Formation and Evolution of Pakistan : The Real Story

[johneeG]

I think even if the water-to-Sindh idea is feasible, it must not be implemented.

Dangle the carrot to inspire a wrangle
Dont get entangle...

As far as, India is concerned, pakis are pakis and can be trusted to be consistent in their perfidy. So, any deal with them is not worth the paper it was written in. But, dangle carrots and promise rewards, then watch them fight within themselves to get to the reward.

It can start with some secretary of some minister making pompous and patronizing statements. Very TFTA ones... Nothing official, only 'sources'. GOI denies any official comment.

If push comes to shove, then India can do Shankustapana (inaugaration) of the project. But never must the shove lead to shovel. Such things happen routinely in India anyway. Inaugrations of huge projects are no guarantee to their successful completion. And the timeline can never be predicted.

As a broader strategy, India needs to adopt a patronizing tone towards the pakindhis taking a leaf out of pakjabi manual. Pakjabis adopt a patronising tone towards the Indian muslims. They pretend to be their tekedaars(contractors). India can do the same with respect to Pakindhis.

This involves making TFTA statements for any real, perceived, imagined, alleged or potential harm to Pakindhis. The culprit is always the pakjabi. During chai-biskut sessions, pakindhis can be given preference for biryani bashes while showing a tenga(middle finger) to pakjabis. Act extra buddy-buddy with pakindhis and ignore pakjabis.

If a pakindhi comes up and shows us a middle finger, then India can call such one as brainwashed by pakjabis or pandering to pakjabis anticipating rewards. In short, with this strategy, neither pakjabi nor pakindhi can deny that India is a friend and protector of pakindhi against pakjabi.

I think a pakjabi's h&d would be greatly hurt if India stops giving bhav(attention) to it and does pappi-jappi with pakindhi.

But, never part with any tangible reward. Neither to pakjabis nor to pakindhis. They are same to us. Only and only
Dangle the carrot to inspire a wrangle
Dont get entangle...

Since we are not going to give any great gifts, this strategy is foolproof in the sense that we loose nothing. However, such strategies can quickly get morphed by becoming serious about our relationship with pakindhis. Thats a bad idea. We are not interested in any love affair or marriage. Not even a one night stand. We dont want AIDS. All we want to do is to create jealousy among two slut sisters by giving more attention to one and ignoring the other. Then, if we are lucky, the two sisters fill fight among themselves and create less nuisance for us. If we are not lucky, then at least we tried...

[Atri]

My two paise..

Nobody (at least I) said anything about implementing it.. It is just a carrot to dangle. and it is a technically plausible carrot to dangle with aim of widening the fissures. there can be n number of excuses to be found if and when the time for actual delivery of promises come. I thought this would be self implied. I thought this would not need explaination..

If India wishes it is possible to implement it. it is not as outrageous as mining iron ore on mars. it is possible. so if we promise something which is possible, it becomes more believable.

[RajeshA]

Sindhoi are begining to hegde their future with Indoi . Departure of Zardari wil hasten the process. Baluchi-Sindhi fedration can be a rich entity as well FATA ,WATA etc loose their land locked importance . Eagerly waiting for the slogan Sindhi Baluchi Bhai Bhai: Pakjabi ki Maut Ayee.

Sindh's connection to Pakistan is predicated on the Bhuttos. The Bhuttos gave Sindh a stake in Pakistan. Now that they are dead, dying or becoming irrelevant, Sindh's stake in Pakistan is also going to become a thing of the past. Sindh too would start thinking, what the hell are we doing in Pakistan?!

[shiv]

My two paise..

Nobody (at least I) said anything about implementing it.. It is just a carrot to dangle. and it is a technically plausible carrot to dangle

My objection to this technically plausible carrot are as follows

1. We are falling hook line and sinker for a Paki story that Sindhis are suffering because of lack of water from Pakjab. I would be wary of taking the word of any Paki. The Sindhis are clearly screwing the crap out of others in Pakistan and no one has any ideas about taking water further wast to dry Baluchistan. So the so called carrot is an ill thought out idea based on what Pakis are saying and Pakis are well known liars.

2. Despite being liars Shitistanis are not totally stupid. They are hardly going to buy the "water" line because they know damn well that India can squeeze the water line shut at will and we may well have WKKs who will sign iron clad treaties to stop that from happening, gifting the Pakis something for screwing us.

If we want Sindh to have water we can point them at the sea. Pakjabis have a river, Sindhis have a sea.

The other thing is what about Kraachi. How about Kraachi becoming a separate nation state?

[ramana]

Folks this is the evolution of Pakistan thread and not the Managing TSP failure thread. Will move all relevant posts to that thread.

Thanks,
ramana

[Atri]

If we want Sindh to have water we can point them at the sea. Pakjabis have a river, Sindhis have a sea.

The other thing is what about Kraachi. How about Kraachi becoming a separate nation state?

touché...

[A_Gupta]

Ah, to see yourself as others see you!
An instance of SDRE from 1941.
http://observingliberalpakistan.blogspo ... /sdre.html

[shiv]

Ah, to see yourself as others see you!
An instance of SDRE from 1941.
http://observingliberalpakistan.blogspo ... /sdre.html

Brilliant! Thanks.

[ramana]

SBajwa, Thinking about your posts on Maharaja Ranjit Singhji and his achievements and connectng them to Hemu's short lived achievement the origin of current Af-Pak mess is the British plan to destabilize the Sikh kingdom in after the Maharaja's death. It was the single most contributor to the current problems. They split Afghanistan from Indian sub-continent and created West Punjab problems by freezing the society there. It didn't help that the Khalsa leaders after Ranjit Singh were not upto par.

[ramana]

X-post....

quote="pankajs"

From crisis to chaos

The whispers in Washington are growing louder: Divorce is inevitable, maybe even imminent. The always difficult “strategic partnership” between the United States and Pakistan has become even more acrimonious in the wake of the November 26 US airstrike that killed more than two dozen Pakistani soldiers in Pakistani territory.
.....

And they should repair and reenergise the manner in which the US delivers civilian aid to Pakistan. Doing so will not be inexpensive, but failing to act could be infinitely more costly.

Robert M. Hathaway directs the Asia Programme at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC
More of the same "Pakistan cannot be allowed to fail".

I think what we are seeing is cognitive dissonance. The cold-warriors found Pakhanastan to be a useful tool to needle the Soviets. I believe in the days of Anti-Soviet jeehard, the cold-warrior slogan was we need Pakhana more than Pakhana needs us. This got repeated so many times, that the whole millitary-intelligence organization got biased in this direction.

Once an organization gets biased and looks at the world with colored lenses, it is very difficult to get those off because of the enormous cost involved in correcting the bias of every individual. Its exactly like a stock market bubble. Americans invested in the Pakhana bubble, the Jernails made the bubble bigger and bigger and rode the waves.

At this juncture, people are realizing that the stock market has crashed. Things are really not what they are. But there are a lot of people who put their sweat and blood in Pakhanastan and enabling Pakhanastan, they refuse to remove their lenses. So they give confusing messages like the above. All they need to say is: Pakhanastan is the trouble, we should destroy them. Instead of Pakhanastan is the trouble, we should help them. The diagnosis is correct, the same old medicine is prescribed out of habit and a belief that this time it would be different.

While the Jernails inflated the Yankee bubble, they also created the homegrown jeehardy bubble. And while inflating the Yankee bubble, they also inflated the Jeehardy bubble as well. The Common abdul has basically nothing to eat, so they fed him delusions from the book about Purity, about Arap ancestors , about killing the kaffir. So the common abdul ate grass but invested in the jeehardy bubble. In return he was promised 72 and Jannat.

Note that these two bubbles inflate each other, jeehardy bubble gets bigger --> Jernails beg more after scaring the world about "nuclear armed failed state" --> Yankee military says "ohh $hit, i better get them some $$$" --> inflates the Yankee bubble. As long as these bubbles dont interact, things should be all fine and dandy for the Jernails, so they kept internal consumption separate from external (read Yankee) consumption. However after Raymond birader, Osama saahib attaining 72 via the SEALs, and finally the November 26th air strikes, the bubbles have collided. Now the Jernails cannot even appear to be begging for Yankee help. Interesting times ahead

We should make sure we double our surveillance at the border, and also get some beer and popcorn. Its going to be a perfect storm!

[ramana]

X-posted.....

caught my eye. Hope people will enjoy this one
Arab origins

By Salman Rashid
Published: January 6, 2012

The writer is author, most recently of, “The Apricot Road to Yarkand” (Sang-e-Meel, 2011) and a member of the Royal Geographical Society salman.rashid@tribune.com.pk

Every single Muslim in the subcontinent believes s/he is of Arab descent. If not direct Arab descent, then the illustrious ancestor had come from either Iran or Bukhara. Interestingly, the ancestor is always a great general or a saint. Never ever have we heard anyone boasting of an intellectual for a forebear. We hear of the progeny of savage robber kings, but there is no one who claims Abu Rehan Al-Beruni or Ibn Rushd as a distant sire.

Arab origin is the favourite fiction of all subcontinental Muslims. Most claim their ancestor arrived in Sindh with the army under Mohammad bin Qasim (MbQ). But, I have heard of lineages reaching back to Old Testament prophets as well. An elderly Janjua (Rajput), from the Salt Range told me of a forefather named Ar, a son of the Prophet Isaac. Ar, he said, was the ancestor of the races that spoke the Aryan tongue!

Touted as a local intellectual, this worthy was unmindful of the fact that Aryan was not a tribal name but a linguistic classification. Neither could he tell me how the name Ar, not being in the Old Testament, had reached him. He insisted this name headed his family tree and was, therefore true. The chart, written on a piece of rather newish paper had been, the Janjua insisted, copied from an old original. The original was of course destroyed after the copy was made.

The Arains flaunt Salim al Raee as their father — the clan being called after his surname. A great and valiant general in the army of MbQ, this man was from an agricultural family of Syria, so the Tarikh-e-Araian tells us. Closer to our times, the Arains are indeed acclaimed for their green thumb for which reason Shah Jehan relocated a large bunch of them to mind the newly laid out Shalimar Garden of Lahore. Today, they are a very rich clan in Baghbanpura.

The Tarikh expounds on this fictional ancestor’s noble background and courage in battle to the extent that he almost outshines MbQ. But it does not give us any source or reference for the rubbish that sullies its pages. There are two authentic histories of the Arab conquest of Sindh. Ahmad Al Biladhuri’s Futuh ul Buladan (written circa 860) and Hamid bin Ali Kufi’s Tarikh-e-Hind wa Sindh, translated first into the Persian as Fatehnama Sindh and then into Sindhi as the Chachnama (written circa 1200).

There are dozens of names sprinkled across the pages of both works, but no mention is made of a blue-blooded warrior called Salim al Raee. There are other histories besides these two works which also disregard this name for the only reason that such a man never existed.

The Awans, similarly, have a fictional ancestor called Qutb Shah from the line of the last caliph of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. My friend Kaiser Tufail, an Arain, has had himself genetically tested from the US. He has no trace of Arab blood. His line comes from what is now Uzbekistan and has lived from early historic times in the subcontinent. The rest of us of this clan will see similar results should we go through this exercise. Kaiser had his son-in-law, an Awan, also tested. He, too, is singularly clean of Arab genes.

Most of us are the progeny of converts. In their need to escape the discrimination of the so-called higher castes, our ancestors converted to a religion that in theory claimed to profess human equality regardless of colour or caste. I use the words ‘in theory’ because even as the Arabs converted our ancestors to Islam, they discriminated against them for being “Hindis” as we learn this from Ibn Batuta’s own prejudices. And he is not alone.

Consequently, even after conversion, my ancestors, poor agriculturists, were looked down upon by the Arabs and even those who had converted earlier the same way as they were by the Brahmans when they professed their Vedic belief. Within a generation or two, those early converts began the great lie of Arab ancestry to be equal to other converts and the Arabs. This became universal with time.

The challenge then is for all those, Baloch, Pathan, Punjabi et al, who have invented illegitimate fathers for ourselves to get ourselves tested and know the bitter truth.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 7th, 2012.

[ramana]

Chandigarh Tribune

Window on pakistan
Syed Nooruzzaman
Journalists in the firing-line

THE media in Pakistan has been playing an admirable role by highlighting fearlessly the happenings in that country for a long time, but at a great cost to journalists. Their survival remains threatened not only in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, in the news mostly for wrong reasons, but also elsewhere. Newspapers keep carrying stories about the plight of media professionals and the authorities make promises to ensure their safety, but that is all. Those — both state and not-state actors — who feel uncomfortable because of their controversial deeds being exposed try to eliminate the journalist concerned. And in most cases, they succeed in implementing their gory plan. The latest case that can be cited is that of Mukarram Khan Atif, a correspondent for the Voice of America and Deewa, a Pashtu-language private TV channel based in Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa.

Atif was killed a few days back while offering prayers in a mosque that had come up mainly because of his efforts. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) would feel threatened because of his exposes. Ultimately, the TTP eliminated him and then claimed responsibility for the crime! According to The News, the TTP has announced that "Atif is just one of a number of journalists they are going to kill".

Dawn says the "targeting of newsmen by the Taliban will not only have repercussions for the safety of journalists reporting militancy. It will also mean that large parts of the northwest (of Pakistan) could well become a news blackout zone, with serious consequences, particularly in the context of abuses that may come to light."

Unfortunately, all institutions of the Pakistani state have a soft corner for religious extremism, one of the factors sustaining terrorism. The role of Pakistan's intelligence agencies is also to blame for the victimisation of media professionals. These state agencies have been patronising extremist outfits as a matter of policy.

