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Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation

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Pakistan Nuclear Proliferation

Postby Gerard » 10 May 2007 06:25


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Postby Arun_S » 11 May 2007 08:53

Pakistani Nukes May Resurface
"There's no doubt that the CIA knew about some of Khan's activities at various stages of his proliferation," Mark Fitzpatrick told a group of journalists in Washington. "There's also no doubt that the CIA didn't give enough attention to this area of private sector proliferation in looking at Iran's nuclear development program over the years."
by Claude Salhani
Image Foto Chor Xerox Khan

UPI International Editor
Washington (UPI) May 9, 2007
The black-market nuclear network established by the father of Pakistan's nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, broken up in 2004, may be dormant but could resume operations in the future, according to a just-released report by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. The IISS study found no evidence to indicate that Pakistan sanctioned or encouraged the sales of nuclear technology and equipment to Iran, Libya and North Korea as a means to fund its own nuclear program.

The report by Mark Fitzpatrick, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation, found that Khan ran a black-market operation beyond the reach of the Pakistani government. However, the truth behind Khan's activities is unlikely to ever be fully revealed.

"Pakistan would never allow any foreign intelligence organization to question Dr. Khan," said Fitzpatrick.

He added that the CIA had some knowledge of Khan's proliferation activities while they were in progress, yet did not pay enough attention to them. "There's no doubt that the CIA knew about some of Khan's activities at various stages of his proliferation," Fitzpatrick told a group of journalists in Washington. "There's also no doubt that the CIA didn't give enough attention to this area of private sector proliferation in looking at Iran's nuclear development program over the years."

The CIA, much like other Western intelligence services, was more focused on state-to-state activities rather than on individuals, like A.Q. Khan's network, said Fitzpatrick.

Fitzpatrick, the lead author of a dossier revealing the activities of the A.Q. Khan network, stated that Khan's sales to Libya, for example, "were almost exclusively private business transactions, beyond state control."

The centrifuges that Khan's black-market operation sold to Libya were produced in Malaysia, Turkey, Europe and South Africa and shipped via Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, according to the report.

But given the control Pakistan maintains over its nuclear technology it is hard to imagine that Khan did not enjoy the protection, if not the outright support of Pakistan's intelligence services -- the ISI -- who were known to be supportive of the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Islamist organizations, such as Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida.

However, Fitzpatrick's report identified some "gray areas." It remains questionable whether prior to Sept. 11, 2001, Pakistan's government did not have knowledge of Khan's illicit activities or to what degree certain groups within the Pakistani government did not facilitate Khan's nuclear proliferation activities. Soon after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Washington communicated to Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf -- in no uncertain terms -- to stop Pakistan's support of Islamist groups.

In an interview with Pakistan's Dawn newspaper, Fitzpatrick said that former Pakistani army chief Gen. Aslam Beg "encouraged" the Khan network's sales to other countries.

"Ego, money, nationalism and a sense of Islamic fraternity" motivated Khan and his supporters to sell nuclear technology to other Muslim countries, he said. "Different motivations in different cases."

Fitzpatrick said in his report that he did not think Pakistan sold its nuclear technology in order to raise money for its nuclear program.

Additionally, Fitzpatrick also found no link between Khan's network of nuclear proliferators and the terrorist group responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon just outside Washington.

Although Khan was removed from Pakistan's nuclear program in January 2004 and placed under house arrest by President Musharraf, he remains a very popular and revered figure in Pakistan. However, despite an official pardon from Musharraf, Khan remains under house arrest.

Following Khan's arrest, Washington declared that the network had been shut down. But according to Fitzpatrick's report published by the IISS, it is believed that some of Khan's associates have escaped law-enforcement attention and "may resume their black-market business."

According to Fitzpatrick, Khan established a procurement network to keep Pakistan's nuclear program operational. Fitzpatrick said the Khan network was made up of about 50 members that included operators from Dubai, Turkey, Malaysia, Switzerland and Germany, as well as from Pakistan.

Given the strong demand for nuclear technology by governments as well as from terrorist groups, the possibility of Khan reactivating his black-market network remains a distinct possibility.

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Postby arun » 12 May 2007 19:49

CFR interview of Mark Fitzpatrick, who wrote the recent IISS report “ Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise Of Proliferation Networks “ .

Long one.

Excerpts.

Involvement of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan :

………………… In assessing the Khan network's sales to Iran, North Korea, Libya, we look at the ways in which Pakistan governmental officials in -- as individuals abetted some of these sales, and the questions about Pakistan government involvement, and it ranges along a continuum. In some cases, there was very clearly government involvement, most clearly in the case of North Korea, altho it would be too much to just say, you know, completely this was strictly a government-to-government deal. There could have -- mayugh well have been some ways in which Khan was operating partly independently with regard to North Korea. …………………….


Equal = Equal :

…………. We have a very substantial chapter on Pakistan's nuclear program in which one of the conclusions is that there is a rough equivalence in South Asia in terms of their ability to produce nuclear weapons and the fissile material holdings between India and Pakistan. We assessed that India has a much greater capacity to expand their nuclear weapons arsenal, and that it would be in Pakistan's interest if these -- if fissile material production were capped at current levels to -- for example, a fissile material cutoff treaty. ………….


When dealing with Pakistani’s, caveat emptor :

…………. By the way, that test design that Libya got was about 95 percent accurate. I mean, it had a few missing pages -- some key to-scale drawings were missing in what Libya got. And in talking with experts about this, they say Libya by itself could not have supplied the missing pages. They just didn't have the infrastructure and enough trained people in the various disciplines to be able to do it.

But if North Korea had gotten the same design they could have because they've got a much larger cadre of trained scientists and engineers, and there's a logic to thinking that A.Q. Khan may well have given the design to North Korea. He sold it to Libya for $24 million -- not very much money really -- and the sale to Libya was 2001. ………………..


URL Here.

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Postby arun » 12 May 2007 19:55

If anyone comes across the transcript, please do post the link :

Pak is America`s most serious proliferation problem: Expert

Washington, May 12: Pakistan is United States' "most serious national proliferation problem" with Islamabad's role being instrumental in the Iranian nuclear weapons programme, an expert on nuclear non-proliferation has told a US Congressional panel.

"If I had to answer who's our most serious national proliferation problem now, in terms of spreading technology, you'd have to say Pakistan -- not because necessarily the government's policy is to do so but they have allowed Pakistanis to do so," said Joseph Cirincione, the vice president for national security at the centre for American progress.

"If it wasn't for Pakistan, we wouldn't have an Iranian nuclear programme," Cirincione told lawmakers in the House Foreign Affairs Committee during a panel hearing on nuclear weapons non-proliferation.

