Indian Military Aviation- September 29 2013

[pragnya]

There is much more at stake here than the 56 aircrafts. We need to build an aero industry here. I firmly support IAF here. Even if the C-27J is chosen, I wish the FMS route is never taken.

i too support IAF's decision to involve the pvt sector as the HAL has too much on plate but the fact is none in the pvt sector is biting it citing it as 'uneconomical'. even if somebody in the pvt sector holds up his hand, this is not going to take any less than 5/7 years in the least before sanctions are made, vendor selected, TOT, assembly plant setup, training of the personnel etc.. and all this subject to the questions raised by some ministers and MPs are settled satisfactorily. i doubt IAF will wait that long because they issued an RFI (2010) which was responded to by Alenia C 27J, Airbus C 295 and Ukraine AN 148.

strange that a proposal by Ukarine to produce AN 148 was not acted upon!! possible IAF thinks AN 148 is not worth the money which means it is a toss up between C27J and C 295. now if the IAF is not willing to wait then C27J looks very appealing as it affords commonality wrt engines to the C 130J IAF already has and if US willing they can get all the aircrafts quickly may be at a discounted price (subject to ofc what GW mentioned is satisfied). ofc this will have to be an arrangement between Alenia, MOD and the US. Alenia will provide the support.

fwiw.

[Karan M]

Fact is penny piecemeal orders by services dont inspire industry at all. They'll all sing paeans in public to national requirements etc, but privately will sit and crib about how ad hoc the planning process is, how limited the orders are, how delayed payments get etc. About the only success story, of whatever sort in the private sector in defence is the ship industry to some extent. The blame is also to be shared by the MOD which of course should take the lead in making a policy and then seeing it through, as versus merely revising the DPP and then letting things slide.

[Cosmo_R]

@ indranilroy ^^^: Indian pvt sector does not offer the same opportunities for political funding through contracts as PSUs do:

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 720914.cms

The FMS system makes it a crime for the seller to make 'facilitating payments'.

Yes, Tata and others could do it. They are a very bright bunch and young too. However, neither the 'party' nor certain people want this to go to domestic private sector companies and they are very powerful (not talking CT here).

In short, the forces simply want the stuff quickly because they can't survive on 40 year old stuff buttressed by concepts. The party wants its cut and so do the facilitators.

The FMS is currently (yet sub optimal) the best way to get the forces what they want quickly without feeding the beast.

[NRao]

build an aero industry here

"aero industry" covers a ton more - such exotic areas as material sciences.

Would be nice to come up with a comprehensive road map that includes proper funding mechanisms (to universities too), covers all aspects in the field and with proper interactions between all players.

[Cosmo_R]

build an aero industry here

"aero industry" covers a ton more - such exotic areas as material sciences.

Would be nice to come up with a comprehensive road map that includes proper funding mechanisms (to universities too), covers all aspects in the field and with proper interactions between all players.

As long as that road map involves PowerPoint, it should be pretty easy. Else, it involves herding (achar eating, acid reflux prone) cats.

[neeraj]

C27J is dhoti dream only..

Alenia Warns U.S. Over C-27J Sales

In what analysts see as an unprecedented move, Alenia Aermacchi, the Italian maker of the C-27J, is warning the U.S. government that it will refuse to support the aircraft it sold to the United States if the U.S. resells them to other nations.

[NRao]

Well ......................

Alenia May Establish C-27J Assembly Line In India

IF IAF selects the C-25J.

[tushar_m]

C27 looks like a good deal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alenia_C-27J_Spartan

with similarity of engine with c130j

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_AE_2100

[NRao]

C27 looks like a good deal

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alenia_C-27J_Spartan

with similarity of engine with c130j

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_AE_2100

errr...............

From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alenia_C-27J_Spartan

In 1995, Alenia and Lockheed Martin began discussions to improve Alenia's G.222 using C-130J's glass cockpit and a more powerful version of the G.222's T64G engine and four-blade propellers. The companies began a program for the improved G.222, named C-27J in 1996. This was a U.S. military type designation based on the G.222's C-27A U.S. designation. Then the design was changed to use the C-130J Super Hercules's Rolls-Royce AE 2100 engine and six-blade propeller. Alenia and Lockheed Martin formed Lockheed Martin Alenia Tactical Transport Systems (LMATTS) for the development of C-27J in 1997.[2] The C-27J has a 35% increase in range and a 15% faster cruise speed than the G.222.[2]

[Victor]

The IAF is using the Avros mainly for mail, communications and training. Any one-for-one replacement is best met by a civilian airliner like the Avro, not a military cargo plane like the C-27. The plane chosen should actually be aimed at India's humongous civilian regional airliner requirement over the next 20 years while secondarily fulfilling the military roles. It would be very short-sighted of us not to aim at making 500-600 or more airliners in India and focus instead on a mere 50-70 military courier aircraft. We could use the clout in sheer numbers to make the chosen plane an export winner which the C-27 has little chance of competing with (total <100 in service to date AFAIK).

In fact, it makes sense to add the An-32 medium cargo replacement to this project because the Antonov also is basically a regional airliner similar to the Avro. But of course we won't do that because the mythical MTA is supposed to be the An-32 replacement. (The MTA is the same size as the C-130j, it is totally unproven and we are planning to make a whopping 45 of them and confidently predicting an export market . Why do I get the feeling this is a neta-babu scheme to stall any private company involvement in military aviation?).

