Formation and Evolution of Pakistan : The Real Story
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Prem, The Brits were one of the factors. I wasnt the one who says they were prime factor.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
There is saying in North " jub apna Sikka hi Khota to doosro ko kyon blame kare".
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Prem If we had visionary leaders and been able to stave of Western interference (includes Soviet) we could have had the Asian domination we wanted. The IM are our own and we were unable to channel their energies outward to the greater Middle East as they should have been.
maybe in this century!
maybe in this century!
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
The issue of partion (i.e. TSP formation) is explained in history books as follows:
Recent spurt of new history information gives clues to study this. Those with more knowledge should post summaries of that to educate us.
One important thing is that while we have had threads to analyze and lay bare Islaamism, Indianism, etc. but there has been no efforts to analyze British Psychology. Understand that is an important element of the whole puzzle. They after all were in control when the idea was conceived and implemented.
- Musilims wanted a separate country,
- They organized under Musalim League, with Jinnah as the leader,
- British tried their best to calm the situation and avoid a conflict or partition,
- INC+Gandhi+JLN also tried, but in the end it was inevitable
- In the end British were forced to accept partition as the sole means left to establish peace
- They called a lawyer named Radcliffe and asked him to do a tough job and left,
- Despite best british efforts many were killed, after they left.
Recent spurt of new history information gives clues to study this. Those with more knowledge should post summaries of that to educate us.
One important thing is that while we have had threads to analyze and lay bare Islaamism, Indianism, etc. but there has been no efforts to analyze British Psychology. Understand that is an important element of the whole puzzle. They after all were in control when the idea was conceived and implemented.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
awesome thread. i dont want to derail it. what do you think of the fallout of the goings on in pakistan on india? what do we do with all these ideological islamists? I only hope the IMs can temper them and tutor them in nazariya-e-reality-and-dal-roti.
if there is any other discussing this, please let me know.
if there is any other discussing this, please let me know.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
For this thread an excellent book is The Shadow of the Great Game by Narendra Singh Sarila. Many of our BRF members have read this amazing book including Shiv and Johann.
The summary of this book is that the British administration in India allied with the Muslim League to keep the nationalist movement for Independence under check. They helped Jinnah against his Muslim rivals in the Punjab, UP, and Bengal, forcing these leaders to apply for dual membership to the League. But they stopped short of agreeing to the formation of Pakistan.
It was the Second World War, which started the process of the unravelling of the British Empire. It saw the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power, once again reclaiming its postion in Central Asia and pressing south into Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. To protect the oil wells, controlled by western companies, from falling into Soviet hands, the British Empire needed a reliable partner in northwestern India from where military and spying operations could be carried out against the Soviet Union.
If WWII had not occured, the British had plans of continuing their occupation of India well into the 1960s. Jinnah and his Muslim League would have been happy to continue as serville partners of the British in this situation, all their claims for Pakistan forgotten. With the war forever destroying Britain's global standing, the British administration in India and the UK, followed a policy of violence and intimidation against the nationalists (the massacre of civilians in Bombay during the naval ratings mutiny, the brutal use of military force during the Quit India movement where people were straffed by machine-guns from aircraft).
By contrast, to the planned communal terrorism of the Muslim League the British adopted a policy of: look the other way, take no effective action. NPA Smith, director of the Intelligence Bureau, wrote in a memorandum to the Viceroy Wavell who forwarded the same to London:
Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem.
The summary of this book is that the British administration in India allied with the Muslim League to keep the nationalist movement for Independence under check. They helped Jinnah against his Muslim rivals in the Punjab, UP, and Bengal, forcing these leaders to apply for dual membership to the League. But they stopped short of agreeing to the formation of Pakistan.
It was the Second World War, which started the process of the unravelling of the British Empire. It saw the emergence of the Soviet Union as a global power, once again reclaiming its postion in Central Asia and pressing south into Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. To protect the oil wells, controlled by western companies, from falling into Soviet hands, the British Empire needed a reliable partner in northwestern India from where military and spying operations could be carried out against the Soviet Union.
If WWII had not occured, the British had plans of continuing their occupation of India well into the 1960s. Jinnah and his Muslim League would have been happy to continue as serville partners of the British in this situation, all their claims for Pakistan forgotten. With the war forever destroying Britain's global standing, the British administration in India and the UK, followed a policy of violence and intimidation against the nationalists (the massacre of civilians in Bombay during the naval ratings mutiny, the brutal use of military force during the Quit India movement where people were straffed by machine-guns from aircraft).
By contrast, to the planned communal terrorism of the Muslim League the British adopted a policy of: look the other way, take no effective action. NPA Smith, director of the Intelligence Bureau, wrote in a memorandum to the Viceroy Wavell who forwarded the same to London:
Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
I read a book about a year ago, titled "Shameful Flight". It was about the British withdrawal from India, and the Partition, and the horrific way they handled it. But the book starts from the late 1930s and the demand for Pakistan, and covers a lot of details about how the British patronised Jinnah and the Muslim League, when the Congress leaders boycotted the War effort. Unfortunately I do not remember the details, since it's been a while since I read it, but all the same, the book was a good source of information on the political wheeling-dealings going on at the time, and the behind the scenes encouragement given to Jinnah to spite the Congress. The book almost goes out to hold Churchill and Mountbatten responsible for Partition and its aftermath.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
^^^^^^
The true architect of the Partition plan was Viceroy Wavell, who had earlier been the C-in-C when the British were defeated by the Japanese in SE Asia. He wrote a letter to King George V soon after taking office:
"I can never entirely rid my mind of the recollections that in 1942 at almost the most critical period of the war in India, when I was endeavouring as C-in-C to secure India with very limited resources against Japanese invasion, the supporters of the Congress made a deliberate effort to paralyse my communications to the eastern front by widespread sabotage and looting (ie the Quit India movement)."
Wavell had been stunned to learn that Indian POWs, to the number of 10,000 (British estimate but the INA sources claimed 50,000 recruits), had joined SC Bose to form the Indian National Army.
Viceroy Wavell had come to the conclusion that the British position in India was on the verge of collapse. The way to preserve the British position worldwide (in the form of the Commonwealth), was a deeper alliance with the Muslim League. Wavell took it upon himself to build up Jinnah as a spokesperson for all Muslims, and to brush a friendly coat of paint on all Muslims. Wavell in a note to the UK goverment said, "The immense gulf between the Hindu religion and mentality and ours and the Moslem is the real core of all our troubles in India."
James Glancy, governor of Punjab which was crucial for the creation of Pakistan, wrote to Wavell, "Jinnah's claim to nominate all Muslims appears to me in light of League's meagre hold on Muslim-majority provinces, to be outrageously unreasonable.....If Pakistan becomes an imminent reality we shall be heading for bloodhsed on a wide scale."
Poor Glancy! He wasn't made aware of Britain's strategic reasons for creating Pakistan as a western puppet, and his prophetic warning fell on deaf ears.
The "Transfer of Power documents", recently declassified have the orignal maps prepared by Viceroy Wavell demarcating the proposed Pakistan, closely matching the Radcliffe Line drawn up two years later! It was also Wavell who said the Gurdaspur district would have to go with India for geographical reasons even though it was 51% Muslim:
"Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan."
Gurdaspur provided road access to Amritsar. The people who later blamed Cyril Radcliffe for the unfairness of the Partition plan were not aware that the same had been prepared much earlier by Wavell. Radcliffe merely implemented the broad outline of Wavell's plan at the village and tehsil level.
added later:
For Calcutta also it was Wavell who said: "There is no case...for including Calcutta in Pakistan. The Moslems will probably try to negotiate for its being made a free port."
The true architect of the Partition plan was Viceroy Wavell, who had earlier been the C-in-C when the British were defeated by the Japanese in SE Asia. He wrote a letter to King George V soon after taking office:
"I can never entirely rid my mind of the recollections that in 1942 at almost the most critical period of the war in India, when I was endeavouring as C-in-C to secure India with very limited resources against Japanese invasion, the supporters of the Congress made a deliberate effort to paralyse my communications to the eastern front by widespread sabotage and looting (ie the Quit India movement)."
Wavell had been stunned to learn that Indian POWs, to the number of 10,000 (British estimate but the INA sources claimed 50,000 recruits), had joined SC Bose to form the Indian National Army.
Viceroy Wavell had come to the conclusion that the British position in India was on the verge of collapse. The way to preserve the British position worldwide (in the form of the Commonwealth), was a deeper alliance with the Muslim League. Wavell took it upon himself to build up Jinnah as a spokesperson for all Muslims, and to brush a friendly coat of paint on all Muslims. Wavell in a note to the UK goverment said, "The immense gulf between the Hindu religion and mentality and ours and the Moslem is the real core of all our troubles in India."
