Indian Army: News and Discussions 15 Apr 2012

[rohitvats]

Yes indeed, only caveat - need some time to do this. Going to be snowed under through November. But if we start a thread, we can post snippets from time to time, and organize later?

We can do that.

I start with inputs from my side on some aspect.

[abhik]

BTW who exactly put out the $50B figure anyway? The Army or some "consultant"/"analyst" with vested interests? What exactly do we get for the $50B? And in what time frame is this amount to be spent? Seems to me like someone is peddling the "Desh Bachao, Lakho karoro ka maal import karo". <SNIP>

If you had spent grand total of 5-minutes trying to research the topic than indulge in whine fest, you would have got the answer to your question.

For starters, there is something known as Long Term Perspective Planning (LTTP) which formulates requirement for a 15-year period. It has been recently formulated after a 2-year ground work for 2012-2027 period.

Vayu Aerospace carried a detailed article on this exercise - here is the link:

http://www.vayuaerospace.in/images1/Ind ... tive_P.pdf

....

Link to Technology Perspective Capability Road Map document from MOD website:

https://mod.gov.in/writereaddata/TPCR13.pdf

Neither links have anything on what is to be bought in what numbers and the monies allocated. Last I heard the 12th defence plan wasn't cleared by the MoF.

[Karan M]

Yes indeed, only caveat - need some time to do this. Going to be snowed under through November. But if we start a thread, we can post snippets from time to time, and organize later?

We can do that.

I start with inputs from my side on some aspect.

Check this out. Some errors shoulder fired Nag etc but still an ok list.
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... n_Army.htm

Another here.
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2011/05/f ... ad-to.html
http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2012/03/a ... force.html

[Austin]

Video of Indra 2013 Ex ( in Russian )

http://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/ ... 1-ph7b.htm

[rohitvats]

Please go ahead and apply the same standard to the post above mine then...which would obviate the need for me to respond at the same level.

Mods are free to be subjective...but consistency is not too much to ask for, is it?

Rajit O - the bane of Military Forum has been the 'nukkadization' of discussion and 'I feel' kind of statements lacking even an iota of background research on the subject. An effort is being made to clamp down on such statements and encourage more meaningful discussion and debate. Project BRF is one such initiative.

However, that does not mean that as a moderator I will simply banish or delete any such post(s) - that too by someone who is new to the forum as a poster. For all you know, the post reflects the persons' understanding of the topic and the same is reflected in the content of the post.

It is expected that knowledgeable posters like you can provide the correct perspective as a counter to such posts and make the other poster see what is the right picture. This might involve a bit of heavy lifting but that is what is required to ensure discussion stays on course.

There is bigger onus on posters like you and hence, a deviation will attract more stricter response from moderators.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Neither links have anything on what is to be bought in what numbers and the monies allocated. Last I heard the 12th defense plan wasn't cleared by the MoF.

(1) You had made an assertion that the equipment projection and acquisition by Services is some sort of adhoc exercise meant only to justify the import of foreign equipment. The link shared about LTTP shows that it is not so.

(2) The MOD document clearly shows there is now more synergy between DRDO and the Services - the requirement is known in advance and R&D can be concentrated on such items and proper road map worked out.

(3) As for what is to be bought and in what numbers - well, that is a classified information unless Services make it public. For example, only the Army knows how many firing units of SR-SAM are required to be replaced and additional units added. And the associated time frame.

(4) The money spent comes from the capital allocation to each service - it is their prerogative as to what to buy and how to allocate resources. The acquisition confirms to the process set out by MOD. And DRDO has a say in what gets imported and what can be produced locally.

So, to raise bogies simply because something does not 'seem' all right to you is an incorrect approach.

[abhik]

^^^
Sorry my point was on the cost and affordability of the weapon systems that are sought to be acquired(most of which happen to be imported). The LTTP, 5-Year Defence Plan do not have the approval of the Finance Ministry(AFAIK, would welcome any correction). So they have no idea of the funds that the FM will commitment. Without knowing how much cash one has to spend how can one calculate affordability? Are these plans of any real use? And its not like the MoD gets 100% of the amount it asks for every year, In fact it sometimes faces cuts from even what little is budgeted. In recent times there has been a massive slowdown in funding, But there is no slow down in the rate at which new tenders are being floated. No change in strategy. No attempt to buy smart.

