China Military Watch

[Arun_J]

China building atomic moon rover

http://www.space.com/news/ap_070402_chinamoon.html

Why do they think making it atomic will make it better? Spirit and opportunity are doing just great for past 3 years with a solar charger batteries. How would they land this thing on moon and what if there is an nuclear accident on moon?

[Philip]

Here's a report about corruption n the Chinese military,that involves ex-pres. Jiang Zhemin.I think that the latest Outlook also carries a tale about the "crore commanders" of the Paki military,who are a massive economic force in that country,controlling virtually everything,especially land.Therefore,analysts should take careful notice that in both China and Pak,a similar political ssytem exists.Both China and Pak are military dictatorships.In China,power is supposed to be in the hands of the Party,but in actual fact,the military and the Party are two sides of the same coin.SO also in pak,where Gen.bandicoot wears two hats,that of pres. and COAS.

http://www.asiasentinel.com/index

A Corruption Trail Leads to Jiang Zemin
Mark Oneill
07 March 2007
Without his protector, a disgraced Chinese Vice-Admiral who knows all, tells all

All he can do now is sing and hope for the bestThe headquarters of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) is an imposing, unmarked, carefully guarded 10-story building in west Beijing. It holds grim secrets for former Chinese Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin.

The CMC edifice is where Vice-Admiral Wang Shouye was sentenced to death last April for accepting 160 million yuan (US$20.1 million) in bribes. In December the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. He is the highest-ranking officer in the People’s Liberation Army to be sentenced for corruption.

The case, which involved dozens of senior officers, was so serious that the party has introduced new regulations to try to stop rampant corruption in the military. The case has also given party chief Hu Jintao new evidence against his predecessor, Jiang, who worked closely with Wang. Such material is reportedly expected to prove invaluable to Hu in the fierce struggle for power and appointments ahead of the 17th party congress this autumn.

From 1995 to 2001, Wang, one of the country’s five senior admirals, was the officer in the PLA General Logistics Department in charge of infrastructure and was given the job by Jiang Zemin of constructing the army headquarters. What Jiang had in mind was not the CMC building but the headquarters of a new body, the China National Security Commission, which he intended to set up and run after stepping down from his posts as state president and head of the party. The party general secretary is also chairman of the CMC, which exercises control over the 2.4 million strong People’s Liberation Army.

Jiang had intended to run the new commission until the Beijing Olympics in 2008. According to sources in Bejing who track these events, Jiang told Wang to spare no expense and Wang took him at his word. The cost of the building was over one billion yuan, with the most expensive floor to be occupied by Jiang himself. Fully computerized and with state-of-the-art security equipment, it has underground tunnels which connect it to the Great Hall of the People, the Zhongnanhai complex that serves as the party’s central headquarters, and other buildings used by party leaders so they can bypass surface roads and move unseen by the public.

Jiang showered Wang with honors, giving him the title of ‘outstanding cadre’ for four of the years between 1995 and 2001 and promoting him to the post of Vice Admiral, one of five deputy commanders of the Chinese navy. But Jiang’s plan was never realized and, once he had left office, his dream commission was never established. Instead, the building became the headquarters of the existing CMC.



Navy songbird Song Zuying won't be seeing Admiral Wang again soonWang did another big favor for his patron. He was one of the main organizers of a concert for Song Zuying, one of China’s most famous singers and a close friend – perhaps even the mistress – of Jiang, in the Golden Concert Hall in Vienna, Austria, in November 2003. The song-and-dance troupe she belongs to is under the navy. Since Song’s repertoire of folk and traditional songs is not the kind of serious classical music the concert hall normally hosts, it required considerable lobbying by Wang and the distribution of free tickets to ensure a successful performance. He sent personnel to Vienna to help arrange the concert and make the Chinese embassy cooperate.

By the early 2000s, Wang’s colleagues at Naval Headquarters were reporting his bribe-taking to the military’s anti-corruption unit but Jiang was strong enough to block any investigation.

But once Jiang stepped down as party leader in November 2002, an investigation began in earnest, assisted by documents received from a woman named Jiang, one of Wang’s several mistresses, who had a son by him.

When Wang refused to acknowledge the boy as his son, she demanded three million yuan in compensation. He offered one million yuan and threatened her, so she wrote petitions of complaint to the CMC and Naval Headquarters.

On the morning of December 23, 2005, Wang went to the headquarters for a meeting and was told by security officers of the General Staff that he was under arrest. He reached for his briefcase but officers stopped him and put him in handcuffs. Inside the briefcase were two German-made pistols, fully loaded, with which he apparently planned to kill himself, according to the government-run Xinhua News Service.

Although Wang’s indictment said he took 160 million yuan in bribes from contractors on buildings he commissioned, of which the CMC headquarters was the largest and most expensive, unofficial estimates put the value of the bribes much higher, at over 300 million. Officers who searched his two homes in Beijing and Nanjing discovered 52 million yuan in cash in a refrigerator and a microwave, and another US$2.5 million in US currency in a washing machine.

Wang’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in December because he co-operated with investigators and told them of dozens of other officers who were involved. Among them, five have been expelled from the PLA and six others demoted.

He also is said to have told investigators that he paid Jiang Zemin bribes worth five million yuan, according to Hong Kong Chinese-language newspapers.

As in other Communist states, the military in China is corrupt because it is virtually above the law. Only the military can investigate wrongdoing by its own members, who are not subject to supervision by the media, the police or the civil justice system. More so than perhaps any other country, China’s military has functioned as the wellsprings of power. The People’s Liberation Army, now 2.3 million strong, was formed by Mao Zedong in 1923, decades before he came to power.

Prior to 1998, the PLA was involved in a vast web of state-owned companies ranging from karaoke bars to industrial and production companies, partly as a method of offsetting budgetary shortfalls. Ultimately, the military ran as many as 20,000 companies, which alarmed officials because they began to increasingly involve bribery, smuggling and inefficiency.

Jiang ultimately ordered the military out of business in 1998. The army complied, although it continues to enjoy numerous privileges. Its vehicles, for example, do not have to pay road tolls levied on other cars. It has its own network of rail cars, airports, trucks, farms and factories that are not subject to external control. The media reports nothing about the military except what is highly censored and praiseworthy.

Following the Wang scandal, the PLA announced new measures against “commercial bribery’ in the military last August. This covered exchanges between the armed forces and local people, including public bidding and procurement in construction, goods, materials and equipment, medical and health services, military communications and transportation, financial affairs, military supplies, telecommunications and outsourcing.

To secure contracts, bidders offer ‘rebates’, ‘labor service fees’ and pleasure trips to officers. From June 2006, PLA units were ordered to investigate their own commercial transactions for six months and report them to the anti-corruption bureau of the CMC.

In January, the PLA went further, issuing new regulations for the auditing of military contracts, aimed establishing a clear line of reporting to superiors and a more stringent approval procedure.

