Understanding Islamic Society

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 25 Jul 2013 02:14

^^^

Dikgaj's Blog

How Islam Came to India and why it must go from India

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 02 Aug 2013 11:30

X-post from pas-e-pardah OT dhaaga:

ramana ji,

Sorry for the delayed response. I was travelling and busy with a family medical emergency and just saw this today. I will work on it now.

brihaspati ji's point is valid. Even the earliest commentaries set the interpretations in a way that makes it difficult to create any common ground between the fortunate, humble (before Allah) Muslim and the stubborn, envious, hypocritical non-Muslim. A good example is at the very beginning of the first main chapter of the Qur'an - 2:13 -

"wa idhaa qeela lahum aaminoo kamaa amin an-naas, qaaloo ano'minu kamaa aamin as-sufahaa? alaa innahum hum as-sufahaa, wa laakin laa ya'alimoon."

The usual English translation given is: "And when it is said to them, 'Believe as the people have believed,' they say, 'Should we believe as the foolish have believed?' Unquestionably, it is they who are the foolish, but they know [it] not."

The word "an-naas" has been correctly translated as "the people". But its interpretation is interesting. Commentators from the earliest times have said that "naas" in the Qur'an refers to Muslims, not to human beings in general. the Arabic word "insaan" (now used in Hindi also) is from the word "naas". But theologically, it supposedly refers to Muslims, or at least to a "monotheist" in general.

But if it was just taken for what it is, the verse could mean that a sane, non-hypocritical person should "be one among men" - especially if you look at the context of the hypocritical personality it is describing. It is describing a personality type who is half-ignorant, has a contempt for humanity or at least vast sections of it, has a sense of irrational special-ness about himself or his caste, he cannot place his trust in others' words nor is his own word reliable, he is merely a chankian opportunist, etc. It is castigating those traits.

Yet, that is not the broad meaning at the human level given since earliest times. Rather, since earliest times, the sane, truly human type of mankind is identified with the community that pledges doctrinal affiliation to Allah and Muhammad. All those who do not pledge this affiliation are deemed equivocal or certain examples of an insane, crooked or ignorant subspecies of mankind. This identificationism is hard to work around from within the "scholarly tradition" of the Islamic ulema.

However, perhaps it is possible to question it at the very textual roots, as I have tried above. Wahhabism supposedly tries to go to the literal roots, but in my opinion doesn't go far enough!

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 02 Aug 2013 11:44

X-post from TSP thread:

Aditya_V wrote:Babies given away in Pakistan

Adoption is illegal in Islam. Why are Pakis following unislamic practice during Raamadan, or are these children considered as right hand possesions.

Adoption is illegal, but taking care of orphans is considered a very good act. The Prophet himself is considered an orphan (yateem).

So Islamically, if a family takes care of these baby girls, the "foster father" in that family is not "mahram" to these girls. So, on reaching 8 or 9 years of age or even sooner, the girls will have to wear hijab and never be alone even with the foster father or brothers in the same home.

Generally in Islamic society, daughters are taught to be a little shy even with their own biological fathers. A responsible father should teach his daughter from infancy to not be naked even in front of himself, and certainly not other men.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 05 Aug 2013 16:11

Deen Hindustani: Qur'an Saar

Bismillah.

On August 15, 1947, as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru reminded the nation of its tryst with destiny from the ramparts of the Red Fort, its rebirth into freedom and light was ushered in by the powerful notes of the shehnai of Ustad Bismillah Khan.

This was the same Ustad whose notes, year after year, ushered in the festival of lights in the ancient city of Kashi (Benaras) whose mention one finds even in the RigVeda. How is it that in one of the holiest cities of "Hinduism", an Indian Muslim musician would find pride of place inaugurating a festival of lights with an ode to Shri Ganesh? But then, the venerable and amiable Ustad was a practitioner of classical music, shaastriya sangeet, whose fundamentals are from a book of love called the SamaVeda.

It is only fitting that such an Ustad, an inaugurator of auspicious offerings, should bear the name Bismillah.

This is modern India. It is a civilization where, since time immemorial, packaged ideologies, cultures and religions have come unbundled, dissolving into a churning ocean of human thought and feeling for the Creator. The word Hindustan comes from "Hindu", a variant of "Sindhu", which means the Ocean in Sanskrit. It also applies to the ethnicities living East of the R. Sindhu (Indus). Foreigners like the Arabs, Turks, Mongols and Iranis would refer to Indian Muslims as "Hindu Musalmaan".

The word for the essence of India is Bhaarata, a word from the Veda. It comes from the Sanskrit roots bhaa (light) and rata (addicted). Therefore, one who is irresistibly attracted to the Light of Knowledge and Love is called Bhaarata. Like the moth to the flame, sham'a aur parvaanah, that familiar metaphor in Urdu poetry.

Vinoba Bhave one compiled the essence of the Qur'an, as a spiritual guideline, in his book Qur'an Saar. Here are those verses. It makes for an apt wird for zikr:

...

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 05 Aug 2013 20:00

So Agnimitra, Vajpayee talking of "insaniyat" in Lahore in 1999 was kind of rubbing it in to the momeens!

RamaY · Post by **RamaY** » 05 Aug 2013 20:06

This is modern India. It is a civilization where, since time immemorial, packaged ideologies, cultures and religions have come unbundled, dissolving into a churning ocean of human thought and feeling for the Creator. The word Hindustan comes from "Hindu", a variant of "Sindhu", which means the Ocean in Sanskrit. It also applies to the ethnicities living East of the R. Sindhu (Indus). Foreigners like the Arabs, Turks, Mongols and Iranis would refer to Indian Muslims as "Hindu Musalmaan".

What is described is NOT 'modern' India. It is the definition of "India that is Bharat". Modern India, founded in 1947, is nothing but self-loathing, hindu-hating intellectual slave nation.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Aug 2013 01:26

X-Post.....

Jhujar wrote:Badodordeen Pondering Over Fowl Smell

Past present: A policy of tolerance
Moi Bark Ali
(O Allah, Let Indian be Tolerant of Muslims in Same Vein)

During the Sultanate period, the issue of Hindu-Muslim relations generated a controversy between the Muslim rulers and the ulema. Following the model of the Arab rule in Sindh, the ulema held Hindus at par with the Jews and the Christians as the ‘people of the Book’. They were regarded as Zimmis who paid jizya. After the Mongols invaded Central Asia, some ulema arrived to settle in India and critical of this policy, they discussed among themselves the options to make amendments to it. Ziauddin Barani, (1285–1357) a Muslim historian and political thinker, in his book Sana-i-Muhammadi discussed the ulema’s view in detail. He highlighted that the Hindus were not people of the book but infidels and pagans as they did not have a divine book nor prophets to guide them. So he believed they should be regarded differently from the Jews and the Christians.

The ulema met Sultan Iltutmish to convince him that the policy of the Muslim state was against Islamic law. They suggested that as the Hindus were not people of the book, they should either be converted to Islam, or killed in case of denial. They further argued that in a Muslim state, infidels must not be allowed to live respectably but should be humiliated and insulted. They wanted the sultan to adopt a policy of coercion towards them and express his anger and displeasure in the presence of the Hindus. When they finished, their conversation, the sultan asked his wazir Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, to respond to the arguments of the ulema. The wazir told him that the argument of the ulema about the Hindus was correct as according to the Sharia, they should either be converted or be killed because they were enemies of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Junaidi pointed out that the Muslims were in minority, while the Hindus formed the majority in the subcontinent. He feared that they would unite and revolt against the policy of coercion which would make it difficult for the Muslims to maintain their hold on the subcontinent. So until the sultanate consolidated and became powerful, a harsh policy towards the Hindus was not advisable. After hearing this, the ulema requested the sultan to not allow Hindus to be appointed to high posts, to reside in Muslim localities or to freely perform their religious rituals. In his book Fatawa-i-Jahandari, Ziauddin Barani revised the question that if a Muslim ruler with political power, wealth and resources tolerates religious practices of the non-Muslims and fails to prevent their influence, how would Islamic teachings be propagated and paganism eliminated. During the period of Iltutmish, Nuruddin Mubarak Ghaznavi, a religious scholar criticised the Muslim rulers for failing to take any action against the infidels because of their majority. He argued that they should be treated with contempt and not be permitted to worship idols openly. They urged the sultan to crush the Brahmins, who were the root cause of idol worship. According to Ghaznavi, the sultan should crush the Brahmins, preserve the Islamic spirit and not extend them any favours or concessions. He also requested that the sultan should expel all philosophers from state institutions and appoint only pious and devout religious people on high posts.While the rulers patiently listened to the exhortations of the ulema, they still did not allow interference in state affairs. They made no attempt to impose the Sharia and continued to follow a policy which suited the interest of the state...

The crush the Brahmins policy has been advocated by the Arabs, the Turkish Muslims and after them by British and the modern seculars.

Misfortunately for the rulers nothing has happened while many have suffered death and exile.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Aug 2013 01:57

Balbir Punj says Carpe Diem to the non-existent 'moderate' Muslims:

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/ ... islam.html

Moderates’ moment to reclaim Islam
Monday, 05 August 2013 | Balbir Punj | in Edit

Across the world from Turkey to Egypt to Pakistan, Islamists are on the rise. But as the Arab Spring at its peak proved, they can be pushed back if liberals and civil society leaders stand up to them

A world troubled by extremist Islam is watching Egypt’s streets and squares with bated breath. If the Army-backed liberals in that country win the confrontation with the Islamists, there may be a reversal in the steady march of fundamentalists in the region stretching from Tunisia in the west to Pakistan in the east.

Across the Mediterranean, Turkey too had caught the wind and it is the popular opposition to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist policies that somewhat broke the country’s slide into religious fundamentalism. Turkey is still under the shadow of that conflict — liberals backed by the Army are demanding a return to the 1920s era when Turkey was established as a Western-style modern state with a secular Constitution.

But recently the liberal traditions of Turkey have suffered a setback. For instance, on July 5, local Muslim fundamentalists in Trabzon offered their Ramzan prayers at an ancient Byzantine church in the north-eastern coastal city. This 13th century church was converted into a mosque around the 16th century and eventually became a museum in 1964. However, through a court verdict, the Islamists have reclaimed the building and converted it into a functioning mosque.

This incident only underlines the hard reality that extremist Islam does not tolerate either other faiths or even a small departure from the orthodox interpretation that it prescribes for the faithful. The Taliban- type zealots will not let girls study or work, they will not allow elections or representative forms of Government to function. They only wish to implement what they say are divine laws.

And so it comes as no surprise that both in Iran and Saudi Arabia — rival nations that represent Islam’s two main warring sects, the Shias and the Sunnis respectively — brutal medieval practices such as stoning criminals to death is legal and public participation statutorily defined, including the size of stones to be used.

There are, of course, moderate Islamic countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Morocco, where some secular laws prevail, democratic norms and elected leaders are accepted, and extremists put down through a carrot-and-stick approach. But the Islamist threat looms large over these countries too, and there are no guarantees on when the situation will take a turn for the worse.

For instance, in Sunni-majority Iraq where a Shia Government has now come to power, the two sects are at each other’s throats. Similarly, in the 70s, when Islamists overthrew the secular Shah of Iran, they imposed a strict religious code. Since then, a council of clerics has governed Iran, handpicking, as was seen recently, even presidential candidates.

Take Bangladesh as another example. While Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League Government rescued the country from religious extremism, religious parties are waiting to tie up with the main Opposition party in that country to dethrone the secular ruling party and bring back the country’s Islamist Constitution.

The problems of religious fundamentalism today are best demonstrated in Pakistan. This is the month of Ramzan — a time of penance, piety and rededication to the divine path. Yet, in several places in Pakistan (a country that was carved out of united India to supposedly allow Muslims a safe haven), Muslim blood lies splattered on the lawns of mosques because different Islamic sects cannot agree on who is the true believer, and thus, they seek to force a decision by competitive bloodletting.

A few months back there was apprehension worldwide that Islamic extremism would swallow Pakistan as the Taliban and other Muslim clerics joined the call to boycott the general election. The civil society that liberated the nation from military dictatorship finally prevailed and a Government with an effective majority in the National Assembly was installed in office. However, the current level of bloodletting displays how the forces of fundamentalism can make the functioning of even moderate Islamism tenuous. In Bangladesh too, civil society has rallied in favour of a secular Constitution and has demanded harsh punishment for fundamentalist leaders who had sided with the Pakistani Army in 1971 and massacred millions of Bengalis.

