Lt. Gen. Prakash Katoch wrote:The Siachen issue is not about Siachen Glacier but the Saltoro Massif. Strategic significance of the latter can hardly be gauged by armchair warriors.
Holding on to the glacier is strategic and in order to hold the glacier, dominating the heights of the Saltoro ridge is essential, is the way this armchair person sees it.
• Widening the China-Pakistan handshake (collusive threat) to include Gilgit-Baltistan (reportedly being leased out by Pakistan to China for 50 years), Shaksgam Valley (already ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963),
How credible is this report of a lease? While China is not above doing so, it would seem like a serious and bold move to box India in. In fact, it makes sense for TSP to NOT negotiate with India, if they are indeed serious about this lease offer. But, I have my doubts on the veracity of this report for many reasons.
• SSN and Eastern Ladakh will become focused objectives of Chinese strategic acupuncture. Defence potential of SSN will be totally degraded with western flank exposed and KK Pass to north, which India stopped patrolling years back for fear of annoying the dragon. We continue to remain thin in Eastern Ladakh against Chinese threat via Aksai Chin – heightened more now with possibility of two front war.
The only way for SSN/Ladakh to be threatened by China is through Karakoram pass and Aksai Chin and NOT through Siachen. The ability of TSPA to occupy the ridges and come down from there is slim to none. The maximum TSPA can do is occupy the ridges and threaten the valleys and the glacier itself, but then India should be smart enough to provide a disproportionate response. The only case that TSPA has is if PRC joins in from the east and even then the axis of attack through Siachen would not make sense. SSN/Ladakh can be exposed, if Pakistan threatens the Shyok/Nubra valleys. Which leads us to the next point.
• Our next line of defence will perforce base on Ladakh Range with possibility of Leh coming within enemy artillery range.
This is where our non linear response options come into play. It will be stupid for us do an upfront assault on the ridges. As Kargil shows it is very expensive and hence other options SHOULD come into play.
Ladakh and Zanskar Ranges will be targeted for terrorism by ISI nurtured groups while Pakistan will say they are ‘out of control’. ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist outfits with an eye on Ladakh since late 1990s.
Then co-existence breaks and all options are open again.
Why are the Ottawa University, the Atlantic Council and the National Defense University, Washington not discussing a ‘Peace Park’ astride the Durand Line? Will demilitarization of Siachen increase the chances / avenues of conflict between China-Pakistan and India?
I think we should ignore the desires and pontifications of the west and act on Siachen, strictly based on how we see our interests and our ability to manage the risks.
• If the whole exercise is based on trusting Pakistan, what exactly has Pakistan done to earn that trust? Has the anti-India terrorist infrastructure including 40 terrorist training camps in POK been dismantled? Has ‘any’ progress been made in punishing the perpetrators of 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks?
TSP has to act BEFORE de-escalation takes place. However, Siachen would be a low risk way to test the waters before other larger de-escalation steps are considered.
• How will Ladakh be defended post de-militarization?
There is no attack force coming in from the Glaciers or the Saltoro, so I do not get the import of this question.
• What force levels we will need to hold ground - mainly along the Ladakh range? On face value ‘many more times’ the current strength north of Khardung La will be required – remember while one brigade was deployed in Kargil earlier, post 1999, the same area is held by a division with nine battalions deployed on the LC and additional troops required during summer months to check infiltration.
A reserve force would be different from a holding force. I think the comparison to Kargil is not accurate. What is fair is to ask, Why is Kargil de-escalation not being considered, maybe the answer is because Siachen is less risky and hence should go first?
Where and in what quantum will reserves for Saltoro Ridge locate, how will they be acclimatized, time frame for launch and what is our capability to launch them at those heights on a ridge already occupied?
While these questions can be explored, I feel our response should be asymmetric and not just limited to getting back the Saltoro ridges, definitely not limited to a frontal assault, in case TSPA is able to execute on this, with our eyes and ears open. I mean it is not like we are trusting them blindly. Our guns may not be on the ridges, but our eyes and ears will be. Look at the details in Brig: Gurmeet Kanwal's presentation for a proposed template.
What troops will we need to counter infiltration and possible terrorist influx into Ladakh? Even requirement of placing reserves on the Zanskar Ranges will need examination.
That is quite pessimistic or extreme caution whichever way one wants to put it, to think about defending all the way back into Zanskar for TSPA. It assumes loss of control below NJ 9842. I think this way it just opens the entire pandora's box then. Let us stick to risk management of Siachen/Saltoro. Below 9842, we do what we do today at the worst.
Expenditure on establishing next defence line post-demilitarization; posts, bunkers, gun positions, helipads, administrative echelons, new communications infrastructure with increased quantum of troops, time frame, tenability, maintenance and recurring expenses.