In 2006, according to the Xinhua news agency, the PLA audited 983 senior officers, of whom 26 were at the army level, 135 at the divisional level and 822 at the regimental level.

While the PLA has taken steps in reaction to the Wang scandal, Hu is keeping his ammunition against Jiang. Few expect him to act against the former leader himself or his son Jiang Mianheng, who has a wide range of business interests in Shanghai, but the bullets may be enough to ruin the careers of many of his associates.

[Multatuli]

China has gained and tested array of space weapons

THE WASHINGTON TIMES March 30, 2007

China is developing an "impressive" array of space weapons, including missiles and jammers, and is moving toward placing nuclear weapons in space to attack U.S. satellites, the commander of U.S. strategic forces told the Senate yesterday.
The Chinese military has "undertaken what we would call a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of capability against ... our space capabilities," Marine Corps Gen. James Cartwright yesterday told the Senate Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee.
Their capabilities go "all the way from temporary and reversible effects -- [Global Positioning System] jamming, things like that, [communications] jamming, all the way through direct ascent ASAT," he said, referring to anti-satellite weapons. "Eventually, they'll probably be looking at co-orbital" weapons -- missiles that orbit near a satellite and then explode.
"Then, the one that you really worry about is introducing weapons of mass destruction into space on a missile," he said.
The testimony provided the first details from the Bush administration about China's space-weapons program.
Subcommittee Chairman Bill Nelson, Florida Democrat, said that China is expected to have enough ASAT weapons by 2010 to "basically knock out most of our satellites in low-earth orbit."
Gen. Cartwright said countering that threat will require the military to develop "prompt global strike" weapons -- missiles and bombers that can hit targets around the world very rapidly.
China's across-the-board program of ground-based jamming and ground-launched missiles shows the arms program is sophisticated in terms of science and technology, he said. China's Jan. 11 ASAT test, when a missile destroyed a weather satellite in orbit, was not a surprise and was Beijing's third attempt to destroy an orbiting satellite with a missile.
"What was for us impressive was that in three attempts, they made significant changes each time and were able to, in three attempts, come to a successful intercept -- on their third attempt," he said.
Additionally, China already has deployed weapons at the lower end of the anti-satellite scale -- weapons that jam or disrupt satellites.
In his testimony, Gen. Cartwright questioned whether the Chinese space-arms program should lead the United States to develop similar weapons.
"We have the technical capability," he said. "My belief right now is knowing what we believe we know about this threat after the demonstrations that it is premature to start thinking about an arms race in space. ...We do not have to have a space response to that threat."
However, the four-star general said it would be "prudent" to improve the U.S. space-defense posture and improve surveillance and intelligence on space threats. Also, U.S. national security satellites should be hardened with "passive-type defenses," such as lens shutters or turn-off systems, he said.
Gen. Cartwright's comments yesterday contrast with his remarks in October, when he said reports China had fired a laser at a U.S. satellite in an apparent ASAT test were "uncertain." Gen. Cartwright, who is in charge of U.S. nuclear-warfighting forces, also suggested the United States might choose to use nuclear missiles to stop a country such as China from using missiles fired from hard-to-reach interior bases to destroy U.S. satellites.
"If there are many targets that are out of the reach of our bombers, conventional forces ... in large countries, the question would be, as an example, how many satellites would we be willing to lose before we went to a nuclear alternative, because the only thing we have to reach those targets is nuclear," he said.

http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070 ... -9929r.htm

[Multatuli]

US National Security and the People's Republic of China - Chapter 2

Chapter 2 Summary

The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified information on all of the United States' most advanced thermonuclear warheads, and several of the associated reentry vehicles. These thefts are the result of an intelligence collection program spanning two decades, and continuing to the present. The PRC intelligence collection program included espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories.

The stolen U.S. secrets have helped the PRC fabricate and successfully test modern strategic thermonuclear weapons. The stolen information includes classified information on seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile arsenal. Together, these include the W-88 Trident D-5 thermonuclear warhead, and the W-56 Minuteman II, the W-62 Minuteman III, the W-70 Lance, the W-76 Trident C-4, the W-78 Minuteman III Mark 12A, and the W-87 Peacekeeper thermonuclear warheads. The stolen information also includes classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"), which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has ever deployed.

In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national weapons laboratory classified U.S. thermonuclear weapons information that cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has determined that further information can not be made public without affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.

The W-88 is a miniaturized, tapered thermonuclear warhead. It is the United States' most sophisticated strategic thermonuclear weapon. In the U.S. arsenal, the W-88 warhead is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile carried aboard the Trident nuclear submarine. The United States learned about the theft of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead information, as well as about the theft of information regarding several other thermonuclear weapons, in 1995.

On two occasions, the PRC has stolen classified U.S. information about neutron bomb warheads from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The United States learned of these thefts of classified information on the neutron bomb in 1996 and in the late 1970s, when the first theft - including design information on the W-70 warhead - occurred. The W-70 warhead contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb"). The PRC subsequently tested the neutron bomb. The U.S. has never deployed a neutron weapon.

In addition, the Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related secrets. The Clinton administration has determined that further information about these thefts cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national security.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen U.S. design information for the development of the PRC's new generation strategic thermonuclear warheads. Current PRC silo-based missiles were designed for large, multi-megaton thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to U.S. warheads of the late 1950s. The PRC plans to supplement these silo-based missiles with smaller, modern mobile missiles that require smaller warheads. The PRC has three mobile ICBM programs currently underway ­ two road-mobile and one submarine launched program ­ all of which will be able to strike the United States.

The first of these new People's Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs, the DF-31, may be tested in 1999 and could be deployed as soon as 2002. The DF-31 ICBM and the PRC's other new generation mobile ICBMs will require smaller, more compact warheads. The stolen U.S. information on the W-70 or W-88 Trident D-5 will be useful for this purpose.

The PRC has the infrastructure and technical ability to use elements of the stolen U.S. warhead design information in the PLA's next generation of thermonuclear weapons. If the PRC attempted to deploy an exact replica of the U.S. W-88 Trident D-5 warhead, it would face considerable technical challenges. However, the PRC could build modern thermonuclear warheads based on stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen W-88 design information, using processes similar to those developed or available in a modern aerospace or precision guided munitions industry. The Select Committee judges that the PRC has such infrastructure and is capable of producing small thermonuclear warheads based on the stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen W-88 information.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC is likely to continue its work on advanced thermonuclear weapons based on the stolen U.S. design information. The PRC could begin serial production of advanced thermonuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design information during the next decade in connection with the development of its new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Select Committee judges that the PRC's acquisition of U.S. classified information regarding thermonuclear warhead designs from the Department of Energy's national weapons laboratories saved the PRC years of effort and resources, and helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and successfully test a new generation of thermonuclear warheads. The PRC's access to, and use of, classified U.S. information does not immediately alter the strategic balance between the U.S. and PRC. Once the PRC's small, mobile strategic ballistic missiles are deployed, however, they will be far more difficult to locate than the PRC's current silo-based missiles. This will make the PRC's strategic nuclear force more survivable. Small, modern nuclear warheads also enable the PRC to deploy multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs or MIRVs, multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles) on its ICBMs should it choose to do so.

