and in the end a category called "other (eg Pakistani"
(Guess If I was a census taker, I'd like to count all Pakistani's accurately too)
How can a paki be a pet? It is a rabid wild animal. Please don't insult pets. They love their masters, and typically don't hurt anyone unless provoked. A paki on the other hand, well, you know how they are ....Prem wrote:
Paki are counted in pet category as census is taken for human head count only.
I believe he is referring to this i.e. the first answer (not the question itself).Amber G. wrote:^^^
It would be the other way around. They have a separate category for Asian Indian, which means that they will get an accurate count of Indians in the US. With Pakistanis lumped in the 'other' category, their count wont be accurate (atleast explicitly so). Wonder why desis are being focused on.Amber G. wrote:While filling out US Census form, just noticed, that in the boxes for "race" we have explicit place for "Asian Indian" (No "south Asian") and in the end a category called "other (eg Pakistani" .....)
(Guess If I was a census taker, I'd like to count all Pakistani's accurately too)
But for a host of reasons the Obama administration has let India slip down the list of its priorities. Not all of these reasons relate to Islamic terrorism, the war in Afghanistan and consequent urge to focus on Pakistan.
The economic crisis has emphasized China's importance, as the country with the biggest trade surplus with the United States and as the second leading holder of U.S. securities after Japan. China's diplomatic role, as a member of the U.N. Security Council and thus wielding a veto, has also underlined China's pivotal position in U.S. attempts to curb the nuclear ambitions of Iran and north Korea.
India understandably chafes at the sense that it plays second fiddle in Washington, lacking that network of institutional ties and official relationships that cement connections to other leading powers.
"The U.S.-Indian relationship remains constrained," notes Evan Feigenbaum, senior fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations and former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia and Central Asia. "Although U.S. officials hold standing dialogues about nearly every region of the world with their counterparts from Beijing, Brussels and Tokyo, no such arrangements exist with New Delhi."
What Putin did not get was any commitment that India would pick Russian warplanes for its planned $11 billion purchase of 126 state-of-the-art fighters, intended to give the country's air force the technological edge over China and Pakistan in the current Asian arms race. It is the deal that everyone wants to win, from the Eurofighter to Boeing's Super Hornet and Russia's MiG-35.
But that arms deal is just a fraction of the estimated $150 billion that India will be sending on energy technology, from nuclear reactors to oil and gas exploration and wind and solar. American hopes of winning a major slice of these contracts have been stalled over an elusive agreement on reprocessing nuclear fuel.
Robert Blake, the senior State Department official dealing with India and its region, is hopeful that a deal can be concluded by this summer. Indian officials are less optimistic and query U.S. insistence that India's parliament enact a limited liability rule on compensation for nuclear accidents, an issue that does not seem to worry Russian and French suppliers.
There is a pattern here. Two far-reaching agreement on U.S.-Indian military cooperation have stalled, as have other projects for hi-tech and space research cooperation.
You mentioned in your address about three contentious issues between India and US: financial makeover, non-proliferation treaty and climate change, of which you said the financial makeover is the easiest to deal with. But despite this, India and US have signed a civil nuclear treaty. What has led to US's change in attitude towards India over the years?TS: What has led to America's change in attitude towards India has nothing to do with those three issues. It was basically three things. The end of the Cold War so that the US no longer organised is foreign policy around the principle that Russia was the big adversary and India no longer had a reason to look to Russia as their primary international support. So that was the first reason for this changed attitude.
The second thing was India's economic growth so that India looked to its future much more in economic terms and the big economic power was the United States, which could then be helpful to India because India had charted a new course in the world. And the third thing is the increasing size and prominence of the Indian-American community, which gave us the kind of personal connection that the US also had with the European countries from which, for example, my ancestors came.The three contentious issues -- there are actually two contentious issues ? the third I think is an asset, they represent the parts of Obama Administration's global agenda. I think the time is ripe for India and the United States to work together on a greater extent on global issues. Because India needs to be involved or they won't be solved.But of the global issues that the Obama Administration is dealing with, one is quite harmonious between India and the US and the others are difficult. That, I think, really is a reflection of the fact that there are difficult problems in the world.How long do you think will the US take to wind up its operations in Afghanistan and how will the equations in the Indian subcontinent shape once US decides to move out of Afghanistan?
TS: That is, I think, a very important question. Afghanistan came first, Iraq came second. Many people, including me, believe that Iraq distracted US attention from the very important, difficult and unfinished business in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, some people believed, will be easy but they were proven quite wrong
.So let Paki stew in its own juices, I say!We need to accept the limits of our capabilities and understanding of realities on the ground. Unlike Iraq and Afghanistan, where the United States and other countries have a huge presence, few Americans travel to Pakistan and U.S. officials are extremely restricted in their movements.