[rohitvats]

^^^
Sorry my point was on the cost and affordability of the weapon systems that are sought to be acquired(most of which happen to be imported). The LTTP, 5-Year Defence Plan do not have the approval of the Finance Ministry(AFAIK, would welcome any correction). So they have no idea of the funds that the FM will commitment. Without knowing how much cash one has to spend how can one calculate affordability? Are these plans of any real use? And its not like the MoD gets 100% of the amount it asks for every year, In fact it sometimes faces cuts from even what little is budgeted. In recent times there has been a massive slowdown in funding, But there is no slow down in the rate at which new tenders are being floated. No change in strategy. No attempt to buy smart.

I think you're being obtuse for the sake of it and making illogical arguments.

What the Services are doing by way of planning is what any organization would do -

(a) Take stock of current situation
(b) Project what requires to be replaced and what needs to be added afresh by way of capability (as technology and threat levels change)
(c) Project the timeline for the same along with cost projection.
(d) Forward the same to the MOD and GOI for approval and processing.

The above exercise has also provided the road map for technology development required in-house and ensure development of weapon systems matches the timeline for replacement.

Unless Services make a LTPP as well as 5-year defense plan, how will Services and MOD know what items and equipment are required to be replaced in short and long term?

And how do you think the Services project the budget requirement for each year (along with planned induction under any 5-year Defense Plan) if they don't undertake the whole exercise listed above? What will MOF reject if these plans are not made in the first place?

As to buy smart and stuff like that - Services know how much money they have and what equipment they require given the threat perception and advancement in technology.

[abhik]

...
What the Services are doing by way of planning is what any organization would do -

(a) Take stock of current situation
(b) Project what requires to be replaced and what needs to be added afresh by way of capability (as technology and threat levels change)
(c) Project the timeline for the same along with cost projection.
(d) Forward the same to the MOD and GOI for approval and processing.

How sir does one go about planning with no inkling of how much they can actually to spend in the first place? If the MoF has not approved the 5-year plan etc. it is not obliged to fund it either. Hence there is no way to evaluate whether the planned acquisitions are affordable or not. Is this so "illogical"?

...
As to buy smart and stuff like that - Services know how much money they have and what equipment they require given the threat perception and advancement in technology.

Sorry the Babus in the Services don't get a free pass on everything, else you'd have to give one for the T-90, AW, Tatra, Adarsh etc.

[rohitvats]

How sir does one go about planning with no inkling of how much they can actually to spend in the first place? If the MoF has not approved the 5-year plan etc. it is not obliged to fund it either. Hence there is no way to evaluate whether the planned acquisitions are affordable or not. Is this so "illogical"?

I'm at actually loss here - why are you not able to understand a simple concept?

You're making this as a linear exercise while it is not. Just look at some examples try and think how these come about:

- Projection by Navy to have X number of surface and sub-surface combatants by a certain time frame?
- IAF projecting requirement for 73 IJT and 8 Squadrons of Akash SAM? Or, 126 number/07 Squadrons of MMRCA?
- The multitude of radars entering service with all the three Services?
- Or the number of Nuclear Submarines planned?

Let us take this up with an example -

Take the example of Mechanized Infantry in the Army.

- Based on certain threat assessment, Indian Army has been authorized a number of Mechanized Infantry Regiments and their attendant infantry combat vehicles and support system.

- These systems have been in service since mid-80s and over the years we've locally produced BMP-2.

- To keep pace with the technology and threat level, we've continued to upgrade these ICVs; a very comprehensive upgrade is planned which I think will be the last one.

- Army knows that starting by the end of this century, it will need to start replacing these vehicles.

- Based on the threat perception and advancement in technology, it would project the number required and configuration thereof. Even if the number of Mechanized Infantry battalion do not go beyond what exists and has been sanctioned for near future, the number thrown around is 2,500 vehicles requiring to be replaced.

- Based on various cost estimates prevailing in the international market it would be able to make a projection in terms of costs involved. I expect the Army to ask for maximum amount at this stage.

Now comes the MOF in picture - MOD takes the requirement to the MOF and in its wisdom, MOF agrees to only 0.8X of the projected cost estimate. Couple of things can happen at this point:

(1) IA reduced the number of systems required but sticks to per unit specification (highly unlikely)
(2) It reduces the specifications and settles for lesser bells and whistles.

So, the final approved plan might or might not represent the original proposal made by the Services.

The acquisition of A-330 MRTT by IAF is a classic live example of this - MOF turned downed the requirement based on XYZ factors including cost. But that was only after IAF projected a requirement.

In 1985, IA had made Army Plan 2000 which was approved by the GOI of the day - but nothing moved on the ground due to deteriorating financial position. And we had the lost decade of 90s.

The entire exercise to purchase or develop something starts with Acceptance of Necessity (AON) - where it has to be proved that the product is required to begin with.

Sorry the Babus in the Services don't get a free pass on everything, else you'd have to give one for the T-90, AW, Tatra, Adarsh etc.

