Formation and Evolution of Pakistan : The Real Story

[Johann]

Especially since the Pakjabis learned the alaf-bey-pey of their faith at the feet of these pashtuns. It was there swords which rested on the shoulder blade of the Pakjabi ancestors asking them "are going to convert or ...".

Pashtuns ruled these guys for centuries. The quirk of fate is that now the Pakjabis rule the pashtuns (fate is indeed fickle).

Invasions by Turkish-Afghan marauders like Ghori and Ghaznavi only established Muslim populations in the major cities of the Punjab. The countryside was far from Muslim

The bulk of Muslim Punjabis are descended from herding (and raiding) nomadic tribes like the Jats, etc until Punjbi Sufi Pirs like Baba Farid drew them in to both agriculture and Islam. Isnt Baba Farid also one of the figures mentioned in the Guru Granth Sahib? It wasnt a very formal Islam with ulama passing fatwas - more a case of visiting shrines and hoping that the baraka from the tomb and the current pir would intercede for you. The pirs and the landed class were like peas in a pod. One looked out for another - they supported whomever was dominant, and whomever left their political and economic power untouched. The Mughals did their best to cultivate influence with the pirs by making them jagirdars.

I wouldnt say its a quirk of fate that saw the rise of Pakjab - they had by far the larger population, the economic clout, a larger educated middle class, sufficient numbers of experienced military and bureaucratic personnel from the colonial era. Modernity shifted the balance of power from the tribes back to the states.

So-called '4th generation warfare' suggests that the balance has tipped back the other way. My own feeling is that Pakjab's greatest strength that allowed them to leverage modernity was a period of strong economic growth, backed by a flexible socio-political system that integrated different jathis and different classes through the pirs.

Where Pakjab went wrong was to import the formal Islam of the Doab, both Barelwi and Deobandi, which didnt have much of a following in Pakjab. The revivalist ulama are not tied to the pragmatic interests of Pakjabis - their goal is a centralised, authoritative Islam that works pretty differently from pragmatic folk Islam.

To make matters worse the Pakistani state, often led by ashraf mohajirs has kept Pakjab's ruling classes politically fractured in order to preserve military and bureaucratic power. This is to a great extent the underlying source of the conflict between Nawaz Sharif and his former mentor the PA. Until the 1980s for example Sunnis and Shia celebrated muharrum together. Zia (not a Pakjabi!) attempt to turn Pakistan in to a Sunni, Hanafi state tried to discourage that, triggering a sectarian conflict that the Pakjabi elite does not want. Wealthy Sunni Pakjabi landlords have far more in common with Shia landlords socially, economically and religiously than with the down and outs the Deobandis have taken in, trained and set on the existing order. Consider the Sharif brothers aggressive pursuit of sectarian Deobandi killers in Pakjab, and their strong Shia support in the face of PA/ISI indifference.

Although Deobandi madrasas have mushroomed in southern Punjab, it still seems like huge numbers of rural Serikis visit pirs and dargahs for for blessings, cures, a chance to celebrate, etc. We havent seen sectarian violence at the level of ordinary people, the kind of rioting and ethnic cleansing of Partition, Lebanon, Iraq, etc. Unless the pirs work out some kind of a deal with the Taliban which allows their kind of Islam (doctrinally offensive to the Taliban) to continue to exist, there will be no wholesale takeover in the Pakjab. Just violence and instability along polarised ideological and organisational lines, maybe analagous to Indian Punjab's Khalistani insurgency. Remember this is not the Ahmadis, or even the Shia (who have continued to hold their own with support from the Pakjabi political and religious establishment) - the cult of saints is the kind of Islam that the majority of practicing Pakjabi Muslims depend on.

The key factor here is the PA's mughal rather than Pakjabi complex, and its limited interest in Pakjabi concerns. It is the PA that for reasons of state prevents Pakistanis from comprehensively defending themselves against the Deobandi jihad.

[SBajwa]

The bulk of Muslim Punjabis are descended from herding (and raiding) nomadic tribes like the Jats, etc until Punjbi Sufi Pirs like Baba Farid drew them in to both agriculture and Islam. Isnt Baba Farid also one of the figures mentioned in the Guru Granth Sahib?

True!! There are five sufi saints in punjab that punjabi muslims use to revere before 1947.
Sheikh Faridudeen Shakarganj was the disciple/friend of the sufi of Delhi (Nizamudeen). While their
chief leader was the Chisti of Ajmer who came into india along with Ghauri and at Lahore he had a dream
that he must go to Ajmer as current Sufis say. But if you look at geopolitics Ghauri wanted to get rid of all
hindus from The capital city of Prithviraj Chauhan which was Ajmer at that time. He probably sent the Chisti over to Ajmer to get dhimmified indians to become sufis.

Slowly these guys created many divisions and deobandi and barelvi are the modern divisions of these old "movements"

Guru Arjan Dev (fifth Guru) got some slokas of Farid into Guru Granth Sahib which are about how you should love your creator.

I am waiting for the Talibanis to destroy the Mazaars of the five sufi peers of Punjabi muslims and let's see what happens then.

I am 100% sure that as judging from the history it has to be Indians to come to the aid of the Pakjabis to get them back to

1. Either continue loving their five sufi peers (who are not liked by Talibanis)
2. Convert out of Islam.

So.. if Indians continue to vote the Dhimmi Congress into power sooner or later the dhimmified generations of Indians will become Wahabis.

[ramana]

Johann, A different way to come to the conclusion that its the TSPA that needs to be reformed and allowed to become a miliatry force from a politico-military organization. Their are not Islam's version of warrior monks.

So its a path independent function .TSPA is the root of the problem.

[surinder]

Johann,

As you written once, there are Sufis and there are Sufis---there are Pirs & there are Pirs.

What has happened to TSP is what happens is when you take mutually incompatible philosophies and overlay them in an incompatible manner; something will have to give. The so-called "Pir" and "Sufi" iszlaam of the Pakjabis, if it was that, should have been incompatible with the idea of partition and definitely incompatible with ethnic cleansing which happened during Partition. Either the so-called "Sufi" "Pir" influence was not terribly peaceful, or that system broke at that time. It was inevitable then that the TSP state will follow the usual path of more iszaaalimization---import the idiologoy from UP, Deoband, and then ultimately from the Wahabis. Their advertised Sufism can only be considered a convenience to escape the rigors of Deobandi/Wahabi iszlaam.