The security expert also acknowledged the covert role of China in Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme.

"I completely agree that if it wasn't for China, Pakistan wouldn't have a nuclear programme now. As far as we know, China is no longer aiding Pakistan in its nuclear weapons programme," the non-proliferation specialist told lawmakers.

"China is not a serious proliferation threat today. They used to be. When Mao Zedong was in charge, they were pro-proliferation. When china exploded theirs (bombs) they changed that position and became, sort of, neutral on proliferation," Cirincione said at the Congressional hearing.

"But they still aided their allies like Pakistan and were a serious problem. Now, they've firmly adopted non-proliferation policies. They've integrated into every aspect of the nonproliferation regime" he said.

Bureau Report

URL

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Postby Neshant » 13 May 2007 00:41

> Beg encouraged Khan networks sale of nuclear technology

The whole 'khan network' is just a con game by the Americans to absolve pakistan of all responsibility. Its a white wash. The whole pakistan govt was involved in selling nuclear stuff not one guy.

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Postby svinayak » 13 May 2007 00:43

Neshant wrote:> Beg encouraged Khan networks sale of nuclear technology

The whole 'khan network' is just a con game by the Americans to absolve pakistan of all responsibility. Its a white wash. The whole pakistan govt was involved in selling nuclear stuff not one guy.

What if CIA was also part of the game to trap other nations.

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Postby Laks » 21 May 2007 22:10

New book in nuke proliferation with coverage on Xerox Khan.
link
The Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor

In his sixth book of combustible investigative journalism, Langewiesche, long a correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and now the international editor for Vanity Fair, takes on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fluent in nuclear politics, Langewiesche explains why nuclear bombs are now the weapons of choice for poor and poorly governed countries and "the new stateless guerillas," and he reveals how such groups can acquire the components of a nuclear bomb. Intrepid and electrifying, Langewiesche reports on contaminated secret nuclear cities in Russia and such U.S. funded outposts as the so-called Plutonium Palace, and he chronicles how stolen uranium and nuclear hardware are smuggled to Turkey, the "grand bazaar for nuclear goods." The book's most startling disclosures are found in Langewiesche's portrait of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the "Muslim" bomb and the "greatest nuclear proliferator of all time," and his profile of fellow journalist Mark Hibbs, who has revealed secrets pertinent to the mess in Iran. Langewiesche's bracing expose of nuclear criminality blasts away the ubiquitous misinformation usually attendant on this alarming subject. Donna Seaman
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved

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Judge says SA may not hold atomic trial in secret

Postby Nayak » 25 May 2007 18:12

Judge says SA may not hold atomic trial in secret

Johannesburg, South Africa
25 May 2007 12:41
A South African judge on Friday rejected a government request for a blanket media ban in a trial of two men accused of links to a global black market in atomic weapons technology, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) reported.

State prosecutors had argued that national security might be compromised by information revealed in the trial of German national Gerhard Wisser and Daniel Geiges, a Swiss citizen, and asked that proceedings take place in a closed court.

Pretoria High Court Judge Joop Labuschagne turned down the request, which had been opposed by South African media houses, although he added that the secrecy order could be imposed later if the evidence warrants it, SABC news said.

The South African case is part of an international effort to crack what prosecutors say is a trade network which helped Libya, North Korea and Iran skirt sanctions in their quest for nuclear technology.

Wisser and Geiges, both engineers living in South Africa, were arrested in 2004 and have pleaded not guilty. Their trial is scheduled to start in July.

Prosecutors said they had evidence linking the two men to the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the disgraced father of Pakistan's atomic bomb programme who has admitted supplying nuclear secrets to countries under international embargo including North Korea, Iran and Libya.

South Africa -- which voluntarily dismantled its own nuclear weapons programme before the end of apartheid in 1994 -- was among 20 countries named by the United Nations's atomic agency as recipients of Khan's atomic secrets.

South African prosecutors say they have evidence linking the two accused to efforts to procure gas centrifuge equipment used for uranium enrichment for Libya.

A third man originally arrested in the case, Johan Meyer, has since turned state witness. - Reuters

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Postby SSridhar » 25 May 2007 18:47

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the "Muslim" bomb . . .

From that link posted by Laks, the "father" prefix goes not to Xerox Khan but to the secular socialist, whisky-gulping Islamist (among many other whisky-gulping Islamists from the Land of the Pure) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

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Postby sraj » 02 Sep 2007 18:38

x-post from India Nuclear News & Discussion - 31 Aug 2007
How the West summoned up a nuclear nightmare in Pakistan

Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark 2007

Extracted from Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons, to be published by Atlantic Books on September 13
[quote]General Pervez Musharraf was surprised. Visiting New York for a session of the UN, the last thing the Pakistani president expected was to be confronted with evidence of his country’s secret sales of nuclear bomb technology and equipment to members of the “axis of evilâ€

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Postby A Sharma » 04 Sep 2007 02:19

Book claims Pak N-plan threat to world peace

By our correspondent

LONDON: General Pervez Musharraf had agreed to arrest Dr A Q Khan only after striking a secret deal with US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage in 2004 that his own army generals involved in illegal nuclear trade would not be touched and most importantly, that he himself would be accepted by the Americans to rule Pakistan in his military uniform.

A new book “Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons: Pakistan nuclear programmeâ€

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Postby enqyoobOLD » 04 Sep 2007 17:14

AllahoAkbar!

Rye, pls post url of ur quote below - need to send that to certain beebals
Last edited by enqyoobOLD on 04 Sep 2007 17:42, edited 1 time in total.

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Postby Rye » 04 Sep 2007 17:22

Mad***od Jimmy Carter asked Pakistan to carryout their nuclear weapons program discreetly while rejecting India's information on that front..while he was stitching up the NPT to screw India. And this jackass who handed over the islamic bomb is supposed to be the "voice of peace" in the middle east and in the muslim world, what a hoot. :roll:

[quote]
[b]“However, the president rejected our briefing, saying our information had come from the Indians.â€

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Postby Philip » 04 Sep 2007 17:57

The animal the US fed,nurtured and trained to do their dirty work (to devour and destroy nations like India),has turned around and bitten them,gouged them and smitten them through 9/11,Iraq,the Taliban and the on-going war in Afghanistan! In fact the ungodly terrorists DO possess nuclear weapons as there is no difference between the terrorists in paki uniform who live in the cantonements ruling the roost in Pukeistan and led by Gen.Bandicoot,than the terrorists in mufti who live in madrassas and are led by mullahs! They're all from the same tribe of ungodly merchants of world terror,astonishingly allowed to exist and strike terror in the west being bankrolled by the Bush administration! What you sow ye shall reap.

