John Snow wrote:NSA is a mega Yam Raj ask Harrods London owner!
I had a good laugh.
Yet the overall message so somber and serious.
Dhanya prabhu.
John Snow wrote:NSA is a mega Yam Raj ask Harrods London owner!
Deve Gowda Jee (JD-S)and Ajit Singh (RLD) jee have decided to oppose the deal.RajeshA wrote:The latest numbers:
As of now India has the technology as well as the ability to convert U in the form of raw material into finished fuel rods for LWRs, PHWRs and FBRs. Presumably, the contracts that India enters into with foreign vendors of nuclear power plants would include a provision whereby the finish manufacturing of the fuel rods would be undertaken in India as in the case of Tarapur 1 and 2. (In the case of Kudankulam there is supposed to be Russian Govt's sovereign guarantee for life-time supply of fuel -- finish manufactured rods? -- and hence stockpiling of it may not be applicable to this discussion).One can take 100 years, for life of a reactor, for say civil engineering purpose. But it just does not make any sense to consider the price of 100 years fuel as starting point.
... and that's what I asked explicitly .. what was his rational behind choosing 100 year number, and he chose not to answer that part.
As mentioned before, no one really expects, that one would be feeding U in the present form and reactor technologies would not significantly change.
Survey of Energy Resources 2007
Uranium - Overview
With headlines of licence extensions instead of early retirements of nuclear power plants, and the prospect of dwindling cheap and reliable fossil fuel supplies, burgeoning energy demand and increasing environmental constraints, the world is witnessing a resurgent interest in nuclear power as a clean, abundant and economically competitive electricity supply option. After almost two decades of decline or, at best, stagnation, numerous countries or utilities, until recently oblivious or opposed to the technology, have begun to reassess nuclear power as a secure and economically competitive base-load electricity generating technology.
Populous countries with rapidly developing economies such as China and India pursue aggressive expansion of all electricity generating options, including nuclear power. Russia has announced that it wishes to increase its nuclear generating capacity from the current level of 21.7 GWe to 44 GWe by 2020. In the Republic of Korea a nuclear share in the national electricity mix of close to 60% is seen as a desirable medium-term target (up from the current 40%).
After more than 20 years without a single new order, utilities in the United States are positioning themselves for an initial round of plant orders, in part stimulated by government incentives, in part by economic and environmental considerations. Finland and France are building or have decided to build third-generation nuclear power plants. The United Kingdom Energy White Paper of May 2007 keeps open the option of constructing new nuclear power plants in the future. Energy policy in Belarus, Poland and Turkey has moved in favour of building nuclear power stations. The World Energy Technology Outlook - 2050 of the European Commission (EC, 2006) projects a significant increase in nuclear power after 2020 worldwide. Such projections are consistent with the growing number of countries expressing an interest in nuclear energy for electricity production. A meeting organised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in December 2006 to examine Issues for the Introduction of Nuclear Power was attended by 28 (predominantly developing) countries that currently do not operate nuclear power plants.
This upbeat outlook on nuclear power is in stark contrast to the not-so-distant past, with years of suppressed growth prospects, including nuclear phase-out policies in several countries, with the consequent impact on uranium exploration activities and production capacities. Nuclear technology and fuel cycle infrastructures are complex and capital-intensive, with long lead times. Without clear long-term demand signals from the market place, the uranium industry has been reluctant to invest in new mine capacities or to pursue large-scale uranium exploration.
In addition to the uncertain outlook for nuclear power, the uranium market has been characterised by a large disparity between global reactor requirements and mine production (Fig. 6-1 ) since the early 1990s when, after decades of production exceeding requirements by an unusually wide margin, mine output slipped below annual reactor requirements. The appearance of so-called secondary supplies (i.e. reactor fuel derived from warheads, military and commercial inventories, re-enrichment of depleted uranium tails, as well as enriching at lower tail assays, reprocessed uranium and mixed oxide fuel) reduced demand for fresh uranium. In addition, new entrants to the world uranium market, e.g., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation, further exerted competitive pressures. As a result of uncertain and low demand plus excess capacity, uranium prices (except for short-term aberrations) fell.
Usually low prices suggest plentiful supplies. Utilities therefore began to hold lower inventories, which suppressed production and prices even further and overall operational mine capacity dropped below reactor requirements. A fair share of the market apparently turned a blind eye to the fact that requirements were increasingly met by accumulated past production and not from operating capacities. In late 2000, uranium prices reached an historical low of US$ 7.10/lbU3O8 or US$ 18.45/kgU, threatening the economic survival of many mines. At the same time, global production had progressively declined to less than 60% of reactor requirements. In short, uranium prices no longer reflected longer-term production capacities.
Shortly after prices hit the historical low, a series of events uncovered the long-ignored demand/supply imbalance and caused prices to rise. Among the triggering factors were a fire in Australia's Olympic Dam mill and the flooding of the world's largest and highest-grade uranium mine, McArthur River in Canada. Both mines were among the top global producers and the drop in output resulted in market prices rising immediately. On the demand side, since 1990 rising plant factors of the world's nuclear fleet added incrementally to annual reactor fuel requirements the equivalent of more than 30 GWe. A series of licence renewals for existing reactors that began around the turn of the century sent plant operators out to secure fuel for another 20 years or so. Another change was the growth of nuclear power in the developing economies of China and India, countries that had either not participated in the market to a great extent or had not participated at all. While demand was picking up momentum, supply from mine output continued to be underprovided.
Concerns surfaced with regard to the global industry's ability to meet a potential surge in demand for uranium and with short-run supplies from mines capped and rising demand expectations, uranium prices began to climb (Fig. 6-2 ). Higher prices were seen by most market participants as a necessary prerequisite to correct past market anomalies and to stimulate investment in direly-needed new production capacity (Combs, 2006). Despite some uncertainty on the precise future availability of fissile materials from military arsenals that still exists, it became clear that the bulk of future uranium supply must come from mine output, i.e., investment in exploration and development of new mines and mills. In the short run, however, because there is no ready-to-produce project on the shelf, the production cannot increase rapidly despite rising demand. As a result, in six years the uranium spot price has been multiplied by a factor of ten.