Against this backdrop, what is happening in Egypt is reflective of things to come. Egyptian civil society had risen in revolt against the dictatorship of former President Hosni Mubarak and had succeeded in ousting him from power. In this, it was also joined by the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood that was long suppressed by the autocratic leader.

However, once successful, civil society and its liberal leaders let down their guard. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, seized power thanks to its well-knit socio-political organisation, and even got an illiberal Constitution approved through a widely-criticised referendum. Continuing economic distress and the increasing clout of Islamists, however, has now provoked the liberals to pour back into the streets and challenge the fundamentalists. The Army’s intervention in favour of the liberals has sealed the fate of the Islamists within the power corridors ,but the Brothers are now challenging the liberals on the streets.

At this stage, there is no telling how the confrontation will end. In December 2011, when the Tunisian people took to the streets to oust a three-decades-old autocracy, there was hope that there would be a new awakening in North Africa in favour of democracy and liberal values. That hope gained ground as the spirit of revolution spread from Tunisia to Libya and Egypt and Yemen and Bahrain.

And even though the Arab Spring has since threatened to turn into an Islamist winter, there is still a possibility that, in the Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Pakistan, there will be a determined confrontation between the forces of liberalism or moderate Islam and extremist Islam. Events in Egypt will indicate which way the wind will blow. The next few months will reveal if civil society leaders in the region have the power to contain jihadi terror, and promote the rule of law based on modern principles of jurisprudence, economic growth and gender equality.

The year 2014 will also be crucial as US troops withdraw from Afghanistan and expose the moderate but fragile Government of Hamid Karzai to the powerful Taliban’s attacks. If the Taliban returns to Kabul in any form, with the Pakistani establishment still holding on to the ‘defence in depth’ strategy against India, and if the confrontation in Egypt brings the ousted Islamist President Mohamed Morsi back to power, the world would have moved backwards and jihadi terror will be the gainer.

(The accompanying visual is of supporters of Egypt’s ousted President Mohamed Morsi chanting slogans against Egyptian Defence Minister General Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, in Cairo. AP photo by Hassan Ammar)

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 06 Aug 2013 21:53

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/intervi ... 989008.ece

The changing face of Tamil Nadu’s Muslim politics
A.R. Venkatachalapathy
The Hindu

KALANTHAI PEER MOHAMED: ‘When the whole world was revolted by the beheading of a Sri Lankan Tamil girl, in Tamil Nadu, it was vociferously defended by a radical organisation.’

Over the last year, agitations by radical Tamil Muslim groups have effectively influenced the Tamil Nadu government’s policies. In September 2012, the Tamilnadu Muslim Munnetra Kazhagam (TMMK) and Tamil Nadu Thowheed Jamath (TNTJ) protested against the film, The Innocence of Muslims, and laid siege to the U.S. Consulate in Chennai. In early 2013, in the face of similar protests, Kamal Haasan’s Vishwaroopam was first taken off the screens and exhibited only after cuts were made. Last week, a scheduled lecture by the Islamic scholar, Prof. Amina Wadud, at the University of Madras was cancelled in the face of threats to disrupt the meeting. The award-winning Tamil writer, commentator and observer of Muslim politics and culture Kalanthai Peer Mohamed tells historian A.R. Venkatachalapathy that it is worrying that Tamil Nadu’s Muslim community does not have representatives who can articulate the moderate viewpoint.

Excerpts:

It is evident that political formations such as the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and Indian National League (INL), which formed alliances with mainstream parties such as the Congress, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), and politically represented Muslims in Tamil Nadu, have lost their influence. In their stead, we see the rise of the TMMK and TNTJ. Can you place this in perspective?

The partition of India had its inevitable impact on Tamil Muslims. As the Muslim League vanished in North India, it was left to Muslims in South India to reorganise politically under the IUML banner in 1948. The venerable Quaid-E-Millath Muhammed Ismail gave cohesion and leadership to the IUML. Despite hailing from Tamil Nadu, he could comfortably win a parliamentary seat in Malappuram constituency in Kerala.

Tamil Muslims played an important role in the anti-Hindi agitation (1937–39) led by Periyar E.V. Ramasamy. How did the relationship between the Dravidian movement and IUML evolve in the post-1947 period?

After C.N. Annadurai and the DMK split from Periyar, Tamil Muslims maintained a cordial relationship with both the Dravidar Kazhagam (led by Periyar) and DMK. Periyar and Anna often appeared on Muslim platforms, usually on the occasion of Meelad-un-Nabi, and extolled the egalitarian ideas enshrined in Islam. The avowed atheism of the Dravidian movement did cause some friction but Tamil Muslims were largely comfortable with a Tamil identity that encompassed Muslims and other religious minorities.

What were the political benefits reaped by the IUML as a result of this alliance?

The IUML was an integral part of electoral alliances with the DMK, and regularly won seats in the Legislative Assembly. It was part of the winning combination in 1967 that routed the Congress. Quaid-E-Millath Ismail’s death in 1972 proved to be a major setback. In the same year, the DMK split. In the post-Quaid-E-Millath period, the IUML was largely content with representing the interests of Muslim businessmen. The IUML was hardly involved in political mobilisation or organising mass agitations. In the pursuit of vote bank politics, the IUML was wooed by both the DMK and AIADMK, finally leading to the split in the IUML. While Abdus Samad retained the leadership of IUML, the Indian National League (INL) was led by Abdul Latheef, considered close to M. Karunanidhi. There was a regional divide as well. Muslims, especially in north Tamil Nadu, who had gained from the DMK’s populist policies, for instance, in the public housing sector, backed the DMK. MGR won popular support from Muslims in the south.

A comment on the economic background of Muslims in Tamil Nadu may be appropriate here.

The better-off Muslims are involved in the leather industry, and run small textile shops, fancy stores and restaurants. Except for the leather industry, these establishments demand little capital and long hours of work. Large numbers are artisans and workers in the unorganised sector. The Muslim middle class is insubstantial. The businesses of the rich Muslims relied largely on Sri Lanka, Singapore and Malaysia.

During the Gulf oil boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, Tamil Muslims, mostly youth, migrated from South-East Asia to the Middle East. The South-East Asian countries were multi-religious societies, in contrast to the Gulf monarchies. The dominant, purist Wahhabi tradition in the Middle East attracted these youth who began to disdain Tamil syncretic Muslim practices. Islamic reform organisations were formed. Dargah worship, the adulation of saints and their tombs, seen as un-Islamic, came in for sustained condemnation. Social practices such as dowry were derided. The Gulf boom, the decline of the moderate IUML/INL and the rise of Wahhabi Islam proved to be a potent cocktail.

This period coincided with the rise of Hindutva politics in India — the Ram janmabhoomi controversy was singularly influential in Tamil Muslim politics. The Shah Bano verdict was seen as interference in the Shariat.

Muslim puritan groups capitalised on the weakness of the IUML/INL. What started as an anti-Dargah campaign soon entered the town, street and home, and vertically split the community. Jamaat, namaz, Id celebrations — everything became two. Youth who returned from the Gulf brought new practices. The gaiety, amity and togetherness that characterised earlier social religious occasions were now lost. The groups championing Thowheed (the Oneness of Allah) argued against the Shafi, Hanafi, Maliki and Hanbali schools of jurisprudence and in effect became a fifth school.

What forces emerged from this chaos?

In 1995, the TMMK was formed. The Babri Masjid destruction was the prime trigger for its launch by M.H. Jawahirullah, P. Jainul Abideen, S.M. Bakkar and others. The violence following the Babri Masjid demolition — the anti-Muslim riots and bomb blasts — and the action and inaction of the police, intelligence agencies and courts pushed Muslim youth into the hands of radical groups such as the TMMK.

What other incidents, both national and global, affect this politics?

Paradoxically, the attacks on a non-puritanical, even secular, regime like Saddam Hussein had an alienating effect on Tamil Muslim youth. But a particularly localised event had the greatest fallout. In November 1997, a traffic constable named Selvaraj was murdered by Muslim youth in Coimbatore. The insensitive handling by the police influenced by Hindutva propaganda, eventually culminated in the gruesome Coimbatore serial blasts on February 14, 1998 leaving 58 people dead and over 200 injured. This tragic event coloured subsequent politics. It became an indelible blemish on Tamil Muslim identity. A largely secular state came under the influence of communal politics.

What was the fallout of this for radical groups such as the TMMK?

It cut both ways. If youth flocked to radical groups, the community also began to wonder if the rise of such outfits was not at the root of such violence. Some even began to long for the good old days of moderate IUML politics. Muslims also became wary of the fact that no political party was exempt from playing ball with the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for electoral considerations. The alliance forged between the DMK and BJP in 1999 was perhaps akin to crossing the Rubicon.

Within the TMMK itself, a radical wing emerged led by the charismatic P. Jainul Abideen who formed the TNTJ. The TMMK remained committed to its founding Wahhabi ideals, but expanded its scope to address other social issues concerning the community including reservation. The Manithaneya Makkal Katchi (MMK), the Humanist People’s Party, formed in early 2009, is an outcome of this goal. An important aspect of its coming of age was its alliance with the AIADMK in the 2011 Assembly elections and the capturing of two seats. The TNTJ, largely a one-man show, eschews electoral politics, and confines itself to its communal ideals. It blindly backs acts of omission and commission committed by the Arab world under the garb of Islam. When the whole world found revolting the beheading of the Sri Lankan Tamil Muslim girl, Rizwana, Jainul Abideen vociferously justified it. It’s worrying that the community in Tamil Nadu does not have representatives who can articulate their voice in a reasonable manner within a broad humanistic and universalistic framework.

How do you respond to the silencing of Dr. Amina Wadud?

It is a pity that we have been deprived of an opportunity to listen to the views of a renowned scholar. People who disagree with Dr. Wadud should articulate their views and refute them. Historically, Islam has been enriched by debate and varied interpretations.

When Center is weak and itself kowtows to radical Islam it silences the other voices.
See how moderate voices from Taslima Nasreen onwards are stiffled.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 07 Aug 2013 15:46

Ikhlas-ud-Deen: Gauhar e Qur'an

Bismillah.

The following is a selection of Qur'anic verses that demonstrate that the actual meanings of the Qur'an are about spiritual technique against the lower self, the nafs al-ammara.

The nafs al-ammara is animalistic and either indolent or violent. According to these verses, the Qur'an exhorts the human intelligence to do battle against lethargy and the violent temper, so that peace and constructive energy can flourish in human society.

It is a pity that animalistic priesthoods and scholars have twisted the Qur'anic wisdom as a tool to mobilize mobs of rage, or to keep an entire community in unemployable ignorance and stupor. These dajjal (impostor) priesthoods and politicians are hypnotizing vast numbers of Muslims, young and old, within India and in all so-called Muslim countries.

Therefore, it is the need of the hour to combat the invidious disinformation of these dajjaal priesthoods and politicians. It is the final jihaad for Islam. The famous hadith says: "'You will invade Arabia and Allah will grant it (to you). Then (you will conquer) Persia and Allah will grant it (to you). Then, you will invade Rome and Allah will grant it (to you). Then, you will invade The Dajjal and Allah will grant him (to you).'" The Dajjaal, as the name suggests, is an impostor that comes from within, in the guise of "pure Islam".

This set of Qur'anic aayats can be used in wonderful awraad for zikr:
<verses below>

Virupaksha · Post by **Virupaksha** » 07 Aug 2013 15:55

But but,

Allah gave quran as a whole. He didnt divide quran into quran-main and quran-lite. Normal mortals cant do that. If allah wanted to give quran-main and quran-lite, he would have given quran-main and quran-lite. Instead he gave quran.

QED.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Aug 2013 20:34

Yet it was dic tated to a man who couldnt read or write. And it was much later complied and written down. As it was written after the victories the quran-main was given more emphasis.

Ikhlas udeen seems to be high class momin.

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 07 Aug 2013 20:37

There is now some scholarship which try to point out evidence of literacy. But the early life has been subject to so much reconstruction, that "truth" is difficult to glean. But all the narrative claims together do indicate literacy as plausible.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 07 Aug 2013 20:42

Err bji, If Muhaamad is shown to be literate then the god dic tated status of Koran goes for toss for Muhammad could have made it up.

So that is a fundamental issue of Islam.
Having an illiterate prophet ensures the god's word for the Koran.

