Indian Naval News & Discussion - 12 Oct 2013

[koti]

P8 gets a non satisfactory review.

Link
Thats surprising.

[asbchakri]

Keel for P15B, the second line of Guided Missile destroyers after the three Kolkatta class destroyers has been laid at Mazagon shipyard. Surprisingly it was a VERY VERY low key function which scarcely any fanfare (apart from the blowing of conch shells at the event). with modular construction the construction cycle should be shortened. see pics at MilPhotos.net.

can you please post the link

[Shrinivasan]

Keel for P15B, the second line of Guided Missile destroyers after the three Kolkatta class destroyers has been laid at Mazagon shipyard. Surprisingly it was a VERY VERY low key function which scarcely any fanfare (apart from the blowing of conch shells at the event). with modular construction the construction cycle should be shortened. see pics at MilPhotos.net.

can you please post the link

please check Milphotos.net, dont want direct traffic there

[nash]

it was on 12 Oct and no media coverage, may be no presence of any mantri.

I would say 2020-22 to get all the 4 inducted in IN.

[chetak]

http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/Ad ... 5B1%5D.pdf

The word @C@H@I@N@K, in the title of the article seems to have been auto censored

CIVIL-MILITARY DISSONANCE : A CHINK IN INDIA’S ARMOUR

Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd)

January 20, 2014

It is a great pleasure for me to be delivering this evening’s K
Subrahmanyam Memorial Lecture. He is someone whom I have always held in
great esteem and I would like to thank the Global India Foundation for
having given me this privilege.

There must be many in this audience who counted Shri Subrahmanyam,
affectionately dubbed “Subbu”, as a friend, mentor or guru. Personally, as
a wandering seafarer, who had few postings in Delhi, I cannot lay claim to
any of these distinctions.

However, having followed and benefitted from Shri Subrahmanyam’s writings
and speeches, for many decades, I have been a
long term admirer.

Consequently, soon after taking over as Chairman Chiefs of Staff in 2005, I
sought out Sh. Subrahmanyam; who was known, in the strategic community, as
the ‘ideological champion of India's nuclear deterrent’.

He was gracious enough to accept my invitations and we spent many hours
over cups of tea discussing arcane issues ranging from nuclear physics and
deterrence strategy to geo-politics and international relations.

His intellectual brilliance as well as clarity of thought never failed to
amaze me.

Subbu’s vision of a strong, secure India, guided the national security
discourse for nearly half a century. Civil-military relations figured
frequently in this discourse, and he was constrained to describe the
current paradigm as one in which, “politicians enjoy power without any
responsibility, bureaucrats wield authority without any accountability and
the military assumes responsibility without any direction.”

With that pithy quote, typical of him, ladies & gentlemen, I dedicate this
evening’s talk to the memory of Shri K Subrahmanyam.

There can be no doubt in the mind of any Indian – civilian or soldier -
that the primary task before the nation, today, is to accelerate
development. All our energies and resources must be devoted to lifting
millions of our countrymen from abject poverty and providing them food,
housing, health, education and so on.

And yet, in spite of this crying need, we are compelled to divert huge
resources to defence. This year’s defence budget was over two lakh crore
rupees or 37 billion USD and, regardless of the state of economy, it is
going to keep growing at between 5% - 10% annually.

Much of it will be spent on arms purchases from abroad; and this poses a
moral dilemma for a poor developing nation like ours. However, we need to
balance sentiment with historical reality.

It has always been a perception of India’s weakness that attracted repeated
foreign invasions, and the same factor has tempted our neighbours to
undertake frequent military adventurism in the past six decades. The harsh
reality is that we do not have a choice between ‘guns’ and ‘butter’; and
that the opportunity cost of national security is worth paying.

As our politicians start writing election manifestos they need to figure
out if our colossal defence expenditure actually buys the security that we
need. At the same time, the common man, too, must ask some pertinent
questions, such as: are India’s core national interests being safeguarded;
are our borders and territories inviolate; and are our citizens adequately
protected from the all-pervasive threat of terrorism?

Unfortunately there are no clear-cut answers. A reality-check will show
that the reassurance that we derive from our large conventional forces and
expensive nuclear arsenal may be misleading, because our flawed national
security structure is incapable of coping with multifarious emerging
threats.

One of the major causes of this is the failure of successive governments to
integrate the organs of state which contribute to national security and
strategic policy making.

A primary fault-line in the existing system is civil-military dissonance.
In the next 40 minutes or so, I will attempt to trace the complex dynamics
of the civil-military equation whose roots lie, as much in political
science and sociology as in history and philosophy.

My endeavour is twofold; firstly, to provide an insight into the nature of
the civil-military relationship, and its flaws, and secondly, to highlight
some of the consequences of the existing dissonance.

Towards the end, I will also offer a few recommendations.