Are we not talking of de-escalation. A reserve force will not require the long logistic tail and special infra that it currently takes to support men on the Glacier and high ridges. So, the expenses will/should be less than what it takes to support the men on the Glacier.
Effect of demilitarization on population in the area, especially the Nubra and Shyok Valleys considering army provides livelihood to most.
Build a reserve force in the these valleys? A base?
Nawaz Sharif’s call for Pakistan to take the lead and withdraw troops from Siachen glacier is nothing more than a political statement and Kayani’s call to resolve the dispute saying his country follows “the doctrine of peaceful co-existence with its neighbours especially India”, words of a sly fox. Without remorse for her dead during the Kargil conflict, Kayani is capitalizing recent loss of soldiers in an avalanche to rake up demilitarization because:
I think this mistrust is the heart of the issues. Deescalation on Siachen is a trial of sorts.
Pakistan is at great disadvantage vis-à-vis India at the Saltoro Ridge with Pakistan holding Gyong and Bilafond glaciers on lower ground to the West.
Small Nitpik, I thought we controlled Bliafond La? We should ask for action on other items such as 26/11, PoK camps and dismantling of other Jihadi infra as good faith by them, since we are at an advantage here.
The situation in Gilgit-Baltistan is becoming explosive due to neglect of Shia dominated areas, enforced demographic changes, subtle but deliberate conversions to Sunni form of Islam and state sponsored Shia massacres. Any outbreak of insurgency will adversely affect communications to Siachen.
The population base here is really small to do any major damage. They are largely rural, socio-economically weak. There is fragmentation along language, religion, regional etc. This is probably the most diverse region in all of Pakistan. There is only so much this population can do, without active support of outsiders. But, the good part for India is they are not Sunnis for the most part. So, the issue can be kept alive for India's benefit in the future. Who knows, how things will shape up in the distant future.
In conjunction Shaksgam Valley, ceding Gilgit-Baltistan region to China for 50 years (reported by USA’s Middle East Media Research Institute) can extend to Siachen-Saltoro through to Aksai Chin, forcing Indian defences south and increasing the vulnerability of Ladakh region.
If true, is this not a whole different issue. But I do agree, if it is true, then Siachen de-escalation does not make sense.
Demilitarization will open avenues of infiltration and terrorism into Ladakh. Since late 1990s, Pakistan’s ISI has been nurturing Shia terrorist organizations including Tehreek-e-Jaferia (TJP) and its many sub groups with an eye on Ladakh and Zanskar Range south of it.
But not from Siachen. The scope is strictly limited to north of 9842. This is not an be all end all solution. It is only a step.
To say that Pakistan will be in no position to re-occupy Siachen is foolish. Even while Indian troops were deployed at Saltoro, the Kargil intrusions were never visualized on plea that terrain was not negotiable. Additionally, in 1984, when both India and Pakistan rushed for Gyong La, an agreement was reached following a flag meeting for both parties to withdraw. Indians did, but the Pakistanis re-enacted their back-stabbing legacy and occupied the pass in clear violation of the agreement made hours ago.
My question is why did we not counter attack as we have done in so many places and take these positions back from them. Need some more light here. Maybe we did try but not succeed?
Compared to Saltoro Ridge, we have many times more troops deployed on Ladakh and Pir Panjal ranges in Kashmir, some of them holding equally, if not more, tenacious posts including some in glaciated terrain. Equally dangerous avalanches occur periodically in such areas resulting in loss of lives. Yet, there have been units who have done a full tenure in Siachen without losing a single man to weather and terrain. Yoga and religiously following pre-induction training saves precious lives.
True one thing at a time. Siachen can be first, since it is least risky amongst the options.
Lack of strategic forethought and political unilateralism has been typical to India ever since Independence. More significantly, ambiguity and deceit have been the hallmarks of China and Pakistan. Ask yourself have they ever bothered about world opinion? Will their expanding nexus and US pullout from Afghanistan, not make Pakistan more uppity? India would do well not to look at Siachen in isolation.
It cannot be in isolation. It has to be a step in an overall vision. The crux of the issue here is one of trust. But, there seems to be as much mistrust on the Indian government as on Pakistanis. Not without cause and hence this issue of trust and if this trust is broken and consequences thereof should be codified, to the degree possible.
In case of Siachen, first the AGPL and posts held by both sides must be duly delineated on ground and map. We need dispassionate analysis of all issues mentioned above before taking any step towards demilitarization.
Only ways it shall be done.
Lt Gen PC Katoch is a Special Forces veteran who has commanded the Siachen Brigade
My million praams to the General and his men, due to whose sacrifices, we are able to pontificate as civilians and exercise our right. The nation owes it to them to listen to these men carefully.