This sorry state of affairs must end for promoting a culture of tolerance, essential for the growth of democracy. "Brutality and barbarism must be shown for what they are. Without this effort, extremist groups will continue to target all those who are vocal about their activities", as Dawn commented editorially.

In the "most dangerous country in the world" for media professionals, politicians and other interest groups too sometimes behave like the Taliban. This shows that the extremist ideology is influencing the thinking of most sections of society in Pakistan.

Before the killing of Atif, the journalist who was done to death was Saleem Shehzad. A group fighting for the cause of journalists recently tried to focus attention on the threat to newsmen through judicial intervention, but in vain. The judicial commission appointed for finding out the forces behind the killing of journalists did not suggest any meaningful remedy. It only recommended the payment of Rs3 million to Shahzad's widow, as if this was the price of a newsman's life. {Wasnt he killed by govt agencies?}

There appears to be no commitment on the part of the authorities to ensure the safety of media persons. How many more journalists they want to be gunned down before the authorities will realise their responsibility?

In fact, concrete measures should have been taken when US journalist (a Wall Street Journal reporter) Daniel Pearl was kidnapped and murdered in a dramatic manner by the Taliban a few years back. No doubt, Daniel's killing led to four persons getting life sentence, but nothing happened in other cases. {Wasnt it Omar Shiekh who is an ISI agent that did it?


The result is that journalists continue to be targeted in Pakistan every now and then. Besides Atif and Shahzad, two other newsmen also lost their lives during the past few months — Zahid Qureshi and Umar Cheema. Among those who have been receiving threats to their lives are three well-known media personalities — Najam Sethi and Jugnu Mohsin of The Friday Times and Hamid Mir. Sethi and Jugnu had to leave Pakistan for their protection. They came back home only recently. But are they feeling safe today?

The real story is journalists get killed in TSP by many state and non state force who don't like their exposes.

[ramana]

X-post....

RajeshA, The Khakees got primacy for two reasons right from the beginging. Shaukat Hayat quoted by Ian Talbott says that the "The large West Punjab Muslim contingent in the Britsh Indian Army is a major reason for the Partition." IOW the Brits would not have decided on Partition but for the large armed forces component from that region. And the military knows that, they are one of the large unstated reasons for the Partition award.
Despite this the ball was snatched from their hands by the Civvies(claiming Muslim League etc got the award) right after Partition. Hence to get the primacy back they created the Kashmir issue so they are in the front seat and sometimes the driver seat. having taken the driver seat under Ayub khan and his ilk, the Army has became a vested interest in TSPA.

In TSP its Military-Civil Relations and not the other way around since 1947.

Ramana,
I find your explanation very convincing. So, historically speaking PA is a kind of rogue faction of British Indian Army.

I saw a bollywood movie on Bhagat Singh or Netaji(dont remember exactly) which depicts that one of the major reasons for the Brits getting ready to declare independence was their apprehension about the loyalty(or lack of it) of the British Army. Also, the Indian soldiers of British Army were inspired by the INA(formed by Netaji) and incensed at the shabby treatment meted out to them as prisoners of war.

So, the army(or more precisely the loyalty of indian soldier) which was the major tool in the hands of the brits in controlling the vast India had also played a decisive role in Independence struggle of India.

It just reiterates the history lesson that the one who controls the army, earns the right to rule.

People keep talking about rogue factions within Pakistan/PA/ISI. But, it seems like the entire PA is a kind of rogue faction of British Indian Army patronized by the brits. It seems that the PA has never grown out of this need for a maibaap. They keep searching for a new maibaap(patronizer) who would look after their needs, give them sense of self-respect by treating them as superior to the Hindus(they dont seem to have any inkling that self-respect can be had independent of bossing around on the Hindus), wink at their naughty deeds towards the Hindus, support and defend them when they put themselves in a tight corner.

Amirkhans played this role to a T. It was a match made in Heaven(or Hell, to an Indian).

I dont know what motivates the Amirkhan thinking. Let me imagine myself in Amirkhan shoes and try to understand their motivations.

We(Amirkhans) needed a vassal in this area who would do our bidding, without any moral, legal, social or political hesitations. There were 3 options: India, China and Pakistan.

There is little doubt that China, the neighbor of Soviet Union, had to be cultivated. But, China turned into a commie nation and as such was always a suspect. It can be used but not to be relied upon.

India was a good prospect, a promising one. A very vital geo-political location(land and seas), markets, raw-materials, and population(waiting to be exploited in various ways). There is little doubt that without the control of India, brits would never have been a force. And they will be relegated to the dustbin, now that they have lost the control of India. It was the reason we(Amirkhans) were very keen on the independence of India from the clutches of brits.

So, India is a good prospect as vassal. However, the commie talk of the regime and its tilt towards Soviet Union was disheartening(if not enraging). Their moral pretensions(going to the extent of trying to imagine themselves as morally superior and then trying to lecture us) got on one's nerves(especially since they were weak). Maybe, they dreamed of ancient times when they had a civilization going before they were defeated and subjugated by all and sundry. Anyway, such attitude is not appreciable and needs rectification. Perhaps, the solution lay in slicing and dicing India, given its size and population(which hopefully will be achieved in due course). Then, more manageable parts which will gladly play ball. Just look at the pakistan that is so eager to be the vassal.

Aha, Pakistan! Not a bad country at all. Manageable size and population. The regime(specially the army fellows) are perfect and pliant. The population is also exclusively Muslim unlike India with its various races. And therefore, India will have to be sliced into smaller parts. Churchill was right, India is not a country anyway. And muslim pakistan will make better allies than hindus of India, that is until India is properly divided with each race with its independent country . At any rate, the alliance of the martial races of pakistan will be very useful. They will do our(Amirkhan) job and perhaps will expect some favours(cash and kind). That is ok. There are no free lunches. Let them quote their price and then let them do our task.

What is their price?
Kashmir!
Hmm...! Why not?!
We(Amirkhans) are thinking of cutting India into smaller pieces anyway. Why not reward one piece to our allies?! Of course, they should not expect free lunches either.

First things first, lets arm the pakis. It is amazing how cheap it is to arm them! Of course, they will use the newly acquired arms to wrest Kashmir for themselves...which will perhaps, start a disintegration of India into smaller manageable states.

What is it? China gobbled Tibet? The bloody chinese are expanding. And they are commies... Not good. But, we need to cultivate them against the Soviets. Lets find some way out.

China attacked India?! The Mao wants to gobble parts of India too? No way! We cant allow that. Help India take on these commies.

So, China and India have a feud. Well, we need to balance them both. We need China against the Soviets. We need India until we can get hold of it in some manner. Pakis can help us deal with the Indians. We also need to find a way to make the chinese rollback from Tibet.

BTW, India is bruised by the chinese, this is the right time for the pakis to launch an attack and get their reward(kashmir).

Pakis failed to get kashmir?!
Even after all the support we provided them?! Hmm, hindus may not be as weak as we imagined. Or maybe the pakis were just unlucky.

What, pakjabis are genociding the bengalis? Why?
So, Bengalis want to rule pakistan(through democracy) and the pakjabis are opposed to it. Well, its an internal matter. And moreover, we are quite comfortable with the present regime in Pakistan. So, no sympathies with the bengalis. Pakjabis should not be genociding their own people, but maybe its a cultural thing.

Why is India making the noise if pakis genocide themselves? Nonsense! We dont believe what these Indians say, they are just using an excuse to vilify the pakis. Anyway, Indians should just shut up and put up until the pakis settle their internal squabbles.

What the hell? Indians want to start a war on east-pakistan? Why are these Indians suddenly behaving so uppity? Well, warn them that no non-sense will be tolerated. BTW, cant the pakis just teach a lesson to the Indians, if they start a war(after all, we have armed them sufficiently)? Oh, so east-pakistan is vulnerable, ok. Fine, warn India to behave and the pakis also need to quickly deal with this issue(of bengalis) without stretching it.

(...will continue later)

JohneeG, Continue here for future posts.

ramana

[ramana]

X-post.....

I think the surest and shortest way of discrediting PA in the eyes of aam pakis(of all varieties) is by subjecting them to defeat(visible and tangible i.e. land) at the hands of IA.

As long as the pakis feel that PA can match IA, PA has a lifeline. As long as the pakis view PA to be able to hold its own before IA, they will tolerate all the shenanigans of PA.

Stopping the external aid to PA will hurt PA's ability to match IA and needle India. Thus, it indirectly paves the way for discrediting of PA before the pakis.

However, I do not think ending PA is enough to end pakistaniyat. Pakistaniyat will persist in some other form. Perhaps, it will go dormant until it finds a suitable outlet. To weed it out completely and permanently, the ideology has to be rooted out. Of course, the first step is to take out the pillars of ideology. PA is, presently, one of the pillars of the ideology. It is the sword arm of the ideology, while mullahs/madrasas are the brain. Both these pillars need to be handled. But, that is not enough. Paki people need to be sanitized from islamism through de-addiction program that will reward and punish accordingly. Such program can be instituted only if the paki people are under one's control. To take control of Paki people(and their lands), one needs to first tackle PA.

[ramana]

Hence the prime objective of the Anglo-Saxon West is to prevent the visible defeat of the TSPA by Indian Armed Forces in West Pakistan. Hence they will use UNSc, fifth column sympathizers in India ( Media, IT/VTY folks during Parakram) to prevent this event. Defeat in far away East Pakistan was explained away as betrayal by Niazi etc.
Ideally the US should have captured the Kunduz guys instead of allowing the airlift. Or allowed the NA to shoot them down. But I suspect the Kunduz airlift was the TSPA clown jewels and/or top clown commanders hiding in strategic depth and hence would be embarrassing to TSPA if they were imprisoned and if its the clown jewels then there would be debris all around Kunduz. Hence the safe passage.

[A_Gupta]

I had written in the past about the July 10, 1946 press conference by JLN :

People like A.G. Noorani blame Partition on this conference by Nehru.

Congress reservations on the grouping plan led to Muslim League declaring Direct Action, etc.. They specifically objected to Nehru's July 10 press conference.

Prof. Bimal Prasad pointed out that days before Nehru's conference, Jinnah had written to both Atlee and Churchill, in a letter delivered to Atlee on July 6, essentially walking out of the Cabinet Mission Plan. The sticking point was that Wavell had not given the Interim government to the Muslim League as Jinnah had expected, when the Congress weighed against the Cabinet Mission Plan.

[shiv]

cross post

I have been doing some reading about the history of democratic government in India which has an impact on how the current Indian and Shitistani governmental set ups were shaped.

In 1928 Nehru made a report about an Indian government called the Nehru report where he gave shape to his ideas of government. By 1929 Jinnah made "Fourteen points" (Jinnah's 14 points) which set the course for Muslim opposition to Nehru's idea and eventually partition. Jinnah's 14 points were accepted by the British when elections were finally held in 1937. Salient among Jinnah's 14 points was that 1/3 of all seats in all legislative bodies at the state or central level would be reserved for Muslims.

I am not sure if this was meant to translate into a "separate Muslim electorate" where Muslims voted for Muslims only. That may or may not have been what Jinnah wanted. I think Jinnah probably just wanted rich and influential Muslims to be nominated to parliament to "represent" all Muslims without the need for election. The problem of course was that lots of Muslims were voting for Congress and other parties so a real attempt at electing Muslims might have ensured that prominent Muslims would have had their backsides handed to them on a platter. In fact that is what happened in the 1937 elections. But I have been unable to find out how the 1/3 reservation for Muslims was filled and who took those places. In any case all this broke down in 1939 when WW2 broke out and the elected Congress government resigned over support to the war, and Jinnah was a happy man when that happened.

But in 1947, when Pakistan was formed, I am certain that its government was made up of the very same "ashraf" rich Muslims who showed their sooth (Tamil for backside/arse) and ran to Pakhanastan. You can bet that these guys had no intention of depending on the fickle whims of an electorate to keep them in power. After all they had just run from an India where the Brits had allowed them nomination and 1/3rd reservation in parliament. They were not going to suddenly be overcome by a proper democratic urge.

Pakistan was a disaster from the beginning. Misconceived and misruled. And held together by American aid and the excuse of Islam - a religion where the only agreement between all Muslims is that Khuda is God and Mahomet is prophet. Everything else, wives, territory, boy's backsides, you name it is up for grabs.

[shiv]

I am going to make some assumptions and generalizations. The "Punjab" area is one of five rivers and those fiver rivers have historically formed a formidable barrier to invasion. The generalization I am going to make is as follows: Since invasions came from the west, the western side of the Punjab was always more vulnerable to occupation, while the eastern side was more easily defendable. The assumption that follows from this is that when you look at empires out of India one can assume that the eastern side of the rivers were more under "Indian" control while the western side fell earlier and more easily than the east. I have found no specific proof of this - only general references in narratives of history in the internet.

The Gupta empire that represented a peak in Indian civilization went into decline around 400-500 CE (CE=AD). Islamic invasions started in the 8-9th century CE. So there was a good 200-300 year gap between the declining Gupta empire and the Islamic invasions when the area called "Punjab" was under the control of various forces. The internet refers to a "Kidarite" kingdom in Punjab in the early part of this interim period, and a Hephthalite empire in the later part. The Hephtahlite empire is a complete mystery. Not much is known and much is assumed/theorized. No one knows if they arose in the Afghanistan area, or western China or Iran. The name "Hephthalite" has been linked to the later name "Abdel" and have been said to be the origin of the Pashtun people. The Hepthalites however used to bury their dead (unlike Zoroastrians) and had polyandry (like Tibetans/Ladakhis). They appeared to practice a "Kabila" like tactic. If they were pushed out of one region, they would go conquer some other region and establish a kabila there. This was pre Islamic.