The interesting thing is that Pashtuns never held the Pakjabis with any respect, based on their historically frequent conquests of this area. They had been the erstwhile rules of the Pakjab provinces (even the Indian Punjab). Their disdain stems from their perception of lack of courage and martial spirit in the Pakjabis, and the fact that it was the Pashtoons predominantly which caused them to "embrace" this faith. (60% of the all Punjabis in the world are M's).

The quirk of fate was that Pasthoons exhausted themselves---first against the Sikhs, then against the British. They got divided, lost territory, lost influence and became vassals and stooges. To add insult to injury, fate allowed the Pakjabis to conquer Af'stan proper (for about 20 years or so through their proxy Talibums). But it seems the end game of Pashtoon subservience to Pakjab has arrived.

PS: Two points: (1) there is more than one Baba Sheikh Fareed. One of the Baba Farid's is indeed represented in the Guru Granth Sahib. (2) Zia was a Pakjabi.

[Johann]

Johann,

As you written once, there are Sufis and there are Sufis---there are Pirs & there are Pirs.

There seems to have been a clear difference between the pirs of Pashtun areas and the UP, who had a pattern of leading intolerant movements (Deoband was formed by a pair of Sabiriyya Chishtis), and the Pirs of Punjab and Sindh.

What has happened to TSP is what happens is when you take mutually incompatible philosophies and overlay them in an incompatible manner; something will have to give. The so-called "Pir" and "Sufi" iszlaam of the Pakjabis, if it was that, should have been incompatible with the idea of partition and definitely incompatible with ethnic cleansing which happened during Partition. Either the so-called "Sufi" "Pir" influence was not terribly peaceful, or that system broke at that time.

Punjab was one of the tougher holdouts against Partition - the Unionist Party wiped the floor with the Muslim League in the elections of of 1937. Sir Sikander Hayat Khan consistantly rejected the idea of a 'Muslim Raj', and in 1939 declared I am a Punjabi first and a Muslim second.

By comparison the Sindh legislative passed a motion calling for Pakistan's creation in 1938, two years before the AIML's Pakistan resolution.

So why the sudden change of heart? The pirs were intermarried with the landed class and used their influence to look out for their interests at the popular level, and while dealing with non-Punjabi Muslims. The Unionist Party was the political expression of that.

Once it became clear that Nehru, Patel, and the British were willing to accept Partition, the Unionist Party lost all appeal since there was no way it could protect their interests once it became clear that the INC and the Raj were going to simply hand over Pakjab to Jinnah.

It was inevitable then that the TSP state will follow the usual path of more iszaaalimization---import the idiologoy from UP, Deoband, and then ultimately from the Wahabis. Their advertised Sufism can only be considered a convenience to escape the rigors of Deobandi/Wahabi iszlaam.

It hasnt really happened in the Sindhi districts, even though Sindh was an early enthusiast for Pakistan.

Even in the Pakjab, enthusiasm for Pakistan before 1944 seems to have been limited to the urban classes. The majority of the committed Pakjabi cadre of the Pakistani movement seem to have studied at Islamia College in Lahore, a modern Urdu college out of Syed Ahmed Khan's model imported from the UP.

The growth of Deobandis since the 1970s seems more of an outgrowth of Deobandi funds and their use of those funds to take in and reshape the views of the most wretched and marginalised in Pakjabi society, the ones for whom the traditional Islam isnt doing a damn thing.

You have to wonder how much of this is the result of the Pakistani states control of shrine funds through the waqf ministry - shrines used to operate far more independently before partition.

The Deobandis cant take over Pakjab without the support of the Pakistani security state. If things really were determined at the popular level Sindh and Pakjab would have had a very different history, and still might have one.

The interesting thing is that Pashtuns never held the Pakjabis with any respect, based on their historically frequent conquests of this area. They had been the erstwhile rules of the Pakjab provinces (even the Indian Punjab). Their disdain stems from their perception of lack of courage and martial spirit in the Pakjabis, and the fact that it was the Pashtoons predominantly which caused them to "embrace" this faith. (60% of the all Punjabis in the world are M's).

There's no question that until the 19th century Pashtuns were the bogeymen that Muslim Punjabis feared, the 'janglis', but the majority of Muslim Punjabis converted at the height of the late Delhi Sultanate and early Mughal era - the pirs were absolutely loaded with land and gifts from Delhi, and they used it along with a relatively undemanding kind of Islam to convert Jats, Rajputs, etc - if anything these groups were a tough lot who seemed to settle down and get soft after conversion. Sort of like the Vikings in Europe. Again, I think it has to do with the particular kind of sufism that existed in the Punjab

When you look at the Pathans its clear they were not for the most part converted by force - but unlike the tribes of the Punjab they didnt exactly settle down.

The quirk of fate was that Pasthoons exhausted themselves---first against the Sikhs, then against the British. They got divided, lost territory, lost influence and became vassals and stooges. To add insult to injury, fate allowed the Pakjabis to conquer Af'stan proper (for about 20 years or so through their proxy Talibums). But it seems the end game of Pashtoon subservience to Pakjab has arrived.

Zia was a Pakjabi.

I'd forgotten - but he seemed to be one of those who traded in a Pakjabi identity for a wholly Islamic one.

Everything I've seen and heard leads me to believe that its this idea, the wholesale suppression of regional identity which developed in UP and over the course of the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal era that prevents Pakistan (and potentially Bangladesh) from being 'normal' Muslim countries. I dont think its the default mode of all Muslims in the Subcontinent - in fact its a top down process that usually gets started among regional urban elites who want to identify with the prestige and status of Old Delhi.

[ramana]

Where does Maulana Maududi fit in this scheme of ummahization?

[Johann]

Where does Maulana Maududi fit in this scheme of ummahization?

In the 18th century there was a major Islamic revivalist movement that focussed on very strict readings of the Quran and Hadith, and tauhid - the unity of god, which meant not relying on anything to intercede for you. Abdul Wahhab was the most famous of these, but it seems to have had some Indian roots - Wahhab's teacher in Mecca was Hayyat al-Sindi, and Al-Sindi's teacher was an Indian Muslim named Ibrahim al-Qurani who also taught Shah Waliullah.

It represented the rise of the ulama against folk Islam - authority based on acquired book learning of scriptures, Islamic legal reasoning, commentary, etc instead of charisma and some kind of hereditary, magical connection to god. These guys wanted to centralise all Islamic authority, and impose a standardised Islam and revive declining Muslim empires. Every time secular modernists attacked the superstition of folk Islam, the ulama would deploy the same arguments to strengthen their authority.