The market reacted as expected and mine re-opening and the expansion of existing facilities increased global mine production capacity from about 45 000 tU in 2001 to more than 52 000 tU in 2006 - still well below current annual reactor requirements. Numerous new mine openings are planned or under preparation, but given the long lead times of up to ten years and more between an investment decision and first mine output, the markets will have to continue to rely on secondary sources for another decade or so. One important source, the agreement to downblend highly enriched uranium (HEU) from the Russian weapons programme, will however be stopped after 2013, when the agreement expires.
Planned new mine capacities, especially in Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan, are considered essential for re-aligning uranium production and reactor requirements for the post-2015 period. Prices and demand prospects are now at levels that warrant additional investments in exploration and production. However, the market remains tight - the 2006 rockfall and water inflow at the Cigar Lake mine in Canada, which will delay the opening of the mine, with an estimated annual output of close to 7 000 tU, by one to two years, sent uranium spot-market prices to US$ 75/lbU3O8 or US$ 194.80/kgU in February 2007.
Another development since 2004 has been the emergence of investment funds in the uranium market - in part prompted by the lasting demand and production imbalance and a view that secondary sources eventually need to be replaced by primary production. These funds hold uranium entirely for speculative reasons, confident in the knowledge that prices will continue to increase and that uranium will sell at a profit. Although the volumes involved are a small portion of the total market, investment funds helped raise spot prices in 2005 and 2006.
Soaring spot-market prices and the wide gap between uranium production and reactor requirements have questioned the ability of the uranium and nuclear fuel-cycle industry to respond to a nuclear renaissance. Indeed it would be the 'ultimate irony if fuel became the Achilles heel in the nuclear turnaround instead of one of nuclear's greatest advantages' (Melbye, 2006). The issue of long-term uranium supply has especially been at the centre of debates about the role of nuclear power in sustainable energy development. Statements like 'the reserve-to-production ratio of uranium amounts to only some 60 years' (essentially implying to the uninitiated that new-build nuclear power plants, with an anticipated economic life time of 60 years, will run out of nuclear fuel before their date of decommissioning) are not only misleading but irrelevant.
Uranium supply is usually framed within a short-term market perspective that focuses on prices, on who is producing and with what resources, where might spare capacity exist to meet short-term demand peaks and how does this balance with demand? In essence, the skill is in the understanding of supply/demand/price interdependencies and dynamics for known uranium resources. In contrast, long-term supply (given sufficient demand) is a question of the replenishment of known resources with new resources presently unknown or from known deposits presently not producible for techno-economic reasons. Here the development of advanced exploration and production technologies is an essential prerequisite for the long-term availability of uranium. Demand prospects and competitive markets are the essential drivers for technology change and investment to ensure sufficient long-term supply, both through the discovery of new resources and the exploitation of known resources that were previously not accessible (Rogner, 2000). There is no doubt that production capacity will catch up with demand again. But the current challenge before the uranium industry is to shift from a mode of merely responding to short-term market changes to a mode of anticipation of the true longer-term uranium demand and supply balances.
Again you too asking the same question !Muppalla wrote:If you have followed this thread that started a zillion years ago, you wouldn't ask this question. Ramana was posting(with analysis) the articles from Seema Mustafa and others and many others gurus were writing the political fallout of this deal.paramu wrote:Why this news in Jul 20?
Why not several months back? Why not a parliamentary discussion before?
If Congress went with BJP on Nuke deal and made a deal that could have ended congress party as a force in Inda. They did a similar thing in Ayodhya during 80s and ended up in current state. It is the mandate of BR to not discuss politics, I will stop there.
However, why now is a question needs analysis from gurus.
* The next two generations of nuclear reactors are currently being developed in several countries.
* The first (3rd generation) advanced reactors have been operating in Japan since 1996. Late 3rd generation designs are now being built.
* Newer advanced reactors have simpler designs which reduce capital cost. They are more fuel efficient and are inherently safer.
The nuclear power industry has been developing and improving reactor technology for more than five decades and is starting to build the next generations of reactors to fill orders now materialising.
Several generations of reactors are commonly distinguished. Generation I reactors were developed in 1950-60s, and outside the UK none are still running today. Generation II reactors are typified by the present US fleet and most in operation elsewhere. Generation III (and 3+) are the Advanced Reactors discussed in this paper. The first are in operation in Japan and others are under construction or ready to be ordered. Generation IV designs are still on the drawing board and will not be operational before 2020 at the earliest.
About 85% of the world's nuclear electricity is generated by reactors derived from designs originally developed for naval use. These and other second-generation nuclear power units have been found to be safe and reliable, but they are being superseded by better designs.
Reactor suppliers in North America, Japan, Europe, Russia and South Africa have a dozen new nuclear reactor designs at advanced stages of planning, while others are at a research and development stage. Fourth-generation reactors are at concept stage.
Third-generation reactors have:
* a standardised design for each type to expedite licensing, reduce capital cost and reduce construction time,
* a simpler and more rugged design, making them easier to operate and less vulnerable to operational upsets,
* higher availability and longer operating life - typically 60 years,
* reduced possibility of core melt accidents,
* resistance to serious damage that would allow radiological release from an aircraft impact,
* higher burn-up to reduce fuel use and the amount of waste,
* burnable absorbers ("poisons") to extend fuel life.
The greatest departure from second-generation designs is that many incorporate passive or inherent safety features* which require no active controls or operational intervention to avoid accidents in the event of malfunction, and may rely on gravity, natural convection or resistance to high temperatures.