It is universally recognized, except, notably, in India, that
civil-military relations form a fundamental part of national security
policy. In fact, a major objective of this policy, according to
social-scientist Samuel Huntington, is to develop a system of
civil-military relations which will maximize national security with the
least sacrifice of other social values.

This requires a complex balancing of power between civil and military
groups.

Nations, such as India, which fail to achieve a stable pattern of
civil-military relations squander their resources and run un-calculated
risks.

The history of civil-military relations does not go back too far in time.
In the old days the political and military leadership of a state tended to
be identical, since it was the king or prince who was not only policy-maker
and ruler, but also commanded armies in battle. These armies were
officered, either by mercenaries who considered war a business for profit
or by aristocrats for whom it was a hobby and adventure. The military as a
profession did not exist.

The credit for professionalizing the officer corps goes to the kingdom of
Prussia, which undertook drastic military reforms after its defeat by
Napoleon in 1806. Entry standards for officers were laid down for the first
time, institutions for higher military education were founded and
promotions were mandated on the basis of merit rather than birth.

All this and the creation of a General Staff laid the foundation of a
professional officer corps and furnished the template on which all modern
armies are based.

What distinguishes today’s military officer from the warrior of earlier
times is his professionalism; and that is what gives a special slant to the
issue of civil-military relations and topic of civilian control.

Despite its frequent mention in discourse, the term ‘civilian control’
lacks a satisfactory definition.

Samuel Huntington proceeds on the hypothesis that this concept is based on
‘relative power’ and that the key to establishing civilian control is:
firstly, to keep the military politically sterile and secondly, to maximize
civilian power vis-à-vis military power.

Given the large number and conflicting interests of civilian groups, it is
impossible to maximize civil power as a whole, and the inevitable question
that arises is; which civilians are to do the Civil Control in the Indian
Context ?

The question of civilian control in the Indian context has a different
connotation.

In India’s unique system of democracy, a layer of civilian bureaucracy has
interposed itself between the political leadership and an isolated military
establishment.

The term ‘civil-military’, thus, implies a three-cornered relationship
encompassing political and bureaucratic players on one hand and the
military on the other.

This relationship has, over the years, evolved into a triangle of discord,
tension and indifference; whose most damaging impact has been a stasis in
national security affairs.

Elsewhere in the world, the pursuit of war has demanded equal attention
from soldiers as well as statesmen, diplomats and bureaucrats.

This has not been the case in India, because for two centuries preceding
1947 wars were fought by Indian armies, at home and abroad, on behalf of
their British colonial masters; and Indians had no involvement in imperial
planning or strategies.

Thus, while Indian soldiers acquired priceless battle-field experience,
neither they nor any civilians learnt much about higher direction of war.

For the past six decades, however, India has been an independent
nation-state, and this, coupled with the fact that we are heirs to a
substantive cultural past, requires us to undertake some introspection.

An examination of the factors that have shaped our strategic culture and
fashioned Indian attitudes towards the military is, thus, necessary.

Strategic Thought and Status of the Military

In 1992, George Tanham, a RAND Corporation researcher, stirred a hornets’
nest with his monograph on Indian Strategic Thought; a study that
highlighted the role and status of the military in India as a manifestation
of lopsided strategic thinking.

Commenting on “tight civilian control of the military”, Tanham points out
that India has pursued this policy to a point, “where the military have
almost no input at all in the formulation of higher defence policy and
national strategy.

Exploring the genesis of this approach, he refers to post-independence
India’s deep pacifism and the strong anti-military attitude of its rulers.
He attributes it, largely, to the perception that the army did not take
part in the nationalist movement and was an instrument of British
oppression.

Consequently, he says, Prime Minister Nehru, “…neglected the military,
giving it few resources and downgrading its top leadership….while
increasing the status and pay of both civil servants and the police.”

While it is true that the Indian army did render loyal service to the
British crown, the contribution of our soldiers to the freedom struggle and
its aftermath was common knowledge in India and no contemporary politician
could have remained ignorant.

But let me elaborate on this a little.

The string of early British defeats in North Africa and SE Asia, in WW II,
saw Indian prisoners of war in Singapore, Germany and Italy eagerly
answering the call of Subhash Chandra Bose to fight for India’s freedom.

Consequently, 3000 Indian POWs were formed into the Free Indian Legion as a
unit of the German Army, and in Singapore 40,000 out of 45,000 POWs joined
the Indian National Army.

In 1943, Bose established a Provisional Government of Free India, in
Singapore which formally, declared war on the British Empire.

INA units fought alongside the Japanese 15th Army in its invasion of India
which ended in failure.

Although the armed forces never mention this subject we need to take note
of the series of mutinies, in early 1946, by sailors of the Royal Indian
Navy, with units of the RIAF, the army’s Signal Corps and EME joining their
naval comrades in revolt against the British.

All these events, involving Indian military personnel, at home and abroad,
not only inspired and galvanized Indian freedom fighters, but also struck
deep fear into British hearts, and hastened their departure from India.

