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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 13:57 
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rohitvats wrote:
Rahul M wrote:
Austin, could you kindly list IN's aggregate sea-lift capability for us, including civilian assets that might be used ?

rohit, could you help us identify IA's amphib units, if there are any that train for that role regularly, and what their wartime role might be ? in IA thread ?

TIA.


There is one Infantry Brigade tasked for amphib. role and one more was to come up in Trivandrum...I don't remember the numbers...let me check.


BMP's were deployed by sea in the last amphib exercises on the west coast, would those be a part of the amphib bde you refer to or from outside units ?
ideally an amphib formation will be of a self-contained combined arms type isn't it ? and IN's amphibs do have the ability to carry tanks.


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 13:58 
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shukla wrote:
sum wrote:
Two Army Majors honoured with Kirti Chakra


These are amazing stories of pure bravery!! Hats off...


Where can I read the citations of ALL the awardees? Newspapers mention only 2 or 3 citations.


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 17:06 
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Rahul M wrote:

rohit, could you help us identify IA's amphib units, if there are any that train for that role regularly?

There is one Infantry Brigade tasked for amphib. role and one more was to come up in Trivandrum...I don't remember the numbers...let me check


The brigade was mentioned as 91 Infantry Brigade based at Trivandum.


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 17:22 
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ATT ATREYA, here is the full list of awardees and citations. Hail the bravehearts of the nation.

ASHOK CHAKRA
IC 59066N MAJOR MOHIT SHARMA (POSTHUMOUS)
1ST BATTALION THE PARACHUTE REGIMENT (SPECIAL FORCES)

IC 59066N Maj Mohit Sharma was commissioned into First Battalion of the Parachute Regiment (Special Forces) on December 30, 1999. During his initial probation period, he got injured and was posted back to his parent unit on medical grounds where he served for three years. Thereafter was posted to 38 Rashtriya Rifles Battalion and due to his exemplary services in combating terrorism during OP RAKSHAK he was awarded the Chief of Army Staff Commendation Card. After serving in the unit for 21 months he again volunteered for probation with the First Battalion The Parachute Regt (Special Forces) and displaying unparalleled motivation he successfully cleared probation. He was awarded with Sena Medal (gallantry) for his daring covert operation in 2005.

On 21 Mar 2009 while tracking an infiltrating terrorist group he and his men came under heavy volume of fire. Unmindful of his safety he rescued two of his comrades to cover under overwhelming effective fire, killed two terrorists and in the process sustained multiple gunshot wounds. Grievously wounded sensing grave danger to his commandos he charged on the terrorists and killed two more at close range. The brave officer succumbed to his injuries and made the supreme sacrifice in the finest traditions of the paltan and the country.

SS-40576A MAJOR D SREERAM KUMAR
39 ASSAM RIFLES

SS-40576A Major D Sreeram Kumar was born on 11 Jan 1981 at Jhansi in Uttar Pradesh. He passed his matric and intermediate exam from Sainik School Amaravati Nagar, Tamil Nadu in 1996 and 1998 respectively. He was commissioned into 90 Medium Regiment (Artillery) on 20 Mar 2004 and was promoted to the Rank of Major on 24 Aug 2008.

Major D Sreeram Kumar is presently serving with 39 Assam Rifles since Mar 2007 in Arunachal Pradesh (OP ORCHID) and from 07 Dec 2007 in Manipur (OP HIFAZAT). With his consummate leadership and ingenuity he has created an effective and vibrant intelligence network, delivering hard blows to the activities of the terrorists and making it extremely difficult for them to operate in the battalion area of responsibility.

Due to his efforts there has been a palpable decrease in insurgency activities in the unit area of responsibility which has bought succor to the people and ensured their safety. The officer has personally participated in number of operations, leading from the front and has eliminated 12 terrorists, apprehended 23 terrorists and recovered 12 weapons since induction of the Battalion in Manipur (OP HIFAZAT) in Dec 2007. Largely due to his efforts and earnestness the unit in 2008, has achieved numerous operational successes in Manipur (OP HIFAZAT).

KIRTI CHAKRA
IC-59630X MAJOR AMIT OSCAR FERNANDES
SEVENTH BATTALION THE MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY

IC-59630X Major Amit Oscar Fernandes was commissioned into the 7TH MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY on 13 May 2000. The officer is presently posted with the battalion which is deployed in Counter Insurgency Operational Area in Jammu and Kashmir since 07 Sep 2006.

He has served with 27 RASHTRIYA RIFLE (MARATHA LIGHT INFANTRY) from 23 Aug 2002 to 18 Aug 2002 deployed in Counter Insurgency Operational in Jammu and Kashmir and thereafter with Commando Wing, Junior Leader Wing, The Infantry School, Belgaum as a Instructor from 19 Sep 2004 to 06 Sep 2006.

On 16 Nov 2008, an input received at 1650 hrs indicated likely presence of terrorists in general area Beli Baihk, District-Baramulla. A well planned search and destroy operation was directed towards general area Beli Baihk at 1700 hrs. Terrorists moving towards Lachhipura was spotted by the search party under Major Amit Oscar Fernandes at 2045 hrs only at extremely close range due to poor visibility and good cover. The contact with terrorists was established and intense fire fight ensured. In the fire fight two terrorists were killed. The third terrorists closed in and fired on Maj Amit Oscar Fernandes. The officer caught the barrel of terrorists weapon and deflected the fire away from himself and his party. The terrorist bit his thumb to release the weapon. Maj Amit Oscar Fernandes overpowered the terrorist, snatched his weapon and shot him dead. Major Fernandes by his raw courage, extreme determination and timely action saved the lives of his comrades while eliminating three hard core terrorists.

