Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

[Mort Walker]

Let me state what the IAF will have to do in a hot war: They will have to fight with whatever they have and in the first week they will likely lose some percentage of what they have - and in the next week they will fight with less. And in the week after that they will fight with even less.

The only long term solution is to have a defence industrial complex that can ramp up production to the levels we need in war. We have never had that and are unlikely to achieve that soon.

So what happens in the interim period? in the interim period the IAF wil have to fight with what it has. If the "interim period" stretches out so long that MiG 21s and 27s are retired - the IAF will then be starting a war with less than 50% of the strength that war plans are made for. That means perhaps 50% of the targets that are to be hit in the first days of the war will not be hit. We could well lose wars unless operational readiness is maintained.

BRFites blindness to the concept of operational readiness makes all discussions look like a poor joke on a forum pretending to be well informed where everyone is patting himself on his own back to say how much he knows. In this "well informed forum" it appears to me that a significant number of people think that inducting a combat aircraft makes it ready for war as quickly as we are ready to travel the minute we get the keys to a new car.

Someone please tell me that this is not what people think - but if someone tells me that, I am going to demand that he also tell me what types of preparation are required to induct a new combat aircraft, who needs to be prepared and how long it takes to make a new aircraft part of the war doctrine of the IAF. So please don't answer the question lightly.

There is the need to think big and long term. A war may not happen tomorrow, but there is the need to be ready in 20 years. A ramped up domestic production of the LCA, LCH, Arjun, Akash, P-75, Arihant, P-15, AWACS, and towed artillery is very possible if there is political commitment. Basically, the armed forces have to accept these programs by the political leadership. There can be no exceptions and operational readiness must be done with these large weapon systems.

[rohitvats]

^Just like the question with regard to Marut was numbers and not induction. It got inducted all right.

Why don't you tell me the big conspiracy theory by IAF when it comes to Marut and how IAF is supposed to have killed the a/c? And how is that relevant to Tejas?

[shiv]

What will happen if one LCA crashes?

Shiv, I have the greatest respect for you and I am not being petulant, but doesn't this apply to an HAL made Rafale too. After all, we can see the IAF grounding the Su-30MKI fleet every time there is a problem.

It absolutely does. And this is where the crunch comes.

Both the Su-30 MKI and the Rafale have already been though the process of induction and operational use and the most common causes of crashes have already been detected and pilot training on emergency/corrective measures are already known. The LCA is yet to get there.

If we argue that the rate of induction of LCA is going to be the same of better than the rate of induction of the Rafale (that would be guesswork in any case) there are several factors that lower the LCAs rank in this "competition"

A single LCA crash will set back induction time until the cause of the crash is detected. And God forbid - if another one crashes - it will be a huge setback - especially if it happens before induction. The supply chain, pilot and crew training, tactics and manuals for the Rafale will come readymade. The capabilities are already known and weaknesses are already defined for Rafale. They have to be discovered in the case of LCA - and that may take 5 years after induction.

Putting LCA and Rafale in a neck and neck competition for induction and quick is unfair to the LCA and to the Air Force.

The Air Force needs to have operational readiness no matter how slowly the LCA gets inducted. The LCA is our future, but the IAF's operational readiness in the 2016-2021 period cannot be tied down to a completely untested aircraft unless we are in a war situation.

The nation has to cough up the extra cash and have MMRCA and LCA

[shiv]

What will happen if one LCA crashes?

The same thing that happens when one of the current gen aircraft crashes in the IAF's inventory. A court of equerry will be constituted to evaluate the cause of crash and lessons learnt from it.

Sorry - too brief to be informative. Who declares an aircraft fit to fly in India?

[Pratyush]

Shiv,

With the basic thrust of your argument in the previous post. It will be logical to shut down ADA and NAL and retain only a screwdriver setup with the HAL.

As unless a domestic product is inducted in large numbers and the problems debugged as and when they occur, you will never have the confidence needed to design & induct the system.

Which will insure that the IAF will remain an importer in perpetuity.

[Pratyush]

Sorry - too brief to be informative. Who declares an aircraft fit to fly in India?

Shiv,

Are you being serious with the question

The fitness will be declared by the IAF, with technical inputs from the ADA & the HAL.

Added later:- The nearly 15 year, flight test & evaluation program of the aircraft has provided the designers with sufficient confidence needed to figure just how capable the aircraft truly is.

[Singha]

External threats are at low ebb for near future.
Glacial pace of msc for ia shows nothing is in hurry.
Now is time to absorb domestic gear and cut foreign gear out without war lurking in corner.

[member_22539]

Both the Su-30 MKI and the Rafale have already been though the process of induction and operational use and the most common causes of crashes have already been detected and pilot training on emergency/corrective measures are already known. The LCA is yet to get there.

How will it ever get there when it only receives a half-hearted induction by the IAF, while it plays with its foreign toys? We all know what happened to the Marut and no amount of "enough for both" will convince any critic, given IAF's history of step-motherly treatment of Indian products.

Putting LCA and Rafale in a neck and neck competition for induction and quick is unfair to the LCA and to the Air Force.

But that doesn't stop the IAF nor the IA, in fact many among them relish in doing just that for obvious reasons.

The LCA is our future.

It will perpetually remain the future (until its too obsolete to be of ANY use, then it will be AMCA's turn). All the while foreign dames like the Rafale will walk away with the dough.

