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Indian Foreign Policy

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 03 Sep 2016 11:20

Yes, that is what was meant, as Kashi has explained. India is the barrier. The IOR explanation, the reminder by many to China that it should follow the Indian example of abiding by the UNCLOS, the consistent stand on the Indo-China Sea, the 'Act East' policy of India are all coming for high praise.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Bhurishravas » 04 Sep 2016 01:04

For the first time, India is showing some spine and talking sense rather than indulging in Nehruvian ch*****pa.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/indi ... 966103.cms

'Let them keep writing to UN': India's response to Pakistan on Kashmir

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 08 Sep 2016 07:55

X Posted from the “China Watch Thread-I” thread.

The Peoples Republic of China’s deep seated racism on display. PRC flag carrier Air China prints tips in inflight magazine advising that “precautions are needed when entering areas mainly populated by Indians, Pakistanis and black people". While PRC racism towards Indian and African origin people is not surprising, overt addition of those originating in PRC’s Higher Than Himalayas, Deeper than Indian Ocean, Sweeter than Honey, Purer than Ever Flowing Water, Closer than Lips to Teeth Iron Brother the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is surprising as I would have thought the PRC would have kept racism here covert:

Row as Air China warns of London's 'Indian, Pakistani and black' neighbourhoods

Air China flys to India. Hope in-flight magazines will be scanned by our Government to ensure P.R.Chinese racism towards Indian's are not on display.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 08 Sep 2016 17:01

X Posted from the “India-US relations: News and Discussions III” thread.

An example of the closeness between the US Armed Forces and the Punjabi Dominated Military of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and why India needs to be circumspect in dealings with the US.

Journalist Shekhar Gupta’s question if the IAF shot up his plane at Chaklala AFB during the 1971 war gets US Air Force Brigadier Chuck Yeager to claim that the Islamic Republic of “Pakistan won” 1971:

https://twitter.com/GenChuckYeager/stat ... 4445783040

The start of the exchange:

https://twitter.com/GenChuckYeager/stat ... 2632882176

It carries on beyond the 2 links with others coming in.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 13 Sep 2016 10:02

When India plays warm host to good neighbours - Suhasini Haidar, The Hindu
With two back-to-back high-profile visits by Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani (September 14-15) and Nepal Prime Minister Prachanda (September 15-18) this week, the Modi government is hoping to send out a two-pronged message about its “neighbourhood first” policy.

On the one hand, the government is seeking to isolate its “bad ties” with Pakistan, comparing them with the “good ties” with the rest of the SAARC region, and on the other, showing a softer side that has allowed it to repair ties with neighbours that had been extremely strained before.

Stormy start

With both Afghanistan and Nepal, India’s ties suffered through much of 2015. When he took over as President in 2014, Mr. Ghani seemed to sideline India. Placing India in the “fourth” and not the ‘first’ circle of friendship, and focussing on engaging the Pakistani military first, Mr. Ghani broke with an unspoken neighbourhood precedent when he decided to visit China for his first official trip abroad, and then Pakistan and the U.S., rather than India.

India reciprocated the snub, and apart from a visit by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, there were no other high-profile visits to Kabul. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj ignored several requests for the Strategic Partnership Council meeting. President Ghani received a cold reception on his visit to Delhi in April 2015, when no agreements that had been worked on such as the Motor Vehicles transit, MLAT and extradition agreements were signed. To make matters worse, Mr. Ghani then announced an MoU for the Afghan and Pakistani intelligence agencies to work together, and quickly followed it with a process for talks with the Taliban held in Pakistan, which included China.

The contrast this year is stark: Mr. Ghani will arrive as a trusted partner and friend who regularly speaks to Prime Minister Narendra Modi over the phone.

Stung by Pakistan’s continued support to Taliban groups that have pounded Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is instead seeking closer military ties with New Delhi, which has promised a slew of transport and ancillary hardware, including more helicopters.

Mr. Modi has visited Afghanistan twice in this period, and the government has also revived the India-U.S.-Afghanistan trilateral meeting during U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s visit this month, which had been shelved since 2014. “The turnaround came because India showed patience, and both Pakistan, and to an extent, China let Mr. Ghani down,” is how an official describes the shift.

With Nepal, the turnaround in relations is even more dramatic. A year ago, Nepal-India ties had come, quite literally, to a standstill at the border, as India tried to pressure the Koirala government and then the Oli government to amend the Constitution to incorporate Madhesi concerns.

Matters came practically to a breaking point when Nepal signed a major infrastructure pact with China, seeking access to Chinese ports and help with road and rail construction.

No more distrust

Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal, or Prachanda, who leads the CPN (Maoist-Centre), formerly UCPN, who was always portrayed as pro-China, was viewed with distrust by New Delhi. In his first term as Prime Minister in 2008, like Mr. Ghani, Mr. Dahal visited Beijing before he visited New Delhi, which has always rankled South Block. The original strain between the Modi government and the Nepalese government in November 2014, came about when the UCPN led massive protests against a planned public rally by Mr. Modi in Janakpur, forcing its cancellation.

‘Positive step’

However, in recent months, Mr. Dahal has become New Delhi’s preferred choice for Premier and replaced Mr. Oli in August. “Prachanda made it clear he will lead a less hostile government for India, and for India, this is a much-needed positive step,” a senior official told The Hindu , adding “The question is whether he can beat the instability his predecessors faced, and whether he can show a greater commitment to the Madhesi concerns.”

Regardless of the outcome, it would seem that with both its SAARC neighbours, New Delhi is displaying a more flexible position, yielding more time to both administrations in Kabul and Kathmandu than it has in the past.

The visits will tie in with high-level visits from the Maldives in upcoming months, as well as the rest of the SAARC minus Pakistan, whose leaders will attend the BIMSTEC-BRICS summit in Goa in October.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Kashi » 13 Sep 2016 10:12

SSridhar wrote:India reciprocated the snub, and apart from a visit by National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, there were no other high-profile visits to Kabul. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj ignored several requests for the Strategic Partnership Council meeting. President Ghani received a cold reception on his visit to Delhi in April 2015, when no agreements that had been worked on such as the Motor Vehicles transit, MLAT and extradition agreements were signed.
...
Stung by Pakistan’s continued support to Taliban groups that have pounded Afghanistan, Mr. Ghani is instead seeking closer military ties with New Delhi, which has promised a slew of transport and ancillary hardware, including more helicopters.


Doesn't this contradict..

SSridhar wrote:Regardless of the outcome, it would seem that with both its SAARC neighbours, New Delhi is displaying a more flexible position, yielding more time to both administrations in Kabul and Kathmandu than it has in the past.
?

It would seem that we refused to yield as in the past and both Afghan and Nepal came around as they were burnt by their "all weather friends"? Ghani in particular ended up losing a lot of Afghan leverage in Bakistan only to face a resurgent Taliban in return.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Paul » 13 Sep 2016 10:57

It is too early to say whether Nepal has turned the corner. India's trump card are the Madhesis. We have to make sure they get a seat at the high table. To MAD's credit, they are for the first time not leery of using these tactics to advance Indian interests.