The free pass is in terms of what they want - the GOI gets it for them either from foreign country or DRDO/DPSU. The requirement of an equipment is established by the Services which can be fulfilled by different options if they exist of we have Javelin kind of situation.

[vaibhav.n]

Long and Short Term Planning in the IA is the domain of the Directorate General Perspective Planning headed by a Lt Gen and his army of Staff Officers. They conduct everything from Technology Analysis, Research, Operational Structure Planning, Weapons Test and Plan, Simulation and Wargaming (WARDEC).

While the ARTRAC handles the Doctrine which will be in the form of Operational, Sub-Conventional, Warfighting Doctrines and others.

[Philip]

Ge.Shankar Roychoudary has written a fine piece in the Deccan Chronicle (Op-Ed page) on legendary Vietnamese Gen.Giap who died recently,considered as possibly the greatest post-war military leader for defeating two colonial powers ,the French and US,with his army of peasant warriors.They faced the most advanced weaponry available at that time including chem-warfare (Agent Orange) and massive bombings by US B-52s but saw off both in full measure.Gen.Giap's book,'People's War,People's Army" is a classic and found in the library's of any military institutions worldwide.Gen.Choudary correctly says that we have not given enough importance to nationalist military leaders like Netaji and the Azad Hind Fauj,forerunners of the Viet Cong,and analysed the politico-military perspectives of both,saying that the time has come for a serious reappraisal of Netaji and the AHF and remains of the "utmost relevance"to the Indian Army in the 21st century.

The piece is yet to get onto the paper's page,will post in full when it arrives.

[Austin]

Unhappy Army

[member_23455]

Long and Short Term Planning in the IA is the domain of the Directorate General Perspective Planning headed by a Lt Gen and his army of Staff Officers. They conduct everything from Technology Analysis, Research, Operational Structure Planning, Weapons Test and Plan, Simulation and Wargaming (WARDEC).

While the ARTRAC handles the Doctrine which will be in the form of Operational, Sub-Conventional, Warfighting Doctrines and others.

Unless this is part of some byzantine reporting matrix, am pretty sure WARDEC is part of ARTRAC...you might want to double check.

At a broader level, at the Lt. Colonel and Colonel level, especially those who have been going on exchange/familiarization visits to the US are being hit with the realization that the lack of a formal acquisitions structure to complement the planning structure is why things go pear shaped so often in our set-up, not that the US model is a silver bullet.

[member_23455]

Ge.Shankar Roychoudary has written a fine piece in the Deccan Chronicle (Op-Ed page) on legendary Vietnamese Gen.Giap who died recently,considered as possibly the greatest post-war military leader for defeating two colonial powers ,the French and US,with his army of peasant warriors.They faced the most advanced weaponry available at that time including chem-warfare (Agent Orange) and massive bombings by US B-52s but saw off both in full measure.Gen.Giap's book,'People's War,People's Army" is a classic and found in the library's of any military institutions worldwide.Gen.Choudary correctly says that we have not given enough importance to nationalist military leaders like Netaji and the Azad Hind Fauj,forerunners of the Viet Cong,and analysed the politico-military perspectives of both,saying that the time has come for a serious reappraisal of Netaji and the AHF and remains of the "utmost relevance"to the Indian Army in the 21st century.

The piece is yet to get onto the paper's page,will post in full when it arrives.

Saved you the effort

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/gen- ... -india-992

Giap's "victories", as the ex-COAS himself points out in the op-ed were often achieved with very high casualties and in some cases like the Tet Offensive, tactical defeat gave way to strategic victory, because the adversary was not interested in the long haul.

Afghanistan is the latest example of such a "victory."

Indian conventional warfighting doctrine would do well to stay away from such a philosophy, as it is we are a bit too cavalier when it comes to body bags coming home.

[member_27847]

Long and Short Term Planning in the IA is the domain of the Directorate General Perspective Planning headed by a Lt Gen and his army of Staff Officers. They conduct everything from Technology Analysis, Research, Operational Structure Planning, Weapons Test and Plan, Simulation and Wargaming (WARDEC).

While the ARTRAC handles the Doctrine which will be in the form of Operational, Sub-Conventional, Warfighting Doctrines and others.

For me, the following are the reasons for army's problems:

1. The political overlords have no military training. The bureaucratic setup that comprises MOD also suffers from a lack of military training. So you get a civilian establishment and a military establishment that lacks a common language. The problems are a result of lack of understanding.

2. How many of India's ministers are ex-military? How many defence secretaries served in the services before taking up that position? As the military is a complex machine, it is hard for a civilian to get a good understanding without actually serving.