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Postby arun » 30 Sep 2007 12:35

Pakistan, epicentre of global instability

Last Updated: 12:01am BST 27/09/2007

Simon Scott Plummer reviews Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark

Pakistan has a strong claim to be the most dangerous country in the world, or, as the authors of Deception more elegantly put it, "the epicentre of global instability". Tension with India has persisted since the British acceded to the partition of the jewel in their imperial crown in 1947. It has resulted in three wars, the last, in 1971, causing East Pakistan, now Bangladesh, to secede. And although talks have been held and confidence-building measures taken, the problem of Kashmir is still intractable.

Since its detonation of five devices in May 1998, Pakistan has been a recognised nuclear power. Earlier that month, India under a new Hindu nationalist government, had conducted a hot test, its first since 1974; Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistani prime minister, declared that a matching response was a matter of national survival.

After the response was made, one of the scientists, Samar Mubarakmand, said: "Our life expectancy is 122nd in the world; in literacy we are 162nd … Now in nuclear weapons we are seventh in the world." His remark illustrates perfectly Pakistan's inferiority complex as a nation which has failed in the basic task of development and is overawed by India.

There are good grounds for arguing that the possession of nuclear weapons by both of these uneasy neighbours strengthens stability in the subcontinent: strike and counter-strike would be so catastrophic that the government on each side would collapse. However, Pakistan prides itself on having created a Bomb for the worldwide Muslim ummah or community, and has been a notorious proliferator, notably through the agency of Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan.

It is the rise and eclipse of this extraordinary man that is the thread of this third book by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark. In 1992, Nawaz Sharif dubbed A Q Khan "Father of the Bomb". Deception reminds us that this sobriquet belongs to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whose daughter, Benazir, is now trying to return to politics.

It was Bhutto senior who invited Khan back from Europe, where he worked for the British/Dutch/German consortium Urenco on a centrifugal method for enriching uranium. Having stolen the blueprints, Khan returned to Pakistan in 1974 and was set to work. By the time Bhutto was hanged by General Muhammed Zia ul-Haq in 1979, Khan, with Chinese help, had succeeded in enriching uranium. Shortly before his execution, Bhutto wrote: "We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilisations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilisation was without it, but that was about to change."

By the time of his death, the entire programme was in military hands, where it has remained. The authors give the lie to Musharraf's claim that the export of nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan was all the work of renegade scientists. Indeed, they quote Benazir as telling them that General Mirza Aslam Beg, chief of army staff, advocated its sale to raise money for rebels in Kashmir. They conclude that the trade has gone on under Musharraf, despite his sacking of Khan.

It might well have been impossible to stop Pakistan getting the bomb. What is incontrovertible, and painstakingly documented in this book, is the blind eye turned by successive American administrations, from Carter to Bush, to the country's nuclear programme. Washington has rightly deemed Pakistan an essential ally, first after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, then after al-Qa'eda, which was based in that country, attacked America in 2001. Non-proliferation goals have been sacrificed to more immediate concerns.

However, the resurgence of the Taliban and the failure to capture Osama bin Laden cast doubts on that alliance, for reasons extensively rehearsed by Levy and Scott-Clark, from the jihadist tendencies of members of the military and intelligence services to the likely presence of bin Laden and Mullah Omar, his one-time protector, in Pakistan.

The authors offer a tightly written case for considering Jinnah's state to be uniquely dangerous. And they throw valuable light on the figures – Musharraf, Bhutto and Sharif – now jockeying for position. Anyone interested in South Asia and the wider subject of nuclear proliferation – or who simply enjoys a gripping tale – should read their book.

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Postby Arun_S » 01 Oct 2007 01:43

Pakistan Rejects Bhutto Plan For UN Access To Khan
Image
    Bhutto would give UN access to nuclear expert AQ Khan
    Former Pakistan prime minister Benazir Bhutto said Tuesday that if returned to power, she would allow UN inspectors but not Western powers to question the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf's military regime has refused to grant any access to US officials eager to question nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan since he admitted to passing atomic secrets to Libya, Iran and North Korea in a televised confession in February 2004. Khan was pardoned by Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf later that month and has lived under virtual house arrest in Islamabad and makes no public appearances. "He has fallen on his sword and taken the blame," Bhutto said on a visit to Washington as she prepared to head back to Pakistan next month from self-imposed exile in London and Dubai. "Many Pakistanis are cynical about whether AQ Khan could have done this without any official sanction," she told the Middle East Institute, promising to hold parliamentary hearings on the question if re-elected prime minister. "While we do not agree at this stage to have any Western access to AQ Khan, we do believe that IAEA... would have the right to question AQ Khan," she said, referring to the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency. That could help satisfy the world community "that the illegal structure has been broken," said Bhutto, who intends to return home on October 18 with Musharraf battling for his political survival.

by Staff Writers
Islamabad (AFP) Sept 26, 2007
Pakistan's government Wednesday condemned ex-premier Benazir Bhutto for saying she would let the UN quiz the disgraced father of the country's nuclear bomb if she regained power.

Cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan and hardline Islamists also criticised Bhutto for saying that she would allow UN inspectors, but not Western powers, to question scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.

Khan in 2004 admitted passing atomic secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. President Pervez Musharraf has refused to grant any outside access to the scientist, who was pardoned but remains under virtual house arrest.

"Pakistan cannot allow any interference in its affairs. We have ourselves investigated AQ Khan's case, we don't think it needs to be taken up again," Deputy Information Minister Tariq Azeem said.

"There is a strong reaction in Pakistan over Benazir Bhutto's statement on AQ Khan. I think her statement is based on some wrong information," he told private Geo television.

Bhutto, who has vowed to return to Pakistan on October 18, said in Washington that "we do believe that IAEA... would have the right to question AQ Khan," she said, referring to the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency.

"Many Pakistanis are cynical about whether AQ Khan could have done this without any official sanction," she told the Middle East Institute, promising to hold parliamentary hearings on the question if re-elected prime minister.

AQ Khan remains a national hero since Pakistan detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1998, and even opposition parties who are calling for Musharraf's ouster sided with the government on the issue.

"This is highly shameful statement," Imran Khan said, adding that Bhutto wanted the blessing of the United States to "take power and rid herself of corruption cases."

Two-time premier Bhutto faces several graft claims which forced her abroad in 1999.

"Benazir Bhutto is doing everything to appease the United States," said Liaquat Baloch, a senior member of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, or United Action Front, the country's main alliance of Islamic parties.

"She wants to gain power and the people of Pakistan know that to achieve her objective she is ready to compromise the country's nuclear programme," he told AFP.

Hafiz Hussain Ahmed, leader of the pro-Taliban Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam party, said Bhutto's statement was "against the solidarity and integrity of the country."

