Indian Army History Thread

Aditya G · Post by **Aditya G** » 02 Mar 2009 13:22

http://www.indianexpress.com/story_prin ... oryid=3634

‘Whoever has seen Aksai Chin, as I have, would want someone else to have it’
Inder Malhotra

Posted online: May 03, 2006 at 0011 hrs

The passing of John Kenneth Galbraith brings back a flood of memories of this outstanding man (in every sense of the expression), especially of his India connection, that need to be shared.
Six years before he arrived in Delhi as one of the more popular American envoys — and became the first reluctant occupant of Roosevelt House, shifting from the lovely residence at 17 Amrita Shergill Marg — he had spent a year in India advising the Planning Commission, then dominated by his friend P.C. Mahalanobis, on the formulation of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Incidentally, the Eisenhower administration had initially offered the services of Milton Friedman for this purpose. On this Galbraith’s typical comment was: ‘‘To ask him to advise on economic planning is like asking the Holy Father to counsel on the operation of a birth control clinic.’’

Taking his advisory assignment seriously, JKG wrote several papers, the most important of which was titled ‘‘India’s Post Office Socialism’’. Even at this distance of time it remains remarkably relevant because, in it, he had brilliantly analysed the causes, principally the politico-bureaucratic stranglehold on the growing public sector undertakings that in later years were to transform many of these sacred cows into white elephants.

The paper inevitably leaked and was quoted in Parliament. In the prevailing atmosphere it led to a loud but uninformed controversy. So much so that even so able a parliamentarian as Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant confused Galbraith with an Englishman, named Braithwaite!

By this time Galbraith had established a cordial rapport with Jawaharlal Nehru that served him well when he became ambassador. But even during those days his association with the Prime Minister was at two levels, official and personal. For instance, which other ambassador could have sent Nehru a note asking whether he could spare a few minutes to see his house guest, the “lovely Hollywood actress Angie Dickinson”, anxious like all visitors to India to meet the Prime Minister? Within the hour he was asked to bring his guest to Teen Murti. Nehru and Angie talked for two hours.

In her time Indira Gandhi listened to Galbraith with respect and sometimes sought his advice. With Rajiv, his relationship was even more avuncular. Shortly before his crucial visit to China in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi discussed with JKG, among other things, Aksai Chin. As Galbraith told me a few days later — in “strict confidence” that I have respected till today — his reply to Rajiv was, ‘‘Whoever has seen Aksai Chin, as I have, would want someone else to have it.’’

Two years earlier, while researching for my biography of Indira Gandhi, I had asked him what he thought of Rajiv Gandhi succeeding his mother within hours of he assassination. He had refused to comment because he did not want to ‘‘insult the memories of the Roosevelts and the Kennedys’’.

During the 27 months JKG was ambassador to this country, the most important event was, of course, the brief but traumatic border war with China. Ironically, on October 20, 1962 he was caught on the wrong foot. He was in London, scheduled to deliver a lecture at the Guild Hall the next day and then to leave for Moscow. he had gone to the theatre and returned to his hotel late. In the wee hours or the morning, a US embassy official, with an ‘‘Eyes Only’’ message from President Kennedy, woke him up. JFK’s cable regretted that his ambassadors were seldom at their posts ‘‘when needed the most’’ and ordered him to cancel the lecture and leave for Delhi ‘‘forthwith’’.

Galbraith’s active, indeed intimate, role during the month-long war and its aftermath is too well known to need recounting. Except to record, with great anguish, that his was arguably the most forceful voice giving Nehru the unwise advice to desist from using the air force against the Chinese, a counsel the Prime Minister accepted.

In Ambassador’s Journal, one of the 33 books he wrote, JKG has recorded with satisfaction that he was left virtually free to make and run policy on the India-China war because it had coincided with the Cuban Missile Crisis that had completely absorbed the attention of all the top policy makers in Washington. That very little attention has been paid so far to this significant coincidence between the events in the Himalayas and the Caribbean is intriguing but it is a different story.

He hasn’t said so in Journal but never made a secret of it in private conversation that his second “great satisfaction” in 1962 was to witness the “dismissal” of Krishna Menon as Defence Minister. In his diary, he had noted down in full all the wounding remarks against Menon that his colleagues in the government had made to the ambassador but decided to delete them from the book.