[NRao]

Well, I think or IIRC, all projects with the Russians have a component of "ToT" in them. In short India needs an experienced partner to teach them some aspects of that industry. So, both the MTA and FGFA, outside of fulfilling the requirements of the user are *expected* to transfer "design" experience (among others). Thus the smallish numbers for the MTA.

IF the entire drama had played out it really may have helped India (although I get the feeling that the Russians have a financial trap set up for India in both these cases). As things lay I am not convinced that India has a *major* benefit from either of these projects. ?????

[member_20453]

C-27 is ideal, nice little bird with very good useful load and volume, if India does choose with assembly line, it would be ideal AVRO and An-32 replacement eventually. I think 120+ should be ordered.

[Philip]

The LTA contenders will all have to go through the evaluation mill.We know how long this takes with the current DM and regime.Only FMS sales have shown alacrity and at times indecent haste.There are several aircraft that could perform the task well.It is going to be an interesting contest.One key factor is going to be the local partner who will have to pick up the tab for "miscell. expenses."

[mody]

For IAF transport fleet, I would propose the following:

1). Buy another 6 C-130J (stretched version, same as the current lot). This is almost a done deal.
2). Buy 24 C-130J none stretched versions, without the extra few extra gizmos that we paid for, for using the current C-130's for special forces. These 24 would be purely transport versions.
3). Buy the complete assembly line of C-27J, set it up in India and produce 100 nos. of these. There are no current order for C-27J, nor are there likely to be orders for more then a dozen odd in the future, if that. The US had bought 38 of these and is not going to buy anymore. The Euros are not buying anymore. Our requirement, is more then the no. of aircraft's that have been produced so far. Form a Tata-Hal joint venture and make an offer to the Italian's that they can't refuse. If India does not choose the C-27J, it is curtains for the aircraft and the assembly line would have to be permanently closed.

The above can replace the entire fleet of Avros and An-32s, given the much better turn around time and lower maintenance requirement. Plus we get the advantage of common engines across a large no. of aircrafts.

[pragnya]

^^^

mody, concur with you but what is 'perplexing' to understand is C 27J lifecycle cost is 'more' than C 130J atleast to the US!!! considering they have the same engines as C-130J and 2 of them instead of 4!! something is amiss.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz testified before Congress last year that the military wanted to divest its C-27J fleet to come in line with budget cuts. He said the C-130 can do everything currently asked for and costs $213 million to fly over its 25-year lifespan. The C-27J, on the other hand, would cost $308 million per aircraft.

New Air Force Planes Go Directly to 'Boneyard'

[GeorgeWelch]

mody, concur with you but what is 'perplexing' to understand is C 27J lifecycle cost is 'more' than C 130J atleast to the US!!! considering they have the same engines as C-130J and 2 of them instead of 4!! something is amiss.

The USAF desire to screw with the US Army mostly.

[GeorgeWelch]

Could you please elaborate on that, George?

Not really appropriate for this thread, but whatever.

The US Army ('Army') operates a small fleet of fixed winged transports, the C-23 Sherpas, that are getting long in the tooth and were not-quite-adequate to begin with.

The Army believes there is a bit of a cultural difference in the way they operate transports and the way the US Air Force ('AF') operates them. The AF likes to do things . . . efficiently. Basically that means consolidating multiple deliveries, avoiding scheduling overlap, etc.

The Army on the other hand often has critical needs and tends to say 'Screw efficiency! We need it now!'. So if there is a critical need for a single battery, they'll send out a plane carrying just one battery. Such an approach would terribly disrupt the AF's carefully planned schedules so they sometimes aren't the most cooperative about such requests.

The AF on the other hand believes that they alone should operate fixed-wing planes (the Army has helicopters after all) and eagerly look for any opportunity to crush the Army's remaining capability in this area.

Anyways, the Army puts out an RFP for a small fixed-wing transport and suddenly the AF discovered that they too had an urgent need for a small transport. And since they both have similar needs, wouldn't it make sense to combine the programs in the name of greater efficiency? Of course this 'sudden need' was met with some skepticism as the AF had never said a peep about such a need in decades and had no studies or papers to backup their claim. Nevertheless the AF swore up and down that they too had a dire, critical need for a small transport. Thus the Army and AF programs were joined and we got the JCA, Joint Cargo Aircraft.

Immediately the AF tried to change the rules to enable the C-130 to qualify, which makes you wonder about their 'need' for a small transport after all. Of course the Army had no interest in such a big plane and managed (barely) to fight off that attempt. Next the AF went to Congress and said, 'Look, we're both going to be operating the same plane, it doesn't make sense to have 2 separate organizations doing the same task when 1 could do it more efficiently. Of course Congress agreed (anything to save money), so ownership of the 'J'CA was transferred solely to the AF.

As soon as they got ownership of the program, it wasn't hard to predict what happened next.

They killed it.

They immediately started saying they no longer had a need for the program and started launching assaults on it saying how it was wasteful and actually cost more than just getting more C-130s. Of course the numbers they presented were clearly and stupidly wrong, but they didn't care. An Army Guard unit showed how their operating costs were a fraction of what the AF was claiming and the baseline assumption of the numbers was absurd to begin with.

Besides the actual hourly operation costs being way off, they were saying that the C-27J would take more flights and more fuel to move a C-130 equivalent load. No kidding Sherlock. The point of the JCA wasn't mass cargo movement like the C-130, it was to make small, time-critical deliveries in a more cost-effective manner.

If you have to deliver just 1 battery, better to make that delivery in a C-27J than in a C-130J.