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Postby Rich » 08 Nov 2007 12:55

X-posted from regular Paki thread:

Pakistan's nuclear history worries insiders - MSNBC

[quote]By Robert Windrem
Senior investigative producer
NBC News
updated 7:04 p.m. ET Nov. 6, 2007


Robert Windrem
Senior investigative producer

It is the most disturbing element in the mix that makes Pakistan the most dangerous country in the world: its stockpile of at least 30 and perhaps as many as 45 nuclear weapons. And it is always the element that captures the most attention from US intelligence officials.

The United States has essentially let Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal grow over the past three decades, as succeeding governments in Islamabad have supported US policies in neighboring Afghanistan, first in thwarting the Soviet occupation and then in driving out the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Still, the fear is that in the chaos that regularly afflicts Pakistan, al-Qaeda or other jihadis will somehow gain control of one of the weapons, some of the highly enriched uranium that forms the core of a bomb or the technology to make a bomb -- or even gain control of the government.

[b]“It’s always been easier to steal a government in Pakistan than to steal a bomb,â€

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Postby arun » 10 Nov 2007 08:03

Washington Post Oped :

Those Nuclear Flashpoints Are Made in Pakistan

By Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins
Sunday, November 11, 2007; B01

George W. Bush is hardly the first U.S. president to forgive sins against democracy by a Pakistani leader. Like his predecessors from Jimmy Carter onward, Bush has tolerated bad behavior in hopes that Pakistan might do Washington's bidding on some urgent U.S. priority -- in this case, a crackdown on al-Qaeda. But the scariest legacy of Bush's failed bargain with Gen. Pervez Musharraf isn't the rise of another U.S.-backed dictatorship in a strategic Muslim nation, or even the establishment of a new al-Qaeda haven along Pakistan's lawless border. It's the leniency we've shown toward the most dangerous nuclear-trafficking operation in history -- an operation masterminded by one man, Abdul Qadeer Khan.

For nearly four years, under the banner of the "war on terror," Bush has refused to demand access to Khan, the ultranationalist Pakistani scientist who created a vast network that has spread nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran and Libya. Indeed, Bush has never seriously squeezed Musharraf over Khan, who remains a national hero for bringing Pakistan the Promethean fire it can use to compete with its nuclear-armed nemesis, India. Khan has remained under house arrest in Islamabad since 2004, outside the reach of the CIA and investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency, who are desperate to unlock the secrets he carries. Bush should be equally adamant about getting to the bottom of Khan's activities.

Bush's sluggishness over Pakistan-based proliferation, even as he has funneled about $10 billion in military and financial aid to Musharraf since Sept. 11, 2001, is even harder to explain when one considers the damage Khan has done to the world's fragile nuclear stability. Khan used stolen technology and black-market sales to help Pakistan obtain its nuclear arsenal, setting the stage for a possible atomic showdown with India. He played a pivotal role in helping Iran start what we increasingly fear is a clandestine nuclear-arms program, allowing Tehran to make significant progress in the shadows before its efforts were uncovered in 2002. He gave key uranium-enrichment technology to North Korea. And if all this weren't enough, he was busily outfitting Libya with a full bomb-making factory when his network was finally shut down in late 2003. Khan has been held incommunicado ever since, leaving the world with new nuclear flashpoints -- and some burning, unanswered questions about his black-market spree.

The most urgent line of inquiry -- particularly given Bush's bellicose statements about the threat posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions -- centers on what exactly Khan provided to the Iranians over 15 years of doing business with them. He could help answer the questions on which war may depend: Is Iran trying to get the bomb? If so, how close is Tehran to obtaining it? Or are the mullahs simply pursuing a civilian nuclear capacity? We do know that Khan sold Iran advanced equipment to manufacture and operate the centrifuges that can enrich uranium, either to generate electricity or to provide the fuel for a weapon. But Khan's nuclear bazaar trafficked in other goodies as well -- including the blueprints for a Chinese-made nuclear warhead, which were found in Libya after Moammar Gaddafi abandoned his atomic aspirations in December 2003 and fingered Khan as his chief supplier.

Despite all these compelling reasons for interrogating Khan, the Bush administration has treated Musharraf with kid gloves, insisting that the general is simply too critical to the fight against Islamic extremism to jeopardize his tenuous hold on power by forcing him to hand over such a national icon. (The same type of flawed rationale is now being rolled out to defend U.S. timorousness in the face of Musharraf's repugnant crackdown on his political foes, the judiciary, the media and human rights groups.) The nastiest legacy of Musharraf's reign will almost certainly not be his turn toward tyranny. It will be his reluctance to get tough on Khan in the past and to question him now -- a reluctance echoed by U.S. reticence about demanding that Pakistan's leaders control its rogue nuclear network. The dangers those failures created will threaten the world long after Musharraf and Bush are gone.

In fact, Khan could have been stopped before he got started. In the mid-1970s, he was working as a mid-level scientist at a research laboratory in Amsterdam, preparing to steal top-secret Dutch plans for building centrifuges and busily compiling a list of potential suppliers for Pakistan's nascent atomic-weapons program -- the seeds of the procurement network that led Pakistan to the bomb. In the fall of 1975, the Dutch secret service discovered what Khan was up to and grew eager to arrest him on espionage charges. But more pragmatic officials from the Dutch economics ministry urged them to hold off, worried about the embarrassment of exposing a spy in the heart of their nuclear establishment.

The CIA turned out to be a tiebreaker. Ruud Lubbers, the Dutch economics minister at the time and later prime minister, told us that the security service had asked the CIA to support its pleas to bust Khan. But the Americans surprised their Dutch colleagues, asking that the scientist be allowed to continue working so that they could monitor his budding procurement operation. Instead of being thrown in jail, Khan was transferred to a less sensitive job. That demotion tipped him off that time was running out, so he bolted for home, taking with him the nuclear secrets that would help make Pakistan a nuclear power. It was a "monumental error," said Robert Einhorn, a senior State Department official who worked on arms control under Bush and President Bill Clinton.

Four years later, Washington got a second chance to stop Khan. By 1979, U.S. intelligence agencies had a clear picture of Pakistan's pursuit of nuclear arms and Khan's crucial role as the chief of its uranium-enrichment efforts. In April, Carter slapped economic sanctions on Pakistan -- a shrewd move that turned out to be woefully short-lived.

