India's Polar Engagement: News & Discussion
Posted: 04 Aug 2023 06:39
The Sino-Russian partnership has expanded not only qualitatively, but also geographically with some of their interaction reaching the Arctic Circle. In April 2019, Russia announced plans to connect the Northern Sea Route, along which Moscow plans to begin year-round navigation in 2022-2023 with China’s Maritime Silk Road. Use of the NSR could pose significant advantages in terms of shipping times. According to a 2018 study published by The Economic Journal, commercial use of the NSR could represent a reduction of average shipping times by about one-third compared to its southern counterpart. In practical terms, shipping from China to the United Kingdom would decrease by 25% compared to the Suez Canal route, and from China to the Netherlands by 23%, according to the study, which estimated that overall trade cost reductions brought about by this more efficient route would increase trade flows by an average of 10%. According to the article, use of the NSR could decrease transportation costs between China and various European countries (e.g. Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) by upwards of 20%. The authors predicted that by 2030, some 13.4% of Chinese trade would be re-routed through the NSR.
Moscow has also signaled wariness in recent years with respect to Beijing’s growing Arctic ambitions. In 2007, China first applied to become an observer of the Arctic Council, the leading intergovernmental body promoting Arctic cooperation. Comprising eight permanent members, all of which have territories within the Arctic—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States—the Arctic Council envisions itself as the region's collective body of stewards, charged with overseeing the land, waters and people of the region. At the time of China’s initial application, according to the Arctic Institute, Moscow displayed resistance to what it viewed as the Council's unnecessary internationalization, as its Nordic partners on the Council pushed for the inclusion of any state that could make a compelling case for its observer status. Beijing succeeded in its bid to join the Council as a non-Arctic observer state in 2013. Two years later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that Chinese-Russian cooperation in the region was purely bilateral and had no bearing on the Council’s governance affairs. "China is an observer in the Arctic Council. China seems to have favorable prospects, because it has appropriate resources, technologies and scientific potential. But our Arctic cooperation with China should not boil down to the Arctic Council. Russia’s Arctic zone is the area where we can work on a bilateral basis with many partners. Of course, China is one of the priority partners," he said in 2015. Then in 2018, the Chinese government released a white paper detailing the policy implications of its status as a so-called “Near-Arctic State.” In the paper, China argued that due to climate change, the Arctic was no longer the concern of the region’s states alone. “The Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development and the shared future for mankind.” The paper went on to define a near-Arctic state as “one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle,” arguing that shifting Arctic conditions have a direct impact on China’s environment, and thus on its economic health. According to the paper, the consequences of this self-designated status are sweeping. “China’s policy goals on the Arctic are: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic.”
In comments delivered in May 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo responded in no uncertain terms. “Beijing claims to be a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ yet the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing,” he said. Russia’s top Arctic official, Nikolai Korchunov, made the surprise move in June 2020 of effectively siding with Washington’s then-top diplomat. "Russia is not interested in delegating its rights to other states," he said, as quoted by TASS. “In this respect it is impossible to disagree with [Pompeo’s] statement made in May 2019 that there are two groups of countries—Arctic and non-Arctic. He said so in relation to China, which positioned itself as a near-Arctic state. We disagree with this." At the core of all this geopolitical posturing is the fact that warming Arctic temperatures open up a bounty of natural resources. The Arctic may contain up to 90 billion barrels of oil and 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Russia's potential shares of which amount to 48 billion barrels and 43 trillion cubic meters, respectively, and some $1 trillion worth of rare earth metals.
Moscow has also signaled wariness in recent years with respect to Beijing’s growing Arctic ambitions. In 2007, China first applied to become an observer of the Arctic Council, the leading intergovernmental body promoting Arctic cooperation. Comprising eight permanent members, all of which have territories within the Arctic—Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States—the Arctic Council envisions itself as the region's collective body of stewards, charged with overseeing the land, waters and people of the region. At the time of China’s initial application, according to the Arctic Institute, Moscow displayed resistance to what it viewed as the Council's unnecessary internationalization, as its Nordic partners on the Council pushed for the inclusion of any state that could make a compelling case for its observer status. Beijing succeeded in its bid to join the Council as a non-Arctic observer state in 2013. Two years later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made clear that Chinese-Russian cooperation in the region was purely bilateral and had no bearing on the Council’s governance affairs. "China is an observer in the Arctic Council. China seems to have favorable prospects, because it has appropriate resources, technologies and scientific potential. But our Arctic cooperation with China should not boil down to the Arctic Council. Russia’s Arctic zone is the area where we can work on a bilateral basis with many partners. Of course, China is one of the priority partners," he said in 2015. Then in 2018, the Chinese government released a white paper detailing the policy implications of its status as a so-called “Near-Arctic State.” In the paper, China argued that due to climate change, the Arctic was no longer the concern of the region’s states alone. “The Arctic situation now goes beyond its original inter-Arctic States or regional nature, having a vital bearing on the interests of States outside the region and the interests of the international community as a whole, as well as on the survival, the development and the shared future for mankind.” The paper went on to define a near-Arctic state as “one of the continental States that are closest to the Arctic Circle,” arguing that shifting Arctic conditions have a direct impact on China’s environment, and thus on its economic health. According to the paper, the consequences of this self-designated status are sweeping. “China’s policy goals on the Arctic are: to understand, protect, develop and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable development of the Arctic.”
In comments delivered in May 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo responded in no uncertain terms. “Beijing claims to be a ‘Near-Arctic State,’ yet the shortest distance between China and the Arctic is 900 miles. There are only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No third category exists, and claiming otherwise entitles China to exactly nothing,” he said. Russia’s top Arctic official, Nikolai Korchunov, made the surprise move in June 2020 of effectively siding with Washington’s then-top diplomat. "Russia is not interested in delegating its rights to other states," he said, as quoted by TASS. “In this respect it is impossible to disagree with [Pompeo’s] statement made in May 2019 that there are two groups of countries—Arctic and non-Arctic. He said so in relation to China, which positioned itself as a near-Arctic state. We disagree with this." At the core of all this geopolitical posturing is the fact that warming Arctic temperatures open up a bounty of natural resources. The Arctic may contain up to 90 billion barrels of oil and 47 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, Russia's potential shares of which amount to 48 billion barrels and 43 trillion cubic meters, respectively, and some $1 trillion worth of rare earth metals.