If you recall, Babar himself, in a later era did the classic Kabila thing, but found India so good that he stayed and his descendants could not be dislodged for centuries. Babar came to India only because he was kicked out of Uzbekistan. The current Pakistan tactic of trying to expand into Afghanistan is again a classic Kabila tactic as ramana pointed out. Pakistan itself is a Kabila for the hordes that ran from India in 1947. Afghanistan is a further kabila in case they get pushed out of Pakistan. So "strategic depth"==place for new kabila. It was the British who built canals who greatly increased the amount of arable land in Pakjab. Until the 1900, parts of Pakjab was like it had been for millennia - with annual floods, the Indus changing course and the pastoralists and agriculturalists who could not settle in one place because of that. But around the rivers it was fertile land. But I digress.

It was Mahmud of Ghazni who captured and settled Punjab around 1000 CE. If I re-introduce the assumptions I made earlier, it is likely that the first conquests and forcing of Islam came on what is now Pakjab. Mahmud died in 1030. Punjab became officially his with the taking of Lahore in 1023, seven years before his death. Somnath was sacked in 1024. Mahmud was mainly a Muslim murderer killing Hindus and Buddhists. I am not sure how many he converted - although many probably did out of fear - forming the earliest Muslims of Pakjab.

I found the following interesting references to the advent of Islam in Punjab. This is from 1881
http://www.chaf.lib.latrobe.edu.au/dcd/ ... record=709

• The people of the eastern districts very generally refer their change of faith to the reign of Aurangzeb; and it is probable that the tradition very nearly expresses the truth. Under the Afghan dynasties, while the great provincial governors were always Mahammedan, the local administration would appear to have been in a great measure left in the hands of Hindoo chiefs who paid tribute and owed allegiance to the Sultan of Delhi. It is tolerably certain that little attempt was made at proselyting under the free-thinking Akbar. It would appear, however, that during his reign and those of his immediate successors, the character of the administration changed considerably, a more direct and centralised control being substituted for an almost purely feudal system.* The change gave the people Musalman governors in the place of Hindoos; and must have greatly facilitated the systematic persecution of the infidel which was instituted by Aurangzeb, by far the most fanatical and bigoted, and probably the first who was a bigot among the emperors of Delhi. The local traditions tell us that in many cases the ancestor of the present Musalman branch of a village community adopted Islam "in order to save the land of the village;" and it appears probable that some sort of legal disability was attached or attachable to a Hindoo.

• Mahammedanism in the Eastern Districts.—In the eastern portion of the Punjáb the faith of Islám, in anything like its original purity, was till quite lately to be found only among the Saiyads, Patháns, Arabs, and other Musalmáns of foreign origin, who were for the most part settled in towns. The so-called Musalmáns of the villages were Musalmáns in little but name. They practised circumcision, repeated the qulmah or Mahammedan profession of faith, and worshiped the village deities.

So it appears that the main push for purity in Islam in Punjab along with forced conversions came with Auragzeb. More on this in a later post.

[Samudragupta]

Just some ideas that are getting in my mind....while Punjab was important for the earlier Islamic Invaders but the Politico-Millitary capital of North India at that time have already shifted to Ajmer...So why do the invaders didnt targetted Ajmer first than Lahore....I believe it would have been easy for them to move South East from Multan through Sindh which already had settled Islamic populations while Punjab still had Hindu population at the time.....

[shiv]

Sindh was arid until much later when the Brits built canals. But I am not going further into the history of Sindh for the time being.

[Atri]

It was Mahmud of Ghazni who captured and settled Punjab around 1000 CE. If I re-introduce the assumptions I made earlier, it is likely that the first conquests and forcing of Islam came on what is now Pakjab. Mahmud died in 1030. Punjab became officially his with the taking of Lahore in 1023, seven years before his death. Somnath was sacked in 1024. Mahmud was mainly a Muslim murderer killing Hindus and Buddhists. I am not sure how many he converted - although many probably did out of fear - forming the earliest Muslims of Pakjab.

Mahmud Gazni's nephew, Salar Masud was killed along with his 100,000 army at Bahraich on June 20, 1033 and central asians were kicked out beyond Indus after this cataclysmic battle. They did not look at India for next 160 years (when ghurid invasions started in 1190s). Ghuri had to again reconquer Punjab from Indics before his tryst with Prithviraja happened.

[member_20317]

I found the following interesting references to the advent of Islam in Punjab. This is from 1881
http://www.chaf.lib.latrobe.edu.au/dcd/ ... record=709

• The people of the eastern districts very generally refer their change of faith to the reign of Aurangzeb; and it is probable that the tradition very nearly expresses the truth. Under the Afghan dynasties, while the great provincial governors were always Mahammedan, the local administration would appear to have been in a great measure left in the hands of Hindoo chiefs who paid tribute and owed allegiance to the Sultan of Delhi. It is tolerably certain that little attempt was made at proselyting under the free-thinking Akbar. It would appear, however, that during his reign and those of his immediate successors, the character of the administration changed considerably, a more direct and centralised control being substituted for an almost purely feudal system.* The change gave the people Musalman governors in the place of Hindoos; and must have greatly facilitated the systematic persecution of the infidel which was instituted by Aurangzeb, by far the most fanatical and bigoted, and probably the first who was a bigot among the emperors of Delhi. The local traditions tell us that in many cases the ancestor of the present Musalman branch of a village community adopted Islam "in order to save the land of the village;" and it appears probable that some sort of legal disability was attached or attachable to a Hindoo.

Shivji, that link you provide is actually a very important in understanding the population distribution. It is almost the signature ‘background radiation’ of ‘the event’. While going to my village in the Pauri district or even while going to Haridwar, we have to go through the Muslim majority areas. But once we are in the Himalayas, where the soil condition is not conducive to an agriculture based life, the Muslim presence is so entirely absent, that its almost surreal. I am sure you will find the same patterns in other parts of India or even say Bangladesh/Pakistan too. Surprisingly the Tanot District in Thar of Pakistan has the last vestiges of Hindu populations as are the Chakmas limited to mainly the hilly areas in Bangladesh. Even though Chakmas are Buddhists.

And while you may not be able to appreciate it as much as I do but the fact is that within my community esp. amongst the elders, the people from the plains are referred to as ‘Deshi’. The community has no such corresponding word/qualifier for itself. And the ‘Deshi’ was and quite often is even now, actually looked down upon as being somebody of low dharmic capability and almost zero ‘Sahanshakti’/’Sak’/’Shak’. With people like me the trend has changed in that we refer to ourselves as ‘Deshi’ also and the qualifier is taken to naturally.

[shiv]

And while you may not be able to appreciate it as much as I do but the fact is that within my community esp. amongst the elders, the people from the plains are referred to as ‘Deshi’. The community has no such corresponding word/qualifier for itself. And the ‘Deshi’ was and quite often is even now, actually looked down upon as being somebody of low dharmic capability and almost zero ‘Sahanshakti’/’Sak’/’Shak’. With people like me the trend has changed in that we refer to ourselves as ‘Deshi’ also and the qualifier is taken to naturally.

Interesting data point. Today I downloaded and read a PDF about Islamic rules regarding land usage and distribution and how it applies to Pakistan - written by a Packee. The article is full of hideously stinking farts - I need to read it again - but your post suddenly threw new light on a part that I had skimmed over. One of the foremost hallmarks of Islamic rhetoric is making expansive statements about Islamic laws and Quranic rules and pretending that they apply but denying that the rules are all invariably broken or ignored routinely. Rarely do I come across the amount of hypocrisy I am finding in "scholarly" Islamic documents. I will re read and post the relevant bits that are related to your experience.

In this case the document says "All land belongs to Allah" and then goes on to talk about how men can own land. It is highly, highly hypocritical.

[ramana]

During early Muslim sultantes the Hindus/Kafirs had to pay higher taxes and hence there was a disincentive to convert them. However Aurnagazeb';s time the empahsis was on conversion ahd spread the deen. So there could be high property taxes used as incentives. Wouldn't be surprized if there was quota system for the governors to deliver so many faith fools annually.

[brihaspati]

There is little actual archeological proof that Mahmud was able to include Punjab in his kingdom. Multan as a township had been Muslim for a while. It could almost be like current paki claim that it rules FATA. Mahmud was most probably an opportunistic raider who must have also been thwarted and defeated and fled a large number of times. Rarely, rarely would Islamic chroniclers mention any defeat of their icons. But one can gain an indication by the length of the gaps between victories that the narratives mention.

But apart from looting, taxation incentive to convert was a feature of early raiding stage - before Ghurid occupation. Its logical - for the wealth would be taken anyway, so the only other incentive to be spared of life and H&D [okay I will leave 10% of your family women for you but take the rest including wife and daughters - if you convert - I will guarantee sparing your wife and all daughters except the most beautiful] was conversion.

Only those who are in permanent occupation, will have an interest in sustained milking of the land - and these would consider "non-conversion incentives". so such policies might have taken place only after Ghurid occupation which took until mid-13th century to consolidate in the north. From there to around mid 14th century would be a period when India would be taxable.

But conversion was not a guarantee of less taxation : such privileges were usually accorded to immigrant deshwali birathers of turko afghan small time crooks masquerading as aristos in India, an dnot to the local convert. From mid 14th century the medieval dry period definitely started having its effects, and Alauddin Capri's theologian suggested punitive taxation regime destroyed the capital base of Indian economy, so that centrifugal forces broke up Turko-Afghan power over the next 200 years.

Actually - the theologian and theology inspired sultans carried on taxation policies that runs counter to modern claims that economy overrules theology. Islam was always predominantly a parasitic economic model - and could only sustain itself on top of otherwise strongly mercantile or productive economies from pre-Islamic cultural roots.

[shiv]

But conversion was not a guarantee of less taxation : such privileges were usually accorded to immigrant deshwali birathers of turko afghan small time crooks masquerading as aristos in India, an dnot to the local convert. From mid 14th century the medieval dry period definitely started having its effects, and Alauddin Capri's theologian suggested punitive taxation regime destroyed the capital base of Indian economy, so that centrifugal forces broke up Turko-Afghan power over the next 200 years.

This fits in perfectly with what I have been reading. In the Islamic scheme of things, all land belongs to Allah except when the despotic murderous ruler (vice-regent of God) declares that it belongs to someone. That means all land is owned by God unless it is owned by me. This is similar to the Islamic attitudes on masturbation. Don't masturbate unless you really need to do that. The hypocrisy is the same in both cases.

You can read it all here
http://ideas.repec.org/a/pid/journl/v39 ... 9-662.html

If I make the assumption that the first Muslims were inserted into Punjab by Mahmud - or as Atri says - it really happened 200 years later we have the year as approximately 1200 CE. In fact it might be later than that as is shown below. Afghanistan was converted first, later Pakjab and last and least was east Punjab.

if I go back to the British sociological document of 1881 that I posted earlier - here is an interesting quote of the state of Islam in Punjab:
http://www.chaf.lib.latrobe.edu.au/dcd/ ... record=709
(a very interesting read - read it all folks)

Early advance of Islám in the Punjáb.—It is difficult to fix with any approach to certainty the time at which Mahammedanism first made material progress among the population of the several portions of the Province....The people of the eastern districts (east Punjab/Indian Punjab) very generally refer their change of faith to the reign of Aurangzeb; and it is probable that the tradition very nearly expresses the truth.
<snip>
On the frontier the spread of Islám was almost certainly of earlier date. Farishtah puts the conversion of the Afghán mountaineers of our frontier and of the Gakkhars of the Ráwalpindi Division at the beginning of the 13th century, and it is certain that the latter were still Hindoos when they assassinated Mahomed Ghori in 1206 A.D. On the lower frontier it is probable that the Mahámmedan faith was already dominant when, early in the fifteenth century, the people of Multán voluntarily elected a Qoreshi and director of a Mahammedan shrine as their chief, ...The people of the western plains (Pakjab) very generally attribute their conversion to' Bahá-ul-Haqq of Multán and Bába Faríd of Pákpattan, who flourished about the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th centuries;
<snip>
Mahammedanism in the Eastern Districts.(east Punjab/Indian Punjab)—In the eastern portion of the Punjáb the faith of Islám, in anything like its original purity, was till quite lately to be found only among the Saiyads, Patháns, Arabs, and other Musalmáns of foreign origin, who were for the most part settled in towns. The so-called Musalmáns of the villages were Musalmáns in little but name. They practised circumcision, repeated the qulmah or Mahammedan profession of faith, and worshiped the village deities. But after the mutiny (1857) a great revival took place. Mahammedan priests travelled far and wide through the country preaching the true faith, and calling upon believers to abandon their idolatrous practices.
<snip>
But the villager of the east is still a very bad Musalmán. A peasant saying his prayers in the field is a sight almost unknown, the fasts are almost universally disregarded, and there is still a very large admixture of Hindoo practice. As Mr. Charming puts it, the Musalman of the villages "observes the feasts of both religious and the fasts of neither." And indeed it is hardly possible that it should be otherwise. As I have already remarked, the conversion was seldom due to conviction, but was either forcible, or made under pressure of the fear of confiscation. Thus the change of faith was usually confined to one or two members of the brotherhood; and while it is common to find one branch of a joint village community Musaluums and the other Hindoos, it is perhaps seldom the case except among the Meos of Gurgaon that any considerable group of villages has embraced Islam as a whole. Living then side by side with their Hindoo brethren in the same or the next village, sharing property in the same land, and forming a part of the same family with them, it is impossible that the Musalmán converts should not have largely retained their old customs and ideasThe local saints and deities still have their shrines even in villages held wholly by Musalmáns, and are still regularly worshipped by the majority, though the practice is gradually declining.
<snip>
A brother officer tells me that he once entered the resthouse of a Mahammedan village in Hissar, and found the headmen refreshing an idol with a new coat of oil while a Bráhman read holy texts alongside. They seemed somewhat ashamed of being caught in the act; but on being pressed, explained that their Mulla had lately visited them, had been extremely angry on seeing the idol, and had made them bury it in the sand. But now that the Mulla had gone they were afraid of the possible consequences, and were endeavouring to console the god for his rough treatment. The story is at any rate typical of the state of the Mahammedan religion in the villages of the Dehli Territory.