Through his innings as ambassador, Galbraith had only one nightmare. It had nothing to with either the border war or the missile crisis. What had shaken him was Jackie Kennedy’s insistence, during her hugely successful, glamour-filled visit to India in March 1962, to see the Sun temple at Konarak. He was mortified by the very thought of Jackie being photographed while looking at some of the more erotic statues. When his attempts to dissuade her failed, he “sheepishly” appealed to her husband. JFK listened to him patiently and said only, “Don’t you think she is old enough”?

Luckily for the ambassador, “for reasons of time and a sinus attack”, Konarak had to be dropped from the schedule.

Countless is the number of those at the receiving end of Galbraith’s slings and arrows, sharpened by wit and laced with just a touch of malice. But this does not mean that he himself was never a target. In fact, on the day his appointment as ambassador to India was announced, The New York Times published a profile of him. At breakfast, Kennedy asked him how he liked it.

JKG replied it was fine but “I cannot see why they had to call me arrogant”.

JFK: “I don’t see why not, everyone else does”.

svinayak · Post by **svinayak** » 04 Mar 2009 02:00

In her time Indira Gandhi listened to Galbraith with respect and sometimes sought his advice. With Rajiv, his relationship was even more avuncular. Shortly before his crucial visit to China in December 1988, Rajiv Gandhi discussed with JKG, among other things, Aksai Chin. As Galbraith told me a few days later — in “strict confidence” that I have respected till today — his reply to Rajiv was, ‘‘Whoever has seen Aksai Chin, as I have, would want someone else to have it.’’

What he was NOT telling was that Aksai Chin was a foot hold for China linking Tibet with Pakistan and all of Kashmir including Leh. China wants to own all parts of land which have Tibet culture including Leh and monasteries.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 04 Mar 2009 05:57

Gentlemen,

The 2nd Bn of the Dogra Regiment celebrates its 150 Raising Day this year. It is today the senior most Bn in the Regiment (the 1st converted to MechInf and is today the 7th Bn of the MEchInf Regiment)..

Incidentally Admins the Raising date for the 1st Bn of the Dogras is given as 1887 in the MEchInf section which is wrong.

I have got a lot information on the regimental history and was wondering who is looking at building on the information currently in the IA - Infantry REgiments Sections. - Anyone interested.

All this talk of the planes and tanks and radars and special forces feels like the footslogger is getting neglected!!!!

Sach

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 04 Mar 2009 07:00

ks_sachin wrote:Incidentally Admins the Raising date for the 1st Bn of the Dogras is given as 1887 in the MEchInf section which is wrong.

I have got a lot information on the regimental history and was wondering who is looking at building on the information currently in the IA - Infantry REgiments Sections. - Anyone interested.

Sachin,

What date do you have for the erstwhile 1st Battalion, Dogra Regiment? Most of my resources point to 1887 as the raising date for 37th Bengal Native Infantry, which became 37th Dogra (i.e 1st Battalion Dogra Regiment).

OTOH admittedly there are numerous points the existing pages need to be corrected on. If anybody is interested in making the changes, I can provide an errata.

sum · Post by **sum** » 04 Mar 2009 09:13

Q to the gurus:

Am currently reading Bharat Karnad's book. In the book, he repeatedly states that JLN had a high regard for the military but the below-par performance of the IA in J&K during 47-48 made him disillusioned about the IA and he lost interest in equipping the military since he felt the IA was not upto scratch.

What exactly did the IA do wrong in 47-48 and was it really below par effort from IA in the J&K sector?

Rahul M · Post by **Rahul M** » 04 Mar 2009 09:18

he repeatedly states that JLN had a high regard for the military but the below-par performance of the IA in J&K during 47-48 made him disillusioned about the IA

BS. JLN wanted to scrap the army and probably would have done so if pak had not attacked in 47-48.

sum · Post by **sum** » 04 Mar 2009 09:33

Rahul M wrote:
he repeatedly states that JLN had a high regard for the military but the below-par performance of the IA in J&K during 47-48 made him disillusioned about the IA
BS. JLN wanted to scrap the army and probably would have done so if pak had not attacked in 47-48.