I would like to see who and where Muhammad is shown to be even a little literate?

I guess one can infer that as he sued to help his wife Khadija's business transactions and needed to know accounts atleast!

brihaspati · Post by **brihaspati** » 08 Aug 2013 01:48

ramana wrote:Err bji, If Muhaamad is shown to be literate then the god dic tated status of Koran goes for toss for Muhammad could have made it up.

So that is a fundamental issue of Islam.
Having an illiterate prophet ensures the god's word for the Koran.

I would like to see who and where Muhammad is shown to be even a little literate?

I guess one can infer that as he sued to help his wife Khadija's business transactions and needed to know accounts atleast!

ramana ji,
it comes from direct reference in Qureshi Arabic - which is the language of the Quran - to reading and writing, and was long a subject of hot dispute by some. This is the story of the first revelations and the Miraj. The words iqra and iktatabaha are the keys.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 09 Aug 2013 14:10

This is why the dialectic among subcontinental Muslims is basically between Aurangzeb and Akbar. Or theologically between Sirhindi (Imam Rabbani) and a form of religion that comes close to Sikhi.

The problem is that those who lean towards Akbar cannot go beyond that into Indian civilization. They believe what we know of India today was wholly recreated during Islamic rule and it is never possible to know what it was like before. Thus, the MJ Akbars, the Saeed Naqvis, the Salman Khurshids, etc. are non-Paki moderate model Indian Muslims in the sense that they like Akbar more than Aurangzeb. They want Akbar's India.

X-post from TSP thread:

Peregrine wrote:A distortion of History in respect of Muslim Rule & Rulers in India :

Past present : Letters of discontent - MUBARAK ALI

Throughout the Muslim rule in the subcontinent, from the Sultanate period to the Mughal rule, the views of the ulema contradicted those of the rulers. Despite state policies being in contradiction to religion according to the ulema, the rulers did not permit them to interfere with the state.

During Akbar’s rule, the ulema disapproved of his policy of sulh-i-kul or peace with all. When Mullah Mohammed Yazdi issued a fatwa, several disgruntled nobles and the ulema rebelled against Akbar who dealt with it in a diplomatic manner. He cancelled the maddad-i-ma’ash jagirs belonging to the ulema, only to reallocate them after interviewing the ulema and confirming their loyalty. He also appointed bureaucrats to supervise their conduct, so that in case of misconduct they could be reprimanded. He then continued with his policy undeterred.

During the reign of Jahangir, a religious scholar, Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624) wanted to convince Jahangir to change Akbar’s policy towards non-Muslims. He tried to influence the nobles to help fulfil his ambitions and wrote letters to them, expressing his fanatical ideas.

In a letter to Shaikh Farid, a devout Muslim who had supported Jahangir’s succession to the throne against his eldest son Khusrau, Sirhindi wrote that Islam was in critical condition, and insisted that as a man of faith, it was Shaikh Farid’s responsibility to take action to revive the glory of Islam. In the same letter he expressed his pleasure on the assassination of Guru Arjan Dev, the fifth Sikh Guru, regarding it an admirable step. He further explained that the government should adopt a policy to humiliate Hindus and that the imposition of jizya rightly kept the infidels in a state of subordination. According to Sirhindi, this was the right time to convince the emperor to eliminate un-Islamic practices which had become a part of the Muslim culture and to eliminate the influence of the infidels. He appealed to Shaikh Farid to play a role in reviving the purity of Islam. If no action was taken and idolatry continued to flourish, the emperor and his nobles would be responsible for damaging the cause of Islam by not creating a consciousness about sharia among the Muslims.

He wrote another letter to Aziz Khan Kuka, Akbar’s foster brother and opposed Akbar’s religious views. In the war of succession, Sirhindi supported Prince Khusrau against Jahangir, yet retained an important position at the court. In his letter, Sirhindi lamented that the forces of Islam were becoming weaker and at this juncture, his contribution would help annihilate irreligious practices and innovations which were influencing the Muslims. He also said that Islam could only be purified by reverting to its original teachings.

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi wanted to destroy Akbar’s diplomatic relations with the Hindus. In one of his letters addressed to Lala Beg, he expressed his views that sacrifice of the cow was an Islamic rite.

However, the majority of the ulema and people remained estranged from his movement. Jahangir continued with Akbar’s policy and was a great admirer of his father. In Tuzk-i-Jahangiri, he praised Akbar’s wisdom and sagacity.

Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi was not popular among the Muslims because of his extremist religious views. When Jahangir summoned him to his court, he found him arrogant and rude and did not hesitate to send him to the fort of Gwalior for a brief period of imprisonment.

During the emergence of communalisn in the 1930s, Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi was resurrected by some ulema and projected as the champion of Islam. In Pakistani historiography, I.H. Qureshi and S.M. Ikram eulogised him as the defender of Islam and the man who saved it and protected it from the heretical views of Akbar.

Writers of history textbooks portrayed the same image. As a result, Akbar and his policy of sulh-i-kul, multi-cultural unity and secularism were condemned while Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi’s orthodoxy and religious extremism were appreciated. Sadly, his anti-Hindu, and anti-Shia views are also accepted without criticism, totally negating their dire impact on society today. Today, Pakistani society is paying a heavy price for these misdemeanours.

Cheers

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 13 Aug 2013 00:02

Jo Lahore Mey G,,u Woh Amreeka Mai Bhi G..Du

Planned ‘Million Muslim March’ Set for Sept. 11, 2013
-By Warner Todd Huston

In an effort to stick their finger in America’s eye, a Muslim group is planning a “million Muslim march” on the very day their cohorts murdered over 3,000 Americans in 2001. This is called gall.The march is being planned by the American Muslim Political Action Committee (AMPAC) and is to be held on September 11, 2013 in Washington D.C. The march is meant to “demand that our civil rights be protected by our government.”To say their rights haven’t been protected is, of course, an absurd claim. Muslims in the USA are not being systematically denied their “civil rights.” Any claims that Muslims are being oppressed in the U.S. is a laughable fiction.On its website, the group is “demanding” that Obama bow to their wishes.“We are demanding that laws be enacted protecting our 1st amendment,” AMPAC says. “We are asking President Obama to fulfill his promise from his first campaign for Presidency of a transparent government. Lastly we are asking for the release of the 9/11 commission report to the American people.”

What the group says next is as if something from the Onion:

On 9.11.01 our country was forever changed by the horrific events in New York. The entire country was victimized by the acts done on that day. Muslim and Non Muslim alike were traumatized but we as Muslims continue 12 years later to be victimized by being made the villains. To this day every media outlet and anti Islamic organization has committed slanderous and libel statements against us as Muslims and our religion of Islam.

Yet our Government either sits idly by and does nothing to protect our freedoms or it exacerbates the problem with its constant war on terrorism in Islamic countries, congressional hearings on Islam in America, and its changes to the NDAA law. This is like the criminal who after being arrested for murder is upset at being called a murderer.First of all, the U.S. media has bent over backwards not to do what Muslims abroad do and treat them as an evil that needs to be eliminated from the face of the earth. Most U.S. media outlets won’t use the word “terrorism,” refuse to call Islamists what they are, and won’t characterize their terrorism as evil in any way. So, for this group to claim that the media has “libeled” them is simply a false statement.Muslims have not been victimized in the USA nor were they “traumatized” by the terror created on 9/11/01. In fact, around the world Muslims are quite supportive of Islamic terror and the goals terrorists want to achieve if not the means they use to achieve them./b]
Further, FBI hate crime stats reveal that very few Muslims have been hit with crime or abuse in this country in the years after 9/11/01. As a point of truth, it is Jews that still face a much, much higher rate of racist/anti-religious crimes.Now, are there some Americans who hate Muslims? In a nation of over 300 million, of course you can find a few. But is there systematic oppression of Muslims and are they being denied civil rights? Not in the least. They are as free as anyone. Maybe more so.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 15 Aug 2013 00:24

Notice in Sunday Guardian:

10
September 2012

Muslims in Indian Cities: Trajectories of Marginalization
6 PM at Teen Murti Auditorium

Book launch of 'Muslims in Indian Cities. Trajectories of Marginalization' by by Prof. Christophe Jaffrelot and Dr. Laurent Gayer. Dr. Hamid M. Ansari, Vice President of India, will be the Chief Guest and he will deliver the keynote address.

Whats wrong with this picture?

Two French authors write about Indian Muslims marginalization in Indian cities(What about Paris with its anti-Muslim riots) and the Indian Vice President who is an Indian Muslim (obviously not a victim of urban marginalization!) will deliver keynote address!!!!

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 15 Aug 2013 08:49

http://blogs.tribune.com.pk/story/18011 ... an-learnt/
Gandhi’s forgotten sacrifice: A lesson neither India nor Pakistan learnt

True, Gandhi was deeply disappointed with the unhelpful attitude of the Hindus, but, he was equally hurt by the callousness of the Muslims. ‘India’s Iron Man’, the biography of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel by Balraj Krishna, offers a vivid account of how Gandhi perceived Muslims’ apathy towards him and how he resented their uncooperative attitude. He seldom made his grievances against the Muslims public though, lest he should be misconstrued.In the quiet, uncontaminated climate of the Yervada jail in 1932, and in the company of his most trusted colleagues including Sardar Patel, Gandhi, for the first time, revealed how much ‘sorrow and pain’ were caused to him by the Muslims’ attitude towards him in the Kohat communal rioting and at the 1931 Round Table Conference in London. In a depressed vein, Gandhi said,“Whom should I tell the insults I have borne on behalf of the Muslims? For their sake I have drunk bitter cups of sorrow.”
One day while reading an Urdu school textbook, Gandhi admitted,
“The book pours out maximum poison. It was prescribed by the government as a textbook before the Hindu-Muslim conflict began; and today’s Muslim youth has been brought up on such books.”On another occasion Gandhi referred to a fourth standard Urdu primer of Lahore’s Anjuman-i-Himayat, and regretfully observed,“The reading of this book makes one sad. It appears the Muslim children are taught violence and bloodshed from their childhood.”

Gandhi told Patel and Mahadev Desai one day,
“Iqbal’s opposition to (single) nationhood is shared by many Muslims. Some speak out; others don’t. Iqbal now repudiates his ‘Sare Jahan Se Acchha Hindustan Hamara’ song.”On another day, Gandhi asked Mahadev Desai to draw Patel’s attention to the distorted version of the same song in a government school textbook in Urdu. The song propagated Pan-Islamism, and its first two lines read:“China, Arab hamara, Hindustan hamara; Muslim hain hum, watan hai sara jahan hamara.”(From China to Arabia, the whole territory is ours; India is ours; we are Muslims , and the whole world is ours.)
Gandhi in a melancholic vein commented,
“The Muslim boys are brought up on such education. The book hasn’t a single lesson which should teach the Muslim boys that this country is theirs and they should take pride in her. Not only that. As a result, the Muslims have developed enmity with others.”
Gandhi’s regret was that all this was happening despite what he had done or undergone for the sake of Hindu-Muslim unity. Who can forget his heroic fast unto death, held to save the lives of those thousands of Muslims who were sitting ducks in Calcutta amidst the ongoing communal frenzy, in a wretched hovel at the city’s Beliaghata Road in August, 1947? Who can forget his last fast unto death in Delhi, after the cataclysmic partition, held to protect the lives of those vulnerable Muslims who had become refugees in their own country, and to ensure that ‘Pakistan gets its due share’?Gandhi led the Khilafat agitation, boldly bearing attacks from senior Congress leaders, Hindu leaders and the saintly Britisher, CF Andrews. And it was at the Round Table Conference, which could have provided India with an opportunity to gain independence in 1931, that Gandhi met his Waterloo at the hands of the Muslims. Maulana Shaukat Ali had told the American journalist William Shirer:
“If the Hindus don’t meet our demands this time, we’re going to make war on them. We ruled the Hindus once. At least we don’t intend to be ruled by them now.”This was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. Gandhi had to admit to ‘an inglorious end’ to his years of labours. According to Shirer,
“This failure, as Gandhi often said, was the greatest cross he ever bore.”
One day Patel ruefully asked Gandhi:
“Are there any Muslims who will listen to you?”
The truth is nobody, nobody paid heed to Gandhi, neither Hindus nor Muslims. Yes, he was let down by all of us; we deserted him whilst the forsaken Mahatma fought alone for peace.It’s a pity that 66 years since independence we have not learned our lessons yet. It’s a pity that we are allowing his sacrifice to go waste.