James Glancy, governor of Punjab which was crucial for the creation of Pakistan, wrote to Wavell, "Jinnah's claim to nominate all Muslims appears to me in light of League's meagre hold on Muslim-majority provinces, to be outrageously unreasonable.....If Pakistan becomes an imminent reality we shall be heading for bloodhsed on a wide scale."
Poor Glancy! He wasn't made aware of Britain's strategic reasons for creating Pakistan as a western puppet, and his prophetic warning fell on deaf ears.
The "Transfer of Power documents", recently declassified have the orignal maps prepared by Viceroy Wavell demarcating the proposed Pakistan, closely matching the Radcliffe Line drawn up two years later! It was also Wavell who said the Gurdaspur district would have to go with India for geographical reasons even though it was 51% Muslim:
"Gurdaspur must go with Amritsar for geographical reasons and Amritsar being sacred city of Sikhs must stay out of Pakistan."
Gurdaspur provided road access to Amritsar. The people who later blamed Cyril Radcliffe for the unfairness of the Partition plan were not aware that the same had been prepared much earlier by Wavell. Radcliffe merely implemented the broad outline of Wavell's plan at the village and tehsil level.
added later:
For Calcutta also it was Wavell who said: "There is no case...for including Calcutta in Pakistan. The Moslems will probably try to negotiate for its being made a free port."
Last edited by Airavat on 09 May 2009 05:49, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?Airavat wrote:^^^^^^
The true architect of the Partition plan was Viceroy Wavell, who had earlier been the C-in-C when the British were defeated by the Japanese in SE Asia. He wrote a letter to King George V soon after taking office:
"I can never entirely rid my mind of the recollections that in 1942 at almost the most critical period of the war in India, when I was endeavouring as C-in-C to secure India with very limited resources against Japanese invasion, the supporters of the Congress made a deliberate effort to paralyse my communications to the eastern front by widespread sabotage and looting (ie the Quit India movement)."
Wavell had been stunned to learn that Indian POWs, to the number of 10,000 (British estimate but the INA sources claimed 50,000 recruits), had joined SC Bose to form the Indian National Army.
...
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Historical Capital of India - Geographical extension - South Africa, Zanzibar, Oman, Arabian Sea, Burma, Malaysia, SE Asia , Central asia was too big to be left to India alone by the Imperial powers. THey cut it down.KV Rao wrote:
Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?
Pak is not attacking Indian state alone, It is attacking the Indian influence world wide.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Yes, but Muslims formed a significant portion of the INA; many of these ex-INA Muslims were used by Pakistan in the invasion of J&K State.KV Rao wrote:Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?
There was an alternative to Pakistan proposed by many British strategic thinkers like Caroe.
Olaf Caroe had been foreign secretary in Delhi (1939-46) and the adviser to both Linlithgow and Wavell on British India's policy towards Afghanistan, Xinjiang (now under China), and the Persian Gulf region. To secure Afghanistan and the Middle-East he proposed that the British keep control of tribal areas on the Indian frontier; from Baluchistan to NWFP. Access to Xinjiang would come from the tribal areas of J&K State, Gilgit and Chitral, connected by land to NWFP.
Caroe believed that the British had a long experience of handling the tribes, and that it would be easier to separate only the tribal areas from India, than to create Pakistan for the upper-caste Muslims. He felt the latter would be unable to control or influence Afghanistan and would instead engage in communal warfare against India, and would drag Britain into the mess as their ally.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
It is news to me that some Muslim ex-INA soldiers were involved in the attack by Pakistan on J&K . However, muslim participation in the INA and the later treachery of some of them in J&K echoes the dynamics of the 1857 war. At that time, Muslims and Hindus fought together, but on the Muslim slde there was a powerful strain of desire to revive something like the Mughal empire, or at least some modern successor of that ideology. Many writers say that the seeds of Pakistan were sown in 1857.Airavat wrote:Yes, but Muslims formed a significant portion of the INA; many of these ex-INA Muslims were used by Pakistan in the invasion of J&K State.KV Rao wrote:Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?
There was an alternative to Pakistan proposed by many British strategic thinkers like Caroe.
Olaf Caroe had been foreign secretary in Delhi (1939-46) and the adviser to both Linlithgow and Wavell on British India's policy towards Afghanistan, Xinjiang (now under China), and the Persian Gulf region. To secure Afghanistan and the Middle-East he proposed that the British keep control of tribal areas on the Indian frontier; from Baluchistan to NWFP. Access to Xinjiang would come from the tribal areas of J&K State, Gilgit and Chitral, connected by land to NWFP.
Caroe believed that the British had a long experience of handling the tribes, and that it would be easier to separate only the tribal areas from India, than to create Pakistan for the upper-caste Muslims. He felt the latter would be unable to control or influence Afghanistan and would instead engage in communal warfare against India, and would drag Britain into the mess as their ally.
This analogy offers some insight to conjecture about the historical forces that led to Pakistan as well as its present predicament:
1a. An ideology of Muslim supremacism and entitlement, combined with resentment at thwarting of the same by the British empire.
1b. The mindset generated by this ideology was more conducive for political consolidation of the masses than for the acquisition and dissemination of competitive modern skillsets.
.
2. A drive towards 'purification' of that same ideology and the natural attraction of stunted adolescent minds (representing most of the religiously indoctrinated) for such 'purity'.
3. 1 and 2 intersecting with the growth of ideologies of racial purity and supremacism in Europe. (In retrospect, it would turn out that this was the last and most impressive gasp of such ideologies which have been commonplace in human tribal history) Westernized Muslim intellectuals like Iqbal, who started out as nationalistic, grow increasingly fascinated with, and enamored of, fascist ideologies and adapt the same to a Muslim supremacist mold, thus constructing the modern face of the ideology of Pakistan. Note that the Iqbalist vision is as liberal as Pakistanis can see themselves being, and it is fascist at the core. In effect, Pakistan bought into a tribalistic ideology that became obsolete as soon as they took delivery.
4. The predominantly Hindu Congress, in the meantime, makes the 20th century transition to a modern version of pluralist democracy with relative ease, encountering relatively little mass resistance; doubtless a consequence of the pluralist memes already embedded in the larger Indic ethos.
5. Jinnah grows to personify the sense of upper-class Muslim entitlement; the obverse side of this is a sense of futility and alienation from an egalitarian and democratic ethos. Simply put, in a democratic setup, persons like Jinnah would have to take their chances of winning or losing like everyone else, and not simply have leadership and power handed to them simply because they are upper-class Muslims.
6. WWII when it took place, was at one level--geopolitical--a clash between British, Japanese Russian, Chinese and German imperial ambitions. At another level, the growth of egalitarian and pluralistic ideologies in the 20th century meant that it was 'sold' to the common man as a battle between democratic pluralism and Fascism.
7. On the domestic front for the US and the UK, this selling, along with the immense publicity generated by the holocaust of european Jews, gave rise to major social reorientation. In the US it led to blacks fighting for, and winning civil rights, and in the UK it led to the destruction of the class system. At the same time, the geopolitics of the WWII conflict morphed into the Cold War.
8. On the subcontinental side, however, both the US and the UK largely ignored the progressive aspects of WWII and retained the geopolitical view: they couldn't care less about progressive values (which were, in any case, a kind of 'necessary evil' fallout of WWII that both societies successfully absorbed), and limited their calculation to maxmizing their side's geopolitical advantage. In this respect a readymade militarized vassal state in the form of Pakistan was vastly preferable to an inward-looking India utterly preoccupied with rediscovering itself after centuries of suppression.
3, 4, and 8 together led to the creation of Pakistan. Pakistan's current predicament is a corollary of 1, 2 and 3. 1b means that they really don't have the critical mass to function in the modern world as a normal, if struggling state. 1a and 2 have a way of acquiring a momentum of their own, even after the first victims--Hindus and Sikhs--have been eliminated; they will inevitably turn into a preoccupation with who is purer than whom and therefore more deserving of being in charge. 3 explains why their democracy is skin-deep. 1a also explains Pakistan's unexamined national preoccupation with the 'liberation' of 'occupied Kashmir'.
The prognosis for Pakistan to emerge from its predicament is very poor, since it requires their society to recognize and critique 1, 2 and 3. However, as I noted under 3, the imagination of the most liberal and intellectually expansive Pakistanis doesn't go beyond a yearning for the ideals of Jinnah and Iqbal. Since these two actually represent the foundations of Pakistan's dysfunction, we have no reason to expect that, in the absence of irresistible external force, Pakistan will ever conduct itself as a normal sensible country.
