International Intelligence news

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Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Philip »

The death of arguably the world's most notorious and "untouchable" fascist,and its greatest criminal,Licio Gelli.

Gelli ,criminal genius and mastermind,whose activities encompassed the world of finance,espionage,terrorism,religion,politics,etc. Gelli was the easily identifiable model for the mafioso godfather "Don Licio Lucchesi" in Godfather-3,who made the famous statement: [/b]" Finance is like a gun,Politics is to know when to pull the trigger".[/b]

Gelli was in reality ,not just in film fiction,at the heart of the Vatican bank scandal involving collapse of Banco Ambrosiano ,the "Grand Puppet Master" of P-2,an illegal Masonic lodge that secretly controlled Italy,mastermind of terror attacks,alleged to be behind the murder of Pope John Paul 1,who was trying to clean up the Vatican bank,the kidnapping and death of Italian PM Aldo Moro,Bologna station bombing, and a CIA masterspy. Gelli's fascist and right wing contacts were so powerful and he was so feared for the information that he possessed that he lived in freedom in his luxurious during his last decadess in Arezzo,an Italian Tuscan hill town,the birthplace of Michelangelo.
Gelli's life history and criminal activities are so incredible that it perfectly underscores the old adage,"truth is stranger than fiction".

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituar ... tuary.html
Licio Gelli, financier - obituary
Grandmaster of a Italy's notorious P2 masonic lodge who was implicated in some of Italy's biggest post-war political and financial scandals


6:54PM GMT 16 Dec 2015

Licio Gelli, who has died aged 96, was one-time fascist blackshirt and grandmaster of a secret Masonic lodge at the centre of Italy’s biggest post-war political scandal; it centred around the collapse, in 1982, of the Banco Ambrosiano, and followed the death of the bank’s former president, Roberto Calvi, who was found in June 1982 hanging from Blackfriar’s Bridge in London.

Calvi had risen to the top of Italy’s largest private bank in the 1970s, during which he worked hand-in-glove with Michele “The Shark” Sindona, a Sicilian banker well connected with both the Mafia and the Christian Democrat political establishment. Both men were members of the P2 (Propaganda Due) lodge of which Gelli was the head and which had operated illegally after it was dissolved by the Grand Orient of Italy (the official Freemasons) in 1976.

With Sindona (who was subsequently killed in jail by a poisoned cup of coffee in 1986)
, Calvi was thought to have set up a complicated web of banking and insurance interests, including laundering drug money for the Mafia and forging a close partnership with Cardinal Paul Marcinkus, head of the Vatican’s bank, the Istituto per le Opere Religiose (IOR). Many paths were allegedly smoothed by Gelli.

An investigation into Calvi’s dealings began in 1978, and in 1981 he was sentenced to four years in jail on charges relating to the illegal export of capital. Freed pending appeal, on June 10 1982 he fled to London on a false passport with a briefcase full of incriminating documents, some showing he was attempting to blackmail the Vatican, among others, in his bid to relieve the financial pressure on his bank. His body was discovered a week later by a postal clerk crossing Blackfriars Bridge.

In August 1982 Ambrosiano finally collapsed and it became clear that over $1 billion had disappeared. The fact that Calvi was a member of Gelli’s lodge, whose members called themselves the “frati neri” (“black friars”) and was found hanging under Blackfriar’s Bridge, his pockets weighted down with bricks, raised suspicions that P2 was somehow involved in his death. But a coroner’s inquest in 1982 returned a verdict of suicide.

In 2003, however, City of London Police reopened their investigation as a murder inquiry after British and German forensic experts concluded that Calvi could not have killed himself, and in 2005 Gelli and five others, including the Mafia boss Giuseppe “Pippo” Calò, were formally placed under investigation in Italy on charges of ordering his murder. But Gelli’s name was not in the final indictment at the trial that started in October that year, and the case against the other suspects was dismissed after 20 months for lack of evidence.

The Calvi and Banco Ambrosiano affair, however, was not the darkest page in the Gelli story.

In 1981, the year before the bank collapse, Gelli had made international headlines when a police raid on his office discovered a secret list of 1,000 prominent politicians, magistrates, journalists, businessmen (among them Italy’s future leader Silvio Berlusconi), policemen, the heads of all three of Italy’s secret services and some 40 senior military commanders, who were all members of P2. The discovery helped bring down the Christian Democrat government of Arnaldo Forlani.

Villa Wanda, home of Licio Gelli Villa Wanda, home of Licio Gelli Photo: Rex

When searching Gelli’s villa, police found a document headed “Plan for Democratic Rebirth”, which called for a consolidation of the media, suppression of trade unions, and the rewriting of the Italian Constitution. “The availability of sums not exceeding 30 to 40 billion lire would seem sufficient to allow carefully chosen men, acting in good faith, to conquer key positions necessary for overall control,” it read. A subsequent parliamentary commission said the aim of P2 had been “to exert anonymous and surreptitious control” of the political system.

As the scandal slowly unravelled, Gelli was also implicated in a series of other crimes, including funding neo-fascist terrorist groups, and frustrating efforts to save the former prime minister Aldo Moro, who was murdered by the Red Brigades leftist guerrilla group in 1978 after a 55-day kidnapping. Most seriously, he was accused of being one of the masterminds behind the bombing of Bologna railway station in 1980, in which 85 people lost their lives, in an attempt to destabilise the Italian state and pave the way for a Right-wing coup.

Gelli was first arrested in Geneva in September 1982 after he tried to withdraw funds from his numbered Swiss bank account, which held $150 million that had been deposited by South American affiliates of Banco Ambrosiano. The Swiss arrested him for entering the country on a false passport. The following year, however, he escaped from jail after bribing a prison guard and spent the next four years on the run, probably in Chile.

In 1987 he returned to Switzerland where he surrendered and was sentenced to two months in prison for bribery, while an Italian court sentenced him in absentia to eight years in prison on charges of financing Right-wing terrorist activity in the 1970s. The following year the Swiss authorities agreed to extradite him to Italy to face trial on fraudulent bankruptcy, fraud and swindling charges in connection with the collapse of the Banco Ambrosiano, but not on nine other charges, including “subversive association” over the Bologna bombing – an offence not recognised under Swiss law.

A hole in the fence made by Licio Gelli to escape from a Geneva prison hospitalA hole in the fence made by Licio Gelli to escape from a Geneva prison hospital Photo: Rex Features

Various court proceedings ensued. In July 1988 Gelli was absolved of charges of subversive association but was given a five-year prison term for “slandering” (i.e. obstructing) the investigation into the Bologna bombings, although terms of his extradition meant that he did not serve time for his crime :rotfl: . In 1992 he was sentenced to 18 and a half years in jail for his part in the Banco Ambrosiano scandal, later reduced to 12 years on appeal. The same year he was one of 16 former P2 members put on trial, most of whom were accused of political conspiracy, spying, revealing state secrets and threatening the constitution. Due to the terms of his extradition, however, Gelli faced only charges of slander and false representation. He was found guilty in 1994 and received a 17-year sentence.

In 1996 Gelli’s lawyers claimed that he was in bad health, suffering from a heart condition which required urgent surgery. Accordingly he was released and kept under 24-hour surveillance in his luxury villa in the Tuscan town of Arezzo. Two years later he disappeared from house arrest and when police, armed with a search warrant, raided his villa, they found 160 kg of gold bars hidden in vases of geraniums and begonias. There was speculation that it was part of a 55-ton fascist haul that Gelli had supposedly “escorted” out of Yugoslavia on a Red Cross-marked train in 1942. Rearrested in Cannes, where he had been living for four months under a false name, Gelli returned to Italy, where he remained under house arrest.