By the time they were able to kill it, the contract had already been signed, so new planes rolled into the desert, but at least the AF kept the Army from getting more fixed-wing planes.

[pragnya]

George,

thanks for clearing up the issue as for as lifecycle costs.

can you throw more light on the law forbidding the resale of C-27Js or any other?? last i read US was looking to sell them to Taiwan and others.

[GeorgeWelch]

George,

thanks for clearing up the issue as for as lifecycle costs.

can you throw more light on the law forbidding the resale of C-27Js or any other?? last i read US was looking to sell them to Taiwan and others.

neeraj already dug up the info. It wasn't law, it was just the manufacturer.

C27J is dhoti dream only..

Alenia Warns U.S. Over C-27J Sales

In what analysts see as an unprecedented move, Alenia Aermacchi, the Italian maker of the C-27J, is warning the U.S. government that it will refuse to support the aircraft it sold to the United States if the U.S. resells them to other nations.

[pragnya]

neeraj already dug up the info. It wasn't law, it was just the manufacturer.

come on George. USA which arm twists majority of nations to their bidding will hold back on a paltry threat from Alenia for double digit number of C 27Js, even if they have to take them along for the resale.

[Philip]

One suggestion.Until we decide upon the LTA,build/buy more Dorniers! These are excellent small aircraft which have served us very well over two decades and can be built at low cost,easy to operate and support is absolutely no problem.True,they aren't in the classof LTA's being considered or even equiv. to our upgraded 100+ AN-32s but are useful assets.

[rohitvats]

Was this posted?

[Philip]

I wish our desi AEW system was aboard a larger platform.The EMB looks loaded to the gills,like some kind of exotic fish.There can't be too much space inside which will make it a pretty tight "railcoach" for the radar/systems operators. The experience gained with the EMB platform could be put to good use in integrating it with larger aircraft like the MTA in the future,which could slot in above the EMB and below the Phalcons.

[Singha]

rumours say the follow on platform will be a bigger one....whether from Embraer family or outside. Embraer has some bigger jets too. my fav is the E-190 (100 seats) of which 500 are in service.

E-190 interior http://farm5.staticflickr.com/4064/4627 ... 6caa_o.jpg
EMB-145 interior http://www.aircharter.uk.com/images/air ... in_lrg.jpg

E-190 is wider and has twice the number of seat rows as the 145, plus it has a cargo hold below which can be used for eqpt.
http://www.powerstow.com/media/4774/e190_170_front1.jpg

being Embraer, it will be easier transition. and its smaller than airbus/boeing whose order book is so large they wont care about a small 10-15 plane modding job.

[NRao]

The question is how many of them have been converted AND more importantly how many are in operation in and around India? No use considering them if India has to pay for the conversion and then perhaps be the only operator of these Brazilian planes. Might as well move on to a more popular platform (outside of any Russian stuff including the MTA).

Having said that IRRC they were thinking about an Airbus.

http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.asp ... 546393.xml

An example. With IN in the Frey too.

[Singha]

no airbus A32x has ever been converted to mil role. their MPA proposal was stillborn. military business is not their bread and butter really. they dont have to care about these niche proposals.

granted the E-series has not seen a mil application, but I do not see any other suitable pre-existing platform unless you want to buy a few Y8 from Cheen! its a AN12 conversion which the chinese continue to make..surely lacking in ceiling and speed vs a jet.
http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/wp- ... 8aew21.jpg

one other option is the half baked aew the US border patrol uses to catch drug planes...on P3
http://www.avionics-intelligence.com/co ... 3Orion.jpg

or else continue on the P8 tack and get boeing to add the dish for us. atleast they are big on the mil side.

[Rahul M]

meanwhile GOI announces the ATR 'replacement' RTA every 5 years or so, sans any funding or any sign of progress.

[MN Kumar]

Saw an IJT in yellow primer flying on Saturday.

[Philip]

So rumours of it being extinct are happily misplaced!

An Airbus 320 platform would cost a lot more to operate and might not have the endurance required,airborne refeuelling nevertheless.One might as well go the whole hog and buy a few more Phalcons instead if one wanted a wide-bodied aircraft .The MTA would be an ideal medium sized platform that could be acquired in larger number,operating from the four corners of the country,and support would be easier the bird being locally built. However,we will not see this happen until the aircraft is in service and the platform put through its paces.Until then we will have to depend upon the 8+ EMBs There are a few EMB civilian aircraft that were formerly with Paramount Airlines.These are comparatively new ,larger than the and possibly could be acquired cheap.The aircraft as Singha has suggested as a possible platform,could be modified for the AEW role.This may be a cost-effective interim solution until larger aircraft with dedicated variants become available .

[Cosmo_R]

incidentally the "flying coffin" term is much older than Mig 21's in IAF service. it was for a while used with the F104 starfighter in NATO useage

Yup. The F014 also had other names "Widow maker", "my favorite : "Lawn Dart" etc.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_F ... #Nicknames

BTW, in the 1960s/70s, it was pretty common to see signs outside Luftwaffe bases such "Beware crashing jet fighters."

[Karan M]

Read in full.
http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... mation.htm

Air Power and IAF’s Strategic Transformation
By Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC
Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff

By Sangeeta Saxena Published: November 2013

New Delhi. The future will witness the continued pre-eminence of air power as the primary instrument of choice for all operational contingencies. Why do nations need to invest in strengthening their military capabilities. And more specifically, how is airpower in general and the Indian Air Force in particular best suited to offer prompt multiple response options to the political leadership in times of national security crises.