In the difficult post-Independence phase, apart from tenaciously holding on
to Kashmir Valley and helping integrate recalcitrant princely states, the
armed forces also played a sterling role during the violent upheaval of
partition.

Over the years, as our glaring strategic naiveté repeatedly led to
adventurism by our neighbours, it has invariably been the courage and
patriotism of the armed forces which safeguarded India’s integrity and
upheld the nation’s honour.

Tanham wonders at the Indian politician’s irrational fear of a military
coup, and points out how this has led to the military leadership being
deprived of even basic discretionary powers.

In a passage worth quoting in full, he adds: “In effect the Services have
been downgraded in status and taken out of the national security
decision-making process, while the MoD civilian staff has grown in prestige
and power and controls almost all military activities and
programmes…bureaucratic opposition has prevented the formation of much
needed institutions like a CDS as well as development of a national
strategy.”

There has been little substantive change in the 21 years since Tanham
undertook this analytic assessment of India’s strategic culture and status
of civil-military relations.

In order to acquire a better understanding of how we reached such a
juncture, it is necessary to, briefly, trace the evolution of our higher
defence organization.

In 1947, the Government of India asked Lord Ismay, Mountbatten’s Chief of
Staff, to evolve a system of higher defence management, which would meet
the emerging needs of the newly independent nation.

Ismay, conscious of the fact that no radical measures could be contemplated
at the delicate juncture of partition, came up with a pragmatic solution
that called for the least amount of turbulence. This interim organization
was to serve till a proper system could be developed to suit Indian
conditions.

The Ismay model recommended a C-in-C for the operational management and
administration of each Service, and a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) for
central coordination between the three Services.

The COSC was to be the highest body for rendering advice to the Defence
Minister and government. It was to be supported by a series of other
inter-Service committees
to address details of coordination.

To facilitate quick decision-making and cut red-tape, civil servants were
embedded in each committee as members, and its decisions were not to be
subject to further detailed scrutiny by the MoD.

This interim higher defence management system had the potential to evolve
in many alternative ways.

The Service Headquarters (SHQ) could have become separate departments of
the MoD.

Alternatively, they could have integrated themselves completely with the
Department of Defence.

Even if no changes were made, the integrated civil-military committees had
adequate decision-making clout to ensure streamlined functioning of the
MoD/SHQ complex.

However, none of this happened, and within a short period of the new system
being implemented, senior civil servants intervened to replace the concept
of ‘civilian supremacy’ with a distorted version which actually established
‘bureaucratic control’ over the armed
forces. This was done by the simple expedient of designating the three SHQ
as ‘Attached Offices’ of the Department of Defence.

[raj.devan]

^^^ +1

A country's defence forces, no matter how large and lethal, are only as good as their weakest link. In our case, our weakest link is probably the manner in which our bureaucracy conducts the business of national defence.

[vasu raya]

Navy strips top officers of warship command

The captains of two frontline warships have been stripped of their positions, with the Indian Navy blaming them for disturbing lapses that led to accidents under their command.

A top navy official said separate probes held INS Talwar’s skipper Captain (equivalent to an army colonel) Gopal Suri and INS Betwa’s commanding officer Captain Deepak Bisht responsible for the lack of adequate supervision and noncompliance with naval procedure.

Navy spokesperson Captain PVS Satish, however, said, “Bisht’s removal isn’t linked to the accident and is a routine transfer.”

Suri and Bisht are likely to face a court martial that could lead to loss of seniority, privileges and even dismissal from service, if found guilty. Incidentally, Bisht is heading the probe into the sinking of INS Sindhurakhshak, the navy’s worst peace-time tragedy.

INS Talwar, a Russia-built stealth frigate worth `1,500 crore, infamously slammed into a trawler off the Ratnagiri coast on December 23 last year, sinking the boat and tossing 27 fishermen into the sea.

Barely two weeks later, INS Betwa, a guided missile frigate, ran aground near the Mumbai naval base on January 4, damaging critical equipment and raising questions about the navy’s safety record. “Such navigational errors are not expected from seasoned mariners commanding warships,” a defence ministry official said.

The reports of the boards of inquiry into the two accidents have been sent to the Western Naval Command chief Vice-Admiral Shekhar Sinha.

The navy is grappling with an accident-prone tag — seven accidents have been reported since the INS Sindhurakshak blew up and sank at a Mumbai harbour last August, killing all 18 men onboard.

“Every incident is thoroughly investigated and the shortcomings are corrected,” the navy official said.

The initial explanation for the INS Talwar accident was that the trawler was not lit and the waters were congested; this had left the ministry fuming.

“If it were an explosives-laden trawler, we would have been dealing with a USS Cole-like bombing,” the ministry official said. In October 2000, suicide bombers exploded a small boat alongside USS Cole, a US Navy destroyer, in the Yemeni port of Aden, killing 17 American sailors and injuring another 39.