Prachanda is being nice to India only for this reason.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby g.sarkar » 14 Sep 2016 04:27

http://thewire.in/65644/nam-namo-skippi ... iss-india/
NAM and NaMo: Skipping the Summit Is a Miss for India
BY ARUN MOHAN SUKUMAR ON 13/09/2016
Modi should not ignore the fact that the Non-Aligned Movement comprises frontline states in the contest for economic influence between China and the United States.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s decision to skip the 17th Non Aligned Movement (NAM) summit reflects poorly on his ability to utilise strategic levers that have served the country well in the past and continue to have relevance even today. Some analysts may see the decision to give the meeting in Margarita, Venezuela a miss as driven by an aversion to the bloc’s perceived anti-West posturing. Were that the case, however, the Ministry of External Affairs would not have embarked on an energetic and highly successful outreach endeavour to the BRICS countries, that began with India assuming the presidency of the five-nation grouping this year. Could it be, however, that NAM is too closely identified with the Congress for the prime minister to want to engage with it?
Modi’s sights are set not on the many Congress prime ministers who flew to NAM summits out of some sense of obligation to the leagcy of the party’s first family, but on Jawaharlal Nehru himself. If Nehru was the architect of independent India’s external relations with the world, he also steered the country away from great power politics, positioning New Delhi as an interested observer. Modi appears personally committed to re-orienting India’s foreign policy in the 21st century, driven squarely by its engagement with major powers, be it the United States, Russia, Iran or China. This is a commendable objective – perhaps even commensurate to India’s rise globally – but there is no reason that India’s participation in the NAM summit at the highest level has to be a casualty of cross-party differences. Instead of staying away, the prime minister should have used the latest summit to turn around India’s recent history of largely symbolic and vacuous engagement with the NAM into real benefits.
Perhaps the backdrop of this year’s summit has the MEA concerned about NAM. There is some irony in proclaiming solidarity with the developing world even as the host country, Venezuela, suffers from a debilitating economic crisis. Second, the host country usually holds the pen and circulates a ‘zero draft’ in advance for inputs from member countries. The Venezuelan draft may have rhetoric that India would find difficult to temper, although this is a problem that India has already managed once in 2012 during Iran’s presidency of NAM under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad......
Gautam

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 16 Sep 2016 15:47

Ideally, the following should be in India Trade Policy, but I will post it here.

India need not genuflect at RCEP - Amiti Sen, Business Line
Negotiations for the regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP), which could make India a part of one of the largest proposed free trade blocs in the world, are gaining momentum. But the crucial question is whether New Delhi is comfortable with the direction the talks are now taking.

While the BJP government is rightly critical of the free trade pacts that the UPA government signed with Japan, South Korea and Asean as the increase in India’s imports from these regions far outstrip the rise in exports, it may face the danger of treading on the same path if it is not careful.

The China factor

In the case of RCEP, the fallout of a badly negotiated pact for India would be much graver than the consequences of the FTAs signed so far, because of the China factor. Unbridled competition from the neighbouring country could be a nightmare come true for an Indian industry already reeling under the burden of a growing bilateral trade deficit which now accounts for nearly half the country’s total trade gap.

Although the negotiations on RCEP by its 16 members — which account for 45 per cent of the global population and 40 per cent ($21.3 trillion) of world trade — are far from being wrapped up, there are already signs that things may not move the way India envisages.

At the meeting of trade ministers in Laos early August, India gave up a long-held position of providing different levels of market access to different members. It had earlier opted for a three-tier structure in which it offered tariff elimination on 42.5 per cent of traded goods to China, Australia and New Zealand (the countries with which India doesn’t have FTAs), followed by 65 per cent to South Korea and Japan with which it has FTAs. The highest level of 80 per cent was to 10-member Asean.

The thought of moving towards tariff elimination for Chinese products, even when it was expected that it would be restricted to 42.5 per cent of traded items, was enough to give sleepless nights to Indian industry. New Delhi did make a brave attempt to move away from a zero-duty regime to one of low tariffs, where duties would be reduced but not eliminated, by moving a proposal in the Jakarta meeting in July, but it was rejected. The proposal not only went against RCEP’s idea of a free trade bloc, but was also not in line with India’s trade pacts with Asean, Japan and South Korea, where tariffs are being eliminated on a wide range of products.

On the back foot

With RCEP countries refusing to drop tariff elimination in favour of moderation, how wise was it for India to agree to equal market access for all? If Asean, which has been making a case for tariff elimination on almost all traded items, keeps up the pressure, will New Delhi be ready to offer zero tariffs to China for 80 per cent of the items or even more? Even if Indian negotiators are able to offer some resistance, it is highly improbable that they would be able to lower the overall ambition significantly.

On the positive side, New Delhi has managed to make RCEP countries tentatively agree to a different/longer implementation period for the tariff cuts for different countries and different products depending on sensitivities. This means that if it agrees to eliminate tariffs for most products from Asean over ten years, it might get a longer time period to do so in the case of China, especially for sensitive items such as steel. But there is a limit beyond which the implementation period cannot be staggered, and tariffs will ultimately have to go. Is our industry prepared to face zero-tariff competition from China even if the tariff elimination happens gradually?

A question of even greater significance is, what is India getting in return? Gains on the goods front would be limited as it already has FTAs with Asean, Japan and South Korea where commitments to eliminate tariffs on a large number of items have been made. Australia and New Zealand, which don’t have free trade pacts with India, already have low tariffs on goods. The Chinese market is big, but it is not a big attraction for Indian industry which stands to gain just a fraction of the market there compared to what the Chinese would wrest on their domestic turf.

So, as the Government has been saying, India’s gains from a deal with RCEP would mostly lie in the area of services. Indian negotiators take pride in stating that due to their insistence, services would be part of a single undertaking and not carved off as a separate agreement as was done in the case of the FTA with Asean. In the India-Asean FTA, India got a raw deal in services as the pact on goods had already been signed and it did not have any bargaining chips left, but this time, negotiators say, they will not make the same mistake.

Unfortunately, despite efforts by India to get members to give substantial offers in services, especially for professionals, the offers made so far are insignificant. Including a toothless pact on services in the proposed RCEP would not justify India’s participation in a trade pact where China is to be ultimately provided unrestricted market access for most products.


Clear choices

Another reason why India has been keen to be part of RCEP, despite the presence of China in the group, is the fact that two other mega regional trade pacts — the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade & Investment Partnership (TTIP) — are simultaneously being forged and it is not a part of either. Its worry is that if it is excluded from all major regional trade pacts, it could soon become uncompetitive in its traditional markets where rivals would get access at lower import duties.

But how real is the fear? The TPP — which is a US-led group of 12 Pacific Rim countries — has been signed but is nowhere near being ratified even in the US. While the Obama regime is unlikely to ratify it in its remaining few months, both the front-runners for the presidential race, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, have voiced their opposition to the deal.