On Christmas Eve 1979, Soviet troops landed at Kabul International Airport, and by Christmas morning, Red Army soldiers were rolling across pontoon bridges in northern Afghanistan and fanning out across the country. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, saw an opportunity to confront the Soviets by funneling money and arms to the nascent Afghan resistance movement, dominated by the zealous Muslim fighters who would one day become the Taliban and al-Qaeda. But Brzezinski's plan required using Pakistan as a conduit for aid to the anti-Soviet jihad, which meant abandoning the sanctions on Islamabad. "This will require a review of our policy toward Pakistan, more guarantees to it, more arms aid, and, alas, a decision that our security policy toward Pakistan cannot be dictated by our nonproliferation policy," Brzezinski wrote Carter in a memo dated Dec. 26, 1979.

Carter reluctantly agreed. But by revoking the sanctions, he granted Pakistan -- and Khan -- carte blanche on the nuclear front. Washington sacrificed the goal of stopping Pakistan's nuclear-arms effort, and the moral authority that the United States had used to advocate the cause of nuclear nonproliferation was severely damaged.

The blame did not end with Carter. During a campaign stop in Florida in January 1980, Ronald Reagan was asked about Pakistan's atomic ambitions. "I just don't think it's any of our business," he replied.

In office, Reagan and his aides made an art of ignoring Pakistan's march toward the bomb, including intelligence in 1987 that warned that Khan had transferred nuclear equipment to Iran. That transaction started Tehran's clandestine atomic program and marked Khan's transformation from a buyer of nuclear technology to a seller of it. Once again, an opportunity to stop him -- and to derail Iran's fledgling efforts -- was missed.

Bush brags that he helped shut down Khan's network. In fact, much of the damage had already been done. And even Bush's supposed great nonproliferation victory -- persuading Libya to abandon its secret nuclear program -- was too little, too late.

Between 1997 and 2003, we found, Libya paid Khan and his associates nearly $100 million for bomb-making technology and expertise. Among Libya's purchases were detailed plans, which arrived in Tripoli in 2000 or early 2001, for a Chinese warhead. International experts who have seen those designs strongly suspect that the Libyans copied them before turning the plans over to the Americans, along with their nuclear hardware.

In fact, the Americans could have acted against Khan before Libya ever got the nuclear designs. A CIA case officer nicknamed "Mad Dog" had recruited a Swiss technician at the center of Khan's ring who was providing regular reports on what was going to Libya. We don't know whether the mole was aware of the warhead plans, but we do know that he provided the CIA with a list of equipment so frighteningly thorough that British intelligence, after learning how much material Gaddafi was receiving, was clamoring for action against Libya well before the Americans agreed to move.

The mole also revealed another bombshell. In previously secret briefings with senior IAEA officials in Vienna, he disclosed that he had made electronic copies of the warhead plans in the fall of 2003, acting on orders from Khan, according to diplomats with direct knowledge of the briefings. The mole said that he sent the copies to Khan and one of his associates. But the plans have never surfaced.

Other items from Khan's deadly inventory are missing, too, including a shipment of centrifuge components and precision tools that disappeared in mid-2003. International inspectors worry that the material wound up in the hands of a previously unknown Khan customer -- perhaps Saudi Arabia or Syria, both countries where Khan had tried to peddle his wares before he was arrested. Another possible destination: Iran, where some U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials suspect that the military is operating a second, parallel enrichment program buried deep within the mountains that cover much of the country. But solving such dangerous riddles is apparently not as attractive as propping up a dubious ally in the fight against Islamic extremism.

In the Carter and Reagan years, the justification for going soft on Pakistan's nuclear adventures was always the hope of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan. Under George H.W. Bush and Clinton, the CIA argued convincingly that it needed more information before striking at Khan. When it comes to Pakistan, there's always something -- some perfectly sensible, hard-headed reason for putting the dangers of nuclear proliferation on the back burner. And Washington's priorities may well stay that way until the very moment when the unthinkable occurs.

frantzfiles@hotmail.com collinsfiles@gmail.com


Douglas Frantz, a senior writer at Cond¿ Nast Portfolio, and Catherine Collins, a D.C.-based writer, are co-authors of the forthcoming "The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets . . . and How We Could Have Stopped Him."

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Postby arun » 17 Nov 2007 20:40

Some more details on Pakistani nuclear proliferation to Iran dribbles out with the handy fudge that this was all an A.Q.Khan private initiative continuing :

A Report Half Empty: Iran Needs to Level with the IAEA

…….. The IAEA report also says that Iran has finally handed over a controversial 15-page document on how to convert UF6 to uranium metal and casting it into hemispheres—a process used to form the cores of nuclear weapons, but one that has no civilian use. The report explicitly tags Pakistan as the source of the document, provided to Iran by nuclear black marketeer A.Q. Khan.

Iran continues to insist that it was unaware that Khan had included the document in the pile of technical materials on centrifuge development he sold to Iran. The IAEA does not consider this issue closed, however, indicating that it is "seeking more information" from Pakistan—and noting that Iran plans to eventually build a small UF6 to uranium metal conversion line at the Uranium Conversion Facility in Isfahan. ………….

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Postby arun » 17 Nov 2007 21:10

Sounds to me like a thinly veiled threat to proliferate nuclear weapons if the Armed Forces do not continue to be at the helm of Pakistan’s polity :

Reuters report of Gen. Musharraf’s interview with the BBC :


………. "They cannot fall into the wrong hands, if we manage ourselves politically. The military is there -- as long as the military is there, nothing happens to the strategic assets, we are in charge and nobody does anything with them," …………..

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Postby ramana » 17 Nov 2007 21:24

There are three to four aspects to the TSP nukes.

Their prime track is the Chinese nukes fully assembled and under TSP PA control. The US seems to have 'proximate' security for this and there appears to be tacit understanding that US folks will be withdrawn in case of Indian Dash to Indus.

The second track is the AQK HEU weapons based on centrifuge separation. All this hemispheres etc refers to the Chinese design (ChiC-4), remanufactured by TSP and already proofed in 1984. This is the track for Libya, Syria, NoKo HEU, Iran and Allah knows who else. My thinking is this ones failed in May 16th tests at Chagai and led to the real deal from PRC to be unveiled. German Chancellor Kohl and Japanese PM prematurely announced these at G-8 and went quiet after that.

The third track is the Pu stuff proofed at Chagai on May 30th. This is the basis for small payloads for the Hatf etc. This was transfered to NoKo and is thier PU track.

The fourth is dirty bombs technology spread by the jihadized scientists of TSP establishment. The West is most worried about these.

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Postby Dilbu » 18 Nov 2007 00:14

ramana wrote:There are three to four aspects to the TSP nukes.

Their prime track is the Chinese nukes fully assembled and under TSP PA control. The US seems to have 'proximate' security for this and there appears to be tacit understanding that US folks will be withdrawn in case of Indian Dash to Indus.