Referring to the sinking of INS Sindhurakshak, defence minister AK Antony had asked the navy last November to “optimally operate” the country’s assets and ensure these were not “frittered away.”

[parshuram]

Worry if true . From broadsword http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2014/01/p ... s.html?m=1

[raj.devan]

Worry if true . From broadsword http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2014/01/p ... s.html?m=1

why read a report of the report? The following link takes you to the original story on the Bloomberg website:

http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0 ... ssion.html

But the wording and tone of the whole report makes it look like a planted story intended to sway public opinion than something meant to be solid reporting. Consider the following phrases:

"Flaws in the $35 billion program included the plane’s radar performance, sensor integration and data transfer, Michael Gilmore, chief of the Pentagon testing office, wrote in his annual report on major weapons, *which has yet to be released*"

So we are given to believe that this journalist has access to Pentagon Weapons reports that have not been released. And we are expected to have blind faith since no scan or copy of the leaked report is made available.

[Sagar G]

So we are given to believe that this journalist has access to Pentagon Weapons reports that have not been released. And we are expected to have blind faith since no scan or copy of the leaked report is made available.

Are you saying that you have a scan or copy of the report prepared by IN regarding the performance parameters of P8-A that you are imposing so much faith in it and rejecting this non conforming article ???

The link you have provided say's

“Many of these deficiencies” led Gilmore to determine that the P-8A “is not effective for the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance mission and is not effective for wide area anti-submarine search,” he said in a section of the report obtained by Bloomberg News.

They don't have the entire report with them. Funny thing here is that the problems aren't even new,

He said the new P-8A Poseidon exhibited “all of the major deficiencies” identified in earlier exercises when subjected to more stressful realistic combat testing from September 2012 to March 2013.

Gilmore’s report said the recent realistic combat testing confirmed earlier results on flaws in the P-8’s radar “and revealed the operational implications of the radar’s limitations for some targets.” It said details are classified. Raytheon Co. makes the ocean and land-surveillance radar.

Deficiencies with on-board electronics to detect enemy anti-aircraft radar “limited threat detection” while “seriously degrading capabilities and aircraft survivability across all major missions,” the report found. Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC) makes the “Electronic Support Measures” equipment.

Elzea said the Navy is conducting additional testing “to evaluate several system technical improvements” that will be assessed by Gilmore’s office “as they are delivered.”

The Navy has plans for fielding two sets of aircraft upgrades to “improve anti-submarine warfare capability over several years” and has developed “an adequate test and evaluation master plan” to evaluate improvements, she said.

And India does it again, we will spend billions of $$$ to fix crappy foreign military products which are sanctionable during war time by the way.

[Viv S]

And India does it again, we will spend billions of $$$ to fix crappy foreign military products which are sanctionable during war time by the way.

Will we be spending billions? The P-8Is would have had a certain class of performance advertised to the Indian Navy/MoD before the order was placed. The Navy in turn would have verified the performance against set parameters, either on pre-productions variants or on freshly received production units. The responsibility for fixing the deficits, will lies with the OEM. In this case, most of the issues identified likely relate to software, upgrades for which should not cost a substantial deal to implement.

[Sagar G]

Will we be spending billions? The P-8Is would have had a certain class of performance advertised to the Indian Navy/MoD before the order was placed. The Navy in turn would have verified the performance against set parameters, either on pre-productions variants or on freshly received production units. The responsibility for fixing the deficits, will lies with the OEM.

Yup just like how all these years all the OEM's around the world have helped India to fix their crappy product for "free" so will Boeing. Totally trustable but then why you also say that,

In this case, most of the issues identified likely relate to software, upgrades for which should not cost a substantial deal to implement.

Make up your mind how you intend to defend Boeing. Are they going to do it for free or is it going to cost a small amount.

[raj.devan]

No, Sagar. What I am saying is that I am extremely cautious about planted news reports designed to sway and manipulate my opinion.

But do go through the Bloomberg article again, and discern for yourself the tone of the article. I, for one, noticed a definite attempt to sell a certain line of thought - at least in the 1st 4 paras.

In any case the DOT&E annual reports are always made public - so we should all be able to confirm what it says and what context it was said in.

[Sagar G]

raj.devan yes we must guard ourselves from falling for propaganda articles but given that the article is only confirming the Boeing's failure to fix previous issues with P8-A, I fail to see any propaganda material here.

I don't think the entire gamut of information will be made public since the article also talks about details of the shortcomings being classified.