3. I believe that army bosses also take advantage of this situation. So you have two camps each one looking for their self interests. Both camps have institutionalized vested interests which are not shaken by change of officers. India has the same situation of institutionalized corruption in the judiciary and police forces.

4. Army may also feel left out of the gravy train as bulk of its needs are low to medium technology items. Army knows for sure (a lot of army officers transition to civilian jobs) that today's India can build pretty much everything for the army. However fixation with imports remains in the army.

As regards modernization needs of the army, it is true that the list is long. Army needs towed and SP artillery pieces, smart artillery shells, new IFVs, better soldier kits etc. Nobody questions that army needs better equipment and needs it today. The only question is why the import fixation when stuff can be built locally. It is not only the question of building but also supporting the weapon during its lifetime. A steady stream of spares is required to keep the weapon performing. The imported weapons often face shortage of spares that hamper their operational viability (just a few years after acquisition). Army knows all this but sidetracks the issues. The flaws of imported equipment are not published or told, but there are pitched battles inside offices and outside in the press in case of locally built weapons.

[member_27847]

Ge.Shankar Roychoudary has written a fine piece in the Deccan Chronicle (Op-Ed page) on legendary Vietnamese Gen.Giap who died recently,considered as possibly the greatest post-war military leader for defeating two colonial powers ,the French and US,with his army of peasant warriors.They faced the most advanced weaponry available at that time including chem-warfare (Agent Orange) and massive bombings by US B-52s but saw off both in full measure.Gen.Giap's book,'People's War,People's Army" is a classic and found in the library's of any military institutions worldwide.Gen.Choudary correctly says that we have not given enough importance to nationalist military leaders like Netaji and the Azad Hind Fauj,forerunners of the Viet Cong,and analysed the politico-military perspectives of both,saying that the time has come for a serious reappraisal of Netaji and the AHF and remains of the "utmost relevance"to the Indian Army in the 21st century.

The piece is yet to get onto the paper's page,will post in full when it arrives.

Saved you the effort

http://www.asianage.com/columnists/gen- ... -india-992

Giap's "victories", as the ex-COAS himself points out in the op-ed were often achieved with very high casualties and in some cases like the Tet Offensive, tactical defeat gave way to strategic victory, because the adversary was not interested in the long haul.

Afghanistan is the latest example of such a "victory."

Indian conventional warfighting doctrine would do well to stay away from such a philosophy, as it is we are a bit too cavalier when it comes to body bags coming home.

Mr Rajat,

Each army has to fight with what it has. Indian army will not get magical weapons in its next war.
People die in wars. More than 1.5 million Chinese soldiers died in second world war, our next door neighbor.
Even British Indian Army lost more than a hundred thousand men in that war.

An independent India has only faced border wars or skirmishes as an independent country. The losses faced have been like 3000 at one time.

So the test for independent India has not arrived yet. But it will arrive for sure. I shall consider Indian Army successful when it stays steadfast after a loss of one million men.

Respect is always earned, it is never given.

[vaibhav.n]

Unless this is part of some byzantine reporting matrix, am pretty sure WARDEC is part of ARTRAC...you might want to double check.

At a broader level, at the Lt. Colonel and Colonel level, especially those who have been going on exchange/familiarization visits to the US are being hit with the realization that the lack of a formal acquisitions structure to complement the planning structure is why things go pear shaped so often in our set-up, not that the US model is a silver bullet.

Ranjit,

AFAIK, WARDEC(WarGaming Development Centre) Delhi reports to DG(Info Sys & Trg) and works for ARTRAC. Could be otherwise.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP> I shall consider Indian Army successful when it stays steadfast after a loss of one million men.

Respect is always earned, it is never given.

If you consider the number of combatants dead in a war as a barometer of professionalism of a country's armed forces, then surely you need to reconsider your definition of professionalism.

Secondly, the mandate of the Indian Armed Forces is to safeguard national interests as defined in their charter - and they have done that with the means at their disposal. Both men and material.

And loss of men is NOT a barometer to judge whether they have discharged their duties to the best of their potential or not.

Finally, loss 3,000 or 3 million men in war is a test of resolve of a NATION and not its armed forces. Every nation and society decides the price it is willing to pay. So, the Red Army which was part of a totalitarian dictatorship could force its men into frontal assault with only 1 rifle amongst 5-6 soldiers - and shoot its own soldiers if they did not press the attack or tried to surrender or showed any wavering of 'resolve'. And Imperial Army soldiers chose to fight or commit suicide than surrender.