The PRC's collection of intelligence on smaller U.S. thermonuclear warheads began in the 1970s, when the PRC recognized its weaknesses in physics and the deteriorating status of its nuclear weapons programs. The Select Committee judges that the PRC's intelligence collection efforts to develop modern thermonuclear warheads are focused primarily on the U.S. Department of Energy's National Laboratories at:

· Los Alamos

· Lawrence Livermore

· Oak Ridge

· Sandia

The FBI has investigated a number of U.S. National Laboratory employees in connection with suspected espionage.

The Select Committee judges that the U.S. national weapons laboratories have been and are targeted by PRC espionage, and almost certainly remain penetrated by the PRC today.

The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the counterintelligence problem at Department of Energy national weapons laboratories until 1995. A series of PRC nuclear weapons test explosions from 1992 to 1996 began a debate in the U.S. Government about whether the PRC's designs for its new generation of nuclear warheads were in fact based on stolen U.S. classified information. The apparent purpose of these PRC tests was to develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads, with an increased yield-to-weight ratio. In 1995, a "walk-in" approached the Central Intelligence Agency outside the PRC and provided an official PRC document classified "Secret" that contained specific design information on the W-88 Trident D-5, and technical information on other thermonuclear warheads. The CIA later determined that the "walk-in" was directed by the PRC intelligence services. Nonetheless, CIA and other Intelligence Community analysts that reviewed the document concluded that it contained U.S. warhead design information.

The entire text is available here :

http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105 ... h2bod.html

[pradeepe]

Part of a seies of debates:

Reframing China Policy Debate 5: China's Role in Asia

Debate Topic: Does China seek to dominate Asia and drastically reduce (if not eliminate) U.S. influence as a regional power?

The fifth debate in the Carnegie Debate Series features Aaron Friedberg and Robert Sutter with Carnegie Senior Associate Michael Swaine as the moderator.

[Sanjay M]

China's plan to re-take Taiwan:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/10/ ... efense.php

Actually, it might be a good thing for us if China did re-take Taiwan, as it would snap Japan and the US out of their lethargy, and spur closer cooperation against Chinese hegemony.

[asprinzl]

China's plan to re-take Taiwan:

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/10/ ... efense.php

Actually, it might be a good thing for us if China did re-take Taiwan, as it would snap Japan and the US out of their lethargy, and spur closer cooperation against Chinese hegemony.

Recently, I got to talk about China/Taiwan issue with a son of a KMT general. Ironically, this guy is married to a woman from mainland and she is in a way connected to a retired PLA general. They both are American citizens and a bottle yomeishu and other vinery in Chinatown and the conversation went like the Pearl River.

Here is the gist of it.
China will not take Taiwan militarily. What they hope to do is militarily black mail TW in capitulating. Why you may ask? A Chinese military adventure will be bloody on both sides even without direct American involvement. Even as the array of Chinese rockets rain down on TW, ROC retaliation will also leave a trail of blood and destruction on Chinese side. It will not be a quick war but a prolonged war. As the death reaches home to the ordinary peasants whose sons end up in caskets, which direction will their anger be directed? You guessed it- the Communist Party.

The CPC cannot effort to have another Tiananment Sqr type uprising.

And time is against them.

The more China urbanizes, the the speed and scope of diffussion of information will only be greater. News will travel fast. The last thing the Chinese want to see on their TV or read on the internet is a bloody Chinese on Chinese violence. They will not tolerate it and the CPC knows it well. Thus, they would rather try to intimidate/blackmail ROC with military might than to actually employ their military means in an actual war.

This couple that I talked to, the only thing that they say that could be worrisome is that miscalculation by either the Taiwanese, CPC or the Americans in the scale of the miscalculation by the Germans, Austrians, Russians and French that started the first world war. None of them wanted the war but they all got sucked into it reluctantly.
Avram

[karkera]

Beijing Is Developing Anti-Stealth Abilities

[quote]China is developing new radar and other sophisticated systems to find and target U.S. radar-evading stealth aircraft such as the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning, F-117 Nighthawk and B-2 Spirit.

China watchers in Asia and the United States have seen an increase in China’s anti-stealth research and development, and procurement and manufacturing of passive, bistatic high frequency and long-range radars.

China’s efforts to defeat U.S. stealth technology also include espionage. From 2002 through 2005, China received sensitive data on the B-2 from Noshir Gowadia, a former Northrop Grumman engineer who helped design its exhaust cloaking system, according to FBI officials. The information likely helped China more easily detect not just the B-2, but the B-1, F-15 and air-launched cruise missiles as well.

A former U.S. defense attaché who was assigned to Beijing said China’s anti-stealth programs may seriously threaten U.S. stealth aircraft.
“I think it’s real and well within China’s reach. It’s been investing in research and development on counterstealth technologies for a decade or more,â€

[mandrake]

Vera E was transferred to Pakistan IIRC, not only that after that immediately US just bought the whole Czech company, it is now under US.

[SGupta]

The US continues to fund Chinas research by buying everything Chinese. The logic considering the political terrain escapes me. I get internationalization, comparative advantage and all the other key words free traders like to throw around. I fail to understand this in the context of trading with a country that would be interested in and be able to dominate you militarily in just a few decades. A country that has pegged its currency against yours to provide it with a unfair advantage, a country that does not respect your copyright laws, that steals technology when it suits and yet no action is taken. Short term gain for long term pain perhaps. Stay healthy now so they can deal you a body blow later or two taps to the head.

India in the meanwhile is denied access to technology. It would seem that the US would lavish this upon India if for nothing else to force China to focus along another threat axis. Yes there is Pakistan that needs to be kept happy lest somebody run off with nukes or the requistie material and provide it to unsavory parties if India is pampered.

Bah humbug .....

[Tilak]

China arms talks, reciprocity stalled
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
June 14, 2007

China continues to put off nuclear weapons talks with the United States that were promised by Beijing's leader and has not matched U.S. openness in recent military exchanges, a senior Pentagon official told Congress yesterday.