Licio Gelli was born in Pistoia, north of Florence, on April 21 1919. Expelled from school aged 17, during the 1930s he volunteered for the Blackshirts’ expeditionary forces sent by Benito Mussolini in support of Franco’s fascists in the Spanish Civil War, and subsequently became a liaison officer between the Italian government and Nazi Germany. After the war, accused of torturing anti-fascist partisans, he fled to Argentina, where he built up links that later brought him friendship with its dictator Juan Peron.

Licio GelliLicio Gelli Photo: Rex

Returning to Italy, he began work at a mattress-spring company and rose quickly to become its managing director and the director of several other interconnected businesses.

In 1966 Gelli joined an old-established Italian Freemasons lodge, P2, rising to its grandmaster in 1973. After its dissolution it became a “black”, or “covert” lodge, operating illegally in contravention of Article 18 of the Italian constitution banning secret associations, until 1981. It was later described as “a state within a state” and Gelli became known as “The Grand Puppet Master”. In the 1970s when the Italian Communist Party was a major force, there was fear among Nato countries was that Italy could be vulnerable to a Soviet-backed leftist takeover. Gelli is said to have established contacts with US intelligence during the Allied occupation of Italy and there were claims that P2 had been bankrolled by the CIA.

New charges of tax fraud were filed against him two years ago and the state took ownership of his villa, though he continued to live there until his death.

“I am a fascist and will die a fascist, ” he declared at a news conference in 1999.


Gelli is survived by his second wife, Gabriella, and by a daughter and two sons.
Licio Gelli, born April 21 1919, died December 15 2015
Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Philip »

Long article,great insight.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/d ... kov-ak-47s
Why has the AK-47 become the jihadi terrorist weapon of choice?
In Europe in 2015 more attacks were carried out with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles than any other device. Investigators are trying figure out why – and how
Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Philip »

Unexpected death of Russia's famed GRU chief,Igor Sergun.
http://www.businessinsider.in/The-Russi ... .cms[quote] The Russian security chief who just died helped transform one of the country's most feared intelligence agencies

Armin Rosen0Jan 5, 2016,
igor Sergun

One of the most powerful intelligence figures in Russia died unexpectedly, according to a Russian government announcement on January 4th.

Igor Sergun, the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate of Russia's General Staff (GRU), died of unspecified causes at the age of 58, The Wall Street Journal reports, although there is no indication died of anything other than natural causes.

The GRU is Russia's most important military intelligence department, and is believed to have a vast foreign operative network.

It is also responsible for a range of paramilitary activities as well - including the Spetsnaz, the clandestine special forces that Moscow deployed in its March 2014 annexation of Ukraine's Crimea peninsula.

Under Sergun, the GRU recovered from a range of setbacks stemming from Russia's 2008 invasion of Georgia. Although Georgia's military was decisively beaten in the war, the GRU performed poorly during the conflict. According to an IHS Jane's analysis, during the war the GRU was deemed responsible for "friendly-fire incidents as a result of poor inter-service co-operation," including one in which six Russian paratroopers were killed.

As a result, the directorate underwent what New York University professor and Russian security sector expert Mark Galeotti described in a May 2014 blog post as "a savage round of cuts," in which 1,000 officers and 80 of the directorate's 100 general-level officers were either transferred or retired. All Spetsnaz brigades were disbanded or moved under other military commands, while the GRU's presence in Russian embassies abroad was dramatically scaled back.

Under Sergun, the GRU regained control of the Spetsnaz and became a crucial instrument of Russian policy. The Spetsnaz were expanded in early 2014 under the pretext of providing additional security for the Sochi Winter Olympics, according to IHS Jane's. And shortly after that, they became a central part of the boldest Russian geopolitical gambit in a generation, helping to annex Crimea and maintaining pro-Moscow separatists' control over parts of eastern Ukraine.

A man holds a Russian flag on the roof of the naval headquarters in Sevastopol, March 19, 2014.

The GRU's emergence under Sergun demonstrates the evolution of Russia's strategy and priorities since the Georgia war. Galeotti notes that after that conflict, there was some doubt as to whether the GRU would even retain its status a main directorate.

Military espionage and paramilitary aspects of Russian military operations were in danger of being reorganized under a series of different offices, showing the GRU and its functions had fallen out of favor among Russia's security elite.

It now seems surprising that this was ever the case. After the Ukraine war, the annexation of Crimea, and a host of other GRU activities - including its role in propping the military of embattled Syrian president Bashar al Assad - it's hard to imagine Russian foreign policy without "Putin's secret weapon." Sergun was a crucial part of Russia's security apparatus in a time when Moscow became increasingly ruthless, and less restrained by international norms.
[/quote]
Prem
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Prem »

The Int'l Spectator
‏@intlspectator
BREAKING: South Korean officials believe it is 'very likely' that North Korea has conducted nuclear test
Austin
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Austin »

State media states they tested hydrogen bomb. Last week little kim mention they have H Bomb , so its proof of pudding. 5.2 seismic event indicates big bum

Congratulations to Kim :P
Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

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Stratfor's take on the death of the famous GRU chief Sergun.

https://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-d ... ons-russia
A Mysterious Death Raises Questions in Russia
Geopolitical Diary
January 6, 2016

Intrigues within the Kremlin reignited Monday after the chief of Russia's military intelligence service, Igor Sergun, died unexpectedly. Sergun was a relatively unknown figure who kept a very low profile over his 30-year career, despite the fact that his position at the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff of the Armed Forces made him one of the most powerful figures in Russian security.

Sergun came to power in 2011, at a time when the GRU's position was under attack by the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service — both of which were attempting to gain control of, or at least influence in, intelligence operations in Russia's borderlands. Sergun was able to consolidate the GRU, fortifying the military intelligence service's position among the security groups.


What is a Geopolitical Diary?

Russia's various security services have long vied with one another for power. Even though Russian President Vladimir Putin served in the FSB (known at the time as the KGB), he has not always let the agency have its way. Putin has tried to keep a balance among the various services — a difficult feat in a world of intrigue and espionage. That balance has been off for the past two years, mainly because of events in Ukraine. Moscow's failure to anticipate the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich and the installation of a pro-West government in Kiev in early 2014 largely fell on the FSB. The service reportedly was restructured by mid-2014, and the GRU gained more responsibility for intelligence inside Ukraine — a humiliation for the FSB. The GRU and FSB wrestled with each other during the remainder of 2014 and all of 2015 over control of ground intelligence in Ukraine. Evidence of the behind-the-scenes struggles could be seen in the turnover of pro-Russian separatist leaders in eastern Ukraine and in sporadic reports from Ukrainian intelligence.

However, the FSB's recent problems go beyond Ukraine. The security service has fought to maintain its position within Russia, particularly Chechnya, and to keep one of its most lucrative assets, Rosneft, afloat financially. The FSB's problems could be connected to Putin's mysterious disappearance in March 2015 and to the assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov.