IC-61379L MAJOR DEEPAK TEWARI
Corps of EME

IC-61379L Major Deepak Tewari was commissioned into Corps of EME on 08 Dec 2001. He completed his attachment period with 8 Bihar from 08 Dec 2001 to 07 Dec 2002 and was then posted to 7002 EME Battalion from 08 Dec 2002 to 03 Jun 2005. Major Deepak Tewari was posted to 14 Rashtriya Rifles (Garhwal Rifle) on 29 Jun 2008 after completion of his Engineering Degree at MCEME Secunderabad.

On 27 November 2008, he received specific information from the Brigade HQ, regarding presence of five terrorists in one of the houses of Shokbaba. He rapidly moved in pitch dark night, thus surprising the terrorists with the speed of movement. At 0015 hrs while closing in on to the target, the officer heard the militants coming out of the house towards them. On seeing troops, terrorists opened heavy volume of fire. The officer, despite the barrage of fire, displaying nerves of steel and quick reflexes retaliated and chased four terrorists who jumped behind a rock, lobbed a grenade and resumed firing at the officer. In the face of terrorist fire, displaying dogged determination, the officer moved forward with lightning speed, leap frogging behind boulders, encircled the terrorists and in a daring act of bravery, single handedly eliminated three terrorists in extremely close range gun battle of approximately three meters and critically injuring the fourth. The brave officer then provided personal leadership to the team which resulted in elimination of five hardcore Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists.

9113063K PARATROOPER SHABIR AHMAD MALIK (POSTHUMOUS)
1ST PARA SPECIAL FORCES

No. 9113063K Paratrooper Shabir Ahmad Malik joined the army on 15 Mar 2007 in J&K Light Infantry. An alumnus of the prestigious Sainik School Manasbal, he was a fierce patriot since childhood and thus volunteered for Special Forces. Out of two hundred odd probationers he got selected to become part of the elite First Para (SF) on 15 Mar 2008.

As a young paratrooper, he proved to be a very motivated and hardworking soul. Always ready to volunteer for any task not considering the risks involved. He volunteered as a scout to lead his troops in operations.

On 21 Mar 2009, his troop was tracking an infiltrating column of terrorists when leading as a scout he observed suspicious movement and alerted his commando buddy. An overwhelming volume of fire from three directions by the terrorists resulted in the injury of his buddy. Undaunted the young paratrooper crawled under overwhelming effective fire and rescued his comrade to cover and further charging on the terrorists killed two at close quarters in hand to hand combat. During this act of bravery he sustained severe gunshot wounds but refusing to be evacuated he kept motivating and directing his troop mates. The brave paratrooper finally succumbed to his injuries but not before he had eliminated two hardcore terrorists and helped in successful evacuation of his buddy. This act of valour and selfless sacrifice has made him a youth icon in Kashmir valley.

2994546Y NAIK RISHIKESH GURJAR
10 RASHTRIYA RIFLES (RAJPUT)

2994546Y Naik Rishikesh Gurjar 10 Rashtriya Rifles (Rajput) was born on July 10, 1978 at village Nisura, Dist Sawaimathopur, Rajasthan. He did his schooling in his village and studied upto class 8th. The individual got enrolled into the Rajput Regiment on October 28, 1995 and after successful completion of basic training from Rajput Regimental Centre, Fatehgarh, he joined 3 Rajput in mid-1997. During his service career, he has participated in Operation Vijay at Kargil from June 1999 to Sep 99 in operation in Operation Parakram / Rakshak at Bandipura (J&K) from December 2002 to August 2005 and in operation Rakshak at Doda from October 2007 till date.

Presently as an NCO incharge of Ghatak Platoon of 10 Rashtriya Rifles, he has been part of various operations during, which include arrest of two overground workers with Rs. 1,90,000/-, one Terrorist of LeT ‘Tanzeem’ apprehended with Chinese Grenade and surrender of two terrorists of LeT ‘Tanzeems’.


SHAURYA CHAKRA

1. GS-173875N Satish Kumar, BRO, Operator Excavating Machinery Grade–II (cleared a landslide at great risk to his own life)

2. 26696 Sqn Ldr Harkirat Singh (landed a stricken MiG at night)

3. IC-64795 Maj Ankur Garg

4. IC-62248 Maj Saurabh Dutt Kholia

5. 15330627 Lance Naik Sujith Babu V (Posthumous)

6. IC-57104 Maj Dinesh Singh Parmar

7. IC-63089 Maj Subramaniam Anand

8. 25871 Sqn Ldr Tarun Kumar Chaudhry (Piloted away a stricken chopper after Maoists shot at it and killed an airman in Jagdalpur)

9. 776951 Sgt Mustafa Ali (Posthumous) (Shot dead by Naxalite as his IAF chopper was taking off in Jagdalpur)

10. GS-171792-K Operator Excavating Machinery Pritam Chand (Posthumous)

11. GS-173772-P Driver Mechanical Transport Grade – II Piar Chand (Posthumous)

12. 9107449 Rifleman Mohd Abdul Amieen Bhat (Posthumous)

13. IC-70145 Lt Satbir Singh (Posthumous)

14. 13625790 Naik Manoj Singh (Posthumous)

15. 2795178 Sepoy Hanmant Mahadeo Yevale

16. 13622147 Hav Vipan Thakur (Posthumous)

17. SS-39651 Maj Ajay Singh

18. JC-74651 Naib Subedar Ganesh Nath

19. IC-61038 Maj Harmeet Singh Samra

20. G/114735 Hav Thangjalet (Posthumous)

21. IC-59470 Maj Manoj Aruparayil Pothen

22. 4478544 Lance Naik Davinder Singh

23. IC-63580 Capt Mudassar Iqbal

24. IC-69343 Capt Anoop Pandey

25. 120351-A POWTR CD III Chandra Sekhar (Posthumous)