Anand K · Post by **Anand K** » 15 Aug 2013 14:07

These posts on embellishments of Muhammad's early life got me thinking:-

Max Weber has written about "Charismatic Authority" and other scientists/shrinks have written about the narcissism-incubation-awakening-ityadi steps.... and the possibility of (a degree of) insanity and/or exposure to harsh climates. I vaguely remember a parallel made between the desert messiahs/prophets and a couple of fully unhinged Eskimo shamans.

Apparently the popular stories of pre-prophethood Muhammad shows him as a quiet, rather worldly and stable person..... with pedigree, a regular job and a wife. The usual pre-prophethood symptoms or odd instances don't seem to apply. Once the prophethood period starts the development and sophistication seems unbelievably rapid.... stratospheric considering the region and the times. In fact, many have debated how he in effect created a new tribe of Islam led by a unique/infallible/word-of-God leader and news laws of solidarity in a Bedouin society which was not prone to charismatic priests or leadership or monarchs. Centuries ago Ibn Khaldun had hypothesized that the human nature to seek solace in numbers is overpowering. It had led even the uncouth Bedouins to literally islam themselves to the new tribe of Islam because of heady mix of charismatic prophet-giri and rebooted old (true) religion for the final time. The new tribe accepted any man, woman or slave from any background in a time when being accepted into a village/tribe/clan was a difficult affair. He noted, IIRC, that this kind of leader is thrown up all the time but it is the local situation (and the quality of the person) which makes him a God or a Prophet.
Weber and other sociologists note that the string of victories (and even the reversal at Uhud) in Muhammad's lifetime cemented the claim of divine grace. After his death the Ridda Wars sealed all doubts..... the seemingly miraculous victories against Byzantines and Sassanians and the individual chelas made the belief eve stronger. In fact, the next couple of centuries also saw them expanding all over the world.... reinforcing Islam even more. Even the defeats seemed to be foretold, like the failed first campaigns to conquer Byzantium.

All prophets, founders of religions etc have legends associated with their pre-mission life and in these legends all of them have some sort of supernatural power or extra-ordinary experiences. Buddha, Mises, Moses, Jesus, the old Prophets, Joseph Smith... ALL of them. It is quite possible these were later, sincere fabrications.

But I find it strange that such an attempt was not made on Muhammad's early life. Maybe it was not necessary because of the core nature of the new religion... and this is where the subtle and key differences with Judaism and Christianity and the sociology aspects come in. One can imagine the Salafists/Wahhabis merrily razing the Hira Cave and even bulldozing the grave of Muhammad (which they promise to do soon) but you can't expect even the craziest EvanJehadi to even cast a dirty glance at the Church of the Nativity.
Even in Muslim religious scriptures we have things like Satanic Verses (which goes into the core of Prophethood), marriage with Zainab and Aisha's sass, Khalid ibn Walid and the die hard Goddess, Laila emerging from the stone, Nasikh-Mansukh contradictions and Hudaibiya and cleansing of the Jews etc which could have been purged for good. Like the constant revisions of the Bible..... my favorite apocrypha being St Peter and Simon Magus going all Mortal Kombat and the awesome talking dog... and the well known Virgin Birth episode. However, the focus is on how simple and respected and wise (despite being unlettered) Muhammed was before his mission began and how even tall leaders like Abu Bakr and Hamzah and Omar (and Quraish princes such as Abu Ubaidah) wondered how an illiterate person could produce verse such as this.
Long and short of it, IMO if there is embellishment, it is on these lines...... on the centrality of the revealed verse through a living vessel (and hence enhancing his skills), who must be emulated in all respects for best results and all that.

JM2c

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 15 Aug 2013 23:25

Anand K wrote:Apparently the popular stories of pre-prophethood Muhammad shows him as a quiet, rather worldly and stable person..... with pedigree, a regular job and a wife. The usual pre-prophethood symptoms or odd instances don't seem to apply.
...
All prophets, founders of religions etc have legends associated with their pre-mission life and in these legends all of them have some sort of supernatural power or extra-ordinary experiences. [...] But I find it strange that such an attempt was not made on Muhammad's early life.

There are several narrations about extraordinary experiences in Muhammad's (pbuh) pre-Prophethood life.

It is said he was a delicate boy, who sometimes had what seemed like epileptic fits and swooned. Once when he was a youth, the whole town was engaged in a grand project to re-build and fortify the Ka'abah. He was volunteering to lay some bricks. It is said that, for the sake of efficiency, someone asked him to lift his robe and tie it above his knees, exposing part of the thighs as well (the way lungi-wearing people sometimes do). But being a chosen one, modesty was supposedly inherent in his personality. Thus, although he obeyed and lifted his garment, when he did so, he supposedly saw a chastising angel and swooned.

Another incident that comes to mind was that one time when he passed out, he said that two angels came and cut open his torso, took out his heart, removed a black clot that was in it, washed the heart with snow, and put the purified heart back in. They performed this surgical operation from the back. Thus, there was a signature mark on his back - the same one that Salman (Ruzbeh) the Persian used to identify him as a Prophet, as foretold by Bahirah the Christian monk.

Etc, etc. There are other such stories about his qualities and extraordinary experiences before his prophetic career began.

Anand K wrote:Weber and other sociologists note that the string of victories (and even the reversal at Uhud) in Muhammad's lifetime cemented the claim of divine grace. After his death the Ridda Wars sealed all doubts..... the seemingly miraculous victories against Byzantines and Sassanians and the individual chelas made the belief eve stronger. In fact, the next couple of centuries also saw them expanding all over the world.... reinforcing Islam even more. Even the defeats seemed to be foretold, like the failed first campaigns to conquer Byzantium.

For the conquered and converted peoples (Iranians, Pakis, and other Arabized people in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, N. Africa, etc.), a similar "logic" applies. The stunning collapse and brutal humiliation their ancestors experienced under the Islamist invasion is, to them, a sign of a chastisement from God. Thus, even though many Iranians or Pakis may find out about and cherish their pre-Islamic culture, they will not dare leave the current God-ordained dispensation, which must obviously be Islam.

Anand K · Post by **Anand K** » 16 Aug 2013 13:47

Agnimitra wrote:There are several narrations about extraordinary experiences in Muhammad's (pbuh) pre-Prophethood life....

I had the impression this sort of thing was....... fringe and not accepted by the mainstream Salafists/Wahabists and their predecessors. Any miracle they acknowledge is after the "commission" from Gabriel. AFAIK the really fantastic stuff (like all the wives and mothers of the previous prophets Doula-ing Muhammad's birth, born without foreskin, the first shahadah, fall of the Sassanid palaces and extinguishing of the ancient Magi fires at the moment of the birth, the weeping date palm etc) are not a part of the general narrative.... not even with the Shias who like this sort of thing.
In fact I remember from certain biographies that such hadiths are jahil hadith. They say the "splitting of the chest" was a deliberate mistranslation of a surah about Gabriel saying "have we not opened your heart and dissipated the burden within" (i.e.e cleared your doubts about your suitability for the mission). The cleansing of the Devil's stain had roots in original sin, baptism and holy ghost jahil/kufr fundae. They contend that there was no need of such divine surgery and miracles and the "pure, sensitive and humane" nature of Muhammad alone made him the chosen one. That is, the "sakinah" was an innate nature..... it was not a surgical implant.
They also point out that author mentions that he got this from a source who quoted another source, which he believes to be authoritative source (who was not a Sahaba IIRC and quoted one of the original followers). This authority was a major source for Bukhari as well. Yeah, that old centuries old fight of which Hadith is the true one and if X or Y or Z should be believed.
Then there are the rational explanation type stories about Ethiopian child abductors who carried away Arab children making a go at the child and Halimah trying to get rid of an epileptic orphan etc etc.

Anyway, got to think about this a little more. The hardcore seem to have a problem with pre-mission miracles.... even the early adventure mythos of characters such as Ali and Hamzah. Methinks the notion that he was divine from birth and all that introduces elements of confusion and contradiction with the main narrative. BTW, I am trying to find out the origin of the idea of physical signs of prophethood...... that "Bahirah consulting his scripture to confirm prophethood" is interesting.

PS: The Angel and the lungi knot thing was new!

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 16 Aug 2013 16:19

Anand K ji, good points.

Anand K wrote:I had the impression this sort of thing was....... fringe and not accepted by the mainstream Salafists/Wahabists and their predecessors.

Salafists/Wahabists are not historically and sociologically "mainstream". They are a significant section, but a very vocal and currently extremely powerful section that is getting even more powerful. But even in the subcontinent, until fairly recently the Barelvis were more mainstream than even the Deobandis in terms of sheer numbers. Needless to say, those Islamists who have any affiliation with most Sufi tariqats such as Naqshbandi do encourage tales of all such extraordinary stuff among the mango abduls.

Essential point - You are right that there is a sort of prominent "angel of death" aspect of Islam that pretends to destroy all "traditions", "superstitions", "faith fetishes" and "idolization", and in that sense it lends itself to the Wahabi/Salafist group's ideology which has a long historical tradition within Islam. They claim to be epistemic realists. HOWEVER, at the core of Islam is an undeniable blind faith in a magical realism. Whether it is the Mi'raj, or any other miraculous apparitions and sonic revelations. Thus, there is a sort of split personality built in.

But given that the Wahabi/Salafi ideology is gaining much wider prominence, I should read up more on their versions. I usually hang out with Islamists of a different type - those aligned with Sufi tariqats, etc.

One can see the same thing in the split between Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism, too - where the former derides the mythologies of the latter. In Hinduism, a lot of the confusion can be overcome if people took a pan-deterministic 6-darshana view of reality. Other "religions" don't have that comprehensive 6-darshana perspective in their resource kit.

Baikul · Post by **Baikul** » 16 Aug 2013 21:23

Agnimitra wrote:............
There are several narrations about extraordinary experiences in Muhammad's (pbuh) pre-Prophethood life.

It is said he was a delicate boy, who sometimes had what seemed like epileptic fits and swooned. Once when he was a youth, the whole town was engaged in a grand project to re-build and fortify the Ka'abah. He was volunteering to lay some bricks. It is said that, for the sake of efficiency, someone asked him to lift his robe and tie it above his knees, exposing part of the thighs as well (the way lungi-wearing people sometimes do). But being a chosen one, modesty was supposedly inherent in his personality. Thus, although he obeyed and lifted his garment, when he did so, he supposedly saw a chastising angel and swooned.
..........

That's one way to get out of doing manual labour.....

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 18 Aug 2013 03:00

^^^ Na na Baikul ji, the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) was an enthusiastic volunteer for the Ka'abah rebuilding project as a youth. There was a millennarian spirit in the air at that time, everybody was talking about it. As a young man he absorbed this spirit. Also, a tribe from the Horn of Africa had supposedly invaded and tried to destroy the Ka'abah, but the folktale says that a flock of strange birds appeared in the sky from nowhere, each one carrying a payload of one or two big rocks in their talons, which they dropped on the invading Africans and thus repulsed the attack on the Ka'abah. The Prophet had heard this story also as a youth, something that had happened only recently. It finds mention in the Qur'an also. Thus, as a youth he was deeply affected by the religious and supernatural revivalist events and spirit that was in the air. He was an enthusiastic volunteer, an avid listener of different religious discussions, etc.

Later in his prophetic career, within the Islamic community, dignity of manual labour was given a high priority. Even as an aged Prophet, he contributed physical labour to building activities in Medina. They would all be carrying bricks, and he was part of that physical activity, and they would all be singing and chanting while doing so.

Doing one's own physical menial tasks oneself was also emphasized. This self-reliance is called istighna. As an example, a venerated (by Sunnis, but despised by Shi'as) commander like Abu Bakr was on his horse before battle one time, and his sword fell down. A soldier standing by was about to bend down and pick it up for him but he stopped him, got off his horse, and picked it up himself. That's an example of istighna. Istighna means showing contempt for outside help, etc., disdain; independence, showing ability to do without.; to show independence; to disdain to receive service from others.

In that incident, the youth Muhammad had fainted during the shramadaan when he raised his robe above his knees only out of acute embarrassment, which the apparition instilled in him.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 28 Aug 2013 01:28

The Muslim Brotherhood: Origins, Efficacy, and Reach

by Raymond Ibrahim
World Watch Monitor
July 4, 2013

http://www.meforum.org/3596/muslim-brotherhood-origins
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Be the first of your friends to like this.