Along with the other indices, Military Power of a nation is a very important constituent of the Nation’s Comprehensive National Power. As vital pillars of our national defence, the Armed Forces need to constantly examine the type of war fighting capabilities they will field as sovereign options, for employment of military force that no other country possesses. And as the Air chief, I always ask myself as to “What can the IAF offer in terms of Sovereign options?”

Air Power – Cutting Edge of National Power: Air Power is only 110 years old but has provided immense freedom from friction that is inherent in surface operations. Before the advent of air power, sea faring nations capitalized the inherent advantages of maritime power and built empires with greater freedom in far away continents.

Air Power’s Defining Moment: With the resounding success of Air Power in the Gulf War, it replaced maritime power because of its ability to simultaneously interfere as well as influence land/sea operations. With its unique characteristics of versatility, flexibility, speed of response and tailorability, it provides us the much needed options at a time when constraining fiscal pressures leave us with fewer material resources to address a wide spectrum of challenges. Thus, air power has the qualities of achieving strategic advantages/effects, something which is somewhat lacking in land/sea power. This is the reason why nations have treated their Air Forces as their best form of defence and have invested heavily in this process.

Air Power: Instrument of Choice: The key is to have a national instrument which not only provides the best defence but also provides the best deterrence with a range of sovereign options. Air power, with its unique attributes, presents a host of opportunities for the senior leadership when faced with a national security challenge. Highlights:

Strategic Flexibility. As an attribute of Air Power, flexibility flows from the ability to reconfigure for different kinds of missions within a short span of time.
Projecting Power without Projecting Vulnerability. The overarching dimension of air operations lends it the capability to project power without projecting the vulnerability. Air power offers the political leadership strategic choices and genuine alternatives to exert influence in a sustainable and easily scalable manner.
Parallel Operations at all Levels of War. Air Campaigns can be executed against different target systems at different levels of war simultaneously. The parallel effects of these operations present the enemy with multiple crises to deal with thereby influencing his decision cycle. Air Power’s inherent capability to provide both kinetic and non kinetic options which can be used to either prevent, deter and contain conflicts – and/or provide unrivalled ‘hard power’ capabilities to coerce, deny or disrupt with pin point accuracy.
Direct Effect on the Movement/Action of the Surface Forces. Air Power can directly influence or even control the movement and action of the surface forces and thus can control the tempo of operations.
Ability to Influence the Time Factor. Formulation of an effective air strategy is based primarily on the ability of air power to simultaneously produce physical as well as psychological shock by dominating the fourth dimension.

IAF at 81 Years: For democracies like India, Air power is uniquely suited to provide credible deterrence and play a major role in case of deterrence failure. There are numerous examples in IAF’s history when application of air power for lethal or non-lethal effect has contributed immensely in altering the balance and ensuring speedy victory in condition, which would have otherwise precipitated into long drawn battles and even loss of territory. As IAF nears the completion of 81 years of its existence, it prepares to transform itself into a strategic air force with cutting edge technology and precise firepower.

Strategic Scan: As a responsible and peaceful democracy, India has pursued cordial relations with its neighbours and likeminded nations across the world. Our restraint and maturity in the face of extreme provocation has won widespread admiration. India is committed to inclusive growth and peaceful co-existence. However, a broad scan of the evolving geopolitical environment clearly presents many security challenges. The emergence of China and India as major economic powers signal, a pre-eminent shift of focus to the Asian region. We are actively engaged with China with an aim to foster closer economic and cultural ties, while we work on issues of unresolved borders. However, China’s sustained focus on military modernization and development of infrastructure in TAR is a matter of concern. As a strategic objective, we continue to strengthen our capacity along the LAC while we seek to build bridges of co-operation with China.

The uncertainties that will accompany drawdown of US Forces from Afghanistan and its influence on regional security dynamics is likely to have a negative impact on the regional security environment. While India looks forward to long lasting friendly relations on our Western borders, the recent spurt of violence along the LoC and tacit use of terrorism as an instrument against India does not inspire confidence. Terror groups inimical to India’s interests receive material and institutional support for purporting terror attacks on our soil.

Strategic Frontiers: India’s sphere of interest has expanded from the traditional frontiers of Hindu Kush to Irrawaddy and is growing to include the Suez on the West to Shanghai on the East. The boundaries of this sphere make it imperative for the nation to build capabilities that provide reach and the desired effect at these ranges.

Policy Challenge: In my opinion, the coming two to three years are crucial watershed years warranting a pro-active approach towards national security and IAF’s modernisation programme. The key challenge in formulation of our strategy is to ensure conducive international and external environment for the unhindered economic progress and socio-political development of India, enabling it to assume its rightful role in the emerging world order.

Spectrum of Conflict: IAF needs to be prepared to act at two levels. It should be persuasive in peace while staying poised to be equally effective in war. IAF is keeping our nation’s skies secure with a 24x7 air defence cover during peacetime. We are also fully committed to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) within our borders and beyond. While we maintain an eternal vigil during peace time and wholeheartedly support the national HADR effort, our combat crews constantly hone their skills for undertaking combat and combat support operations spanning the entire gamut from sub conventional, conventional, out of area to Nuclear Operations.

Op Triveni: Six MI-17V5 helicopters are actively supporting the security forces involved in anti-Naxal operations. Augmentation of the existing capacity as well as capability to undertake night operations will be provided by MI-17V5 helicopters from Nagpur by end of this year. Op Triveni highlights the tremendous benefits of using the third dimension in a hostile and impenetrable terrain.