The TTIP — the proposed FTA between the US and the EU — too is in trouble, with French Trade Minister Matthias Fekl and Germany’s Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel describing the talks as having failed.

India, therefore, need not feel threatened by other trade blocs while it is negotiating the RCEP. Nor should it fear losing market access in the RCEP region in the absence of a deal, as it already has FTAs with most member countries. It has to continue its negotiations, not with an imaginary gun pointed at its head, but with the clear understanding that it has the freedom to decide whether to stay or opt out.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 17 Sep 2016 09:26

Summit over substance - Shyam Saran, The Hindu
Barely six weeks after participating in the G-20 summit at Hangzhou, China, and the East Asia and ASEAN-India summits at Vientiane, Laos, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will himself play host to the annual BRICS summit in Goa on October 15-16, 2016. This will bring together the heads of state of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, and the summit theme put forward by India is “Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions”, which is a clever play on the letters constituting the membership of the grouping. India has also exercised its privilege as host to arrange a regional outreach.

At the Fortaleza summit in 2014, Brazil had invited several heads of state/government from Latin America, while at Ufa last year Russia had invited the leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. One would have expected India to have invited SAARC leaders to the outreach but it has chosen to host the leaders of the seven-member BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) instead. BIMSTEC is a potential Bay of Bengal Economic Community comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka from South Asia and Myanmar and Thailand from ASEAN. The motivation is obvious, to avoid having to invite Pakistan. BIMSTEC will also hold its fourth summit in Goa. Nepal was to have hosted it in 2015 but was unable to do so mainly on account of the earthquake and the subsequent political turmoil. Not much should be expected from the BIMSTEC summit. It has been as somnolent as SAARC has been since its inception.{Only India can excite this grouping and India is not doing so. My surmise is that the small size of our MEA is a major cause for such loss of focus. If we have decided to downgrade SAARC, we must invest in other such groupings of neighbourhood countries aggressively}

The China-Russia dynamic

There will be greater focus on the BRICS summit mainly because of the stature of those who will be attending, including President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Xi Jinping of China. Both have a shared image of being tough leaders, of having defied the U.S. and the West, and now edging closer to a closer security partnership, if not an alliance. The largest ever Sino-Russian joint naval exercises are being held in the South China Sea off the coast of Guangdong province. And Russia is the only country to have explicitly supported China’s stand on the South China Sea dispute, of rejecting the international tribunal award and proposing bilateral dialogue with claimant countries, though it has not endorsed its territorial claims.

There will be a Chinese effort to include in the summit declaration a formulation similar to what had been agreed upon in the India-Russia-China trilateral Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Moscow in April this year and which appeared to support China’s stand: “Russia, India and China are committed to maintaining a legal order for the seas and oceans based on the principles of international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS). All related disputes should be addressed through negotiations and agreements between the parties concerned. In this regard the Ministers called for full respect of all provisions of UNCLOS, as well as the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and the Guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.”

This was before the tribunal award. Now having a formulation along these lines in the BRICS declaration, post the award, would be of even greater value to China, which will undoubtedly press for it with Russian support. Indian negotiators will probably resist. Already after the Moscow meeting there had been criticism that India was speaking with two voices, one when in the company of Americans and the other when meeting with the Chinese and Russians. Furthermore, given Chinese opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and its blocking at the UN of naming the Pakistani Jaish-e-Mohammed chief Masood Azhar as a terrorist, it is likely that India may dig in on this point. We shall wait and see.

A triangular game

The other two leaders, Brazil’s Michel Temer and South Africa’s Jacob Zuma, are unlikely to come up with any notable initiatives. Their countries are suffering from both political and economic turmoil. Mr. Temer has taken over after a politically polarising impeachment of the former Brazilian president, Dilma Rousseff. Mr. Zuma is facing serious charges of corruption, and there has been unprecedented infighting in his ruling African National Congress. So it will be mostly a triangular game among Mr. Modi, Mr. Putin and Mr. Xi, and the latter two seem to be leaning closer to each other. This will be a challenge for the Indian host.

For Mr. Modi, a strong and categorical statement on counter-terrorism will be a must even though neither China and now nor Russia will countenance the naming of Pakistan or even an oblique reference to it. Brazil and South Africa do not have much play in this game. So expect a strong formulation but more general in scope.

BRICS has begun to suffer the affliction characteristic of several other multi-country groupings, and that is the exponential expansion in its committees, working groups and forums resulting in a extraordinarily crowded calendar of meetings. There are now over a hundred such bodies covering a multiplicity of subjects ranging from trade, investment and finance, to health, education and security. India itself has been hosting several tens of these meetings during the year in its capacity as incoming chair, but it is questionable whether such hyper activity leads to substantive outcomes. The impression one has is of being stretched too thin across a steadily expanding space with neither the human nor the financial resources to follow through. The event itself then becomes the focus and not the process. It is no surprise then that outcomes from such summitry are sparse.

BRICS has one practical outcome to its credit, and that is the New Development Bank, and an Indian, K.V. Kamath, is its president. The Bank has been operationalised and India has reportedly received loans totalling about $300 million. But this institution is overshadowed by the much better funded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) initiated and led by the Chinese. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), another important BRICS initiative, remains on paper. There is a proposal for the setting up of a BRICS Credit Rating Agency to challenge the monopoly of the West, and this might be of value if adopted. On the trade side any hint of a BRICS free trade agreement comes up against the fears both India and Russia have of being swamped by Chinese imports. It will not have traction even though none of the five countries are part of any of the emerging mega trade blocs like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). At a time when both TPP and TTIP are stalled, even a hint of a mega trade bloc of the key emerging economies would be a major development. It could even bring the World Trade Organisation back in play!

The BIMSTEC summit could be an important occasion for reviving what, on the face of it, appears to be a grouping with immense potential. Its attraction is that China is not there to crowd India out, and it fits in very well with the logic of India’s Act East policy. The parallel Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC), which is a platform for India’s exclusive engagement with the countries of Indo-China (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) and Myanmar, could also be a major component of the Act East strategy. But neither BIMSTEC nor the MGC have lived up to their potential, and India’s engagement with them has been mostly episodic and ad hoc. There are sets of activities under both but they do not add up to a well-thought-out and long-term strategy of integrating India more closely with its eastern neighbourhood. The perception remains that India continues to be at the margins of this increasingly contested geopolitical space, unable to play a significant role in shaping its emerging economic and security architecture.

Trailing on connectivity

There is little doubt that connectivity will have to be the key theme at the BIMSTEC summit but here, too, is an Indian dilemma. The connectivity platform also opens the door to China selling its ambitious One Belt, One Road initiative among the members of this grouping. India’s own resources are limited, but more than that its record of delivery on commitments continues to be abysmal. There are occasions when one finds the same projects reappearing as “fresh initiatives” in serial joint statements over recent years. Our capacities and institutions continue to lag behind our ambitions.