[Karan M]

Exactly. The point that modern India has not been tested in this manner is correct, but thats India not the IA itself, which operates to the level and mandate, the Govt has set it, that of a professional army with a certain manpower limit. And quite right, high casualties don't mean the Army is successful. They may merely imply wasteful use of precious human resources.. and by squandering those, you can weaken the nation, setting it up for a defeat later. For instance France in WW1 and in WW2, the huge loss of life in WW1 was frequently cited as a reason for the Vichy/collaborators to work with the Germans.

[Pratyush]

SNIP.........

Finally, loss 3,000 or 3 million men in war is a test of resolve of a NATION and not its armed forces. Every nation and society decides the price it is willing to pay. So, the Red Army which was part of a totalitarian dictatorship could force its men into frontal assault with only 1 rifle amongst 5-6 soldiers - and shoot its own soldiers if they did not press the attack or tried to surrender or showed any wavering of 'resolve'. And Imperial Army soldiers chose to fight or commit suicide than surrender.

Define what are the core interests and defend them to the fullest. If lives are lost dong that, the loss, while tragic, is acceptable. But just throwing a million men in order to show we have a bigger dick than the enemy. Is quite foolish.

I guess that is why, it is said, "If you want peace, be prepared to do battle. "

[member_23455]

Unless this is part of some byzantine reporting matrix, am pretty sure WARDEC is part of ARTRAC...you might want to double check.

At a broader level, at the Lt. Colonel and Colonel level, especially those who have been going on exchange/familiarization visits to the US are being hit with the realization that the lack of a formal acquisitions structure to complement the planning structure is why things go pear shaped so often in our set-up, not that the US model is a silver bullet.

Ranjit,

AFAIK, WARDEC(WarGaming Development Centre) Delhi reports to DG(Info Sys & Trg) and works for ARTRAC. Could be otherwise.

Sure, two/three-way reporting structures are not uncommon. But yes the tasking and supervision is typically from ARTRAC.

[member_27847]

<SNIP> I shall consider Indian Army successful when it stays steadfast after a loss of one million men.

Respect is always earned, it is never given.

If you consider the number of combatants dead in a war as a barometer of professionalism of a country's armed forces, then surely you need to reconsider your definition of professionalism.

Secondly, the mandate of the Indian Armed Forces is to safeguard national interests as defined in their charter - and they have done that with the means at their disposal. Both men and material.

And loss of men is NOT a barometer to judge whether they have discharged their duties to the best of their potential or not.

Finally, loss 3,000 or 3 million men in war is a test of resolve of a NATION and not its armed forces. Every nation and society decides the price it is willing to pay. So, the Red Army which was part of a totalitarian dictatorship could force its men into frontal assault with only 1 rifle amongst 5-6 soldiers - and shoot its own soldiers if they did not press the attack or tried to surrender or showed any wavering of 'resolve'. And Imperial Army soldiers chose to fight or commit suicide than surrender.

Rohit,

You need to read Mahabharata and Ramayana (Sanskrit) carefully. Why the story of two wars is so revered in our culture?

Because in Arya culture, running away from a challenge is unthinkable.

What India did in 1962? You can tell me better.

The same happened in 1947-48 Kashmir war when Mr Nehru dithered and Indian Army reached Srinagar at the last moment.

The 1965 war story is no better. It is only 71 when a resolute Mrs Gandhi supported by good military leadership fought with courage.

What India did in the face of Sikh insurgency and Kashmir terrorism - erect a wall and confine itself into a shell. That does not signify a confident or powerful nation.

There will be great challenges. India has powerful and resourceful enemies. India's history of last 2500 years (starting from Alexander) is one of defeat. India needs introspection if it wants its nation to endure or not?

War has not become outdated in the world. The resurgence of Muslims and rise of China are great challenges for India. So it is not up to India to chose. There will be a situation when India will have to stand up and fight.

[Lalmohan]

no sir, the history of india is one of survival and endurance against overwhelming odds

[Cosmo_R]

no sir, the history of india is one of survival and endurance against overwhelming odds

"....the history of the people of India is one of survival and endurance against overwhelming odds

[member_23455]

Meanwhile in other news...

COAS in one of the few Indian Reapolitik successes

[vaibhav.n]

For me, the following are the reasons for army's problems:

1. The political overlords have no military training. The bureaucratic setup that comprises MOD also suffers from a lack of military training. So you get a civilian establishment and a military establishment that lacks a common language. The problems are a result of lack of understanding.

2. How many of India's ministers are ex-military? How many defence secretaries served in the services before taking up that position? As the military is a complex machine, it is hard for a civilian to get a good understanding without actually serving.

3. I believe that army bosses also take advantage of this situation. So you have two camps each one looking for their self interests. Both camps have institutionalized vested interests which are not shaken by change of officers. India has the same situation of institutionalized corruption in the judiciary and police forces.