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARDS

PARAM VISHISHT SEVA MEDAL

1. IC-24198 Lt Gen Chanroth Kunnumal Suchindra Sabu

2. 01248-K Vice Admiral Sanjeev Bhasin

3. 12939 Air Marshal Venkatraman Ramamurthy Iyer

4. 13472 Air Marshal Pramod Vasant Athawale

5. MR-03364 Lt Gen Naresh Kumar Parmar

6. IC-24219 Lt Gen Ajay Kumar Singh Chandele

7. IC-25053 Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj

8. IC-25064 Lt Gen Shreedharan Shyam Kumar

9. IC-25126 Lt Gen Rajinder Singh Sujlana

10. IC-24706 Lt Gen Kammula Ramachandra Rao

11. IC-25213 Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal

12. IC-25469 Lt Gen Karan Singh Yadava

13. IC-23689 Lt Gen (Retd) Narinder Singh Brar

14. IC-29915 Lt Gen (Retd) Vinod Chopra

15. 12833 Air Marshal (Retd) Keshava Murthy Rama Sundara

UTTAM YUDH SEVA MEDAL

1. IC-25538 Lt Gen Rabindran Krishna Swamy

2. IC-25816 Lt Gen Bikram Singh

BAR TO ATI VISHISHT SEVA MEDAL

3. IC-25457 Lt Gen Vijay Kumar Ahluwalia

ATI VISHISHT SEVA MEDAL

1. IC-24654 Lt Gen Tejinder Singh

2. IC-27146 Lt Gen Uma Shankar Prasad Sinha

3. IC-25141 Lt Gen Deepak Raj

4. IC-25442 Lt Gen Swatantarta Nand Handa

5. IC-25056 Lt Gen Inderjit Singh

6. IC-25815 Lt Gen Gurdeep Singh

7. IC-27325 Lt Gen Rajesh Kochhar

8. V-00330 Lt Gen Jai Krishan Srivastava

9. 02373-T Vice Admiral Paras Nath

10. 01701-R Vice Admiral Pradip Kumar Chatterjee

11. 01773-D Vice Admiral Anurag Gopalan Thapliyal

12. 13606 Air Marshal Simhakutty Varthaman

13. IC-25280 Maj Gen Ashok Vasudeo Taskar

14. IC-30052 Maj Gen Brijinder Singh Daulta

15. IC-30076 Maj Gen Sathish Chandra Nair

16. IC-30137 Maj Gen Sukhraj Pal Kochhar

17. IC-30389 Maj Gen Sanjiv Chachra

18. IC-30571 Maj Gen Rajeev Datt

19. IC-33450 Maj Gen Darshan Lal Chowdhary

20. IC-30687 Maj Gen Sanjiv Langer

21. 01660-Y Rear Adm Chander Shekhar Patham

22. 13508 Air Vice Marshal Dinesh Mukundan

23. 14446 Air Vice Marshal Anil Kumar Behl

24. 15327 Air Vice Marshal Ajit Shankarrao Bhonsle

25. 13487 Air Vice Marshal Salem Sunder Ram Gunashekar

26. 15220 Air Cmde Kulwant Singh Gill


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 18:01 
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Army practices response to NBC disasters

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The Indian Army’s Northern Command Saturday concluded a two-day exercise aimed at practicing its response to nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) disasters, an official said.
On first day of the exercise, held in Himachal Pradesh’s Dharmashala area, Friday, deliberations were held on the situations which would be encountered and “the response of the civil administration as the first responder and that of the army as the second responder,” army spokesman Major K.S. Rathi said in a release here.

“On the second day (Saturday), troops carried out their drills for mitigation of the said disasters,” the spokesman said, but gave no further details. According to the spokesman, the exercise “benefited the army in streamlining their drills and procedures, thereby ensuring effective response to any such disaster.” “It also re-emphasised the requirement of coordination and understanding between various branches of the army and the civil administration to face any disasters.”


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 18:39 
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Thanks a lot pmund ji. I love reading the citations of awardees. It fills me with pride and passion. R.I.P posthumous awardees! You martyrdom will inspire others to no end!


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PostPosted: 11 Apr 2010 22:26 
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Anantz wrote:
Rahul M wrote:

rohit, could you help us identify IA's amphib units, if there are any that train for that role regularly?

There is one Infantry Brigade tasked for amphib. role and one more was to come up in Trivandrum...I don't remember the numbers...let me check


The brigade was mentioned as 91 Infantry Brigade based at Trivandum.


The number is correct - iirc, it is part of 54 Infantry Division.

Interestingly, 340 Infantry Brigade was raised in the 80s for amphib. role - the same is now (I) Mechanized Brigade...


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 00:47 
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the task ahead for the new chief Gen Singh


Army Chief must lead from the front

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EDITS | Wednesday, April 14, 2010


Army chief must lead from front

Ashok K Mehta

While the new Army Chief, Gen VK Singh, has set his own priorities, he has received a fair amount of advice from military veterans and newspaper editorials. On their own, Service chiefs can’t do much by way of introducing change: They can tinker — which they usually do — or they can make grand resolves. But somewhere down the line it dawns on them that the system is too deeply entrenched and vested interests so embedded that it is not worth trying in the first place.

Still, some have succeeded in creating a spectacular mess in the name of change and innovation. One Army Chief started his innings with what was described as “reaching out to officers” with a personal letter encapsulating his vision of an Officer and a Gentleman. When he realised his ethical guidelines could not be implemented he forgot about it. The last incumbent discovered unpleasantly that the Army Chief, if he wishes to oblige, can be pushed around by his Minister to the detriment of that high office.