Note: The following essay, commissioned and written nearly a year ago but only recently published, has, in light of the June 30 Revolution and ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, been slightly updated with additional bracketed text.

The Muslim Brotherhood is the most important Islamic organization in the world, with tentacles of influence everywhere, both in the Islamic world but also in the West, wherever its purpose—the establishment of a Sharia-enforcing caliphate—can be achieved. The efficacy of this group can be seen in the fact that, less than a century ago, when it was founded, it consisted of very few members; it was violent and eventually crushed and outlawed; today in Egypt, a MB leader, Muhammad Morsi, sits on the throne of the Middle East's most strategic nation, ironically in the name of democracy, where he is trying to enable the totality of Sharia law in Egypt, even as
many resist.
History and Approach

The story of the Muslim Brotherhood, as with many other stories dealing with Islamic importance, begins in Egypt—which still serves as something of a paradigm of the group's strategies and approach in general. Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), the son of a mosque imam
and Sheikh of the Hanbali school of law, founded the Muslim Brotherhood. Hassan incorporated Sufi views, which tend to be more moderate and which teach, among other things, pragmatism and patience. Of course, in an Islamic context pragmatism and patience can easily take on the form of taqiyya and tawriya—Islamic doctrines that instruct Muslims to deceive when it is perceived to be in Islam's interest—and may well explain how Banna came to develop the Muslim Brotherhood's way of operating, to be discussed further below.

A school teacher and imam, Banna was reportedly very charismatic and pivotal to the subsequent growth of the movement, which, when he started it in 1922, consisted of only a handful of members but had burgeoned to half a million in as little as little as ten years. Banna did one thing that not only gave rise and prominence to the Muslim Brotherhood, but all Islamist organizations as well—including al-Qaeda, which is currently headed by Ayman Zawahiri, a onetime Muslim Brotherhood member: he helped politicize Islam at a time when it was seen at best as a personal matter, in much the same way modern-day Westerners view religion.

To understand this, one must understand the history of the Middle East. A few centuries after the chaotic times of the Islamic conquests, Islamic law, or Sharia (etymologically related to the words meaning "way" and "road") was developed and held sway over Islamic lands, in this case Egypt for centuries. Thus, in this sense, Islam, from a historical point of view, has in fact wholly permeated the politics of Islamic law. For example, courts were all ruled according to Sharia dictates; the caliph, again, according to Sharia, was obligated to wage war, or jihad, on his non-Muslim neighbors; and so forth.

However, a new thing happened in 1798: a Frenchman—an infidel, Napoleon—invaded and conquered Egypt. This heralded a new paradigm—that the infidel West (then and often now seen as Christendom) was stronger, and thus better, than the Islamic world. To appreciate this idea fully, one must first understand that, since the time of the Muslim prophet Muhammad, the veracity of Islam and its Sharia have been tied to its temporal success, its ability to aggrandize and enrich its followers with land and warbooty, including slaves.

When Muhammad was just a "prophet" preaching to the Arabs, he spent a decade with nothing but a handful of followers. But when he styled himself as a warlord, attacking and plundering those who did not accept him as prophet, and thereby acquiring many victories and even more war booty for his growing number of followers, Arabians acquiesced to him and his message. Thus, from the start, the veracity of the prophet was tied to his military and temporal successes. The Islamic conquests, whereby Islam's invading armies conquered much of the Old World—from India in the east to Spain in the west—were especial proof that the Islamic way, the Sharia,
was the right way. The West's conquest and subsequent colonization shook this paradigm to its core, causing the majority of nominal Muslims to turn to the West and essentially westernize.

Accordingly, in the colonial era, and even when Muslims ruled Egypt, lots of reforms were made, the jizya was abolished, and political Islam lost its influence. Even if Islam was given formal respect, no self-respecting Egyptian would invoke the Sharia as a way to govern people; they adopted and promoted Western forms—in governance, politics, and even dress and culture. In early 20th century Egypt, especially in the cities, the hijab, or female veil, was a rare oddity. Today it is ubiquitous.

To appreciate this great change, consider the following anecdote. A rare video shows President Gamel Abdel Nasser speaking before a large assembly, and explaining to them how back in 1953 he wanted to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood, and met with its leader. According to Nasser, the very first demand of the Brotherhood leader was for the hijab to return to Egypt, "for every woman walking in the street to wear a headscarf." The audience erupted in laughter at this, then, ludicrous demand; one person hollered "Let him wear it!" eliciting more laughter and applause. Nasser continued by saying he told the Brotherhood leader that if they enforced the
hijab, people would say Egypt had returned to the dark ages (to more laughter), adding that Egyptians should uphold such matters in the privacy of their own homes.

Such was the Egypt that Banna and others inherited. To overcome nearly two centuries of westernization, whereby most Egyptians knew little more about Islam than the five pillars, if that, Banna politicized Islam, making it as it once was. However, he and his followers eventually realized that their message would only resonate if: 1) they took a grass-roots approach to mobilizing Muslims—an approach which inevitably took longer, in this case decades, almost a century, but which as we are seeing has yielded great fruit, and 2) they instituted activism and propaganda, which eventually led to a complex, multi-layered organization, with members from
all walks of life, from peasants to professionals . The Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of pre-existing Islamic organizations—politicizing them, Islamizing them, and mobilizing them. Accordingly, many businesses, schools, and other organizations became attached to the Brotherhood, either formally or informally, as they continue to do to this day. Decades of this further fueled by the group's humanitarian work with laypeople, led to an immense sense of loyalty to the group and always attracted new recruits.

No matter how humanitarian or social, Banna's message, and the Brotherhood's, was/is always couched in Islamic terms. Whether talking about colonialism, health-related issues, education, or nationalism, everything was articulated through an Islamic framework, subtly re-Islamizing the average Egyptian's worldview. Major themes always hammered out included the loss of the caliphate, the weakness of the fragmented Islamic world, and the need to revive the caliphate and enforce Sharia law—the Islamic "way," which was and is always portrayed as the supreme guide to justice and fair dealing.

It is significant to note that, though several General Guides of the Muslim Brotherhood have come and gone since Banna, the latter's overall strategy and tactics have generally remained fixed, depending on the vicissitudes of the times, and the MB's capacities and position vis-à-vis its opponents. To be sure, and perhaps inevitably, the MB, once it became relatively powerful, did engage in terror attacks, especially against the Nasser government, and ended up being outlawed. Banna himself was killed by government forces in 1949.

Due to its popularity, the MB was briefly legalized again, but only as a religious organization, and then banned again in 1954 due to its non-stop insistence that Egypt be governed under Sharia. Egyptian officials were assassinated, with attempts on Nasser's life as well. The government retaliated swiftly, outlawing the group, imprisoning and torturing thousands of members, while others fled to sympathetic nations, especially Wahhabi Saudi Arabia.

A few of the greatest MB leaders and agitators were also executed at this time. One member who was executed under Gamal in 1966 is of special note: Sayyid Qutb—today known as the "godfather" of modern Islamism. Perhaps no figure has impacted the modern Islamist movement as this man, who wrote prolifically and voluminously especially during his incarceration, producing two "classics" that are today still staples of any serious Islamist or jihadi: (in translation) In the Shade of the Quran (a multi-volume exegesis) and Sign Posts, a short primer that very well captures the phase-by-phase approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, the need to use both prudence and act only according to the reality on the ground, the chances of success. While Qutb stressed the need for stages, he also popularized the jihadi movement by arguing that the Islamic world was not sufficiently Islamic and thus needed a jihadi vanguard to overthrow jahiliyya, or the pre-Islamic state of ignorance the Muslim world was currently in.

According to the 9/11 Commission Report, "Three basic themes emerge from Qutb's writings. First, he claimed that the world was beset with barbarism, licentiousness, and unbelief (a condition he called jahiliyya, the religious term for the period of ignorance prior to the revelations given to the prophet Mohammed). Qutb argued that humans can choose only between Islam and jahiliyya. Second, he warned that more people, including Muslims, were attracted to jahiliyya and its material comforts than to his view of Islam; jahiliyya could therefore triumph over Islam. Third, no middle ground exists in what Qutb conceived as a struggle between God and Satan. All Muslims—as he defined them—therefore must take up arms in this fight. Any Muslim who rejects his ideas is just one more nonbeliever worthy of destruction."

The influence of the Muslim Brotherhood's Qutb's writings cannot be underestimated, as they are quoted regularly by modern-day Islamists. Even al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri regularly quotes Qutb in his writings. Due to Qutb's popularity with terrorists, the Brotherhood's leadership eventually distanced itself from him, openly advocating instead a nonviolent "reformist" strategy from within, which it has followed ever since. [Until the popular June 30, 2013 revolution that overthrew President Morsi, which prompted the Brotherhood to openly engage in violence and terror, seeing they had been exposed and have nothing to lose.]

Due to the popularity of the MB—those many decades of cultivating Egyptian society were not for nothing—Nasser's successor, Anwar al-Sadat, released a great many of their number from the prisons and promised to institute Sharia in Egypt, leading to the introduction of the Second Article of the Egyptian Constitution, which made Islamic law (Sharia) the principal source of jurisprudence. (Ironically it is this matter concerning the Constitution and how Islamic it will be that has created a major rift in Egyptian society today, with Muslim Brotherhood President Muhammad Morsi—and all Islamist factions—pushing for an even greater role for Islam, and portraying as "infidels" and "apostates" all who would resist.)

Even so, Sadat's gesture to Sharia was not enough: after he signed a peace treaty with Israel, the Brotherhood and other Islamic groups constantly agitated against him and he was shortly thereafter assassinated in 1981. In the Mubarak era the group was once again formally outlawed even as independent members were allowed in parliament. But both containment and appeasement were too late: the revivalist spirit of Islam was in the air; banning or arresting individuals was not enough.

Accordingly, after nearly a century of Islamic activism and propaganda by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian worldview that for some generations had been emulating the West as the path to success has diminished by degrees, decade after decade, slowly becoming more Islamic in orientation. With the 2011 revolt in Egypt, which started with moderates and secularists seeking true democracy, all Islamists were released from the prisons—including Egypt's current [now deposed] president—and they now dominate the life of the nation. For the first time, then, not only is the Brotherhood fueling society from a grass-roots level, but from a top-down approach.
Goals, Objectives, and Other Islamists

What is the ultimate goal of the Muslim Brotherhood? Although many Islamic groups have developed since the inception of the MB, many of them born of it. Equally significant, by and large, all Sunni Islamic organizations—including al-Qaeda and the Taliban—want the same thing the Brotherhood does: a Sharia-enforcing caliphate. They differ primarily on how this goal is to be achieved.

Consider the MB's slogan: "Allah is our objective; the Quran is our law; the Prophet is our leader; Jihad is our way; and death for the sake of Allah is the highest of our aspirations."

This credo represents a statement that even the most radical, jihadi Muslim would embrace, for it captures all the essentials of radical and jihadi Islam, the sort of Islam practiced by terrorist organizations. Similarly, the Brotherhood's English language website describes the "principles of the Muslim Brotherhood" as including firstly the introduction of the Islamic Sharia as "the basis for controlling the affairs of state and society"; and secondly working to unify "Islamic countries and states, mainly among the Arab states, and liberating them from foreign imperialism." In other words, working to unite the Muslim world under a caliphate which it still openly insists is its
ultimate goal. Indeed, not too long ago, Muhammad Badie, the current General Guide of the Brotherhood [arrested August 19, 2013], openly declared that "The Imam [Bana] delineated transitional goals and detailed methods to achieve this greatest objective, starting by reforming the individual, followed by building the family, the society, the government, and then a rightly guided caliphate and finally mastership of the world."

This idea of "transitional goals" and objectives for every stage is captured very well by the Brotherhood's vision and is very easily captured by the one word that appears under the Muslim Brotherhood banner of two swords crossed over the Koran, "prepare"—a word taken from Koran 8:60: "And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrorize the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged."

In short, the Muslim Brotherhood is dedicated to preparing the way for the coming of the caliphate—which, if history is any indicator, is much more problematic than any one, single Islamic state or terrorist organization: all Islamic conquests of non-Muslim, mostly Christian lands occurred under caliphates, including the Umayyad, Abbasid, and of course, the Turkish
Ottoman State.