Last edited by KLNMurthy on 09 May 2009 07:28, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
KV Rao wrote:
Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?
Yes, as per my understanding. It also appears that there was a sense that India would not survive very long.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
double post.
Last edited by Airavat on 09 May 2009 07:26, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
It is painful to read BRF members referring to J&K State as "Kashmir". That is a nomenclature used by the Pakistanis, their foreign backers, and our leftists.KV Rao wrote:It is news to me that some Muslim ex-INA soldiers were involved in the attack by Pakistan on Kashmir. However, muslim participation in the INA and the later treachery of some of them in Kashmir echoes the dynamics of the 1857 war.
In this particular case of the Pakistani invasion of J&K, the fighting in kashmir was in a different category to the fighting along the long Jammu border, as well as the fighting in Gilgit and Baltistan.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
There. I changed it to J&K. No need of any pain.Airavat wrote:
It is painful to read BRF members referring to J&K State as "Kashmir". That is a nomenclature used by the Pakistanis, their foreign backers, and our leftists.
In this particular case of the Pakistani invasion of J&K, the fighting in kashmir was in a different category to the fighting along the long Jammu border, as well as the fighting in Gilgit and Baltistan.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Sir!!by Airavat
Yes, but Muslims formed a significant portion of the INA; many of these ex-INA Muslims were used by Pakistan in the invasion of J&K State.
Please do not belittle the effort of Sardar Mohan Singh in INA. He was the chief leader who got all the Punjabis together into INA, which included Shahnazaz Sehgal and Dhillon, do you remember the famous LAL Qila Trial?
Please do remember that Sardar Mohan Singh started the INA before he handed over to Netaji. He was responsible for getting the Pakjabis (pre partition muslims are also Pakjabis to me) in to INA.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan - Apr. 16 2009
Surinder - I am virtually certain that this is true to a greater or lesser extent. The words of PakRAPE in articles even today reflect exactly this sentiment.surinder wrote: What has happened to TSP is what happens is when you take mutually incompatible philosophies and overlay them in an incompatible manner; something will have to give. The so-called "Pir" and "Sufi" iszlaam of the Pakjabis, if it was that, should have been incompatible with the idea of partition and definitely incompatible with ethnic cleansing which happened during Partition. Either the so-called "Sufi" "Pir" influence was not terribly peaceful, or that system broke at that time. It was inevitable then that the TSP state will follow the usual path of more iszaaalimization---import the idiologoy from UP, Deoband, and then ultimately from the Wahabis. Their advertised Sufism can only be considered a convenience to escape the rigors of Deobandi/Wahabi iszlaam..
I suspect that Sufism in its "more gentle" avatars represents the "erosion/softening" of Islam when it met the dharmic faiths of India. Sufism was able to appear like Hinduism among Hindus and appear like Islam among Muslims.
In Pakistan, Sufism taking on the appearance of Hinduism would be suicidal, but the alternative is to submit to the intolerable rigors of Wahhabi Islam. So it has to appear like "real islam" which is what Pakjabi RAPE are attempting. Need to see how far it goes...
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
This is why the original sources are important. Sorry, long post here, but I'm putting in the whole thing to put the N.P.A. Smith quote in its correct context.Airavat wrote: By contrast, to the planned communal terrorism of the Muslim League the British adopted a policy of: look the other way, take no effective action. NPA Smith, director of the Intelligence Bureau, wrote in a memorandum to the Viceroy Wavell who forwarded the same to London:
Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and lead us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem.
This quote is from a letter from Mr Abell {George Edmund Brackenbury, Pvt Secy to the Viceroy} to Mr Harris {Randolph Montague Joseph, Pvt Secy to Secy of State for India} and is item 304, in the volume IX of the Transfer of Power papers.
***In a letter from Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, September 24, 1946, N.P.A. Smith's assessment of "possible moves in the Muslim League field and the consequences that might flow from them" is included. {#360 in Volume VIII of the Transfer of Power}. I read this while looking for the quote that prompted this post. Strictly, to be fair, I should produce the whole letter, but it is now 2:00 AM.My dear Ronald,
H.E. thinks the Secretary of State may be interested in the enclosed note on the situation in India by Smith, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau.
Yours sincerely,
George Abell.
Enclosure:
British Angle
1. The game so far has been well played in that (a) both Congress and the League have been brought into the Central Government; (b) the Indian problem has been thereby thrust into its appropriate plane of communalism; (c) some kind of an opportunity for orderly evacuation now presents itself through the existence at the Centre of a government to which power can be transferred.
2. I fear, there is a tendency, now that we are temporarily in relatively untroubled waters -- from the purely British angle --, to forget that a storm will sooner or later again arise, and to move much too slowly in shedding our responsibilities. The fullest advantage should be taken of our present breathing space. In my view, the Secretary of State's control over civil officers should be abrogated at the earliest possible moment. This is only fair to the officers and has the political advantage that a decisive gesture of this kind will help to keep the problem on its correct communal plane.
3. The Quit India policy has now the general acceptance of almost all British officers. In the Congress Provinces, this acceptance is accompanied by a realisation of its complete inevitability and a general support of the line so far taken by H.M.G. In the non-Congress Provinces, and particularly in the Punjab, civil officers are apt to criticise bitterly H.M.G.'s policy and the moves made by H.E. This difference of outlook arises from difference of political circumstances. The Punjab is inclined to regard the rest of official India as defeatist and much of the rest of India regards the Punjab as living in a dead or dying past.
4. Grave communal disorder must not disturb us into action which would reintroduce anti-British agitation. The latter may produce an inordinately dangerous situation and leads us nowhere. The former is a natural, if ghastly, process tending in its own way to the solution of the Indian problem***
The Indian Angle
What is likely to eventuate? Very difficult to answer. My own views are --
(a) Whatever the position a few years ago, communal antagonism has now reached such a point of bitterness that it is difficult to see how Hindu and Muslim can jointly work the future. This antagonism may lessen, but the cleavage and difference of culture is so marked as to make healthy cooperation unlikely.
(b)It is clear that India, with its strongly fissiparous tendencies, can only continue to exist through a strong Centre.
(c) It is equally clear that this strong Centre will not be conceded by the Muslims, and is probably unattainable.
(d) The weak Centre of the present target carries within itself the seeds of disruption. It is difficult to foresee a joint policy in foreign affairs, and consequently in defence and finance.
(e)Indian leadership is so inept that there is little prospect of these inherent difficulties being overcome.
(f)I have little faith therefore in a successful outcome, in the long view, of the attempt to maintain a unified India. As I have said for some months, Pakistan is likely to flow from Congresstan (the acceptance of office by Congress).
(g)I do not think Pakistan will advantage the Indian Muslim, who is likely to be squeezed and embarrassed by stronger forces East and West of him; but if he is determined to have it, he will get it.
(h)If Congress were wise, they would either attempt to dissolve by a psychological approach the psychological mistrust which exists or they would establish a strong Centre for areas of Hindu preponderance and to the exclusion of the N-West. But I doubt if Congress is wise enough to do either of these things.
(i)Even if a strong Hindu Centre were established it is doubtful whether it could maintain itself for long in the face of a left-wing attack based on conditions rife for trouble, in labour, the peasantry, linguisitic and provincial jealousies, etc. Jai Prakash Narain and his ill-assorted horde threaten the future. Congress might conceivably handle them and the Communists with sufficient firmness, but they have not much time to spare, and with Nehru in the Cabinet, I doubt their capacity or even willingness.
(j)In brief, I am pessimistic and fear, first, Hindu-Muslim separation, and, secondly, some measure of Balkanisation. The threat of the extreme Left-Wing may serve to bring present Hindu-Muslim leadership closer together, but this remains to be seen.
(k)If pessimistic, I am also philosophical about all this. If we cannot control natural forces, we must accept them, keeping our eyes steadily on reasonable British interest.
(l) The psychological approach which I would commend to Congress would have to be one of great generosity -- an offer, if necessary, of one over parity. I suggested this to Sardar Patel and told him, moreover, that any attempt to force the Muslims would result, through the disintegration of the police and Army, in the loss of N.W. India. His reply was that, if I thought that generosity would placate the Muslim Oliver Twist, I did not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation. With which sentiment I am tempted to agree.
N.P.A Smith.