"In the bilateral military relationship, we are troubled by what appears to be an unwillingness to reciprocate the openness and transparency we have shown to visiting [Chinese military] representatives," said Richard Lawless, deputy undersecretary of defense for Asia.
Mr. Lawless, appearing before the House Armed Services Committee, said the Pentagon was encouraged by Chinese President Hu Jintao's stated interest in talks on nuclear strategy, policy and doctrine. However, "we are concerned by an apparent reluctance on the part of the [Chinese] government to discuss transparently these important issues."
Mr. Hu told President Bush during an April 2006 summit in Washington that he would arrange the talks with China's military on nuclear issues.
"We have been unable to schedule a date for this dialogue," Mr. Lawless said.
Pentagon officials said China has refused to set a date for a visit to the United States by Gen. Jing Zhiyuan, head of China's nuclear forces, after he was invited by Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, the commander of U.S. nuclear forces. Chinese officials have said scheduling problems and an upcoming Communist Party conference prevented them from setting a date.
The Chinese general, however, visited several nations in South America in December, an indication that China's military is delaying the visit, defense officials said. They noted that China's military fears that discussions on its growing nuclear weapons arsenal will assist the United States military in targeting the weapons in any conflict.
Mr. Lawless said a dialogue on nuclear issues is needed because "what's really happening here is while the United States' capabilities are remaining essentially constant, we have a significant improvement in China's ability to target the United States or to target us regionally but specifically the continental United States."
Mr. Lawless said China's lack of openness about its annual defense spending is "emblematic of our fundamental concerns over a lack of transparency in China's military and security affairs." Beijing maintains that it is spending about $45 billion a year on defense, while U.S. estimates put the figure as high as $125 billion.
Mr. Lawless, who is stepping down from his post this summer, said China's military is engaged in a major buildup of forces that includes longer-range missiles, warships, submarines and other high-technology armaments. China's military also is building up space weapons and cyber-warfare capabilities, he said.
The buildup is aimed at preparing for a war over Taiwan, which Beijing views as part of its territory, as well as to conduct military expansionism in the future over energy resources or territory, Mr. Lawless said.
He said China's military has reached a point where it can confront the U.S. military successfully and is building "asymmetric" warfare weapons.

[abrahavt]

ROC retaliation will also leave a trail of blood and destruction on Chinese side. It will not be a quick war but a prolonged war. As the death reaches home to the ordinary peasants whose sons end up in caskets, which direction will their anger be directed? You guessed it- the Communist Party.

I think it is just bravado and wishful thinking on his part. ROC is only in a position to play defense and doesnt really have much offensive capability. As for the second part when did the Chinese Govt care about casualties. They believe in the human wave philosophy of warfare. Check out their losses in all prior conflicts (Korean, Indian, Vietnam)

[akumar]

abrahavt-ji

Most humbly I must say that PRC may not think or act that way anymore.

I visit both China and Taiwan quite often. Its hard to see how PRC will have it easy if it comes to a military situation with Taiwan. In most ways Taiwanese are more or better prepared than us (sans the atom bum) to take on PRC. Taiwan will eventually capitulate, but it will be bloody on moth sides. They will hit back hard on the mainland coastal area. The damage to PRC will be very high. Taiwanese defensive line is very hardy. PRC will need to literally obliterate the island before making a physical landing. I think even PRC will find that unacceptable.

I don’t know about the past (gang of 4 era) but now the Chinese government will not enter a situation that calls for mass destruction. This hold true for an Indian deterrence. We have a long held belief that our missiles need to hit Beijing and Shanghai for the Chinese leadership to feel the deterrence. But I don’t think now they will be prepared to loose the Shenzhen-Guangzhou-Dong Guang belt or cities like Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, Changsha or Kunming etc, which should be well within the Agni range.

[surinder]

Here is the gist of it.
China will not take Taiwan militarily. What they hope to do is militarily black mail TW in capitulating. Why you may ask? A Chinese military adventure will be bloody on both sides even without direct American involvement. Even as the array of Chinese rockets rain down on TW, ROC retaliation will also leave a trail of blood and destruction on Chinese side. It will not be a quick war but a prolonged war. As the death reaches home to the ordinary peasants whose sons end up in caskets, which direction will their anger be directed? You guessed it- the Communist Party.

The CPC cannot effort to have another Tiananment Sqr type uprising.

And time is against them.

The more China urbanizes, the the speed and scope of diffussion of information will only be greater. News will travel fast. The last thing the Chinese want to see on their TV or read on the internet is a bloody Chinese on Chinese violence. They will not tolerate it and the CPC knows it well. Thus, they would rather try to intimidate/blackmail ROC with military might than to actually employ their military means in an actual war.

That makes total sense. Chinese way of warfare is to win without fighting (in the lines of "Art of War" by Sun Tzu). Their philosophy of conflict is to get into wars where a quick victory is ensured. Moreover, the Taiwanese are militarily stronger with good navy and airforce. It is not possible for PRC to even blockade Taiwan.

s

[Karan Dixit]

abrahavt-ji

Most humbly I must say that PRC may not think or act that way anymore.

I visit both China and Taiwan quite often. Its hard to see how PRC will have it easy if it comes to a military situation with Taiwan. In most ways Taiwanese are more or better prepared than us (sans the atom bum) to take on PRC. Taiwan will eventually capitulate, but it will be bloody on moth sides. They will hit back hard on the mainland coastal area. The damage to PRC will be very high. Taiwanese defensive line is very hardy. PRC will need to literally obliterate the island before making a physical landing. I think even PRC will find that unacceptable.

I don’t know about the past (gang of 4 era) but now the Chinese government will not enter a situation that calls for mass destruction. This hold true for an Indian deterrence. We have a long held belief that our missiles need to hit Beijing and Shanghai for the Chinese leadership to feel the deterrence. But I don’t think now they will be prepared to loose the Shenzhen-Guangzhou-Dong Guang belt or cities like Wuhan, Chengdu, Chongqing, Changsha or Kunming etc, which should be well within the Agni range.

Overall a good post just two minor nitpicks:

1) Taiwan will not capitulate
2) Taiwan is not better prepared than India to take on PRC.

Actually, no one is better prepared than India to take on PRC.

[Gerard]

China arming terrorists

New intelligence reveals China is covertly supplying large quantities of small arms and weapons to insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban militia in Afghanistan, through Iran.

[m_bose]

New Chinese Submarine spotted on Google Earth

The article above also links to a larger picture of a Jin Class Chinese Submarine

[SK Ram]

What are the nos of active chinese subs ? An estimate ?

From the article-

"Now the expectation is they will build this new class and, if it’s more successful, they will be capable of having submarines permanently deployed at sea with nuclear weapons,"

Thought of Chinese subs with nukes on board tagging along Andamans like in the past is not a comforting thought ...

[SK Ram]

China arming terrorists

link doesn't show up the article

[Sanjay M]

China Defense Companies to Gain Foreign Investment:

http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdi/j ... _1_n.shtml


I think India should do this too. We need to grow our defense industry more rapidly, and foreign investment would help.

[Sanjay M]

China has created its own Ekranoplan style Wing-In-Ground plane:

http://inventorspot.com/articles/plane_ ... water_5661

http://www.reuters.com/article/scienceN ... 4720070711

[Vipul]

China fought more wars in cold.

Most of the armed conflicts in eastern China over the past 1,000 years were triggered by food shortages caused by climate, say researchers.