4. Army may also feel left out of the gravy train as bulk of its needs are low to medium technology items. Army knows for sure (a lot of army officers transition to civilian jobs) that today's India can build pretty much everything for the army. However fixation with imports remains in the army.

As regards modernization needs of the army, it is true that the list is long. Army needs towed and SP artillery pieces, smart artillery shells, new IFVs, better soldier kits etc. Nobody questions that army needs better equipment and needs it today. The only question is why the import fixation when stuff can be built locally. It is not only the question of building but also supporting the weapon during its lifetime. A steady stream of spares is required to keep the weapon performing. The imported weapons often face shortage of spares that hamper their operational viability (just a few years after acquisition). Army knows all this but sidetracks the issues. The flaws of imported equipment are not published or told, but there are pitched battles inside offices and outside in the press in case of locally built weapons.

Suggest you read up more on Huntington's Political-Military Models. There are broadly two such models.

Subjective:In such a model, the military is closely associated and participates in the social and political system. Citizens are drawn up to form large provincial militias and a smaller standing army, when the danger abates they return to the civilian setup and serve in multiple capacities including political ones. Such a model is characterised by a smaller military service tenures. The US is an ideal proponent of such a setup, where the entire military leadership is at the mercy of the incoming President. Service Chiefs there are completely political.Their founding fathers had a deep distrust of standing armies, which lays at the root of the 2nd Amendment providing for citizens to keep arms.

Objective:Here political and Military Leaders focus their efforts on their areas of expertise.The military focuses on the profession of arms.In this model, military profession is maximized. Ideally, military leaders work as advisers and formulate doctrines while our netas focus on national strategy and international relations to further state policy. Ideal examples are UK and India.

Actually, senior bureaucrats undergo courses at the National Defence College alongside military leaders to groom them to various service challenges. What we lack is dedicated Defence Procurement Bureaucracy/Agency especially in modern military contracts which are exceedingly complex spanning decades.

The IA's contracts by their sheer size are amongst the biggest. The stalled FICV contract which including its support variants for ATGM, Signals, Ambulance, Mortar Carrier, Recovery, Recce is valued at an easy 30,000 crores. The future Assault Rifle and Carbine Contest, 155mm Towed, Tracked and Wheeled SP, C2ISR Projects take your pick.

[symontk]

Actually, senior bureaucrats undergo courses at the National Defence College alongside military leaders to groom them to various service challenges. What we lack is dedicated Defence Procurement Bureaucracy/Agency especially in modern military contracts which are exceedingly complex spanning decades.

Many would be surprised to know that senior bureaucrats are trained there for hush hush stuff too. The argument that senior civil bureaucrats are unaware of the military part of world & setup is wrong

[member_27847]

no sir, the history of india is one of survival and endurance against overwhelming odds

It is not my friend. You are reading the wrong history.

Unfortunately it is not your fault as real history of Bharat is suppressed in this country due to political reasons.

The country that is called 'Bharat' which existed during Mahabharat war included Kabul (Gandhar desh), Punjab and Sindh to current Bengal (including Bangladesh).

Now Afghanistan is sitting on Kabul. Pakistan sits on Punjab and Sindh. Most of Bengal gone to Bangladesh.

When we say 'Hindu', it means local people who lived on this sub-continent prior to Muslim invasions (Hindu is derived from Sindhu which is a short form of Sindhu-desh. Sindhu-desh was the gateway for foreigners (like Arabians and Egyptians) for a very long time.

I must stop here. If you want a discussion, you can start a new thread.

[member_27847]

The IA's contracts by their sheer size are amongst the biggest. The stalled FICV contract which including its support variants for ATGM, Signals, Ambulance, Mortar Carrier, Recovery, Recce is valued at an easy 30,000 crores. The future Assault Rifle and Carbine Contest, 155mm Towed, Tracked and Wheeled SP, C2ISR Projects take your pick.

Vaibhav, taking a course is not the same as serving. Anyway thanks a lot for your viewpoint.

Next army should divide 'very large' procurements into smaller manageable parts. Products can be developed by local industry IF industry is trusted and R&D funds are allocated. The insistence of army to involve a foreign vendor in IFV/Artillery as the primary contractor is troubling. This reeks of motives beyond the genuine needs of Army. Private industry can acquire technology as needed rather than work as an appendage to a foreign vendor.

Private industry is trying honestly but combined MOD/Army bureaucracy alongwith influence of foreigners has stopped from any headway on army projects.

It is a fact that local industry will offer equipment at much lower prices than international firms. Local industry will also be far cleaner (not inclined to bribe) as they have to survive in this country's regulatory environment.