It seems to me that eastern Punjab (Indian Punjab) by 1947 (just 66 years after 1881) was largely Hindu/Sikh but with families where one or two senior members had been forcibly converted. Among other converts - thre was a practice of "dual faith" where they would behave Muslim under duress and return to their traditional beliefs when not under duress.

A Pakistani source has the following take on pre-1947 Punjab.

This man talks of great bhaichara and communal harmony. He claims that many (high caste) Jats had converted to Islam. This fits in with the observation of the earlier British document that speaks of forced conversion of one or two key members of landowning families. The Paki, named Sandhu, who might himself be descended from a converted Jat claims that pre-1947 Punjab had a mix of Hindu, Sikh and Muslim "high caste" land-owning families, with a mass of low caste poor. In Pakjab these low castes were Muslims and consisted of "Kaamis" and "Chuhras", while the Muslim high castes are referred to as follows:

The Punjab had been under the foreigners that helped the non-Indian or Arab origin castes like
Araeen, Qureshi or Syed, Awan, Qizalbash, Ansari, etc. to settle in the region who further achieved
a big influence in the social and political affairs in the name of religion.

The Paki author says that the converted Jats had maintained great Muslim-Sikh relations, but it was the lower castes who were responsible for the massacres of partition.

But what is clear from all the above references are the common ground that all have:

1. Forcible conversion to Islam caused some families to be split among Muslim/Sikh lines, but these families maintained ties with each other
2. There was definite communal strife because of fundamental religious differences
3. Despite that cultural relations were maintained with Sikhs being invited for Iftar and Muslims taking part if non Muslim festivities. Both communities shared music and some other cultural events
4. The western districts were Muslim dominant and the eastern districts were Sikh/Hindu predominant.

I read elsewhere that about 3 million Sikhs and Hindu came in from Pakjab and 5 million Muslims left. But the Hindus and Sikhs lost a greater area of land and had to make do with less when resettled. But he larger number of Muslims were migrating to a smaller area. But then again, many of the Muslim Migrants were "low caste Muslims" who never owned much land anyway and I doubt if they got any in Pakjab. I need to look into this is come more detail.

But the data above may have set the trend for the demographic and social dispribution of Pakjab, which has echoes today. I will come to that in yet another post.

[ramana]

Shiv, Another way of saying it is the British engineered Partition speeded-up the Islamization of West Punjab.
Was it willful or just happenstance after all those surveys and assessments over decades?

[svinayak]

Shiv, Another way of saying it is the British engineered Partition speeded-up the Islamization of West Punjab.
Was it willful or just happenstance after all those surveys and assessments over decades?

The British want to support the same goal of the Muslim League. Islamization of the region.

[shiv]

Shiv, Another way of saying it is the British engineered Partition speeded-up the Islamization of West Punjab.
Was it willful or just happenstance after all those surveys and assessments over decades?

That is an interesting point ramana and at this juncture I can't say yes or no, -I'm just looking for more data and points such as the one you make just open up another area that I will explore. The point is - assuming what you say is correct, I want to look at specific moves/legislation "on the ground" that aided that speeding up of islamization. That detail just helps me collect the data that I want and the detail I need to fill up gaps.

I started this quest initially to see if there was a link between the popularity of the JuD/LeT today and the percentage of low caste Muslims without land ownership in Pakjab. After a week and 20 serious references later I am no longer sure is that is either true or what I need to be looking at. From what i have found, after 1947 - about 40 of Pakjabis were high caste with Jats as a dominant group - but others too, including Rajputs and "foreign high caste" like Sayyed. About 20-30% were low caste "Kamis" and others. But the problem is that Pakistan has always under-reported the number of low caste and Arzal (Muslim untouchable) people because when a census is held in land owned by a feudal, the census takers can't go into the land - they merely ask the land owner to give an estimate. That is how Pakistan's low caste and population has been under-reported all these decades.

Apparently Hindus and Sikhs vacated about 1.3 million acres of land in Pakjab, and 800,000 of those acres was occupied by existing powerful landowners in Pakjab - the existing Muslim high castes, possible predominantly Jats because of their traditional agriculturist occupation.

The British themselves actually entered Sindh and got control of Punjab only around 1840 to 1850 - a mere 100 years before they left. Ranjit Singh's empire was taken over only in 1845 - a mere 9 years before Macaulay's minute and 12 years before the 1857 war of independence.

After 1857, the British showed a preference employing Pakjabis and Pashtuns over other Indian in the army. I have read (I will look again) that the British had a policy of gifting tracts of land to loyal soldiers to keep their loyalty and that would definitely have favored the loyal Mussalman of the Northwest.

The links I posted above about "impure Muslims cleaning idols" was from the 1881 census of India available online. Earlier I had posted links from a book that my grandfather had that has quotes from the 1901 census and also shows how racist theories of the superior white races were accepted as normal by 1901. Rudyard Kipling wrote "White Man's Burden" and "Gunga Din" around 1890. Clearly then the British, in the 1860 to 1900 period were finding the people of the North West as loyal servants. they also believed that the fairer complexion was better, and they furthermore understood Islam better as opposed to the mysterious heathen Hindoos with their many armed gods.

So even if the British did not deliberately put Islamism ahead from 1850 to 1900, their attitudes and the servility of the north-west Mussalman made them favor the placement of the loyal Northwest mussalman over the treacherous Hindoo. Of course after 1918, when the Caliphate was demolished by the same Brits, they became conscious of the need to mollify Islamic sentiment. Gandhi by then was doing exactly the opposite by trying to cooperate with Indian muslims to support the re establishment of Khilafat as a ploy to unite Hindus and Muslims. Clearly the British must have found it convenient to kill Gandhi's game by playing up the differences between the fair, martial loyal Mussalman versus the scheming bania Gandhi and the devious brahmin Nerhu.

But the data I am looking for is exactly what made the people of the Punjab switch religion from Hindu, to Buddhist to Muslim until the Sikh Gurus gave them some spine and created the proudest empire out of Punjab. In the absence of the Sikhs, or alternatively if the British had time to proselytise, maybe Pakjab would have been Christian by now, given the history of the people there.

Will cross post to evoke more opinions/views.

[A_Gupta]

The thinking exemplified in the linked piece is something I would like to understand more completely.
http://thepartitionofindia.blogspot.com ... indus.html

[shiv]

The thinking exemplified in the linked piece is something I would like to understand more completely.
http://thepartitionofindia.blogspot.com ... indus.html

LOL!

To me this is like a man who has a fond illusion of Islam in his head. The fact that the man could write English in 1946 indicates schooling either in India in a school where the teachers were Brits or Indian taught by Brits. That means both urban and urbane. Far, faar removed from the hoi polloi of Islam, the 90% illiterate, 50% women.

The man may well have read the Quran and ignored the bits about istimnation and has said what he thinks it is all about. The viewpoint of one of the blind men describing the elephant.

[ramana]

X-Post...
Bala vaakya Brhama vaakya!

Shivji,
You are an esteemed member,a 'guru',an ex-admn of this forum.As a keyboard jehadi,I have a high regard for people like you who have created this forum.

But I cant help feeling you are on a wildgoose chase.Its your choice to get yourself acquainted with sh1tland.To be honest,even that seems a pisko exercise.Cant help feeling that its impossible for you not to know about paki history.

If your search for faultlines in paki society is real then I have a few thoughts.
1) You will never be able to find any faultlines in Pakjab for India to exploit.I will explain why.The two largest castes in Pakjab are jats and rajputs.An additional 'hindu caste' which converted is Gujar.These form the bedrock of stability in Pakjab.Without them,theres no sh1tland.So ideally one would be looking for some sanity from these castes.As they were part of united punjab until 47.

These castes,particularly rajputs and then jats are fairly well resprented among paki RAPES and TSPA.Yet they have made no difference to pakhanastan.Why?

1) As Bajwaji pointed,these are rangaars-ba$turds.

2)Their conversion was purely opportunistic,but it happened under duress,the duress we cannot apply so long as 3.5 friends remain

3)The paki history looks down on the jats and rajputs and glorifies araps,turks,persians.In the paki hierarchy the pashtuns,mongol,persian,syed,awan,gakkar rank higher than rajputs and jats.And the rajput and jat has to prove their muslimness by demonstrable anti-hinduness even though it means hating themselves.Thus the pakjabi even while sh1t scared of the pashtun still would like to be a scheming and more brutal version of pashtun.This is reinforced by mullahs who look west.The Pakis look upto Saudi barbaria,Iran and Central Asia.The pakis hate themselves.Look at the contrast with jutt sikhs.The jutt sikhs have great pride in punjab,its rivers.The Gurus were from Punjab.The Sikh misls was led by jutt sikhs.The empire of MRS though not wholly Sikh was largely Sikh.

4)Only in spain,was the muslim population reconverted.Theres no record of that elsewhere

5)Any overtures by India will be seen only as weakness- as efforts by special interest groups in Delhi to reactivate trading relations particularly because Cong/BJP are increasingly fragile.It will seen only as a vindications of Jinnahs vision that Hindustanis claim of united India was a Brahmin-bania conspiracy which has unravelled and the hindoo banias having seen the writing on the wall were supplicating themselves before the RAPES,all this while we see no corresponding unravelling of TSPA/mullocracy.

6)The pakis have gone so much down the virulent Islamist path,any accomodation with kaffirs will be just taqqiya by a tiny fraction of society.

7)One might think the RAPEs would have some interest in sanity given that they are on the line to the lamp post,but the fact they are RAPes makes them impervious to any reason.

and

Shiv, there is a difference between inter-personal relationships and inter-community relationships. When a Sikh or Hindu knows personally a Muslim, they probably relate to them as a person, not as a representative of the Islamic empire. It is not entirely clear to me whether that that is entirely reciprocated. There is also the inter-community relationship which could be very different, based on the community's collective sense of history. So, e.g., Sikhs may have Muslims that are close friends or family, but collectively as Sikhs they would not want to be in a situation where their political existence depends on Muslim goodwill (e.g., as a minority group in an undivided Punjab that was part of Pakistan).

The mystery to me is why these relationships are maintained given the assumption of uniform hatred from Pakistanis.

One possible explanation is that a Pakistani cannot afford to publicly show friendship of be conciliatory towards India and Indians. Of course this is a weak argument akin to saying "The sun is actually 99% cold - we just happen to see the 1% hot part and act as if that is all there is to the sun. We need to look for the cold bits".

But clearly we know that there seems to be a contingent of inestimable size in India that seeks friendship with what is, for all intents and purposes, a murderous country. This Indian contingent is referred to as "traitor", "WKK", jholawala" etc. There are enough of them to form an entire named class of their own. Does this class exist in a total vacuum?

The answer that we have to this question is as follows: "You know, Pakistanis will behave all friendly and reasonable about everything until it comes to Kashmir when they suddenly go all fundoo" The Traitors/WKK/Jholawalas seem to profess friendship for Pakistanis despite all this. And recall that we can't see those Pakistanis in any case - we assume that they exist, giving a reason for the WKKs to want friendship. The story that we have depended upon all these years on BRF is that the Pakistanis who act friendly ar patriots - who will pretend when necessary to get concessions. And out WKKs are traitors or fools who fall for this pretence (that we don't fall for)

Having made all these "logical" arguments that are difficult to refute, I think it is still worth looking at who or what in Pakistan may be having some regrets about the state of affairs and what it is about their environment that prevents them from open vulgar WKK like displays. After all there are many who are openly critical of Indian WKKs but Indian WKKism per se is not disallowed. Only disliked and lampooned.

Does an animal called Paki WKKism exist? Why is it invisible if it exists? Why do Indian WKKs exist if Paki WKKs don't exist?

An answer to this question is important because if it can be shown that Paki WKKs do not exist, Indian WKKs can be bashed into submission with no excuse/opportunity for their efforts. Indian WKKs exist on the premise that Paki WKKs exist (AFAIK). i want to see those Paki WKKs and know why they are otherwise invisible?

[SBajwa]

Quote:
The mystery to me is why these relationships are maintained given the assumption of uniform hatred from Pakistanis.


Most relations are maintained as following.

Before 1947, People converted to Islam (where they thought they could get economic advantage by people in power or majority) in Punjab but maintained their "Biradari" i.e. "Family Code" when a male converted, according to which they have to

1. Attend marriage ceremonies along with their women folks but cannot eat food as they are of different religion.
2. Attend death ceremonies.
3. Attend any other ceremonies that are deemed "fit" to maintain Biradari relations.

So!! when Hindus/Sikhs visited the ceremonies at their Muslim "Biradari" they did this

1. Give them lodging away from their women (which was usually at Village Gurdwara/Temple/etc).
2. Give them dry rations (Atta, Dal, sugar, Oil, sweets) that they could cook at Temple/Gurdwara.

So!! The "Biradari" communications were maintained till around 1970s when that older generation passed away. After 1970s the communications have stopped and there are no "Biradari relations" anymore.

I still remember Chaudhary Lahirdeen Bajwa of Narowal (our Biradari) sending letters (3-4 times a year) to my grand father (My father who knew how to read/write punjabi written in Urdu script would read and reply my grand father dictation to him ) telling him things about

1. Who born who died (even cattle), got married
2. Crops yield., milk yields, good/bad seeds/etc.
3. Political situations around country at that time.
4. and so forth.