The finding lends weight to the idea that future climate change, resulting in water and food shortages, might have similar effects, says Earth scientist David Zhang, of the University of Hong Kong. "Regions with rich resources and those lacking resources could be hot spots for conflicts."

Between 1000 and 1911, there were 899 wars in eastern China, where most of the country's food is grown. Zhang's team classified each decade as a time of either very high (more than 30 wars), high (15-30 wars), or low (less than 15 wars) conflict.

Over the same period, climate data for the Northern Hemisphere show six major cycles of warm and cold phases. Crop and livestock production dropped significantly during the cold phases.

All four decades of very high conflict, and most periods of high conflict, coincided with cold phases, they found. Warfare generally lagged 10-30 years behind the start of a cold phase.

"In situations of ecological stress, warfare could become the ultimate means of redistributing shrinking resources," the team has said. "The result surprised me very much," says Zhang. "All high war periods and dynastic changes occurred during cold periods. I felt that human beings were still animals."

The match between climate and warfare "would seem to make perfect sense", says economist Gary Yohe of Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, a contributor to the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

He agrees that migrations or shortages brought on by climate change could lead to increased tensions and warfare.

"The potential for human conflict within and across national boundaries is certainly something that climate change could exacerbate," he says. "There is a long history of nation states invading other nation states for natural resources."

Recently, a United Nations report declared that climate change was one of the causes of the conflict in Darfur, although experts on the region have criticised this conclusion as being too simplistic.

Sinologist Rudolf Wagner of the University of Heidelberg in Germany says that poor growing weather would be one of several contributing factors for war in China. "In extreme cases, I think there is definitely something to it."

But, he adds, organisational, social and political factors—such as whether governments could control their territory, and how they treated their people—are also important. "The paper is interesting but I think a bit overdone," he says.

Zhang, however, believes that the strife-inducing effect of cold weather was probably not confined to China. "In the coldest period of the Little Ice Age, we can find the general crisis of the seventeenth century in Europe, Japan, Korea and the Ottoman Empire," he says.

[joshvajohn]

India cannot contain China at least for a few more decades in terms of power and money. It can only do so by democratic sucesses and also political stability and strong leadership and also economically growing. This will strongly damage China as the argument will be democracy is better than red army, red tapism, cold murder of officials just for bribing (while leaders can call it donation to marxism and gift personally), poor man has food and shelter but the military is luxorius.

India should develop scholarship for young Chinese students to come to India and see the development and understand democracy. India also should bring more people for business and send all these naxals to go and see there - the conditions of the normal man versus the neo-liberal rich ones in the streets of Shanghai.

More intercultural engagement of people at grassroots should happen as Chinese have got a lot of misapprehension about Indians as provided/ridiculed by the Chinese Govt and also Indians about Chinese. This would enable people to interact at large levels and would be a good strategy for both countries to develop a better understanding though militarility Red Army is still a threat to Indian Interests.

[Rye]

joshvajohn wrote:

India should develop scholarship for young Chinese students to come to India and see the development and understand democracy.

And leave an open-door policy for chinese spooks to operate in India, while India does not secure a similar advantage? Seems like a silly idea without total reciprocity, and a totalitarian china can make India believe there is reciprocity without there being any real reciprocity.

The chinese already have their footsoldiers in the CPI(M) providing intel and information about India on a regular basis....any reason why we should make things easier for the CPI(M) and their bosses in China?

[Philip]

Ram here's an answer,though a little dated.However,developments since the article was written have only confirmed the general plan of the PLN and its chief,Adm. Ding-Fa ,accelerating the buildng and acquisition of modern subs into the Chinese navy.

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813965

Trouble below

China's submarines pose regional, strategic challenges
By Richard D. Fisher Jr.
For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the United States faces a resurgent submarine challenge from a state that is seeking to challenge American pre-eminence in Asia, and likely beyond. China is making a large-scale investment in the building up and sustaining of its submarine force, along with impressive investments in submarine weapons, surface warship, combat aircraft and space assets to complement its submarine force. Since the early World War II Battle of the Atlantic, when Germany's relatively small SSK fleet nearly knocked the U.S. out of the war, the U.S. has never let its strategic interests be so threatened by a foreign submarine fleet.

The submarine pre-eminence enjoyed by the U.S. today requires continued investment in both weapons and personnel, especially given China's determined buildup.

China is building up its People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) not only to achieve regional military dominance in Asia, but also to give Beijing increasing options for the global exercise of military power. For the remainder of this decade, the most important element of the PLAN's buildup will be its nuclear and conventional submarines.

It is noteworthy that current PLAN Commander Adm. Zhang Dingfa is a nuclear submariner. Until the growth of carrier aviation in the next decade, submarines will remain at the core of China's developing naval doctrines, which serve to achieve the strategic objectives of the state.

Through the 1990s, which saw the formation of doctrinal and industrial advances that are now propelling the transformation of the PLAN's submarine force, that force remained wedded to largely defensive naval doctrines and operations in coastal areas. The operational focus that was developed during the 1990s, and which will remain during the medium term, is to prepare for possible conflict to subdue Taiwan, and along with that, prevent the U.S. Navy from defending Taiwan if there is a decision to attack. Initially, the PLAN's goal is to join nuclear submarines (SSNs) and conventional submarines (SSKs) with ships and new aircraft, all equipped with new missiles, to operate in conjunction with PLA Air Force and even new 2nd Artillery ballistic missile forces, to attack enemy ships and their bases. This has led to the development of new classes of submarines and their weapons but has also propelled the PLAN to exploit new information technologies under the doctrinal goal of "informationalization." In addition, with the launching of the PLAN's first second-generation nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) in June 2004, the submarine force will quickly assume nuclear deterrent and attack missions.

FLEET GROWTH

Of particular concern to the U.S. and its allies is the speed of the PLAN buildup of new modern nuclear and conventional submarines. The PLA Navy submarine force started this decade with about 70 conventional and nuclear submarines and is likely to end the decade with roughly the same number. What is changing is the number of first- and second-generation Type 033 Romeo and Type 035 Mings, which are being replaced in the active force at a nearly 1-for-1 rate by third- and third-plus-generation submarines. According to U.S. government sources, from 2002 to mid-2005 the PLA Navy built 14 submarines. These included the first Type 094 Jin second-generation SSBN, two Type 093 Shang SSNs, the first Yuan-class SSK and 10 Type 039A Song SSKs. In 2006, the PLA Navy is expected to launch its third Shang and will finish taking delivery of eight Russian Kilo 636M SSKs. If this rate is sustained, China could produce and purchase about 40 new submarines this decade.