The third category of claimant to Islamic authority is the lay Muslim intellectual who popped up in the 19th century as modernisation took place. These are usually guys who have no formal training as ulama, who have no claims of mystical union with god, or the prophets or whatever. They're steeped in Islamic history (much more than theology) and a mix of modern and Islamic philosophy. They tend to be simultaneously attracted to the West's success, and repelled by its materialism and godlesness. They see their primary goal as building an Islamic ideology that will allow Muslims to use modernity to unite and empower Muslims while innoculating them against the materialism, secularism and hedonism of the west. This is the category that includes people like Iqbal, Maududi, Hasan al-Banna etc. Although they're Islamists they often dislike the ulama who they think of as rigid hair splitters who sectarianism, squabbling and opposition to technological, political and social change will doom the Muslim community.

[Airavat]

Once it became clear that Nehru, Patel, and the British were willing to accept Partition, the Unionist Party lost all appeal since there was no way it could protect their interests once it became clear that the INC and the Raj were going to simply hand over Pakjab to Jinnah.

Very amusing. The British innocently "accepting partition" while the reality is that they created Pakistan! Jinnah and the Muslim League were built up as leaders of all Muslims, despite their poor showing in the 1937 provincial elections, by the Viceroy Linlithgow. The viceroy ordered Fazl-ul-haq (of the Peasants and Tenants Party in Bengal) and Sikander Hayat Khan (of the Unionist Party in Punjab) to give precedence to Jinnah on the national stage. By his insistence the Muslim members of these regional parties were made to take dual membership of the Muslim League.

But the Unionists never lost all appeal. In the 1945-46 elections they again formed the government in Punjab.....it was only after the Simla Conference, where the Viceroy Lord Wavell insisted on foisting Jinnah as the sole representative of Muslims, that the other Muslim leaders realized that Pakistan in some form was coming and they switched sides permanently to the Muslim League.

the majority of Muslim Punjabis converted at the height of the late Delhi Sultanate and early Mughal era - the pirs were absolutely loaded with land and gifts from Delhi, and they used it along with a relatively undemanding kind of Islam to convert Jats, Rajputs, etc - if anything these groups were a tough lot who seemed to settle down and get soft after conversion.

Every convert to Islam in India claims that his/her ancestors were converted by sufis and pirs who showed them the "soft side of Islam". Sufis and pirs could convert large numbers only in places where the invading Turks had extinguished local powers. As an alternative example large numbers of sufis had dargahs in Rajasthan (Ajmer, Nagaur, Dausa, Jalore, Jodhpur, Bundi, and other places) and yet they could not convert the ruling classes or even significant numbers of the common people to Islam.

Wherever the indigenous powers held political and military power they, and their people, remained true to their ancestral faiths. This was not the case in West and Central Punjab.

[Johann]

Airavat,

In 1937 the AIML won 2 seats in the Punjab legislature, and 1946 they won 75 - the Unionist Party won exactly IIRC 16 or 18 Muslim seats. The Unionist Party formed a government based on coalitions with non-Muslim parties.

The political centre of educated Indian Muslim's remained in Delhi-UP and then Bombay, and the AIML's hold there was extremely strong well before 1945. College students in the Punjab were overwhelmingly pro-AIML well before 1945.

Iqbal was the person who put the Pakistan idea on the top of the AIML agenda in 1930, the person who told Jinnah in 1934 that he had to come back to India because he was the only person who could lead India's muslims towards Pakistan, and Iqbal was about as anti-colonial as you could get.

The INC did not work particularly closely with regionalist parties in Punjab and Bengal - the INC always treated the AIML (and Jinnah) as entities who had to be dealt with, rather than ignored. On top of that you had the Communist Party assisting the Muslim League in Punjab, and the Hindu Mahasbha endorsing the 'Two Nation theory' way back in 1937.

Well before 1945, all of the national Indian parties across the spectrum had given the AIML and Jinnah what he wanted. The only exception was the Deobandi Jamaat-i-Ulema-Hind. The INC decision to grant the Deobandis national religious authority over the Muslims that remained in India in exchange for its attacks on Jinnah is one of the reasons Muslim personal law is so reactionary today.

[Vishal_Bhatia]

Johann Sir,

I do not know much about the pre-Partition politics but I once had a chat with a great-grandson of Fazlul Haq who led the Krishak Praja Party (KPP) in Bengal.

He told me that for a while his great-grandfather was enamored by Jinnah and his whole Muslim-country-rhetoric but later changed directions dramatically.

He said that after joining the Muslim League, his great-grandfather realized the "reality" of Jinnah. Though his great-grandfather worked toward the benefit of the Muslim League, Jinnah and his ilk were using underhanded (bribery/intimidation/promises of influence) to cut his support base within his own cadre. The guy also told me that his great-grandfather was very much against the partition largely because he realized the real Jinnah and the real drama of the Muslim League. But by then it was too late and the rest is history.

He also admitted that his great-grandfather was confused between being a Bengali, Pakistani, Indian and Muslim.

But he stated in blunt terms, the Muslim League had no popular support. This was true for both Punjab and Bengal. His ego was massive. This was true for both Punjab and Bengal. Politicians and political parties were literally bought, and that is how the sudden turn-around happened. Once, however, the Partition was declared it was a free for all grand theft auto, and this has led many to believe that the Partition was reflective of the will of the people.

The point he made was that Jinnah wanted nothing but power at all costs, and that his ego was massive.

Sir, I would like to hear your views on this. Thanks in advance and sorry if inapt.


Regards
Vishal Bhatia

PS: Sorry if this is off-topic.

[SSridhar]

Johann,

I have posted the following before.

The seeds for separation were probably sown in 1909 when Lord Minto, the successor to Curzon, declared to the elite group of Mussalman who called upon him, the so called All India Mohammadan Deputation, that the Muslims of India “were descendants of a conquering and ruling race” forgetting conveniently that but for a minuscule descendants of Turks, Persians, Pathans or Mughals, the vast majority of the Indian Muslims were converts from the Hindu religion. The delegation was led by 'Aga Khan of Bombay' who was the 'Leader of the Indian Muslims'. This deputation made several demands, among which were:

• Separate electorate for the Muslims (This really laid the foundation for Pakistan later on)
• The British should not place the "Muslims' national interests at the mercy of an unsympathetic majority"
• Due share for Muslims in the gazetted, subordinate and ministerial services
• Not to place the Muslims as an 'ineffective minority' in the Imperial Legislative Council

Minto replied to these demands saying he 'appreciated the just demands of the Muslims which centered around the fact in any electoral system, Muslims should be treated as a 'community'. He referred to India as 'this continent of multiple nations' and said that any legislation that did not take into account various 'communities' was mischievous and doomed to failure.