[raj.devan]

The FY2013 report is expected to be up very soon. And when it does we can do a CtrlF to look for all references to the Poseidon in it. Watch this space:

http://www.dote.osd.mil/pub/annual-reports.html

RajD
http://www.rajdevan.net

[Viv S]

Yup just like how all these years all the OEM's around the world have helped India to fix their crappy product for "free" so will Boeing. Totally trustable but then why you also say that,

The majority of our equipment comes from Russia. To add to which we have traditionally negotiated a low acquisition cost and then chased after support contracts in a piecemeal fashion (with obvious results). Thankfully, that attitude is changing now. Case in point; Boeing C-17s, where Boeing is contractually obligated to ensure set availability standards are delivered. Most other contracts too, now have penalty clauses written in. I'm assuming the P-8I contract was not drafted/negotiated in a sloppy fashion either.

Make up your mind how you intend to defend Boeing. Are they going to do it for free or is it going to cost a small amount.

The aircraft would need to be grounded for a while during the process. There'd be some interference with maintenance schedules. You'd also have some officers/officials who need to be shuttling to and from the US. So yes, there's bound to be some cost involved, even for for software upgrades.

[John]

"Flaws in the $35 billion program included the plane’s radar performance, sensor integration and data transfer, Michael Gilmore, chief of the Pentagon testing office, wrote in his annual report on major weapons, *which has yet to be released*"

P-8i uses BEL IFF and Data Link and also the radar system on P-8A is different from P-8I if i recall correctly the P-8A has been upgraded to have APS-137D and P-8I has APY-10 which was originally intended for P-8A.

[Aditya_V]

Worry if true . From broadsword http://ajaishukla.blogspot.in/2014/01/p ... s.html?m=1

why read a report of the report? The following link takes you to the original story on the Bloomberg website:

http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-0 ... ssion.html

But the wording and tone of the whole report makes it look like a planted story intended to sway public opinion than something meant to be solid reporting. Consider the following phrases:

"Flaws in the $35 billion program included the plane’s radar performance, sensor integration and data transfer, Michael Gilmore, chief of the Pentagon testing office, wrote in his annual report on major weapons, *which has yet to be released*"

So we are given to believe that this journalist has access to Pentagon Weapons reports that have not been released. And we are expected to have blind faith since no scan or copy of the leaked report is made available.

Wouldnt the fact the US P8A not having MAD and P8I's having MAD make a lot of difference for Submarine detection. ME thinks P8A will soon begin to have MAD and APY-10 with air to air mode.

[Philip]

When the deal was first announced years ago,the debate centered upon the "low and slow" ASW mission which is more suited to turboprops,and the limitations of the P-8 in that area.Thus special wingkits for ASW torpedoes were developed to allow them to be released from a higher alt. Secondly,we were never going to get the level of sensors,and related eqpt. for detection of subs,surface and air targets meant for the USN .The initial reports suggest that it is the USN variant that has failed substantially in exercises in the waters around Japan.The IN must've made its own evaluation and compared it with the existing IL-38SDs and TU-142 Bears.Unliklely that we'll see bad news being acknowledged from our side.

For Washington, as for New Delhi, this news is worrying. The first P-8A of 117 that the US Navy plans to buy was deployed to Kadena, in Japan. It is operating along with others in the tense maritime environment of the Sea of Japan, tracking Chinese submarines. The three P-8Is already delivered to India (with five more due to come by 2015) are based at Arakonam, near Chennai, to watch over India’s 7,500-kilometre coastline and the ocean stretch from the Strait of Malacca to the Strait of Hormuz.

In November, the US Navy had declared the P-8A ready for combat deployment, while admitted that the US Navy had developed “software upgrades to correct deficiencies.” Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, who commands the US 7th Fleet, backed the P-8A, stating on January 10 that it “represents a significant improvement” over the P-3 Orion, which it replaced in the US fleet.

The P-8I’s sensors include a Raytheon multi-mode radar to detect aircraft, ships and submarines, while another belly-mounted radar looks backwards, like an electronic rear-view-mirror. When a submarine is suspected, the aircraft drops sonobuoys into the water, which radio back suspicious sounds. A “magnetic anomaly detector” on the P-8I’s tail also detects submarines. The P-8I can destroy ships and submarines with Harpoon missiles (?), Mark 82 depth charges and Mark 54 torpedoes mounted on the aircraft.

Napoleon always asked of his generals;"Is he lucky?" Unfortunately,our current CNS's tenure has been plagued with disaster.

[member_23455]

Wouldnt the fact the US P8A not having MAD and P8I's having MAD make a lot of difference for Submarine detection. ME thinks P8A will soon begin to have MAD and APY-10 with air to air mode.

The guys who allocate money and draw up their version of the GSQRs in the USN have made a deliberate choice to stop relying on MAD as a major form of detection, they have dropped it not just from the P8A but also the SH-60/MH60 Sea Hawk's latest avatars. Plus they have the whole BAMS gig going on.

The IN has made a different choice based on its accumulated wisdom.

None of this has to do with the reported problems with the P8A, which are typical of any new type, in any armed force in the world. It makes for good TRPs, and some knee jerk discussions on internet forums, but beyond that it's all pretty meh.