NPA Smith wrote:
BTW, we are told later {#410, October 8} in a letter from Pethick-Lawrence to Wavell that "I hope, as you do, that this {NPA Smith's assessment of Direct Action, of which a para is above} will make an impression on Patel". So presumably Sardar Patel was shown this assessment.5. In brief, Mr Jinnah may be tempted by the knowledge of his possession of a very strong weapon which, though double-edged, can inflict deep wounds on his opponent. If he feels that the threat of its use is unavailing, he may well employ its reality. It is strange to think that, in the present century, the settlement of a dispute can be contemplated through the arbitrament, not merely of civil war, but of an insane butchery which spares neither women nor children. Nevertheless, the ghastly reality is there and it is beyond doubt that "jehad" is still an emotion of the Muslim mind and that relatively few Muslims will be found to resist its call, or to resist the pressure which sustains it. If, therefore, Mr. Jinnah does decide to plunge, the consequences will be of the gravest. The League has proclaimed its intention to keep "direct action" on the non-violent plane of non-cooperation and, until it announces its plan, it would perhaps be unwise to exclude absolutely its ability to do so; but, in the ordinary run of things, violence must result and must probably take on at least something of the character of a jehad.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan - Apr. 16 2009
Major Brown the British officer of the Gilgit Scouts, who treacherously delivered that part of J&K State to the Pakistanis, got his just desserts from these same Calcutta Sikhs, because he and Mathieson had caused the massacre of Sikh soldiers of the company of 6 JAK RIF posted at Bunji, 54 km from Gilgit:Airavat wrote:The Sikhs who ran the transport business in Calcutta also suffered from this outrageous act of terrorism. Thousands were killed in the most barbaric manner, reminiscent of the scenes created by the savage Muslim armies in medieval era. But just as in those savage times, the Hindu and Sikh resistance hit back with equal violence and so frightened the Muslim League leaders (who were utter cowards for all their bombast) that Suhrawardy begged Mahatma Gandhi's help in subduing the mobs. But by then the violence had spread to Bihar, where the Hindu majority attacked the Muslim League supporters.
Amazingly enough Wavell, having done nothing to prevent this violence, refused to even upbraid Jinnah or Suhrawardy for their speeches inciting communal war, forget about throwing those terrorists in jail. Nor was the Muslim League ministry dismissed for this crime against humanity. Viceroy Wavell merely remarked, "Both sides made preparations, which may or may not have been defensive."
"In July 1948, Brown was awarded an MBE (Military) and the British Governor of the NWFP got him a civilian job with ICI~ which however sent him to Calcutta, where he came to be attacked and left for dead on the streets by Sikhs avenging the Bunji massacre. Brown survived, returned to England, started a riding school, and died in 1984. In March 1994, Pakistan awarded his widow the Sitara-I-Pakistan in recognition of his coup détat."
Article by Dr. Subroto Roy in The Statesman
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
KV Rao, IMHO, the answer may not be a simple Yes or No here. While some events might have crystallized certain decisions, there is a tremendous amount of history and accumulation of significant events over a long period of time that play their part as well.KV Rao wrote:Would it be fair to infer that, following Quit India and the formation of INA, the British decided that India will never be their proxy as a successor state to the empire, and therefore threw their lot in with Jinnah and the Pakistan movement?
To begin with, the creation of Pakistan itself was due to the insecurity felt by the British on account of an "expanding communism" and an inability to accept the eventual loss of the Crown Jewel, India, which would leave the British with no leverage in this part of the world even as the nearby Middle East was becoming strategically significant with its huge oil finds.
Even as early as at the turn of the Twentieth Century, Curzon, who had been about a year into his duties as the Viceroy of India said: "It was the prompt dispatch of a contigent of the Indian Army a year ago that saved the colony of Natal. They were Indian regiments who accomplished the rescue of the Legations at Peking. . . If our arm reaches as far as China in the East and South Africa in the west, who can doubt the range of our influence, or the share of India in the Imperial destinies ?" {See, From Curzon to Nehru and After by Durga Das}
Curzon rightly concluded, "India is the pivot of Empire, by which I mean that outside the British isles, we could lose any porion of the Dominions of the Queen and yet survive as an Empire; while, if we lost India, I maintain that our sun would sink to its setting"
The Great Game which started between the British and the Russian Czarist Empire originally and then continued with the Soviet Union after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, was continued therefore by the British. In order to execute its strategy, Britain found that the fruits of its earlier attempt to drive a wedge between the Hindus and Muslims in India in order to divide-and-conquer the country, came handy by 1947. It is common knowledge that Jinnah, a non-practising Westernized Shi’a Muslim married to a Parsi - and who opposed the Ottoman Empire for its pan-Islamism and hence was against the Khilafat movement and in the good books of the British therefore - and his associates, including Liaqat Ali Khan were the instruments of the British Empire in bisecting a secular India and carving out a Muslim Pakistan. The other founding leaders of Pakistan included such non-Sunnis as Aga Khan, an Ismaili and the Ahmadi Sir Zafarullah Khan. The foundations for separation had been laid much earlier and two such Islamic founders, apart from Jinnah, were Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who founded the Aligarh Muslim University, and the poet Allama Iqbal.
Of course, on the British side, it was Minto who succeeded Curzon as the Viceroy (see my earlier post) who set the ball rolling for the creation of Pakistan. Of course, there was no Pakistan Movement at that time, but his actions formed the nucleus from which the current-day menace developed.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
The Wavell plan also suited Chuchill's sensibilities perfectly. For, he got the perfect excuse to stave off the Americans, who were pressuring him to act on India, yet at the same time wanted the Indian position held against Japan and access to Indian resources. Churchill even lied to FDR about the number of muslims in the Indian army, claiming them to be about half the strength, while the actual number was about 35%, higher by about 11 points than the Indian Muslim population at that time.Airavat wrote:^^^^^^
The true architect of the Partition plan was Viceroy Wavell, who had earlier been the C-in-C when the British were defeated by the Japanese in SE Asia. He wrote a letter to King George V soon after taking office:
"I can never entirely rid my mind of the recollections that in 1942 at almost the most critical period of the war in India, when I was endeavouring as C-in-C to secure India with very limited resources against Japanese invasion, the supporters of the Congress made a deliberate effort to paralyse my communications to the eastern front by widespread sabotage and looting (ie the Quit India movement)."
Wavell had been stunned to learn that Indian POWs, to the number of 10,000 (British estimate but the INA sources claimed 50,000 recruits), had joined SC Bose to form the Indian National Army.
Viceroy Wavell had come to the conclusion that the British position in India was on the verge of collapse. The way to preserve the British position worldwide (in the form of the Commonwealth), was a deeper alliance with the Muslim League. Wavell took it upon himself to build up Jinnah as a spokesperson for all Muslims, and to brush a friendly coat of paint on all Muslims. Wavell in a note to the UK goverment said, "The immense gulf between the Hindu religion and mentality and ours and the Moslem is the real core of all our troubles in India."
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Just to spell it out, the key one being separate electorates/representation for the muslims of India.SSridhar wrote: Of course, on the British side, it was Minto who succeeded Curzon as the Viceroy (see my earlier post) who set the ball rolling for the creation of Pakistan. Of course, there was no Pakistan Movement at that time, but his actions formed the nucleus from which the current-day menace developed.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Note on the tour of the Reforms Commissioner {H.V. Hodson} from 8 November to 7 December 1941, to Madras, Orissa, Assam, Bengal and Bihar.
7. My impression was that among the Muslim Leaguers in the provinces visited there was no genuine enthusiasm for Pakistan. At the same time, none of them will repudiate it, not only for fear of incurring the wrath of Mr Jinnah or impairing the Muslim solidarity which they feel to be vitally necessary at the present time, but also, I though because the policy itself, extreme and unpalatable as it may seem to them, expresses however crudely some inarticulate but vital theme in the Muslim mind. Even Muslim critics of the League, like Sir Mahomed Usman, told me that outside Bengal it would be hopeless for anyone to try to capture a Muslim constituency on anything but the League ticket. H.E. the Governor of Madras went so far as to say that whenever there was any effective organization among the Opposition (including the Non-Brahmins, who are not prevented by their communal proportion from actually commanding a majority) it was now always engineered by the Muslim League.