Even i had thought so but Karnad says the opposite and i find it tough to dis-believe a guru like Karnad....

k prasad · Post by **k prasad** » 04 Mar 2009 10:22

If what Karnad says is true, it only points to a "chemical-locchaa" in JLN's head - if the army doesn't perform well, the solution isn't to ignore them and sulk... it is to equip them actually.

From the books that I've read, JLN was anti-services, having seen them as British instruments of oppression during the freedom struggle. Plus, he had a dislike for war, given the panchsheel and NAM, and all the other treaties that he thought would make war impossible.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 04 Mar 2009 10:49

ParGha wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:Incidentally Admins the Raising date for the 1st Bn of the Dogras is given as 1887 in the MEchInf section which is wrong.

I have got a lot information on the regimental history and was wondering who is looking at building on the information currently in the IA - Infantry REgiments Sections. - Anyone interested.
Sachin,

What date do you have for the erstwhile 1st Battalion, Dogra Regiment? Most of my resources point to 1887 as the raising date for 37th Bengal Native Infantry, which became 37th Dogra (i.e 1st Battalion Dogra Regiment).

OTOH admittedly there are numerous points the existing pages need to be corrected on. If anybody is interested in making the changes, I can provide an errata.

The second was raised a couple of years after the 1st and we celebrate 150 years!!.

Also there is a lot of data on war time raising of the regiment that is missing as well as post-war reconstitution of the few dogra regiments.

I can fill some of the gaps and I may be be going to the Centre hopefully end of year and get more from the records.

cheers

ParGha · Post by **ParGha** » 04 Mar 2009 17:31

ks_sachin wrote:The second was raised a couple of years after the 1st and we celebrate 150 years!!.

Also there is a lot of data on war time raising of the regiment that is missing as well as post-war reconstitution of the few dogra regiments.

I can fill some of the gaps and I may be be going to the Centre hopefully end of year and get more from the records.

Ah, I can explain that: The 2nd Battalion has a longer history from 1858, when it was raised as an irregular levy (Agra Levy). However the irregular raisings are not commonly accepted in determining seniority (ex JAKRIF would be a much senior regiment if its original raising dates are used, but only its regularized date is actually used). It was regularized as 38th BNI much later. But the date for 1 Dogra is correct.

Hope this helps.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 04 Mar 2009 22:01

I have question. The 1962 debacle was really a failure on the politicial front due to underperformance by ill-equiiped and ill-prepared Indian Army. However the IA recovered quite promptly and gave a good account in 1965. So what and how things changed in those three years? What was Nehru's role in the early plans for recovery. BTW he died in May 1964.

ks_sachin · Post by **ks_sachin** » 05 Mar 2009 02:55

ParGha wrote:
ks_sachin wrote:The second was raised a couple of years after the 1st and we celebrate 150 years!!.

Also there is a lot of data on war time raising of the regiment that is missing as well as post-war reconstitution of the few dogra regiments.

I can fill some of the gaps and I may be be going to the Centre hopefully end of year and get more from the records.
Ah, I can explain that: The 2nd Battalion has a longer history from 1858, when it was raised as an irregular levy (Agra Levy). However the irregular raisings are not commonly accepted in determining seniority (ex JAKRIF would be a much senior regiment if its original raising dates are used, but only its regularized date is actually used). It was regularized as 38th BNI much later. But the date for 1 Dogra is correct.

Hope this helps.

I stand corrected. But I will check the regimental history.
What I am interested in is putting more meat into the descriptions of each of the regiments etc.
Their battle honours, their ethos, etc etc. Characterists of their fighting men.
I want our members to understand that makes these men tick.
We could start by asking RayC to write about the Mahar's. I am sure he would educate us.
I have an interesting anecdote = I was speaking to a retd Gen - a formed DGMT - who was from the Khukri weilding regiment - and although he was a proud Gurkha he spoke very highly of the Madras regiment and he went on to describe what he thought made them special.
The regimental section is too brief.

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 05 Mar 2009 06:20

sum wrote:What exactly did the IA do wrong in 47-48 and was it really below par effort from IA in the J&K sector?

In the 1947-48 J&K War the IA's operations were hamstrung by its British commanders and the Governor-General Mountbatten. And the latter got a say in controlling the IA's operations thanks to the sheer idiocy of that #$!(*& Nehru!