Having explored some of the history and doctrines of the Muslim Brotherhood, some relevant questions are in order. First, comprehending the motives of the Muslim Brotherhood continues to be difficult for people in the West, whose epistemology for centuries has always separated the realm of religion from the realm of politics. Is the Muslim Brotherhood a political group, or is it a religious group? Such questions plague the West. The fact is, it is both—for in Islam, historically and doctrinally, Islam is politics. The word "sharia" simply means "way", that is, the Islamic way of conducting affairs. It governs every aspect of the believer's life (in Islam, all possible acts are classified according to five categories: obligatory, recommended, permissible, not recommended, and forbidden). Muslim authorities are deemed legitimate or illegitimate based primarily on whether they enforce Sharia on society or not. In fact, this has historically been the grievance that the various Islamist and jihadi groups—beginning with the Brotherhood—have had against the ruling governments and regimes of their respective nations—that they have not been enforcing Sharia law in society.

It bears repeating: the overarching goal of all Islamist and jihadi groups the world over is the establishment of "Allah's rule" on earth. From its inception, this has also been the Muslim Brotherhood's goal—hence the reason it is heavily involved in politics. The primary disagreement more violent Islamists and jihadis have with the Brotherhood has to do with tactics—not the overall vision which they all share: establishment, enforcement, and then spread of Sharia law. Jihadis have long argued that, by (at least formally) disavowing violence—that is, jihad—and instead participating in politics in order to achieve power and implement Sharia, the Muslim Brotherhood has betrayed the call to jihad. For instance, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda, was also a former Muslim Brotherhood member when he was fifteenyears old. However, he was soon lured by the call to jihad, abandoned the group, and joined more radical groups in Egypt, including Al-Gam'a Al-Islamiyya (the "Islamic Group") and Islamic Jihad.

Ayman al-Zawahiri is an interesting case in point concerning the tactics of the Brotherhood and its detractors. Many years after he quit the Brotherhood in the late 1960s when he was a teenager, Zawahiri wrote an entire book criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood. Titled Al Hissad Al Murr, or "The Bitter Harvest", Zawahiri argued that the Brotherhood "takes advantage of the Muslim youths' fervor by bringing them into the fold only to store them in a refrigerator. Then, they steer their one-time passionate, Islamic zeal for jihad to conferences and elections…. And not only have the Brothers been idle from fulfilling their duty of fighting to the death, but they have gone as far as to describe the infidel governments as legitimate, and have joined ranks with them in the ignorant style of governing, that is, democracies, elections, and parliaments."

Ironically, however, for all his scathing remarks against them, time has revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy of slowly infiltrating society by a grass-roots approach has been much more effective than Zawahiri's and al-Qaeda's jihadi terror [until, that is, fellow Egyptians and Muslims saw them for what they were and overthrew them; in the West, however, subtle infiltration still works better than terrorism and is still the preferred strategy]. The Brotherhood's patience and perseverance, by playing the political game, co-opting Western language and paradigms, formally disavowing violence and jihad, have turned it into a legitimate player in the eyes of many, to the point that the U.S. government has become supportive of it, even though it was once banned. Yet this does not make the Brotherhood's goals any less troubling. For instance, in July 2012, Safwat Hegazy, a popular preacher and Brotherhood member [since arrested for incitement to terrorism], boasted that the Brotherhood will be "masters of the world, one of these days." Likewise, according to Kamil al-Najjar, who left the Muslim Brotherhood and is currently living under threat of death, "They are trying to deceive the people and they have managed to deceive a lot of Western politicians into believing in them. Their only aim is to control the world with Islam. They know they cannot use force to convert the West, so they use deceit." Even Gamal al-Banna, the brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, had harsh words for the movement his brother founded, saying it (Preview)
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The Muslim Brotherhood has become a major force in Mideast politics. But a new Norwegian film uncovers the Brotherhood's true strategy for world domination... The Christian Broadcasting Network CBN http://www.cbn.com
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.

Egypt's Salafis—who are identical to al-Qaeda and other radical Muslims in that they seek literally to emulate the 7th century Muslim prophet Muhammed and the earliest Muslims, who were quite violent and intolerant—are another case in point. Released from the jails and now in parliaments around the Arab world, following the "Arab Spring", Salafis represent the al-Qaeda-type Muslims who, while initially contemptuous of the Brotherhood's political game of patience, have seen the rewards the Brotherhood has nonetheless earned, and thus are also trying to "moderate" their approach, leading to some incongruous moments. Thus, while the Salafi Nour ("Light") Party ran in Egypt's elections, engaged in democracy, and otherwise played the political game, they rarely hid the fact that they saw democracy and elections as a contemptible means to one end—Sharia law. Thus, one Salafi cleric appears on video telling Muslims to commit voter fraud if they can to see that an Islamist candidate wins; another portrayed elections as a jihad, saying that whoever dies during voting becomes a martyr. Unlike the Brotherhood, whose members have learned to master the art of taqiyya over the course of decades(dissembling has become almost second nature to them), the Salafis—who share the same ideology as al-Qaeda (that is, that open Islam must be practiced now, with force if necessary) have still not fully learned to play the game, and are simply too honest concerning their designs.

It is perhaps ironic that the Brotherhood's greatest opponents at the current time are not Western governments or human rights groups but Egyptians themselves, including a great many Muslims. Western analysts—here I speak of those who understand the threat of the Muslim Brotherhood—sometimes forget that, whatever the Brotherhood's goals are, to a great many of those Egyptians supportive of the group, they see something entirely different. To them, Islam is goodness, and Sharia is justice—so what is so bad about wanting to implement Sharia, as the Brotherhood has long maintained? This is why Muhammad Morsi received slightly more than 50% of Egypt's vote (and that is with widespread allegations of voter fraud). Many Egyptians, used to the humanitarian side of the Brotherhood—as mentioned, like its Hamas offshoot, the Brotherhood won many people over by its social programs—did not think of an overtly Islamist agenda; or, if they did, to their minds an Islamist agenda meant goodness and justice not wholly unlike in the Western sense (which of course many Muslims are still influenced by).

However, mere months after Morsi became president, he began replacing many key governmental and media positions with Brotherhood members. Worse, he introduced a new Constitution that had a strong Islamist element. Many critics pointed out that the wording was always ambiguous, but in all cases, Sharia was portrayed as the ultimate arbitrator in several aspects. Accordingly, Egyptians rose up against Morsi, in protest after protest—arguing that Egypt is not a "Brotherhood organization" to be run like one. At one point, the forcefulness of the attacks drove him from the presidential palace under the cover of dark. Watching some of
the videos of average people in the streets is eye-opening. Many of them say things like "May I have died when I voted for you Morsi!" and much more derogatory statements not fit to publish. The main reason such Egyptians are disgusted with Morsi has less to do with Islamism and more to do with the fact that Egyptians are still suffering economically and socially, in fact even worse than under Mubarak. Accordingly, Morsi is increasingly seen as more interested in empowering his group and the Islamist agenda than he is in the betterment of Egypt—as well captured by the previous Brotherhood's General Guide who once declared "the hell with Egypt", indicating that the interests of Egypt are second to the interests of Islam. [The last two paragraphs, written several months ago, have culminated in the June 30 Revolution and ousting of the Brotherhood.]
The Arab Spring

This leads to the questions of the Arab Spring—which was pivotally important for the empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood: What was it? Who was behind it? How and why did the Muslim Brotherhood most benefit from it? All evidence indicates that the Muslim
Brotherhood had very little to do with the beginnings of the January 25 2011 revolution of Egypt, which saw the ousting of 30-years-long ruler Hosni Mubarak. Indeed, in the early stages, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership forbade young members from participating in the revolt—although many did so anyway. There is even a video of President Muhammad Morsi, in the early stages of the revolution, mocking it, saying "What do you think you'll achieve?"

The reason for this reticence was, of course, not because of any great love for Mubarak, but rather because the Brotherhood likely thought that Mubarak would ultimately prevail, quash the revolution, and then quietly target all those leaders who participated. The Obama administration seems also to have shared this view, for it originally expressed support for Mubarak during the early days of the protest, though it later abandoned him.

The Egyptian Revolution, which followed the Tunisian revolution, was fundamentally a product of the huge frustration of the average Egyptian, especially regarding the immensely poor economic conditions, where many college graduates could not and cannot get a simple job—certainly not one to enable settling down and starting a family, which, in Egyptian society, is the norm. However, the only group outside the government that was so well organized and prepared to exploit the situation was the Muslim Brotherhood—the primary oppositional group to the government for decades. Many relatively new Egyptian secular parties, for example, complained
that presidential and parliamentary elections were conducted too soon after the fall of Mubarak for them to properly mobilize and campaign. But the Brotherhood was ready. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the idea of Islam as the immediate solution for all of Egypt's woes had become very popular among especially the less educated Egyptians—who make up the majority of the nation. Nor did the U.S. State Department's meddling help. As Andrew McCarthy put it, Hillary Clinton did "her part to help the Muslim Brotherhood," by pressuring the military to surrender power and portraying its delay to proclaim a winner as "clearly troubling"— words better reserved for the Muslim Brotherhood's anti-democratic tactics.
The Muslim Brotherhood's Reach and Presence

Both formally but especially informally, the Brotherhood's reach is immense. Two reasons account for this: 1) as the oldest and best organized Muslim organization, it has had ample time and experience to expand, network, and propagate its message around the world and 2) the message it is propagating is usually not seen by Muslims as a "Brotherhood" message but rather an Islamic message, hence its popularity and appeal.

This is an important point that needs to be kept in mind as we explore some of the regions where the Brotherhood is present and influencing society. Because its goals are one and the same with all other Islamists—resurrection of a caliphate and enforcement of Islamic law—it often works in unison with other Islamic organizations, making it especially difficult to determine when an organization is a Brotherhood outfit and when it is simply a likeminded ally. This phenomenon occurs also with jihadi organizations: all too often individual jihadis are in the West conflated with al-Qaeda, under the assumption that all who engage in jihadi activities are al-Qaeda members. Yet often the reality is that there is no affiliation—except, of course, in ideology and tactics. Likewise, although many Islamic organizations maintain close symbolic and ideological ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, they remain largely autonomous.

The heart of the Muslim Brotherhood is also the region it was born: Egypt, which represents the core of the movement. The second layer of presence and influence is the region nearest to Egypt, the Middle East, especially Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, the PA territories, and even throughout the Arabian Peninsula. The third and most recent—and perhaps the most important—region is the West, Europe and North America. Altogether, it is believed that the Brotherhood is present in some 70 countries around the world.

We have already examined the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As for its next layer of presence and influence, the Middle East, especially those countries closest to Egypt, the following are some of the more important areas where the Brotherhood is known to exist and operate. It is important to note that, as in Egypt, many of these Brotherhood affiliates were founded in direct opposition to the ruling regimes of their respective countries, portrayed as the "moral", "Islamic" substitute for the "secular", "westernized", and, in short, corrupt ruling regimes:

Arabian Peninsula: many Brotherhood members, after being driven out of Egypt in the 1950s and afterwards, found sympathizers and asylum in the Gulf nations. Many of them settled there, influencing those societies, especially by agitating against the authorities. For example, in Saudi Arabia, Brotherhood members formed the Awakening (Sahwa) group, which challenged the legitimacy of the Saudi crown. In nations such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, Brotherhood members exploited the media presence there, most notably Al Jazeera, to influence Muslims both in and beyond the region with the Brotherhood narrative and propaganda. [This has proven especially true after the June 30, 2013 revolution, as Al Jazeera has unabashedly proven that it is the Brotherhood's mouthpiece, distorting and manipulating news for the group's benefit.] Brotherhood members have also, as in Egypt, gained many seats in parliaments throughout the Gulf. For example, in Kuwait, through the Hadas movement; in Yemen through the Islah movement; and in Bahrain through the Minbar party, which, since 2002, has been the largest elected party. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef denounced the Brotherhood, saying it was guilty of "betrayal of pledges and ingratitude" and was "the source of all problems in the Islamic world". On the other hand, many Brotherhood members and their descendants who settled in the Peninsula were themselves further radicalized by Saudi Arabia's ultra-Islamic, Wahhabi worldview, bringing it back with them to Egypt and their other countries of origin. The Salafis seem to be the hybrid result of Egyptian Brotherhood mentality mixed with Saudi Wahhabism. Again, this points to the symbiotic relationship that exists between all Islamic groups, for they are all ultimately rooted in the same immutable sources: the Koran and the teachings of Muhammad, as captured in the Hadith, and relayed in the Sunna.