8. I was therefore led to ask myself, what is this element in Muslim thought which finds expression in Pakistan? It derives, it seemed to me, from a revolt against the allied concepts of "minority" and "safeguards". Experience under Congress governments may have been the immediate stimulus, but the real motive goes deeper. Nor does it lie only in the recognitiion that "safeguards" depend for their efficacy upon the presence of a third power to enforce them, a power which will disappear from the Indian scene with the coming of Dominion Status. It lies more profoundly, though perhaps less consciously, in the knowledge that "safeguards" are designed to improve, but cannot radically alter, the position of a "minority", which remains a minority, a Cinderella with trade-union rights and a radio in the kitchen but still below-stairs. It is against this whole combination of ideas that the Muslim mind rebels. The two-nation theory, which transmutes the ideology of "minorities", is thus more fundamental to their present thought than the Pakistan theory, which transmutes the ideology of "safeguards". From this new outlook of the Muslims there will obviously be no retreat. My conversations have therefore indicated that it is misleading to approach the general Muslim problem in terms of the same phraseology as we use about the interests of minorities like the Europeans, Depressed Classes, and so on. Some new terminology is needed to keep our consideration of this problem on the right lines - a terminology which recognises that the problem is one of sharing power rather {than of} qualifying the terms on which power is exercised by a majority.
9. In effect, the British Government and Parliament committed themselves to this approach when they first introduced separate communal electorates {in 1909, under the Indian Councils Act}. I found no sign that any substantial section of Muslim opinion would sacrifice separate electorates at any price in the currency of other constitutional concessions....
10. The demand for separate electortes from smaller minorities appears to be growing along with their political consciousness. The idea that was pressed on me by representatives of the Justice Party in Madras that Non-Brahmins should have separate electorates to save them from domination by the Brahmins is ridiculous in theory, and the answer in practice is obviously that the Justice Party should improve its organisation and leadership. Majority Hindu opinion is, of course, strongly against separate electorates, and it is more often than not that any Hindu with whom one talks will begin his observations on the constitutional problem by blaming everything on separate electorates. Nevertheless, there is a widespread recognition, encouraged by the official policy of the Congress, that if the Muslims insit on having separate electorates they must have them.
11. In a discussion with Mr. Sarat Bose and members of his party, one of the latter said heatedly, "Either the constitution is communal from top to bottom or it is non-communal from top to bottom". He was using this as a weapon against separate electorates, but the logic of it would equally sustain an argument for special communal arrangements in legislature and executive, if the communalism of the electorate must continue to be recognized....
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Any theory also has to explain the fact that Lord Mountbatten encouraged the {princely} States to join either India or Pakistan and not exercise any option for Independence.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
The Brits were not confident of their Macaulayization projecct. They worried that a Hindu India will have a very large area of influence from South Africa to South East Asia. They split the country and cut down in size to enusure a large power does not emerge. They advised the Princes that Paramountcy reverts back after they leave.
First they split Bengal into two and nurtured Muslim separatism in some regions. And then took Burma away. They took Indian weatlh during WWII as sterling balnaces to prop the Pound to buy weapons. They kept the Sterling Reserves as price of freedom and bankrupted the Treasury. True they gave shoddy weapons after the war in return. They split the country and ensured forces look askance while rioting was going on. And then engineered the J&K invasion to ensure bad bloos. Just as the tide was being reversed they adviced JLN to take it Un Secy council where they kept it pending. I said before that Partition and the killings were modern India's Kalinga war and JLN the modern Ashoka. To add to this we have Mahatma Gandhi's assassination by a Hindu Mahasabha adherent and this put non Macaulayised Hindus out of political process for atleast 30 years.
I am not blaming the Brits but they did all this. Indians were also gullible and sing paens to the the Brits. Indian leadership did what it could to keep the country together and by emphasizing on economic growth they managed to survive. To survive was the best option. We are now looking beyond survival and re-emergence.
The secularism project has turned India inwards and cut-of the expansion which happens when any large area merges.
First they split Bengal into two and nurtured Muslim separatism in some regions. And then took Burma away. They took Indian weatlh during WWII as sterling balnaces to prop the Pound to buy weapons. They kept the Sterling Reserves as price of freedom and bankrupted the Treasury. True they gave shoddy weapons after the war in return. They split the country and ensured forces look askance while rioting was going on. And then engineered the J&K invasion to ensure bad bloos. Just as the tide was being reversed they adviced JLN to take it Un Secy council where they kept it pending. I said before that Partition and the killings were modern India's Kalinga war and JLN the modern Ashoka. To add to this we have Mahatma Gandhi's assassination by a Hindu Mahasabha adherent and this put non Macaulayised Hindus out of political process for atleast 30 years.
I am not blaming the Brits but they did all this. Indians were also gullible and sing paens to the the Brits. Indian leadership did what it could to keep the country together and by emphasizing on economic growth they managed to survive. To survive was the best option. We are now looking beyond survival and re-emergence.
The secularism project has turned India inwards and cut-of the expansion which happens when any large area merges.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
ramana wrote: I am not blaming the Brits but they did all this. Indians were also gullible and sing paens to the the Brits. Indian leadership did what it could to keep the country together and by emphasizing on economic growth they managed to survive. To survive was the best option. We are now looking beyond survival and re-emergence.
The secularism project has turned India inwards and cut-of the expansion which happens when any large area merges.
Very succinctly put ramana ji,
But please tell me,
Why are you not blaming the british?
They did after all demonstrate a clear, malicious, venomous and vicious intent to undermine and sabotage our future, even though grand exercise was diplomatically couched and impeccably turned out in top hat and tails. Tastefully accompanied by the marching band and liveried mounted guards to show the might of the raj, even in full retreat.
They were anyway leading JLN around by his pecker. They thought that they had it in the bag. Edwina would probably have returned once in a while on the mountbatten yacht to keep the pecker pointed right.
If it had not been for a certain Sardar and his pecker, India would have naively traversed the already laid out greasy path.
They even suborned the americans into helping out in their nefarious plans.
In short, they screwed us coming and going.
But in the end it was one of the few strategic british ploys that did not go all as planned. Even in partial success, they have managed to inject discord and strife in the subcontinent.
I for one, am glad that sharia is in the air in "great" britain.
There is nothing else in the world worse than a predatory minority taxi or auto driver stalking the streets of britan.
I do wish that certain initiation ceremonies will be done with a blunt and rusty knife upon the remnants of the raj.
Today, even tiny srilanka tosses out milliband.
jai ho!
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E NT
Printed for the Cabinet. May 1 9 4 7
SECRET
C M . ( 4 7)
50th Conclusions
C A B I N E T 50 ( 4 7 )
Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing Street, S.W. 1 , on Friday, 23rd May, 1 9 4 7 , at 1 1 a.m.
.
.
.
All the Indian Parties were now convinced that, in view of the recalcitrant a t t i t u d e of the Muslim League, some form of p a r t i t i o n was unavoidable.
..
Unfortunately, there was now reason to fear that the Muslim League might after all decide to oppose the plan. In that event, the best coursewould be to impose it as a n award by His Majesty^ Government.
While Mr. Jinnah had always claimed that P a k i s t a n would wish to remain within the British Commonwealth
.
.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
T H I S D O C U M E N T I S T H E P R O P E R T Y OF H I S B R I T A N N I C M A J E S T V S G O V E R N M E NT
Printed for the Cabinet. May 1 9 4 7
SECRET
C M . ( 4 7)
50th Conclusions
C A B I N E T 50 ( 4 7 )
Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet held at 1 0 Downing Street, S.W. 1 , on Friday, 23rd May, 1 9 4 7 , at 1 1 a.m.
.
.
.
All the Indian Parties were now convinced that, in view of the recalcitrant a t t i t u d e of the Muslim League, some form of p a r t i t i o n was unavoidable.
..
Unfortunately, there was now reason to fear that the Muslim League might after all decide to oppose the plan. In that event, the best coursewould be to impose it as a n award by His Majesty^ Government.
While Mr. Jinnah had always claimed that P a k i s t a n would wish to remain within the British Commonwealth
.
.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Excellent material & views by Airavat, Raman, A_Gupta, SSridhar & others.
One point I want to point is that isn't the partion of Bengal in 1901 an early sign of British thnking?
Also British inpired Partition has happened in many other places in the world (Palestine, other nations in Middle East, Africa, German, etc.). THere are bound be some clues about the British tendencies.
Partitioning, it seems to me, is a natural pinnacle of divide-and-rule. The purpose often is the same: maximize your gain by dividing others. It keeps others eternally busy with themselves (like a Dog chasing its tail).
In every sphere of Indian rule the British have tended to divide and set one part of the body against the others. Reformating the border is just one aspect of it. In the field of religion they set about injecting such confusing history and narrative that people are still sorting through the mess. THey did that to Hinduism, and I was to discover recently, also with Sikhism. It shows a tendency of the British---make the enormously busy with themselves & others and fritter away their energies.