Gen Singh’s first task is to restore the image of his office allowing no one to interfere in his chain of command and ensuring the principle percolates down the line. He must make known that he will protect and promote the health, prosperity and operational effectiveness of the Army whatever the stakes.

Most issues are best addressed collectively. Strength is in numbers too, as the Services discovered from the unified approach to the Fifth and Sixth Pay Commission. Why should the three chiefs allow the Ministry of Defence to divide and rule? A priority task for Gen Singh is to get hold of Admiral Nirmal Verma and Air Chief Marshal PV Naik to forge a united front. This will be easy as all three are of the same vintage and identical professional background.

Following the Dantewada massacre last week, the Army and Air Force Chiefs made some relevant professional comments on the CRPF-Maoist encounter in response to questions by the media. They were in good company as a couple of Ministers had also made critical remarks. Promptly the Cabinet Secretary issued a directive authorising only the Home Ministry to speak on the Maoist problem, forgetting that the Army and IAF are already involved in training and logistics support of the State and Central police forces.

While exercising care in what is said, the chiefs must not allow muzzling of legitimate views (including dissent) especially in relation to operational readiness, morale and welfare of troops. It was heartening to learn that Air Chief Marshal Naik has no objection to the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff provided the model is appropriate. This is a breakthrough of sorts as in the past, it is the Air Force which has blocked the creation of the CDS’s post. The Group of Ministers approved the appointment of a CDS in 2000 after the Kargil intrusions, but the Government has stalled the appointment, saying there is no political consensus.

Gen Singh and Admiral Verma must settle with Air Chief Marshal Naik over single malt whisky on the right model for CDS. The blueprint is there. All that needs to be done is for the Service chiefs to accept one model, take it to the Prime Minister and President, and tell them this is what they want.

The Big Three must similarly attend to the festering sore of underutilisation of capital budget for defence modernisation. Over the last decade, around Rs 60,000 crore could not be spent (and an additional one-fifth was misspent at the last minute to beat the March syndrome) due to a variety of reasons. Very recently, Vice-Chief of Air Staff, Air Marshal PK Barbora, stated at an international conference that politics was hurting India’s defence and that political parties use defence procurement deals to settle political vendettas.

Defence Minister AK Antony, who has set saintly standards in probity, has ensured that one-fifth of capital funds go unused and back to the treasury to balance the fiscal deficit. :mrgreen: The Service chiefs must ask for a Group of Ministers to end this farce. A separate committee, headed by a professional/strategic analyst — as was done recently in the UK through the Bernard Gray report — should be established to energise defence acquisitions, ensuring operational readiness supersedes probity and lengthy procedures.

As Eastern Army Commander, Gen Singh chaired a multi-faceted study on the operational preparedness of the Army so that he could implement the recommendations when he became Chief. In the Army’s Military Operations room and its think-tank, Centre of Land Warfare Studies, impressive power-point presentations are made about the two-and-a-half front doctrine and cold start with the entire spectrum of conflict compressed on to two slides.

Such intense professional orientation to conventional and nuclear conflict in a network-centric environment underemphasises the nature of battle that the Army has been and will be fighting for the foreseeable future. It is Low Intensity Conflict where the stellar role is played by the Infantry soldier whose modernisation has been ignored since 1985 when the first 15-year Army modernisation plan was drawn. India has not fought a conventional war since 1971 though the Army, notably the Infantry, has not ceased fighting since independence. The infantry modernisation (‘Infantry Vision 2020’) was approved only last year and Gen Singh has to put this on fast track.

The Service chiefs who are accountable for the actions and outcomes of their warriors have not had a matching role in decision-making. This too, needs to be corrected and their access to the political leadership must not stop at the door of the National Security Adviser or the Cabinet Secretary. Gen Singh must lead the way in reopening access to the Prime Minister for institutionalised meetings as was the practice in the past.

In the mid-1980s the triumvirate of Gen K Sundarji, Admiral R Tahiliani and Air Chief Marshal D Lafontaine functioned admirably as a tri-service entity. The Army and Air Force accepted voluntary cuts to accommodate the Navy’s requirements for additional funds, such was inter-service cooperation. No opportunity was given for bureaucracy-induced discord. It was boom time for the Services and requires to be reinvented.

As the primus inter pares, Gen Singh has to help build the triumvirate of Service chiefs speaking in one voice for the greater good of the armed forces and the country.



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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 03:54 
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Recently bought the book - "Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers". Was reading through the biography of Lt.Gen. Hanut Singh. The man had very high level of professional and moral courage...Couple of interesting anecdotes: As GOC 17 Division in 80s, argued for more offensive approach towards operations in his sector (which btw is opposite the LAC in Sikkim) but the Corps Commander differed (as it is, he was not in 'good books' of GOC-in-C of the Corps)...in a debate during Sand-Model exercise, when the Corps commander did not agree to his concepts, his reply was(not verbatim),"As long as I'm GOC of 17 Division, this is how I will fight my battles".

Subsequently, he was posted as GOC 31 Armored Division. During a brain storming exercise in presence of Lt.Gen. Sundarji (Army Commander - Western Command), they were debating certain concepts introduced by Lt.Gen.Sundarji. While many other oficers agreed with him in private on certain objections to the concepts, no one said anything during the debate. Therefore, it was him against the Army Commander and the house...while he debated with Sundarji on the concepts, he also sensed that the debate might get acrimonious and he did not want this to happen in front of Junior officers. He again closed the arguments with the words to the effect,"As long as I'm the GOC, this is how 31 Armored Division will fight"

It is a mark of his professional abilities that Sundarji, then COAS designate, advised the MOS, Arun Singh, to appoint him as 2 Strike Corps commander - when the incumbent COAS, Vaidya, had overlooked him for this post. Incidentally, Hanut Singh was the II Corps Commander during the Brasstacks...