This acquisition surge follows a substantial investment in submarine development, production and logistic support capability. Nuclear submarine production facilities in Huludao were modernized in the late 1990s to enable the series production of both SSNs and SSBNs that is now underway. In 2003, China started building its new Type 039A Song-class submarines at a second conventional submarine yard at the Jiangshan shipyards Shanghai, while the traditional yard at Wuhan started construction of the new Yuan-class SSK in addition to the Song. For its 2002 order of eight new Kilo 636M submarines, China invested in the revival of two additional Russian submarine yards to accelerate delivery. Foreign sources also note that the PLAN is building up to five "new" submarine bases, though PLA sources note some of these new facilities are expansions of current bases. New foreign technologies, to include modern welding robots from Russia and computer-aided design systems from Europe, have been critical to the success of China's submarine production expansion. There has also been a vigorous exchange in dual-use fuel cell technology between German and Chinese engineers, with many of the latter coming from PLAN institutes.

U.S. sources point to substantial cooperation between Russia and China. The Type 093 has often been described as having performance similar to the Project 671 (Victor III) SSN, and Russia has provided particular assistance to China's naval nuclear propulsion development. In recent years, however, as the prospect of European competition has loomed, Russia has relaxed previous limits on the level of military technology sold to China, and it stands to reason that Russia may be selling China ever more modern nuclear and conventional submarine technologies. In a 2004 unclassified publication, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) projected that the Type 094 SSBN would have a submarine-launched ballistic- missile (SLBM) "farm" that is strikingly similar to that projected for the Russian fourth-generation Project 955 Borei SSBN. This raises the possibility that some Russian fourth-generation submarine technologies are also migrating to China.

NUCLEAR WAR-FIGHTING GROWTH

In June 2004, the PLA launched its first second-generation Type 094 Jin class SSBN. In contrast to the long-gestating and troubled Type 092 Xia-class, the Type 094 is expected to constitute China's first reliable nuclear second-strike force within the next year or two. In the mid-1990s, reports emerged that Russia's Rubin Bureau was assisting China's nuclear submarine effort. It is curious that Rubin is the lead designer for the new Project 955 SSBN, an upgraded version of the Project 667BDRM (Delta IV). ONI has adjusted its projection for the Type 094 from 16 JL-2 SLBMs to 12, the same number as projected for the Project 955. It is variously estimated that China will build four to six new SSBNs.

The buildup and basing of China's second-generation SSBN force will also create strategic pressures for the United States, its friends and its allies. In early 2005, the PLA deployed a Type 091 Han class nuclear attack submarine to its South Sea Fleet base at Yulin, on the southern end of Hainan Island. Some Asian military officials believe that in 2006 the PLAN will begin operations at a new nuclear-submarine base beside Yulin that will become a new base for PLAN SSBNs and SSNs. This base was constructed to give near-immediate access to waters for deep water patrols, which is not possible in the shallow Bohai Gulf, the current base area for the solitary Type 092. But to hit targets in the United States with their new 5,000-plus-nautical-mile-range JL-2 SLBMs, these SSBNs will have to travel between the Philippines and Taiwan. This will mean that the PLAN's focus of operations will shift to the south to support SSBN access, requiring that additional ship and aircraft resources be deployed south.

NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINES

Following a lengthy development program that started in the 1970s, the PLA launched its first second-generation nuclear attack submarine in December 2002. A second was launched in late 2003, with a third under construction, and the first was expected to enter service in 2005. Designated the Shang class by the U.S. Navy and known as the Type 093 in the PLA Navy, it is widely believed to constitute a major technological advance over the first-generation Type 091 Han class SSN. The 2003 Pentagon report on the PLA noted, "The Type 093-class will compare to the technology of the Russian Victor III SSN and will carry wire-guided and wake-homing torpedoes, as well as cruise missiles." However, the only known picture of the Type 093 shows its sail is a consistent development from the Type 091: thin, with diving planes in the U.S. fashion. If the Type 093 were to approach the acoustic performance of the Project 671RTM (Victor III), it would be superior to early SSN 688 Los Angeles class SSNs. Though not as good as the latest SSN 21 Seawolf and SSN 774 Virginia, the Type 093 would constitute a remarkable advance over the widely acknowledged poor acoustic performance of the Type 091.

Barring conjecture that the Type 093 may incorporate unknown elements of Russian fourth-generation nuclear submarines that may further improve its acoustic and combat performance, it can be expected that the PLA will aggressively pursue improvements for the Type 093 or even rapidly develop follow-on classes in the next decade. China can be expected to develop or seek Russian assistance with new large spherical sonar arrays, quieting technologies, propulsors, advanced underwater communications, vertical launch tubes for cruise missiles, and canted torpedo tubes. It is also likely that China will seek to follow the U.S. example and incorporate unmanned underwater vehicles and energy weapons on to its new SSNs.

To replace its more numerous and less sophisticated Type 033- and 035-class conventional attack submarines, the PLA is taking delivery of three new SSK types. The U.S. Navy was reported to have been surprised by the launching of a new type of Chinese SSK at the Wuhan yard in July 2004. Dubbed the Yuan class by the U.S. Navy, it has since been in testing at the Northern Fleet submarine development complex at Qingdao. While the Chinese have released virtually no data on this submarine, many Internet source photos confirm its broad similarity to the new Rubin-class Project 667 Lada/Amur-class SSK, although the Yuan may be similar in size to the larger Kilo. The Yuan exhibits modern anechoic tiling, and the "step" deck that Rubin has used to develop vertical cruise missile launch tubes aft the sail for future versions of the Lada. If, as suspected, there has been substantial Russian input, it would be safe to project that the Yuan also incorporates advanced quieting technologies and better automated combat-and-control systems, and, in the future (if not already) will incorporate new Russian or Chinese-designed air-independent propulsion systems.

Russia already has made a substantial contribution to the PLAN's new submarine capabilities through the sale of 12 Rubin-designed Kilo class SSKs. The first two Project 877EM export models introduced the PLAN to modern SSK technology and led the PLA to order two of the more capable Kilo 636 model. Following initial challenges absorbing these ships, most are now stationed with the East Sea Fleet nearest Taiwan. The latest batch of eight new Kilo 636M submarines appears to be divided between the East Sea Fleet and the South Sea Fleet.

In addition to improvements in quieting and automation, the Kilo 636M also features the Novator Club-S series of three missiles. These include the 220-kilometer-range 3M-54E anti-ship cruise missile, which uses a unique supersonic second stage to defeat close-in weapon system defenses. The 91RE1 fires a purpose-designed lightweight torpedo out to a maximum range of 50 kilometers. And the 3M-14E is a 300-kilometer-range subsonic terrain-following land-attack cruise missile. Russian sources have told the author that China has purchased all three of these missiles for its new Kilos. Also, the Kilos allowed the PLAN to have access to other modern Russian submarine weapons to include their latest homing and wake-homing torpedoes, and new mobile mines. In late 2003, there were Russian press reports of the nation considering selling China the rights to co-produce up to 20 Kilos, a prospect that seems less likely should the Yuan prove successful. However, it cannot be discounted that China may order more Russian-built Kilos, having already invested in substantial production expansion.