Among the delegation that called on Lord Minto was the founder of the Aligarh Muslim University, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, who said “No Mohammedan can say that the English are not ‘people of the Book’. No Mohammedan can deny this: that God has said that no people of other religions can be friends of Mohammedans except the Christians. . . . Now God has made them rulers over us. Therefore we should cultivate friendship with them, and should adopt that method by which their rule may remain permanent and firm in India, and may not pass into the hands of the Bengalis. This is our true friendship with our Christian rulers . . . for we do not want to become subjects of the Hindus instead of the subjects of the people of the Book." No wonder then that the AMU at Aligarh has played a significant role in creating Pakistan and causing permanent divide between the Hindus and the Muslims.

[SSridhar]

The point he made was that Jinnah wanted nothing but power at all costs, and that his ego was massive.

Vishal_Bhatia, have you read Rafik Zakaria's (Fareed Zakaria's father) book, "The Man who divided India" ?

[Vishal_Bhatia]

Vishal_Bhatia, have you read Rafik Zakaria's (Fareed Zakaria's father) book, "The Man who divided India" ?

No, Sir I haven't. I'm not that well-read when it comes to books. Most of what I know, I have read on the internet.


Regards
Vishal Bhatia

[Airavat]

Airavat,

In 1937 the AIML won 2 seats in the Punjab legislature, and 1946 they won 75 - the Unionist Party won exactly IIRC 16 or 18 Muslim seats. The Unionist Party formed a government based on coalitions with non-Muslim parties.

I didn't say the ML influence was not growing, but without British support (in India and from the UK conservatives) it would not have grown to the extent where the other Muslim groupings had to merge with the ML.

British support in India was particularly useful in the fostering of communal terrorism by the Muslim League; the collection of arms, the militant training, and communal propaganda by the Aligarh Muslim University students. The British could have stopped these activities but connived in the growth of communal tensions because it helped take away the pressure from the nationalists.

In 1946 occured two events that graphically illustrated this connivance; the mutiny in the Indian armed forces and Jinnah's direct action of communal terrorism. The rising of the naval natings in Bombay and Karachi, and certain air force and army units, did not remain confined only to the military but spread by sympathy to Indian civilians in these places. A frantic Wavell supressed this rising with horrific violence, killing 200 protestors and injuring 1000 in Bombay alone.

Wavell's reaction to Muslim League's violence was entirely different. In Muslim-majority Bengal the League government launched Jinnah's 'direct action' of communal terrorism on 16 August 1946. In the capital Calcutta, the Muslim League chief minister Suhrawardy told the mob of nearly 100,000 at a public rally that he had confined the police and army in the barracks, and that they were free to take 'direct action':

As soon as the rally ended, the Muslim fanatics armed with sticks, knives, swords, and guns, attacked Hindu shops and houses. The Sikhs who ran the transport business in Calcutta also suffered from this outrageous act of terrorism. Thousands were killed in the most barbaric manner, reminiscent of the scenes created by the savage Muslim armies in medieval era. But just as in those savage times, the Hindu and Sikh resistance hit back with equal violence and so frightened the Muslim League leaders (who were utter cowards for all their bombast) that Suhrawardy begged Mahatma Gandhi's help in subduing the mobs. But by then the violence had spread to Bihar, where the Hindu majority attacked the Muslim League supporters.

Amazingly enough Wavell, having done nothing to prevent this violence, refused to even upbraid Jinnah or Suhrawardy for their speeches inciting communal war, forget about throwing those terrorists in jail. Nor was the Muslim League ministry dismissed for this crime against humanity. Viceroy Wavell merely remarked, "Both sides made preparations, which may or may not have been defensive."

[surinder]

and Iqbal was about as anti-colonial as you could get.

I might have missed the news of Iqbal being sent to Kaala Paani at Andaman Nicobar, or his being lathi charged and beaten or hanged to death. How much time did he spend in prision for his anti-colonialism?

[surinder]

Iqbal was the person who put the Pakistan idea on the top of the AIML agenda in 1930, the person who told Jinnah in 1934 that he had to come back to India because he was the only person who could lead India's muslims towards Pakistan,

Jinnah was cooling his heels in UK. It is impossible that the India Office did not keep good contacts with him and prepare him for his role in dividing India. The idea of dividing India was conceived before Jinnah had thoughts about it by the British. Churchill was in secret communication with Jinnah. Jinnah never had to face back-breaking incarcerations at British hands. Mountbatten sent clear signals that Pakistaan was inevitable to Jinnah, which of course encouraged & egged him. All the while making it seem like an idea that emanated not from them, but from Indian Musluamans themselves.

[ramana]

SSridhar, Two books that tell the story from British point of view are
1) Indian Mussalmans:W.W. Hunter
2) Future of ISlam: Wilfrid Scawen Blunt
Wiki on:Blunt
What a character!

Also note there was an East India company official whose task was to induced the Aga Khan to settle in Bombay from somewhere in Syria area. This was also related to the project tp appear as the protectors of Islamic people.

Give me time will get you the name.

[surinder]

In 1946 occured two events that graphically illustrated this connivance;

Airavat, thanks for this example. There are, in fact, many many such incidents which clearly show how selective groups in India were encouraged to destroy the communal atmosphere while hiding the British connivance. Partition was just the grandest, and the culmination of all that.

I can cite one more example: British were very cognizant of any individual or group that would accumulate arms or had any preparation for any kind of conflict. The intelligence networks were always on look out for such tendencies. The details of how scores of common people contemplating protests were promptly arrested and kaala-panied. Contrast this with the Gurudwara Nankana Sahib incident (around 1920 or a little earlier). The Mahants there were installed by the British. He had collected arms and ammunitions. When Sikhs came to protest, he and his goons opened fire and killed many Sikhs. The British police chief at Lahore (Nankana Sahib falls in Lahore district) kept curiosuly quiet and aloof. The chief had known all along, and had encouraged & emboldened the Mahants itself. The masterstroke is that Sikhs would not feel they were fighting the British when they were mowed down by the Mahant's goons, they felt they were in conflict with the Hinduized mahant's.

The same story was repeated during the 1947 partition riots. British controlled police & army kept coolly aloof when riots errupted in Lahore & Rawalpindi & elsewhere. India at that time had just come out of a World Wars and had accumulated 2 million troops to fight the useless irrelvant wars in Europe, but could not muster the little troops necessary to maintain order in its own heartland of Punjab.