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 07:32 
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rohitvats wrote:
Anantz wrote:
The brigade was mentioned as 91 Infantry Brigade based at Trivandum.


The number is correct - iirc, it is part of 54 Infantry Division.

Interestingly, 340 Infantry Brigade was raised in the 80s for amphib. role - the same is now (I) Mechanized Brigade...
aha, so my memory was playing correct.
btw, does 340th retain its amphib orientation ?

also, suman sharma mentions the new mtn div being raised as 71th, any confirmation from your end ?


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 07:49 
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General Zorawar Singh Day celebrated

Image

The borders of India, which extend beyond the mighty Himalayas, are the imprint of gallantry of the Dogra Army led by their charismatic general, Zorawar Singh. Every year 13 April is celebrated as General Zorawar Singh Day. This year again, a befitting function was organized by the Army at Zorawar Chowk, Bahu Plaza, Jammu.

Wreaths were laid on behalf of the Colonel of the Regiment, Jammu and Kashmir Rifles and Ladakh Scouts, Lt Gen B S Jaswal, GOC-in-C Northern Command. This grand event was organized by the 20th Battalion, the Jammu and Kashmir Rifles, Sainik Welfare Board and J&K Ex-Servicemen League.


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 18:45 
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Ajai Shukla reports..

Army to order more Arjun tanks

Quote:
The success of the indigenous Arjun main battle tank (MBT) in desert trials last month is generating additional army orders for a tank that is emerging as a notable R&D success. Meanwhile, the Arjun is becoming more capable; the Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO), which designed the Arjun, says that all future Arjuns will incorporate major improvements, including the ability to fire missiles.

Business Standard had reported (Arjun tank outruns, outguns T-90, 25th Mar 10) that the Arjun tank had conclusively outperformed the Russian T-90 --- the army’s current frontline MBT --- in trials conducted in early March by the Bikaner-based 180 Armoured Brigade.

The army is still evaluating that trial report to decide how many additional Arjuns it should order, over and above the existing order of 124 tanks. But the question before the army is no longer whether to order more Arjuns; rather, it is how many to order? Highly placed Ministry of Defence sources confirm that the army is moving away from its staunch opposition to the Arjun.

The DRDO, meanwhile, is working overtime to sweeten the deal. Dr S Sundaresh, the DRDO’s Chief Controller for Armaments and Combat Engineering, has told Business Standard, that all Arjuns now ordered will fire anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) through the tank’s main gun; provide extra protection for the tank’s crew through explosive reactive armour, or ERA; be fitted with thermal imaging panoramic sights that allow the Arjun’s commander to scan his surroundings even by night; and incorporate at least seven other improvements over the current Arjuns.

“We had test-fired the Israeli LAHAT missile through the Arjun gun as far back as in 2005”, pointed out Sundaresh. “It will take us about six months to integrate the LAHAT’s designator into the Arjun’s fire control system.”

The addition of two tonnes of ERA will increase the weight of the Arjun to just over 60 tonnes, making it one of the world’s heaviest tanks. But the DRDO claims that its powerful 1500 Horse Power engine easily handles the extra weight.

“The ERA will protect the Arjun’s crews from enemy missiles. Initially we will fit the same Russian ERA that protects the T-90 and the T-72. But we will also develop our own indigenous ERA.

An early order from the army would be crucial, says the DRDO, for continuity in the Arjun production line at the Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) near Chennai. The current order of 124 Arjuns will occupy the production line until end-2011. For the next order of Arjuns to hit the production line then, the order would have to be placed now. That would allow 18 months for provisioning of components, such as armour sheets and sub-systems that are manufactured by ancillary suppliers. That period also caters for the purchase of foreign systems, e.g. the engine from MTU, Germany.

“Continuity is vital for quality control”, explain officials from HAV Avadi. “We have instituted systems for quality control in the current order of Arjuns, which is why they performed so reliably during trials. These systems will wither away if the production line shuts down for lack of orders.”

Since the Arjun’s assembly takes 12-18 months, a fresh order of Arjuns will start being delivered 30-36 months after the order is placed. Thereafter, HVF will deliver 30 Arjuns per year if it operates with just one shift of workers; 50 tanks per year with two shifts


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 20:41 
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Rahul M wrote:
aha, so my memory was playing correct.
btw, does 340th retain its amphib orientation ?

also, suman sharma mentions the new mtn div being raised as 71th, any confirmation from your end ?


340(I) Mech. is with XII Corps in Nasirabad-Rajasthan. I don't think they are getting close to sea anytime soon :P . From what I know, the other MD for NE is 55th and not 71st

Interestingly, I think we've got the expansion of acronym RAPID incorrect - it should be Reorganized Assault Plains Infantry Division. Came across in the book that I'm reading by ex-Maj. General. Makes more sense actually...


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 21:23 
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Continuing excerpts from the book "Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers".

The Nathu La incident - 1967

Many of us have heard of the same but I don't know how many know the details. Came across the same in biography of Lt.Gen.Sagat Singh - he was the GOC 17 Mountain Division(MD) during the incident. Some details -

--The genesis of the incident lay in Indo-Pak 1965. With the aim to help their freinds, PLA started putting pressure on
IA. PLA placed ultimatum that IA withdraw from Nathu La and Jelep La and started intense and highly provocative activities-including psy ops. Nathu La was with 17 MD while Jelep La was with 27 MD.

--As per the plans then, the main defensive position of 17MD lie in Changgu and Nathu La was to be treated as only an observation post. Similarly, Jelep La was observation post for 27MD with main defences at Lungthu.

--Corps HQ gave orders to both MDs to fall back on main defensive location and vacate the two passes.27 MD vacated Jelep La which was promptly occupied by the PLA. Sagat Singh refused and 17MD held onto Nathu La. To this date, Jelep La is with PLA while we have the Nathu La. Sagat Singh is the man India needs to thank for this - even though the Corps Commander wanted him to withdraw.