JLN's first mistake was in not accepting Hari Singh's accession offer in mid-September 1947. But leave that aside; his most criminal negligence was in making Mountbatten the Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet. It was this Defence Committee which controlled the IA's operations. The following are a small list of proposed IA operations stymied by the British through the Defence Committee:

1. Supply of arms to J&K State. A request made by Hari Singh on 1st October, and supported by Sardar Patel, was initially blocked (on the plea that no surplus arms were available) and then delayed for several weeks by C-in-C General Lockhart.

2. Relief of J&K State Forces garrisons in the towns of Mirpur, Punch, Kotli, Jhangar, Naoshera, etc which were holding on against the Pakistani invaders, were stymied repeatedly by the new C-in-C Bucher. The British wanted these areas to be occupied by Pakistan because they controlled access to the Jhelum River and the Mangla Dam, which sustained agriculture in West Punjab.

3. Requests for additional battalions by either Kalwant Singh or LP Sen were denied by Bucher on the grounds that it would thin the defence in East Punjab!

4. Air operations against Pakistani dakotas flying in supplies to their forces, which had occupied Gilgit, were halted after the UK High Commissioner in Delhi spoke to Air Marshall Elmherst who then convinced Nehru that the pakistani supply missions were not that critical!

5. A plan to destroy bridges across the Kishenganga, which would have cut-off Muzaffrabad from Pakistan, was also dropped on the insistence of Bucher.

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 26 Mar 2009 10:02

USI Journal

Battle of Longewala

putnanja · Post by **putnanja** » 13 Apr 2009 07:46

Legendary General

Zorawar Singh, the most famous General of Maharaja Gulab Singh, was a Dogra Rajput born in Ghaloor in Kangra, HP in 1786. He joined the Raisi garrison as a sepoy in Maharaja Gulab Singh's Army and rose to be an outstanding general of the country. This once obscure Dogra soldier - self made and self taught accomplished feats of arms, which justly won him the title of "The Little Napoleon of India". After a successful stint at Riasi where he proved his administrative ability and leadership qualities besides courage, conviction and bravery he was appointed Governor of Kishtwar after Gulab Singh had become Raja of Jammu.

Zorawar Singh embarked upon the conquest of Ladakh in 1834, The physical obstacles in conquering the region were formidable and Zorawar Singh's force succeeded only because of their intensive training in snow and mountain warfare. He set out in August 1834 with an Army of 10,000 Dogras for the conquest of Ladakh. His forces included the Fateh Shibji, the present 4 JAK RIF. He crossed the Zanskar range and entered Ladakh via the Suru Valley. On 16 August 1834, he defeated a 5000 strong Ladakhi force which had taken up a strong position on a hill at Shanku and occupied Suru. Zorawar Singh succeeded in dislodging them after a bitter fight. After a halt of one month at Suru, Zorawar Singh advanced to Leh and in September 1834 reached Pushkyum, where the Ladakhis were determined to prevent the Dogras crossing the River Indus.

...
...

JaiS · Post by **JaiS** » 19 Apr 2009 03:15

Shankar Rao: The Unsung Hero

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 03 May 2009 12:30

Jagan, for you!

Martial India-Yeats Brown

asprinzl · Post by **asprinzl** » 04 May 2009 10:58

In competent and arrogant fools right up to the level of Montgomery who could not think out of the box and had to be relieved by the Americans during WW2 from more than one military disaster. If given a chance Monty would have repeated Gallipoli after Gallipoli to his resume. And it is to these same idiots Nehru placed the fate of the new born country's fate? Anyways....its way too much water had passed under the bridge. India had to ensure no more of her land will be taken away by outsiders or given away by insiders.
Avram

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 04 May 2009 17:36

Great find Ramana. The DU archive does have several other older books related to the Mutiny and Tipu Sultans battles etc. worth checking out

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 04 May 2009 23:39

On 4 th May 1799 the Lion of Mysore Tipu Sultan gave his life for the country

JaiS · Post by **JaiS** » 08 May 2009 04:40

Dead and forgotten

Airavat · Post by **Airavat** » 08 May 2009 11:46

PHOTO

An Indian cavalry unit advancing on the North-West Frontier towards the Khyber Pass between India and Afghanistan, September 1922. (Photo by Topical Press Agency/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 31 May 2009 05:55

I dont know if this was posted earlier

http://pakistaniat.com/2007/09/06/1965- ... nt-legacy/

General K. M. Arif in Khaki Shadows writes that in the immediate aftermath of the 1965 War “Pakistan suffered a loss of a different kind…Soon after the War the GHQ ordered all the formations and units of the Pakistan Army to destroy their respective war diaries and submit completed reports to this effect by a given date . This was done?Their [the war diaries'] destruction, a self-inflicted injury and an irreparable national loss, was intellectual suicide.”