There is no doubt that the forthcoming summits will be major events and will reflect India’s status as a key player in the region and as a globally significant player. But that will only be a transient gain unless we begin to pay attention to the much less glamorous and more nuts-and-bolts effort to use events as key markers in a well-conceived and systematic process of expanding our strategic space, leveraging our strengths and remedying our vulnerabilities. It is time to move from an event-oriented to a process-driven approach.

Shyam Saran is a former Foreign Secretary. He is currently Chairman, RIS, and Senior Fellow, Centre for Policy Research.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 20 Sep 2016 10:05

Excerpt from Pew Global survey on our Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s handling of our foreign policy. Indians are found to be a pretty disgruntled lot when it comes to our PM’s handling of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Given Pew’s finding elsewhere in the survey for robust support for use of military force and backing that up with increased spending, it would be reasonable to suppose that the electorates disgruntlement is because PM Modi’s handling of the Islamic republic of Pakistan is viewed as not robust enough:

Modi’s foreign policy

Modi fares less well in public assessment of his handling of relations with other countries, despite having taken 51 trips to 42 nations since he became prime minister in 2014.

The prime minister has made four trips to the United States since taking office. More than half (54%) of Indians approve of Modi’s dealings with Washington. Just 15% disapprove. But roughly three-in-ten (31%) voice no opinion. Notably, public approval of Modi’s handling of America is down 12 percentage points since 2015 despite his having visited the U.S. more than any other country during his premiership.

More than four-in-ten Indians (43%) approve of Modi’s relationship with Russia, while 25% disapprove. But 32% say they “don’t know.” Support for the prime minister’s dealings with Moscow is up 6 points since 2015.

About four-in-ten (38%) back Modi’s handling of ties with China. Roughly three-in-ten (32%) disapprove, while 30% express no opinion. Such sentiment is largely unchanged from last year.

Just 22% of the public approves of Modi’s management of India’s volatile relationship with Pakistan. Half disapprove. This harsh judgment is relatively unchanged from 2015.

In the handling of China, supporters of Modi’s own party, the BJP, are more likely than adherents of the Congress party to favor his conduct of bilateral relations. Notably, however, more than half of BJP supporters (54%) and a plurality of Congress party adherents (45%) disapprove of the prime minister’s handling of relations with Pakistan. However, the proportion of Indians responding “don’t know” is higher among Congress supporters (35%) than among BJP adherents (23%).


From here:

India and Modi: The Honeymoon Continues

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Philip » 20 Sep 2016 12:30

The honeymoon has been brought to an abrupt end with the Paki terror strike. The entire country now wants revenge.PM Modi is under intense pressure to take action that restores India and its military's honour.Severe diplomatic sanctions,etc. will be insufficient.Indians want Paki blood drawn,nothing less will suffice. The MEA must gear itself up to the probability of that happening and warn all foreign nations that this time Pak has gone too far and has to be bloodied.Here is a foreign viewpoint.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ ... mir-attack
Retaliation or restraint? India has limited options over Kashmir attack
Narendra Modi’s government has promised aggressive response but military action is unlikely due to Pakistan’s nuclear capacity
Indian soldiers guard the Uri army base attacked by suspected militants in Indian-controlled Kashmir.

@safimichael
Monday 19 September 2016
The death toll from one of the deadliest strikes on Indian security forces in Kashmir history has continued to rise, and so too the pressure on Narendra Modi’s government to retaliate.

India has directly accused Pakistan of involvement in the raid on Sunday by four militants on an army base in Uri, near the “line of control” that divides Kashmir between the two nuclear powers. At least 18 soldiers were killed, most in fires set by the militants, which consumed their tents and temporary shelters as they slept.

Modi was elected prime minister in 2014 promising to toughen India’s stance against Pakistan and its alleged sponsorship of militancy in the Kashmir valley. Ram Madhav, the general secretary of the ruling Bharatiya Janata party, struck the same aggressive tone on Sunday, saying: “For one tooth, the complete jaw.”

Restraint – of the kind India showed after the November 2008 terror attack in Mumbai, or after the assault by militants on an air base in Punjab in January – would “betray inefficiency and incompetence”, the leader of Modi’s party said.

But analysts say that tough rhetoric aside, the range of possible Indian responses to this latest attack are limited.

One reason is structural. Unlike Pakistan, India’s government is civilian-led and senior military officials “are not in the security planning loop at all”, says Ajai Shukla, a former Indian army colonel, now defence analyst.

The result is little military involvement in national security contingency planning, he says, and less capacity to escalate against Pakistan without igniting a full-blown war.

“To escalate militarily, one has to do a lot of advance planning, capability assessments, diplomatic strategy. Escalation dynamics have to be thought through. The entire political and military game has to be worked out in advance – none of this has been done yet,” Shukla says.

Even if swift military retaliation were possible, both sides are keenly aware of the limits of armed coercion, particularly since Pakistan acquired nuclear capacity in 1998.

“The government actually has a very narrow band of options, and even those are not without a certain amount of risk,” says Dhruva Jaishankar, a foreign policy fellow at the Brookings Institution in New Delhi.

Covert action, such as cross-border raids on militant camps or training centres, could send a signal to Pakistan but would do little to cool public anger at home.

India could also shell Pakistan positions across the disputed Kashmir border – as both sides have done in past years – at the risk of drawing retaliatory shelling and further weakening a 2003 ceasefire agreement.

Kashmiri activist barred from leaving India to attend UN summit
Airstrikes against Pakistani army posts or Jaish-e-Mohammad facilities are also a possibility, though would come with significant risk of casualties from Pakistan’s air-defence system, geared towards that very kind of Indian attack.

“All options come with latent risks and latent costs, but the short answer is there are no good options, and if there were, they would have been explored already,” Jaishankar says.

Yet if the Indian government can ride out the public anger, a restrained, diplomatic response might be its wisest route.

Myra MacDonald, a South Asia specialist and author of an upcoming book about relations between India and Pakistan, says the statements issued on Sunday by the US and UK were telling. Both governments unequivocally condemned the attack but, unlike past years, did not twin their condemnation with appeals for a return to dialogue on the Kashmir issue.

“Both countries realise there is very little hope of Pakistan giving up its support for militant groups,” she says.

That, combined with India’s growing economic clout, has seen greater Indian-US military cooperation than ever before, and Pakistan grow increasingly isolated from its neighbours and the international community. Stopping attacks by militants from Pakistan might be a losing battle, but India is winning the wider diplomatic war.

“The US and the UK have seen so much double-dealing by Pakistan in Afghanistan that they are now far more sympathetic to the Indian position,” MacDonald says.

And earlier version of this story said 20 soldiers died in the attack but the Indian government has since denied those reports, putting the figure at 18.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby NRao » 20 Sep 2016 23:20

How Ajit Doval, India's 007, is shaping PM Narendra Modi's foreign policy Natalie Obiko Pearson

He spent seven years undercover in Pakistan, recruited rebels as informants in disputed Kashmir, and once disguised himself as a rickshaw driver to infiltrate a militant group inside India's holiest Sikh temple. Now some consider Ajit Doval the most powerful person in India after Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Modi picked Doval as his National Security Advisor, a position that holds more sway than the ministers of defense and foreign affairs. It puts Doval in charge of talks with arch-rival Pakistan. He visits arms manufacturers to discuss strategic capabilities, and orchestrates the response to militant attacks, liaising daily with Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, the nation's top diplomat.