--Sagat Singh's line of argument was this: Nathu La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed - the principle on which McMohan Line was drawn. India had gone to war in 62 based on this line and it did not make sense now to abandon it. Also, the shoulders and adjoining features of the pass offered excellent view for several kilometers of Yatung Valley on Tibet side.This allowed IA to keep track of any movement on the PLA side and use the features around Nathu La as OP for directing artilery fire on PLA positions. Giving Nathu La to PLA would give them very good observation points while denying IA the same.

Plus, Nathu La(and Jelep La) was the only point of ingress through the Chumbi Valley and was on the main & traditional trade route between India and Tibet. This itself held immense psycological value.

--There was use of force from PLA during the period to which IA replied-but short of main artillery guns, as the permission for the same had not been given. This continued from 1965 to 1967. During this whole time, the border on the pass had not been demarcated and patrols kept running into eah other - there were incidents and loss of life on both side.

--In 1967, Sagat Singh discussed the problem with Corps Commander, Lt.Gen. Aurora and suggested that border on Nathu La be clearly marked to prevent such incidents. He offered to walk along the crestline of the pass to test the PLA resolve and if they did not object, the same would be marked as border. He did the same and while the Chinese commander walked on the other side, they did not object to this walk by Sagat Singh on the crestline of the pass.

--So, now Sagat Singh ordered to mark the crestline and double wire fence was to be put from either side of pass to its Northern and Southern shoulders. This is where the main story starts.

--The work began on 20th August 1967 and immediately the PLA objected to it. Inspite of PLA threating and trying to block the work (at one time leading to scuffle), most of the work was done by 10th September.

--It was decided to complete the last leg of work and finish the job before 1st light of 11th September. For this, additional manpower (engineers and pioneers) were brought in as was a Company of 18 Rajput - 2 Grenadiers was already in the area.

--As soon as the work began, PLA tried to stop the progress and there was heated debate between PLA officers+Political Commissar and CO of 2 Grenadiers. Passions rose and then suddenly the PLA opened fire. The Grenadier CO was injured and this enraged the Grenadier troops. Led by one Captain, they charged at the PLA positions and were joined in by the supporting company of 18 Rajput. As it is, IA engineers and pioneer troops were in open and this was the only way to silence the PLA positions. Several Indian soldiers were killed in this frontal assault but they did neuteralize the PLA and overwhelm their positions. Both Company Commanders from 2 Grenadiers and 18 Rajput lost their lives in this initial battle.

--This battle then lasted for three days and Sagat Singh brough in heavy artillery. The OP which he had sited on features adjoining the Nathu La pass were used to bring in effective and deadly fire on the PLA. PLA had no such OP facility and due to steep incline on western slope of Nathu La (were most of Indian positions were), the PLA shelling failed to have any impact.This, of course would not have been the case if Sagat Singh had agreed to vacate the Nathu La earlier.

--Indian casualties were 65 KIA and 145 WIA. PLA was estimated to have suffered 300 casualties. The PLA had been given bloody nose and the myth of their invinsibility broken.

PS: The book has interesting anecdotes on the 1962. Will post in some time.


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 21:45 
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rohitvats wrote:
Continuing excerpts from the book "Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers".

The Nathu La incident - 1967



Thank you Rohit sir for this wonderful post. Its strange that there is so little information on the internet about Nathu La incident. This post gave quite an insight. Thanks once again.


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 22:39 
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and we will **** them again in their WZC if they try any of the REMCF/RRF/ whatever nonsense.


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 23:18 
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Rohitvats, thanks for the summary of the 1967 incident. I would like you to, if time and god willing, look at LNS 's article on Battle of Chusul in the BR Monitor as a guide and describe the whole incident with maps.

I recall as schoolboy reading cursory accounts of the battle fo Nathu la in 1967 and was always curious to know more. No luck till now. One thing I recall is reports of 106mm RCls used to destroy the PRC positions/bunkers. Any such thing or is it my vague memory?

We need to document our victories and not let it rest with vague memories. Or else it becomes legend and worse myth!


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PostPosted: 14 Apr 2010 23:52 
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From whatever I've read so far (in the book mentioned above), the complicity of Nehru in 1962 debalce due to acts of commission and ommission is quite obvious. His out and out support for Menon was one of the biggest reasons for the sorry saga of 1962. Another important point is his distrust of Army in particular which led to blinkered vision and decision making. Some important points:

--The famous COAS General Thimayya resignation case. Let me post for the sake of everyone's knowledge - COAS General Thimayya resigned on 31st August 1959 when matters came to head with Mennon - the RM. This was mainly due to the way Menon wanted to run the Defence and Forward Policy (and the way defences of NEFA were being handled).The fact that Major General Kaul was BGS did not help matters either. Here it is important to note that Thimayya was then well liked by Nehru due to his handling of the POW issue in Korea and laurels it brought to the country. Nehru prevailed on Thimayya and got him to take back the resignation. Meanwhile, media had picked up the issue and gave wide coverage to it. Nehru had to give reply in the parliament on the issue and openly supported Mennon on the same. He ended up slighting the COAS and underplayed and trivialized the issues raised by Thimayya. Thimayya was never the same person after this incident and it greatly undermined his stature. This was one episode which further emboldened Mennon and allowed Kaul to run IA as his fief. Thimayya retired in 1961 and in his farwell address to troops said the following prophetic words and I qoute," I hope I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese...God Bless you all". Timayya had recommended Lt.Gen. SPP Thorat as next COAS - this was shot down by Menon and they chose Thapar.