Recent developments provide few details about the current state of the power struggle. Four months ago, rumors circulated in Russian media that one of the GRU's biggest backers, Vladislav Surkov, lost the Ukraine portfolio once again. Surkov, alongside Sergun, had been instrumental in implementing Russia's so-called hybrid warfare strategy in eastern Ukraine and in coordinating the separatist leaders throughout the year. Over the weekend, a Ukrainian intelligence source claimed that the FSB was back in eastern Ukraine working with the separatist leaders. This would indicate a strengthening of the FSB's position.

Against this backdrop, the unexpected death of the head of one of the FSB's biggest rivals raises a number of questions. First is the circumstance of Sergun's death. The Russian government said he had a heart attack in Moscow on Jan. 4, but a Stratfor source heard a report that he died on New Year's Day in Lebanon. If the report that he died in Lebanon is true, it raises questions about what Sergun was doing in a country that is a hotbed for the world's intelligence services and why the Kremlin would cover up his death abroad.

A second question is whether Russian operations in Ukraine will change. Sergun was allegedly one of the designers of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy there, but the FSB could continue with the same strategy. It is also not clear whether the FSB and the Russian military would be able to continue coordinating in eastern Ukraine if the Russian military's intelligence unit weakens or splinters.

Moreover, there is the question of whether the GRU can remain unified under a new leader, particularly with other intelligence services vying for influence. Russian media have already started floating rumors of who will replace Sergun — a curious development, since he allegedly died just a day ago — and various Kremlin watchers have even suggested non-military candidates who have personal ties to Putin. If Putin promotes an ultra-loyalist over a military replacement, it could indicate that he is attempting to bring another security group more firmly under his control, adding another layer of protection for the president should the FSB or any other group grow more disgruntled.

In the months ahead, it will be important to see if or how the FSB takes advantage of the shake-up in the GRU brought about by Sergun's death. The state of the struggle among Russia's security services is of great concern to the Kremlin, which is nervous about the potential for growing unrest in the country ahead of parliamentary elections. It is one of the FSB's primary tasks to monitor and defuse such tensions, but the FSB has taken on many other roles as it has attempted to gain more power. Putin is likely also concerned about the power struggle in the lead-up to the next presidential election in 2018, particularly if he is seen as taking sides in the dispute. This fight for power within the Kremlin has the potential to be one of Russia's — and Putin's — more dangerous challenges in the years ahead.
habal
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by habal »

If he was done in inside lebanon, then is there a connection between him and Israeli attack on Samir Kuntar, the hezbollah commander released from Israeli prison and killed in Israeli missile strike. Strong reason to suspect then that the russians themselves may have bumped off Igor Sergun.
Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

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V.good article on the facets of the Israeli intel appratus.
http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/israel ... ence-wars/
Israel’s Intelligence Wars
Shay Hershkovitz
March 2, 2016

On January 12, the spokesman of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) announced the resignation of Brig. Gen. Eli Ben-Meir as head of the Research Division due to differences of opinion with the chief of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, Maj. Gen. Herzi Halevi. According to several prominent Israeli media channels, the dispute revolved around disagreement on the way the Research Division should be managed — along with personal differences between the two senior officers. Such a situation is extremely rare, especially since Ben-Meir was assigned to his position only a year ago — the term usually lasts three or four years.

Rare as it is, this event is a good opportunity to examine one of the most intriguing anomalies among intelligence agencies in the Western world. Unlike in the United States, where the body responsible for the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the Office of the Director of National Intelligence — a civilian organ — the responsible official in Israel is a military officer. With recent dramatic changes in Israel’s intelligence community leadership, it will be interesting to see if there will be changes to Israel’s national assessment structure and practice.

The head of the Research Division is one of several brigadier generals in the Military Intelligence Directorate. His direct commanding officer is the head of the Intelligence Directorate, who in turn reports to the joint chief of staff (JCS). The latter reports to the minister of defense, who is part of the government under the prime minister.

However, the same head of the Research Division is also called “the national estimator” — i.e., the most senior official responsible for the national strategic assessment. He reports directly to the prime minister, minister of defense and cabinet without the need to get preliminary approval for his assessment from his superiors in the military. In this capacity, the head of the Research Division is expected to deliver an independent intelligence assessment regarding practically every geopolitical, social and economic challenge that Israel faces — now and in the future — regardless of the opinions of his direct commanders, the head of the Intelligence Directorate and the JCS.

In other words, the head of the Research Division is beholden to two masters: He is the intelligence officer of both the government and the IDF. To complicate things further, each one of these entities requires different analytic inputs. Lastly, even when the head of the Intelligence Directorate briefs the state’s leadership, he relies upon the Research Division’s assessments, all of which are approved by the division commander.

Indeed, there are several other intelligence agencies that operate in parallel to Israeli military intelligence with regard to intelligence assessment: the Shin Bet — a.k.a., the Israel Security Agency (ISA) — and the Mossad (“Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations”). Less prominent is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Research Center (MAMAD). Each one of these entities conducts strategic intelligence estimates and submits to the prime minister, the minister of defense, the cabinet and other elements. Ultimately, each organization has a specialty and field of interest (e.g., the Shin Bet focuses on terror and the Palestinian theater; Mossad focuses on unconventional weapons). By contrast, the only body with the capacity — and responsibility — to present a holistic strategic assessment is the Intelligence Directorate. (Shin Bet is responsible for doing so only with regard to internal threats.) Even the National Security Council — established in 1999, and initially intended to operate as the prime minister’s council for national security issues — is still a relatively toothless body when it comes to producing intelligence estimates, and operates under the shadow of the Intelligence Directorate and the other agencies.

This unique state of affairs has historic roots. Before the establishment of the state of Israel, the Hagana (the primary quasi-military body of the Jewish community in Palestine) operated a small intelligence unit called “the SHAI” (an acronym of Sherut Yediot, or “information service”). Since the Hagana was the skeleton on which the IDF was built, it was only natural that the organization’s intelligence unit would become the most prominent such agency in the state. Furthermore, the new intelligence unit had no real competition: A parallel organization was under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but was focused on acquiring information via diplomatic channels. The Shin Bet was focused on internal security, and the Mossad was only a coordinating and administrative body with zero relevance to actual intelligence work. Lastly, the SHAI (and later the IDF’s intelligence unit) were the only entities that had access to signals intelligence sources. This gave its commanders (as well as the JCS) prestige and significant advantages over any other intelligence entity.

As the years went by, the role of the head of the Intelligence Directorate has become even more influential, especially given the unique characteristics of the individuals who have headed this organization. Moreover, it is important to note that most — but not all — prime ministers have had significant military experience in which they worked closely with military intelligence. In a militarized society such as that of Israel, the military enjoys great prominence in public and political discourse — and is oftentimes considered to be the supreme authority for Middle Eastern affairs. For the military, having such an influential body with direct contact to national-level leadership is nothing short of a prestigious asset. Cynics might even say that the military leverages this close relationship to promote somber descriptions of current and future events — thereby influencing the ongoing allocation of state resources in their favor.

It is, therefore, not surprising that despite several previous attempts to create an alternative, Israeli military intelligence has remained the most prominent and influential body responsible for the national strategic assessment.

It is worth mentioning that in the past there have been disputes between the head of the Intelligence Directorate and the head of the Research Division. Oftentimes, these disputes revolved around the intelligence assessment itself, especially when dealing with explosive political questions — such as former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s attitude towards the peace process with Israel, and his involvement in terror in midst of it. Other controversies have revolved around whether the head of the Research Division and his people should be involved in strategizing Israeli policy, or whether they should merely remain objective, describe reality and refrain from any involvement in policy.