[raj.devan]

What is more pertinent, and an eye opener for me at least, was that the annual report of the Pentagon's department of testing and evaluation is made public - detailed list of weapons failures and all. I was going through last years report, and found this to be transparency on a whole new level.

RajD

[Sagar G]

I'm assuming the P-8I contract was not drafted/negotiated in a sloppy fashion either.

Big assumption without knowing the details of the negotiations no ???

The aircraft would need to be grounded for a while during the process. There'd be some interference with maintenance schedules. You'd also have some officers/officials who need to be shuttling to and from the US. So yes, there's bound to be some cost involved, even for for software upgrades.

So in the end we will end up paying to fix the anomalies and we don't even know what kind of bugs the IN version carries.

[Viv S]

Big assumption without knowing the details of the negotiations no ???

Any bigger than declaring that this would cost India billions?

So in the end we will end up paying to fix the anomalies and we don't even know what kind of bugs the IN version carries.

The Indian Navy would certainly know where it stands, as opposed to what it was promised.

[Sagar G]

Any bigger than declaring that this would cost India billions?

Have problems understanding figure of speech ???

The Indian Navy would certainly know where it stands, as opposed to what it was promised.

So you agree that there is a good possibility that crappy gear was supplied to IN and we paid for that and going to pay for it to get it fixed.

[Viv S]

Have problems understanding figure of speech ???

'Billions of $$$' = lots of money. Yes I got that. Its still not evidence of India having to pay extra for non-performance on the OEM's part.

So you agree that there is a good possibility that crappy gear was supplied to IN and we paid for that and going to pay for it to get it fixed.

The P-8 beats out the EADS's A319 based entry, LM's P-3 as well as an Elta proposal.

There's a 'good possibility' that the report points out teething problems present on any new platform entering service, and that'll be reflected in the follow-on orders for the aircraft.

[NRao]

Viv s,

The contract is governed by fms, the support is governed by the oem, in this case boein

[Sagar G]

'Billions of $$$' = lots of money. Yes I got that. Its still not evidence of India having to pay extra for non-performance on the OEM's part.

So non performing foreign gear doesn't equal to India having to pay for it !!!! Wow ground breaking insights here.

The P-8 beats out the EADS's A319 based entry, LM's P-3 as well as an Elta proposal.

There's a 'good possibility' that the report points out teething problems present on any new platform entering service, and that'll be reflected in the follow-on orders for the aircraft.

The problems shouldn't have been their in the first place. India isn't a guinea pig for refining foreign military wares.

[Viv S]

So non performing foreign gear doesn't equal to India having to pay for it !!!! Wow ground breaking insights here.

Not if the contract calls for the OEM to carry out modifications to meet contractual requirements on its own dime.

The problems shouldn't have been their in the first place. India isn't a guinea pig for refining foreign military wares.

The aircraft was still in development when ordered. Same for the EADS and Elta entries. If the IN wanted a 'tried-and-true' system over a 'next-generation' aircraft, it had the freedom to opt for the P-3 or Il-38.

[Sagar G]

Not if the contract calls for the OEM to carry out modifications to meet contractual requirements on its own dime.

Again a big assumption without knowing the contract details.

The aircraft was still in development when ordered. Same for the EADS and Elta entries. If the IN wanted a 'tried-and-true' system over a 'next-generation' aircraft, it had the freedom to opt for the P-3 or Il-38.

A "next-generation" aircraft with teething problems.

[Viv S]

Again a big assumption without knowing the contract details.

On both our parts perhaps. The IN's P-8Is are currently undergoing flight trials. We'll know the result eventually, reflected in the follow-on order (or lack thereof).

A "next-generation" aircraft with teething problems.

Its true for all aircraft. I'd imagine the DRDO's AEW&C is/will be going through something similar.

[Sagar G]

Its true for all aircraft. I'd imagine the DRDO's AEW&C is/will be going through something similar.

So P8-A == DRDO AEWAC's, another ground breaking insight you give. Now I expect Tejas to be brought in as well.

Bottomline is we ended up paying for a non mature platform and will most probably pay more to make it mature and hence continue our long glorious history of getting scammed by foreign OEM's.

[Viv S]

So P8-A == DRDO AEWAC's, another ground breaking insight you give. Now I expect Tejas to be brought in as well.

Point was, all new aircraft have teething problems.

Bottomline is we ended up paying for a non mature platform and will most probably pay more to make it mature and hence continue our long glorious history of getting scammed by foreign OEM's.

It was inducted by the Indian Navy barely an year after the first delivery to the USN. Its not received its FOC as yet, it should come as no surprise that its immature.

And this can hardly have been unknown to the IN/MoD (who had the option of older aircraft). It stands to reason that they would've negotiated the support contract with Boeing accordingly i.e. without supplemental costs charged to Indian exchequer.