--Soon after independence, a rule had been introduced which forbade IA Chiefs from serving a tenure of more than 4 years. The same was not applicable to IAF/IN/Bereaucracy. When Thimayya retired, he was all of 55 years. Similarly, Cariappa was 53. God knows what would have been the case if he had been the COAS in 1962.

--IB led by B.N. Mullick had suggested that Thimayya was about to launch coup and SPP Thorat was part of the plan. Nehru went to Mountbatten for his views and he assured him that there was no better person than Thimayya for the job :evil:

--SPP Thorat was the Eastern Army Commander till 1961. He, along with Thimayya, were perturbed by the way defences of NEFA were organized. It was the responsibility of Assam Rifles and SPP Thorat wanted NEFA to be places under IA. This was in 1959. Thorat prepared a paper for the defence of NEFA and forwarded to COAS. This was forwarded to Menon for action. Menon termed the same as alarmist and called Thorat as warmonger. He did not forward the paper to Nehru.

--In 1960, Eastern Command conducted an exercise called LAL QUILA at Lucknow(then HQ of Eastern Command). It was attended by COAS and all PSO in AHQ. Here Thorat showed that with present weapons, troops and equipment, the 'Forward Polic' as advocated by Menon and Kaul was untenable. He even showed with timetable how the positions would fall day by day under PLA attack. Kaul, who was the QMG and attended the exercise, differed in his views.

--Thimayya had recommended that SPP Thorat be next COAS - as Eastern Army Commander he knew the problems in NEFA and was best placed to handle the situation. The same not accepted partly due to the Coup theory given above and also because he had given a laudatory speech at the Kumaon Regimental Center during farewell of Thimayya. :roll:

--After the inital Chinese assault, there was lull in the war - as predicted by Thorat in his LAL QUILA exercise. Nehru asked for him during this time and here I will quote verbatim from the book:

'Thorat, how could this have happened? You were in Eastern Command. Did you have any inkling of this starter?'.Thorat replied:'Yes Sir.The possibility had occurred to us and we had warned the ministry'.When he saw the paper that Thorat had sent him in 1959, he was stunned.'Why was this not shown to me?' he asked.Thorat suggested that perhaps the Defence Minister could answer the question. At this Nehru exploded:'Menon,Menon!Why have you got your knife into him? You people do not realize what an intellectual giant he is.' Thorat said:'If he is, Sir, I have seen no evidence of it in the case under consideration'

--Nehru asked Thorat about the possibility of Chinese advancing upto Brahmaputra valley. Thorat replied in negative sayin that they have already stretched their lines of communication and the unilateral cease fire will hold.


Last edited by rohitvats on 15 Apr 2010 00:10, edited 2 times in total.

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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 00:01 
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ramana wrote:
Rohitvats, thanks for the summary of the 1967 incident. I would like you to, if time and god willing, look at LNS 's article on Battle of Chusul in the BR Monitor as a guide and describe the whole incident with maps.

I recall as schoolboy reading cursory accounts of the battle fo Nathu la in 1967 and was always curious to know more. No luck till now. One thing I recall is reports of 106mm RCls used to destroy the PRC positions/bunkers. Any such thing or is it my vague memory?

We need to document our victories and not let it rest with vague memories. Or else it becomes legend and worse myth!


ramana, I have a still better account of Rezang La with me in one of the books on 3rd Division. While the map thing is interesting, it will take some time. Let me try on the weekend and see what effort it involves.

There is no mention of RCL in the book. Talks about Medium Guns being used.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 00:02 
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kittoo wrote:
Thank you Rohit sir for this wonderful post. Its strange that there is so little information on the internet about Nathu La incident. This post gave quite an insight. Thanks once again.


Most welcome. I will post more as I progress with reading of the book.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 00:12 
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rohitvats wrote:

--After the inital Chinese assault, there was lull in the war - as predicted by Thorat in his LAL QUILA exercise. Nehru asked for him during this time and here I will quote verbatim from the book:

'Thorat, how could this have happened? You were in Eastern Command. Did you have any inkling of this starter?'.Thorat replied:'Yes Sir.The possibility had occurred to us and we had warned the ministry'.When he saw the paper that Thorat had sent him in 1959, he was stunned.'Why was this not shown to me?' he asked.Thorat suggested that perhaps the Defence Minister could answer the question. At this Nehru exploded:'Menon,Menon!Why have you got your knife into him? You people do not realize what an intellectual giant he is.' Thorat said:'If he is, Sir, I have seen no evidence of it in the case under consideration'

--Nehru asked Thorat about the possibility of Chinese advancing upto Brahmaputra valley. Thorat replied in negative sayin that they have already stretched their lines of communication and the unilateral cease fire will hold.

It is clear that coordination problem and foriegn policy and advance planning was the real problem during 1962. Indian establishment was not ready for diplomacy and military campaign for the Indo CHina war. Chu Enlai had visited and met Nehru 5 times from 1955 to 1958. He must have figured out that Indian diplomacy and its readiness was below alert and could be taken advantage of.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 09:11 
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India’s Future Main Battle Tank: Which way are we heading?

An article written by some Vinayak Shetti.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 10:30 
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rohitvats wrote:
Nehru went to Mountbatten for his views and he assured him that there was no better person than Thimayya for the job :evil:

Looks like Mountbatten knew members of his "British Indian Army" better, rather than Nehru and Menon knew the "Indian Army" :D. FWIW, I have heard an anecdote that Mr.Menon disliked the Army for their customs and traditions which he felt was "acting more British than British themselves". I have read it in "Freedom at Midnight" than when India gained her freedom, and when the communal riots took place Nehru did a sprint to Mountbatten to get help to settle things back.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 10:31 
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sumshyam wrote:
India’s Future Main Battle Tank: Which way are we heading?