* Traditional reactor safety systems are 'active' in the sense that they involve electrical or mechanical operation on command. Some engineered systems operate passively, eg pressure relief valves. They function without operator control and despite any loss of auxiliary power. Both require parallel redundant systems. Inherent or full passive safety depends only on physical phenomena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high temperatures, not on functioning of engineered components.
Another departure is that some will be designed for load-following. While most French reactors today are operated in that mode to some extent, the EPR design has better capabilities. It will be able to maintain its output at 25% and then ramp up to full output at a rate of 2.5% of rated power per minute up to 60% output and at 5% of rated output per minute up to full rated power. This means that potentially the unit can change its output from 25% to 100% in less than 30 minutes, though this may be at some expense of wear and tear.
Many are larger than predecessors. Increasingly they involve international collaboration.
Certification of designs is on a national basis, and is safety-based. In Europe there are moves towards harmonised requirements for licensing.
However, in Europe reactors may also be certified according to compliance with European Utilities Requirements (EUR). These are basically a utilities' wish list of some 5000 items needed for new nuclear plants. Plants certified as complying with EUR include Westinghouse AP1000, Gidropress' AES-92, Areva's EPR, GE's ABWR, Areva's SWR-1000, and Westinghouse BWR 90.
In the USA a number of reactor types have received Design Certification (see below) and others are in process: ESBWR from GE-Hitachi, US EPR from Areva and US-APWR from Mitsubishi. Early in 2008 the NRC said that beyond these three, six pre-application reviews would get underway by about 2010. These include: ACR from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL), IRIS from Westinghouse, PBMR from Eskom and 4S from Toshiba as well as General Atomics' GT-MHR apparently. See also NRC and Appendix.
Longer term, NRC expected to focus on the Next-Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) for the USA (see USA paper) - essentially the Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) among the >Generation IV designs.
Joint Initiatives
Two major international initiatives have been launched to define future reactor and fuel cycle technology, mostly looking further ahead than the main subjects of this paper:
Generation IV International Forum (GIF) is a US-led grouping set up in 2001 which has identified six reactor concepts for further investigation with a view to commercial deployment by 2030. See Generation IV paper and DOE web site on "4th generation reactors".
The IAEA's International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) is focused more on developing country needs, and initially involved Russia rather than the USA, though the USA has now joined it. It is now funded through the IAEA budget.
At the commercial level, by the end of 2006 three major Western-Japanese alliances had formed to dominate much of the world reactor supply market:
* Areva with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) in a major project and subsequently in fuel fabrication,
* General Electric with Hitachi as a close relationship
* Westinghouse had become a 77% owned subsidiary of Toshiba (with Shaw group 20%).
Then in March 2008 Toshiba signed a technical cooperation agreement on civil nuclear power with Russia's Atomenergoprom - the single vertically-integrated state holding company for Russia's nuclear power sector created in 2007. This could lead to a "strategic partnership" and include designing and engineering of commercial nuclear power plants, as well as manufacturing and maintenance of large equipment.
Light Water Reactors
In the USA, the federal Department of Energy (DOE) and the commercial nuclear industry in the 1990s developed four advanced reactor types. Two of them fall into the category of large "evolutionary" designs which build directly on the experience of operating light water reactors in the USA, Japan and Western Europe. These reactors are in the 1300 megawatt range.
One is an advanced boiling water reactor (ABWR) derived from a General Electric design. Two examples built by Hitachi and two by Toshiba are in commercial operation in Japan, with another under construction there and two in Taiwan. Four more are planned in Japan and another two in the USA. Though GE and Hitachi have subsequently joined up, Toshiba retains some rights over the design. Both GE-Hitachi and Toshiba (with NRG Energy in USA) are marketing the design.
The other type, System 80+, is an advanced pressurised water reactor (PWR), which was ready for commercialisation but is not now being promoted for sale. Eight System 80 reactors in South Korea incorporate many design features of the System 80+, which is the basis of the Korean Next Generation Reactor program, specifically the APR-1400 which is expected to be in operation soon after 2010 and marketed worldwide.
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) gave final design certification for both in May 1997, noting that they exceeded NRC "safety goals by several orders of magnitude". The ABWR has also been certified as meeting European requirements for advanced reactors.
Another, more innovative US advanced reactor is smaller - 600 MWe - and has passive safety features (its projected core damage frequency is nearly 1000 times less than today's NRC requirements). The Westinghouse AP-600 gained NRC final design certification in 1999 (AP = Advanced Passive).
These NRC approvals were the first such generic certifications to be issued and are valid for 15 years. As a result of an exhaustive public process, safety issues within the scope of the certified designs have been fully resolved and hence will not be open to legal challenge during licensing for particular plants. US utilities will be able to obtain a single NRC licence to both construct and operate a reactor before construction begins.
Separate from the NRC process and beyond its immediate requirements, the US nuclear industry selected one standardised design in each category - the large ABWR and the medium-sized AP-600, for detailed first-of-a-kind engineering (FOAKE) work. The US$ 200 million program, was half funded by DOE. It means that prospective buyers now have firm information on construction costs and schedules.
The Westinghouse AP-1000, scaled-up from the AP-600, received final design certification from the NRC in December 2005 - the first generation 3+ type to do so. It represents the culmination of a 1300 man-year and $440 million design and testing program. In May 2007 Westinghouse applied for UK generic design assessment (pre-licensing approval) based on the NRC design certification, and expressing its policy of global standardisation. The application was supported by utilities including E.ON.
Overnight capital costs were originally projected at $1200 per kilowatt and modular design is expected to reduce construction time to 36 months. The 1100 MWe AP-1000 generating costs are expected to be very competitive and its has a 60 year operating life. It has been selected for building in China (4 units) and is under active consideration for building in Europe and USA, and is capable of running on a full MOX core if required.