........................................

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Philip » 21 Sep 2016 13:08

Suggestion.SAARC is doomed because of the Paki presence.Therefore start a new org SAFE/SAEF.South Asian Economic Forum or South Asian Forum Economic,It sounds "safe " too! Like the ECM which morphed into the EU.Keep Pak out of it and disband SAARC.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Ramu » 21 Sep 2016 16:54

I support this line of thought.
Abandoning SAARC and creating a new org will be seen as a cowardice act by the paki army.

SAARC is a place where we can be the judge jury & executioner and deliver the maximum echandee blow to them by suspending pakis for the next 2 years. Suspend them for 2 years and change the venue for the next meet outside Pak.

I am deliberately saying suspension to keep them tied to a string.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 22 Sep 2016 14:32

Fantasies about non-alignment - G.Parthasarathy, Business Line
During his recent visit to the US, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar signed a ‘Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement’ with his American counterpart, Ashton Carter. The memorandum outlined a framework for provision of supplies such as food, fuel and berthing for visiting naval ships, and overflight and landing facilities for military aircraft.

The Congress Party and the Left cried foul and accused the Government of mortgaging the country’s sovereignty, the country’s policy of nonalignment, and even its “strategic autonomy”. This, despite the fact that the agreement contained provisions for providing such facilities on a case-by-case basis.

Logical progression

The present agreement logically follows the remarkable transformation in India-US relations during the presidency of George Bush, by the actions of two UPA government stalwarts, Manmohan Singh and Pranab Mukherjee. It was Pranab Mukherjee as defence minister who signed a ten-year agreement in June 2005, titled: “New Framework for the US India Defence Relationship (NDFR)” with his American counterpart, Donald Rumsfeld. This framework covered a wide range of activities, including collaboration in multinational operations, when such operations were found to be in “their common interest”. Such cooperation was envisaged in areas like terrorism and curbing nuclear weapons proliferation. There has been a substantial increase in military cooperation, arms acquisitions and joint exercises. Negotiations continued for signing three framework agreements in defence cooperation, on logistics, communications and information security, and geospatial information.

The most path-breaking agreement India signed this century came barely a month later, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush agreed that the US would end nuclear sanctions against India. They also agreed to persuade other nuclear suppliers to end global nuclear sanctions imposed on India after its nuclear test in 1974, by the establishment of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Bush stood by his word and even personally intervened with China’s President Hu Jintao to fall in line. In the meantime, in August 2008, Mukherjee, then external affairs minister, signed an agreement with his counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, for the resumption of bilateral nuclear cooperation.

The question that remains is whether India ever provided facilities for positioning foreign warships and aircraft on its soil?

Historical perspective

India has historically shaped its military cooperation with foreign powers, from the days of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on geopolitical realities and not ideology. Even before the Sino-Indian border conflict broke out in 1962, the CIA was permitted to position facilities along the border with China, to monitor Chinese nuclear tests. Panicking after the humiliation heaped on India in the 1962 conflict, a desperate Nehru wrote to President Kennedy, appealing to him to deploy 12 squadrons of fighters and two squadrons of fighter bombers, together with radar cover, on Indian soil. The US was permitted to use a staging base in Charbatia, Odisha, for flying U2 spy planes over China. Strangely, our non-alignment was such in the 1950s that we fought shy of seeking defence equipment from the Soviet Union, despite signs of a growing Sino-Soviet rift!

In less than a decade, thereafter, the geopolitical situation turned upside down, with Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong embarking on a clandestine affair, midwifed by Pakistan. This came to light when Henry Kissinger flew secretly to China from Pakistan. Indira Gandhi had no hesitation in entering into a defence agreement with the Soviet Union to deal with the emerging US-China-Pakistan axis. The Soviet Union had proposed a bilateral treaty with India in 1969, when its defence minister, Andrei Grechko, visited India. The draft treaty proposed by the Soviets gathered dust for two years in South Block. It was spruced up once it became clear that a Sino-US-Pakistan axis was emerging to counter the Soviet Union and incidentally India, even as the Pakistani army proceeded with its genocide in Bangladesh.

Once this geopolitical reality was recognised in Moscow and New Delhi, DP Dhar was sent to Moscow to finalise the treaty, in the first week of August 1971. External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh and Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko signed the treaty on August 21, 1971. Despite our claims of being “non-aligned”, there was a clear military provision in Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. It read: “In the event of either party (India and the Soviet Union) being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations, in order to remove the threat and to take appropriate effective measures, to ensure peace and security of their countries.” I was then a young First Secretary in Moscow and took notes in meetings, as events unfolded. When the conflict broke out in December 1971, the Soviets, though isolated, vetoed every effort by the US-China axis to stop us from liberating Bangladesh. It appears the Soviets had deployed mechanised forces and airpower on their borders with China and warned China of serious consequences if it militarily intervened. A Russian nuclear submarine followed the USS Enterprise as it crossed the Straits of Malacca.

A different scenario


The world situation has changed drastically since the 1970s. What has, however, continued, is the Sino-Pakistan axis, with a powerful China providing Pakistan with nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, while enhancing Pakistan’s maritime, air and land power. The China-Pakistan economic corridor is being accompanied with the establishment of a direct fibre optic link between the headquarters of the Western Theatre Command of China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army in Kashgar, in China’s Muslim-majority Xinjiang province, and the GHQ of the Pakistan army, in Rawalpindi.

Signing defence cooperation agreements with the US does not mean we are compromising our “strategic autonomy”. We will continue to differ with the US on some of its policies. We should understand Russian imperatives in its immediate neighbourhood, in Crimea and elsewhere, while strengthening defence and energy cooperation with Moscow. We should spare no effort to enhance mutual trust in the India-Russia relationship.

Meamwhile, India and China hopefully share a common interest in maintaining peace along their borders. The 2005 agreement outlining the guidelines for a settlement of the border issue remains the most viable framework for moving forward.


The writer is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby NRao » 23 Sep 2016 04:53


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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby ramana » 23 Sep 2016 05:01

NRao wrote:How Ajit Doval, India's 007, is shaping PM Narendra Modi's foreign policy Natalie Obiko Pearson

He spent seven years undercover in Pakistan, recruited rebels as informants in disputed Kashmir, and once disguised himself as a rickshaw driver to infiltrate a militant group inside India's holiest Sikh temple. Now some consider Ajit Doval the most powerful person in India after Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Modi picked Doval as his National Security Advisor, a position that holds more sway than the ministers of defense and foreign affairs. It puts Doval in charge of talks with arch-rival Pakistan. He visits arms manufacturers to discuss strategic capabilities, and orchestrates the response to militant attacks, liaising daily with Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, the nation's top diplomat.