The second track is the AQK HEU weapons based on centrifuge separation. All this hemispheres etc refers to the Chinese design (ChiC-4), remanufactured by TSP and already proofed in 1984. This is the track for Libya, Syria, NoKo HEU, Iran and Allah knows who else. My thinking is this ones failed in May 16th tests at Chagai and led to the real deal from PRC to be unveiled. German Chancellor Kohl and Japanese PM prematurely announced these at G-8 and went quiet after that.

The third track is the Pu stuff proofed at Chagai on May 30th. This is the basis for small payloads for the Hatf etc. This was transfered to NoKo and is thier PU track.

The fourth is dirty bombs technology spread by the jihadized scientists of TSP establishment. The West is most worried about these.


Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also a prime suspect to be xerox khan and TSPA's customer. If nuke was on sale for cash, KSA will be the first one to get it given their relationship with both unkil and TSP. Who knows, KSA might be having an active nuke program even now and unkil might be knowingly turning a blind eye towards it most essential oil rich military ally in middle east
like it did towards TSP.

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Postby ramana » 18 Nov 2007 00:22

No they are not in the run for AQK junk. They will get the Chinese supplied stuff. Its related to Shia Iran and not Israel. And the latter knows it.

BTW I suggest you register with a proper name as the rest of us. Thanks, ramana

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Postby Sanjay M » 18 Nov 2007 03:37

NYT: US Considers Boosting Pak Nuclear Security

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washi ... 8nuke.html

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Postby svinayak » 18 Nov 2007 04:18

Sanjay M wrote:NYT: US Considers Boosting Pak Nuclear Security

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washi ... 8nuke.html


This may be breaking the NPT rules.
By boosting and helping Pakistan they may help Pak to design better its weapons infrastructure

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Postby ramana » 18 Nov 2007 05:33

Acharya wrote:
Sanjay M wrote:NYT: US Considers Boosting Pak Nuclear Security

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washi ... 8nuke.html


This may be breaking the NPT rules.
By boosting and helping Pakistan they may help Pak to design better its weapons infrastructure


To provide security for the initiation of the weapons they have to know the circuit and adding these is breaking the NPT.

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Postby CRamS » 18 Nov 2007 07:53

What is truly shocking beyond dis-belief is that with TSP in such levels of instability, US is talking about protecting TSP's nukes instead of calls to make them nuke nude. Exposes all the sophistry about non-proliferation. Folks, TSP and its nukes are the ultimate trump card Unikil has over India. It ain't gonna go away. From pressure on India to de-nuke (with willing collaboraters like MMS/Sonia), to caging India in 'south asia' box, TSP & its nukes are key.

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Postby Satya_anveshi » 18 Nov 2007 08:23

CRamS wrote:What is truly shocking beyond dis-belief is that with TSP in such levels of instability, US is talking about protecting TSP's nukes instead of calls to make them nuke nude. Exposes all the sophistry about non-proliferation. Folks, TSP and its nukes are the ultimate trump card Unikil has over India. It ain't gonna go away. From pressure on India to de-nuke (with willing collaboraters like MMS/Sonia), to caging India in 'south asia' box, TSP & its nukes are key.


That is why we have policy paralysis on very very important and burning issues on SL, Burma, and on Pakistan now. Let along taking the opportunity to demonstrate leadership role there isn't a whimper of an action to work towards furthering Indian interest.

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Postby Singha » 18 Nov 2007 08:58

[i]The most famous case of nuclear idea sharing involves France. Starting in the early 1970s, the United States government began a series of highly secretive discussions with French scientists to help them improve the country’s warheads.

A potential impediment to such sharing was the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which bars cooperation between nations on weapons technology.

To get around such legal prohibitions, Washington came up with a system of “negative guidance,â€

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Postby arun » 20 Nov 2007 19:37

It's raining book reviews on Pakistani Nuclear proliferation. The first of 3.

Coincidence :?: :

[quote]Pakistan’s Short Fuse

WASHINGTON DISPATCH: A new book, Deception, details the rise and menace of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program—and how the U.S. did nothing to stand in its way.

By James Ridgeway
November 19, 2007

By now, the idea of “blowbackâ€
Last edited by arun on 20 Nov 2007 19:50, edited 2 times in total.

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Postby arun » 20 Nov 2007 19:41

[quote]A Tale of Two Bhuttos

By Douglas Frantz, Catherine Collins

Posted November 2007

Benazir Bhutto knows how to tell Western audiences what they want to hear, but when the former prime minister had a chance to shut down Pakistan’s nuclear Wal-Mart, she looked the other way instead.

With Pakistan in turmoil and the Bush administration rapidly losing patience with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the time seems ripe for Benazir Bhutto’s return to power. But how would the former prime minister handle the most critical international issue confronting Pakistan today? We are not talking about dealing with Islamic extremists within its borders, though that is perilous enough. Even more critical to the international community is the matter of securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and eradicating the final vestiges of A.Q. Khan’s nuclear Wal-Mart. Bhutto may say all the right things on this issue, but history raises troubling questions about her performance when it comes to nuclear weapons.

In the fall of 1989, less than a year into her first term as prime minister, Bhutto attended a conference for Islamic heads of government in Tehran. On the sidelines, then President of Iran Hashemi Rafsanjani pulled Bhutto aside to talk about a critical matter:

“Our countries have reached an agreement on special defense matters,â€

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Postby arun » 20 Nov 2007 19:47

A review of Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan, and the Rise of Proliferation Networks

By Zia Mian | 19 November 2007

Proliferation watchers have kept track of A. Q. Khan's activities for about 30 years. In 1979, the Washington Post named him as the Pakistani engineer who had left his position at the uranium enrichment centrifuge facility at Almelo, Netherlands, four years earlier with "lists of subcontractors and probably blueprints for the plant." Khan then returned to Pakistan, where he soon became director of the country's secret uranium enrichment project at Kahuta, near Islamabad, and a key player in its nuclear weapons program.

To evade the existing system of controls on the sale of nuclear weapons-related technology, Pakistan established a complex multinational effort to purchase components for its enrichment plant from European and U.S. companies--something the international community was aware of even in the late 1970s. By 1978, Pakistan's nuclear program had created international concern. Washington failed to convince Pakistan that it should place the Kahuta facility under international safeguards, and in April 1979, as required by U.S. law, the United States cut off economic and military aid to Pakistan. Khan later claimed that by 1982 Kahuta was producing weapon-grade uranium. Having succeeded in Pakistan, Khan and his network of suppliers then went on to market centrifuge design information, centrifuges, entire enrichment plants, and even a nuclear weapon design to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.

Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks, edited by Mark Fitzpatrick, a senior fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and formerly with the U.S. State Department, where he served as deputy assistant secretary of nonproliferation and at the South Asia desk, is an important addition to the literature on Pakistan's nuclear program and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation.