It would seem to me that the real surprise would be if the British had not Partitioned India---that would be a shocking surprise. It can only be concluded that this is a British trait, a Britishism, if you will.
One point I want to point is that isn't the partion of Bengal in 1901 an early sign of British thnking?
Also British inpired Partition has happened in many other places in the world (Palestine, other nations in Middle East, Africa, German, etc.). THere are bound be some clues about the British tendencies.
Partitioning, it seems to me, is a natural pinnacle of divide-and-rule. The purpose often is the same: maximize your gain by dividing others. It keeps others eternally busy with themselves (like a Dog chasing its tail).
In every sphere of Indian rule the British have tended to divide and set one part of the body against the others. Reformating the border is just one aspect of it. In the field of religion they set about injecting such confusing history and narrative that people are still sorting through the mess. THey did that to Hinduism, and I was to discover recently, also with Sikhism. It shows a tendency of the British---make the enormously busy with themselves & others and fritter away their energies.
It would seem to me that the real surprise would be if the British had not Partitioned India---that would be a shocking surprise. It can only be concluded that this is a British trait, a Britishism, if you will.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Can someone explain me the above paragraph ?http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
It now appeared, however, that some of the Congress leaders h a d become increasingly apprehensive about the difficulties which the grant of immediate independence would involve, and a most significant approach to the "Viceroy had been made by P a n d i t Nehru and Sardar Patel, who had suggested that in the event of p a r t i t i o n Hindu I n d i a should be granted Dominion status, at any rate as a temporary measure. They had explained t h a t they would hope to secure the agreement of their supporters to this course by arguing that acceptance of Dominion status would enable power to be transferred to I n d i a n hands at a date substantially earlier than June 1948, and that onee she had attained Dominion status Hindu India would be free to secede at any time from the Commonwealth.
Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan - Apr. 16 2009
There is a view that Pakjabi version of Islaam is Sufi or Pir Baba based. This is often advertised as the inherent softness of Pukjabi Islaam. But that fact hides some bald inconvenient facts. When the idea of Pakistan was implanted on Pakjabis, after some initial hesitation, they took to the idea really well. Much before 1947 (my Grandmother tells) there Muslim gangs who would go chanting in Pakjabi cities "Pakistan Banawange, Khoon diyan nadiyan bahawangey" (We will make Pakistan, we will make rivers of blood flow). This same so-called followers of Sufis/Pirs/Babas had no problem initiating the rioting, killing, burning to ethnically cleanse their lands of Kaafirs. Then the same followers of Sufis/Pirs/Babas foisted Talibums on Afghanistan, Jihadis in J&K, Jihadis practically everwhere else, killing Bengalis & Baloochs & Ahmadiyas.shiv wrote:Surinder - I am virtually certain that this is true to a greater or lesser extent. The words of PakRAPE in articles even today reflect exactly this sentiment.
I suspect that Sufism in its "more gentle" avatars represents the "erosion/softening" of Islam when it met the dharmic faiths of India. Sufism was able to appear like Hinduism among Hindus and appear like Islam among Muslims.
In Pakistan, Sufism taking on the appearance of Hinduism would be suicidal, but the alternative is to submit to the intolerable rigors of Wahhabi Islam. So it has to appear like "real islam" which is what Pakjabi RAPE are attempting. Need to see how far it goes...
I am not sure how deep their faith in Babas/Pirs/Sufis really is if that is what their actions.
But I must stop, this is stuff for Islamism kind of threads.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
I guess it basically means that India wanted to retain the services of British Army and Civil Services officers for a while.shravan wrote:Can someone explain me the above paragraph ?http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
It now appeared, however, that some of the Congress leaders h a d become increasingly apprehensive about the difficulties which the grant of immediate independence would involve, and a most significant approach to the "Viceroy had been made by P a n d i t Nehru and Sardar Patel, who had suggested that in the event of p a r t i t i o n Hindu I n d i a should be granted Dominion status, at any rate as a temporary measure. They had explained t h a t they would hope to secure the agreement of their supporters to this course by arguing that acceptance of Dominion status would enable power to be transferred to I n d i a n hands at a date substantially earlier than June 1948, and that onee she had attained Dominion status Hindu India would be free to secede at any time from the Commonwealth.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
Two myths to be addressed here:
The first is that Jinnah was vague about Pakistan, and had only people made concessions to him, Pakistan could have turned out to be something else. Second, re: Jinnah's moth-eaten Pakistan - later on, Jinnah was to insist on the non-Partition of Bengal and Punjab, but he was overruled. The logic of the partition of India applied to the provinces as well. But back in 1942, Jinnah definitely had a clear plan of what he wanted to do, and he shared it with the Governor of Bombay.
The first is that Jinnah was vague about Pakistan, and had only people made concessions to him, Pakistan could have turned out to be something else. Second, re: Jinnah's moth-eaten Pakistan - later on, Jinnah was to insist on the non-Partition of Bengal and Punjab, but he was overruled. The logic of the partition of India applied to the provinces as well. But back in 1942, Jinnah definitely had a clear plan of what he wanted to do, and he shared it with the Governor of Bombay.
So, as per Jinnah in 1942, the provinces were "artificial" and had to be redone to have a overwhelming Muslim majorities.Jan 15, 1942, Sir R. Lumley (Governor of Bombay) wrote a letter to Linlithgow.
Linlithgow had asked Lumley to talk to Jinnah over a meal, and Lumley invited
Jinnah to lunch.
"After lunch I had a talk with him, which I had intended would be a short one...but at the first opening he proceeded to give me an exposition of the Muslim League position which lasted for three quarters of an hour. It was all most friendly, very logical and well argued from the Muslim League point of view; but there seemed to me to be no indication at all of any change in his position......
...Take the Punjab. There, the Muslims, although they formed the strongest party, could not have a majority over all others. In order to carry on a Government at all, they had to work in with Hindus and others, and if the Government there was to be maintained with a large Muslim element, there had to be a compromising attitude. That was the difficulty of Sikander Hyat Khan's position. He had often come to the Working Committee of the Muslim League and pointed out his difficulties, and he (Jinnah) had always recognised the difficulty of his position. That would always be the case so long as the Muslims only had a small majority over other communities, and that was why, in framing his Pakistan scheme, he excluded from that Muslim zone the predominant Hindu area centering on Ambala. The Muslims, according to his plan, would have 75 per cent of the population, and they would be able to form a strong Muslim Government."
{NWFP, Sind, Bengal discussion } followed by "To him, the lesson of these Parliamentary situations was that it was necessary for the Muslims to have an overwhelming majority in their zones, instead of the precarious majorities which they had in the present artificial Provinces."....
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
To understand the history of partition I think one has to look at two separable, but interlinked phenomenon
- the emergence and growth of the idea of Pakistan
- the political and administrative maneouverings of all involved groups in the actual decision to proceed with partition
There's a huge difference between Jinnah and Iqbal when it came to Pakistan. Iqbal was someone obsessed with Muslim 'greatness' and the need to live in an 'Islamic' environment. The ultimate ideology of Pakistan was Iqbal's - he rejected nationalism even amongst Muslims, rejected regional identity, and even came to adopt anti-Ahmadi prejudices in the 1930s.
For Jinnah (as it was for Wavell) total separation was a card to play for a greater share of power at the centre and numerous Muslim provinces of an undivided India. I believe that is why there was very little triumph on Jinnah's part following partition, but rather rancour and depression.
National Partition was Jinnah's fallback, his threat, rather than his goal. That is the gulf that separated Jinnah not only from Iqbal, but from the bulk of the supporters of the Pakistan movement who really believed in it.
How did separation come about if it wasnt the first choice of either Jinnah or the British? I think it has a great deal to do with
-the unanticipated level embrace the idea of Pakistan/2 nation theory among educated Muslims, Hindus and communists
-the INC's determination to rule firmly from the centre at any cost (including partition) without the constraints of coalition politics at the centre, consulation with a host of provinces, etc, and
-the weakness of the British who could neither force Jinnah to settle for a slightly smaller share of central power, or force the INC to offer Jinnah more.
+ The AIML first preference was to have a number of Jammu & Kashmir type states/provinces within India that allowed every concentration of Muslim population in the country to function as a local majority and dominate local politics (similar to pre-partition Punjab and Bengal). India's Urdu speaking Muslim elite feared any sort of strong central authority in Hindu hands
The Nehru Report of 1928 mapped out a post-colonial India's constitutional future, and it immediately produced significant opposition from national Muslim elites because it had no interest in an India internally differentiated along linguistic or religious lines.