The nation has to cough up the extra cash and have MMRCA and LCA

Well then, lets buy the LCA in big numbers first then do the MMRCA, after all if funds are there why should the LCA always wait.

[member_22539]

External threats are at low ebb for near future.
Glacial pace of msc for ia shows nothing is in hurry.
Now is time to absorb domestic gear and cut foreign gear out without war lurking in corner.

Exactly. All this hurry is only when it comes to buying foreign toys with fat commissions to be made. Be it Rafale or tank ammunition.

[shiv]

Sorry - too brief to be informative. Who declares an aircraft fit to fly in India?

Shiv,

Are you being serious with the question

The fitness will be declared by the IAF, with technical inputs from the ADA & the HAL.

Added later:- The nearly 15 year, flight test & evaluation program of the aircraft has provided the designers with sufficient confidence needed to figure just how capable the aircraft truly is.

What does CEMILAC do?

[shiv]

Both the Su-30 MKI and the Rafale have already been though the process of induction and operational use and the most common causes of crashes have already been detected and pilot training on emergency/corrective measures are already known. The LCA is yet to get there.

How will it ever get there when it only receives a half-hearted induction by the IAF, while it plays with its foreign toys? We all know what happened to the Marut and no amount of "enough for both" will convince any critic, given IAF's history of step-motherly treatment of Indian products.

Putting LCA and Rafale in a neck and neck competition for induction and quick is unfair to the LCA and to the Air Force.

But that doesn't stop the IAF nor the IA, in fact many among them relish in doing just that for obvious reasons.

The LCA is our future.

It will perpetually remain the future (until its too obsolete to be of ANY use, then it will be AMCA's turn). All the while foreign dames like the Rafale will walk away with the dough.

The nation has to cough up the extra cash and have MMRCA and LCA

Well then, lets buy the LCA in big numbers first then do the MMRCA, after all if funds are there why should the LCA always wait.

All this ignores the question of operational readiness which no one wants to talk about.

[shiv]

External threats are at low ebb for near future.
Glacial pace of msc for ia shows nothing is in hurry.
Now is time to absorb domestic gear and cut foreign gear out without war lurking in corner.

Aksai Chin is a flat uninhabited land where nothing grows. Money need not be wasted in defending it.

[member_23694]

Honestly I don't get where the issue is. The IAF chief recently has time and again mentioned that IAF will induct Tejas in numbers yet the complain that Rafale induction is detrimental to Tejas future.

just a month back article
http://www.oneindia.com/india/we-have-n ... 59076.html

"We have no doubt about the capability of the aircraft," Raha said.

The first two SP still have variations, so why the complain against IAF

"The first two series production aircraft (SP-1 and SP-2) have some slight variations and from SP-3 onwards we will have them entering into the Squadron. The first squadron will consist of aircraft from SP-3 to SP-6," the Air Chief said.

The Air Chief said confirmed that in addition to the first order of 40 Tejas aircraft, 80 more will be ordered (Mark II version).

The LCA is our future, but the IAF's operational readiness in the 2016-2021 period cannot be tied down to a completely untested aircraft unless we are in a war situation.

+++1

[Pratyush]

All this ignores the question of operational readiness which no one wants to talk about.

OK,

Lets talk operational readiness & what are the various components to it.

Can it be defined as an answer to the questions raised below.

1) Is it the ability to wage a 2 front war.
Ans:- What is the number of platforms needed to do so successfully, given the current & future threat perceptions.
2) Is it the ability to hit x number of identified targets within y amount of time.
Ans:- What is the number & type of munitions required. Along with the logistical bandwidth needed to deliver the warheads to bases and the air forces ability to use them.
3) Or is it something else all together.

[DexterM]

Here is a table which gives my understanding of IAF re-equipment plans.

Bottom part of the table which has been high-lighted shows the number of number-plated squadrons. These two can form a candidate for additional Tejas Mk1/Mk1.5 order.

Here's something I was supposed to post two months ago!
Sorry for the delay. I see that you've added the numberplated sqns, but we are facing an unprecedented shortfall in numbers over the next ten years as often repeated by many.



Rohit, I apologize for what may seem ill-tempered or an irrational outburst. Rest assured, it is not, and please do not consider it a personal attack (that is not the intent). My focus is on showing how the MOD could work out higher numbers even now. I do intend to map out the rationale and the points raised typically. This is delayed for the paucity of time.
Most stats are from articles from Vayu/Stratpost/Wiki references and may be slightly off (as in MiG27 might be Medium by most counts, but is a Heavy for my list).

What matters therefore
1. Is the IAF deliberating about a decision right now on whether the LCA Mk1 (structurally identical as the FOC version) incapable or does it simply fall short of the ASR? (There of course cannot be a debate about the merits of the ASR since this is what the user would like to have to perform its role).
2. If the IAF considers the LCA Mk1 FOC version capable enough for the limited Point Defense role, would it wait until Mk2 is ready?
3. Why do we require either HAL to invest before seeking further orders for Mk1x or 1.5? (How do they care if they're already involved in MMRCA? Their topline is secure and HAL is after all a DPSU!) However, their board minutes from 2014 will tell you about the decision to invest in expansion to 16 units per year. Now this includes IN versions as well so the IAF does not have enough reasons to be happy with such a pace. I would simply go with the NLCA trainer version for LOFT now.