........................................



When George Bush became US President none of these worthies wrote how a former CIA chief became US President.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby NRao » 23 Sep 2016 05:53

Well, one lived in a foreign land as an Amby and the other in disguise. Both in broad day light.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Manish_P » 23 Sep 2016 10:43

So did NS ....

viewtopic.php?f=1&t=6901&p=2048274#p2048274

:D

(Just venting.. Mods please delete this post if inappropriate for this thread)

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby NRao » 23 Sep 2016 18:03


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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby g.sarkar » 23 Sep 2016 18:29

http://www.firstpost.com/world/in-aidin ... 13266.html
In aiding Balochistan, India must be careful about where it leaves its fingerprints
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's mere mention of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech probably caused more flutter than any actual Indian policy ever has. An earlier reference to the western Pakistani province by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval at the 10th Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture in February 2014 had already set the tone — in rhetoric, at least — of the Modi administration towards misadventures from its western neighbour.
In the wake of the terror attack in Uri, these comments have acquired greater salience among the public.
To be sure, these utterances represent some bold and out-of-the-box thinking by anyone in the Indian government. However, supporting an insurgency — in whichever country — is a complicated and messy affair that cannot be dismissively relegated to a mere talking point. There is interest in many quarters about the feasibility of Indian support to Balochistan, especially since it appears at first glance to be analogous to the situation in Kashmir. Yet appearances can be deceptive and if Modi and co are serious about the option, there are some questions they must first consider.
Henry Kissinger is famously said to have asked, "Who do I call if I want to call Europe?" The same is true for Balochistan. Whom does the prime minister — or his NSA — call if he wants to call the Balochi rebels? The Balochi struggle, such as it is, remains deeply fractured and it is difficult to identify one clear leader or even someone who could potentially unify the different factions against their common oppressor. Needless to say, Islamabad would have picked off such a person at the earliest, had one emerged.
Uniting factions in service of a common cause is not easy as even the US with its several carrots found out in Syria. Even supporting the two or three major factions is a recipe for disaster as intra-faction fighting can quickly sap international sympathy and India's patience.
Even if the Baloch were able to come together, what would India's aid look like? The rebels would be committing suicide with small arms alone and heavy arms would only encourage the Pakistani Army to bring in even heavier arms such as armour and air support; Delhi can hardly supply the rebels commensurately. Yet India's struggle to even overtly train and arm the Afghan Army puts the country's role as an arms supplier to the Baloch in question.
There is also this to be considered: Who stands guarantee to the suitability of Baloch targets? So far, India has had the advantage of international confidence that it does not distinguish between good and bad terrorists. Were Balochi fighters to target Pakistani civilians, especially schools or hospitals, it could tarnish India's reputation for no apparent gains. This is not an unlikely situation — Baloch anger at their harsh treatment by Islamabad so far would only naturally boil over and lash out at the first instance it can strike where it hurts. Wars seldom remain kosher for long.
An armed and active Baloch insurgency would cause alarm in the neighbourhood — Tehran, Kabul, and Beijing at the very least. Historically, the Baloch people have lived in what is today western Pakistan, eastern Iran, and southwestern Afghanistan. If the insurgency were to excite dormant aspirations among Balochis outside Pakistan, it could very well sour India's relations with Iran and Afghanistan. Baloch leaders would have to promise to abandon any dreams of an akhand Balochistan and even if they were to, could they be trusted? For how long?
.....
Gautam

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby svinayak » 24 Sep 2016 23:08

g.sarkar wrote:http://www.firstpost.com/world/in-aiding-balochistan-india-must-be-careful-about-where-it-leaves-its-fingerprints-3013266.html
In aiding Balochistan, India must be careful about where it leaves its fingerprints
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's mere mention of Balochistan in his Independence Day speech probably caused more flutter than any actual Indian policy ever has. An earlier reference to the western Pakistani province by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval at the 10th Nani Palkhivala Memorial Lecture in February 2014 had already set the tone — in rhetoric, at least — of the Modi administration towards misadventures from its western neighbour.
.....
Gautam


India will only help the displaced and oppressed people of Baluch.
India will only help the families of people killed only because they raised their voice for their rights
India will only help the people who want political asylum

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 25 Sep 2016 10:11

X Posted from the “India-Russia: News & Analysis” thread.

Russia methinks has accepted that it is no longer the power it used to be and has made the choice that it will cede influence in the East to the Peoples Republic of China as evidenced by PRC being permitted to make inroads into the former Soviet controlled areas of Central Asia like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan etc. and instead seek to salvage their diminished national power in the West in areas such as Georgia and Ukraine.

Indian foreign and defense policy makers need to re-valuate relationship with Russia in the light of this Russian acceptance of PRC hegemony in the East and “pivot” to the West.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby salaam » 26 Sep 2016 20:33

Cross-post, also in STFUP.

Sushma Swaraj UNGA

* Kashmir is an integral part of India, will remain so. So stop dreaming.

* Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said India is violating human rights. I must say, those who live behind glass walls should not throw stones at others. What are they doing in Balochistan? The brutality against the Baloch people represents the worst form of State oppression.

* They (Pakistan) said India is refusing to talk without preconditions. We invited the Pakistan PM Sharif to the swearing in ceremony of our PM? Did we impose any preconditions before inviting him? PM Modi touched down in Lahore before returning home from Afghanistan? Did he have any preconditions for his visit? Did we impose any pre-condition when I went to Islamabad for the Heart of Asia conference and agreed to begin the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue?

* As I said at the very beginning, we will be judged by our action and equally by our inaction. What goals have we achieved and what objectives remain unfulfilled? What did we get in return? Pathankot? Uri? Bahadur Ali? (Ali is a terrorist in our custody, whose confession is a living proof of Pakistan's complicity in cross-border terror).

* In our midst, there are nations that still speak the language of terrorism, that nurture it, peddle it, and export it. To shelter terrorists has become their calling card. We must identify these nations and hold them to account. These nations, in which UN declared terrorists roam freely, lead processions and deliver their poisonous sermons of hate with impunity, are as culpable as the very terrorists they harbour. Such countries should have no place in the comity of nations.

* If we want to fight terror we must accept that terrorism is the biggest violation of human rights. We have to examine: Who is providing safe haven to terror? Who is financing them? Who's providing them weapons? Whoever has sown the seeds of terror has had to face the consequences some day.

* Fight against terrorism can't be won if we identify terrorism as ours and theirs. We need a joint mechanism to fight the scourge of terror. If a nation doesn't want to join the fight, let's isolate it.

* The CCIT was proposed by India in 1996. In 2016, despite the passage of two decades, we are yet to come to a conclusion. As a result, we are unable to develop a norm under which terrorists shall be prosecuted or extradited. Therefore it is my appeal that this General Assembly acts with fresh resolve and urgency to adopt this critical Convention.