[member_25400]

"Flaws in the $35 billion program included the plane’s radar performance, sensor integration and data transfer, Michael Gilmore, chief of the Pentagon testing office, wrote in his annual report on major weapons, *which has yet to be released*"

Much smoke, unclear if any fire.

The issues seem to be completely based on its avionics suite. Since the P-8I is an export variant (read degraded capabilities in some areas), they might not even apply to P-8I given differing equipment (india replaced some modules and requested differing modes in others), integration, and requirements.

The bloomberg report listed raytheon and northrop grumman, but it is unclear if it meant to specifically call out issues (or even unresolved issues here) with them. Raytheon makes the APY-10 radar used in both P-8I and P-8A variants (with certain changes)., while Northrop Grumman has multiple equipment in P-8A (it appears likely that at least some of those are different in P-8I)

(http://ukarmedforcescommentary.blogspot ... nd-uk.html).This site has some of the specifics on P-8I/P-8A avionics and makes it clear that issues on the P-8A were known and many of them were scheduled to be fixed by IOC. (Nov 29 2013). (for comparison, India's 1st 8 P-Is will be delivered through 2015 with 2 aircraft delivered and acceptance trials for the first aircraft progressing ~Nov 2013).

Here, continued military interaction between the US and India could also help provide a channel to suggesting gross fixes/improvements. (Over and above system vendor/integrator).

As an example of equipment changes that could be pertinent: P8A has Link 16 (data transfer protocol), Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) but no Magnetic anomaly detector (to save weight). while P8I has the MAD but no Link16 (CISMOA ) or SLAM-ER

Of course, US wouldn't make available it's precious electronic threat signature libraries (if any used) to any export variant ...

Also ref:
http://www.indiandefence.com/forums/ind ... ns-15.html

[Shrinivasan]

Before we all go overboard with the Ajai shukla article (which smells of Lifafa), let us go to the original report.... here is the 2012 version of the same describing the P8-A program P8-A Posedion

There are Four recommendations for 2012, of the 2011 recommendations, Most have been corrected and above all progress has been made on ALL RECOMMENDATIONS.

[Philip]

We'll have to wait for a CAG report to come out to know the truth.One old report criticised the Derby on the SH,saing that it had failed to meet desired parameters in range,etc.Wil we see in the future a similar report reg. the P-8s?

http://www.livefistdefence.com/2010/08/ ... udent.html

Indian Navy Harrier Upgrade "Imprudent", Partiality Shown To Israeli Firms: Indian Audit Watchdog
India's national audit watchdog agency, the Comptroller & Auditor General (CAG) has severely criticised the Indian Navy's upgrade of 14 Sea Harriers. The Navy embarked on the upgrade -- called the Limited Upgrade Sea Harrier (LUSH) programme -- in March 2005.

The new CAG union audit report on the Indian Navy, tabled in Parliament yesterday, observes, "The contract for limited upgradation was concluded but only in March 2005. The delay was mainly on account of finalising technical requirements, issuing the Request for Proposal, conducting Technical Evaluation for the missile and associated radar. Not only did this delay defeat the very purpose of execution of the project on fast track basis but the Navy would also be able to exploit the upgraded Sea Harrier aircraft for a very limited period only, i.e about three years or less. Even subsequently, there were delays in the execution of the programme by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the first milestone of handing over two prototypes to Navy by February 2007 could not be achieved. Consequently, delivery of the remaining aircraft, scheduled for February 2008 was postponed to December 2009."

Further, the report says, "The Sea Harrier has had, over the past few years, a very high attrition rate. In fact, subsequent to the time of mooting the proposal, in October 2001, Navy lost two aircraft in August 2003 and December 2004. Despite being aware of these facts, Navy initially committed all its aircraft for the upgradation though they ultimately reduced one aircraft from the final contract. Further they did not include any provision in the contract for payment on prorata basis depending on the number of aircraft upgraded by the vendor. As a result, after conclusion of contract, when more aircraft were lost in accidents, Navy had no option but to make payment of Rs 204.30 crore to HAL towards upgradation of these nonexistent aircraft lost in the interim period. Navy would, however, be able to setoff only Rs 16.16 crore payable to HAL for their services."

Damningly, the CAG report also notes that the Navy was "predisposed" towards selecting the Rafael-made Derby BVR missile "even though the missile did not fulfil the needs of the Indian Navy". The report notes, "The RFP issued in August 2003 stipulated that the IN’s requirement was for the Derby missile. As no corrigendum to the RFP was issued, clearly, competition in procurement was ruled out. As a result, although the RFP was issued to seven firms and an extension was granted till October 2003, only the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the Derby missile responded. The trial directives were issued in March 2008 after scaling down the NSQRs at the instance of vendor. Consequently, the acceptable maximum range of the missile was reduced from ‘A’ Km to ‘B’ Km, which was 54 per cent of the original accepted range. Actual live firing of missile was conducted, in March 2008, on an upgraded prototype Sea Harrier aircraft at a range of ‘B’ Km for missile in mid envelope scenario (33 67 per cent). The vendor was unwilling to guarantee performance of the missile beyond the scaled downrange of ‘B’ Km. One of the basic aims of the acquisition of BVR Air to Air missile was to destroy targets at beyond visual ranges of up to ‘C’ Km. However, the missiles acquired failed to achieve the desired ranges in the live firing. The capability of the seeker, at the range prescribed in NSQR (‘A’ Km) was also not demonstrated in live firing. Moreover, the missile launcher design is being used for the first time for airborne operations."