After my grand father passed away in 1970s the communications broke up! I don't even know what/who is in that part of the land.

and BTW.. Chaudhary Lahirdeen Bajwa helped his whole Sikh side of the family to escape to India., which is probably the same story across Kapoors, Sethis, Aroras, Kohlis, etc.

[Supratik]

I read elsewhere that about 3 million Sikhs and Hindu came in from Pakjab and 5 million Muslims left. But the Hindus and Sikhs lost a greater area of land and had to make do with less when resettled. But he larger number of Muslims were migrating to a smaller area. But then again, many of the Muslim Migrants were "low caste Muslims" who never owned much land anyway and I doubt if they got any in Pakjab. I need to look into this is come more detail.

But the data above may have set the trend for the demographic and social dispribution of Pakjab, which has echoes today. I will come to that in yet another post.

About 7 million Hindu/Sikh population and about 7 million Muslim population were exchanged in the Punjab.

Rajput, Jat, Gujjar, Meo make about 60-70% of the population of Pakjab and AJK. The foreign extracts and lower castes in fact are
minorities.

I have two hypothesis. The first one is about conversion of these groups. I believe that these groups were relatively new converts to
Hinduism being of foreign extraction. So they found it easier to convert either under pressure, force, allurement or conviction. The other groups in North India are of more ancient extraction. So you will see e.g. UP, Bihar, etc which had been under continuous Muslim rule for long period had less than 20% Muslims. The second one is about partition. I think that with the activity of Arya Samajis there was genuine fear among Islamists that they would loose these castes who would reconvert back to Hinduism and hence one of the motivations of partition was to prevent that possibility.

The long term solution is to defeat the Islamists so that these groups are able to reintegrate into Indic society. Ofcourse, how that
can be done is the big question.

[KLNMurthy]

The thinking exemplified in the linked piece is something I would like to understand more completely.
http://thepartitionofindia.blogspot.com ... indus.html

Iqbal seems to have had the same views about Hindus. Distortions and erasure of complexity and sophistication in the subject culture were tools of intellectual aggression used by both the British and the Muslims. In other words, there isno question of misunderstanding or being misinformed; this kind of analysis is the only one that will do the job.

And Indians are not going to have an equivalent misinterpretation of Pak because (a) there is no conqueror-conquered relationship with Hindus as conquerors and (b) Hindu model of conquest didn't involve cultural extirpation.

[ramana]

WH Auden on Cyril Radcliffe the English Judge who partitioned Punjab two days before Independence and led to the massacres.
A truly despicable character protected by the INC's Nehru coterie.

Link:

http://www.poemhunter.com/poem/partition-2/

Partition

Unbiased at least he was when he arrived on his mission,
Having never set eyes on the land he was called to partition
Between two peoples fanatically at odds,
With their different diets and incompatible gods.
"Time," they had briefed him in London, "is short. It's too late
For mutual reconciliation or rational debate:
The only solution now lies in separation.
The Viceroy thinks, as you will see from his letter,
That the less you are seen in his company the better,
So we've arranged to provide you with other accommodation.
We can give you four judges, two Moslem and two Hindu,
To consult with, but the final decision must rest with you."

Shut up in a lonely mansion, with police night and day
Patrolling the gardens to keep the assassins away,
He got down to work, to the task of settling the fate
Of millions. The maps at his disposal were out of date
And the Census Returns almost certainly incorrect,
But there was no time to check them, no time to inspect
Contested areas. The weather was frightfully hot,
And a bout of dysentery kept him constantly on the trot,
But in seven weeks it was done, the frontiers decided,
A continent for better or worse divided.

The next day he sailed for England, where he could quickly forget
The case, as a good lawyer must. Return he would not,
Afraid, as he told his Club, that he might get shot.

WH Auden

A true MOFO. As the French say "Perfidious Albion"

[ramana]

X-Post....

The Pakistan IEDddodology: History of a grand concoction

Yeh NC Inbreds Abhi Tukk Ro Rahe Hain

Pakistan had come into being in 1947 on the back of what its founders called the ‘Two Nation Theory.’ The Theory was culled from the 19th Century writings of modernist Muslim reformists in India who, after the collapse of the Muslim Empire in South Asia, began to explain the region’s Muslims as a separate political, cultural, and, of course, religious entity (especially compared to the Hindu majority of India). This scholarly nuance, inspired by the ideas of the nation-state introduced by the British Colonialists, gradually evolved into becoming a pursuit to prepare a well-educated and resourceful Muslim middle-class in the region.

Eventually, with the help from sections of the Muslim landed elite in India, the emerging Muslim middle-classes turned the idea into a movement for a separate Muslim homeland comprised of those areas where the Muslims were in a majority in India. However, when the country’s founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah - a western-educated lawyer and head of the All India Muslim League (AIML) - navigated the Movement towards finally reaching its main goal of carving out a separate Muslim homeland in South Asia, he was soon faced with an awkward fact: There were more Muslims in India than there were in the newly created Muslim-majority country of Pakistan.Jinnah was conscious of this fact when he delivered his first major address to the country’s Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947.Though during the Movement some factions of his party had tweaked the Two Nation Theory to also mean that the Muslims of India desired an Islamic State, Jinnah was quick to see the contradiction in this claim, simply because more Muslims had either been left behind in India or refused to migrate to Pakistan. Islam during the Movement was largely used as an ethnic card to furnish and flex the separate nationhood claims of the Muslims. It was never used as a theological roadmap to construct an Islamic State in South Asia. In his August 11 speech, Jinnah clearly declared that in Pakistan the state will have nothing to do with matters of the faith and Pakistan was supposed to become a democratic Muslim-majority nation state.He went on to add: ‘ … you will find that in course of time (in Pakistan) Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims; not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State. ’Some extraordinary circumstances (World War II, the receding of British Colonialism and rising tensions between the Muslim, Hindu and Sikh communities in India) had combined to hand Jinnah a Muslim-majority country that had fewer Muslims compared to those who stayed behind in India.Within this Muslim community were various sects and sub-sects with their own understanding and interpretations of the faith. Then, the country also had multiple ethnicities, cultures and languages - some of them being more ancient than Islam itself! Keeping all this in mind, Jinnah’s speech made good sense and exhibited a remarkable understanding of the complexities that his new country had inherited. But it seems many of his close colleagues were still in the Movement mode. A number of League members thought that with his August 11 speech, Jinnah was being a bit too hasty in discarding the Islamic factor from the new equation and opting to explain the new country as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Muslim-majority state.

As the Bengalis went on strike and held widespread demonstrations protesting the contradiction in the government’s decision, Jinnah ordered that the Bengali writing system (close to Vedic and classic Sanskrit) be replaced with Arabic script and even with the Roman script. It was as if the government was suggesting that Bengali could not be adopted as the national language because its writing system looked too much like that of Hindi. Jinnah’s desperate attempt to replace the Bengali writing system was vehemently challenged by Bengali intellectuals and politicians and he had to beat a hasty retreat on the issue. But Urdu did become the national language. The Bengalis’ resentment found immediate sympathisers within other non-Punjabi and non-Mohajir ethnic communities.

Sindhi, Pushtun (and eventually Baloch) intelligentsia were alarmed by the way the state and government had treated the Bengalis’ demands, and foresaw the same happening to their own languages and ethnic cultures. But instead of anticipating future fissures in the country on ethnic lines, the League (after Jinnah’s death), became even more myopic and wallowed in its self-serving naivety about using Islam as a slogan that was supposed to dissolve ethnic nationalism among the Muslim majority of the country. The slogan might have worked to haphazardly pull together the Muslim minority of various ethnicities and cultural leanings of India during the Pakistan Movement; but there was no guarantee that it would be able to do the same in a country where this minority had become an overwhelming majority. Ideally a system and constitution advocating direct democracy should have been worked out to facilitate and streamline the political and cultural participation of all ethnicities in the nation-building process. But this wasn’t done. Political and cultural expressions of ethnicity were immediately treated as being threats to the unity of the nation and the answer to this threat, ironically, came from elements, most of who were once staunchly against the creation of Pakistan. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, though steeped in the progressive Modernist Muslim tradition of Sir Syed’s ‘Aligarh School of Thought,’ was, however, willing to continue to use Islam selectively to maintain the cherished unity of the Muslim majority of Pakistan. Being a Mohajir, he wasn’t the ‘son of the soil.’ Meaning, unlike most Sindhis, Pushtuns, Punjabi, Baloch and Bengalis, he was born outside of what eventually became Pakistan and didn’t have a large constituency based on language and ethnicity in the country. So it is understandable why the notion of Islam being a unifying factor was important to him.But the question was what kind of Islam?



....

Soon after the Arab conquest of Persia they intorduced Arabic script for writing Persian. Similarly Jinnah was introducing Arabic script for Bengali in East Pakistan.
I have always stated that Pakistan is an abomination of the early Arab conquests of Islam.

[ramana]

Rajiv Malhotra has an article in Sulekha on the very subject written 12 years ago.....

The root of India-Pakistan Conflict

The Root of India-Pakistan Conflicts
Rajiv Malhotra / Blog / 12 yrs ago /

It is commonly accepted as an article of faith that Kashmir is the root cause of all problems between India and Pakistan. I disagree with this premise, and wish to demonstrate that the 'Kashmir issue' is itself the result of a deeper root cause, which is a clash of two worldviews: pluralism versus exclusivism.

(It must be clarified that neither pluralism nor exclusivism is the same as secularism, because secularism denies the legitimacy of religion, seeing it at best as exotic culture, and at worst, as a scourge. On the other hand, pluralism and exclusivism both recognize and celebrate religion, but in entirely different ways.)

Most people fail to recognize that this clash between pluralism and exclusivism does indeed exist. This exposes an intellectual failing and lack of preparation in getting to the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict. This has repressed the real problem, pushing it into the intellectual basement of the global subconscious, and turning it into the shadow side of humanity.

Any genuine attempt to address geopolitical problems must look deeper than examining merely the symptoms of conflict. This essay calls for a paradigm shift in the understanding of the root cause, without which attempts to resolve the 'Kashmir issue' shall fail, or at best bring temporary relief. It concludes by defining the 'hard question' that must be tackled by the world community.


Religion and Conflict
All religions have two dimensions: theological beliefs that pertain to one's relationship with a Supreme Reality of whatever kind; and sociological beliefs that pertain to dealings with human society. Often, people compare only the theologies, finding common ground across many diverse religions, and declare them all be the 'same' or 'equivalent'. Hence, they naively conclude that the present global problems are not about religion.

However, one must pay special attention to the second dimension of religions, namely, the social theories mandated by different religions. It is here where the root of much conflict is to be located.

Christianity's onerous social demands became the subject of intense fighting after 1500 C.E., leading to the Reformation of Christianity. Both sides -- orthodoxy and the reformers -- agreed that the social space should allow critical thinking, independent inquiry, and separation of church and state. This clipped the wings of Christianity from its control over the public space. Consequently, contemporary Western religion is largely a private affair and focuses less on control over society.

While Christianity does remain very active socially today, and has strong positions on abortion, euthanasia, and many other ethical matters, it is not the final legal authority to resolve sociological disputes. It has a position on these, but this is only 'a' position and does not automatically become 'the' position in Western society.

The situation in Islam is entirely different. A comparable Reformation has never been accomplished successfully, and those who have tried such amendments have been killed as heretics. Hence, in many ways, the sociological dictates of orthodox Islam today are comparable to those of pre-Reformation Christianity. For instance, during the Middle Ages, Catholic bishops had fatwa-like powers to give death sentences. They had police powers, and controlled the definition and enforcement of public law. (The greatest gift that the West could give to Muslims is guidance in bringing about such a Reformation, as that watershed event was the beginning of the rise of the West. The only losers would be the Islamic clergy.)

Furthermore, sociological mandates of a religion are also of two kinds: internal ones, such as the varna system, marriage customs, gender relations, and so forth, that only impact the internal society within a particular religion; and external ones, such as the requirement to proselytize or to kill or ill-treat outsiders, that impact those who are outsiders to a given faith.

In my view the theological and internal, sociological, aspects of a religion are not the primary causes of global conflict. Rather, the external, sociological, aspects of religion are the direct causes of global conflict.

It logically follows that it is the business of the world at large to interpret, question, and challenge those aspects of a religion that take a position concerning outsiders. If I am the subject of some other religion's doctrine, and such a doctrine states how I am to be treated, what is to be done to me, what I may or may not do freely, then, even though I am not a member of that religion, it does become my business to probe these doctrines and even to demand a change. On the other hand, if a religion minds its own business, and has little to say pertaining to me as an outsider, then I should respect its right to be left alone.

In other words, a given religion's right to be left alone by outsiders should be reciprocal and contingent upon its responsibility to leave outsiders alone.

Islam's socio-political strategies in dealing with the non-Muslim world are now at the crossroads and under the world's microscope. The positions adopted by Islamic leaders will have long-term consequences for the entire world, including both Muslims and non-Muslims.


Pakistan's Islamic Foundations
The three important social demands that dominate the Islamic orthodoxy as adopted by Pakistan's government and many other Islamic States (as opposed to alternative liberal interpretations that are subverted) are: (1) the 2-nation theory, (2) global loyalty to Islam superceding sovereignty of man-made countries, and (3) Islamic triumphalism. These are summarized below:

1. The 2-nation theory: Pakistan was carved out of India based on the theory that Muslims require their own separate nation in order to live in compliance with Islamic Law. This theory is equivalent to: (a) segregation (neo-apartheid) by demanding a separation of socio-political jurisdiction for Muslims; and (b) Islamic exclusiveness and imposition of Islamic “Law” upon the public sphere. This is the exact opposite of both pluralism and secularism. The traumatic event that resulted from this, in India, is commonly called “The Partition.” Once the population of Muslims in a given region crosses a threshold in numbers and/or assertiveness, such demands begin. Once this ball is set in motion, the euphoria builds up into a frenzy, and galvanizes the Pan-Islamic “global loyalty” discussed in #2 below. The temperature is made to boil until Muslims worldwide see the expansion of their territory as God's work. The US will have this experience at some point during the next few decades.