* The world has been battling the scourge of terrorism for long. However, despite the blood and tears of innocent victims, attacks this year alone in Kabul and Dhaka, Istanbul and Mogadishu, Brussels and Bangkok, Paris, Pathankot and Uri as well as daily barbaric tragedies in Syria and Iraq, remind us that these malevolent forces are yet to be defeated.

* The 21st century has begun in the shadow of turmoil, but we can turn this into a golden age in the history of civilization through united and concerted efforts. But what happens tomorrow will depend on what we do today.


Some other points that rediff didn't write about:
- UN Security council should reflect current world order. Both in permanent as well as temporary seats.
- Talked about JanDhan, Digital India, MIA and Clean India.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Dumal » 26 Sep 2016 21:09


* Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said India is violating human rights. I must say, those who live behind glass walls should not throw stones at others. What are they doing in Balochistan? The brutality against the Baloch people represents the worst form of State oppression.


I have seen this kind of logic coming out of our diplomatic statements more than once before. Don't understand the logic. Sounds to me like the worst kind of equal-equal!

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby pankajs » 26 Sep 2016 21:29

Depends on where the equal-equal happens

India does not like India == Porkistan but Porkis like that.
Porkistan does not like Balochistan == Kashmir but India is pushing it now. All Baki commentators insist the two situation can not be compared.

It CAN be a bit problematic but Modi/Doval gamble is that the status-quo had to be changed from when Kashmir was the only game in town and India was always on the defensive on all forums.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby GShankar » 26 Sep 2016 21:36

I think India has accepted the fact that human rights violation is happening in Kashmir. And has started to point out where else it is happening.

If I recall, china used to say the same about US. If US brought up any incident inside china, china used to bring up vietnam, iraq, etc. Now, we all have Black Lives Matter.

And seems like some nations have already come to the understanding that human rights are no longer sustainable as a negotiation tactic - http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/po ... 77661.html

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby pankajs » 26 Sep 2016 21:42

We will see the situation shift further once Europe comes to grip with their latest million plus imports.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Rudradev » 26 Sep 2016 21:52

GShankar wrote:I think India has accepted the fact that human rights violation is happening in Kashmir. And has started to point out where else it is happening.

If I recall, china used to say the same about US. If US brought up any incident inside china, china used to bring up vietnam, iraq, etc. Now, we all have Black Lives Matter.

And seems like some nations have already come to the understanding that human rights are no longer sustainable as a negotiation tactic - http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/po ... 77661.html


Very true. In the age of ubiquitous SM, internet, and cell-phone video, plus widespread public knowledge about how videos can be faked (cf: the so-called "chemical weapons attack" blamed on the Syrian govt)... no government is immune from charges of human-rights abuse. If you show one video of my people abusing human rights, I can show three videos of your people doing the same. So overall, citing human-rights abuses as a pretext for international intervention has less and less currency with each passing year.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby GShankar » 26 Sep 2016 21:56

@pankajs - Possible, but I don't think Europe is going to 'come to grip' together as one block at this point. If the situation gets worse and if some countries are affected worse than others, we may see more exits out of EU. In the meantime there will be EJs, NGOs trying their best (with OPM - other people's money) to engage with the peacefuls. Then I guess we all know the rest of the end game.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 29 Sep 2016 10:03

Mission ‘SAARC minus Pakistan’ - The Hindu
By pulling out of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, the government is trying to achieve two ends: sending a tough message in the wake of the Uri attack in which 18 soldiers were killed, but also that it is going ahead with its plan for ‘SAARC minus Pakistan’ instead. The fact that India did not pull out alone but that Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan also did so, citing the same reason as India, was a significant step in that direction for the grouping, officials say.

“If you heard the PM’s speech in Kathmandu [November 2014], he made it very clear that we would like to go forward with regional connectivity and other initiatives with all SAARC member countries if possible, and with only some if necessary,” MEA spokesperson Vikas Swarup said on Wednesday. “So if there is one country that doesn’t want to be part of the initiatives, then we have no choice but to work with those who share our vision,” he added, pointing to the motor vehicle movement agreement, railway linkages, and the SAARC satellite programme for which all SAARC countries apart from Pakistan have signed up. With Afghanistan, which cannot be accessed by land, the two governments have discussed a separate “air corridor” for cargo.

A bigger articulation of that vision is expected in mid-October, when India hosts the BIMSTEC outreach summit on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Goa. The initiative for Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan and Nepal is expected to see proposals on transport as well as electricity and broadband connectivity being discussed. This week, another grouping of India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka met for the South Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation (SASEC) programme in Delhi to release the first SASEC Operational Plan 2016-2025. SASEC’s lead financier, Asian Development Bank (ADB), has already approved about 40 infrastructure and IT projects worth about $7.7 billion.

Bilaterally too, India has been busy with its ‘SAARC minus Pak’ programme. Earlier this month, PM Modi played host to Nepal PM Prachanda and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremsinghe is expected in Delhi from October 4-6.

However, analysts say India’s push for a South Asian isolation of Pakistan is also driven by the fact that it received less than expected support on the world stage and at the UN General Assembly for the Comprehensive Convention on International Terror (CCIT), which it had hoped to corner Pakistan, and External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj referred to her disappointment over that in her speech. India also received criticism at the UN Human Rights Council over Kashmir,
although Pakistan failed to have any resolutions or references passed against India.

Pakistan’s line of action

However, Pakistan continues to receive support from several other countries outside of the SAARC, most notably China, and also has a new relationship with Russia that conducted its first ever military exercises in Pakistan just days after the Uri attack. Iran too sent four naval warships to the Karachi port to participate in a Passage exercise (PASSEX) this week.

The U.S., which joined many countries in condemning the Uri attack, also called on India and Pakistan to resume dialogue, which now seems as remote as the rescheduling of the 19th SAARC summit in Islamabad.

×

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby dnivas » 29 Sep 2016 12:20

144 virgins have been put into service tonight in Jannat

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakis ... 1Z0IJ?il=0

Two Pakistani soldiers were killed in an exchange of fire with Indian forces across the de facto border in the disputed region of Kashmir on Thursday, the Pakistani army said, as tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors remain high.

The exchange of fire took place in the Bhimber, Hot Spring, Kel and Lipa sectors, and lasted about six hours early on Thursday, the Pakistani military's press wing said in a statement

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby sum » 29 Sep 2016 12:26

^^ IIRC< something is surely cooking at the borders. If the TSPA has to admit it lost 2 of its guys, wonder what really happened there and what was true count?

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby SSridhar » 29 Sep 2016 13:20

But, the question is what were the two Pakistani Army regulars doing in terrorist camps? Oh, I get it. *They* are the terrorists, right?

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Bhurishravas » 29 Sep 2016 18:29

All future governments will be under pressure to react to Paki terrorist strikes the same way now. Public pressure will be enormous.
In that sense, this is a milestone development in the evolution of Indian foreign and military policy.

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 01 Oct 2016 14:20

X Posted from the “India-Russia: News & Analysis” thread.

Official Press Release by Russia’s Foreign Ministry.