General Electric has developed the ESBWR of 1390 MWe with passive safety systems, from its ABWR design. Originally the European Simplified Boiling Water Reactor, this is now known as the Economic & Simplified BWR (ESBWR) and a 1560 MWe version is at preliminary stage of NRC design certification in the USA, so that design approval is expected at the end of 2008, with formal certification 12 months later. It is favoured for early US construction and could be operational in 2014. It uses 4.2% enriched fuel and has a design life of 60 years.
Another US-origin but international project which is a few years behind the AP-1000 is the International Reactor Innovative & Secure (IRIS). Westinghouse is leading a wide consortium developing it as an advanced 3rd Generation project. IRIS is a modular 335 MWe pressurised water reactor with integral steam generators and primary coolant system all within the pressure vessel. It is nominally 335 MWe but can be less, eg 100 MWe. Fuel is initially similar to present LWRs with 5% enrichment and burn-up of 60,000 MWd/t with fuelling interval of 3 to 3.5 years, but is designed ultimately for 10% enrichment and 80 GWd/t burn-up with an 8 year cycle, or equivalent MOX core. The core has low power density. IRIS could be deployed in the next decade, and US design certification is at pre-application stage. Multiple modules are expected to cost US$ 1000-1200 per kW for power generation, though some consortium partners are interested in desalination, one in district heating.
In Japan, the first two ABWRs, Kashiwazaki Kariwa-6 & 7, have been operating since 1996 and are expected to have a 60 year life. These GE-Hitachi-Toshiba units cost about US$ 2000/kW to build, and produce power at about US 7c/kWh. Two more started up in 2004 & 2005. Future ABWR units are expected to cost US$ 1700/kW. Several of the 1350 MWe units are under construction and planned in Japan and Taiwan.
To complement this ABWR Hitachi-GE has completed systems design for three more of the same type - 600, 900 and 1700 MWe versions of the 1350 MWe design. The smaller versions will have standardised features which reduce costs. Construction of the ABWR-600 is expected to take 34 months - significantly less than the 1350 MWe units.
Mitsubishi's large APWR (1538 MWe) - advanced PWR - was developed in collaboration with four utilities (Westinghouse was earlier involved). The first two are planned for Tsuruga. It is simpler, combines active and passive cooling systems to greater effect, and has over 55 GWd/t fuel burn-up. It will be the basis for the next generation of Japanese PWRs.
The US-APWR will be 1700 MWe, due to higher thermal efficiency (39%) and has 24 month refuelling cycle and target cost of $1500/kW. US design certification application was in January 2008 with approval expected in 2011. The first units may be built for TXU at Comanche Peak near Dallas, Texas. In March 2008 MHI submitted the same design for EUR certification, as EU-APWR.
The Atmea joint venture has been established by Areva NP and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop an 1100 MWe (net) three-loop PWR with extended fuel cycles, 37% thermal efficiency and the capacity to use mixed-oxide fuel only. Fuel cycle is 12-24 months and the reactor has load-following capability. They expect to have this ready for licence application by 2010. The reactor is regarded as mid-sized relative to other generation III units and will be marketed primarily to countries embarking upon nuclear power programs.
In South Korea, the APR-1400 Advanced PWR design has evolved from the US System 80+ with enhanced safety and seismic robustness and was earlier known as the Korean Next-Generation Reactor. Design certification by the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety was awarded in May 2003. The first of these 1450 MWe reactors will be Shin-Kori-3 & 4, expected to be operating about 2012. Fuel has burnable poison and will have up to 60 GWd/t burn-up. Projected cost is US$ 1400 per kilowatt, falling to $1200/kW in later units with 48 month construction time. Plant life is 60 years.
In Europe, several designs are being developed to meet the European Utility Requirements (EUR) of French and German utilities, which have stringent safety criteria. Areva NP (formerly Framatome ANP) has developed a large (1600 and up to 1750 MWe) European pressurised water reactor (EPR), which was confirmed in mid 1995 as the new standard design for France and received French design approval in 2004. It is derived from the French N4 and German Konvoi types and is expected to provide power about 10% cheaper than the N4. It will operate flexibly to follow loads, have fuel burn-up of 65 GWd/t and the highest thermal efficiency of any light water reactor, at 36%. It is capable of using a full core load of MOX. Availability is expected to be 92% over a 60-year service life. It has four separate, redundant safety systems rather than passive safety.
The first EPR unit is being built at Olkiluoto in Finland, the second at Flamanville in France. A US version, the US-EPR, is undergoing review in USA with intention of a design certification application in 2007. It is now known as the Evolutionary PWR (EPR). Overnight capital cost is quoted as $2400 per kilowatt, levelised over the first four units.
Together with German utilities and safety authorities, Areva NP (Framatome ANP) is also developing another evolutionary design, the SWR 1000, a 1200-1290 MWe BWR with 60 year design life. The design was completed in 1999 and US certification was sought, but then deferred. As well as many passive safety features, the reactor is simpler overall and uses high-burnup fuels enriched to 3.54%, giving it refuelling intervals of up to 24 months. It is ready for commercial deployment and the prospects of that will be helped by a 2008 agreement with Siemens and the major German utility E.On (Siemens built the Gundremmingen plant on which the design is based, for E.On).
Toshiba has been developing its evolutionary advanced BWR (1500 MWe) design, originally BWR 90+ from ABB then Westinghouse, working with Scandinavian utilities to meet EUR requirements.
In Russia, several advanced reactor designs have been developed - advanced PWR with passive safety features.
Gidropress late-model VVER-1000 units with enhanced safety (AES 92 & 91 power plants) are being built in India and China. Two more are planned for Belene in Bulgaria. The AES-92 is certified as meeting EUR.