The report offers a sweeping, well-referenced review of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, with a focus on how it established and managed a system of embassies, front companies, false end users, friendly countries, and Pakistanis living abroad--paying whatever it took to make a deal--to import material and technology. It concludes, "The weakness of export controls and the fatalism of Western suppliers were the strongest factors abetting the network," and notes, "Many industrialists reasoned, 'If we do not do it, others will.'" The effort's scale was significant: Dutch researcher Frank Slijper has reported claims by Henk Slebos, a key Khan supplier and lifelong friend, that he worked with "maybe even 1,000" European companies. (See Project Butter Factory: Henk Slebos and the A. Q. Khan Network.)

Nuclear Black Markets also looks at Pakistan's proliferation of centrifuge technology to other countries. On the question of who was responsible for the network's activities, it observes, "Khan cannot be characterized strictly as either a government representative or a businessman acting independently. He was in fact both, in varying degrees according to the circumstances." It faults the Pakistani government, which it argues "should have known what key officials, such as Khan, were up to in an area so fundamental to Pakistan's national security and international reputation." It may be that Pakistani leaders simply chose not to ask, allowing them to deny any knowledge if confronted by Washington with evidence of illegal or illicit nuclear activity.

In some detail, the report describes Pakistan's recent efforts to recover from the Khan network being exposed. With help from Washington, Pakistan's Strategic Plans Division, the managers of Pakistan's nuclear complex, say they have brought people, materials, and weapons under tighter control. But the claims of improved security have not allayed concerns. The debate in Washington about the safety of nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan has resurfaced following Gen. Pervez Musharraf's recent imposition of martial law and the subsequent public protests. Assurances by Pakistan's generals and nuclear managers and appeals to "trust us" are no substitute for a system of checks and balances that include parliamentary oversight of the nuclear program, an independent judiciary, watchdog groups, determined anti-nuclear activists, whistleblowers, and a free press. It has taken all of this and more to expose the continuing problems in the United States and other nations with nuclear weapons.

Pakistan and Khan are only part of the problem. Nuclear Black Markets observes that the larger proliferation challenge is that "tighter controls on state-to-state technology transfers over the past four decades have resulted in the emergence of the private sector as an additional source of nuclear technology and expertise for proliferant states." It details how these "black and grey markets" in both nuclear technology and knowledge have been tapped by Iraq, Iran, India, North Korea, and Libya, and to lesser degree by Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Israel, and Syria.

The bottom line is clear: "Export controls alone are not likely to stop illicit trade in nuclear material and technology. Where there is a determined demand and the price is high enough, there is likely to be a supply." And government agencies are "often underfunded, undermanned, and undermotivated" and cannot hope to stem the tide. Capitalism will prevail over the state.

In its concluding chapter, Nuclear Black Markets lays out some policy options to "preclude nuclear black markets." It offers the standard U.S. nonproliferation fare--for instance, urging states to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which requires states to prevent non-state actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. But it accepts that the resolution "suffers a credibility problem with third world states who believe that obligations should have been established through treaty negotiations" and not imposed by the Security Council at Washington's behest.

The report suggests other steps as well: educate and help industry manage its nonproliferation responsibilities; severely punish trafficking in nuclear materials; end production of (and block access to) weapons-useable fissile materials; improve intelligence sharing; and seizure of materials in transit through efforts such as the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative. But it's hard to see how such "more-of-the-same" proposals resolve the core issues that the report raises about the tension between market forces and governments, the industrialization of developing countries, increasingly rapid innovation and diffusion of technology, the nature of bureaucracy, and the demands of domestic politics.

In a triumph of hope over experience, these proposals also assume that states will hold nonproliferation as a top priority. The history of U.S. efforts to curtail Pakistan's nuclear program, important details of which are curiously missing in Nuclear Black Markets, teaches otherwise. As noted earlier, Washington imposed sanctions on Pakistan in April 1979. Nine months later, the United States offered to waive the sanctions and provide hundreds of millions of dollars in economic and military aid to Pakistan. This was to grow into two multibillion dollar aid packages and was only part of a much larger U.S. effort that would involve Saudi Arabia, other oil-rich Arab countries, Western Europe, and China.

Why did nonproliferation suddenly lose its value? Washington decided that Khan and the Pakistani Bomb were less important than confronting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It mattered even less that Pakistan was ruled by a military dictator intent on creating an Islamic state. This remained the judgment for 10 years. By then, the damage was done: Pakistan had the Bomb, and a generation had been schooled in radical Islam and jihad. It was only when the Soviets left Afghanistan that Washington rediscovered Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and again imposed sanctions. These and other sanctions on Pakistan were lifted as part of the effort to gain Pakistan's support for the U.S. attack on Afghanistan in 2001. Billions of dollars of military and economic aid again flowed to Pakistan.

The same logic has long informed U.S. policy toward Israel, and now extends to India. For 30 years, U.S. law and international rules have banned nuclear trade with India (and others outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), because India used material and technology supplied for peaceful purposes to make nuclear weapons. But Washington now wants to build a new strategic relationship with India--to counter China and to improve U.S. access to Indian markets. India has insisted on the right to nuclear trade as the price of cooperation, and Washington has obliged.

In the determination to make a deal with India, there's no looking around, forward, or back. Washington wants the deal to go ahead even though it will enable India to significantly increase its production of fissile materials for weapons. It has already driven Pakistan to ask for a similar deal (since refused) and to begin expanding its nuclear arsenal. (For more on the U.S.-India nuclear deal see "Fissile Materials in South Asia: The Implications of the U.S.-India Nuclear Deal" [PDF].)

Nor is there any mention now in Washington of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1172, passed unanimously in June 1998 soon after both India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. It calls upon India and Pakistan to "immediately stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons." The resolution also "encourages all states to prevent the export of equipment, materials, or technology that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons."

Nuclear Black Markets fails to see how U.S. nuclear weapons policy is a driver for proliferation. For instance, consider the fact that Washington maintains a declared policy of being prepared to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict and has repeatedly made clear that it would use nuclear weapons even against countries without them. In 1981, Daniel Ellsberg, who worked on U.S. nuclear war planning in the early 1960s, observed, " Every president from [Harry S.] Truman to [Ronald] Reagan, with the possible exception of [Gerald] Ford, has felt compelled to consider or direct serious preparations for possible imminent U.S. initiation of tactical or strategic nuclear warfare, in the midst of an ongoing, intense non-nuclear conflict or crisis." U.S. presidents since have been no different. In Empire and the Bomb, Joseph Gerson documents both the earlier history of U.S nuclear threats and how President George H. W. Bush threatened Iraq with nuclear weapons during the first Gulf War, President Bill Clinton threatened North Korea, and President George W. Bush threatened Iraq and recently Iran. Even presidential candidates now talk of keeping "all options on the table," as if a willingness to make nuclear threats is proof of being fit for office. It's hard to imagine a greater incentive for insecure states to seek nuclear weapons.