Iqbal's response was to propose Pakistan in his December 1930 presidential address to the AIML.
Every step towards not just independence, but centralised majority authority produced a swing towards the Pakistan idea.
Nehru, Patel and the INC were far more willing to surrender territory than to surrender the strength of the authority state they were to govern, even if they were ideologically opposed to the 'Two-Nation theory'.
Ideologically, both the Communists nor the Hindu Mahasabha who were both important players in shaping elements of public discourse both supported the Two Nation theory.
The political forces that had the greatest means and will to resist the Two-Nation theory were the regional, Muslim led parties of Punjab and Bengal, but their regional perspectives clashed with the INC's national perspective, and the only alliance that could have stopped Partition failed to emerge.
+ As for the mechanics of partition,
For those who do believe that the decision was ultimately in British hands, whether Wavell or Mountbatten, it remains to be demonstrated what leverage the British had to enforce anything at all once the war ended given the manifest lack of commitment to staying on.
There is no question that Wavell resented and distrusted the INC for having undermined the war effort by mounting its Quit India campaign while the British and Indian army was fighting the Japanese, and appreciated the Muslim League's supprt the time.
There is no question that as a result Wavell did not want to see the INC in sole control at the national level - his preferred solution was a Congress-Muslim League cabinet at the centre of an undivided India. The INC was even less keen on this than on the idea of dozens of highly autonomous mini-Pakistans within a federation, and they consistantly prevented it from happening throughout 1945 and 1946.
The month after the Simla conference, Churchill was voted out and Labour was elected under Clement Attlee.
Labour had been elected on a promise of building a comprehensive welfare state, a programme that would cost billions of pounds at a time when Britain had already accumulated billions in debts for weapons and food from the Americans, and to the colonial GoI for the expansion and equipping of the Indian armed forces.
Getting out of India as quickly as possible, and ending the enormous expense of empire was a top priority. Any delay, or major security costs would have serious economic implications.
In September 1946, the INC formally formed India's interim government, and Patel took control of the Home Ministry, but had been taking the reins of central government gradually through the Viceroy's council in the months before.
Mountbatten was sent out to India in early 1947 largely because the Labour government fundamentally differed with Wavell on the pace of decolonisation.
It is a matter of record that Jinnah was beginning to prepare for and threaten a jihad against colonial authority unless he got Pakistan - Iskander Mirza was sent out to the tribes with money, and influential leaders like Pir Manki Shah were backing him. The British had spent an enormous amount of resources attempting to quell previous uprisings, such as those in 1919 and 1931. It was a very effective threat.
The Labour government was not going to spend any money, or any British lives to extend colonial rule. That further diminished an already limited capacity to fundamentally alter the broad course of events.
- the emergence and growth of the idea of Pakistan
- the political and administrative maneouverings of all involved groups in the actual decision to proceed with partition
There's a huge difference between Jinnah and Iqbal when it came to Pakistan. Iqbal was someone obsessed with Muslim 'greatness' and the need to live in an 'Islamic' environment. The ultimate ideology of Pakistan was Iqbal's - he rejected nationalism even amongst Muslims, rejected regional identity, and even came to adopt anti-Ahmadi prejudices in the 1930s.
For Jinnah (as it was for Wavell) total separation was a card to play for a greater share of power at the centre and numerous Muslim provinces of an undivided India. I believe that is why there was very little triumph on Jinnah's part following partition, but rather rancour and depression.
National Partition was Jinnah's fallback, his threat, rather than his goal. That is the gulf that separated Jinnah not only from Iqbal, but from the bulk of the supporters of the Pakistan movement who really believed in it.
How did separation come about if it wasnt the first choice of either Jinnah or the British? I think it has a great deal to do with
-the unanticipated level embrace the idea of Pakistan/2 nation theory among educated Muslims, Hindus and communists
-the INC's determination to rule firmly from the centre at any cost (including partition) without the constraints of coalition politics at the centre, consulation with a host of provinces, etc, and
-the weakness of the British who could neither force Jinnah to settle for a slightly smaller share of central power, or force the INC to offer Jinnah more.
+ The AIML first preference was to have a number of Jammu & Kashmir type states/provinces within India that allowed every concentration of Muslim population in the country to function as a local majority and dominate local politics (similar to pre-partition Punjab and Bengal). India's Urdu speaking Muslim elite feared any sort of strong central authority in Hindu hands
The Nehru Report of 1928 mapped out a post-colonial India's constitutional future, and it immediately produced significant opposition from national Muslim elites because it had no interest in an India internally differentiated along linguistic or religious lines.
Iqbal's response was to propose Pakistan in his December 1930 presidential address to the AIML.
Every step towards not just independence, but centralised majority authority produced a swing towards the Pakistan idea.
Nehru, Patel and the INC were far more willing to surrender territory than to surrender the strength of the authority state they were to govern, even if they were ideologically opposed to the 'Two-Nation theory'.
Ideologically, both the Communists nor the Hindu Mahasabha who were both important players in shaping elements of public discourse both supported the Two Nation theory.
The political forces that had the greatest means and will to resist the Two-Nation theory were the regional, Muslim led parties of Punjab and Bengal, but their regional perspectives clashed with the INC's national perspective, and the only alliance that could have stopped Partition failed to emerge.
+ As for the mechanics of partition,
For those who do believe that the decision was ultimately in British hands, whether Wavell or Mountbatten, it remains to be demonstrated what leverage the British had to enforce anything at all once the war ended given the manifest lack of commitment to staying on.
There is no question that Wavell resented and distrusted the INC for having undermined the war effort by mounting its Quit India campaign while the British and Indian army was fighting the Japanese, and appreciated the Muslim League's supprt the time.
There is no question that as a result Wavell did not want to see the INC in sole control at the national level - his preferred solution was a Congress-Muslim League cabinet at the centre of an undivided India. The INC was even less keen on this than on the idea of dozens of highly autonomous mini-Pakistans within a federation, and they consistantly prevented it from happening throughout 1945 and 1946.
The month after the Simla conference, Churchill was voted out and Labour was elected under Clement Attlee.
Labour had been elected on a promise of building a comprehensive welfare state, a programme that would cost billions of pounds at a time when Britain had already accumulated billions in debts for weapons and food from the Americans, and to the colonial GoI for the expansion and equipping of the Indian armed forces.
Getting out of India as quickly as possible, and ending the enormous expense of empire was a top priority. Any delay, or major security costs would have serious economic implications.
In September 1946, the INC formally formed India's interim government, and Patel took control of the Home Ministry, but had been taking the reins of central government gradually through the Viceroy's council in the months before.
Mountbatten was sent out to India in early 1947 largely because the Labour government fundamentally differed with Wavell on the pace of decolonisation.
It is a matter of record that Jinnah was beginning to prepare for and threaten a jihad against colonial authority unless he got Pakistan - Iskander Mirza was sent out to the tribes with money, and influential leaders like Pir Manki Shah were backing him. The British had spent an enormous amount of resources attempting to quell previous uprisings, such as those in 1919 and 1931. It was a very effective threat.
The Labour government was not going to spend any money, or any British lives to extend colonial rule. That further diminished an already limited capacity to fundamentally alter the broad course of events.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
In reply to Johann, the idea that Partition was not Jinnah's intention, it was forced on him, etc.
There were no set of concessions to Jinnah that would have been sufficient.(l) The psychological approach which I would commend to Congress would have to be one of great generosity -- an offer, if necessary, of one over parity. I suggested this to Sardar Patel and told him, moreover, that any attempt to force the Muslims would result, through the disintegration of the police and Army, in the loss of N.W. India. His reply was that, if I thought that generosity would placate the Muslim Oliver Twist, I did not understand either the Muslim mind or the situation. With which sentiment I am tempted to agree.
N.P.A Smith, Director of the Intelligence Bureau, 1946
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
A Gupta,
Patel was talking about bigger things, and he was right!
Jinnah wanted to create a situation where Jinnah could have ruled over an undivided India, with the Muslim-League majority provinces of Pakistan as a secure power-base, stacking some sort of electoral college at the centre.
That was his first choice. That was also the first choice of those such as Wavell the conservative reactionaries among the India hands who fundamentally distrusted the INC. Ruling over a separated and truncated Pakistan was the brass ring.
On the other hand you had liberal India hands like Amery etc who saw the liberal Nehru's INC success as inevitable, and considered the highest priority to maintain a close relationship with them following independence. They had no intention of pushing any sort of constitutional arrangement unacceptable to the INC, aware that it would most likely fail, and damage the prospect of India remaining in the commonwealth.