Nevertheless, this is the first time that the head of the Research Division has resigned in the middle of his term. Whether the reason for this resignation is professional, personal or both, this event demonstrates the need of the Israeli intelligence community to recalibrate the national strategic assessment mechanisms. The fact that such an important figure — who has direct access to national leadership — has decided to resign in the midst of a sensitive and challenging time for Israel only emphasizes the need to have an independent and civilian national intelligence assessment body. Such an organization needs to have full access to the intelligence community’s variety of sources; it must also operate closely with the prime minister in order to ensure its influence on national decision-making. Given the inherent conflict of interest due to the fact that the military is arguing for state resources based on its own (almost sole) strategic assessment, the current dynamic is tricky — not to say undemocratic. Israeli intelligence requires a more balanced mechanism to keep its national assessment both unbiased and transparent.

Since the resignation of Brig. Gen. Ben-Meir, new heads of Shin Bet and Mossad were announced, as well as Ben-Meir’s successor as head of the Research Division. It will be interesting to see if, and how, these individuals will change the structure and process of Israel’s national assessment, especially since a new head of the National Security Council has yet to be appointed.

Dr. Shay Hershkovitz is Wikistrat’s Chief Strategy Officer. He is also an adjunct professor at the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University and at Bar-Ilan University.
Philip
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Philip »

Truth stranger than fiction.Mirroring the popular TV series "The Americans",a Cold War suspense thriller about Soviet "illegals",this report shows a true real life example of how Soviet/Russian illegals operated in the US.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/m ... alex-foley
The Guardian
The day we discovered our parents were Russian spies
For years Donald Heathfield, Tracey Foley and their two children lived the American dream. Then an FBI raid revealed the truth: they were agents of Putin’s Russia. Their sons tell their story
by Shaun Walker
Saturday 7 May 2016 09.00 BST 389 Comments
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Tim Foley turned 20 on 27 June 2010. To celebrate, his parents took him and his younger brother Alex out for lunch at an Indian restaurant not far from their home in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Both brothers were born in Canada, but for the past decade the family had lived in the US. The boys’ father, Donald Heathfield, had studied in Paris and at Harvard, and now had a senior role at a consultancy firm based in Boston. Their mother, Tracey Foley, had spent many years focused on raising her children, before taking a job as a real estate agent. To those who knew them, they seemed a very ordinary American family, albeit with Canadian roots and a penchant for foreign travel. Both brothers were fascinated by Asia, a favoured holiday destination, and the parents encouraged their sons to be inquisitive about the world: Alex was only 16, but had just returned from a six-month student exchange in Singapore.

After a buffet lunch, the four returned home and opened a bottle of champagne to toast Tim reaching his third decade. The brothers were tired; they had thrown a small house party the night before to mark Alex’s return from Singapore, and Tim planned to go out later. After the champagne, he went upstairs to message his friends about the evening’s plans. There came a knock at the door, and Tim’s mother called up that his friends must have come early, as a surprise.

At the door, she was met by a different kind of surprise altogether: a team of armed, black-clad men holding a battering ram. They streamed into the house, screaming, “FBI!” Another team entered from the back; men dashed up the stairs, shouting at everyone to put their hands in the air. Upstairs, Tim had heard the knock and the shouting, and his first thought was that the police could be after him for underage drinking: nobody at the party the night before had been 21, and Boston police took alcohol regulations seriously.

When he emerged on to the landing, it became clear the FBI was here for something far more serious. The two brothers watched, stunned, as their parents were put in handcuffs and driven away in separate black cars. Tim and Alex were left behind with a number of agents, who said they needed to begin a 24-hour forensic search of the home; they had prepared a hotel room for the brothers. One of the men told them their parents had been arrested on suspicion of being “unlawful agents of a foreign government”.

Not only were their parents indeed Russian spies, they were Russians. They were not Donald Heathfield and Tracey Foley
Alex presumed there had been some mistake – the wrong house, or a mix-up over his father’s consultancy work. Donald travelled frequently for his job; perhaps this had been confused with espionage. At worst, perhaps he had been tricked by an international client. Even when the brothers heard on the radio a few days later that 10 Russian spies had been rounded up across the US, in an FBI operation dubbed Ghost Stories, they remained sure there had been a terrible mistake.

But the FBI had not made a mistake, and the truth was so outlandish, it defied comprehension. Not only were their parents indeed Russian spies, they were Russians. The man and woman the boys knew as Mom and Dad really were their parents, but their names were not Donald Heathfield and Tracey Foley. Those were Canadians who had died long ago, as children; their identities had been stolen and adopted by the boys’ parents.

Their real names were Andrei Bezrukov and Elena Vavilova. They were both born in the Soviet Union, had undergone training in the KGB and been dispatched abroad as part of a Soviet programme of deep-cover secret agents, known in Russia as the “illegals”. After a slow-burning career building up an ordinary North American background, the pair were now active agents for the SVR, the foreign spy agency of modern Russia and a successor to the KGB. They, along with eight other agents, had been betrayed by a Russian spy who had defected to the Americans.

The FBI indictment detailing their misdeeds was a catalogue of espionage cliches: dead drops, brush-pasts, coded messages and plastic bags stuffed with crisp dollar bills. The footage of a plane carrying the 10 touching down at Vienna airport, to be swapped for four Russians who had been held in Russian prisons on charges of spying for the west, brought back memories of the cold war. The media had a field day with the Bond-girl looks of 28-year-old Anna Chapman (what a red-head corker,wheew! :mrgreen: ), one of two Russians arrested not to have pretended to be of western origin; she worked as an international estate agent in Manhattan. Russia didn’t know whether to be embarrassed or emboldened: its agents had been busted, but what other country would think of mounting such a complex, slow-drip espionage operation in the first place?

For Alex and Tim, the geopolitics behind the spy swap was the least of their worries. The pair had grown up as ordinary Canadians, and now discovered they were the children of Russian spies. Ahead of them was a long flight to Moscow, and an even longer emotional and psychological journey.

Nearly six years since the FBI raid, I meet Alex in a cafe near the Kiev railway station in Moscow. He is now officially Alexander Vavilov; his brother is Timofei Vavilov, though many of their friends still use their old surname, Foley. Alex is 21, his still-boyish looks offset by a serious manner and businesslike clothes: black V-neck over a crisp white shirt. A gentle North American lilt and the careful aspiration of final consonants give him the unplaceable accent of those who have been schooled internationally – in Paris, Singapore and the US. These days, he speaks enough Russian to order lunch, but is by no means fluent. He is studying in a European city and is here to visit his parents; Tim works in finance in Asia. (In the interests of privacy, both brothers have asked me not to reveal details about their working lives.)

‘Donald Heathfield’ with Alex and Tim in 1999. Photograph: courtesy Tim and Alex Foley
Since 2010, they have made a conscious decision to avoid the media. They have agreed to talk to me now, Alex explains, because they are fighting a legal battle to win back their Canadian citizenship, stripped from them six years ago. They believe it is unfair and illegal that they are expected to answer for the sins of their parents, and have decided to tell their story for the first time.