Op Rahat: IAF responded to the unprecedented devastation in Uttarakhand by mounting ‘Op Rahat’, the biggest heli-borne relief effort in military aviation history and employed 45 helicopters for rescuing over 24000 civilians in 3500 sorties. The treacherous terrain, marginal weather conditions and the urgency of rescue effort all combined together posed an unprecedented challenge. This remarkable feat once again highlights the professional calibre of our helicopter fleet and the benefits of our maintaining core competence in employment of these versatile assets.

Operational Paradigm Shift: In the process of transforming itself, IAF is witnessing a paradigm shift in operational planning and force level considerations. The approach has shifted from being ‘platform-based’ to being entirely ‘capability based’. Effects based operational planning has replaced the strike packaging based on Over Target Requirements (OTR). Our operations are rapidly migrating to a network centric construct while the upcoming combat platforms will possess swing role capabilities. Our transformational plan thus has three key components

Preserve and maintain
Upgrade and Improve
Replace and Acquire

At the end of this process, IAF force structure will be modern and potent with new and upgraded fleets only. This action plan is firmly underway and I wish to highlight certain important elements of this plan.

Combat Capability: Besides the induction of high technology assets, we have also started projects aimed at enhancing the operational effectiveness of some of our existing assets through mid life upgrades. In addition to the aircraft and weapon systems, a systematic approach is also being followed towards upgrading our operational infrastructure. Our aim is to have a balanced force structure – a structure where the focus is not just on the number of platforms but rather the balance of capabilities.

We plan to have at least 40% of our combat fleet comprising high tech all weather multirole platforms by end of 12th Plan period.

We aim to increase this further to 55% by end of 13th Plan. By the end of 14th Plan – when we expect to have fully executed our transformation plan – we plan to have 65% of our combat fleet comprising of high tech aircraft as the FGFA, MMRCA and upgraded Su-30MKI. Of course our entire transformational plan hinges on meeting the predetermined induction timelines of design and development, project deadlines and most importantly presupposes assured budgetary support.

Upgrading Transport Capability: In the 12th Plan, our airlift capability is also expected to increase significantly. The C-17 Globemaster have started operating from Hindan from Sep this year and this platform would take our strategic airlift capability to the next level. Similarly, additional 6 X C-130J Special Ops aircraft would add a force multiplier effect in our Op capability. IL-76 fleet will continue to last for the next 15 years along with AN-32 & Dornier.

Upgrading Helicopter Capability: Our helicopter fleet is planned for a major upgradation both in terms of numbers as well as capabilities. We have worked out a detailed plan by which helicopter assets, both medium lift as well as attack heptr assets, have been earmarked for supporting each Army command and the individual Strike Corps respectively during any operational contingency.

Training: Resource constraints notwithstanding, our objective is to provide our men and women the best aircraft, equipment as well as the best training exposure that we can afford. The induction of Pilatus PC-7 as the basic trainer in May this year is an important step in this direction. To my mind, such advanced training systems are absolutely essential for preparing the future generations of air warriors of a transforming Air Force like ours.

Tri Service Issues: On tri-service issues, due to the multi dimensional nature of present day conflict, increasing the levels of synergy amongst the Armed Forces as well as with the other civil agencies has become an important operational imperative. Organisational changes would be necessary to facilitate increased efficacy of the joint response by both the armed forces and the civilian agencies. HQ IDS has initiated a process to raising three new Tri Service Commands namely Special Ops, Cyber and Space. Responsive and adaptive, these new joint commands would provide us the required degree of operational flexibility to deal with the unconventional challenges of the future.

Maintenance Challenges: The major challenge we face on a daily basis is the maintenance of varied inventories both of aircraft as well as other weapon systems spread across the extremities of the technology spectrum.

To manage such a diverse inventory, we have also worked out a tailored maintenance support system which would enable us to meet our long term requirements. These initiatives include procurements using life cycle cost model, entering into long term support agreements for supply of spares, upgradation of IMMOLS, provisioning of OEM established and maintained support facilities at major airbases and migration to a single database concept. With the planned induction of high technology assets such changes in our operating philosophy will help us exploiting the full potential of our costly resources.

Budget: We live in an era of persistent fiscal tightening marked by widespread budgetary constraints. As an element of national power, air power in certain circumstances offers multiple options to the national leadership to influence behaviours and events without the commitment of major land forces. So it needs to be clearly understood that notwithstanding the capital intensive nature of maintaining an Air Force, nations cannot afford neglecting its continuous growth.

IAF’s ongoing transformation plan has brought many budgetary challenges. The future calls for increased focus on ‘smart budgeting’. In the absence of a well-established indigenous aerospace production base, we are forced to source a major share of our inventory from foreign vendors. It mandates us as well as the other important stakeholders in the aerospace sector to tighten our belts further. For the Defence PSUs, it would mean meeting all the contractual obligations to the last word, both in terms of quality and timelines, since any slippages would automatically translate into cost overruns.

For the IAF, while the upfront acquisition cost for any new capital project may appear to be high, we need to view it against the value bought throughout its life (LCC Model). With the induction of more multirole platforms and by limiting the number of variants, we can slowly work towards having better ‘buy to fly’ ratios and thereby maximize on the aerospace employment potential.

Indigenisation: Development of indigenous aerospace production capability will not only boost the operational potential of IAF but will also have a positive growth effect on other spheres in the civilian domain as well.