As for the Mk1 or Mk1.5, there exists scope for not just 2 but more imho. You ask how they could deliver when the plans for Mk2 will be a max of 16 a year using two production lines (there is no second line currently since there are two structural assembly sheds and one final assembly shed - adding one of which is Rs 800cr and should be HAL's capex to be fully funded by MoD). However, with the Mk2 ONLY ready for FOC by 2022, there appears to be a situation where we will taper off production if any delays occur on the Mk2 FOC (which should be taken as a given, per the posts of many here). I agree with that sentiment too but believe that the Mk1 will be more than capable of matching anything on the Western front for the next decade. We do have the heavies to handle the 21 odd operational Block 50s. Why therefore are we not considering an order of 2 or 4 more squadrons since that is what HAL needs to ensure the investment in an additional line is worth it! Remember, none of your primary or secondary vendors will simply stock any LRUs without a delivery window in clear sight. Production requires orders, now that is true for both HAL and its own suppliers, who're not bound by any aspects other than a contract or the PO!

If our key focus was operational readiness and type conversion, should we be looking at higher numbers of the Mk1 or NLCA/1.5 trainers (apart from those required by ASTE) rather than raising a full squadron (or raise the sq with a higher number of trainers and help seed other squadrons using Sulur as the training base!). As in, my real question is not about the numberplated squadrons but the time taken for type conversion and operational readiness. Even if 40 are handed over, on average 125-160 training hours would be required. The logistics of flying 50 sorties a day to fulfill training requirements for two squadrons might lead to a conclusion that 6 trainers might not be enough. (This number is to cover for the shortfall assuming these will be raised using LCAs). Would someone be able to list hours required by the ground crew to independently support their squadron? I'd imagine their training runs parallel to that of pilots in terms of time.
PS: As for the rationale of the MMRCA, leaving it for another time. However, just one data point may help - Rs 60,000 cr is the projected cost over-run. A tenth of that would help raise the production rate to 20 Mk1s a year, provided it clears FOC without further delay.
PPS: Edited to add - the FGFA numbers include both SKD and the initial kits that will be shipped to India for assembly by HAL. The number might be too optimistic.

[shiv]

All this ignores the question of operational readiness which no one wants to talk about.

OK,

Lets talk operational readiness & what are the various components to it.

Can it be defined as an answer to the questions raised below.

1) Is it the ability to wage a 2 front war.
Ans:- What is the number of platforms needed to do so successfully, given the current & future threat perceptions.
2) Is it the ability to hit x number of identified targets within y amount of time.
Ans:- What is the number & type of munitions required. Along with the logistical bandwidth needed to deliver the warheads to bases and the air forces ability to use them.
3) Or is it something else all together.

There are several unknowns here as far as we (on the forum) are concerned. But no harm in talking about it so people know what operational readiness means.

I would ignore a two front war for the moment and simply talk about hot war on one long front. I recall vaguely from the mobilization of 2001-2002 that the IAF had a list of 700 targets to hit. Please take this as a random data point.

I also recall (vaguely) from Jasjit Singh's book on air warfare that very heavy losses are possible in the earlydays of the war as enemy airfields and command and control targets are being attacked. Losses as high as 10%-20% can occur in the first few days or first week after which, if the required air dominance is achieved, the losses will tail off. No air force can remain effective taking 10-20% losses for more than 3 weeks. Air dominance has to be achieved in a limited time period, accepting losses, but we need to have the required strength to achieve that dominance plus losses. If 700 targets have to be attacked in the first 48 hours - assume 2 sorties per target - i.e 1400 sorties. If we have 500 working combat aircraft - some of those aircraft will have done 5 or 6 sorties within the first 48 hours. If 5% are lost - the strength is down to 475. Subtract from this number the aircraft that cannot fly due to servicability problem and combat damage. If the magic figure of 80% serviceability is achieved after 48 hours of war - on day 3 the IAF will have just 380 combat aircraft, but at least a lot of damage would have been done to teh enemy in the first 48 hours

Such issues can rapidly spiral out of control so it makes sense to have some idea of fleet strength required. If IAF planning calls for a fleet strength of 500 aircraft at the start of a war, what would happen if the IAF had only 400 combat aircraft and only 70% fleet availability (serviceability). The war would then start with a combat strength of just 280 aircraft. Those 280 aircraft would be hard put to attack those 700 targets and put many of them out of action. That is why the IAF needs the required numbers of aircraft so as to avoid dilution of operational readiness

A few days ago it was reported that the serviceability of Su 30s was 60% - and would improve by the end of the year. At least for the Su 30 the IAF knows the serviceability. If war occurs next week only 60% of our Su 30 MKIs can fight. In an aircraft like the Rafale - the serviceability in wartime conditions is already known. With the LCA it is completely unknown.

Combat tactics are honed by the IAF over time. Put LCAs in attack mode and defend a target with Su 30s and MiG 21s and see how the LCA's cope. In other scenarios put MiG 27s and Jaguars in attack mode and defend using LCAs and see how well they perform. LCA pilots need to come back to a debriefing and say - I was at 100 meters and the MiG 21 came in from x direction and wow - I was able to shake him off by doing bla bla. I was on his ass before he knew what hit him" Or they should say "Oops - when the LCA is in this particular situation - it's a no win - even a Jag can take you out - so don't get into this situation" . This takes time and operational plans cannot be made from aircraft whose capabilities are still being discovered.