Pakistan would have learnt its lessons and Kargil-II (1965 War was, in fact, Operation Kargil-I) would not have happened. Consequently, Sharif government would not have been toppled and Musharraf would have been living a retired existence for the last 5 years.

The 1965 War should be remembered as a day of courage and sacrifice of Pakistani people–most notably our men and women in uniform–who were wronged by their civilian and military leaders, but more importantly it should be remembered as a missed opportunity to learn and improve our lot. That is the test we continue to fail each year.

About the Author: Dr. Athar Osama is a public policy analyst and an amateur historian of Pakistan’s political and constitutional history. He also the Founder of the Understanding Pakistan Project

Dmurphy · Post by **Dmurphy** » 02 Jun 2009 10:57

BBC's In pictures: India-Pakistan 1965 war

JaiS · Post by **JaiS** » 26 Jun 2009 04:00

A tribute to the unknown soldier

shyamm · Post by **shyamm** » 27 Jun 2009 13:57

World War 2 Memorial in Madikeri,Coorg

Jamal K. Malik · Post by **Jamal K. Malik** » 02 Jul 2009 19:47

First IDS chief Lt Gen Joshi dies
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Indi ... 729577.cms

ramana · Post by **ramana** » 08 Jul 2009 00:09

India in WWI:

Internet Archive on "Empire At War" Edited by Sir Charles Lucas:

Empire at War

Vol V by Sir Francis Younghusband.

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 11 Jul 2009 20:41

Pakistani invasion of J&K State
http://horsesandswords.blogspot.com/200 ... state.html

Siege of Kotli and the defence of Punch, Bagh, Mang and Rawlakot by the J&K army's Punch Brigade
http://airavat.googlepages.com/siegeofkotli

p_saggu · Post by **p_saggu** » 14 Jul 2009 23:56

^^^

The three corps from the Indian army, the Army Corps, foreground, the Marine Corps, in white behind, and the Air Force Corps, behind in blue, parade during the Bastille Day military parade on the Champs Elysees avenue in Paris, Tuesday July 14, 2009. (AP Photo/Remy de la Mauviniere) Bastille0714a

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 15 Jul 2009 04:06

^^ atleast you have to give credit that they did remember it after 60 years even if it was symbolic and opportunistic. The worst case is British who dont even today acknowledge that more than 5 million Indian soldiers died protecting them in WW-I and II. The most humiliating thing is they dont even teach this to their school kids who learn british history heavily and more prominently WW-I and II victories over Germans.

Sorry being off-topic but couldnt resist posting it.

Samay · Post by **Samay** » 15 Jul 2009 04:18

ashish raval wrote:^^ atleast you have to give credit that they did remember it after 60 years even if it was symbolic and opportunistic. The worst case is British who dont even today acknowledge that more than 5 million Indian soldiers died protecting them in WW-I and II. The most humiliating thing is they dont even teach this to their school kids who learn british history heavily and more prominently WW-I and II victories over Germans.

Sorry being off-topic but couldnt resist posting it.

Please provide a link of such a huge number,
If that is even near to 2 to 3 millions, it is Indians who won war for them !!

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 15 Jul 2009 04:33

It is listed now on World war memorial dedicated to soldiers from Indian sub continent in London on its way to Buckingham palace. It was erected after massive hue and cry by an Indian origin women lord in british parliament. I actually took the photo of it. I will have to dig it out. It certainly was above 5 million as I chatted with that lady lord who was instrumental in getting it erected. I am not sure weather they are teaching it in history now or not but it was certainly not 10 years back.
ok I found a link
http://www.bigartmob.com/view/1308/the-memorial-gates

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 15 Jul 2009 04:36

ashish raval wrote:^^ atleast you have to give credit that they did remember it after 60 years even if it was symbolic and opportunistic. The worst case is British who dont even today acknowledge that more than 5 million Indian soldiers died protecting them in WW-I and II. The most humiliating thing is they dont even teach this to their school kids who learn british history heavily and more prominently WW-I and II victories over Germans.