Added later: All the while one only hears the pious tone of British establishment that they so eagerly wanted to leave India. Those who would rule india with an iron hand for 200 years suddenly lost control in such dramatic a fashion they they could not even control mobs of mussalmaans in lahore in control? Instead of asking this question, most the printed word, documents are innundated with British eagerness to depart. Talk about controlling the message.

Also note, if British could have been ruling India for 200 years, why the urgency to Radcliffe to divide the country in a matter of weeks. Why could the exact details of the division not worked out over a few years? Especially since the idea of dividing India had been on the minds of British every since they partioned Bengal & later set up communal electrorates.

(Independent India learned this peculiar practice well. In the 1984 riots, police & army kept aside for a few days while the mob rampaged.)

[Rahul M]

merging posts to this thread is still a work in progress,
if I have missed one or more relevant posts from the original TSP thread, please use the report function
to help us locate it.
thanks,
Rahul.

[svinayak]

Johann Sir,

I do not know much about the pre-Partition politics but I once had a chat with a great-grandson of Fazlul Haq who led the Krishak Praja Party (KPP) in Bengal.

He told me that for a while his great-grandfather was enamored by Jinnah and his whole Muslim-country-rhetoric but later changed directions dramatically.

He said that after joining the Muslim League, his great-grandfather realized the "reality" of Jinnah. Though his great-grandfather worked toward the benefit of the Muslim League, Jinnah and his ilk were using underhanded (bribery/intimidation/promises of influence) to cut his support base within his own cadre. The guy also told me that his great-grandfather was very much against the partition largely because he realized the real Jinnah and the real drama of the Muslim League. But by then it was too late and the rest is history.

He also admitted that his great-grandfather was confused between being a Bengali, Pakistani, Indian and Muslim.

But he stated in blunt terms, the Muslim League had no popular support. This was true for both Punjab and Bengal. His ego was massive. This was true for both Punjab and Bengal. Politicians and political parties were literally bought, and that is how the sudden turn-around happened. Once, however, the Partition was declared it was a free for all grand theft auto, and this has led many to believe that the Partition was reflective of the will of the people.

The point he made was that Jinnah wanted nothing but power at all costs, and that his ego was massive.

Sir, I would like to hear your views on this. Thanks in advance and sorry if inapt.


Regards
Vishal Bhatia

PS: Sorry if this is off-topic.

This is very important to understand how this Pakistan Project was formed with Bluff and violence. THe money trail goes from the wealthy Muslim Zamindars in Lucknow to wealthy Muslims from AMU, Bombay and Delhi.

The support from CHurchill and London Bankers and power brokers such as Rockefellers was important for the formation of this artificial financial entity.

You can see Zardari asking for Aid to Pakistan linking AIG(Rockefeller) bailout in US to help for Pakistan.
This is directly related to the original supporters of Pakistan in 1947.

[ramana]

X-post from E-Books thread
This is book written in 1948 from Karachi

Pakistan and Middle East

It confirms a lot of our thinking on TSP origins.

[ramana]

Can we have the picture of Ibn Saud with FDR on the US ship?

[jash_p]

Edited

[negi]

edited

[A_Gupta]

Historical context:

In the period 1946-early 1947, Punjab was ruled by a Coalition Ministry of Unionists, Sikhs and Congress party members headed by Unionist leader Sir Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana. In the 1946 provincial elections, though the Muslim League won the largest number of seats (77 out of 175), it had been unable to form a majority coalition with other parties and stake a claim to government.

In late-January 1947, the Muslim League began an agitation against a ban imposed by the Coalition Ministry on the Muslim League National Guards. However, even after the ban on the Guards was lifted a few days later, the Muslim League continued its agitation, claiming that even without a legislative majority it was entitled to use force to bring down the Khizr Hayat Ministry. The League agitation which thus explicitly denied the legitimacy of a Punjabi government with Hindus and Sikhs in it, hence, inevitably grew increasingly communal in tone and more so in its later stages when Hindu and Sikh ripostes to it began.

On February 20, 1947, the British government announced that it would withdraw from India by June 1948, that is, in approximately 16 months. This announcement greatly increased the political ferment in Punjab. The Muslim League's efforts to wield power over Punjab, the linchpin province of its envisioned future Pakistan became more urgent. The Unionist Party's proximity to and patronage by the British Indian administration and the British Indian Army had been the main sources of its power and legitimacy in Punjab. The Unionist Party thus immediately and swiftly lost prestige and position now that the British had definitely decided to withdraw from the region and effectively ditch their chief subcontinental ally of many decades.

On 3rd March Sir Khizr Hayat finally decided to resign and in the succeeding few days Punjab experienced widespread urban and rural outbreaks of violence resulting in an estimated 3,500 (overwhelmingly non-Muslim) deaths, widespread abductions of non-Muslim women and forced conversions of non-Muslims, looting and arson and more than 40,000 non-Muslim refugees. Within days the Congress demanded the partition of the Punjab (this demand in effect meant that even if India as a whole remained united, the Congress position was that Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs wanted the Punjab province partitioned).

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Quote:

366 page 654 (excerpts)
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Lord Pethick-Lawrence
8 February 1947

Muslim League agitation has so far taken normal course of all Indian passive resistance movements. Methods employed are hartals to ensure mass idleness, organisation of processions and meetings in contravention of law and dissemination of exaggerated false stories about roughness of police, heroism of demonstrators and so on...

2. Agitation has sympathy of almost all Muslims official and non-official. But police have been staunch and good humoured. Participants are mainly politicians and their womenfolk and Muslims of poorer classes. Villagers have joined demonstrations in some districts. The objects of agitation are not generally understood and apart from abuse of Khizar and Ministry slogans refer to Pakistan.

3. There has been little violence. One demonstrator died of injuries received in lathi charge in Simla. No other fatal casualty reported.
..

5. Immediate situation is not alarming. But it might be worsened at any minute by a clash between communities or between demonstrators and police. Former danger is real but communal trouble seldom occurs during a conflict between one community and the Government.
...
6. Agitation can end only in one of the following four ways. First. By communal outbreak so violent that agitation is swamped by it. Second. By outright defeat of League. Third. By straight defeat of Ministry. Fourth. By a compromise.