It is easy to argue that we are at peace today and that we should force the IAF to accept a decrease it its operational readiness while LCA numbers are ramped up and MMRCA cancelled. It's a gamble. If the gamble pays off - great. If the gamble fails - we will lose something the way Aksai Chin was lost. The IAF pilots are our boys. Our brothers and sons (and now daughters as well). They will die for the country whether they fight with 500 aircraft or 100 aircraft. But when the IAF needs X aircraft for its operational readiness it is profoundly stupid to ignore or sideline their request. No one know the meaning of operational readiness more than the IAF. The way to bring them down to their knees is to question their motives and ask them to go fuk themselves because we BRFites know so much more about air warfare.

It is easy to be more understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru when he said that Aksai Chin is a useless piece of land. When you do not actually have the strength to defend something it is easy to rationalize and say sour grapes. I refuse to accept such arguments.

[DexterM]

Regarding operational readiness and training, here is an excellent piece "Assessing Unit Readiness of an Air Force Fighter Wing" - R.V. Phadke, Senior Fellow, IDSA
Posting the summary for you to evaluate relevance to this discussion:

Summary of Relevant Issues

1. It will be evident that the problems highlighted in the document are of a universal nature and that a number of lessons can be learnt without experiencing the problems at first hand.

2. Operational training and operational readiness are intimately connected and ad hoc deployments for exercises, inspections or indeed for meeting contingency situations can and do have serious long-term implications for the health of the air force.

3. Maintaining a healthy experience mix of pilots and technicians is often neglected at the altar of expediency. If USAF, which is the biggest and the most powerful air force in the world, faces such serious problems of operational preparedness, one can imagine the conditions in a smaller air force with even more limited funding and resources. We in India are quite familiar with the difficulties faced by the Indian Army due to its frequent deployments in Internal Security and Counter-Insurgency Operations. Frequent alerts and actual deployments to operational areas or stations naturally disrupt routine flying training activities and also adversely affect operational readiness of the air force. Going by the USAF experience such imbalances in training and experience mix of fighter squadrons require a long time and concerted effort to correct.

4. Problems of retention, motivation, morale, boredom with routine sorties like Combat Air Patrols among pilots and repeated cannibalisations among the technicians, need to be addressed. Frequent separations from families when deployed in areas and for causes without a visible and easily understood national stake or interest are apparently eroding the will of the American combatants involved.

5. It is interesting to note that if a larger wing like the 388th with as many as fifty-four F-16 aircraft (three squadrons) faces such serious difficulties, a smaller wing operating two or more types is bound to be much worse off. Not only would dissimilar aircraft demand different and additional supervisory staff to oversee flying training activities but there would also be an attendant increase in maintenance manpower. Difficulties of Logistics and Spares availability would also be considerable.

6. Retention of fighter (as indeed other) pilots continues to be a serious problem in almost all the air forces. In addition to the well-known reasons such as huge disparity in pay packages, there are many others. These include a relatively short span of active flying since most fighter pilots are under-employed after completing their command assignments at the level of the Squadron Commander. There is a need to modify our organisational structure to utilise them for much longer periods in active flying jobs. Chief Operational Officers (COOs), Station Flight Safety and Inspection Officers, (SFSIOs) could be given more senior pilots to augment the supervisory pool at Stations. But these would require some difficult decisions that would be painful in a hierarchical organisation. As brought out above, skill oriented exercises such as air-to-ground and air-to-air armament delivery need to be given more importance in planning the personnel mix of a squadron. Larger squadrons would certainly help. In the final analysis, the raison d'etre of an air force is to deter a war or to successfully fight it when deterrence fails. It is axiomatic therefore that each pilot is given the opportunity to continuously hone his basic and advanced skills to remain fighting fit at all times. Station Commanders are usually so engrossed in routine administrative functions such as ensuring adequate water and electricity supply, schooling, medical, transportation, local purchase, housing and the like; that the more important function of maintaining the operational preparedness of the combatants gets less attention. Finally, there is no alternative to regular and vigorous flying training and to achieve that goal, aircraft need to be maintained at the highest level of serviceability, reliability and availability possible.

[member_22539]

^Which serious war has Rafale been in? If its the handful (relatively) of sorties flow against the likes of the Libyans, then that is hardly worth mentioning. Furthermore, stuff like serviceability in wartime and such can only figured out by IAF itself during a war or through years worth of use by themselves. No fanciful figures/promises provided by the French is going to make up for real data. The same (granted more to figure out) can be achieved for the LCA if the IAF would give it a real chance.

As for the repeated line about Aksai Chin, it was not lost due to drawbacks of indigenous fighter and to my knowledge we did not have one back then. Are you implying that the Chinese are more scared of Rafale than the LCA. What does the Rafale have that is so scary for the Chinese?

Also, I get the feeling you are mistaking the comment by the above poster regarding the ebb and flow of threats. To my understanding, he never suggested that Aksai Chin is worthless. If so, why are you repeating that line?