There is a need to formalise policies for integration of the private sector and Defence Public Sector Undertakiings (DPSU) assets towards this greater national effort. New policies promoting joint ventures and public private partnerships must be put in place. I am sure that if we merge the enterprising spirit of private sector with the excellent infrastructure of public sector, we can have a win-win situation. Our private and public sector companies should optimize the offsets from contracts under DPP.

Future Road Map: On future contours of Air Power with regards to doctrine and strategy as well as its application, there is unlikely to be an operational contingency in the future, which will not only demand control of the air, situational awareness, intelligence and precision strike ability – but also the essential mobility and sustainment required through tactical and strategic air transport support. When we plan our future manning matrix, we need to ensure that we have the right capability mix. Therefore, our aim must be to build as much adaptability and multirole capability into our force structure as possible. For this, we must shift our focus from an emphasis on individual platforms for executing particular roles and instead look at the delivery of capability.

Conclusion: IAF is conscious of the onerous responsibility of being the prime instrument of our Military power. We need to be always ready and prepared to deliver appropriate response options as assigned by our political leadership.

Such capabilities cannot be developed overnight or quickly acquired when things start heating up across our frontiers. It requires visionary planning, a commitment of national resources and a synergetic approach by all stake holders – the civil authority, military establishments, defence production agencies, R&D organisations and the academicia.

IAF is respected the world over as a professional force which is confidently striding into the strategic realm. Our air warriors are proud of their responsibilities and remain steadfast in their commitment to the nation and to their mission – with honour and pride.

(Excerpted from the Air Chief’s lecture at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses -IDSA, September 23, 2013).

[Karan M]

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... mation.htm

IAF Transformation: Happening but delay on MMRCA is worrying

By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal Ashok Goel (Retd) Published: October 2013
New Delhi. IAF is steadily acquiring modern assets towards its planned transformation but the recent demise of a key officer in the Ministry of Defence who was handling Air Force matters could delay that.

In an interview with India Strategic and at other forums, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne said that the first lot of 18 Rafale Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCAs) are to be delivered in the 3rd or 4th year after the contract is signed with Dassault International, and the remaining 108 between 4th and 11th year.

He said he was expecting the contract to be signed within this year, but the sudden death of Mr Arun Kumar Bal, Joint Secretary (Air), on October 2 (due to a heart attack), will have implications for MMRCA as well as other air force acquisitions, including helicopters.

A Joint Secretary is a key player in various Indian ministries, and all decisions pivot around this assignment. A new officer is yet to be appointed and even when that is done, he would take a couple of months to study the files and take decisions. By then, next parliamentary elections are likely to be announced, and after that, no deals can be done by law till the next elected government takes over.

The Air Chief observed that the number of IAF squadrons was set to deplete due to the phasing out of old Mig 21s and Mig 27s while some other aircraft in its inventory required immediate upgradation. However the Mig 21-bis could be used till 2025, instead of its envisaged phasing out plan for 2017.

The key always is to “Preserve, Upgrade and Acquire.” All these components are part of the Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP) of the IAF and would be progressed as per the envisaged time lines. “I am pleased that this process has been progressing well and we are already witnessing early results with a comprehensive enhancement of our capabilities.”

Nonetheless, although the political leadership could take a positive decision on IAF’s MMRCA project within the next two months, it doesn’t seem likely given the country’s political environment as also the fact that HAL, which is the official partner in the licence manufacturing of Rafale in India, has not yet finalised its discussions with the French manufacturer so far.

But Air Chief Marshal Browne emphasised that thanks to the implementation of several programmes, “we are already witnessing early results with a comprehensive enhancement of our capabilities.”

He was hopeful, he said, of at least a couple of deals being signed within the next few weeks, particularly involving Boeing’s Chinook and Apache helicopters and Airbus Military’s six A 330 MRTT Flight Refueller Aircraft. There was progress also with Russia on helicopters.

The Air Force is determined to progress the Long Term Integrated Procurement Plan (LTIPP), as simply put, there is no other choice. The focus on Rafale as IAF’s lead swing role fighter and overall 24 x 7 day and night capability has to stay.

The Air Chief observed that India required a strong defence industrial base with high-end skill workers for only then could the IAF, Army, Navy and other forces could have sustained supplies of quality equipment and side benefits for the economy. At the moment, this is not so, and if IAF itself can do a job for `200 or 300 an hour, a public sector unit would take five to seven times that.

Air Chief Marshal Browne stressed the importance of Electronic Warfare and pointed out that it was now a key element in training of IAF personnel.

“Realizing the need to impart high quality training and adapt to technology driven war-fighting, we have accorded the highest priority to exposing our air crew to latest trends in Electronic Warfare. EW training forms an important part at all levels of IAF’s operational training. The ground training syllabi include EW aspects from the ab-initio stage onwards while the aircrew are trained on all practical offensive and defensive aspects of EW in the squadrons. System specific capabilities and tactical application of EW are an intrinsic part of annual training schedules.”

Induction of force multipliers, he said, had added a tremendous fillip to IAF’s capabilities for sustaining high tempo operations and had afforded greater battlefield transparency. IAF is already operating three AWACS and the case for procurement of two IL-76 based AWACS from M/s ELTA System Ltd of Israel is at an advanced stage.

In addition, Defence research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is undertaking indigenous development of two AWACS which is at Design and Development (D&D) stage. The case for procurement of four additional Aerostats is at CNC stage. As far as mid-air refuellers are concerned, IAF is currently operating six IL-78 based FRAs. M/s EADS, Spain, with Airbus-330 MRTT has emerged as the L-1 vendor for the procurement of six additional FRAs and the contract for the same is being progressed.