2. Pan-Islamic loyalty superceding local sovereignty: Islamic doctrine divides humanity into two nations that transcend all boundaries of man-made countries: All Muslims in the world are deemed to be part of one single nation called dar-ul-islam (Nation-of-Islam). All non-Muslims are deemed to belong to dar-ul-harb (the enemy, or Nation-of-War). This bi-polar definition cuts across all sovereignty, because sovereignty is man-made and hence inferior and subservient to God's political and social bifurcation. Islamic doctrine demands loyalty only to Islamic Law and not to the man-made laws of nations and states, such as USA, India, etc. Among the consequences of this doctrine is that a Muslim is required to fight on the side of a Muslim brother against any non-Muslim. This has often been invoked by Muslims to supercede the merits of a given dispute at hand. Orthodox Islam calls for a worldwide “network” of economic, political, social, and other alliances amongst the 1.2 billion Muslims of the world. Pakistan invokes this doctrine to claim Indian Muslims as part of dar-ul-islam, with Pakistan designated as caretaker of their interests. The Al Qaeda global network of terror is simply the extreme case of such a “network” mentality turning violent against the dar-ul-harb.

3. Islamic Triumphalism: A central tenet of Islam is that God's “nation” -- i.e. the dar-ul-islam -- must sooner or later take over the world. Others, especially those who are in the crosshairs, as prey at a given moment, see this as religious imperialism. Pakistan's official account of history honors Aurungzeb because he plundered and oppressed the infidels, i.e. Hindus and Buddhists. Likewise, many other conquerors, such as Mohammed of Ghazni, are portrayed as great heroes of Islamic triumphalism. (Even Pakistan's missile is named after an Islamic conqueror of India in the Medieval Period.) Given this divine mandate, the ethos of aggressiveness and predatory behavior is promoted and celebrated in social life, which non-Muslims see as Islamic chauvinism. September 11 was a misjudgment of timing and dar-ul-islam's ability to take over. But any orthodox Mullah or Imam would confirm God's edict that eventually Islam absolutely must take over the world.


Socio-Political Consequences
Once ingrained, these ideological essences become the contexts that define all thinking concerning society, politics, ethics, and even militancy. A sort of closed universe develops and rigidifies, and assumes a life of its own, with its internal logic and legitimacy.

An intense identity is often programmed from childhood. For instance, history gets rewritten to fit the requirement that anything pre-Islamic is to be seen as inferior and false. In India, this legitimized the destruction of Hindu-Buddhist institutions. The past is still a threat, because it is too obviously Hindu-Buddhist. In Arabia, it caused the virtual erasure of rich pre-Islamic cultures. Indigenous art got re-branded as 'Islamic art', even though it was done by non-Muslims who were employed by the conquerors.

Indian contributions in math, science, medicine, art, literature, etc. were translated by Arab and Persian scholars in the Middle Ages with explicit acknowledgment and great respect for the Indian sources, and were later re-transmitted to Europe. However, since Islam now no longer has exclusive control over India, it now claims these as “Islamic” sciences. This version of a triumphant Islamic history is promoted heavily by Arab sponsored television shows, and even on public television in the US.

The education system of such societies brainwashes and hypnotizes young boys into dogma that either includes hatred, or can easily be turned into hatred, by pushing a few buttons. It denies them job skills for the modern era, thereby expanding the available pool of jihad mercenaries for hire.

When Islam is in a minority and brute force power is not advisable, the Al-taqiyah doctrine legitimizes deception, if done for the larger cause of dar-ul-islam.

All this has built a neurosis and hatred for others. There is also hatred for modernity, seeing it as evil. When the infidels start to win economically or politically, the orthodoxy preaches that Islamic people are not doing a good enough job on behalf of Allah, and must get re-energized to fight the dar-ul-harb. Such a powder keg blows up under the right conditions of stress.

This thinking led to the creation of Pakistan in 1947.


History of the Two-Nation Theory
Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1876-1938), the leading Muslim philosopher of his time, was an Indian nationalist in his early writings. But by 1930, in his poem, The Millat, his thoughts had crystallized on Muslim separatism. He explained the concept of partition in his presidential address to the Muslim League in Allahabad in 1930: that a unitary form of government was inconceivable, and that religious community had to be the basis for identification. His argument was that communalism in its highest sense brought harmony.

Iqbal demanded the establishment of a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh, and Baluchistan. In subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal reiterated the Muslim claim to nationhood “based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests.”

The name 'Pakistan' originated in 1933, when some Muslim students in Cambridge (UK) issued a pamphlet titled Now or Never. The pamphlet denied that India was a single country, and demanded partition. It explained the term 'Pakistan' as follows: “Pakistan… is… composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North-West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean.”

In the 1937 elections to the provincial legislative assemblies, the Indian Congress party gained majorities in seven of the eleven provinces. Congress refused to form coalition governments with the Muslim League, even in Uttar Pradesh, which had a substantial Muslim minority, and vigorously denied the Muslim League's claim to be the only true representative of Indian Muslims. This permanently alienated the Muslim League from the Congress.

By 1939, the Aligarh Muslim group's resolution reflected the hardening of the Muslim leadership's thinking: “Neither the fear of the British bayonets nor the prospects of a bloody civil war can discourage (the Muslims) in their will to achieve free Muslim states in those parts of India where they are in majority.”

To rally political support, Jinnah used 'Pakistan' as the unifying cause. His famous 1940 Presidential address to the Muslim League's annual convention in Lahore was a watershed event to segregate dar-ul-islam in the Indian subcontinent. He said:

“It is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism. They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact, different and distinct social orders. It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality, and this misconception of one Indian nation has gone far beyond the limits, and is the cause of most of our troubles, and will lead India to destruction, if we fail to revise our notions in time. The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature. They neither intermarry, nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life and of life are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, their heroes are different, and they have different episodes. Very often the hero of one is a foe of the other, and likewise, their victories and defeats overlap. To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State.”

(Americans should visualize a future American Jinnah substituting “Christianity” in place of “Hinduism” and adopting similar positions.)

Jinnah's theory was partially rationalized by his understanding of history according to which segregation was normal and natural across the world. In his above speech, Jinnah went on to say:

“History has also shown to us many geographical tracts, much smaller than the Subcontinent of India, which otherwise might have been called one country, but which have been divided into as many states as there are nations inhabiting them. The Balkan Peninsula comprises as many as seven or eight sovereign States. Likewise, the Portuguese and the Spanish stand divided in the Iberian Peninsula.”

This was a false theory of history on Jinnah's part. Recent events demonstrate the trend towards European unification as opposed to subdivision, because the common interests greatly outweigh what divides the various diverse peoples of Europe.

However, having once made up his mind, Jinnah politicized his two-nation theory successfully, using fear tactics with the British:

“The present artificial unity of India dates back only to the British conquest and is maintained by the British bayonet; but the termination of the British regime, which is implicit in the recent declaration of His Majesty's Government, will be the herald of an entire break up, with worse disaster than has ever taken place during the last one thousand years under the Muslims. Surely that is not the legacy which Britain would bequeath to India after 150 years of her rule, nor would the Hindu and Muslim India risk such a sure catastrophe.”

At the 1940 Lahore convention, the Muslim League resolved that the areas of Muslim majority in northwestern and eastern India should be grouped together to constitute independent states - autonomous and sovereign - and that any independence plan without this provision was unacceptable to Muslims. The Lahore Resolution was often referred to as the 'Pakistan Resolution'.

Without any concrete 'dispute' between Hindus and Muslims, the logic that prevailed was that Muslims require segregation of political and social life in order to be in compliance with the demands of sharia. The Two-Nation Theory was a manifestation of the doctrine of dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb.


Divergent Post-Independence Directions
India was built on an entirely different worldview, inspired by the same ideals as the United States, as is evident from the Preamble to its Constitution:

“WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens:
* JUSTICE, social, economic and political;
* LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
* EQUALITY of status and of opportunity;
* and to promote among them all
* FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the [unity and integrity of the Nation]; …”

In sharp contrast, the Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has the following Preamble:

“Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust; …”

After Jinnah, Pakistan became increasingly radicalized and Islamicized, in many ways more extreme than the founder's vision. For instance, the Ninth Amendment in 1985 caused Article 227 to read:

“All existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, …”

The Ninth Amendment explains that the “objects and reasons” for this Islamicization are “so as to provide that the Injunctions of Islam shall be the supreme law and source of guidance for legislation and policy making and to empower the Federal Shariat Court to make recommendations for bringing the fiscal laws and laws relating to the levy and collection of taxes in conformity with the said injunctions.”

Once there is a State religion that has a strong orthodoxy, the State must also interpret the religion. For example, the Ahmadiyya sect of Muslims is considered heretical, because it recognizes a 19th century man born in India to be the new Prophet of Islam. In order to preserve the purity of the interpretation of Islam, the Pakistan Federal Government has constitutionally prohibited the group from calling themselves Muslim, even in the use of everyday Islamic greetings. This was implemented in the Second Amendment of Pakistan's Constitution in 1974, which reads:

“A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever , after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.”

This Constitutional provision is now enforced in various application forms of the Pakistani government, such as the following passport form on the home page of its embassy in Washington, DC. In item 14, the form asks for the following Declaration:

a. “I am a Muslim and believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon him) the last of the prophets.
b. 'I do not recognize any person who claims to he prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever after Muhammad (peace be upon him) or recognize such a claimant as prophet or a religious reformer as a Muslim.
c. “I consider Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Quadiani to be an impostor nabi and also consider his followers whether belonging to the Lahori or Quadiani group, to be NON-MUSLIM.”

As further examples of Islamization, the Law of Pakistan calls for amputation of hands or feet for many property crimes. Consumption of alcohol by Muslims in any quantity whatsoever is punishable by flogging.

Under Pakistan's Islamic laws, adultery and fornication are punishable by stoning to death. The law on rape (zina-bil-jabr) has a very chilling effect on women who are raped because: The crime is rarely proven because it requires that four adult Muslim males of 'good reputation' must appear as witnesses to the act. (One is left wondering why four men 'of good reputation' would be watching a rape.) If the charge fails, then the woman who has brought it can be punished for false accusation (qazf) or, more commonly, for adultery (zina) herself because through her charge she has admitted her own involvement in an illicit sexual act. For instance, in 1991, around two-thirds of the 3,000 women imprisoned in Pakistan were being held on such charges -- the victims of rape prosecuted for illicit sex!

Islamic texts are being introduced into Pakistani military training. Middle ranking officers must take courses and examinations on Islam. There are even serious attempts under way to define an Islamic military doctrine, as distinct from the international military doctrines, so as to fight in accordance with the Koran.

An eminent Pakistani writer, Mubarak Ali, explains the chronology of Islamization:

“The tragedy of 1971 [when Bangladesh separated] brought a shock to the people and also a heavy blow to the ideology of Pakistan… More or less convinced of their Islamic heritage and identity, Pakistan's government and intelligentsia consciously attempted to Islamize the country… The history of Islamization can be traced to the Bhutto era…”

“General Zia-ul-Haq [another great friend and ally of the US] furthered the process to buy legitimacy for his military regime. The element of communal and sectarian hatred in today's society are a direct consequence of the laws that the dictator had put in place… He made all secular and liberal-minded people enemies of the country. They were warned again and again of severe consequences in case of any violation of the [Islamic] Ideology of Pakistan.”

“Nawaz Sharif added his own bit, like mandating death penalty to the Blasphemy Law… With the failure of the ruling classes to deliver the goods to the people, religion was exploited to cover up corruption and bad governance… The process of Islamization not only supports but protects the fundamentalists in their attempts to terrorize and harass society in the name of religion. There are published accounts of the kind of menace that is spread by religious schools run by these fundamentalists…”

Khaled Ahmed describes how this radicalization of Pakistan is continuing even today:

“In Pakistan… every time it is felt that the ideology is not delivering there are prescriptions for further strengthening of the shariah… Needless to say, anyone recommending that the ideological state be undone is committing heresy and could be punished under law… The Council for Islamic Ideology (CII) is busy on a daily basis to put forth its proposals for the conversion of the Pakistani state into a utopia of Islamic dreams. The Ministry for Religious Affairs has already sent to the cabinet of General Musharraf a full-fledged programme for converting Pakistan into an ideal state… We have reached this stage in a gradual fashion, where these state institutions have become directly responsible for encouraging extremism…”

This hole is so deep that General Musharraf, while promising to de-radicalize Pakistan, must reassure his people not to fear the 'threat' of secularism. He recently clarified it as follows:

"No-one should even think this is a secular state. It was founded as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan…”

While America still has enormous racial inequality 150 years after the abolishing of slavery, the important point is that it is committed to racial equality. Similarly, despite many flaws in India's pluralism, the State is committed to it. What counts is a commitment to steady improvement. India has had one of the most aggressive and ambitious affirmative action programs in the world. The results, while far from perfect, have produced many top level Muslim leaders in various capacities in India, and a growth of Muslims as a percentage of total population. But in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Hindu population has decreased from 11% in 1947 to around 1% today, as a result of ethnic cleansing.