[DexterM]

For those interested in the training pattern:
Shiv saar talked about Phil Camp during the BRF meet - this is an excerpt from an excellent piece on BR itself:

After graduation from the Airforce Academy the students are sent to Air Force Station Barrackpore, near Calcutta for their Technical Type Training (TETTRA) course. Here future aircrew and groundcrew get to learn about the Mig21. They spend 78 hours spread over 85 periods learning the general description of the aircraft, including 24 periods on the airframe and 24 on the engine and after the 5-week course they have to pass an exam. Those that pass go onto the MOFT Syllabus and are despatched to the airfields that cater for it in the various commands. This usually amounts to about 45 students going to the main airfields in Eastern Air Command (which we will describe below) and approximately 30 students going to 15,32 and 101 squadrons in the west. The latter 3 squadrons operate the Mig21Bis and Mig21M and because of the height limitations in the Mig21FL, pilots with a torso or sitting height of over 98.25 cms will come here.

Until 31st October 2002, five units flying the Mig21FL and Mig21UM would take the students for semester 1 of the MOFT Syllabus in Eastern Air Command. They were the Mig Operational Flying Training Unit and 30 Squadron at Tezpur, the Operational Conversion Unit and 52 Squadron at Chabua and 8 Squadron at Bagdogra. However 30 Squadron was numberplated on 31.10.02, after 33 years of continuos service with the MIG21FL.

For the first two weeks the students study the pilots notes on the aircraft and the standard airfield operating procedures. At the end they have to achieve a 95% pass rate in the exam and if they fail, they get one more chance to pass it. They then progress onto the simulator where they complete several sorties to increase their knowledge on the type. The initial flying phase lasts for 30 weeks and will include 30 flying training sorties and 48 fighter sorties. Initially the students will complete about 9 sorties, dual in the Mig21U before being allowed to go solo. During dual training they practice low speed handling and must complete one practice diversion. Regimes covered include circuit training, aerobatics, loose formation flying, medium tactical flying, 2 and 4 ship formations, low level tactical flying with 2 aircraft and 4 aircraft, instrument flying.

Semester 2 commences after 6 months and continues with more advanced flying. The basic principals of ground attack, air combat training, advanced air combat and live firing are taught to the flying officers. 28 sorties are completed in the Mig21U trainer and a further 70 are completed on the Mig 21FL. During the live firing phase, sorties are flown to the Dolungmurgh Range, 125 kms to the North East of Tezpur. This range is shared with Chabua and Mohanbari, and the aircraft adhere to strict slot times over the target. Weather over the range and at diversion airfields has to be clear before a sortie can depart. Normal weapons carried are the GSH23 cannon loaded with 60 rounds, two UB16 rocket pods each with one 57-mm rocket projectile and 25-lb practice bombs. Upon completion of semester 2 the students would have flown a grand total of 58 trainer sorties and 118 fighter sorties, amounting to 105-110 flying hours. They are then deemed daytime operational on the Mig21.

This here is another article that was posted on a different thread (I had it bookmarked but can't find the original reference on the forum):
Pilot training and accidents in the Indian Air Force, C. Manmohan Reddy (dated 2001 but very much a talking point about how the AJT was being opposed earlier).

About serviceability/availability during war time or peace time, here is an article penned on the Indian Air Force fans group on FB:

Major problems with the availability of spares and support from the ex-USSR affected operations severely during the period 1991-1994. Peacetime daily serviceability rates declined from an average 70-72% in the preceding decade to as low as 60% for some types. The MiG-29 and An-32 fleets were particularly hard hit. In case of the former, serviceability had declined to as low as 55%. It should be noted that daily serviceability rates during peacetime represent the number of armed and operational combat aircraft that the IAF can put into the air at immediate notice. While wartime serviceability has been historically much higher (in 1971 it was 96%), reduced peacetime availability does affect routine operations.

There is lots to read on that article, so please forgive the specific focus on one item.

[Sid]

There are several unknowns here as far as we (on the forum) are concerned. But no harm in talking about it so people know what operational readiness means.
-----------------------------------------------

I also recall (vaguely) from Jasjit Singh's book on air warfare that very heavy losses are possible in the earlydays of the war as enemy airfields and command and control targets are being attacked. Losses as high as 10%-20% can occur in the first few days or first week after which, if the required air dominance is achieved, the losses will tail off. No air force can remain effective taking 10-20% losses for more than 3 weeks.-------------------------------------------------------

It is easy to be more understanding of Jawaharlal Nehru when he said that Aksai Chin is a useless piece of land. When you do not actually have the strength to defend something it is easy to rationalize and say sour grapes. I refuse to accept such arguments.

Shiv,

During the same era, when our threats were leaving some sever brown stains on salwars, China shipped ~50 J-7 in a record time to augment PAF numbers. If required they could have done this 2-3 times to neutralize India's numerical superiority. They will do the same in any future conflicts as well, but this time they may be supplying them with crash loads of JF-17 or J-11 or maybe even J-10s.