7. First is possible but not in my judgment very likely for reason given in paragraph 5. Ministry would probably attempt to remain in office and control situation. Second is most improbable. Like first it would leave Ministry in office. Third is possible but Muslim League would not (repeat not) be able to form stable Ministry. Agitation has convinced Hindus and Sikhs that League want undiluted Muslim Raj. League ministry would therefore not materialise, or if formed with venal support would be overthrown in turn by non-Muslim direct action. Sikhs are of course incalculable and might co-operate with League but I think not. Fourth is most likely ending but much depends on outcome of present controversy at Centre. Compromise would need most skillful handling if split between Premier and non-Muslims is to be avoided. It might take form of abandonment of agitation in return for offer to review working of Ordinance and to enlarge Cabinet. Majority of Muslim League are against settlement but some are in favour.

..
8. It is quite impossible for one community to rule the Punjab with its present boundaries. Long-term alternatives are therefore reversion to Unionist principles with Muslim domination or partition which would create intolerable minority problems. Effect of agitation is to force second alternative on non-Muslims and to impair seriously long-term prospects of Muslim League and Muslims generally. Muslim League are in fact wantonly throwing away certainty of Muslim Leadership in a United Punjab for uncertain advantages of a partition which Sikhs will gradually now demand. But nobody has brains to understand this.


383 page 681 (excerpts)
Field Marshal Viscount Wavell to Lord Pethick-Lawrence
The Viceroy's House, 12 February 1947

..
It is clear that the Muslim League could not run a stable Government in the Punjab without support from some other party, even if they could win over all the Unionist Muslims. The party strength as on the 11th December was as follows:-

Congress ...........................................48
Muslim League...................................77
Panthic Akali Party............................21
Unionists(including 7 or 8 Muslims)...16
Independents.......................................5
Speaker................................................1
Vacant..................................................7
Total........175

It is unlikely that the Muslim League would secure any firm support from another party for a policy which was based on Pakistan, and I agree with Jenkins' view expressed in his telegram of 8th February that one community cannot possibly govern the Punjab with its present boundaries. It will perhaps only be when the Muslim League have the opportunity of forming a government that they will realise the full facts of the situation.
..


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More at:
http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/CMPA4_Punjab.html

[surinder]

I would request that this thread be kept clean of emotional or funny posts. Also not needed are rants against British or Mughals or others. What is needed is more than anything facts, and truths.

If you know facts, clues, leads, evidences, about what REALLY happened in TSP formation & Partition, please post, otherwise just read and enjoy.

Also it is not irrelevant to state what was the PUBLIC message about this creation the British & the M's & TSP wanted to present. (Knowing what someone is trying to project can be clue to what really happened.)

Books on Partition are valid posts here.

If you cannot add productive posts, just read and have fun.

[A_Gupta]

contd:

404 page 720 (excerpts)
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell (Extract)
15 February 1947

2. It is now possible to get the agitation into rather better perspective. To understand it properly one must go back to the Census tables, the essential figures in which are approximately as follows:- {table not copied to here in BRF}

It is obvious on these figures that no one community can rule the Punjab with its present boundaries, except by conquest. The peaceful alternatives are a united Punjab under a Government representing Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, or a partition into two or possibly three separate States.

3.
...
After Sir Sikander's death the Muslim wing of the Unionist Party disintegrated in circumstances which Your Excellency knows, and since then the Muslim League have been determined- so far as their published policy is concerned- to establish undiluted Muslim rule all over the Punjab. This can certainly not be done by consent, and I am very doubtful whether it could be done by conquest. Members of the Muslim League are in fact much more liberal in private conversation that they are in public, and some of them realise the difficulties inherent in their official policy. But the fact remains that they fought the General Election of 1946 on the extreme demand for Pakistan, and have not since said a word to reassure the Hindus or the Sikhs. Even among the more liberal of them the line seems to be that having established undiluted Muslim rule they will be generous to the minorities.

4. The failure of the Muslim League to take office after the General Election was due more to their uncompromising communal outlook than to any other cause. I believe that the local Congress broke with them on the old question of the inclusion of a nationalist Muslim in the Cabinet, but the underlying suspicion was there. A Sikh, who says he was present in the negotiations between the League and the Akalis, has told me that the immediate terms offered by the League were acceptable, but that the League leaders bluntly refused to discuss the future of the Sikhs or to give any assurances to them. The Sikhs felt that they could hardly maintain in power a party whose avowed policy was to treat them as inferiors in a Muslim country.

5. Having failed to form a Ministry the Muslim League were inevitably sore...

[A_Gupta]

contd:

476 page 829 (excerpts)
Sir E. Jenkins (Punjab) to Field Marshal Viscount Wavell
3 March 1947

I reported last night to the Secretary of State and Your Excellency by telegram that Khizar had resigned. The following is a rather fuller account of what has happened.
..
3. Khizar's anxiety about his position was increased by the Muslim League agitation, and increased still further by His Majesty's Government's announcement of 20th February. As I reported in an earlier letter, the announcement shook Khizar severely on 20th February, and after an attempt to "laugh it off" on 21st (which I thought imprudent to encourage) he became increasingly gloomy. (Sir E. Jenkins [had] reported that 'on 20th February, when I showed him the text of the announcement, Khizar remarked that it was "the work of lunatics". On 21st February he was in a more complacent mood, and said he took it to be nothing more than "a threat"."). In all our discussions up to 2nd March, however, Khizar agreed to see the Budget Session through.
..
4. On the morning of 2nd March Khizar telephoned asking if he and Qizilbash could see me in the early afternoon, as he had to address a meeting of the members of the coalition parties at 3 p.m. I duly saw him and Qizilbash at 2.15 p.m. when Khizar made it clear that he was not really interested in his meeting of Assembly members, but wished to ascertain my reactions to his immediate resignation.

He said that he had consulted Zafrullah Khan who had been staying in Lahore for the last few days, and had come to the conclusion that the Muslim League must be brought up against reality without delay. In his opinion they had no idea of the strength of Hindu and Sikh feeling against them and as long as he and his Muslim Unionist colleagues acted as a buffer, they would not change their fantastic and arrogant ideas. He did not feel that the unnatural Coalition Ministry could continue for very long and he was not disposed to lead the Congress and the Panthic Sikhs during the Budget Session only to make it clear to them immediately afterwards that he intended to break the Ministry. He felt that if he attempted to act as a "bridge", he could do nothing effective, and in the meantime communal relations would inevitably worsen. He had not consulted his colleagues, but intended to do so later in the afternoon, and might wish to see me again in the evening.

5. I replied that given his views..
I believed that the Muslim League were bent on forming a Muslim Ministry with the support of a few Scheduled Caste Members whom they expected to buy. If they adhered to this idea, they could not maintain themselves in office for more than a few weeks. The Sikhs would immediately start a most formidable movement, and the Muslim League had already established "direct action" as a legitimate means of attack on a constitutional Government with a technical majority in the Assembly. It was evidently to me that the only Government which could keep the Punjab steady until June 1948 was one representing a large section of all communities or at least the vast majority of the Muslims and the Sikhs.