As we eat khachapuri, a Georgian bread stuffed with gooey cheese, Alex recalls the days after the raid. He and Tim stayed up until the early hours in the hotel room the FBI had provided, trying to understand what was going on. When they went home the next day, they found every piece of electronic equipment, every photograph and document had been taken. The FBI’s search and seizure warrant lists 191 items removed from the Foley/Heathfield residence, including computers, mobile phones, photographs and medicines. They even took Tim and Alex’s PlayStation.

News crews held a vigil outside; the brothers sat inside with the blinds drawn, their phones and computers confiscated. Early next morning Tim snuck out to get online at the public library and try to find a lawyer for his parents. All the family bank accounts had been frozen, leaving the boys with just the money they had in their pockets and whatever they could borrow from friends.

FBI agents drove them to an initial court hearing in Boston, where their parents were informed of the charges. There was a brief meeting with their mother inside jail. Alex tells me he did not ask her what she and his father were accused of. This seems surprising, I say: surely he must have been dying to ask?

They were promising, young, smart people. They were asked if they wanted to help their country and they said yes
“Here’s the thing: I knew that if I was going to testify in court, the less I knew, the better. I didn’t want to cloud my opinion with anything. I didn’t want to ask questions, because it was obvious people were listening,” he says. A boisterous group of women are celebrating a birthday at the next table, and he raises his voice. “I refused to let myself be convinced they were actually guilty of anything, because I realised the case would probably draw on for a long time. They were facing life in prison, and if I was to testify, I would have to completely believe they were innocent.”

The family had been planning a month-long summer break in Paris, Moscow and Turkey; their mother told them to escape the media circus and fly to Russia. After a stopover in Paris, Alex and Tim boarded a plane to Moscow, unsure of what to expect on arrival. They had never been to Russia before. “It was a really terrifying moment,” Alex recalls. “You’re sitting on the plane, you have a few hours to kill and you don’t know what’s coming. You just sit there and think and think.”

As the brothers disembarked, they were met at the plane door by a group of people who introduced themselves in English as colleagues of their parents. They told the brothers to trust them, and led them outside the terminal to a van.

“They showed us photos of our parents in their 20s in uniform, photos of them with medals. That was the moment when I thought, ‘OK, this is real.’ Until that moment, I’d refused to believe any of it was true,” Alex says. He and Tim were taken to an apartment and told to make themselves at home; one of their minders spent the next few days showing them around Moscow; they took them to museums, even the ballet. An uncle and a cousin the brothers had no idea existed paid a visit; a grandmother also dropped by, but she spoke no English and the boys not a word of Russian.

It would be a few days before their parents would arrive, having admitted at a court hearing in New York on 8 July that they were Russian nationals. An exchange was already in the offing, and they arrived in Moscow, via Vienna, on 9 July, still wearing the orange prison jumpsuits they had been given in America. My face must give away some of my amazement: how does a 16-year-old process such an extraordinary turn of events?

Alex smirks at me wryly. “Typical high school identity crisis, right?”

‘Tracey Foley’ with Tim at Toronto Zoo in 1991. Photograph: courtesy Tim and Alex Foley
Alex and Tim’s father was born Andrei Olegovich Bezrukov, in Krasnoyarsk region, in the heart of Siberia. Since his return to Moscow in 2010, he has given just a handful of interviews to Russian media outlets, mainly concerning the more recent work he has done as a geopolitical analyst. Details of his past, or that of his wife, Elena Vavilova, are scarce.

Alex tells me what he knows about his parents’ recruitment, based on the little they have told him: “They got recruited into it together, as a couple. They were promising, young, smart people, they were asked if they wanted to help their country and they said yes. They went through years of training and preparing.”

None of the 10 deportees has spoken publicly about their mission in the US, or their training by the SVR or KGB. Department S, which runs the illegals programme they were on, was the most secretive part of the KGB. One former “illegal” tells me his training in the late 1970s included two years in Moscow with daily English lessons, taught by an American woman who had defected. He was also trained in other basics such as communicating in code and surveillance. All the training was done on a one-to-one basis: he never met other agents.

The programme was the only one of its kind in international espionage. (Many assumed it had been stopped, until the 2010 FBI swoop.) Many intelligence agencies use agents operating without diplomatic cover; some have recruited second-generation immigrants already living abroad, but the Russians have been the only ones to train agents to pretend to be foreigners. Canada was a common place for the illegals to go, to build up their “legend” of being an ordinary western citizen before being deployed to target countries, often the US or Britain. During Soviet times, the illegals had two main functions: to aid in communications between embassy KGB officers and their US sources (an illegal would be less likely to be put under surveillance than a diplomat); and to be sleeper cells for a potential “special period” – a war between the US and the Soviet Union. The illegals could then spring into action.

The KGB sent the couple to Canada in the 80s. In June 1990, Vavilova, under the assumed identity of Tracey Foley, gave birth to Tim at the Women’s College hospital in Toronto. His first memories are of attending a French-language school in the city and visiting the warehouse of his dad’s company, Diapers Direct, a nappy delivery service. It was hardly James Bond, but the work of an agent has always been more tortoise than hare – years spent painstakingly building up the legend.

Andrei Bezrukov already had a degree from a Soviet university, but “Donald Heathfield” had no educational records. Between 1992 and 1995, he studied for a bachelor’s degree in international economics at York University in Toronto. In 1994, Alex was born; a year later the family moved to Paris. We don’t know whether this was on the orders of the SVR, but it seems a safe assumption. Donald studied for an MBA at the École des Ponts and the family lived frugally in a small flat not far from the Eiffel Tower; both brothers shared the only bedroom while the parents slept on the sofa.

As Bezrukov and Vavilova built up their story, the country that had recruited and trained them ceased to exist. The ideology of communism had failed; the fearsome spy agency that had dispatched agents across the globe was discredited and renamed. Under Boris Yeltsin, post-Soviet Russia seemed on the verge of becoming a failed state. But in 1999, as the family planned a move from France to the US, a new man entered the Kremlin who himself had a KGB background. In the subsequent years, he would work to make the KGB’s successors important and respected again.

With the legend of a hardworking, well-educated Canadian perfected over the years, Heathfield got into Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government towards the end of that year, and was ready to deploy as an agent of the SVR. He would be spying not for the Soviet system that had trained him, but for the new Russia of Vladimir Putin.

I never had anything close to a suspicion. It seemed all my friends' parents led much more exciting lives
Alex
Heathfield and Foley sent their sons to a bilingual French-English school in Boston, so they could maintain their French and stay in touch with European culture. They could not teach their children about Russia; perhaps the emphasis on French was a way of ensuring their children were not “ordinary” Americans without ringing alarm bells. At home, the family spoke a mixture of English and French. (An online video of Bezrukov, appearing in his post-deportation role as a political analyst, shows him speaking smooth North American with the faintest of twangs.) When he completed his postgraduate degree at Harvard, Heathfield got a job working for Global Partners, a business development consultancy.

I speak to Tim on a Sunday afternoon, talking to me on Skype from his kitchen. He has the same facial features and careful parting as his younger brother, but his hair is blond rather than dark. Looking back on his youth, he tells me his father worked hard, making frequent business trips. He encouraged his sons to read and educate themselves about the world, and “was like a best friend to us”. Foley, Tim says, was a “soccer mom”, picking her sons up from school and taking them to sports practice. When the boys were in their teens, she started work as a real estate agent.