1. War of attrition, we cannot win this in current state. China can and help Porkies too in this field. But there is no USSR to help us in that area.
2. Operational Readiness, we all agree that IAF demands for minimum aircraft strength should be accepted. But what is the solution -
2.a. Rafael, delivery starting ~2018 (36 months from the time of signing). 10 to 12 per year after that (figures crossed).
2.a.i. Cons/Risk factor -
- High Cost, Delivery Schedule of local manufactured plane from HAL.
- My hunch is that once local factories will be established, IAF will ask to push ahead the delivery dates (to compensate for lost time). This will effectively raise the cost and render HAL as another CKD assembly unit for Rafael.
- Another con is that it will effectively kill local aircraft industry. We can debate on this, but after acquiring and spending truck load of money on FGFA/Rafael, not sure what we would like to do in-house.
- Any mid-life upgrade will be astronomical in cost, when compared to upgrades done for Mirages. We may not go for such deep upgrades as we did for Mirages in one go but expect to spend much more money on anything new on these white elephants.
2.a.ii. Pros -
- Readily available,
- mature fighter,
- technologically advanced (with sensor fusion).
- Will augment IAF numbers in short term.
2.b. LCA, FOC MK-I delivery starting 2016 (hopefully). 8 per year after that.
2.a.i. Cons/Risk factor -
- Delivery schedule, FOC dates are constantly getting delayed.
- Low rate of production
- Ambitious features and dates for MK-II, jeopardizing MK-II delivery dates.
- lots of unknowns unknowns
2.a.ii. Pros -
- Low cost
- Upgrade costs minimal (local maal)
- Can be produced in numbers (like Migs)
- Help build base for making fighters for future.

Like you said its a gamble, where no one is willing to roll the dice. To make a analogy China kept on building J-7/J-11 until it could find its silver bullet in J-10 and newer J-20 fighters. Similarly they kept on trying to upgrade J-6s into various versions (with French/Israeli help).

[Surya]

what was the operational status of the IAF in the almost happened last war?

Yeah Mig 21s with 57 mm rocket pods lined up to go at Pakistan's most heavily defended airfield?

Mig 27s with dumb bombs and rockets going at the other end. Everytime they skirted the ingression route - every damn siren screamed out in the cockpit.

what do you think would have happened to those boys?

BTW those boys bravely told the senior IAF officer who visited the base how stupid it was - but they will do it.

The long deployment together allowed some corrections - to lessen the risks
But huge risks were there

So ultimately there is a risk but a stake needs to put in the ground for both the IAF and HAL

if not we will ask questions about how will LCA mk2 handle some intruder in 2022.

[vishvak]

At times, we do not calculate Naval LCA induction strengths however considering its potential, more assembly lines will be surely needed. Production numbers should be increased from 8 to 16 to 24 and may be 32 is not out of probability. Closing down a line is much better than lack of numbers of such potent fighter jet; and we are not yet reached stage where we can discuss all options of additional jets.

[Singha]

The hal tejas assembly plant at eastern end of base looks like same one where jaguar and hawks were made.
The main shop floor can perhaps take 10 birds and construction rigs.

There is no shortage of land next to it.
If some more $ is made available and more ppl
Trained, surely hal can up prod to 16-20 in parallel.

[arshyam]

I rarely post on mil threads due to lack of expertise, but I do have one newbie pooch after reading the above discussions:

What will the Rafale package cost if we were to drop the ToT requirement and just import it from France?

I do not know if the above is even an option given the clauses in our RFP, etc. Anyway, let me expound on why I asked the above question:

If the IAF gets the ~126 Rafales direct, these planes can replace some of the middle level fighters that are looking at retirement over the next decade - primarily the MiG 27, and MiG 29, numbering 86+66 = 152 fighters. Given the time to absorb the new fighter into various sqds., training working out tactics, maintenance, etc., the sooner we get these planes, the better it is. With ToT, HAL is bound to take some more time to build the assembly infra for the Rafale, and get the local suppliers up to spec for the ToT'd components. I am assuming this is not an issue with a direct import since the ecosystem exists in France.

Having said that, if the direct import is cheaper, we can take the money saved and fully use to build a second LCA line, and bump up production to 32 a year. This should be done at a war footing, something Shiv-ji said we haven't done ever. For us to turn out 32 a year, we need to address the engine aspect (have GE build a plant locally for the 414 at least, and purchase as many 404s needed). Also, we need a bigger/additional autoclave plants to produce the desired number of composite parts for the LCA fuse structures.

To fully flesh out my question, please bear with me a bit more: the Rafales imported directly will replace the MiG 27 and 29 sqds as said above, and given the jump in tech, a 1:1 replacement isn't necessary. So we can cap the Rafales at 126. Since the Jags and Mirages are expected to stay on till the end of next decade, they can be earmarked for replacement by a combination of AMCA + FGFA. But the MiG-21s are the problem, as they start retiring soon, so we need to replace them starting next year, hence a ramp up in Tejas production is not an option. And here, going by DexterM's chart, we will face a serious drop in fighter availability, as 150 nos. of MiG 21 M/MF will be done by 2018, and Tejas cannot fill it that fast, and Su-30s can only do so much, since they have their primary strike roles to fill. So while in the near term, we have no choice but to use the MKIs as a -21 replacement, the sooner we can relieve these big birds to do what they do best, the better. The Rafales arriving by 2018/19 can help out a bit here as well, as a stop gap measure.

A word on MLG, as we are seeing the cost of Mirage 2000's upgrades. I think NRao suggested this elsewhere: keep the Rafales for ~15 years, and if MLG is expensive (experience shows that it will be), sell the planes to someone else. Yes, it will be a small loss to us, but we will have 2 alternatives by then, one being fully homegrown: AMCA, and we can use the money saved in the MLG toward these programs.