[rohitvats]

<SNIP>Next army should divide 'very large' procurement into smaller manageable parts. Products can be developed by local industry IF industry is trusted and R&D funds are allocated. The insistence of army to involve a foreign vendor in IFV/Artillery as the primary contractor is troubling.

Please stop these patronizing posts when it is quite obvious that you don't even have basic knowledge of the developments in the IFV and Artillery segment.

IA had INSISTED on the participation of the private players in the FICV development where private players had the liberty to partner with foreign players. Companies were to submit their proposal and MOD-IA were to fund 80% of the R&D cost of the top-2 designs. Further, the winner was going to build ~70% of the 2,600 vehicles with runner-up given the option of 30% of the production.

Private players (Mahindra/TATA/L&T - 4th player OFB) had submitted their proposals and MOD is yet to announce the two-winning designs and Development Agencies.

Coming to Artillery - the story is well known. Private players are developing one type of gun required by IA while OFB is trying to develop a copy of Bofors we inducted with larger caliber.

This reeks of motives beyond the genuine needs of Army.

Please explain the bold part of the above statement with respect to acquisition of FICV and Artillery products.

Private industry can acquire technology as needed rather than work as an appendage to a foreign vendor. Private industry is trying honestly but combined MOD/Army bureaucracy along with influence of foreigners has stopped from any headway on army projects.

When you make a statement, please ensure you make a clean statement. MOD is NOT SAME AS IA. Read this slowly and ensure you don't make this mistake again.

Services WANT private players to participate because that is the only way they think they can break the monopoly of DPSUs and help solve the attendant issues. They want wider participation. It is the MOD which does not want to let go of the cash cows. So when IAF did not send RFP for AVRO replacement to HAL, you had the Praful Patel raising hue and cry.

It is a fact that local industry will offer equipment at much lower prices than international firms. Local industry will also be far cleaner (not inclined to bribe) as they have to survive in this country's regulatory environment.

Local industry is not going to mushroom overnight - it will need to partner with firms which can provide the technical know-how. Enough checks and balances can be created to ensure they don't become fronts for foreign companies but that does not mean they don't need hand-holding. Further, there is no need to invent everything - lot of stuff is available off the shelf.

It is MOD which needs to provide the level playing field - like what has been tried for FICV. Which interestingly might be scuttled by MOD and powers-that-be.

So, a Baba Kalyani can purchase the entire production line of Austrian howitzer if he sees encouragement from MOD - and GCF Jabalpur staff does not threaten to go on strike when they come to know that private player(s) are also developing howitzers for the army.

[member_27847]

Rohit,

You may be more knowledgeable than me in these procurement matters. Maybe army genuinely wants private industry involvement.

All I see though is endless artillery trials and frequent blacklisting of firms without even procuring anything.

I agree that government does not solve problems that are seen so clearly by every rational person.

My point about involving private industry as a developer of a weapon system is very important. If the control is with a foreign player, the domestic guy will have no control over costs. It is well known that private industry picks up government contracts at fixed costs (max at a fixed inflation adjustment). There are too many unknowns including foreign currency. So while army may be well meaning in involving a foreign player, it will be twisted by MOD to ultimately exclude domestic firms.

Everybody knows that OFB is a white elephant. The best way is to ignore OFB (get it to work on non-critical areas).

[Pratyush]

^^^

Rohit, 2 points WRT the FICV.

Have we seen any prototypes for the FICV, by the Pvt players. Cause if the threat is to cancel the project. IMO they may be best served, if the prototype was already under testing. In case of direct imports.

Secondly, I recall reading that the 2 of the Pvt players were reluctant to build a greenfield plant for the vehicle, and were open to the utilization of the preexisting plant at OFB Medak. Which in turn would save a lot of money. While utilising a national asset.

Quoting from Broad Sword.

http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2010/08/i ... fence.html

At least two of the private contractors believe that it would be wasteful to set up a Greenfield production line. Says a senior executive in one of the contending companies, “Ordnance Factory, Medak is a national asset and it would be lying idle at that time. We could build the FICV at Medak --- on a Government-Owned-Company-Operated (GOCO) basis --- instead of setting up a brand new facility.”

[KrishnaK]

Rohit,

You need to read Mahabharata and Ramayana (Sanskrit) carefully. Why the story of two wars is so revered in our culture?

Because in Arya culture, running away from a challenge is unthinkable.

What India did in 1962? You can tell me better.

The same happened in 1947-48 Kashmir war when Mr Nehru dithered and Indian Army reached Srinagar at the last moment.

The 1965 war story is no better. It is only 71 when a resolute Mrs Gandhi supported by good military leadership fought with courage.