The 2002 order for the Kilo is often linked to problems that China had with its Type 039 Song SSK, but its protracted development issues of the 1990s were largely solved by the time the latest Kilo contract was signed. According to a European submarine industry source, the Type 039's problems stemmed from the inability of Israeli consultants to meld disparate foreign technologies. By 2005, however, an estimated 12 to 14 Songs had been launched, with reports noting that at least three more are under construction. And the decision to expand production of this submarine to a second shipyard constitutes a vote of confidence in its design. Since 2004, the PLA has marketed the Type 039, and Pakistan could emerge as an early customer for this type.

Roughly similar in size and appearance to the French Agosta-class SSK, the Type 039 or 039A Song is a clear improvement over the Type 035 Ming, in turn a development of the 1950s Russian Romeo design. The Song uses an Agosta-style sail with diving planes, and Chinese TV coverage shows it makes ample use of digital command-and-control systems, indicating some degree of automation. Internet source photos of Song construction in Shanghai also show it employs sophisticated two-level anechoic covering. The Song is also armed with a sub-launched version of the 40-kilometer-range YJ-81 anti-ship missile, in addition to Chinese-made torpedoes.

While the numbers of Type 033 Romeo and Type 035 Ming SSKs may be declining in the active force, it is possible that many will be retained for training or combat reserve missions. As part of its still-relevant "People's War" doctrines, the PLA is averse to simply discarding weapons that still work, regardless of whether they are obsolete. Some PLAN writers have identified missions for these older submarines to include laying mines, transporting special forces and acting as decoys to expose more capable, but less numerous, U.S. submarines.

REACHING OUT

PLAN submarines typically have not been deployed far from their bases. While there have been rumors for some time of aggressive movements by PLAN submarines during the March 1996 confrontation over Taiwan, the most visible PLA use of its submarines occurred in November 2004. Destroyers and P-3 Orion anti-submarine warfare aircraft of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force tracked Han-class SSN No. 405 for several hours as it briefly clipped Japanese territorial waters. No. 405 was on its way back from circumnavigating Guam, and apparently had been tracked by the U.S. Navy since it left its Northern Fleet base at Qingdao. Such sorties, designed to test U.S. and Japanese reactions, are likely to become more frequent as the number of new PLAN submarines continues to grow.

In addition, as the focus of its nuclear second-strike capability moves south, it can be expected that Beijing will become more belligerent regarding its territorial claims in the South China Sea. After three decades of a hot-cold military-diplomatic campaign to seize and build up small island bases in the South China Sea, Beijing is now in a lull period. But as it builds up its strategic nuclear presence in Hainan, China will be tempted to undertake military operations to capture Taiwan's island holdings at Itu Aba, the Pratas, and possibly as far as the Peng Hu Islands in the middle of the Taiwan Strait in order to ensure no opposing force can use them to prosecute PLAN SSBNs. China may demonstrate high sensitivity to future U.S. and Japanese naval activities in this region, increasing the chances of naval incidents. The April 2001 EP-3 incident offers just a foretaste of the PLA's resistance should the U.S. move to shadow and contain Hainan-based SSBNs.

Also, before the end of the decade, new Type 093 SSNs are likely to be able to carry out small-scale but politically powerful power-projection missions for the Chinese leadership. This will follow from the expectation that the Type 093 SSN will be the only PLA platform that can carry a version of the PLA's new land-attack cruise missile (LACM) to the world's littoral areas. These LACMs are expected to have a range of 1,000 kilometers to 2,000 kilometers and to be cued and guided by an initial space constellation of imaging and communication, expected to be in place by the end of the decade. It is not inconceivable that by early in the next decade China could be using these LACMs to intervene in distant countries to favor political factions loyal to Beijing.

China's commitment to increasing both the numbers and the capabilities of its submarine forces comes at a time of increasing fiscal constraint for the U.S. Navy's submarine and anti-submarine forces. It has long been reported that budgetary pressures could have dire consequences should U.S. SSN production decline to less than one per year, with SSN numbers seen as falling to between 30 and 40 by the end of the next decade. This would clearly be unacceptable given the global strategic commitments supported by the U.S. submarine fleet and the expected rapid rise in PLAN submarine numbers. Should there be a conflict in which the U.S. would choose to defend Taiwan from Chinese attack, Washington simply may not have sufficient submarines to hold the line long enough. Despite projections of continuing U.S. technical superiority, the nation simply may not be able to withstand a superior number of China's Russian-influenced third- or third-plus-generation submarines.

Other Asian democracies will face pressures from China's submarines. The PLA's 2002 order for eight more upgraded Kilo 636M SSKs sought to match the U.S. 2001 commitment to sell Taiwan eight SSKs. The PLA will have its new submarines by 2006, whereas, because of politics in Taipei, it remains undecided whether or when Taiwan will receive theirs. In addition, barring a significant increase in defense spending, Japan is expected to sustain its fleet of 15 to 16 SSKs. Though modern, and manned by highly professional crews, Japan's submarine fleet would be overwhelmed by the PLAN's sub fleet in the event of a Sino-Japanese war, such as a conflict over resource claims in the East China Sea.

[vsudhir]

China's military might: The long march to be a superpower (Economist)

[pradeepe]

deleted -

[Calvin]

Pradeep - you are right. I have deleted my message to avoid introducing confusion where none exists.

[SaiK]

http://ipcs.org/IPCS-IssueBrief-No48.pdf

China’s New War Concepts for 21st Century Battlefields

[m_bose]

Chinese Military Hacks into Pentagon

[alokgupt]

Check out the china's road network in Tibet below. At first glance it may seem that all roads are far away from AP border but look closer (using google earth) and you will realize that Lhasa to Bangda connection passes very close the major passes (international border) into Arunachal Pradesh. Also Bangda (not very far from AP border) has one of the largest airport runway. What's the GDP of Bangda? How much people live close enough to really use the flights from Bangda?

http://www.tibettravel.info/tibet-map/

[vsudhir]

The man behind China's missiles (Asia times)

During the exchange, General Jing reaffirmed the centrality of the "no first use" principle to China's nuclear doctrine, which helped to offset some of the growing concern in US circles over PLA General Zhu Chenghu's comments in Hong Kong three months earlier. Zhu, a dean at the National Defense University, told reporters that "if the Americans draw their missiles and precision-guided ammunitions onto the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons".

PRC mouthing NFU?

Jing Zhiyuan's constructive approach to talks with his US guests, as well as his assertion that his seat on the Central Military Commission (CMC) puts him "in a position to clarify the issue" of Chinese nuclear doctrine, left a favorable enough impression on Rumsfeld and Rodman for them to conclude that General Jing was the type of figure who could serve as a valuable conduit for military-to-military exchanges between China and the United States.