As for ToT and import pasand-ness:
a) ToT is meaningless, is expensive, slow, and the impact not apparent. Keep in mind that most of our hard won tech was built by ourselves, ToT is merely a candy for others to attract us.
b) Imports in the short term is the unfortunate price to pay for 10 years of AKA inspired stasis. Make in India is good, but not at the cost of readiness and fleet strength. Drive a hard bargain with the French, combine the Rafale deal with the Areva power plant deal, and work something out, but get the planes to the IAF asap.

Does the above make sense?

[shaun]

Shiv,

During the same era, when our threats were leaving some sever brown stains on salwars, China shipped ~50 J-7 in a record time to augment PAF numbers. If required they could have done this 2-3 times to neutralize India's numerical superiority. They will do the same in any future conflicts as well, but this time they may be supplying them with crash loads of JF-17 or J-11 or maybe even J-10s.

1. War of attrition, we cannot win this in current state. China can and help Porkies too in this field. But there is no USSR to help us in that area.
.........

Okay lizard can give porkis as many a/cs they want , but who will fly those a/cs ??? fighter pilots are not built in assembly lines !!!
Unlike India , there is no strategic depth in case of porkis , where will they field so many juicy targets ???
and Rafale is just not another a/c , it will compliment MKI's in a big way . But saying this , it doesn't mean LCA production can not be ramp up , actually we need very quick induction and squadron formation and it can be only done if we have 2 assembly lines . Once in squadron service , pros and cons will show up in due time and will have positive affect on later variants of LCA.

[shiv]

A word about "serviceability" of aircraft. Combat aircraft are complex systems where the stress of flying and combat causes sub systems to fail. If failures are critical the aircraft may not be flyable. Modern "Line Replaceable Units" can ease many of these issues. We have recently read about the dismal 60% serviceability of our Su 30s. That means only 60% fleet strength is available at any given time for service - i.e combat, in a war. I have read figures like 50% serviceability for F-22. I have also read that some stealth aircraft require 20 hours of maintenance for one hour of flying.

Despite all that the figures can vary. I recall reading that Su 30s had 100% serviceability in Red Flag. Mirage 2000s are also supposed to have very high rates of serviceability and availability for combat - as now shown by thousands of hours in service. The Rafale too is reputed to be as good as the Mirage 2000.

Serviceability in a war like scenario is judged from flying combat sorties in a war like scenario or war game and air forces do this all the time because success and failure depends on this.

What is the level of serviceability and combat availability of the LCA in a war like scenario? Currently we have zero experience. Of course it needs to be gained and it will be developed, but there will be a gap between the induction of LCA in numbers and the tailing off of IAF numbers. If 200 MiGs need to go in 5 years we will not get 200 LCAs to replace them in 5 years. That gap cannot be ignored and left unfilled on the excuse that we now have "relative peace". There is going to be a drop in numbers when MiG 21s and 27s go leading to an inevitable reduction in operational readiness unless something replaces them. We do not want that drop in numbers. On the contrary we want an increase in size of the air force. The possibility that the LCA can meet the demands of going beyond mere replacement and taking the IAF into actual expansion after so many decades looks remote because of a huge number of uncertainties and unknowns. The only option will be some additional aircraft to maintain operational readiness. The MMRCA was meant to do that. I would not be happy to see an emergency import of MiG 29s or some such aircraft to make up numbers simply because MMRCA deal fails and LCA cannot be made to meet the needed load.

[shiv]

During the same era, when our threats were leaving some sever brown stains on salwars, China shipped ~50 J-7 in a record time to augment PAF numbers. If required they could have done this 2-3 times to neutralize India's numerical superiority. They will do the same in any future conflicts as well, but this time they may be supplying them with crash loads of JF-17 or J-11 or maybe even J-10s.

The whole idea of intense attacks at the beginning of conflict is to put all air bases out of action. Once air bases are out of action Lizard is welcome to give Pakistan 10,000 aircraft but none of them can take off or land. But the IAF will need the numbers to maintain the operational readiness to conduct such intense attacks and keep mounting attacks despite high initial losses in aircraft being shot down. Operational readiness must not be messed with based on fluffy theories.

[brar_w]

A word about "serviceability" of aircraft. Combat aircraft are complex systems where the stress of flying and combat causes sub systems to fail. If failures are critical the aircraft may not be flyable. Modern "Line Replaceable Units" can ease many of these issues. We have recently read about the dismal 60% serviceability of our Su 30s. That means only 60% fleet strength is available at any given time for service - i.e combat, in a war. I have read figures like 50% serviceability for F-22. I have also read that some stealth aircraft require 20 hours of maintenance for one hour of flying.

Despite all that the figures can vary. I recall reading that Su 30s had 100% serviceability in Red Flag. Mirage 2000s are also supposed to have very high rates of serviceability and availability for combat - as now shown by thousands of hours in service. The Rafale too is reputed to be as good as the Mirage 2000.

Serviceability in a war like scenario is judged from flying combat sorties in a war like scenario or war game and air forces do this all the time because success and failure depends on this.