Note last line where the Mohammadden Terrorist fomenting Islamic Republic of Pakistan is specifically and solely called upon to “take effective measures to stop the activities of terrorist groups in its territory” particularly the words “in its territory”.

Does this mean that Russia is okay with terrorist acivities in Non-Pakistani territory such as Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir?

Or does this mean that Russia considers Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir as Pakistani Territory?

Trust our MEA will seek a clarification from the Russian’s :

30 September 2016 16:45
Comment by the Information and Press Department on the rise in tensions along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan

1778-30-09-2016

We are concerned over the latest rise in tensions along the Line of Control between India and Pakistan.

We are calling on the parties to avoid an escalation of tensions and to resolve the existing problems by political and diplomatic means through talks.

We advocate a resolute fight against all manifestations of terrorism.

We hope that the Pakistani Government will take effective measures to stop the activities of terrorist groups in its territory.


Clicky

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Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby arun » 03 Oct 2016 18:18

X Posted from the “India-Russia: News & Analysis” thread.

Video of CNN-News 18 interview of Alexander M Kadakin, Russia’s Ambassador to India.

All in all pretty supportive of India.

Note:
A.His stressing that the Uri attack came from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
B.Call on the Islamic Republic to cease cross border terror
C.Support for India’s surgical strike
D.Use of term "Pakistan-Occupied Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir"
E.Falling in line with India and terming terrorism as the greatest human right violation just as India has done at the UN
F.Comment that the Uniformed Jihadis of Pakistani army “use itself for terror attacks against India”:

Youtube - Clicky

Text of the accompanying article put out by CNN-News 18 follows:

New Delhi: Backing India’s surgical strikes against terror camps in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) the Russian ambassador to India, Alexander M Kadakin, said that Russian Federation was the only country to say in plain words that terrorists came from Pakistan.

In an exclusive interview with CNN News18, he called upon Pakistan to stop trans-border terror.

He said that his country had always been with India in fighting cross-border terrorism.

“Greatest Human Rights violations take place when terrorists attack military installations and attack peaceful civilians in India. We welcome the surgical strike. Every country has right to defend itself,” said the Russian Ambassador.

Assuring India that it does not need to worry about Russia-Pakistan joint military exercise, he said the exercises didn't take place in "Pakistan-Occupied Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir".

The usage of the word/term “Pakistan-Occupied Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir” assumes a lot of importance.

“India should not be concerned about military exercises between Russia and Pakistan because the theme of the exercise is anti-terror fighting. That's in India’s interests that we teach Pakistani army not to use itself for terror attacks against India. And the exercise was not held in any sensitive or problematic territories like Pakistan-occupied Indian state of Jammu," said the Russian Ambassador.


Here:

Clicky

EswarPrakash
BRFite -Trainee
Posts: 59
Joined: 15 Aug 2016 13:22

Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby EswarPrakash » 03 Oct 2016 19:30

^^^ I get a feeling that this whole Pak-Rus "military exercise" was all about distracting Paki uniformed jihadis while India did it's "Op Chadi Utharo" over LoC. Otherwise, I cannot guess what Russia would gain with that? Surely, India is not silly to fall for the "if you don't buy arms from us, we will sell it to your enemies" idea. I don't think the Russians are that silly either.

Viv S
BRF Oldie
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Joined: 03 Jan 2010 00:46

Re: Indian Foreign Policy

Postby Viv S » 03 Oct 2016 21:45

Cross posting

Understanding the Modi way of doing things

The driving self-belief of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is that the price of inaction far outweighs the risks and fallout of action

Anil Padmanabhan

Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi confounded foreign policy pundits by abandoning the principle of strategic restraint and authorizing an audacious military strike across the Line of Control (LoC) to destroy 40 terror training camps located in Pakistan.

In the process, he reset the existing paradigm of dealing with a hostile neighbour whose USP is the sorry fact that it is one of the terror factories of the world.

Several countries in the past have used the wares to settle scores with their geopolitical rivals (such as the fostering of the Taliban to checkmate the then Soviet Union in its ambitions in Afghanistan) and encouraged Pakistan in its ways.

In return, these countries have looked the other way (or like China, brazenly intervened to prevent multilateral action against key terrorists based in the country) as Pakistan went about dealing a thousand cuts to India to realize its obsession: Kashmir.

It is too early to say how the new paradigm will evolve as all the players review the new play on the chessboard of geopolitics.

But the actions of the Prime Minister demonstrate a clear pattern, which, if traced, can help us understand, for want of better words, the “Modi way”.

And the driving self-belief of the PM is that the price of inaction far outweighs the risks and fallout of action.

Whether it be managing the consensus in getting the Constitutional amendment bill passed to facilitate the roll-out of the goods and services tax (GST) or, more recently, in the case of Pakistan, the Prime Minister seems to have a game plan.

It is essentially a strategy of giving a long rope to his opponents, even while he stays on the message.

At the opportune moment, if required and despite the underlying risks, he snaps the rope.

It worked in politically isolating the Congress party on GST and then, last week, Pakistan found itself in a lonely place when India exercised its right to retribution in the aftermath of the terror attacks on the Uri army base in Kashmir.

Beginning 2014, since he assumed office in the aftermath of the historic 16th general election, Modi made his approach on South Asia very clear.

Cognizant of the fact that India has more to lose with a disturbed neighbourhood, Modi relentlessly pursued the impossible: peace with Pakistan (a country with which India has officially gone to war thrice).

Accordingly, he, in an unprecedented action, invited the heads of South Asian countries over for the inaugural of his government.

Surely, he knew the odds were stacked against any reconciliation, not just because of the bitter past between the two countries but also because keeping the conflict alive is critical to the legitimacy of the Pakistan army (which for all effective purposes holds the veto vote in the country).

But he was seemingly undeterred.

In fact, Modi, in a surprise move, seemingly on the spur of the moment, stopped over in Lahore on his way back from Afghanistan to engage with his counterpart Nawaz Sharif.

Cynics, rightly so in retrospect, dismissed the ability of the out-of-the-box initiative to generate any returns.

But, as in politics, in diplomacy, too, what matters is not what you do, but what you are seen to be doing.

Alongside his public outreach to Pakistan, Modi made it a point to share his desire for peace unambiguously at various global forums—though his political critics argued that the PM was only racking up frequent flyer miles—earning crucial social capital for himself and India.

So, by the time he decided to use the stick to deal with Pakistan’s unrepentant support to cross-border terror, India had for the moment succeeded in isolating its neighbour.

Barring China, which receives pay in mercantile gains for itself, every other major country tacitly endorsed India’s right to retaliate with surgical strikes—including the US, which in the past has been quick to caution India against any adventurism.

This time, short of endorsing the surgical strikes, it officially rebuked Pakistan for failing to curb United Nations-designated terrorist groups located in the country.

It is clear then that Modi is redrawing the rules of the game. At the least, it is forcing a change in status quo. That is a good beginning.

Anil Padmanabhan is executive editor of Mint and writes every week on the intersection of politics and economics.


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