An article written by some Vinayak Shetti.

T-72 "vijeya" ?! enuff said.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 10:52 
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Sachin

I think its hard for us to see this now

But you got to remember for our grandfathers generation - the Military was largely a British tool and hence was never warmed up too.

I spoke to a 91 year old freedom fighter from the South - he was jailed in Andamans.

And he was adamant that about that view.

My own father was a staunch Menon supporter and could see no fault in him leading to countless fights at home.

However one expects better from the likes of Nehru.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 12:31 
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How far are we in indigenizing the Arjun Mk-I ? What % is still imported?


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 12:34 
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ask this question after half the production order of 500 odd tanks are completed (if that happens), no one is going to set-up dedicated production units for a measly 124 tanks and absorb the losses. :wink:


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 12:41 
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Rahul, my question was more in lines with - if anything is done to reduce costs by indigenizing - componenets that is currently being imported for the Arjun. But guess this question will be best put in the armour thread.

I seriously hope there is big follow up order.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 12:46 
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most people have given up hope on the Arjun project.

many are now hoping this same disease does not spread to the LCA.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 12:49 
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rohitvats wrote:
Continuing excerpts from the book "Leadership in the Indian Army - Biographies of Twelve Soldiers".

The Nathu La incident - 1967

Many of us have heard of the same but I don't know how many know the details. Came across the same in biography of Lt.Gen.Sagat Singh - he was the GOC 17 Mountain Division(MD) during the incident. Some details - . . . .


This incident is also why Gen. Sagat was never made the COAS. Indira Gandhi considered him to be too hot-headed; the bureaucrats peed their pants after Nathu-La and went running to IG and complained about him.

The netas in Delhi never like smart, daring officers to rise to high levels. They try their best to bring up sycophants who are easier to control.

Regarding 1962: I don't know how much has been said about the American involvement in the 1962 war, but one of the reasons why the Chicoms didn't push down further was the fear of full-scale American active involvement (instead of just the support they were providing). Other reasons include their stretched-thin supply lines, of course.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 15:11 
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Rajput wrote:
Regarding 1962: I don't know how much has been said about the American involvement in the 1962 war, but one of the reasons why the Chicoms didn't push down further was the fear of full-scale American active involvement (instead of just the support they were providing).

Wrong. The Americans were tied up with the Cuban missile crisis.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 15:35 
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Kailash wrote:
Rahul, my question was more in lines with - if anything is done to reduce costs by indigenizing - componenets that is currently being imported for the Arjun. But guess this question will be best put in the armour thread.

I seriously hope there is big follow up order.

then you missed my point completely. if you try to indigenise for a tiny production run, more often than not you will end up costing more than the imported compoenents, do you get me ? because the producer will include all developmental and fixed costs into the price.

say component X is supplied by a foreign source @ $10/unit, but remember that is after he has produced 10,000 units. he has already recovered his original investment within the first 1000 production run. price at that time would have been $20/unit. now he can afford to sell the component at just the amount it takes him to make it, plus a profit.

if he was to set up a factory for a 124 order run, he would have quoted a price upwards of $150/unit.

assume this was India, labour costs and development costs are lower. even then cost/unit for a 124 run would be > $100/unit. who would buy that when you get one from abroad @ $10/unit ?


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 15:37 
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Point taken ji :!:

More orders is the only thing that can warrant any kind of further R&D in Arjun..


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 15:41 
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Kailash wrote:
More orders is the only thing that can warrant any kind of further R&D in Arjun..


Well strictly speaking not essential (helpful certainly) for further R&D, but critical for lowering the price.

Price per unit of Arjun should only be judged as per a longer production run.


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PostPosted: 15 Apr 2010 17:23 
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Surya wrote:
My own father was a staunch Menon supporter and could see no fault in him

C. Sankaran Nair once chief of R&AW also mentions in his book about Menon's tricky behaviour (in one of the official dinners). Looks like during the initial days of our independence we had many people who have become too idealestic (and some times naive) in understanding politics. Menon's and Nehru's behaviour might be due to this aspect as well.


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PostPosted: 16 Apr 2010 20:53 
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A Deshmukh wrote:
Rajput wrote:
Regarding 1962: I don't know how much has been said about the American involvement in the 1962 war, but one of the reasons why the Chicoms didn't push down further was the fear of full-scale American active involvement (instead of just the support they were providing).

Wrong. The Americans were tied up with the Cuban missile crisis.


Bear in mind that at that time, Korean War was still fresh in the minds of the Chicoms, so their concerns were real.


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PostPosted: 16 Apr 2010 21:01 
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Rajput wrote:
A Deshmukh wrote:


Bear in mind that at that time, Korean War was still fresh in the minds of the Chicoms, so their concerns were real.


Korean War ?? I thought Korean War was over sometime in early 1950s !

K


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PostPosted: 17 Apr 2010 09:28 
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Maoist-shy army prefers Games toilet

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1100417/j ... 349074.jsp


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PostPosted: 17 Apr 2010 11:30 
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Kersi D wrote:
Korean War ?? I thought Korean War was over sometime in early 1950s !


Yeah, we're talking about 1962 here, only 9 years(*) after the Korean war. Chicoms had fought the US
in Korea, and didn't have full diplomatic relations with US. The US was also starting to get involved
militarily in Vietnam by 1962.


(*)It's been 10 years since Kargil, and it's still fresh in our minds....


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PostPosted: 17 Apr 2010 15:34 
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Rahul M, remember the query on BMP with Amphib. Brigade? Well, just check the pics here:

http://www.team-bhp.com/forum/commercial-vehicles-india/46619-indian-armed-forces-army-navy-airforce-vehicle-thread-2.html

God answers the doubts of the faithful in mysterious ways... :mrgreen:


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