In 2008, Tim got a place at George Washington University, in DC, to study international relations. He focused on Asia, taking Mandarin lessons and spending a semester in Beijing. The same year, the family became naturalised Americans, with US passports in addition to their Canadian nationality.

The brothers would never live in Canada again; Alex had been one when they left Toronto and Tim only five – but both felt Canadian. The family returned often to ski, and when the boys went on school trips from Boston to Montreal, they took pride in showing the other students around their “home” country. Alex made a big fuss about his Canadian background, because “at high school you always want to go counterculture”.

Tim describes their childhood as “absolutely normal”: the family was close and spent time together at weekends; his parents had many friends. He has no recollection of them discussing Russia or the Soviet Union; they never ate Russian food, and the closest Tim says he came to a Russian was a polite boy from Kazakhstan at school.

Their parents did not discuss their childhood much, but this was how they had always been and the boys had little reason to question it. “I never had anything close to a suspicion regarding my parents,” Alex says. In fact, he often felt disappointed by how boring and mundane they were: “It seemed all my friends’ parents led much more exciting and successful lives.”

Little did he know. Bezrukov and Vavilova had been put under FBI surveillance soon after they moved to the US, probably because of a mole in the Russian agency. Excerpts from their 2010 indictment suggest the couple lived with a level of intrigue most people would assume exists only within the pages of a spy novel. One paragraph recounts an intercepted communication from Moscow Centre (SVR headquarters), explaining how Vavilova should plan for a trip back to her motherland. She was to fly to Paris and take the train to Vienna, where she would pick up a fake British passport. “Very important: 1. Sign your passport on page 32. Train yourself to be able to reproduce your signature when necessary… In the passport you’ll get a memo with recommendation. Pls, destroy the memo after reading. Be well.”

Their father, meanwhile, was using his work as a consultant to penetrate US political and business circles. It is not clear whether he managed to access classified material, but FBI intercepts reported a number of contacts with former and current American officials.

In the few public remarks Bezrukov has made about his job, he makes it sound more like that of a thinktank analyst than a super-spy. “Intelligence work is not about risky escapades,” he told Expert magazine in 2012. “If you behave like Bond, you’ll last half a day, maybe a day. Even if there was an imaginary safe where all the secrets are kept, by tomorrow half of them will be outdated and useless. The best kind of intelligence is to understand what your opponent will think tomorrow, not find out what he thought yesterday.”

The family home had been bugged for years. The FBI knew the couple's real identities, even if their own children did not
Bezrukov and Vavilova communicated with the SVR using digital steganography: they would post images online that contained messages hidden in the pixels, encoded using an algorithm written for them by the SVR. A message the FBI believes was sent in 2007 to Bezrukov by SVR headquarters was decoded as follows: “Got your note and signal. No info in our files about E.F., BT, DK, RR. Agree with your proposal to use ‘Farmer’ to start building network of students in DC. Your relationship with ‘Parrot’ looks very promising as a valid source of info from US power circles. To start working on him professionally we need all available details on his background, current position, habits, contacts, opportunities, etc.”

Way back in 2001, nearly a decade before her arrest, the FBI had searched a safe-deposit box belonging to Tracey Foley. There they found photographs of her in her 20s, one of which bore the Cyrillic imprint of the Soviet company that had printed it. The family home had been bugged, possibly for many years. The FBI knew the couple’s real identities, even if their own children did not, but the Americans preferred to keep an eye on the Russian spy ring, rather than make a move.

Why the FBI finally acted is unclear. One suggestion is that Alexander Poteyev, the SVR officer believed to have betrayed the group, felt his cover was blown. He reportedly fled Russia in the days before the arrests; in 2011, a Russian court sentenced him to 25 years in prison for treason in absentia. Another possibility is that one of the group was getting close to sensitive information. Whatever the reason, in June 2010 the FBI decided to wrap up Operation Ghost Stories and bust the Russian spy ring.

The house raided by the FBI in June 2010.
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The house raided by the FBI in June 2010. Photograph: Russell Contreras/AP
I speak to Tim and Alex many times, in person, over Skype and email. They are not uncomfortable talking about their experiences, but neither do they enjoy it much. Initially, they want to speak only about their court case in Canada; but gradually they open up, answering all my questions about their extraordinary family life.

I have to admit there are some details that bother me. Did they really never suspect a thing?

In 2012, the Wall Street Journal reported that unnamed US officials claimed an FBI bug placed at the family’s Boston home had picked up the parents revealing their true identities to Tim long before the arrest. Furthermore, the officials said, his parents had told Tim they wanted to groom him as a Russian spy. A second-generation spy would be a much more impressive asset than first-generation illegals, who had built up personas that were solid but not impregnable to background checks. Tim, according to the unnamed officials, agreed he would travel to Moscow for SVR training and even “saluted Mother Russia”.

Tim strenuously denies the story, insisting it was a total fabrication. “Why would a kid who grew up his whole life believing himself to be Canadian, decide to risk life in prison for a country he had never been to nor had any ties to? Furthermore, why would my parents take a similar risk in telling their teenage son their identities?”

The claim that he saluted Mother Russia is “just as ridiculous as it sounds”, Tim says. He would be happy to answer the allegations in court, but it is impossible to argue with anonymous sources. When contacted by the Guardian, the FBI declined to comment on the Wall Street Journal article.

There was another thing that bothered me: was it really just coincidence that the family had planned to travel to Russia that summer, and that the brothers therefore had Russian visas? Yes, Alex says. “It was very much my idea to go to Russia. We had this world map at home and when you looked at the pins on it, you could see we’d been almost everywhere but Russia, so I was very curious and I was pushing for it. It was just going to be one part of our summer trip.”

In hindsight, surely, that summer trip to Paris, Turkey and Moscow must have looked rather different. When the family were reunited in Moscow in July 2010, did the boys ask their parents what the plan had been? Had they intended to reveal everything? Or were they really going to spend a week in Moscow pretending not to understand a word spoken around them?

“I actually think that was the plan,” Alex says. “That we would travel to Russia, and maybe they might go and meet people without us. But I don’t think there was a plan to tell us anything.”

Tim agrees. If their parents had revealed the truth, it would have made Tim and Alex a huge liability; “as professionals”, he says, it’s unlikely they would have taken the risk. They doubt their parents ever planned to tell them about their real identities. “Honestly,” Tim says, “I really don’t think so. It sounds strange, but yeah.”

Both brothers tell me they remember, as young children, seeing their grandparents. Where? On vacation, Alex says, “somewhere in Europe”; he can’t remember where, exactly. Asked if he was sure the people he met were his real grandparents, he says, “I think so.” Were they speaking Russian? “I was really young, I have no idea,” he says firmly.

I raise the question with Tim, who would have been older. He remembers seeing his grandparents every few years until he was around 11, when they disappeared from his life. “Obviously, now when I think back on it, I kind of understand how it worked. If I had seen them when I was older, I would have realised that they don’t speak English – they don’t seem very Canadian.”

At Christmas, the boys would receive gifts marked “from grandparents”. Their parents told them they lived in Alberta, far from Toronto, which was why they never saw them. Occasionally, new photographs would arrive of the grandparents against a snowy backdrop; it helped that the climates of Alberta and Siberia are not so different.

An FBI surveillance photo of Tracey Foley.

