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Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran writes: China is firmly in Russia’s corner — India needs to take note
China has the capacity to limit Russian engagement with India, including in defence. This must enter our foreign policy and security calculations
Written by Shyam Saran
Xi Jinping’s state visit to Russia from March 21 to 23 is of greater significance than is apparent in most analytical comments in India and abroad. It carried forward the promise of the “no-limits partnership” and “no forbidden areas of cooperation” contained in the February 4, 2022, Sino-Russian Joint Statement issued during Russian President Putin’s visit to Beijing for the Winter Olympics. That was before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine later that month. If there were doubts whether the promise of a more substantive strategic partnership between the two countries would survive the Ukraine crisis, the answer is clear. The Ukraine war has not diminished Chinese commitment to such partnership; in fact, it has enhanced it. The reasons are two-fold.
One, China is convinced that the United States and its allies are determined to contain it. At the recently concluded session of the National People’s Congress, Xi Jinping said, “Western countries led by the US have implemented all round containment and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to the country’s development.”
This is the first time that such a charge has been made at the highest level in China. Xi does not say that the US and the West are attempting to contain China but that they have already “implemented” such a policy and must therefore be countered. In this context, the partnership with Russia, also subject to containment by the US and the West, becomes indispensable to pursuing a counter-strategy. In other remarks made during the visit, Xi conveyed this with even greater clarity, calling for “an all-encompassing partnership and strategic interaction in a world threatened by acts of hegemony, despotism and bullying”.
Two, both sides continue to believe that despite their current dominance, the US and the West in general are in terminal decline. The balance of power is changing, according to them, in their favour and the change could be hastened if China and Russia were to team up. This assessment was dramatically broadcast across the world in a clip, which recorded Putin bidding farewell to Xi Jinping at the end of the visit. Xi is heard saying to Putin, “Change is coming that hasn’t happened in a hundred years. And we are driving this change together.” And Putin replies, “I agree.”
This brief exchange just about sums up the current logic of the Sino-Russian partnership. In the joint statement issued at the end of the visit, the same point is underscored: “They shared the view that this relationship has gone far beyond the bilateral scope and acquired critical importance for the global landscape and the future of humanity.” Therefore, China could hardly pursue a mediatory role between Ukraine and Russia as had been expected by some analysts. And the anticipated phone call between Xi and Ukrainian President Zelenskyy never materialised.
Some European countries have credited China for having restrained Russia from threatening the use of nuclear weapons. Within a week of Xi’s departure from Moscow Putin announced that he would be stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus. One has seen no statement of concern from China over this Russian return to nuclear brinkmanship.
China is no longer a neutral party in the Ukraine crisis. It is firmly in Russia’s corner. This is an important shift in geopolitical equations. It also gives China much greater leverage over Russia and on the latter’s capacity to pursue independent relations with other states such as India. China now has the capacity to limit Russian engagement with India, including in defence. This must now enter our own foreign policy and security calculations.
Russia is clearly the junior partner in the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, by compulsion if not by choice. China has been able to structure a significantly advantageous economic and energy partnership with Russia. During the past year, China’s import of Russian oil has gone up by 8 per cent but of natural gas by 50 per cent. A new pipeline is being planned from the Russian Arctic gas field of Yamal to China through Mongolia. This will be the second long-distance gas pipeline, “The Power of Siberia 2”, bringing gas supplies to China overland. The long-term effort of China has been to diversify its energy supplies away from the strategically vulnerable maritime route to the more secure landward supply routes from Russia and Central Asia. Chinese energy security is enhanced through a long-term energy partnership with Russia and this is also an important driver of the strategic partnership.
How will this unequal partnership affect the relative influence of Russia and China in what Russia describes as its “near neighbourhood” in Central Asia? China is convening a summit of Central Asian leaders from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan in May this year. It is increasingly projecting itself as a security guarantor for these countries. And these countries look upon Russia, particularly after its invasion of Ukraine, as their main security preoccupation. Chinese influence in Central Asia will expand and Russia will have to accept its own diminished role. This may marginalise even the limited presence India has in the region.
Is China likely to supply lethal weapons to Russia to shore up the latter’s firepower against Ukraine? Having announced an unprecedented close partnership with Russia, any defeat of Russia in the war would be a major setback to China. China cannot let Russia be defeated though it may acquiesce to a stalemate or a low intensity war. The Chinese may change its policy over supply of weapons to Russia in case the latter is facing imminent defeat. In the meantime, China is doing all it can to help Russia through the supply of dual use items and drones and strategic items such as semiconductors. Its relative restraint may also be influenced by US policies towards Taiwan. China has already complained that while the US is accusing China of supplying arms to Russia, it is engaged in supplying lethal weapons to Taiwan, which would be used against China. There is a link between the Ukraine and Taiwan issues.
In its latest foreign policy strategy document, Russia has described China and India as its two allies. In the case of India, this may be more a case of wishful thinking.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary and Honorary Fellow at Centre for Policy Research
Currently, there is a great game between 1) the US, 2) China, 3) India and 4) Russia in that order.1 wants to stay on top. 2 doesn't like 1, 3 and 4. 4 likes 3 and is afraid of 2 and 1. Shyam Saran's article does not explore all the paths.