If you look at that contract,the entire deal stinks .Deals with Israel and the US are pushed through with comparative ease and as in this case an abject failure.Now the Derby will be found on the LCA.We'll have to wait for future CAG reports to find out if its flaws have been rectified.

The IN has gone down a dangerous route of dependence upon a single nation for its missile defence for its future major warships,with Barak-8,late and unproven .Why the French Aster SAMs were not evaluated is a mystery.The LR SAM requirement has actually been a single-vendor gift to the Israelis even before the Barak scandal was officially put to sleep.

[srai]

^^^

For LCA Mk.1 to have BVR capability by 2015 FOC, Derby even with its range limitations is the only choice since it is already integrated with EL/M-2032 radar. Few years later other BVR AAMs will be integrated.

[Nikhil T]

Western fleet chief summoned in ‘dress No.2’

The chief of navy’s Mumbai-based elite western fleet has been read the riot act and asked to explain a series of recent mishaps involving warships that have blemished the navy’s safety record under his watch.

In a rare action against an officer of his rank, Rear Admiral Anil Chawla, who heads the crucial naval formation, was summoned by the Western Naval Command chief Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha and made to report in a ceremonial uniform, called “dress no.2” in naval parlance, which signifies displeasure on part of his superiors, sources confirmed to HT.

“When someone is asked to report in dress no.2, it is connected with censure. It is uncommon for two-star admirals to be paraded this way, unless the matter is grave,” a retired vice admiral said.

Ordinarily, officers posted in Mumbai wear a working dress called No.8A.

The navy is tightening the screws on officers who have been held responsible for the lack of adequate supervision and non-compliance with naval procedure.

The captains of two frontline warships, INS Talwar and INS Betwa, were stripped of their positions this month, with the navy blaming them for disturbing lapses that led to accidents under their command, as first reported by HT on January 26.

Seven accidents have been reported after India’s Russian-built submarine INS Sindhurakshak blew up and sank at a Mumbai harbour last August, killing all 18 men onboard and dealing a severe blow to the navy’s fast deteriorating underwater force levels.

INS Talwar infamously slammed into a trawler off the Ratnagiri coast on December 23, sinking the boat and tossing 27 fishermen into the sea. Barely two weeks later, INS Betwa, a guided missile frigate, ran aground near the Mumbai naval base on January 4, damaging critical equipment.

[ramana]

Western fleet chief summoned in ‘dress No.2’

The chief of navy’s Mumbai-based elite western fleet has been read the riot act and asked to explain a series of recent mishaps involving warships that have blemished the navy’s safety record under his watch.

In a rare action against an officer of his rank, Rear Admiral Anil Chawla, who heads the crucial naval formation, was summoned by the Western Naval Command chief Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha and made to report in a ceremonial uniform, called “dress no.2” in naval parlance, which signifies displeasure on part of his superiors, sources confirmed to HT.

“When someone is asked to report in dress no.2, it is connected with censure. It is uncommon for two-star admirals to be paraded this way, unless the matter is grave,” a retired vice admiral said.

Ordinarily, officers posted in Mumbai wear a working dress called No.8A.

The navy is tightening the screws on officers who have been held responsible for the lack of adequate supervision and non-compliance with naval procedure.

The captains of two frontline warships, INS Talwar and INS Betwa, were stripped of their positions this month, with the navy blaming them for disturbing lapses that led to accidents under their command, as first reported by HT on January 26.

Seven accidents have been reported after India’s Russian-built submarine INS Sindhurakshak blew up and sank at a Mumbai harbour last August, killing all 18 men onboard and dealing a severe blow to the navy’s fast deteriorating underwater force levels.

INS Talwar infamously slammed into a trawler off the Ratnagiri coast on December 23, sinking the boat and tossing 27 fishermen into the sea. Barely two weeks later, INS Betwa, a guided missile frigate, ran aground near the Mumbai naval base on January 4, damaging critical equipment.

Navies all over the world are very firm on accountability as they have to fight far away from shores and the crew has to have absolute trust in their captains.

They might already have done stand downs to review procedures and way of life.


Bravo.

[chackojoseph]

Indian Navy commissions 81st Immediate Support Vessels Squadron to protect offshore assets

[vic]

I think light crafts of coast guard and navy should be mounted with Helina missile