If Tim and Alex’s story sounds eerily familiar to fans of The Americans, the television drama about a KGB couple living in the US with their two children, that’s because it’s partly based on them. The show is set in the 1980s, providing a cold war backdrop, but the 2010 spy round-up served as an inspiration. The show’s creator, Joe Weisberg, trained to be a CIA case officer in the early 1990s and, when I speak to him on the phone, tells me he always wanted to put family at the heart of the plot. “One of the interesting things I saw when I worked at the CIA was people lying to their children. If you have young children, you can’t tell them you work for the CIA. And then, at some point, you have to pick an age and a time, and they find out that they’ve been lied to for most of their lives. It’s a difficult moment.”

When I meet Alex in Moscow, he has just finished watching the first season. (He had started on previous occasions, but found it too difficult; he and Tim joked that they should sue the creators.) His parents like the show, he tells me. “Obviously it’s glamorised, all this killing people and action everywhere. But it reminded them of when they were young agents, and how they felt about being in a strange new place.” Watching it, Alex says, has made him more curious: what set his parents off on this path, and why?

In 2010, the spies were welcomed back to Russia as heroes. After a debriefing at SVR headquarters, Bezrukov, Vavilova and the other deportees met with then-president Dmitry Medvedev to receive medals for their service. Later, they met with Putin, and the group reportedly sang the patriotic Soviet song From Where The Motherland Begins. The authorities put on a tour: the agents and their families travelled to St Petersburg, Lake Baikal in Siberia and Sochi on the Black Sea. The idea was to show off modern Russia, and to provide them with an opportunity to bond.

Do they still meet up, I ask Alex. “From time to time,” he says. He and Tim were the only adolescents; of the four couples arrested, two had younger children, while another had adult sons. Even so, the other families were probably the only people in the world who could even begin to understand their surreal situation.

Bezrukov and Vavilova found themselves back in a very different Russia from the one they had left. The oldest of the agents had been retired from active espionage work for a decade, Alex says, and barely remembered how to speak Russian. The group were told they would no longer work for the SVR, but jobs were found for them in state banks and oil companies. Anna Chapman was given a television series and now has her own fashion line. Bezrukov was given a job at MGIMO, a prestigious Moscow university, and has written a book on the geopolitical challenges facing Russia.

Tim and Alex were given Russian passports at the end of December 2010; suddenly, they became Timofei and Alexander Vavilov. The names were “completely new, foreign and unpronounceable for us”, Tim says. “A real identity crisis,” he adds with a hint of bitterness. Unable to return to university for his final year, he managed to transfer to a Russian university and complete his degree there, before doing an MBA in London.

Alex was less lucky. He finished high school at the British International School in Moscow, but did not want to stay in Russia. He applied to university in Canada, but was told he would first have to apply for a new birth certificate, and then a citizenship certificate; only then could he renew his Canadian passport. In 2012 he was admitted to the University of Toronto, and applied for a four-year student visa on his Russian passport. The visa was issued and he planned to depart for Canada on 2 September. But four days before he was due to leave, as he was packing his bags and exchanging emails with his future roommate, he received a phone call from the Canadian embassy in Moscow demanding he come for an urgent interview. The meeting was hostile; there were a lot of questions about his life and his parents. The visa was annulled before his eyes, and he lost his university place. Alex has since been rejected for French and British visas. Twice, he has been accepted to study at the London School of Economics, but both times did not get a visa. Eventually, he was able to get a visa to study elsewhere in Europe; Tim travels mainly in Asia, where many countries can be visited visa-free on a Russian passport.

I'm glad they had a cause they believed in, but I wish the world wouldn’t punish me for their choices
Alex
The brothers’ battle to regain Canadian citizenship is not just about logistics. Moscow is not a city that embraces newcomers, and neither of them feels particularly Russian. “I feel like I have been stripped of my own identity for something I had nothing to do with,” Alex tells me. Both are keen to work in Asia for the time being, but want to move to Canada when they feel ready to start families. More than anything, their Canadian identity is the last straw they have left to grasp on to, after so much of the rest of their previous reality fell away.

“I lived for 20 years believing that I was Canadian and I still believe I am Canadian, nothing can change that,” Tim wrote in his affidavit to the Toronto court. “I do not have any attachment to Russia, I do not speak the language, I do not know many friends there, I have not lived there for any extended periods of time and I do not want to live there.”

Everyone who is born in Canada is eligible for Canadian citizenship, with one exception: those who are born to employees of foreign governments. But the brothers’ Toronto-based lawyer, Hadayt Nazami, argues that it is ridiculous to apply the provision to their case; the whole point of the law, he says, is to prevent those who don’t have the responsibilities of citizenship from enjoying its privileges.

Ultimately, the court seems to be operating as much on emotional as on legal grounds, possibly with the Wall Street Journal story about Tim’s apparent recruitment at the back of its mind. But even if the brothers knew about their parents’ activities (and there is no hard evidence of this), I wondered what the court expected of them. What is a 16-year-old who finds out he is the child of Russian spies supposed to do? Call the FBI?

Alex and Tim in Bangkok in 2011. Photograph: courtesy Tim and Alex Foley
Tim and Alex have been through many months of questioning themselves and their identities, and of wondering whether they should be angry with their parents. They don’t want their childhood to define them as they grow older. Many of their close friends know, but most of their casual acquaintances don’t. When asked where they are from, the default response for both is “Canada”.

They remain friends with many people from their previous life in Boston, though Tim says some broke off contact, mainly those whose parents were friends with his parents and felt betrayed.

While they have no wish to live in Russia, both brothers visit Moscow every few months to see their parents. I ask them how hard it has been to keep that relationship going. Was there a confrontation? Tim and Alex choose their words carefully; they want to appear rational and pragmatic, rather than emotional, it seems. “Of course, there were some very difficult times,” Tim says. “But if I get angry with them, it’s not going to lead to any beneficial outcomes.” He admits it is sad that, even though he can now spend time with his grandparents, the language barrier means he will never know them properly. “In terms of family and keeping this whole thing together, it really doesn’t work out well when you choose this kind of path,” he says, his voice trailing off wistfully.

Alex tells me that he sometimes wonders why his parents decided to have children at all. “They live their lives like everyone else, making choices along the way. I am glad they had a cause they believed in so strongly, but their choices mean I feel no connection to the country they risked their lives for. I wish the world wouldn’t punish me for their choices and actions. It has been deeply unjust.”

A number of times, Alex tells me that it is not his place to judge his parents, but that six years ago he spent a long period wrestling with “the big question” of whether he hated them or felt betrayed. In the end, he came to one conclusion: that they were the same people who had raised him lovingly, whatever secrets they hid.
sum
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by sum »

Old article but actual pics of a Cisco router being "bugged" by the friendly NSA folks:
Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant
Austin
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Austin »

New York Times Interview with Julian Assange - 31.08.2016

ricky_v
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by ricky_v »

http://www.ozy.com/pov/the-day-it-all-began/71831
When we arrived Monday, the president crisply issued about a dozen orders, parceling out duties to each department. Among other things, he was ready to deploy forces to Afghanistan to take on al-Qaida and the Taliban. Referring to our plan, he said he expected the CIA to be the “first in.”
The subsequent months and years brought dramatic changes to the CIA: new resources, new authorities, a closer integration with the U.S. military and an entire generation of officers socialized in war. It also brought new dangers. When an officer is killed in the line of duty, the CIA carves a star in the marble wall of its headquarters lobby. There are 117 stars; one-third of them have been carved since 9/11
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Re: International Intelligence news

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/na ... story.html
Intelligence community is already feeling a sense of dread about Trump

The lobby of CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. (Larry Downing/Reuters)
By Greg Miller November 9 at 7:06 PM
The election results were only hours old Wednesday when a sober team of intelligence analysts carrying black satchels and secure communications gear began preparing to give President-elect Donald Trump his first unfiltered look at the nation’s secrets.