What is the level of serviceability and combat availability of the LCA in a war like scenario? Currently we have zero experience. Of course it needs to be gained and it will be developed, but there will be a gap between the induction of LCA in numbers and the tailing off of IAF numbers. If 200 MiGs need to go in 5 years we will not get 200 LCAs to replace them in 5 years. That gap cannot be ignored and left unfilled on the excuse that we now have "relative peace". There is going to be a drop in numbers when MiG 21s and 27s go leading to an inevitable reduction in operational readiness unless something replaces them. We do not want that drop in numbers. On the contrary we want an increase in size of the air force. The possibility that the LCA can meet the demands of going beyond mere replacement and taking the IAF into actual expansion after so many decades looks remote because of a huge number of uncertainties and unknowns. The only option will be some additional aircraft to maintain operational readiness. The MMRCA was meant to do that. I would not be happy to see an emergency import of MiG 29s or some such aircraft to make up numbers simply because MMRCA deal fails and LCA cannot be made to meet the needed load.

As mentioned serviceability, and mission availability is a function of how much you are willing to spend on it provided that there are no technical glitches. The F-22 case was that it had yet to develop a robust enterprise wide system to improve availability and that took years. It also took some time to get the mission systems to be made as reliable as originally expected. You can also play around with stealth coatings. If you require the RCS to be 80% all the time and 100% in say X hours of getting the order you have a different cost-structure as opposed to if you have a 60% RCS treatment requirement at all times and 80% RCS regained by X hours with 100% at X+ hours. You can play around with all that. Legacy stealth (strange word but what else to call f-22, b-2 and F-117) had a different mechanism, then say the F-35 that has already reached 65% mission availability nearly a year before IOC. It does not need coatings.

The reason why aircraft like the Gripen or F-16 (in its era) were/are cost-effective solutions is that historically they allowed their users to operate and train and operate the fleet while maintaining high availability and low CPFH simultaneously. The F-15 could get you the same figures in availability but it would cost quite a bit more.

[shaun]

with mirage 2000 upgrade programme , what TOT have our defense industry got with 30 per cent offset ??

[Sid]

During the same era, when our threats were leaving some sever brown stains on salwars, China shipped ~50 J-7 in a record time to augment PAF numbers. If required they could have done this 2-3 times to neutralize India's numerical superiority. They will do the same in any future conflicts as well, but this time they may be supplying them with crash loads of JF-17 or J-11 or maybe even J-10s.

The whole idea of intense attacks at the beginning of conflict is to put all air bases out of action. Once air bases are out of action Lizard is welcome to give Pakistan 10,000 aircraft but none of them can take off or land. But the IAF will need the numbers to maintain the operational readiness to conduct such intense attacks and keep mounting attacks despite high initial losses in aircraft being shot down. Operational readiness must not be messed with based on fluffy theories.

And who said IAF's "Operational readiness" should be messed with? But conversely to justify your theory you seem to be using fluffy logic yourself!

Just repeating "Operational readiness" to justify outright purchases is not the right way forward, that's the only point everyone is trying to make here. Army uses the same argument for T-XXX purchases and same goes for IAF.

[Singha]

cheapest way of grounding the PAF and PLAAF fwd bases is cheap, stealthy cruise missiles.
brahmos-M & Brahmos for heavily protected SAM sites.

we do not need rafale for that. the location of runways and base facilities are well known from satellite photos.

[member_23370]

Nirbay and Brahmos are ideal for that. Heck Prahaar can probably take out airfields close to IB.

[DexterM]

The hal tejas assembly plant at eastern end of base looks like same one where jaguar and hawks were made.
The main shop floor can perhaps take 10 birds and construction rigs.

There is no shortage of land next to it.
If some more $ is made available and more ppl
Trained, surely hal can up prod to 16-20 in parallel.

There are two plots next to the gate for the final assembly areas (before the lightning test facility). If they end up only integrating the components say three or five years from now, the area required will also shrink. btw, each assembly area can handle no more than 4 frames and 2 WIP frames. I think this is the real reason they have two structural assembly areas and just one final assembly area right now.

Let's ask the TASL experts on this forum - is the autolay/fiber-taping an automated process for you?
Or is it a resin-impregnation autoclave process unique for the LCA? Can TASL do better if it works directly with Kemrock?

[Kartik]

First picture emerges of a Mirage-2000H after the upgrade..

[Shreeman]

Many bichhars here or there. These have been handed over.

Also, hello NAL Saras, are you dead or alive?

[adityadange]

looking at the paint scheme doesnt it indicate it will be deployed in himalaya primarily?

[Pratyush]

with mirage 2000 upgrade programme , what TOT have our defense industry got with 30 per cent offset ??

How to turn the screwdriver.

[Kartik]

Many bichhars here or there. These have been handed over.

Also, hello NAL Saras, are you dead or alive?

the pics shown so far have been those of a Mirage-2000TH upgraded..this is the first one of an upgraded single seater Mirage-2000H.

[Kartik]

looking at the paint scheme doesnt it indicate it will be deployed in himalaya primarily?

why? the same camo appears on all Mirages since the time they were inducted..and they've been based in Gwalior ever since induction.

[Shreeman]

Many bichhars here or there. These have been handed over.

Also, hello NAL Saras, are you dead or alive?

the pics shown so far have been those of a Mirage-2000TH upgraded..this is the first one of an upgraded single seater Mirage-2000H.

first patch (sorry batch) was handed over together bichhars had appeared elsewhere, suspekt same now arrived here. I think rest are to be upgraded at HAL, so the work in france is over.