To a question from India Strategic on IAF’s vision for the next 20 to 50 years, he said that it has to be about a multi-spectrum force.

The application of aerospace power would prove decisive in winning the short and intense wars of the future. Unmanned aircraft and unmanned combat aircraft would be needed but there would always be a decisive role for man in the aircraft to win a battle.

About the upgrades, he said that as of now, the Mirage 2000, MiG-29 and Jaguar fleet upgrade plans are progressing well and are in various stages of implementation. The mission system upgrade of these fleets includes long range multi-function radars, glass cockpits, highly advanced man machine interfaces, new mission computers, state-of-the-art Electronic Warfare systems, Air-to-Air as well as Air-to-Surface munitions with enhanced range and performance. There is a focus on Smart weapons.

“Additionally, the Jaguar aircraft is planned to be re-equipped with Honeywell F-125 engine to overcome issues of thrust and reliability of the existing power plant. Our main aim is to focus on sustaining a high combat potential and build adequate force levels with a potent mix of platform and weapon systems.”

Situational Awareness, Reach and Precision are the main elements in IAF’s dictionary, Air Chief Marshal Browne said.

“Our new transport aircraft, both Boeing C-17 Globemaster III and Lockheed Martin C-130J are doing well and have got integrated in the IAF’s over all system,” he added.

- Part 2 in November issue.

[chackojoseph]

Presidential Standards presented to IAF's 32 Squadron and 220 Squadron

One is bison sqn and other is su-30 mki sqn.

[PratikDas]

Ah, thank you. I was wondering what they flew.

[Aditya_V]

IAF deceides on SU-30 for Brahmos

Looks Brahmos intergration is delayed till end of 2014

[Rahul M]

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/fi ... ign=Buffer

First IAF woman to graduate as Flying Instructor


Last Updated: Thursday, November 21, 2013, 17:57
Chennai: Squadron leader Shalija Dhami will become the first woman from the Indian Air Force (IAF) to qualify as a Flying Instructor from the Flying Instructors' School here on Saturday.

Dhami will be among the 44 officers, including 40 from the IAF, three from the Indian Navy and one from the Army, who will graduate from the school, a defence release said here on Thursday.

Air Marshal J Chauhan, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Air Command would preside over Saturday's valedictory function, being organised at the Air Force station Tambaram.

The training of these officers from the 135th Qualified Flying Instructors Course (QFIC) commenced on June 3 2013.

The Tambaram school trains operational pilots of defence services, para military forces and friendly foreign countries to be flying instructors, who are trained to impart Air and Ground Instructions to trainee pilots.

[srai]

http://www.indiastrategic.in/topstories ... mation.htm

IAF Transformation: Happening but delay on MMRCA is worrying

...
In an interview with India Strategic and at other forums, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne said that the first lot of 18 Rafale Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCAs) are to be delivered in the 3rd or 4th year after the contract is signed with Dassault International, and the remaining 108 between 4th and 11th year.

....

If the Rafale deal is signed in 2014, the first 18 from OEM would be delivered by 2018 and the last of the deliveries from HAL would take place in 2025.

[chackojoseph]

Royal Malaysian Air Force Chief to visit SU-30 MKI production & training facilities in India

Good description of what IAF did in Malaysia for MKM.

[Kartik]

Some details on the MiG-29UPG program and its Zhuk-ME radar from Phazotron-NIIR's General Designer Yuri Guskov.
Posting in full.
Phazotron radars for India and other customers

ср, 06/02/2013 - 01:08

India is perhaps the largest export customer of Russia’s leading radar design house Phazotron-NIIR. General Designer Yuri Guskov told Russia & CIS Observer about the corporation’s on-going Indian contracts and new development programs.

— What programs for India is Phazotron-NIIR currently working on?

— There are two major on-going programs for Indian customers. One of them is to design and deliver MiG-29K/KUB carrier-borne fighters fitted with the FGM-129 variant of our Zhuk-ME radar. These aircraft performed successfully in trial landings on INS Vikramaditya last summer, but so far the Indian Navy is operating them from airfields in the state of Goa. As part of after-sales support for our radars we pay great attention to any criticisms and requests made by the Indian customer.

Deliveries of an additional batch of these fighters have begun to India; four aircraft have been handed over so far. The next two airframes will be used to coach Indian pilots in arrested landings at the NITKA land-based carrier trainer in Yeysk, Russia.

Our other program is to upgrade Indian Air Force MiG-29 fighters with the Zhuk-ME radar. A total of 55 single-seat and eight twin-seat aircraft of this type will be upgraded this way. In the course of the program we work to meet a number of additional requirements set by the project team. These include preferences related to identification of target classes and types, to the radar library, etc.

Under the terms of the contract, four single-seat and two twin-seat fighters have undergone tests at the Russian Air Force base in Akhtubinsk under the supervision of the project team. Based on the results of the tests, a preliminary decision was made to permit series production of the upgraded aircraft. A final production decision is expected to follow by the end of this year.

Two single-seaters and one twin-seater from the test batch, all equipped with the new Zhuk-ME radar, have already been delivered to India and will be formally handed over in late January. These aircraft were test-flown in Russia by an Indian pilot, who had to test about 50 different radar operating modes in the course of a single sortie. There were some criticisms of the radar but we have fixed these issues by now.

