KaranM wrote:So? Boss, all throughout I have been making the EXACT point that the AF led decision to keep the TDs as science lab programs was FLAWED thanks to their desire to keep the program in a very "lets see and then decide manner" which is where the entire development process was doubled since basic technology had to be reworked or added in much much later.
Karan, your gripe is that IAF was “lets see & decide” mode for TDs instead of working in parallel to expedite matters.
In reality, things that needed to progress linearly had to be done linearly.
There was no other way of doing it. And whatever could’ve been done concurrently, was done concurrently.
For example, when the TD’s were being built, adding systems to it would’ve been meaningless, because TD’s were built to prove & test the basic flight characteristics of the airframe.
Only once the flight characteristics were proven, could adding systems progress.
From ADA
http://www.tejas.gov.in/history/genesis.html[quote] Phase 1 - TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATION STAGE (TD-1 & 2)
The focus in this phase was on ‘proof of concept’. It entailed the development and testing of two technology demonstrator aircraft. These aircraft were called TD-1 and TD-2.
The decision to move forward was to be taken after the successful completion of this phase. This would be followed by the production of additional prototype vehicles. [/quote]
Now this was not something IAF could’ve helped with, this is just basic project management. Its only after a house’s foundation is laid and basic structures like pillars & floors are in place that one can start working on laying electricity cables, water, gas & sewage lines, doors & windows.
In proof of concept phase, in any project, anywhere in the world, everyone, and not just IAF, has to work in "lets see and then decide manner". And as underlined as per ADA, everyone was "lets see and then decide manner".
KaranM wrote:If the IAF team had been part of the TD process itself & the TD process was not merely a "demo" but worked on in parallel with a clear roadmap (as versus waiting for FSED approval) we would have saved a heckuva lot of time.
As I’ve said earlier, Proof of Concept cannot be worked in parallel, like adding systems when the airframe characteristics are yet to be proven.
However, everything that could be done concurrently was done concurrently. Like MMR Radar development, Kaveri engine development, RWR development, etc.
Again, from ADA
http://www.tejas.gov.in/history/genesis.html[quote] Phase 2 - ADDITIONAL TESTING PHASE (PV-1, PV-2, PV-3 and PV-5)
This phase consisted of additional testing and development of systems using Prototype Vehicles which would lead to the development of the final variant that would join the IAF and the Indian Navy. The first Prototype Vehicle, PV-1 flew on 25 November 2003.
By 2005, the Tejas had proven itself in the testing phase and the first order for 20 Series Production aircrafts was placed. A follow on order for an additional 20 SP aircraft was placed in 2010. [/quote]
IAF requirements except weapons did not change. CAG is clear on that. Other than that, nothing from IAF delayed the project.
The “heckuva lot of time” was what it actually took to develop the Tejas by ADA.
KaranM wrote:tesarkar wrote:Even the MMR (Multi-Mode Radar) underwent changes after the indigenous effort to make one did not succeed. So we had to go for Israeli Elta Radar.
The Hybrid MMR is NOTHING but an ELTA 2032 with an Indian scanner.
The reason I posted this was whenever IAF uses a foreign system, many forum members like characters from the “Lord of the Flies” viciously accuse them of being under the influence of Natashas without any reason or logic. However, when ADA Chief says his system is ELTA instead of Hybrid MMR, the same forum members are conspicuously silent. In SP aircraft, fully integrated radars will be imported from Israel, without any Indian antenna. ECIL did build antennas that were used in testing, but in production, decision was taken for a single manufacturer to avoid integration issues.
KaranM wrote:The point all along which you don't seem to get is that the TD ->PV development choice was FLAWED to begin with
Your statement is grossly incorrect. It was ADA & everyone’s decision, and normal Engineering Development to do a PoC and build the TD’s and thereafter PVs.
KaranM wrote:since the IAF did NOT specify proper specifications for the TDs themselves to do the heavy lifting
Your statement is again incorrect, since IAF specifications existed since 1985.
And it was everyone’s decision to build TD’s as PoC and thereafter build PV’s with combat systems.
No one builds mission systems into unproven PoC systems
KaranM wrote:As such everything had to be redone.
Further incorrectness.
Can you enlighten us specifically what “
everything had to be redone”?
KaranM wrote:LOL, here I was pointing out that this was the exact flaw in the program that the TDs didn;t have adequate mission capable systems and you are repeating my words.
Hope you’ve understood by now that Proof of Concept Technology Demonstrators by deliberate design don’t have mission capable systems. They are just for proving concepts like basic airframe characteristics. And its got nothing to do with IAF.
KaranM wrote:Next you just posted a list of handful of items and even there you are wrong. TD's didn't have MFD? What were they flying with, steam gauges? The TDs had a complete mission computing, display suite which experience was used for upgrade programs.
http://www.tejas.gov.in/history/milestones.html[quote] 2006
1st December - PV-3 flew for the first time for 27 minutes at an altitude of 2.5 km and at a speed of Mach 0.8.
PV-3 was equipped with a more advanced pilot interface, refined avionics and higher control law capabilities compared with the previous versions. [/quote]
KaranM wrote:The IAF choosing the flawed TD to PV model ensured the actual FSED started much much later.
No, its your understanding of Program Management & Engineering Development that is horribly incorrect and flawed, as explained above.
KaranM wrote:I could even post a list of changes from my own notes but this is ending up as a waste of time.
No, please post. Would love to be enlightened if you have any further information.
KaranM wrote:In the case of the LCA, the IAF happily let things slide till 2005 before which they werent bothered with the program and hence it took FSED to actually make the LCA into a combat aircraft. As versus having done a fair amount of the heavy lifting by TD stage itself and not using this sequential process to begin with!! IAF came up with high level specs & then disassociated themselves from the program till 2005-6. "AF goalposts didn't change" except the fact that only they knew what their specific interpretation of many of these goalposts would be, which is typical for a program of this nature. The IAF appointee to the program recently noted that the IAF joined in 2006 and reworked all the design logic and raised hundreds of engineering change requests for the program to make it a viable program. All good, but thats five years after 2001!
The prevalent culture in the 80’s & 90’s was anything but collaborative. Air Commodore Sen has written extensively how talented people like Air Marshal PM Ramachandran recommended by A P J Abdul Kalam were interested in joining the program.
https://tkstales.wordpress.com/2012/04/ ... s-arrives/
By 28 Feb 1993 Ramu had reached his age of retirement. He was then a full Air Marshal holding the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff. Dr Abdul Kalam was then the SA to RM. He wanted Ramu to take over the LCA project in the existing vacancy of Director General ADA as he had done good work earlier on the very successful “Jaguar Darin” project. Ramu was willing to take on the challenge provided his name was proposed jointly by DRDO & Air Force so that he was not identified as an “Air Force” man or a “DRDO” man and he could function freely in the interests of the project. Accordingly, the SA to RM routed the file through the CAS who concurred with the proposal and forwarded it to the RM Sri Sharad Pawar in Feb 93. It is learnt that the same got approval from three out of the four members of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) within a couple of months but was held up by the PMO for more than two years on various pretexts. It was examined by a few more search Committees all of whom had concurred with the original selection of Ramu. Dr Kalam intervened again and Ramu’s appointment was finally cleared by the PM in Jun 95. The file was then passed to the Establishment Directorate for issue of an official letter of appointment. Even after another one full year, this letter had not been issued. It looked as if no one other than Dr Kalam was interested in strengthening the LCA project Management, and even he was powerless to enforce his will in the face of departmental apathy/antipathy.