Khizar admitted that the outlook for Mamdot was very bleak, and said that if he failed to secure adequate support from the Hindus or the Sikhs or both, it would be my duty to go into Section 93. I expressed no opinion on this- provisionally I think that if Mamdot can form a Government of any kind, he must be allowed to go ahead, though the consequences may be very serious and may include an early Section 93 situation.
...
7. The Budget Session was due to begin at 12 noon on 3rd March with the presentation of the Budget by the Finance Minister. On the morning of the 3rd March I got into touch with the Speaker, canceled my orders fixing dates for business connected with the Budget and the Supplementary Estimates, and arranged for the adjournment of the Assembly. My own idea was an adjournment for a week-that is up to 10th March; but I understand that the Speaker prefers an adjournment sine die, and the House will have to decide what to do. [The Assembly adjourned to a date to be intimated later by the Speaker].
...
8. I saw Bhim Sen Sachar at about 11 a.m. on the 3rd. He was tired, having been up all night. The Premier's decision had come as a surprise to him and he thought it injudicious; but he spoke without heat, and like other members of the Cabinet has, I think, a genuine regard for Khizar. I told him I was sending for Mamdot and asked him what the attitude of the Congress would be to co-operation with the Muslim League. I am not clear whether he had consulted the Congress leaders in Delhi; but he said that the Congress could not co-operate with the Muslim League unless it was clear that the minorities would be treated as equals and not as inferiors. The arrogance of the Muslim League had created a very bad impression upon the Hindus, and they were not going to submit to undiluted Muslim rule.

Whether the Punjab remained as it was not or were partitioned a stable Government was most necessary and could not be achieved by one community alone.
...
9. Swaran Singh saw me immediately after Bhim Sen Sachar at about 11-25 a.m. on 3rd March. He also was surprised at Khizar's decision. His views about co-operation with the Muslim League were similar to Sachar's but stiffer. He said that Sikhs would no longer be satisfied with immediate concessions and assurances, which might be repudiated later.

They must have a clear account of the Muslim League's plan for the future of the Punjab and of the position of the Sikhs within this plan. The Sikhs had no intention of being treated as serfs under Muslim masters, and felt that they were strong enough to defend themselves. I told him, as I had told Sachar, that I might later want his help, and asked, and asked him to prevent the Sikh leaders from making any rash commitments in the immediate future.

Swaran Singh said that he would certainly co-operate with me; but the attitude of the Sikhs towards the Muslim League is not encouraging. In particular Swaran Singh observed in the course of our conversation that if Mamdot succeeded in forming a Muslim Ministry with Scheduled Caste and miscellaneous support, it would be my clear duty to go immediately into Section 93.

10. Finally, I saw Mamdot at 11-40 a.m. I said that I was charging him with the duty of forming a Ministry. I had no doubt that he was aware of the very heavy responsibility that rested on him and need only say that in my judgment no Ministry formed by one community, with support from miscellaneous elements in the Assembly such as the Scheduled Caste Members, could last for more than a few weeks. He would find the Hindus and the Sikhs, particularly the latter, indignant and hostile, but in my opinion he must do his utmost to come to terms with them. I hoped he would be able to report progress by Saturday, 8th March, at latest- I realised that he would want some time, since the Sikhs would certainly ask for a complete statement of long-term policy on the future of Punjab and the Sikh community; and unless the Muslim League leaders could deal with the minorities as Punjabis negotiating with Punjabis, they would make little progress. I gave him an absolutely free hand and said that I would not interfere at all unless he asked for my help.
..

T

[A_Gupta]

The gun-to-the-head style of negotiation

There followed some discussion on means of bringing about any form of agreement between Muslims and Sikhs, in which Sir Evan said that the Muslim policy was one of 'daring us to leave' by threatening us with the bogey of the conditions which would be the result of our departure: and that the Sikhs were almost certain to ask for partition on their own terms and would be content to have the Hindus in with them.

[surinder]

A_Gupta,

Would it be possible to post your summary & take, rather than the whole articles? Maybe quoting selectively, if you will.

Amount of literature on Partition/TSP is immense, if we start posting it, it can get overwhelming. We need to spell out the proferred view & see if that is what really happened.

[A_Gupta]

Sorry, it is very educative in my opinion to spend some time to read some of the primary sources of the history. Anyway, a quick and dirty summary:

0. British dependence on Punjabi manpower led to various peculiarities in the administration not seen in the rest of India. These were to have an effect on eventual partition.
http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/SSources2.html
1. Muslim side of Unionist Party started disintegrating after Sir Sikandar Hayat's death.
2. Muslim League felt it needed to be ruling Punjab as foundation for Pakistan (whether it meant Pakistan in a weakly federated united India, or as independent nation).
3. Demographics of Punjab kept them from having undiluted Muslim rule - they needed partners.
4. Muslim League tried to topple the Unionist government and somehow form a government.
5. They were not getting anywhere until the British announced the date of departure from India.
That was the terminating event for the Unionists. This is because Unionist power was derived from the peculiar association with the British arising from step 0 above. (Sorry, the website does not have all the material that explains this relationship).
6. In the agitation against the Unionists, because of the tactics they used, and because of their arrogance, they utterly destroyed any possibility of Sikhs or Hindus joining in a coalition with them. Punjab would have to be partitioned, even in a United India, because Sikhs and Hindus, after suffering general massacre, would not consent to be in the same administrative unit with the Muslims. The dressing down Jenkins gave to Ghanzafar Ali, found here:
http://www.geocities.com/sadna_gupta/CMPA4_Punjab.html
is worth reading.

[surinder]

One thing that strikes me in the lead up to partition is the following: I will use an example. Let us say I go and occupy someone's house illegally. The owner will agitate to evict me. This goes on for years. Finally I see that there is no way I can stay here, and hence I must leave. Why would I at that juncture---knowing that I am going to be persona non-grata in this house soon---go ahead and make decisions about the house, say, decide to renodel the kitchen, or change the drapes or repaint the house?

British were there for 200 years, they now realize they are out of India and it will be now handed over to the Indians themselves. Why would they at this piont want to redraw the border? Hand it over, let the Indians handle it. Make the decision making and all that process the job Indians. Why would they think it is part of their job when they are not going to be there in a few months?

Elementary logic, right?



A_Gupta, thanks for the summary. We need more summaries like these, which my cite relevant materials.