Churchill backed the first group, but Labour backed the second. Labour's arrival in power meant that Jinnah could not count on British support for the AIML against the INC within India. That's the point at which Jinnah committed to partition at the national level.
The Liberals (who included Caroe) were as Airavat has correctly pointed out most concerned with the NWFP and the Makran coast - they were not particularly keen on ceding Punjab or Bengal whole, or even divided to a separated Pakistan. That was roughly the point at which Jinnah began to threaten launching a jihad.
Patel was talking about bigger things, and he was right!
Jinnah wanted to create a situation where Jinnah could have ruled over an undivided India, with the Muslim-League majority provinces of Pakistan as a secure power-base, stacking some sort of electoral college at the centre.
That was his first choice. That was also the first choice of those such as Wavell the conservative reactionaries among the India hands who fundamentally distrusted the INC. Ruling over a separated and truncated Pakistan was the brass ring.
On the other hand you had liberal India hands like Amery etc who saw the liberal Nehru's INC success as inevitable, and considered the highest priority to maintain a close relationship with them following independence. They had no intention of pushing any sort of constitutional arrangement unacceptable to the INC, aware that it would most likely fail, and damage the prospect of India remaining in the commonwealth.
Churchill backed the first group, but Labour backed the second. Labour's arrival in power meant that Jinnah could not count on British support for the AIML against the INC within India. That's the point at which Jinnah committed to partition at the national level.
The Liberals (who included Caroe) were as Airavat has correctly pointed out most concerned with the NWFP and the Makran coast - they were not particularly keen on ceding Punjab or Bengal whole, or even divided to a separated Pakistan. That was roughly the point at which Jinnah began to threaten launching a jihad.
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -65-54.pdf
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES
1ST CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1
(30th May, 1945 - 11.30 a.m.)
The Cabinet had before them a Report "by the India Committee (77.F. (k-5) 27k) on the constitutional position Constitutional in India, to which was appended the draft of a statement Position which, subject to the approval of the Cabinet, might be made in Parliament by the Secretary of State for India.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -65-54.pdf
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 121-55.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. December 1939.
1. The War Cabinet had under consideration a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (G.) (39) 154) covering :—
(a) a letter from Mr. Jinnah to the Viceroy, dated the 5th November
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 121-55.pdf
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -21-93.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1942.
January 28, 1942.
WAR CABINET. THE INDIA N POLITICA L SITUATION.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -21-93.pdf
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -65-54.pdf
CONFIDENTIAL ANNEXES
1ST CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 1
(30th May, 1945 - 11.30 a.m.)
The Cabinet had before them a Report "by the India Committee (77.F. (k-5) 27k) on the constitutional position Constitutional in India, to which was appended the draft of a statement Position which, subject to the approval of the Cabinet, might be made in Parliament by the Secretary of State for India.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -65-54.pdf
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 121-55.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. December 1939.
1. The War Cabinet had under consideration a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (G.) (39) 154) covering :—
(a) a letter from Mr. Jinnah to the Viceroy, dated the 5th November
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 121-55.pdf
=================================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -21-93.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1942.
January 28, 1942.
WAR CABINET. THE INDIA N POLITICA L SITUATION.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -21-93.pdf
=================================
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 45-9-9.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1945.
That evening a press report had been received from which it
appeared that Mr. Jinnah declined all responsibility for whatever
talks there might have been between Liaqat Ali Khan and Desai.
Liaqat Ali Khan had also made a speech reiterating the demands
put forward on behalf of the Muslim League by Mr. Jinnah in the
autumn of 194Q.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 45-9-9.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -76-14.pdf
Mr. Jinnah's non-co-operation to hold up progress with the forma
tion of an Interim Government. The telegram had proposed that
the next step should be for the Viceroy to see Mr. Jinnah and
endeavour to persuade him, even now, to allow members of the
Muslim League to enter the proposed Interim Government. The
Secretary of State for India now proposed that a further telegram
(Annex II I to C P . (46) 315) should be sent to the Viceroy I
indicating the policy which he should adopt if Mr. Jinnah was
unwilling to co-operate in the formation of an Interim Government.
The Secretary of State for India reported that since C P . (46)
315 had been circulated a telegram had been received from the
Viceroy to the effect that he was sure it would not be advisable for
him to see Mr. Jinnah immediately. The Viceroy wished to put
on Congress the responsibility for any attempt to satisfy the League.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -76-14.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -271-1.pdf
June 27, 1942.
POLIC Y TO BE ADOPTE D TOWARD S MR . GANDHI .
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -271-1.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
May 1 9 4 7
While Mr. Jinnah had always claimed that Pakistan would wish to remain within the British Commonwealth, it had been the policy of the Congress Party that India should be a sovereign independent republic and they had seamed a resolution to that effect in the Constituent Assembly.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 45-9-9.pdf
Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1945.
That evening a press report had been received from which it
appeared that Mr. Jinnah declined all responsibility for whatever
talks there might have been between Liaqat Ali Khan and Desai.
Liaqat Ali Khan had also made a speech reiterating the demands
put forward on behalf of the Muslim League by Mr. Jinnah in the
autumn of 194Q.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 45-9-9.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -76-14.pdf
Mr. Jinnah's non-co-operation to hold up progress with the forma
tion of an Interim Government. The telegram had proposed that
the next step should be for the Viceroy to see Mr. Jinnah and
endeavour to persuade him, even now, to allow members of the
Muslim League to enter the proposed Interim Government. The
Secretary of State for India now proposed that a further telegram
(Annex II I to C P . (46) 315) should be sent to the Viceroy I
indicating the policy which he should adopt if Mr. Jinnah was
unwilling to co-operate in the formation of an Interim Government.
The Secretary of State for India reported that since C P . (46)
315 had been circulated a telegram had been received from the
Viceroy to the effect that he was sure it would not be advisable for
him to see Mr. Jinnah immediately. The Viceroy wished to put
on Congress the responsibility for any attempt to satisfy the League.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -76-14.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -271-1.pdf
June 27, 1942.
POLIC Y TO BE ADOPTE D TOWARD S MR . GANDHI .
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -271-1.pdf
==========================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
May 1 9 4 7
While Mr. Jinnah had always claimed that Pakistan would wish to remain within the British Commonwealth, it had been the policy of the Congress Party that India should be a sovereign independent republic and they had seamed a resolution to that effect in the Constituent Assembly.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 7-50-1.pdf
==========================
Re: Formation of Pakistan : The Real Story
=======================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -282-3.pdf
November 1 9 t h , 1931
I n d i a n R o u n d T a b l e C o n f e r e n c e
Second Conference
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -282-3.pdf
===================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 6-69-7.pdf
Printed for the Cabinet. July 1946
It was proposed to send a telegram to the Viceroy approving the general line which he intended to take and making it clear that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Jinnah's claim that only the Moslem League could nominate Moslems could not be allowed to prevent the formation of an Interim Government.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 6-69-7.pdf
===============
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... CP-107.pdf
Indian Statutory Commission.
I keep on hearing of Jinnah's discomfort, Hindu Mahasabha has definitely broken with him, and he is now seeing a good deal of the Punjab Moslem contingent. I am told, on what I believe to be quite reliable authority, that he told them that he was now proposing to stand out for communal electorates and separation of Sind and rest of Moslem platform, and that they had said to him, why not come with us also in regard to Commission. To this he had replied that he must think that over.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... CP-107.pdf
===================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -282-3.pdf
November 1 9 t h , 1931
I n d i a n R o u n d T a b l e C o n f e r e n c e
Second Conference
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... -282-3.pdf
===================
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 6-69-7.pdf
Printed for the Cabinet. July 1946
It was proposed to send a telegram to the Viceroy approving the general line which he intended to take and making it clear that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, Mr. Jinnah's claim that only the Moslem League could nominate Moslems could not be allowed to prevent the formation of an Interim Government.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... 6-69-7.pdf
===============
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... CP-107.pdf
Indian Statutory Commission.
I keep on hearing of Jinnah's discomfort, Hindu Mahasabha has definitely broken with him, and he is now seeing a good deal of the Punjab Moslem contingent. I am told, on what I believe to be quite reliable authority, that he told them that he was now proposing to stand out for communal electorates and separation of Sind and rest of Moslem platform, and that they had said to him, why not come with us also in regard to Commission. To this he had replied that he must think that over.
http://filestore.nationalarchives.gov.u ... CP-107.pdf
===================