A third-generation standardised VVER-1200 reactor of 1150-1200 MWe is an evolutionary development of the well-proven VVER-1000 in the AES-92 plant, with longer life, greater power and efficiency. The lead units are being built at Novovoronezh II, to start operation in 2012-13 followed by Leningrad II for 2013-14. An AES-2006 plant will consist of two of these OKB Gidropress reactor units expected to run for 50 years with capacity factor of 90%. Ovrnight capital cost was said to be US$ 1200/kW and construction time 54 months. They have enhanced safety including that related to earthquakes and aircraft impact with some passive safety features, double containment and core damage frequency of 1x10-7.
Atomenergoproekt say that the AES-2006 conforms to both Russian standards and European Utilities Requirements (EUR).
The VVER-1500 model was being developed by Gidropress. It will have 50-60 MWd/t burn-up and enhanced safety. Design was expected to be complete in 2007 but this schedule has slipped in favour of the evolutionary VVER-1200.
OKBM's VBER-300 PWR is a 295-325 MWe unit developed from naval power plants and was originally envisaged in pairs as a floating nuclear power plant. It is designed for 60 year life and 90% capacity factor. It now planned to develop it as a land-based unit with Kazatomprom, with a view to exports, and the first unit will be built in Kazakhstan.
The VBER-300 and the similar-sized VK300 are more fully described in the Small Nuclear Power Reactors paper.
Heavy Water Reactors
Canada has had two designs under development which are based on its reliable CANDU-6 reactors, the most recent of which are operating in China.
The CANDU-9 (925-1300 MWe) was developed from this also as a single-unit plant. It has flexible fuel requirements ranging from natural uranium through slightly-enriched uranium, recovered uranium from reprocessing spent PWR fuel, mixed oxide (U & Pu) fuel, direct use of spent PWR fuel, to thorium. It may be able to burn military plutonium or actinides separated from reprocessed PWR/BWR waste. A two year licensing review of the CANDU-9 design was successfully completed early in 1997, but the design has been shelved.
Some of the innovation of this, along with experience in building recent Korean and Chinese units, was then put back into the Enhanced CANDU-6 - built as twin units - with power increase to 750 MWe and flexible fuel options, plus 4.5 year construction and 60-year plant life (with mid-life pressure tube replacement). This is under consideration for new build in Ontario.
The Advanced Candu Reactor (ACR), a 3rd generation reactor, is a more innovative concept. While retaining the low-pressure heavy water moderator, it incorporates some features of the pressurised water reactor. Adopting light water cooling and a more compact core reduces capital cost, and because the reactor is run at higher temperature and coolant pressure, it has higher thermal efficiency.
The ACR-700 design was 700 MWe but is physically much smaller, simpler and more efficient as well as 40% cheaper than the CANDU-6. But the ACR-1000 of 1080-1200 MWe is now the focus of attention by AECL. It has more fuel channels (each of which can be regarded as a module of about 2.5 MWe). The ACR will run on low-enriched uranium (about 1.5-2.0% U-235) with high burn-up, extending the fuel life by about three times and reducing high-level waste volumes accordingly. It will also efficiently burn MOX fuel, thorium and actinides.
Regulatory confidence in safety is enhanced by a small negative void reactivity for the first time in CANDU, and utilising other passive safety features as well as two independent and fast shutdown systems. Units will be assembled from prefabricated modules, cutting construction time to 3.5 years. ACR units can be built singly but are optimal in pairs. They will have 60 year design life overall but require mid-life pressure tube replacement.
ACR is moving towards design certification in Canada, with a view to following in China, USA and UK. In 2007 AECL applied for UK generic design assessment (pre-licensing approval) but then withdrew after the first stage. In the USA, the ACR-700 is listed by NRC as being at pre application review stage. The first ACR-1000 unit is expected to be operating in 2016 in Ontario.
The CANDU X or SCWR is a variant of the ACR, but with supercritical light water coolant (eg 25 MPa and 625ºC) to provide 40% thermal efficiency. The size range envisaged is 350 to 1150 MWe, depending on the number of fuel channels used. Commercialisation envisaged after 2020.
India is developing the Advanced Heavy Water reactor (AHWR) as the third stage in its plan to utilise thorium to fuel its overall nuclear power program. The AHWR is a 300 MWe reactor moderated by heavy water at low pressure. The calandria has 500 vertical pressure tubes and the coolant is boiling light water circulated by convection. Each fuel assembly has 30 Th-U-233 oxide pins and 24 Pu-Th oxide pins around a central rod with burnable absorber. Burn-up of 24 GWd/t is envisaged. It is designed to be self-sustaining in relation to U-233 bred from Th-232 and have a low Pu inventory and consumption, with slightly negative void coefficient of reactivity. It is designed for 100 year plant life and is expected to utilise 65% of the energy of the fuel.
Once it is fully operational, each AHWR fuel assembly will have the fuel pins arranged in three concentric rings arranged:
Inner: 12 pins Th-U-233 with 3.0% U-233,
Intermediate: 18 pins Th-U-233 with 3.75% U-233,
Outer: 24 pins Th-Pu-239 with 3.25% Pu.
The fissile plutonium content will decrease from an initial 75% to 25% at equilibrium discharge burn-up level.
High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactors
These reactors use helium as a coolant which at up to 950ºC drives a gas turbine for electricity and a compressor to return the gas to the reactor core. Fuel is in the form of TRISO particles less than a millimetre in diameter. Each has a kernel of uranium oxycarbide, with the uranium enriched up to 17% U-235. This is surrounded by layers of carbon and silicon carbide, giving a containment for fission products which is stable to 1600°C or more. These particles may be arranged: in blocks - hexagonal 'prisms' of graphite, or in billiard ball-sized pebbles of graphite encased in silicon carbide.
South Africa's Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is being developed by a consortium led by the utility Eskom, and drawing on German expertise. It aims for a step change in safety, economics and proliferation resistance. Production units will be 165 MWe. They will have a direct-cycle gas turbine generator and thermal efficiency about 42%. Up to 450,000 fuel pebbles recycle through the reactor continuously (about six times each) until they are expended, giving an average enrichment in the fuel load of 4-5% and average burn-up of 90 GWday/t U (eventual target burn-ups are 200 GWd/t). This means on-line refuelling as expended pebbles are replaced, giving high capacity factor. The pressure vessel is lined with graphite and there is a central column of graphite as reflector. Control rods are in the side reflectors and cold shutdown units in the central column.