The other two single-seaters and one twin-seater from the trial batch remain in Russia to be brought up to India’s additional requirements. They should be delivered to the customer in March 2013. Six upgrade kits including our radars and other systems were sent to India last December to be installed on IAF fighters at the Nasik repair facility.

Also last year Phazotron-NIIR offered India to sign an agreement to jointly develop an active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar. We held a presentation of AESA radars and our Indian counterparts got interested in the possibility of using such a solution on their future MCA military transport aircraft.

— Will your proposed solution be based on the Zhuk-AE radar?

— The Zhuk-AE AESA radar, which we proposed as part of Russia’s bid in the Indian MMRCA tender in 2010, is a production item. This means there would be no critical issues that could affect series production. We are currently designing an all-new 3D AESA radar but we need another 1.5 to two years before we can launch its series production. The problem is not creating the 3D transmit/receive modules [TRM], which we already have. At the moment we are focusing our efforts on making all components located behind the array, i.e. the power sources, the steering devices, and so on, as thin and compact as the array itself.

Phazotron-NIIR is working to design a 3D AESA radar for a future unmanned aerial vehicle. Kamov, on the other hand, would like to install a similar radar on its Ka-52 helicopter.

— How expensive will the new radar be to buy and operate?

— Designers of 3D AESA radars aim to bring the price down to a level comparable to that of a radar with a traditional mechanically-scanned array. So far AESA radars remain about 30% more expensive; our goal is to further narrow this gap to 8-10%. The bulk of the price is the cost of monolithic integrated circuits which are used in the TRMs. If purchased abroad they hike the price of a single TRM to between $800 and $1,000. We are planning to launch domestic production of such circuits, thus reducing the TRM price to about $400 to $500 apiece.

I am also getting better at convincing people that an AESA is cheaper to operate than a mechanically-scanned array because it is thrice as reliable. You require fewer spare parts so your aircraft grow more mobile because you no longer need to move large SPTA stocks when relocating from one air base to another. The service life of the TRMs is comparable to that of the airframe. Our goal is to bring the reliability of all radar components up to the same high level.

— What are your plans for the Zhuk-AE radar?

— We continue to improve the Zhuk-AE; Phazotron-NIIR is partially financing the manufacture of a full-scale array but we would also like to receive some funding from customers to complete this work.

Indian specialists liked the Zhuk-AE radar installed on the Russian MiG-35 fighter proposed for the MMRCA tender. I am bringing to Aero India several presentations for the Indian military and defense companies. It says in these presentations that the Zhuk-AE will be totally interchangeable with the mechanically-scanned Zhuk-ME model. In Bangalore I am planning to suggest to IAF representatives that we upgrade the last two of their MiG-29 fighters with our AESA radar, to demonstrate that the airframe would not require any alterations at all.

— Would the Russian Air Force like to get this radar?

— Our military would like to have two fighter types, including the AESA-equipped MiG-35 medium fighter. But the industry keeps insisting that this type should be delivered with the Zhuk-M radar.

What the industry wants is fast orders, so if we are talking about the 2013 [state defense] order for example then of course these aircraft should have the tried-and-tested Zhuk-M radar installed. Nevertheless we must still continue to improve EASA technology, build two Zhuk-A-equipped fighters and send them for trials. After the testing is completed in late 2014 we could launch production of AESA-equipped fighters. This would be the most rational solution, but a final decision has not been made yet.
...

[Kartik]

and another of his older interviews from 2011 where he speaks about the Zhuk-AE

Yuri Gaskov - AESA radars are remarkably reliable

18/08/2011

— The Zhuk-AE AESA radar for the MiG-35 fighter has remained the main product of your corporation for the past several years. Unfortunately, the aircraft has missed the shortlist under the Indian MMRCA tender. Where are you planning to use your radar now?

— As a designer I was proud to learn that when [Russian state arms exporter] Rosoboronexport was analyzing the reasons for the aircraft’s failure in the Indian tender, there was not a single criticism of our radar. Despite a certain bias on the part of the Indian evaluation pilots, their overall appraisal of the radar was very favorable. Everyone loved its extremely maintenance-friendly design, which allows for easy dismantling and reinstallation of the radar "in the field".
Although the aircraft missed the shortlist we have not stopped working on the radar — although, admittedly, we did slow down a little. We continue to build a production-standard prototype with the number of transceiver modules increased to 1,016. The radar has a detection range of 250 km, whereas the Indian tender specifications were for just 130 km. Also, it is a truly multimode radar, with assorted mapping and target recognition capabilities.
It has been decided that the Russian Defense Ministry will order the MiG-35. A number of such aircraft will enter service [with the Russian Air Force]. They will be equipped with Zhuk radars. In addition, we offer the radar as an upgrade solution for newly-built MiG-29 fighters, and for retrofitting those aircraft already in operation. No airframe changes will be required.
I’m all for fitting MiG-29s with an AESA radar, because such systems are remarkably reliable. We have performed about 50 test flights with Zhuk-AE, and there were no malfunctions of the radar. We estimate the mean time between failures as being not less than 600 hours, but I think that 1,000 hours is a fairly realistic figure as well.

— Is it the AESA technology that makes it so reliable?
— Yes it is. Transmitters in previous-generation radars operate from voltage of 18 kV to 30 kV. Such high-voltage equipment requires specific materials, structural configuration, and operating procedures.
An AESA radar runs on 3-5 V, 10 V maximum. This is low voltage, which does not entail any particular structural or operational requirements. Besides, monolithic integrated circuits used in AESA radars are themselves highly reliable.
...