Iraq: under Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Islamic Party—the largest Sunni Islamic political party and a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—was banned in the 1960s and forced underground for its religious agitations. It reemerged soon after the U.S. toppled Hussein, and has since been a harsh critic of the U.S. while simultaneously taking part in government and in the transitional process.

Iran: although a predominately Shia Muslim country, and the Muslim Brotherhood is Sunni in doctrine, it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood, the modern-day pioneers of political Islam, have influenced the Shia of Iran. For example, Nava Safari, who founded Fada'iyan-e Islam, an Iranian Islamic organization active in Iran in the 1940s and 50s, was highly impressed by the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1945 to 1951 the Fadain assassinated several high level Iranian personalities and officials who they believed to be un-Islamic, including anti-clerical writer Ahmad Kasravi, Premier Haj Ali Razmara, former Premier Abdolhossein Hazhir and Education and Culture Minister Ahmad Zangeneh. Again, it must be stressed that, even within the Sunni-Shia divide, which is very real, much cooperation exists, specifically in the context of resurrecting a caliphate and enforcing Sharia. The prevailing logic is that the greater enemy is the infidel (U.S., Israel, etc.), and that it is beneficial for all Muslims to work together for their subjugation. Then they may resume their internal struggle for overall mastery.

Jordan: the Brotherhood is represented by the Islamic Action Front, which was founded in the 1940s and has deeply influenced segments of society through charity, propaganda, and indoctrination. At various times, and under various leaders, it has vacillated between militancy—often influenced by Palestinian elements—and the Brotherhood's hallmark approach of patience and perseverance, working with the Hashemite rulers. To be sure, during the 2011 uprisings, the group became much more assertive. Having failed, it has now slipped back into the diplomatic course, calling for internal, peaceful reforms.

In North Africa, west of Egypt, the Brotherhood's existence has again been positioned in the context of resisting secular/corrupt rulers, this time, the colonial powers themselves. For example, in Algeria, Brotherhood members took part in the nation's war of independence from France. Due to their calls for Sharia, they were eventually marginalized by the secular FLN
party. In Tunisia, the Brotherhood has had a strong impact on that nation's Islamists, particularly al-Nahda, which was formed in 1989 and was largely inspired by the Brotherhood. Since the Tunisian revolution, al-Nahda has received widespread support, and is the new government's most influential voice. In Libya, Brotherhood members have been present since at least the 1940s, when King Idris offered them refuge from Egypt. After Colonel Gaddafi seized power, he, like all other Arab leaders, seeing the threat of the Brotherhood, worked hard to eliminate them. However, they maintained a presence there, and most notably were involved in the
opposition that overthrew Gaddafi.

PA Territories: Hamas, which maintains a militant, jihadi wing, is a Brotherhood offshoot, founded during the First Intifada in 1987. Like its parent organization, it quickly became popular with the Palestinian people in large part because of its charitable services. And like its parent organization, over the years it has managed to indoctrinate the average Palestinian Muslim through its propaganda. While Hamas is dedicated to the elimination of the state of Israel, in fact this objective ties in very well with the overall objective of the Muslim Brotherhood: the global resurrection of a caliphate. After all, any number of Muslims—including many influential Egyptian Brotherhood members—maintain that the seat of the caliphate must be Jerusalem. Thus, even though an organization like Hamas seems to be engaged in a "different" endeavor—the elimination of Israel—in fact, this objective corresponds very well to Brotherhood objectives, and is seen as just one more necessary phase.

Syria: the Brotherhood has been present there for decades and, after the Ba'th party took over in 1963, it became the main Sunni opposition force against the Alawite Assad clan. Resonating with the Sunni majority of Syria, the Brotherhood in many ways spearheaded a violent revolt against the then President Hafiz Assad. However, it was crushed in the 1982 Hama uprising. Afterwards, the group was largely politically inactive in the country, although it maintained a strong support network there—a perfect example of the difficulties involved in determining who a formal Brotherhood affiliate is, and who simply shares their exact worldview, and thus is a natural ally and affiliate. The ongoing uprisings against Assad have a strong Brotherhood element, especially among the Islamist/Salafi factions. A recent Washington Post article describes the Brotherhood as playing a "dominant" role.

Sudan: the Brotherhood maintains a significant, though informal, presence, and has played an important role in the mass Islamization campaigns the Khartoum regime has carried out, often in the context of genocide. Brotherhood members make up a large part of the current Khartoum regime, following the 1989 coup d'état by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir. The National Islamic Front (originally the Islamic Chart Front) which grew during the 1960s, with Islamic scholar Hasan al-Turabi becoming its Secretary General in 1964, is a Brotherhood offshoot.

As for the third layer of the Muslim Brotherhood—its newest and perhaps most important layer of presence—the West, in Europe, formerly Christendom, and home of the original infidel par excellence, the Brotherhood has made great strides in recent years, growing as it has with the large influx of Muslim immigrants and their offspring in Europe. It operates often under the umbrella of other Muslim organizations, which appear innocuous, such as the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations, and the European Council for Fatwa and Research. The group is also involved in setting up a vast and sophisticated network of mosques, schools, and Islamic charities.

Russia: the Muslim Brotherhood is banned there.

United States: the Brotherhood is also in America, where, according to one captured document, the Brotherhood "understand their work in America is a grand jihad in eliminating and destroying Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands so that Allah's religion [Islam] is victorious over all religions." Accordingly, the Brotherhood has founded and/or works under the cover of several prominent Muslim organizations in America, including the Council on American-Islam Relations ("CAIR"), the Muslim Students' Association (MSA), the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA), and the Muslim American Society (MAS).

With lots of funding and organization, and a Western willingness to dialogue with Muslims, the Brotherhood has naturally taken over, and received much legitimacy from European governments, convinced as they are that, by giving the most prominent Muslim organizations much representation, Westerners are demonstrating their "tolerance".

The Muslim Brotherhood is the most organized of Muslim organizations; its ultimate goals—establishment of caliphate and enforcement of Sharia—are shared with all Islamists; its tactics of patience and perseverance—and of course dissembling—have proven themselves more effective than violent jihadi tactics; and it is now widely described as a "moderate" organization (indeed, one U.S. official absurdly referred to it as a "largely secular" organization) and it is thus seen as a legitimate player by many Western governments. There is no doubt that the Brotherhood will continue spearheading the Islamist movement around the world, gaining more and more recruits, both formal and informal, as it edges closer to realizing its ultimate goals.

Raymond Ibrahim is author of Crucified Again: Exposing Islam's New War in Christians (published by Regnery in cooperation with Gatestone Institute, April 2013). He is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center and an associate fellow at the Middle East Forum.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 31 Aug 2013 00:17

A good commentary on the typical dominant discourse in Islamic societies. Only problem is that it does an equal-equal with "ALL religions have this tendency...". It is mainly true only of Christianity and Islam - the two imperialist-fascist religions (and perhaps Zoroastrianism also). He does admit that "animist" and "nature-worshiping" polytheist religions do not have these problems, but they were also devoid of "great concepts"! These guys just can't break out of their brainwashed mould of thinking and understanding humans and history!

Rawal TV's Baland Iqbal - The Narcissism of the Muslim Civilization - Password Ep32

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbhKY-tTv88

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 31 Aug 2013 00:51

One key event in the revival of Arabic control of Islam in the 20th century was the Turkish Sultan building the Hejaz Railway from Damascus to Medina in 1908 with 2/3 of the funds from the Ummah. One third of the cost was borne by Indian Muslims.
The railway consolidated the Sultan's political power by asserting his links to the temproal power.

In response the British plotted to revive the Arab control of Islam and started the secret war in Middle East.

When the British blockaded the Red Sea the Grand Mufti of Mecca ordered the overthrow of the Turks and cast the Arab lot with the British Empire against the Ottomon Turks.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 22 Sep 2013 23:42

Its pathetic that Indian Muslim intellectuals hang on to validation form a deluded white woman about Muhammad and his deen.

http://www.business-standard.com/articl ... 153_1.html

Talmiz Ahmad September 20, 2013 Last Updated at 21:48 IST

Muhammad, prophet and human being

An important new biography paints an intimate portrait of a complex and all-too-human thinker, redressing the culture of Islamophobia that has gripped many parts of the world

THE FIRST MUSLIM:
THE STORY OF MUHAMMAD
Author: Lesley Hazleton
Publisher: Atlantic Books, London, 2013
Pages: 320
Price: Rs 599

Over 14 centuries since the advent of Islam, Prophet Muhammad, his life and the religion preached by him have remained controversial. The reasons have been both doctrinal and political. The prophet asserted that Islam, i.e., submission to the will of God, was a continuation of the religion revealed to mankind through Adam and all the prophets who followed him, including Abraham, Moses, Joseph and Jesus Christ. But, just as the Jews had refused to see Jesus as the promised messiah so did most of the Jews and Christians of the seventh century refuse to accept Muhammad as the "seal of the Prophets".

The success of Muslim arms across West Asia, North Africa and even Europe within a century after Muhammad's death made the enemies of Islam see Muslims as the despised "Other", with the prophet being caricatured over the centuries as a false prophet, a cruel villain and a debauch. The currents of Islamophobia in many parts of the contemporary western world, strengthened by the events of 9/11 and the extremist violence of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, have fed this culture of hate and otherness, which sees Muslims and their faith as isolated from the mainstream of human civilisation.

This, in turn, has strengthened the sense of separateness amongst several Muslims, often leading to their physical isolation in ghettoised communities, fostering in them a sense of victimhood and encouraging some of them to mindless violence in support of their faith. The clash of civilisations, however flawed its logic, history and politics, is a living reality for millions of Muslims and their detractors in large parts of the world.

In this environment, Lesley Hazleton's new biography of Islam's prophet is most welcome. While based on solid scholarship, the style is fresh, informal and chatty. The writer, a renowned journalist, in her search for Muhammad the prophet and the man, has sought "to uncover the meaning and relevance within the welter of events" in his life. She paints an intimate portrait of the man, freely speculating about his thinking, possible motivations, and even the political and emotional context within which he took certain important decisions. At the end, the prophet emerges as "a complex man carving a huge profile in history, his vision (going) beyond seemingly irreconcilable opposites."

She notes the "real bond of deep love and affection" between Muhammad and his first wife, Khadija, who was 15 years senior to him, with whom he had a monogamous marriage of 24 years. She speaks of Muhammad's "palpable feeling of terror" and "a terrible awe" after the first revelation, even a fear of madness. She paints a touching portrait of the trembling, shuddering Muhammad, seeking solace in the lap of his beloved Khadija; the first revelation was then formed in words that, over time, changed the world.

Hazelton provides thoughtful insights on certain important aspects of the prophet's life. The Satanic Verses, when the prophet announced a "revelation" that suggested that the supreme God could have lesser gods associated with Him, remain controversial to this day. The people of Makkah, who had welcomed the prophet and his message on hearing of this "association", debunked the man and his revelations when he issued a quick correction. Hazelton argues that this episode was "the means of making it clear that no matter how painful, Muhammad needed to be true to himself, to his voice and to that of God".

Hazelton does not shy away from some of the less savoury aspects of Muhammad's life. These include: the expulsion from Madina of the Jews of the Zaynuqa tribe; the apparent sanction to eliminate satirists who did not accept the divine revelations, and the condemnation of early dissidents in Madina as "hypocrites", worthy of severe chastisement. She also touches on his various marriages after the death of Khadija, which were usually meant to strengthen ties within the community of believers as also to turn enemies into political and military allies. One episode that has been frequently cited to exemplify the prophet's cruelty is the killing of the men of the Jewish Qureyz tribe, which asserted that the new faith would now have a political identity that would not tolerate any challenge or dissent.

The book is embellished with several pithy observations that impart substance and meaning to important episodes. Thus, speaking of the collection of the revelations in the Quran, Hazelton notes that the Muslims, who had earlier looked up to the People of the Book were now "a people with their own book …it was overtly political. And for those without power, empowering". The political was never far away from the spiritual. As the author notes, in Madina the Prophet moulded the contending tribes into one community, the ummah, and points out that Muhammad had "persuaded a place in search of an identity to connect with an identity in search of a place".

Every aspect of Muhammad's life and his message has been a matter of debate over the centuries, with critics pouring scorn, while the faithful see him as the perfect man, with every remark and action of his exemplary and worthy of emulation, though the prophet himself spoke of his human frailty and propensity to error. "The purity of perfection," Hazelton points out, "denies the complexity of a lived life."