[Laks]

http://saag.org/%5Cpapers25%5Cpaper2404.html
China Unveils its New Power

By Bhaskar Roy

The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, recently published a photograph of its navy’s most modern submarine, Type 093. It had finally achieved its ambition to deploy a second generation nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). It has two nuclear power plants, steam turbine drive and can reach a speed of at least 30 knots. Its operational dive depth is reported to be 400 metres, for a standstill noise avoidance position possibly to counter easy detection.

The submarine has a variety of armament including long range anti-ship torpedoes, anti-ship cruise missiles and land attack cruise missile. The Type 093 was built with Russian assistance. It is to be followed up by the deployment of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), currently under trial.

Publishing the photograph of the Type 093 submarine is an emphatic message to Taiwan, especially Taiwanese President Chen Shiu-bin who has been frequently provoking Beijing on the Taiwanese independence issue. Chen, who is also the leader of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) recently made an attempt to make Taiwan a member of the UN with the support of a few small countries. Chen and the DPP were obviously aware that their UN membership attempt would go nowhere, but they were confident that the very move would greatly disturb Beijing. China achieved his objective.

The Chinese army, the PLA, has deployed about 800 M-9 missiles pointing at Taiwan. They could flatten the island if they wanted to but, at the same time, they cannot. The Taiwanese people are their compatriots, and such an attack will result in unacceptable casualties. Hence, one of China’s strategies is a naval blockade of Taiwan, if the island forces a face off. This way, the Taiwanese authorities can be squeezed and a strong movement can be engineered against the ruling regime from inside.

Taiwan reunification is China’s highest priority and would conclude its major territorial ambitions. A quiet debate has been going on in the country for sometime about how long they can wait. One group feels that except for a seat in the UN, Taiwan is a de facto independent country and if they wait for too long it may become de jure eventually. Hence, internal pressure for an early situation may arise. Here, the PLA has an important say.

There is a problem, however. How will the Americans react? The US Navy’s 7th Fleet is stationed in the region. Another seven carrier task forces would become available. The Japanese may not be far behind after their 2004 enhanced defence agreement with the USA. Then China’s only hope becomes to create a credible deterrence against the US Navy. The Type 093 SSN’s anti-ship missiles and torpedoes are capable of sinking large ships. In addition, the sovereign clan of acquired from Russia are also highly lethal. From China’s point of view it will have achieved its objective in a very short time and make it a fait accompli before the US military might is unleashed.

Unification of Taiwan with the backing of a powerful and modern military, whether used or not, is the highest priority task for Beijing. But matters do not stop here. More important, implications for regional stability will follow as a natural corollary and the signs are already there. For the time, however, Beijing has shown Chen Shuibian if may not hesitate to use a naval blockade to check his independence aspiration. Thus the display of the Type 093 SSN flag.

China straddles the Asia Pacific region with the USA projecting its influence at the next level. Japan and Australia follow thereafter, although the John Howard government in Australia is reluctant to get into any confrontation in the region, especially the Taiwan Strait.

The new dialogue concept, the ‘Quadrilateral Arrangement’ between the USA, India, Japan and Australia has raised China’s concern as another ‘China encirclement’ partnership. China is unnecessarily worried since each of the four countries have their own relationship and interests with China which prevents such an encirclement concept.

At the same time China’s military modernisation with diplomacy giving glimpses of what they are capable of in the region and beyond to establish their great power station, is obviously worrying for its small neighbours. With the demonstration of their anti-satellite warfare capability earlier this year, Beijing’s message they are preparing for a five-dimensional warfare has not been missed. China’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) which includes informatics warfare may add another dimension.

Any country has the legitimate and sovereign right to build its defence capability. But when such military modernisation goes well outside the requirement of its environment, the development calls for some alert.

When China launches a consistent barrage about India’s big power ambition and colonial aspirations against its neighbours with military development, this becomes a matter of serious concern. The Chinese have been doing exactly this.

Therefore, going beyond Taiwan, China’s growing military might in all its dimensions casts a dark shadow on the rest of greater Asia with India as a perceived hurdle to its colonial ambitions with Chinese characteristics, periodic placebos notwithstanding. This distils to China’s unipolar Asia agenda, and it is in some kind of hurry to consolidate its position as the Asian pole.

This is a very uncomfortable thought to go to sleep with.

(The author is an eminent China analyst with many years of experience of study on the developments in China. The views expressed by the author are his own. He can be reached at grouchohart@yahoo.com)

[alokgupt]

It seems SAAG has done their homework. I have been a broken record asking for 6-8 more divisions (4-5 in north west and 2-3 in the east). This is absolutely must unless India wants give up Ladakh to China. Also India needs to maintain greater than 1200 fighter air force. A cheaper option could be simply build thousands of nuclear war heads.

http://www.saag.org/papers8/paper734.html

Indian Army’s Manpower Requirements: This is a subject which never receives detailed scrutiny. Before the Kargil War, the then COAS, General Malik had planned a cut of 50,000 personnel and which subsequent events proved to be unwise.

India’s terrain configuration, mountain warfare, high altitude warfare and combating Pakistan’s proxy war do not permit the luxury of substituting technical equipment in place of increased manpower.

Post-Kargil War, a number of senior Indian Army officers have over-emphasised the requirement of technical gadgetry to explain the otherwise lack of proper surveillance. What must not be forgotten is that in our operational environment, it is the “ Infantry man’ who counts both for surveillance and subsequent tactical actions thereafter. Indian Army's operational environment dictate manpower-extensive requirements.

India needs to increase its Infantry/Mountain divisions by an additional 6-8 divisions at the very least.

[Sanjay M]

Type 093 won't be traveling into Ladakh, it'll be moving into the Bay of Bengal and on to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.

Meanwhile, India's 1st-generation ATV has yet to be completed.

[ramana]

And pray how will the Type 093 move into the Bay of Bengal? What route from its home port? Unless its in Myanmar.

[Sanjay M]

I imagine that's what the Grand Cocos Islands, Gwadar and the String of Pearls strategy will be telling us.

Hey, maybe they can pass through the Great Sethusamudram, once DMK has accomplished its goal of driving Sri Lanka into China's arms.

[Sanjay M]

China Toughening Up on Taiwan

sounds like things are on a collision course

[bala]

China may have intruded into Bhutan territory

[quote]China may have intruded into Bhutanese territory in the recent past and Delhi is in the process of ascertaining the factual position with Thimphu and Beijing.

“Probably, there is Chinese intrusion in Bhutan. We are checking that out both with China and Bhutan,â€

[Philip]

I agree with the need to beef up our strength on the Chinese border.At least 5 divisions which specialise in "Himalayan" mountain warfare are needed to counter China's growing adventurism.Worse is the state of our infrastructure on our side of the border.AfterChina opened its railway to Tibet,one must note how its bragadoccio has increased along with its intrusdions on the ground.Wealso need an extra couple of divisions specialising in tropical/jungle warfare to deal with the coming crisis in Burma.