Performance includes great flexibility in loads (40-100%), with rapid change in power settings. Power density in the core is about one tenth of that in light water reactor, and if coolant circulation ceases the fuel will survive initial high temperatures while the reactor shuts itself down - giving inherent safety. Each unit will finally discharge about 19 tonnes/yr of spent pebbles to ventilated on-site storage bins.
Overnight capital cost (when in clusters of eight units) is expected to be modest and generating cost very competitive. The PBMR project has reverted to Eskom and is funded by the South African government. A demonstration plant is due to be built in 2009, with fuel loading expected in 2013. In the USA, PBMR Ltd is planning to submit a design certification application for the reactor in 2008, and to bid for a nuclear-powered thermochemical hydrogen production plant based on it at the Idaho National Laboratory.
A larger US design, the Gas Turbine - Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR), will be built as modules of 285 MWe each directly driving a gas turbine at 48% thermal efficiency. The cylindrical core consists of 102 hexagonal fuel element columns of graphite blocks with channels for helium and control rods. Graphite reflector blocks are both inside and around the core. Half the core is replaced every 18 months. Burn-up is about 100,000 MWd/t. It is being developed by General Atomics in partnership with Russia's Minatom, supported by Fuji (Japan). Initially it will be used to burn pure ex-weapons plutonium at Tomsk in Russia. The preliminary design stage was completed in 2001.
Fast Neutron Reactors
Several countries have research and development programs for improved Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR), which are a type of Fast Neutron Reactor. These use the uranium-238 in reactor fuel as well as the fissile U-235 isotope used in most reactors.
About 20 liquid metal-cooled FBRs have already been operating, some since the 1950s, and some supply electricity commercially. About 290 reactor-years of operating experience have been accumulated.
Natural uranium contains about 0.7 % U-235 and 99.3 % U-238. In any reactor the U-238 component is turned into several isotopes of plutonium during its operation. Two of these, Pu 239 and Pu 241, then undergo fission in the same way as U 235 to produce heat. In a fast neutron reactor this process is optimised so that it can 'breed' fuel, often using a depleted uranium blanket around the core. FBRs can utilise uranium at least 60 times more efficiently than a normal reactor.
They are however expensive to build and could only be justified economically if uranium prices were to rise to pre-1980 values, well above the current market price.
For this reason research work on the 1450 MWe European FBR has almost ceased. Closure of the 1250 MWe French Superphenix FBR after very little operation over 13 years also set back developments.
Research continues in India. At the Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research a 40 MWt fast breeder test reactor has been operating since 1985. In addition, the tiny Kamini there is employed to explore the use of thorium as nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In 2004 construction of a 500 MWe prototype fast breeder reactor started at Kalpakkam. The unit is expected to be operating in 2010, fuelled with uranium-plutonium carbide (the reactor-grade Pu being from its existing PHWRs) and with a thorium blanket to breed fissile U-233. This will take India's ambitious thorium program to stage 2, and set the scene for eventual full utilisation of the country's abundant thorium to fuel reactors.
Japan plans to develop FBRs, and its Joyo experimental reactor which has been operating since 1977 is now being boosted to 140 MWt. The 280 MWe Monju prototype commercial FBR was connected to the grid in 1995, but was then shut down due to a sodium leak.
The Russian BN-600 fast breeder reactor has been supplying electricity to the grid since 1981 and has the best operating and production record of all Russia's nuclear power units. It uses uranium oxide fuel and the sodium coolant delivers 550°C at little more than atmospheric pressure. The BN 350 FBR operated in Kazakhstan for 27 years and about half of its output was used for water desalination. Russia plans to reconfigure the BN-600 to burn the plutonium from its military stockpiles.
Construction has started at Beloyarsk on the first BN-800, a new larger (880 MWe) FBR from OKBM with improved features including fuel flexibility - U+Pu nitride, MOX, or metal, and with breeding ratio up to 1.3. It has much enhanced safety and improved economy - operating cost is expected to be only 15% more than VVER. It is capable of burning 2 tonnes of plutonium per year from dismantled weapons and will test the recycling of minor actinides in the fuel.
Industry spokesmen have warned the government that Russia's world leadership in FBR development is threatened due to lack of funding for completion of BN-800 and as of 2006 funding seems to have been released.
Russia has experimented with several lead-cooled reactor designs, and has used lead-bismuth cooling for 40 years in reactors for its 7 Alfa class submarines. Pb-208 (54% of naturally-occurring lead) is transparent to neutrons. A significant new Russian design is the BREST fast neutron reactor, of 300 MWe or more with lead as the primary coolant, at 540C, and supercritical steam generators. It is inherently safe and uses a high-density U+Pu nitride fuel with no requirement for high enrichment levels. No weapons-grade plutonium can be produced (since there is no uranium blanket - all the breeding occurs in the core). The initial cores can comprise Pu and spent fuel - hence loaded with fission products, and radiologically 'hot'. Subsequently, any surplus plutonium, which is not in pure form, can be used as the cores of new reactors. Used fuel can be recycled indefinitely, with on-site reprocessing and associated facilities. A pilot unit is planned for Beloyarsk and 1200 MWe units are proposed.
In the USA, GE was involved in designing a modular 150 MWe liquid metal-cooled inherently-safe reactor - PRISM. GE and Argonne have also been developing an advanced liquid-metal fast breeder reactor (ALMR) of over 1400 MWe, but both designs at an early stage were withdrawn from NRC review. No US fast neutron reactor has so far been larger than 66 MWe and none has supplied electricity commercially.