This book is a balanced, scholarly yet lucid narrative of doubt, controversy, cruelty, compassion and extraordinary achievement of Muhammad, a man of his times and a prophet for all times.

The author is a former diplomat. His book, The Islamist Challenge in West Asia, releases this month

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 23 Sep 2013 21:28

To paraphrae jhujar:

Islam is a religion of peace
Islamism is the killigion of Islam

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 17 Oct 2013 00:24

Continuing from Indicization Thread

SBajwa wrote:BTW... We should coin an acronym for these groups (Tableeghi, Wahabi, Salafi, Deobandis) to isolate them from the rest.

Good initiative to categorize Subcontinental Muslims according to their sociopolitical views!

I would say:

Ashrafs & Apes - Live in Subcontinent, but identify with Middle-Eastern races and interests. Then there are a host of well to do Subcontinental Muslims (Apes) who try to distance themselves from Indics, considering them inferior, act as chauvinistsd just like the real Ashrafs do, i.e. try to ape the Ashrafs. All these are used by the Ummahite Core to sway politics and culture of other lands like India in the desired direction. Many have rebranded themselves as Muslim Liberals.
Attack Dogs - These are the Muslims who have been brain-washed to be violent and do Jihad on the Kufr and Murtads. These are fully deracinated, Islamized and act only for the cause of Islam. Basically used by the Ummahite Core to wage war according to their strategic interests.
Cannon-Fodder, Battery & Fog Muslims - Most of the Muslim commoners would be in this category. Again used by the Ummah as cannon-fodder for their wars, where their death is useful to the Ummahite Core to basically play the victim. They are also used to fund Islam's expansion and provide logistics. The mass of Muslims is also useful for the Attack Dogs to hide among many.
Hidden Murtads - These are officially Muslim but have sympathies for non-Muslim culture.

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 17 Oct 2013 02:21

^^^ RajeshA ji, its interesting that your analysis corresponds exactly with Islamic tradition's own internal social classification, which later Islamic scholars and historians considered a God-ordained classification.

RajeshA wrote:

Ashrafs & Apes - Live in Subcontinent, but identify with Middle-Eastern races and interests. Then there are a host of well to do Subcontinental Muslims (Apes) who try to distance themselves from Indics, considering them inferior, act as chauvinistsd just like the real Ashrafs do, i.e. try to ape the Ashrafs. All these are used by the Ummahite Core to sway politics and culture of other lands like India in the desired direction. Many have rebranded themselves as Muslim Liberals.

These are called Ashraf/Arab and the Mu'arrabeen ("those conquered and converted peoples who are in the process of being further Arabized") in traditional Islamic sources.

RajeshA wrote:[*] Attack Dogs - These are the Muslims who have been brain-washed to be violent and do Jihad on the Kufr and Murtads. These are fully deracinated, Islamized and act only for the cause of Islam. Basically used by the Ummahite Core to wage war according to their strategic interests.

This is the standard jihadi lashkar/jaish garrison core of the Islamic qabila guard. Agents provocateur, lumpen mafia element, desperadoes, vigilantes.

RajeshA wrote:[*] Cannon-Fodder, Battery & Fog Muslims - Most of the Muslim commoners would be in this category. Again used by the Ummah as cannon-fodder for their wars, where their death is useful to the Ummahite Core to basically play the victim. They are also used to fund Islam's expansion and provide logistics. The mass of Muslims is also useful for the Attack Dogs to hide among many.

These are the Mawaliyoon - those natives who have been converted and are under the "protection" of an Ashraf/Arab "Wali" (Master). The "wali" or "maula" is like a guru and feudal lord combined. "Hum unke aadmi hain", is what a Mawali would say of his Wali. They were typically treated by their Wali with a distant paternalistic condescension, sometimes kind, sometimes contemptful. In some parts in Hindi, "Mawali" even today has a connotation of a lowly, uncivilized fellow. In many areas of N. India and Pakistan, the lay Muslim treats the local Wali family the way caste-Brahmins are/were treated in some parts of India.

RajeshA wrote:[*] Hidden Murtads - These are officially Muslim but have sympathies for non-Muslim culture.[/list]

The Munafiqeen, of course.

nachiket · Post by **nachiket** » 17 Oct 2013 03:27

Agnimitra wrote: These are the Mawaliyoon - those natives who have been converted and are under the "protection" of an Ashraf/Arab "Wali" (Master). The "wali" or "maula" is like a guru and feudal lord combined. "Hum unke aadmi hain", is what a Mawali would say of his Wali. They were typically treated by their Wali with a distant paternalistic condescension, sometimes kind, sometimes contemptful. In some parts in Hindi, "Mawali" even today has a connotation of a lowly, uncivilized fellow. In many areas of N. India and Pakistan, the lay Muslim treats the local Wali family the way caste-Brahmins are/were treated in some parts of India.

Wow! I had no idea that is where the word Mawali came from. Its usage is very common in Mumbai. I must have used it myself quite often.

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 17 Oct 2013 12:31

Agnimitra ji,

thank you for the elaboration on the above.

I think we need to take the classification of Muslims further along all axis of social status, psychological profiles, behavior, ideology, indoctrination level and type, etc.

However its important that we do it from an external frame of reference. Islam's internal classification however helps in bolstering the validity of the external frame of reference.

The more detailed the classification is the more thoroughly would non-Muslims have to analyze and adjudge the Muslims in society. Such scrutiny would lead to more Muslims becoming more sensitive about their projection to the outsiders and thus more self-aware about their position in their society itself as well as about any perception of abuse and instrumentation.

Different from the Muslims in the West, Indian Muslims are ethnically and linguistically a part of the mainstream Hindu society. Therefore it is best if we build a different framework than that in the West to classify Muslims - something different than just Moderates and Islamists. In the West they are outsiders and the terminology chosen is to prod the Muslims to an ideal which makes them compatible with their society and on the other side moderates the reaction of Western society towards Islam itself by degeneralizing it.

Our aims should be different. Our aim should be to show the Indian Muslims as simply tools, instruments and fuel, as exploited people of external Ummahite Core and their junior Indian partners.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 17 Oct 2013 21:41

You can call that the
'Taxonomy of the Islamic Faithfuls'

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 18 Oct 2013 16:55

ramana garu,

yes indeed. "Taxonomy of the Islamic Faithfuls"

RajeshA · Post by **RajeshA** » 18 Oct 2013 17:34

Elements of 'Strength of the Islamic Faith' for a Muslim

Listing the reasons why a Muslim would want to stay in Islam

Shahada/Kalima - deep and self-evident conviction in existence of Allah and in Muhammad's Prophethood
Identification with Islam's historical personalities, most prominently Muhammad himself, considering him the Ideal Man
Belief in Inevitability of Islam's Domination of the World, Belief in Islam's Invincibility
Racial, Ideological and Cultural Chauvinism, Moral Superiority (relative to others)
Security of the Brotherhood (both physical and existential)
Cultural Inertia, Comfort in Regimented Practice
Community & Family Networks
Mortal Fear of Reprisal for Opting for Apostasy
Ownership over Women, Nikah with Multiple Women and Minor Girls, Temporariness of Marriage
Investments in the Islamic social structure

Agnimitra · Post by **Agnimitra** » 24 Oct 2013 03:09

Tarek Fatah's latest -

The Muslim Conquest of India: From Will Durant’s Classic 11-Volume ‘Story of Civilization

Prem · Post by **Prem** » 24 Oct 2013 04:39

Agnimitra wrote:Tarek Fatah's latest -
The Muslim Conquest of India: From Will Durant’s Classic 11-Volume ‘Story of Civilization

Above Frome Tarek, This is from India ..
http://newindianexpress.com/opinion/Sir ... 849811.ece

Every year, October 17 is celebrated on the campus of Aligarh Muslim University to mark the birthday of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), arguably the 19th century’s foremost Muslim reformer. After the fall of the Mughal rule in 1857, Sir Syed thought deeply over the causes of Muslim decline and argued for rejecting religious orthodoxy and initiating educational reform to ensure advancement of Muslims. He toured England during 1869-70, learned about the British educational system, familiarised himself with the ideas of European enlightenment and sciences, and returned, inspired by The Spectator of London, to launch Tahzibul Akhlaq, a journal for educational and social reform among Muslims.AMU alumni groups organise Sir Syed Day functions on October 17 in India, the Middle East and North America, but his message of enlightenment and reform is lost. Invariably, the annual functions are known for two features: dinners and mushairas, or Urdu poetry recitations. While Urdu did play a role as the language of rebellion against the British, its contribution to generating good ideas for the advancement of Muslims now is nil. Under incapable editors, Tahzibul Akhlaq that once stood for advancing scientific temperament among Muslims is reduced to promoting friends and reproducing translations of articles. It has failed to challenge religious orthodoxies, cause a stirring of ideas among students and the wider Muslim society, debate arguments on issues that matter to Muslims. It is hardly read on campus.
There is no dearth of ideas among Muslims, but good ideas are missing. Across the Islamic world, clerics and academics are establishing disciplines like Islamic sociology and Islamic finance in a bid to revive Islam. They are full of ideas, reproducing the same ideas each time. AMU has a large residential campus that can match any varsity. It runs hundreds of courses from food craft, theology and management to foreign languages, tourism and physical and social sciences. It trains students in various skills and can take credit for bringing Muslim youth from rural areas and turning them into a graduate on a par with the national average, but a university of its scale and infrastructure is performing far below its potential.Its negligible role in scientific innovation, original research in social sciences, or excellence in other fields reflects the following: a comprehensive failure to recruit and promote meritorious teachers, lack of progressive culture and free thinking among students, inability to promote a culture of debate and questioning on campus, and the like. In that sense, AMU mirrors the wider Muslim society. Also, hooliganism among students is corroding academic culture; students’ table manners will make any visitor ashamed; AMU student union leaders have engaged in collecting bhatta (extortion) from nearby shops and were recently the subject of ridicule for spending, in one case, one lakh rupees on buying water for a function.In India and abroad, it is understood that universities should be administered by academics who better understand their needs. However, it seems that Muslim societies have a predilection for Islamism and authoritarianism, factors evident in the governance of leading minority institutions like the AMU and the Jamia Millia Islamia of Delhi. Regionalism, feudalism and Islamism are undermining north Indian Muslim educational institutions, combined with a failure in the voluntary education sector. P K Abdul Aziz, a southerner from Kerala who did not speak Urdu and did not bend to the pulls of the feudal, Islamist and regional lobbies of north Indians on the AMU campus, was accused of being an enemy of Urdu and forced to quit as VC.
On October 17, at the main function to mark Sir Syed’s 196th birthday, AMU vice chancellor retired Lt Gen Zameer Uddin Shah pledged to turn the university into an “intellectual powerhouse” but Shah has recently shunned the path of setting up expert committees to recruit academics. Instead, he has misused emergency powers to appoint professors, notably in the departments of West Asian studies, English and electronics engineering—one of them being a retired major general with no teaching experience in West Asian studies, another an Islamist ideologue with no research experience in English and a third from the Tablighi Jamaat with no degree in electronics. Shah, a former deputy chief of Indian Army, has relied on recruiting retired military officials to key offices, notably Brig S Ahmad Ali as pro-VC, Gr. Captain Shahrukh Shamshad as registrar and another as an intermediate college principal.Despite the total absence of government interference in recruitment of its vice chancellor, AMU has been run by retired officers from the military and the Indian administrative service in recent decades. Dr Shamim Akhtar, an assistant professor at AMU’s department of adult and continuing education, says Shah’s reliance on former military officers strengthens a culture of nepotism on campus and damages academic excellence and motivation of the teaching staff whose anger recently stopped him from appointing a military man as caretaker of the medical college. Akhtar rues that elections to the teachers’ association are marked by public demonstrations of regional loyalties, and regionalism—between those from eastern and western UP—prevents recruitment of meritorious teachers.
The challenge now before AMU and the editors of Tahzibul Akhlaq is to foster a culture of debate that challenges religious orthodoxies among Muslims, thereby creating a wider intellectual base from which reformist Muslim writers in India can advance Sir Syed’s message of enlightenment and reform.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 24 Oct 2013 04:50

Juhjar, the location of the writer shows his potential point of view. He is trying to blame the lLt Gen for the mess in AMU while the latter is trying to fix the mess.