Pakistan's Identity Crisis
The problem for an educated Pakistani is to figure out when and where his history started. If it is to be 1947 in the geographical area that is now Pakistan, then there is very little past for him to build an identity. If it is to be from the time of Mohammed, then his history is outside his land. If it is prior to that, then his history is largely a Hindu-Buddhist history, a past he wants to deny.

He must invent history to answer the question: Why was Pakistan created? Mubarak Ali, a prominent Pakistani scholar, explains the predicament:

“Since its inception Pakistan has faced the monumental task of formulating its national identity separate from India. Partitioned from the ancient civilization of India, Pakistan has struggled to construct its own culture; a culture not just different and unique from India, but one appreciable by the rest of the world. The overshadowing image of the Indian civilization also haunted the founders of Pakistan, who channeled their efforts in making the differences between India and Pakistan more tangible and obvious.

“The fundamental difference between India and Pakistan was based on the Two Nation theory, strengthening Pakistan's Islamic identity.

“…The University Grants Commission of Pakistan made Islamic Studies and Pakistan Study compulsory subjects at all levels of the education system, even for the professional students. … This gave the government an opportunity to teach the students its own version of history, especially the Pakistan ideology, which is described as something like this: "The struggle was for the establishment of a new Islamic state and for the attainment of independence. It was the outcome of the sincere desire of the Muslims of the subcontinent who wanted Islam to be accepted as the ideal pattern for an individual's life, and also as the law to bind the Muslims into a single community.

“In asserting this identity, Pakistan is in a state of dilemma…”

If Pakistanis were seen merely as Indians who converted to Islam, then they would seem no different than the Indian Muslims, who are equal in number to Pakistan's total population, who are better educated and economically placed, and who enjoy greater social freedom than their counterparts in Pakistan. Hence, the very existence of Pakistan as a separate nation rests upon constructing an identity for itself that is radically different from India's. But you cannot build a nation on a negative identity.

One might say that a birth defect of Pakistan was its lack of a self-sufficient positive identity. Such a positive identity would neither be a negation of India, nor be an imperialistic claim of authority over all dar-ul-islam of the subcontinent. Kamal Azfar, a Pakistani writer, explains the dilemma:

“There are two concepts of Pakistan: the first empirical and the second utopian. The empirical concept is based on solid foundations of history and geography while the utopian concept is based on shifting sands. Utopia is not an oasis but a mirage… Samarqand and Bukhara and the splendors of the Arab world are closely related to us but we do not possess them. Our possessions are Moenjodaro and Sehwan Sharif, Taxila and Lahore, Multan and the Khyber. We should own up to all that is present here in the Indus Valley and cease to long for realities not our own for that is false-consciousness.”

This obsession to be seen as neo-Arabs has reached ridiculous extremes, such as Pakistani scholars' attempts to show that Sanskrit was derived from Arabic. Even Persian influence on Indian culture is considered impure as compared to Arabic.

Pakistan's un-Indian identity easily gets turned into anti-Indian rhetoric. In short, hatred for India has been required to keep Pakistan together, because Allah has not done so. Pakistan is largely a garrison state, created and sustained using the Hindu-Muslim divide.

A secure Hindu seems to be incompatible with what the Pakistani thinks a Hindu should be. Especially any 'Hindu' success feeds its Hindu-phobia.

Pakistan's positive identity building projects are using multiple strategies. The following are three of the major historical myths being spun by Pakistan, to secure legitimacy for its separate existence.


Myth 1: Pakistanis = Descendents of the Indus Valley Civilization
The most aggressive identity engineering project is the theory of Pakistanis depicted as the 8,000-year-old people of the Indus Valley. This civilization is presented as different from the Ganges Valley civilization. The Indus and Ganges are depicted as the ancestral homelands of Pakistanis and Indians, respectively. Hence, they have always been separate people. Given this model, Pakistan's Indus Valley researchers are encouraged to show the links to the Middle East civilizations of Mesopotamia, so as to bring Pakistan and the Arab-Persian worlds into a single continuous historical-geographical identity since the beginnings of recorded history.

The following article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit, published in the Urdu newspaper Jang, explains the construction of this theory of an 8,000-year-old Pakistan:

“Pakistani intellectuals have been looking for the roots of their separate identity in the remote past for the last two decades. They are not satisfied with the two-nation theory propounded by Iqbal, according to which religion was the basis of nationhood… They want to show that… the Indus and the Gangetic valleys have always been home to separate civilizations. Being the heir to the Indus valley civilization, Pakistan is a geographic entity whose roots go back to time immemorial…

“Hitherto, the generally held belief has been that Urdu came into being as a result of social contacts between the Muslims who came to India during the middle ages and the native population. So the language was taken to be a crossbreed of Turko-Persian-Arabic vocables with the local dialects. This is, in a nutshell, the view held by such eminent linguists as G.A. Griesson and Sir Charles Lyall, to mention only two. This theory presupposed that these dialects themselves were based upon, or rather were a by-product of Sanskrit.

“Khalid Hasan Qadiri [a new identity developer]… reaches the conclusion that Urdu has its roots in the languages of the Munda tribes who were the inhabitants of the Indus Valley in pre-Dravidian periods…. In this way we are led to believe that the Urdu language has a very well-defined and clear-cut grammar, absolutely different from Sanskrit in every respect. The very basic philosophy governing the grammatical structure of these two languages is totally different. And by any stretch of imagination one cannot state Urdu to have emanated from the sacred language of the Hindus. Grammatically speaking Urdu owes nothing to Sanskrit. Hence it cannot be grouped with the Aryan language either. It clearly belongs to some non-Aryan group of languages. And this view is supposed to give us some solace.”


Myth 2: Pakistanis = West Asian Races
Using a more recent beginning point, there is a popular construction of Pakistanis as Arab-Persian-Turk 'immigrants' (with a few occasional 'jihads' against the infidels). Here, Pakistanis get racially differentiated from the 'native' Indian Muslims. (A different version of this scenario says that Pakistanis are Aryans originally from lands around Turkey.)

These theories encourage rampant Arabization of Pakistani culture. Arabization is to Pakistanis what Macaulayism is to many Indians. The difference is that Macaulayism has afflicted only the top tier of Indian elitists, whereas Arabization of Pakistan pervades all strata of Pakistani identity. For instance:

* Girls are discouraged from wearing mehndi, because it is seen as a Hindu tradition, even though it has nothing to do with one's religion per se.
* The kite flying tradition during the festival of Baisakhi, celebrated for centuries in Punjab as the harvest season, is now under the microscope of Pakistan's identity engineers for being too Sikh and Hindu in character, and not Arab enough.
* Emphasis is placed on being un-Indian so as to assert this new identity wherever possible.

Pakistan has these internal conflicts between its Middle Eastern religious values on the one hand, and its Indian cultural values on the other. In this internal struggle, the Islamic values based on Middle East culture are conquering the indigenous values of the people. Much of the neurosis is about this destruction of one's past identity.


Myth 3: Pakistan = Successor to Mughal Empire
This is the most ominous model of all from Indians' perspective: Pakistan is depicted as the successor to the Mughal Empire. The post-Mughal two-century British rule is seen as a dark period of interruption that is now to be reversed by returning to the glory of the Mughals. Under this return of the Mughals, Hindus would be second-class citizens, in the same manner as they were under the Mughals.

Many Pakistanis would like Mughal Emperor Akbar's model, under which Hindus were tolerated and even respected, although Muslims enjoyed higher status.

But most Pakistanis are said to prefer Emperor Aurungzeb's model, under which Hindus were oppressed and forced to convert, and Islam was asserted in ways that were not different from the Taliban's policies. This glorifies aggressiveness and Islamic chauvinism. Such an imperialistic identity has also led to a leadership claim over India's Muslims, even though they outnumber Pakistan's entire population and enjoy greater prosperity, freedom and culture.


Neurosis
This schizophrenia makes Pakistanis very insecure. To avoid this quandary, they quickly slip into talk of a pan-Islamic identity, hoping to escape the irrational construct with which they find themselves burdened.

It is relevant to point out that Muslims are required to point towards Mecca five times daily in prayer. Psychologists would call this “creative visualization,” a form of subconscious programming. Are loyalties taking shape deep within one's psyche, towards the Arabs, the owners of Mecca?

What is the effect of being told since childhood, in chauvinistic and triumphant terms, of Islam's heroic plunder of infidels, and its inevitable conquest of the entire world? What is the consequence of glorifying Ghazni and Aurungzeb as is done in Pakistan's public school textbooks?

Khaled Ahmed explains the neurosis resulting from such dogma:

“The difficulty lies in the inability of the Muslims to mould their original revealed message to modern times by applying logic and rationality to the ancient case law. There was a time when this was done but the era of taqleed (imitation) has been upon us since the medieval period. Under colonial rule, many Muslims thought of introducing reason in the science of understanding the Holy Writ, but today no one in the Islamic world tolerates any deviation from taqleed even when this taqleed varies in practice from state to state. All Muslim states are unstable either because they have enforced the shariah and are unhappy with it, like Pakistan, or have not enforced it and are unhappy that it has not been enforced. For Muslims the question, 'What kind of state do we want?' is a rhetorical one, because for them it has already been answered.”

Most shocking is the prevalent Hindu-bashing on Pakistani state television and in state school textbooks. A common theme is to depict Brahmins as cunning and wicked, and to mock at Hindu beliefs. By contrast, the state run media in India is extra careful to be sensitive. Private Bollywood has many Muslims in dominant positions and a pluralistic ethos is very much projected.

One of the most popular songs sung by Hindus is Ishvar, Allah tere nam, meaning Ishvar and Allah are God's names. I have not come across Hindus being concerned or even conscious that they are giving Allah recognition as equal to Ishvar. But most Muslim friends refuse to participate in any such song, as it would violate the injunction against respecting other deities.

A friend recently told me that in her corporate office on Wall Street, she has been a close friend of a Pakistani woman executive for many years. They bring lunch from home, and have shared each other's food regularly. But one day, my friend casually remarked that the lunch she brings is after doing puja and offering some as prasadam. The Pakistani woman refused to accept her food ever since. She had no qualms about saying that eating such a meal would be a violation of her Islamic faith.

Pakistan, assuming the leadership of dar-ul-islam, is trying to expand the territory of Islam. Militancy is a relatively recent export of Pakistan, a sort of last resort out of desperation. The 'Kashmir issue' is Pakistan's identity crisis externalized towards an outside enemy, so as to find a meaning for itself. The citizens of Pakistan have been galvanized into a neurosis to Islamize Kashmir on behalf of Allah.


The Need to Decouple
The economic directions of India and Pakistan are entirely different: the technology education emphasis in India, as compared to the madrassas in Pakistan where Islamic identity is the primary curriculum.

India is one-sixth of all humanity. It deserves its own space in the world's mind, and should not be reduced to one of eight countries lumped into a single 'South Asian region' just for simplicity and convenience. Pakistan should be let loose to discover who it wants to be, without being bothered about India.


The Garland Making Worldview

“Be like a garland maker, O king; not like a charcoal burner.” --Mahabharata, XII.72.20
This famous statement from the Mahabharata contrasts two worldviews. It asks the king to preserve and protect diversity, in a coherent way. The metaphor used is that of a garland, in which flowers of many colors and forms are strung together for a pleasing effect. The contrast is given against charcoal, which is the result of burning all kinds of wood and reducing diversity to homogeneous dead matter. The charcoal burner is reductionist and destroys diversity, whereas the garland maker celebrates diversity.

Garland making and charcoal burning represent two divergent worldviews in terms of socio-political ideology. The former leads to pluralism and diversity of thought, whereas the latter strives for a homogenized and fossilized society in which dogma runs supreme.

India represents a long and continuous history of experimentation with garland making. A central tenet of dharma is that one's social duty is individualistic and dependent upon the context:

* To illustrate the context-sensitive nature of dharma, a text by Baudhayana lists practices that would be normal in one region of India but not appropriate in another, and advises that learned men of the traditions should follow the customs of their respective districts.
* Furthermore, the ethical views applicable also depend upon one's stage in life (asramadharma).
* One's particular position in society determines one's personal dharma (svadharma).
* The dharma has to be based upon one's personal inner nature (svabhava).
* There is even special dharma that is appropriate in times of distress or emergency (apaddharma).

Hence, anything resembling a universal or absolute social law (sadharama) is characterized as a last resort and not as a first resort - a fallback if no context can be found applicable.

Combine this with the fact that social theories (called Smritis) were not divine revelations as was the case in the Abrahamic religions, but were constructed by human lawmakers who were analogous to today's public officials. Hence, all Smritis are amendable, and indeed are intended to be modified for each era and by each society. This is a very progressive social mandate, and to freeze Indian social norms is, in fact, a travesty based on ignorance.

This pluralistic social theory is deeply rooted in indigenous religions. In the Bhagavadagita (IX. 23-25), Krishna proclaims that the devotees who worship other deities are in fact worshipping Him; and that those who offer worship to various other deities or natural powers also reach the goals they desire.

Dr. P. V. Kane has researched ancient India's pluralism, and concluded emphatically that there was no state sponsored religious exclusivism. In particular, Kashmir's history of garland making spans several millennia. Its identity was not based on any religion. Kashmiris of all religions lived in harmony, and Kashmir was the incubator of Kashmir Shaivism, much of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, and Sufism. Kashmir's survival as a garland making culture is a crucial challenge to the future of pluralism in the world.


The 'Kashmir Issue'
No fruitful discussion can begin with 'the Kashmir issue' as though it were a stand-alone real estate dispute. The root problem between India and Pakistan is not 'Kashmir'. Neither is it about Islam's theology nor its internal social practices. Rather, it is the clash between worldviews resulting from the external projection of Islam -- dar-ul-islam versus dar-ul-harb. This manifests as Pakistan's two-nation worldview versus India's pluralistic worldview.