The Super-PRISM is a GE advanced reactor design for compact modular pool-type reactors with passive cooling and decay heat removal. Modules are 1000 MWt and operate at higher temperature - 510C, than the original PRISM. The pool-type modules contain the complete primary system with sodium coolant. The Pu & DU fuel can be oxide or metal, but minor actinides are not removed in reprocessing so that even fresh fuel is intensely radioactive and hence resistant to misappropriation. The fission products are removed in reprocessing and resultant wastes are shorter-lived than usual. Fuel stays in the reactor six years, with one third removed every two years. The commercial plant concept uses six reactor modules to provide 2280 MWe, and the design meets Generation IV criteria including generation cost of under 3 cents/kWh.
Korea's KALIMER (Korea Advanced LIquid MEtal Reactor) is a 600 MWe pool type sodium-cooled fast reactor designed to operate at over 500ºC. It has evolved from a 150 MWe version. It has a transmuter core, and no breeding blanket is involved. Future development of KALIMER as a Generation IV type is envisaged.
In the USA Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is involved with a consortium to develop the Advanced Recycling Reactor, a fast reactor which will burn actinides with uranium and plutonium. This will be based on MHI's Japan Standard Fast reactor concept, though with breeding ration less than 1:1. In this connection MHI has also set up Mitsubishi FBR Systems (MFBR).
From the above article:
Q: The corrective measures that we can take and the strategic fuel reserve that we can build up find mention only in the preamble to the ISSA. There is a fear that this will lack teeth because they are not mentioned in the operative part of the ISSA. Why did you not include them in the operative part?
A: That is not correct. I think that if we go by international law, it specifies that any agreement has to be seen as a whole. {Emphasis mine} More specifically, the ISSA preamble is tightly linked with the operative portion.
Q: If India were to conduct a nuclear test, it will attract the Hyde Act of the U.S. and the fuel supply for the reactors will be cut off. So what are the corrective measures that you will take?
A: As far as we are concerned, we are governed by the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation that we have negotiated.
Juhi Singhal
Jul. 19, 2008
Congress party may surprise everyone. The Indian parliament and Indian democracy face the biggest challenge since 1947. It is well known Central Intelligence Agency of USA has deep roots among Indian politicians. Former Prime Minister Morarji Desai faced allegation of being a CIA agent.,
Manmohan Singh does not have the number in his hand. But he somehow knows very well he will win the trust vote. The Congress party now says that they have support from ‘unexpected quarters.’ Already some communists in West Bengal including the speaker of the Parliament are reluctant to vote against the American interest in India-US nuclear deal. There are indications there will be enough defections in the opposition that Manmohan Singh will win the trust vote by razor thin margin.
Where are these ‘unexpected quarters’ coming from all of a sudden? Some international think tanks believe that some of the Indian Members of the parliament are on monthly payrolls of the CIA and European intelligence agencies and will vote for UPA coalition against their own party directives. It will expose them but it may be the directive they have received from the international intelligence agency that pays them regularly.
There is no proof of CIA’s involvement. But the Congress party’s statement that they will with support from unexpected quarters raises serious doubts.
Even the Indian Marxists are struggling to keep their MPs together in the trust vote. Some say it is not CIA but CBI (of India) that will carry the day for Manmohan Singh. There are rumors that Sonia Gandhi keeps secret files on opposition politicians like Somnath Chatterjee. It is possible that these files are being handed over CBI (India’s Central Bureau of Investigation). CBI may be forcing these MPs to vote for the UPA coalition.
If that is the case, India has a serious problem. Like in Pakistan, the next election can be a fiasco dominated by CBI agents and their coercing acts on political parties as well as would be MPs.
It is also possible that neither the CIA nor the CBI is involved. But it is very important for Indian democracy that Manmohan Singh explains every opposition vote he receives from those ‘unexpected quarters.’
shiv wrote:If the "Third front" can cobble up a a government after bringing the UPA down - that will be the biggest gift to the Kaangress. The nation will not forgive a party who rules for 6-8 months after bringing a government down. That is always seen as an opportunistic money making venture.
Rajmata Soniaji may yet rule for another 5 years after a brief gap.
I think it can only mean early general elections with a caretaker minority government.
I would think the "International Law" would trump any national "Law".Is this supposed to be the difference between US Act and International law? Or is it that all parts of Hyde Act are not sufficiently "tightly linked"?
Parts of Hyde Act are not applicable but the whole of Safeguards Agreement is!
That makes me wanna lose faith in Indian democratic system. I did not expect a convicted murder - who could not make a decision whether it is right or wrong to obey constitutional duties while committing a murder - is now going to affect a decision of prime national importance. And it is allowed in our constitution.NRao wrote:He stoops low to conquer:
Delhi notebook - deals and jailbirds
One can get the highest of educations, but, ultimately one is at the mercy of the lowest.
A great observation. This is, I believe, a major burden that the govt of the day in India (or any turd world country dealing with West and particularly US) carries.narayanan wrote:In India it is the exact opposite: in all things international, the Govt is assumed to be corrupt and traitorous.
"The Indo-US nuclear deal is patently anti-people and will make India a strategic ally of American Imperialism in South Asia to impose its hegemony over Asia," they said in an open letter to the Prime Minister.
Terming the deal "an outrageous instrument of recolonisation of India and Third world", they said when the deal comes through, it will grievously undermine the current global regime of the nuclear non-proliferation in gross violation of underlying principles of nuclear peace, workers, environment and women's movement.
They suggested Singh that since India stands very low on human development index, instead of spending on costly nuclear power it should invest in the field of health, education, food security, rural and urban development.
The letter was written by Kuldeep Nayyar, Justice (retd) Rajendar Sachhar, Sandeep Pandey and others.