The initial presentation — to be delivered as early as Thursday — is likely to be a read-through of the President’s Daily Brief, the same highly classified summary of security developments delivered every day to President Obama. After that, U.S. intelligence officials are expected to schedule a series of meetings to apprise Trump of covert CIA operations against terrorist groups, the intercepted communications of world leaders, and satellite photos of nuclear installations in North Korea.

The sessions are designed to bring a new president up to speed on what the nation’s spy agencies know and do. But with Trump, the meetings are likely to be tense encounters between wary intelligence professionals and a newly minted president-elect who has demonstrated abundant disdain for their work.

[75 retired senior diplomats sign letter opposing Trump for president]

A palpable sense of dread settled on the intelligence community Wednesday as Hillary Clinton, the candidate many expected to win, conceded the race to a GOP upstart who has dismissed U.S. spy agencies’ views on Russia and Syria, and even threatened to order the CIA to resume the use of interrogation methods condemned as torture.

How the world is reacting to results of the U.S. election
View Photos People around the globe watched as Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States.
“It’s fear of the unknown,” said a senior U.S. national security official. “We don’t know what he’s really like under all the talk. . . . How will that play out over the next four years or even the next few months? I don’t know if there is going to be a tidal wave of departures of people who were going to stay around to help Hillary’s team but are now going to be, ‘I’m out of here.’ ”

“I’m half dreading, half holding my breath going to work today,” said the official, who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitivity of the subject.

Michael Hayden, the retired Air Force general and former CIA director who in 2008 briefed a highly skeptical President-elect Obama on the agency’s counterterrorism operations, said that intelligence officials are likely to approach their initial meetings with Trump with professionalism, but also consternation.

“I cannot remember another president-elect who has been so dismissive of intelligence received during a campaign or so suspicious of the quality and honesty of the intelligence he was about to receive,” Hayden said in a telephone interview Wednesday. The initial meetings with Trump in the coming weeks are likely to be professionally conducted, he said, but characterized by “a little caution, a little concern.”

[Former CIA chief: Trump is Russia’s useful fool]

Trump has already received at least two preliminary briefings, arranged during the campaign by Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper Jr. But those were done out of tradition and courtesy, providing both candidates broad overviews of security issues while holding back secrets about drone strikes, eavesdropping capabilities and other covert programs.

Intelligence officials were deeply troubled early in the campaign when Trump declared that he might be inclined to instruct the CIA to resume operations to capture terrorism suspects and subject them to brutal interrogation measures, including waterboarding. That agency program was dismantled in 2009, and measures passed since then would make its resumption illegal.

We asked people around the world for their reaction to Trump's victory Embed Share Play Video1:30
In Mexico, China, Russia and Israel we ask people what they think of the election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the United States. (Jason Aldag/The Washington Post)
Trump subsequently backed away from those comments, which were interpreted by some as empty saber-rattling.

“He could revive a program of secret prisons” overseas, said John Rizzo, former acting general counsel of the CIA, but would be likely to find it difficult to get any foreign country to agree to host one.

[Senate report on CIA program details brutality, dishonesty]


His other problem would be convincing the workforce at the CIA to carry out his wishes.
“There would be such pushback,” said Rizzo, whose confirmation as general counsel was derailed because of his participation in crafting the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques used on al-Qaeda suspects in the early 2000s. “Given what it cost the agency” in terms of reputation, “there would be extremely strong resistance,” he said.

More recently, U.S. intelligence officials have been disturbed by Trump’s positions on Russia — his statements encouraging Moscow to seek to steal Clinton’s emails and his refusal to accept the intelligence community’s conclusion that the Kremlin was behind a cyberespionage campaign targeting Clinton and the Democratic Party.

That finding was presented to Trump in one of his early intelligence briefings and then reinforced last month when Clapper’s office took the rare step of issuing a public statement declaring Russia complicit in the hacks.

[Trump praises Putin at national security forum]

Trump treated that determination as unfounded rumor. “I don’t know if they’re behind it, and I think it’s public relations, frankly,” Trump said last month.

Trump has vowed to obliterate terrorist groups including the Islamic State but has offered few specifics on how he would deploy the principal entities in that fight: the CIA and the military’s elite Joint Special Operations Command.

The Obama administration spent years developing guidelines for counterterrorism operations, requiring multiagency approval on most drone-strike targets and “near certainty” that no civilians would be harmed.

That “playbook” is spelled out in presidential orders that will remain in effect unless Trump specifically moves to scrap them, administration officials said. Trump could rescind the procedures or issue his own orders setting out revised rules governing the use of drones and commando teams. But officials said a decision to throw out the Obama playbook risks sparking backlash from career professionals at the Pentagon and the CIA who have been implementing the rules since they were put in place.

The absence of seasoned national security officials on Trump’s campaign staff has been a source of concern at the CIA, the Pentagon and other agencies. His most prominent adviser with intelligence-related credentials is retired U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who was forced out of his job as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and dined with Russian President Vladi­mir Putin last year.

Speculation on where Flynn and former New York mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani might serve in a Trump administration added to the unease among national security officials Wednesday. “Is Giuliani going to be our attorney general?” one official asked.

Some officials drew comparisons to earlier eras — including the administration of Richard Nixon — that were characterized by White House hostility toward key departments and agencies, noting that the Justice Department, Pentagon and CIA survived.

What Trump has said about the CIA and the military has “put us in a difficult position, but the flip side is there is an institutional ability to survive,”
said a second senior U.S. official. “Bureaucracies chug along and take lumps and have conflicts. If you ask about rank and file, for a long time there has been a sense that [presidents and administrations] come and go, but we’re still here. You’ve got to assume that the Foreign Service at State, generals at the Department of Defense have that belief. There’s an institutional stability built into the system that can withstand spasms.”

Dana Priest and Adam Entous contributed to this report.

Read more:
Inside Trump’s financial ties to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin
Trump says intelligence officials’ ‘body language’ showed they were unhappy with Obama
Trump’s White House win promises to reshape U.S. political landscape
Why many veterans are sticking with Trump, even after he insulted a Gold Star family
Austin
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Re: International Intelligence news

Post by Austin »

FSB: cyberattack foreign intelligence services directed to dozens of cities
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20161202/1482675962.html
MOSCOW, Dec. 2 - RIA Novosti. The planned cyberattack foreign intelligence agencies to destabilize the Russian financial system is aimed at a few dozen cities, the official website of the FSB.

"Cyber ​​attacks planned to accompany the mass sending of SMS-messages and publications in social networks (blogs) provocative in relation to the crisis of credit and financial system in Russia, business failure and revocation of licenses of a number of leading banks in the federal and regional level. The campaign is aimed at several dozen Russian cities" - said in a statement.

According to the FSB, the foreign intelligence services were preparing attacks on major banks of Russia on 5 December. Cyber ​​command center located in the Netherlands and owned by a Ukrainian company "BlazingFast". Now the Russian special services carry out activities to neutralize threats.
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