Sorry being off-topic but couldnt resist posting it.

2M Indians fought in WW2, total commonwealth casualties were around 350,000
there has been quite a lot in the media around Indian soldiers fighting for the Empire, but its not enough
are you sure you've seen the school history curriculum? there is quite a lot of political correctness involved these days you know

kit · Post by **kit** » 15 Jul 2009 13:58

MRCA thread but still this is for remembering all those brave souls who died for their motherland even under the british
BBC version of WW1
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/ ... e_01.shtml

In October, shortly after they arrived, they were fed piecemeal into some of the fiercest fighting around Ypres.The fighting came as a shock to soldiers more used to colonial warfare. One man wrote home 'this is not war; it is the ending of the world'.Many men, however, also saw it as their duty to bring honour to their clan or caste, by fighting bravely on the battlefield.

Indian soldiers frequently expressed a strong sense of personal duty to the King-Emperor George V ..(well this was ww1 ! )By November 1918, some 827,000 Indians had enlisted as combatants, in addition to those already serving in August 1914. Official figures suggest that 64,449 Indian soldiers died in the war.

About 1.3 million Indian soldiers and labourers served in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, while both the Indian government and the princes sent large supplies of food, money, and ammunition. In all 140,000 men served on the Western Front and nearly 700,000 in the Middle East. 47,746 Indian soldiers were killed and 65,126 wounded during World War .. source wikipedia

After the end the World War, India emerged as the world's fourth largest industrial power and its increased political, economic and military influence paved the way for its independence from the United Kingdom in 1947

At the outbreak of World War II, the Indian army numbered 205,000 men....Pre-Independence India provided the largest volunteer force (2.5 million) of any nation during World War II.

After reading all that it wont be wrong to say India did win the war for them .. both its resources and men did it .. British wealth to a large extent was from India.

kit · Post by **kit** » 15 Jul 2009 14:05

Then the British and now the Americans .. if India can stand on its own it can have its cake and eat it too ! ..

ashish raval · Post by **ashish raval** » 15 Jul 2009 15:20

Samay wrote:
ashish raval wrote:^^ atleast you have to give credit that they did remember it after 60 years even if it was symbolic and opportunistic. The worst case is British who dont even today acknowledge that more than 5 million Indian soldiers died protecting them in WW-I and II. The most humiliating thing is they dont even teach this to their school kids who learn british history heavily and more prominently WW-I and II victories over Germans.

Sorry being off-topic but couldnt resist posting it.
Please provide a link of such a huge number,
If that is even near to 2 to 3 millions, it is Indians who won war for them !!

Hi Samay,
Here goes the link to photograph from my collection. It should be enough to dispel myths who won WW-I and II fro british and Allied troops.
http://img188.imageshack.us/img188/5665/pc262237.jpg

http://yfrog.com/58pc262237j

Lalmohan · Post by **Lalmohan** » 20 Jul 2009 14:41

^^^ ashish: 'fought' not 'died'

Jagan · Post by **Jagan** » 20 Jul 2009 16:42

The death toll for Indian soldiers in WW2 is around 87,000. The UK lost around 390,000 in the war. The Yanks - a similar number just over 410000

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties

SSridhar · Post by **SSridhar** » 28 Jul 2009 07:40

Perspective on Indian Military History

MODERN WARFARE IN INDIA — From the Eithteenth Century to Present Times: Kaushik Roy; Oxford University Press, YMCA Library Building, Jai Singh Road, New Delhi-110001.

Review by Lt. Gen. (r) V.R.Raghavan

. . . . Paul Kennedy’s view that big military powers are always big economic powers is questioned through alternative arguments. In India’s context, this offers scope for an analysis by the author’s contention that an economically inferior Pakistan continues to pose a credible threat to New Delhi! . . . The author’s assessment that Indian military leadership remained largely defensive in its doctrine and preferred positional warfare despite modern military hardware is not incorrect. . . . he decades’ long counter-insurgency operation being waged by the Indian military is characterised as a campaign to subdue and assimilate rather than eliminate the insurgent groups. . . . The British trained the Indian Army for the defence of its realm which had a lasting impact on its outlook. The political-cultural drivers for this are touched upon in interesting detail.