With whose support can third front cobble up the government. NDA is on record saying they want a fresh mandate. UPA after loosing the trust vote would also be inclined to do that. Congress + BJP account for almost 280 seats. If those two parties decide to go to the electorate, chances of mini government are extremely rare.shiv wrote:If the "Third front" can cobble up a a government after bringing the UPA down - that will be the biggest gift to the Kaangress. The nation will not forgive a party who rules for 6-8 months after bringing a government down. That is always seen as an opportunistic money making venture.
Rajmata Soniaji may yet rule for another 5 years after a brief gap.
I think it can only mean early general elections with a caretaker minority government.
Karan Thapar
July 19, 2008
First Published: 23:25 IST(19/7/2008)
Last Updated: 23:44 IST(19/7/2008)
Tomorrow Parliament will debate the vote of confidence tabled by the Prime Minister. Today, I want to share with you alleged details of how senior BJP leaders gave their word to support the Indo-US nuclear deal only to back out either under pressure from their own colleagues or because they inexplicably changed their mind. I can’t reveal how I came by the two stories I shall relate but I’ve double checked each of them with two separate sources. It’s for you to judge if they’re true.
Sometime in December 2007, the Prime Minister was informed that if he could re-assure the BJP that the Indo-US nuclear deal does not endanger India’s strategic nuclear deterrent the Opposition would endorse it. Accordingly, Dr Manmohan Singh called on Mr Vajpayee. Present at that meeting were LK Advani and Brajesh Mishra.
Mr Vajpayee heard the Prime Minister in rapt silence. When he finished Mr. Advani responded. He said he was satisfied and prepared to endorse the deal. Could the Prime Minister give in writing the details and arguments he had presented? Dr Singh agreed and shortly afterwards sent the BJP leadership a letter repeating what he had earlier verbally said.
However, things did not work out as promised. Mr Advani changed his mind. Responding to the PM’s letter, he claimed he had tried to persuade his colleagues to change the BJP’s position on the deal but they had put their foot down. They were adamant. He was, therefore, helpless.
I can’t say for sure who the recalcitrant colleagues were but I’m told they are Arun Shourie, Yashwant Sinha and Jaswant Singh. I haven’t checked with them because their known positions clearly suggest they would have opposed any endorsement of the deal. In fact, all three of them have given me interviews where their opposition was both unequivocal and vehement.
This leads to my second story. Contrary to the claim that the government did not earlier brief the BJP about the nuclear deal, the NSA, the Foreign Secretary and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission met top leaders of the party to explain the contents of the 123 agreement. The meeting was arranged by the PM. From the BJP, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Yashwant Sinha, Arun Shourie and Jaswant Singh were present. LK Advani did not attend. It happened sometime in August 2007.
The meeting began with a few opening remarks from the PM before he handed over to his officials. When they were finished they answered questions put mainly by Yashwant Sinha and Arun Shourie. At the end of it all Jaswant Singh spoke. My sources remember his words as if they were spoken yesterday. “Gentlemen,” he is reported to have said, “I must compliment you on a job well done.” What made him change his mind four months later?
These two stories reveal a sorry picture of the BJP’s top leadership. They come across as men struggling to accept what they know is in India’s best interest but unable to do so either because they are prisoners of prejudice or unwilling to challenge their own colleagues. Or else why did they so conveniently flip-flop?
I won’t deny that I’ve accepted the veracity of these stories because, in each case, two independent sources, both unimpeachable and utterly trustworthy, have confirmed them. But, of course, I could still be wrong. It could emerge that I’ve been gullible. So let me put a question to the two gentlemen these stories principally concern, LK Advani and Jaswant Singh. If these stories are essentially untrue — not in minor detail but in the broad point they make — why don’t you issue a public statement to say so? After all, if irreproachable sources are spreading “lies” about you then, surely, it’s incumbent on you to refute them? Because if you don’t, your silence will inevitably be construed as acquiescence.
Better still, deny the stories on the floor of the House tomorrow. The whole country will hear you and then it’s up to the government to either keep shut or provide proof.
paramu wrote:Can you quote some media or links to show this threat. Did I miss it? Apologize if so.vishwakarmaa wrote:Its a propaganda of "threat"(they will put sanctions on us if we don't do deal now!) done by media, to pull the weak minded people into SUPPORTERS lobby.
They know Indian political minds are "feeble" so, they talk language of "worst-case scenario" "sanctions". They try best to exploit negative thinkers here.RaviBg wrote: NEW DELHI: French Ambassador Jerome Bonnafont on Saturday met Bharatiya Janata Party president Rajnath Singh here to lobby for the India-U.S. nuclear deal.
The envoy is understood to have told Mr. Singh that their perception of the deal capping India’s military programme was misplaced. It left more than enough room for India to test in the event of Pakistan, China or some other country testing if it affected India’s security. Mr. Bonnafont further explained, the BJP sources said, that India was under international sanctions following Pokhran II, and in the worst-case scenario, sanctions would be imposed again. He is also believed to have pointed out that many American legislators in fact felt that U.S. had given away too much.
Looks like Karan is in lot of stress. There is a fear that Cong will be blamed for the failure of the deal.RaviBg wrote:Nuclear deal and the BJP
Karan Thapar
These two stories reveal a sorry picture of the BJP’s top leadership. They come across as men struggling to accept what they know is in India’s best interest but unable to do so either because they are prisoners of prejudice or unwilling to challenge their own colleagues. Or else why did they so conveniently flip-flop?
So let me put a question to the two gentlemen these stories principally concern, LK Advani and Jaswant Singh. If these stories are essentially untrue — not in minor detail but in the broad point they make — why don’t you issue a public statement to say so?
Definitely there is some big interest from outside.R_Kumar wrote:Now there is a rumor of 100 crores per MP. The most sad part is that now janta has accepted this kind of corruption from Indian politicians. They have become so used to of the corruption among Indian politicians that It doesn't bother them anymore.
Its not good for the county future. Only few months are left for this government any way, I am sure congress won't spend this kind of its own money for the "development of country" . I smell a big scam here and foreign hand can't be ruled out.