[Keshav]

Make the decision making and all that process the job Indians. Why would they think it is part of their job when they are not going to be there in a few months?

Elementary logic, right?

I don't have a source for this but let me just put it out there and others can determine if its correct or not.

The British were divided on who to support. If you read the E-Book Ramana provided above, the author puts forth an atmosphere that the British were not too keen on supporting the Muslims because they were actively anti-colonial while others have posted here about the disgust the British had for Hindu/Sikh culture versus what they percieved as strict, sterile Islam. In light of this, the British probably fell back on the old ethnic divisions.

Churchill was an active racist who, while hating the Muslims, liked them better than the Hindus who felt neither of them could govern well. It was probably their idea that if they could control the people on the basis of religion, that ethnicity were auto-fragment the country and it would simply need them again. This flows with the original British thesis that their conquest of India was not only good but required because the Indians were incapable of governing themselves peacefully.

Hoping India would disintegrate, they supported Pakistan for a variety of reasons - the Great Game, belief in Muslim superiority, banking on future problems between the two/many states, etc.

The British hope was that (and I'm going out on a limb here) considering their devastated economy, India would be ripe for the picking after balkanization. It sounds crazy but in the dying dies of the British Empire, this behavior doesn't seem out of place (i.e. delusions of grandeur in the face of crushing failure after hundreds of years of dominance).

[SBajwa]

formation of pakistan was started with the Jahangir becoming emperor of India and choosing Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi over other Sufi and Shias., thus derailing the policies of Akbar.

Till Babar coming to India, muslims only lived in cities, then they ruled in cities and then with Jahangir
and later Aurungzeb they ruled the countryside through atrocities.

also!! Jahangir was mostly drunk through his rule, while his wife noorjahan though Sarhindi was in charge of India.

[Keshav]

formation of pakistan was started with the Jahangir becoming emperor of India and choosing Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi over other Sufi and Shias., thus derailing the policies of Akbar.

I'm not sure who he was, but it seems to me that someone like Shah Wali Ullah, the mullah who extorted Ahmed Shah Durrani to jihad against the Marathas at Panipat and then later against the Sikhs had a huge following in his time era.

I remember reading an article about how enormous his influence was during this time.

Edit:
Here's one example
1) http://kashmirherald.com/featuredarticl ... ullah.html

2) http://miftaahulkhair.wordpress.com/200 ... nstitutes/

3) http://www.saag.org/common/uploaded_files/paper629.html

If you have to read one, read #3

The Sepoy mutiny of 1857 was a turning point in the history of Islamic fundamentalism in India. With its failure Indian Muslims lost all hopes to restore Muslim power in India. But successive Ulama in their attempt to keep the movement alive turned towards institutionalised Islamic movement.

Some prominent followers of Wahhabi movement like Muhammad Qasim Nanauti and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi drew furter inspiration from the religio-political concept of Wali Ullah and set up an Islamic Madrassa at Deoband in U.P. on May 30, 1866, which grew into a higher Islamic learning centre and assumed the present name of Dar-ul-Uloom (Abode of Islamic learning) in 1879.

For last 135 years Dar-ul-Uloom, which is more a movement than an institution has been carrying the tradition of Wahabi movement of Saudi Arabia and of Wali Ullah of Delhi.

Even Sir Sayid Ahmad drew inspiration from the tactical moderation of Islam from Walli Ullah in launching Aligarh movement. The Muslim politics as we see today in Aligarh Muslim University is deeply influenced with the Islamic thought of Wali Ullah.

Most of the Muslim scholars and Islamic historians have projected Wali Ullah 'as founder of Islamic modernism' and a reformer of faith because of his emphasis on rational evaluation of Shariat.

His attempt to present an integrated view of the various schools of Islamic thought was however, more a tactical move for the political unity of Muslims to restore the political authority of Islam than for overall development of an integrated Indian society.

His insistence for not diluting the cultural identity of Arab in a Hindu-majority environment shows that his so-called reform of Islam was only for a political motive. His obsession to extreme Sunnism of Sufi tradition exposes the theory of Islamic modernism. His political objective that followers of Islam should not lose their status of dominant political group in state Wali Ullah was against the concept of civilised democracy.

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan is another person to look for - his policy of "Muslims first" lead to the creation of the AIML and an ideological anchor for the Khilafat movement in India.

Going back to Jahangir is unnecessary to understand fundamentalist Islam.

[A_Gupta]

Maybe it is an inevitable dynamic of Muslim societies that the politicians compete to see who is most extreme. But until 1937-38, Muslim demands could be understood as demanding a safeguard from the majority (but not asking for anything out of proportion with their numbers). It is after that that Jinnah raised the notion of parity. Namely in a United India, (Hindus + everyone else) have the same weight as (Musalmans); or in any kind of federation, Hindustan and Pakistan have equal weight.

[A_Gupta]

<I>British were there for 200 years, they now realize they are out of India and it will be now handed over to the Indians themselves. Why would they at this piont want to redraw the border? Hand it over, let the Indians handle it. Make the decision making and all that process the job Indians. Why would they think it is part of their job when they are not going to be there in a few months?</I>

If for no other reason than British prestige, which would suffer if they left things in a mess.

[ramana]

keshav, Shah Walliullah looked up to Shaik Ahmed Sirhindi for inspiration.

While at it look for Jemaluddin Afghani an exile from Ottomon Turkey living in India- Hyderabad and Calcutta. He was the link between the old and new Muslim.

Wiki on Jamal al Din al Afghani

With picture and all that

[ramana]

Re-Reading about the Khilafat movement and all that I wonder if the Taliban call to re-establish the new Khilafat is an old Indian Muslim dream? It appears of all the Muslims in the world/ummah it was the Indian Muslims who were most affected by the abolition. Is the Taliban attempt a return to old ideas and dreams?

They Partitioned India and hoped that KSA as the custodian of the Holy places would be an adequate substitute but looks like the princely affairs of Al Saud family were a disappointment for them and they saw a new begining after the end of Afghanistan war against Soviet Union.

[Prem]

Ramana,
No Paki story is complete without Islamic input. British as per their nature took advantage of every division but why blame them for making Pakistan when millions of Muslims living in India rejected and trampled upon their birthland and adopted alien parents to show their real face of dogmatic exclusiveness. Jinnah was but the voice of this rejection .

Islam could not erase Indian civilization as was done to Egypt , Persia etc . Subcontinetal Muslims have no H&D among Ummah nations as they are considered loosers and inferior. The struggle and dream is to wipe out the kuffar and get appointed as leader of Ummah.