What India did in the face of Sikh insurgency and Kashmir terrorism - erect a wall and confine itself into a shell. That does not signify a confident or powerful nation.

There will be great challenges. India has powerful and resourceful enemies. India's history of last 2500 years (starting from Alexander) is one of defeat. India needs introspection if it wants its nation to endure or not?

War has not become outdated in the world. The resurgence of Muslims and rise of China are great challenges for India. So it is not up to India to chose. There will be a situation when India will have to stand up and fight.

There aren't going to be million men casualty wars anymore, except in fantasy land.

[Karan M]

A few nukes on crowded population centers can change that though.

[Pratyush]

^^^

and the retaliation will even the score.

But I fail to understand this insistence on throwing the lives of a million men. As Armies don't exist in isolation. They are a product of the society / nation, they belong to. It is for the nation to decide, what objective is worth paying what price.

If the nation decides that loosing a million lives is ok. I am sure that the lives will be lost. But in the absence of that decision, it is foolish to insist that throwing away a million men is measure of strength.

[shan]

losing a million men, soldiers or otherwise, and still standing and fighting dont have anything to do with military professionalism or capability. As rohit pointed it only shows nations resolve to fight, not till victory perhaps but for a honorable end.

The same people who makes these chest thumping statements realize real cost of such a loss only when near and dear ones are lost. Then we will be shouting about how people in power has wasted lives of innocent soldiers and citizens when these same people are cozing in their air conditioned bunkers. When their is a need to fight, we should. Not out of emotion, popular demand or media demand for war, but by way of professional planing and resolve. And in that respect i dont see how our army is less capable today.

[KrishnaK]

A few nukes on crowded population centers can change that though.

If none of the big countries are willing to fight wars with millions of casualties, no reason to believe nukes on population centers will happen either. Even Pakistan's first claimed step is only counter force.

[Prem]

Brahma Chellaney ‏@Chellaney 2 Nov The surge in Pakistani ceasefire violations has followed the Indian Army chief's politically dictated dismantlement of the covert unit, TSD.

[rohitvats]

Posted by Prasun Sengupta in comment section of his blog:

Just finished reading ex-IA COAS Gen (Ret’d) V K Singh’s autobiography, titled, ‘Courage And Conviction’. The contents are quite a revelation & will make any Indian citizen’s blood boil, that’s a given. For instance:

1) It contains descriptions of just how chaotic the IPKF’s mobilisation was & how Indian Airlines’ entire flight schedules went haywire during the airlift process.

2) Brief explanations of EX Brass Tacks, OP Trident & OP Kartoos & how the Sumdorong Chu incident all began in the latter half of the 1980s.

3) Why Myanmar’s officials refer to India as a NATO country, i.e. ‘no action talk only’ country.

4) How India for 15 years sat on Myanmar’s offer for exploring for offshore oil & gas reserves & when this was explained to Dr MMS on January 15, 2012, Dr MMS said in a resigned manner: “General Sahab, ab yeh procedural problems hain, we are trying”.

5) Several details on the Army HQ’s ‘Transformation Study’.

6) How camels from Rajasthan are being smuggled from India into Bangladesh (for meat!.

7) How Army HQ succeeded in utilising all its allocated budgetary funds for FY 2010-2011 & how the MoD’s bureaucracy reacted to this in FY 2011-2012 by quietly transferring out the MoD’s Joint Secretary (Acquisitions) in April 2011 & keeping that post vacant for nine months, which in turn led to all procurement decisions for all three armed services being deferred for that period.

Why the IA’s infantry battalions are functioning with less than half-a-dozen officers when more than 20 officers are mandated for, & how the then Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar resisted all efforts by IA HQ to remedy such shortcomings.

9) Details about the BEML-TATRA scam & the malicious machinations of BEML’s now suspended CMD V R S Natarajan, who somehow managed to remain CMD of BEML for the past 12 years & his alleged links to T K A Nair of the PMO.

10) How the IA’s GSQR for UFH was reportedly drafted to suit the ‘Pegasus’ from Singapore’s ST Kinetics & how the then Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar tried his level-best to scuttle the IA’s efforts to order the LW-155 under the FMS scheme.

11) How for 25 years the MoD prevented the OFB’s Jabalpur-based Gun Carriage Factory from indigenising the Bofors FH-77B 155mm/39-cal towed howitzer.

12) How the IA was prevented from forestalling the 2012 communal pogrom at Kokrajhaar.

13) How, thanks to the TSD, the IA was aware of the attempted coup in The Maldives way before anyone else in India was.

Have ordered the book - will post review once I get it and can read the thing.