The validity and success of either worldview necessitates the defeat of the other:

* For, if Pakistan's worldview were right, then Muslims everywhere require their own country in order to live as good Muslims. This would mean that Indian pluralism would have to fail, and Indian Muslims would need their own separate nation as well.


* On the other hand, if India's worldview were right, and Indian Muslims lived happily in a pluralistic society, then the very foundation of Pakistan's existence would become unglued and there would be a call for re-unification.

If both India and Pakistan were to adopt a common worldview, there could be a stable peace, regardless of which worldview it was:

* If both adopted the two-nation theory, there would be exclusive and separate nations for Muslims and Hindus, respectively. The practicalities of implementation would be horrendous, given the massive and dispersed Indian Muslim population. But each would eventually become homogeneous internally.

* If both adopted the one-nation theory, they would re-unify.

I disfavor the first choice, because it would set a horrible precedence for humanity at large: If India were to fail as the world's oldest surviving garland making civilization, it would mean that any geographical region of the world with a significant Muslim minority, even with a small population (such as Kashmir's), would eventually demand separation from the dar-ul-harb. Given the empirical fact of a faster birth rate than the rest of the population, Muslims everywhere would sooner or later have the same kinds of fights with dar-ul-harb as in Bosnia, pre-partition India, Philippines, Kashmir, and so forth.

Partitions into Muslim nations could never be complete until there were no others left. Such a theocracy would be the ultimate charcoal burning social structure.

This would eventually become the biggest nightmare for the United States, China and other countries, given their own demographic trends.

The second scenario may not be politically acceptable to Pakistan. This leads us to the hard question of reformation.


The Hard Question
Rather than pretending that these problems have “nothing to do with religion,” or fearing that it would be politically incorrect to address this issue, non-Muslim thinkers and liberal Islamic leaders should brainstorm the following question:

Under what socio-political mutual understandings could it become attractive for Muslims to live in integrated harmony with non-Muslims, even where the Muslims are a majority or a significant minority?

In other words, let's negotiate a framework for Islamic pluralism, separation of mosque and state, and democracy.

The West's failure to understand this clash of worldviews, and its continued approach to Kashmir as the problem in isolation, could end up creating another Palestine-like unsolvable crisis. This crisis would be worse, and involve massive populations and nukes.

There needs to be a paradigm shift in defining the problem. India should take the moral, intellectual and diplomatic high ground to debate: one nation (pluralism) versus two nation (exclusivism) theories. In other words, the real issue is garland making versus charcoal burning.

References:

1. See http://alfa.nic.in/const/preamble.html Also, note that Article 15 explicitly prohibits “discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.”
2. See http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/const ... part9.html
3. Jinnah did have a vision as a moderate, although in an overall Islamic context. In his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, August 11, 1947, Jinnah said: “Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.” Contemporary Pakistanis are often trying to deny this secularist call by Jinnah.
4. See http://www.pakistan-embassy.com/pages/formA.htm This url is to Pak Embassy in DC, giving the official government form to get a passport.
5. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
6. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
7. Pakistan not meant to be secular. BBC., 30 January, 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/ ... 792252.stm
8. In search of identity by Mubarak Ali. Dawn, Karachi. May 7, 2000.
9. The concept of Pakistan by Kamal Azfar. The Friday Times.
10. See the article titled, Separating Urdu from Sanskrit at: http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/dec2001- ... /lit.htm#4
11. This term is named after Lord Macaulay, who pioneered the British program to replace Indian languages with English, to remove respect for indigenous ideas and values, so as to create intellectual dependence and reverence for the colonizers. This was a very essential part of the colonizing process, and its crushing impact is still being felt.
12. What kind of state do we want? by Khaled Ahmed. The Friday Times. January 25, 2002.
13. Dr. P. V. Kane, History of Dharmasastra. Volume III, second edition, 1973, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. p.883.

[ramana]

X-Post...

The saving grace may be that secularism of the state, despite being under threat from the now electorally popular and now rejected Hindutva, has managed to survive, but it has extracted a heavy toll all the same: no Iqbal . . .

I have not read the article, but what a lie in the first place !

Allama Iqbal was troubled by Western colonialism and felt that jihad was a legitimate Islamist tool to get rid of that. He echoed Waliullah’s approach and rejected the inclusive politics of the Indian National Congress. He appreciated the efforts of Syed Ahmed of Rae Bareli, who fought the Sikhs to establish a Muslim nation in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) in the period between 1826-1831. Allama Iqbal sowed the seeds of exclusivist ‘Muslim identity’ amongst the Indian Muslims, an approach that has ever since troubled the Pakistanis. He held in high esteem the illiterate 19-year old Ilm-ul-Din who killed a Hindu publisher, Raj Pal, in Lahore for publishing the book Rangeela Rasool. It is reported that Iqbal placed the body in the grave with tears in his eyes and said: “This young man left us, the educated men, behind.”

Allama Iqbal subscribed to a worldwide view of Islam. The national poet of later day Pakistan, Allama Iqbal, was declared a kafir by the clergy. But, that is a different matter because that is a fate that befalls all Islamists at some point of time as a much greener variety sprouts forth condemning everything before that as the Kharrajis prove eternally.

He termed democracy and elections as ‘sweet tasting Western soporofics’. He opined that since Islam was going through a period of great strain, accepting taqlid was better than laudable ijtihad. The first time that separate states for Hindu-populated and Muslim-populated areas was expounded in the 1930 Muslim League conference at Allahabad by him.

For those who want to know about Sheikh Waliullah Dehelvi, who influenced Allama Iqbal, let me recall the following: Waliullah's aim was to rid the low-church ajlaf Indian Muslims of their Hindu practices. He helped the Afghan king Ahmed Shah Abdali to overcome the Mahrattas in the Panipat war in 1761 He was educated in Makkah and Madinah and a contemporary of Ibn Abd-al Wahhab.; his argument was that the decline of Islam could be arrested only by making it more rigorous. He had a close relationship with ibn Abd Al Wahhab. Both were born in the same year and Waliullah spent considerable time in the company of Wahhab in Saudi Arabia. He wanted an intensification of Aurangzeb’s efforts. His thoughts led to the formation of the Berelvi sect later on. Shah Waliullah’s contribution was the linkage he formed between Deobandi Islam and the Hanbali Islam of Saudi Arabia during his sojourn in Hijaz. Ahmed Berelvi was a disciple Waliullah’s son. Deoband, of UP, largely teaches Islam based on the interpretation of Waliullah. Shah Waliullah was attracted to Ibn Taimiyya whose teachings were also to inspire Abdul Wahab, the spiritual guide of the House of Saud. This 'confluence' gave rise to a new strict fundamentalism in India. Waliullah founded his Madrassah-e-Rahimyya where he strove for the removal of bida’a (innovation and ecclecticissm of other religions) The followers of Sheikh Waliullah are known as Dehelvi Ulema. From his thoughts emerged four different schools of thought in India, Deobandis, Ahl-e-Hadiths, Tableeghis and the Berelvis.

[ramana]

Swapan Dasgupta in Telegraph:

Borderline Questions

Borderline questions
- It is often convenient to misread history to avoid harsh truths
Swapan Dasgupta


The public commemoration of anniversaries is drearily routine and, at best, a marketing opportunity for the publishing, postage stamp and collectibles industries. Yet, which birthdays, death anniversaries and momentous events a country chooses to remember often tells us more about contemporary realities than the past. Likewise, any landmark anniversary a society chooses to overlook is a commentary on collective awkwardness with a facet of the past.

March 23 marks the platinum jubilee of the Muslim League's Pakistan resolution. On that day in Lahore, with Quaid-e-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the presiding deity, the Bengal peasant leader, Fazlul Huq, moved the momentous resolution that proclaimed that no future political settlement "would be workable... or acceptable to the Muslims" unless "geographically contiguous units... in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western and North-eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." The resolution triggered political developments that culminated in the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947.

It is understandable that today's India will be disinclined to remember that day in Lahore. Although time can be potentially a great healer, the wounds inflicted by Jinnah's successful advocacy of the two-nation principles still rankle in the collective psyche of India. The creation of Pakistan was a body blow to the idea of Indian nationalism and constituted a major defeat amid the triumph of Independence. Neither the vivisection of Pakistan in 1971 nor the existential agonies our troublesome neighbour is at present experiencing has quite served to sweeten the bitter pill the country had to swallow as a result of the Lahore resolution.

However, it is not an acknowledgment of defeat - and barring B.R. Ambedkar, the nationalist pantheon was unanimous in seeing it as a colossal tragedy - that makes it embarrassing to address the hiccups of history. The sequence of events from March 1940 to August 1947 raises very awkward issues that seem best to run away from.

After the creation of Bangladesh - an event that punctured the belief that Islam constitutes a sufficient basis of nationhood - there has been an increasing tendency to view Pakistan as an unintended consequence of the Lahore resolution. Jinnah, it has been contended, and not entirely without basis, was basically using the threat of Pakistan to press for a federal India where the powers of the Centre would be limited. By this argument, it was the determination of the Congress leadership - and particularly Jawaharlal Nehru - to ensure a strong Centre that thwarted Jinnah's attempt to achieve Hindu-Muslim parity. The Cabinet Mission Plan was a missed opportunity.

Jinnah, it was also claimed, was using the Muslim community as the pressure point for his constitutionalist thrust and, consequently, never had too much time for abstruse debates on the proposed Pakistan's Islamic identity. For Jinnah, Pakistan meant a modern nation with a Muslim majority.

Extending this argument to politics on the ground, it has been suggested that the idea of Pakistan was always kept utterly vague and confusing, so much so that Muslims in the 'minority provinces'- the Muslim League's core support - were completely unaware of what separation actually involved. Likewise, it has been suggested that the Muslim ulema was resolutely opposed to Pakistan and, had the franchise been extended to the poor Muslims, the social limitations of the Muslim League as a party of the landed gentry and the educated middle class would have been thoroughly exposed. According to this version of history, Partition was a knee-jerk response to Lord Mountbatten's hasty withdrawal timetable and the communal riots resulting from Muslim League's Direct Action Day in August 1946.

In a just-published book, Creating A New Medina: State Power, Islam and the Quest for Pakistan in Late Colonial North India, that may well be at the centre of a new bout of revisionism, a young historian, Venkat Dhulipala, has challenged the new orthodoxy. Basing his research on the speeches, writings and poetry of those who were actually involved in the hard slog of mobilizing Muslims, particularly in the United Provinces and Bihar, he has, in effect, resurrected a memory of the Pakistan movement that was shared by the participants (and opponents) but which has somehow not found place in recent history writing.

First, Dhulipala has questioned the claim that Pakistan was insufficiently imagined. On the contrary, using evidence from the 'minority provinces' that were Muslim League strongholds, he has documented a vibrant engagement between the protagonists and opponents of Pakistan over the implications of separate statehood. This was a debate that touched not merely the clergy but also involved the participation of the Muslim professional classes. Almost every aspect of Pakistan ranging from Hindu-Muslim differences, the viability of the new country vis à vis India, the likelihood of an Islamic state and the boundaries of Pakistan were hotly discussed at different levels from March 1940 till the moment of Partition. Therefore, far from the idea of Pakistan being shrouded in deliberate vagueness, Dhulipala suggests it was "imagined... plentifully and with ambition".

Second, contrary to the claims of a repentant and orphaned Muslim League regional leadership in the 'minority provinces' that it was unaware of the serious implications of separation, Dhulipala documents the openness with which the plight of Muslims in UP, Bihar and the Central Provinces was discussed. The anti-Pakistan Muslim politicians attached to both the Congress and the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hind were quite explicit that there was nothing in Pakistan for the Muslims in the Hindu-majority provinces. Curiously, the Muslim League leadership did not disagree. Instead it posited the strong support for Pakistan among the Muslims in the Hindu heartland as evidence of "sacrifice" for a lofty cause: the creation of a new Medina that would become the focus of an international Islamic brotherhood. The Muslims there were assured that no harm would come their way after separation because the Hindu minority in Pakistan would be "hostage" to their security and well- being. In short, the Muslims in the 'minority provinces' waved the flag of Pakistan knowingly and with their eyes wide open. Their post-Independence repudiation of the Muslim League was born of sheer expediency.

Third, contrary to the impression of the Muslim clergy opposing Pakistan, Dhulipala reveals a vertical split with only the Syed Hussain Ahmad Madani-controlled JUH endorsing the Congress, and the rest - including a large chunk of Deoband-trained maulvis - joining the Muslim League campaign for separation. The schism was essentially over two issues: composite nationalism versus Muslim nationalism, and the likelihood of an Islamic State in Pakistan. Indeed, both the pro-Congress and pro-Muslim League clergy were united in their endorsement of an Islamic State as the ideal for all Muslims. Contrary to what Jinnah said in his speech of August 11, 1947 to Pakistan's constituent assembly, the mood of the Muslim League's foot soldiers was unambiguously for a state that would replicate the early Islamic experience.

Finally, it would seem that Pakistan struck a deep emotional chord among most of the Muslims in united India - a reason why established regional parties and regional leaders proved powerless to combat it. Jinnah may have kept the doors of a federation of self-governing states open till the last minute. However, the passions the Lahore resolution aroused meant that any last-minute compromise would not have endured. By 1946, Muslim India was unwaveringly committed to a separate Pakistan. The alternative was civil war.

Dhulipala has raised a host of uncomfortable issues that politicians and intellectuals on both sides of the Radcliffe Line would prefer to shy away from. In the quest for an elusive modernity, this denial is understandable. Unfortunately, history often comes back to haunt the present.