Now, sadly, a growing number see nuclear weapons as perhaps the only impediment a state in the developing world can impose to blunt U.S. military power. The logic is clear to Washington. As a Bush administration official put it: "It is a real equalizer if you're a pissant little country with no hope of matching the U.S. militarily."

The belief that nuclear weapons level the international playing field is clearly shared by Khan and at least some others in the network. Peter Griffin, a member of the Khan network for more than 25 years, responded to British customs officials who asked him if he knew he was helping Pakistan's nuclear weapons program with the following: "Well, so what? I believe that if everyone's got a big stick that's more security for the world than only a couple of people with big sticks." Similarly, Slijper reports that Slebos believed his business made him rich and served a higher purpose, saying, "I am proud that I have prevented a number of wars . . . I am not proud of an atom bomb as such, but sometimes it can be a necessity that it is there."

There is a need to counter the spread of a system of social values that seeks security with and profits from nuclear weapons, be it the Khan network or the corporations that manage and operate the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. A good place to start may be for all governments, especially those with nuclear weapons, to reaffirm the November 1961 U.N. General Assembly resolution that declared, "Any state using nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization." The resolution called for states to consider convening "a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons." It's long overdue, and time may not be on our side.

LINK

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Postby Leonard » 27 Nov 2007 22:59

Cross -Post Book is a Great Read -- and Should Be Part of BR Collection ---

For $28.95 -- It is a really good buy -- Shows the PAKI, USA and Panda Shenanigans over NUKES ---


Some interesting details from Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clarks Bk.

1. 1983 -- Panda transferred 2 live nukes to Pakis

2. Late 1983 -- Cold Test was conductedd

3. 1984 -- Hot test was conducted for the Pakis at Lop Nor.

4. 1993 -- Pakis bought between 15-25 Ding-Dongs from N.Korea

5. 1996 -- Owed $40 Million to N.Korea -- No Money -- so AQK provided
a entire HEU Centrifuge Cycle in lieu ...

(N. Korean were hobbled and could not master the PU Tech after NPT
was signed)

6. Panda - has been supplying M-11 Missiles and Tech to Pakis since
1990-1991

7. In 1992 -- Even after signing the NPT the Panda M***s Tranferred
34 M-11s
to Pakis

8. Huge #s of Chinkis, N. Koreans, Syrians, Iranians, were always
present at KRL Guest Houses

9. Ramzi Yousuf --- First --- World Trade Center Bombing was in reality
a Full Blown Paki -- Real Name Abdul Karim --- Residence Balochistan

10. Nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

11. Brigadier Khalid Maqbool --- Military Attache at WA Embassy ie ISI
honcho was caught with "Highly Sophisticated" $100 Counterfeit Bills
by US Secret Service ---

Was simply deported to avoid Embarrasement ... !

12. Paki Stupidity -- Knows no Bounds -- Buying 25 Tons of High Strength
Maraging Steel and Loading via PIA to Slumabad -- DUMASS Paki --
Arshad Pervez was caught --- Later Brigadier Inam Ul Haq was
extradited from Europe -- But Freed by SD ...

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Postby Amarjeet Cheema » 28 Nov 2007 09:17

arun wrote:It's raining book reviews on Pakistani Nuclear proliferation. The first of 3.

Coincidence :?: :

Pakistan is one of four nations that refuses to abide by the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (the others are India, Israel, and North Korea), and while it is nominally a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), it has a long history of resisting oversight from the watchdog group.




Sorry to quibble, but nations cannot be expected to abide by treaties they are not even signatories to. India, Israel and Pakistan, hence, cannot be accused of not abiding by the NPT.

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Postby Rye » 28 Nov 2007 21:49

Amarjeet Cheema:
India, Israel and Pakistan, hence, cannot be accused of not abiding by the NPT.


This is a standard line pulled by the NPA-type democrat axholes in the US. You push them on this point, and point out that countries cannot be required to abide by treaties they did not sign, and various forms of hot air will emanate from the other end.

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Postby ShauryaT » 29 Nov 2007 05:38

Leonard wrote:Cross -Post Book is a Great Read -- and Should Be Part of BR Collection ---

For $28.95 -- It is a really good buy -- Shows the PAKI, USA and Panda Shenanigans over NUKES ---


Some interesting details from Adrian Levy & Catherine Scott Clarks Bk.

I second that. I just finised the book yesterday, worth every penny. I intend to post the detail references in the back of this book here, time permitting.

All those STILL supporting the 123 deal should really read this book and consider, who you are dealing with.

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Postby arun » 02 Dec 2007 18:40

Pakistan's Dr. Doom

Thanks to the rogue scientist A.Q. Khan, Iran's nuclear program threatens to ignite another Middle East war.

By Douglas Frantz and Catherine Collins

December 2, 2007

Not long ago, a respected and sober-minded expert on nuclear weapons -- a former government official now employed by a prestigious Washington think tank -- sat in his corner office and reflected for us on the nightmare brought to life by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist.

"The best thing would have been to take Khan into an alley somewhere and put a bullet in his head," said the expert, who not surprisingly insisted that his name not be attached to such an outrageous suggestion.

Although we would not advocate assassination, it is certainly true that the world is a far more dangerous place because of the nuclear Wal-Mart that Khan established, and that the worst of his actions have yet to play out. Khan's fingerprints are all over the world's most dangerous nuclear threats, from the potentially unstable atomic arsenal in his chaotic home country to the prospect of another reckless Middle Eastern war ignited by Iran's nuclear ambitions.

A European-trained metallurgist (who had fled to Pakistan from India as a boy), Khan became a national hero in the 1990s when he helped Pakistan build its first nuclear weapon. Today, at 71, he remains a revered figure in many quarters despite having admitted that he sold the country's prized nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

In recent weeks, international attention has been focused on the political crisis in Pakistan and whether the military there could lose control of the nukes that Khan helped develop -- estimated at between 50 and 120 devices -- if the political situation were to spiral out of control or if radical Islamists were to take over.

But we believe the bigger threat today comes from Iran, where the country's leaders are forging defiantly ahead toward the bomb -- even as the Bush administration seems equally relentless in its determination to stop them. This is a recipe for a global confrontation that could make the Iraq war seem tame by comparison, and it has gotten to this point thanks to A.Q. Khan.

The most immediate threat is that Iran's scientists will soon complete their mastery of the uranium enrichment cycle, enabling them to produce fissile material that could fuel a civilian reactor (as they claim is their intention) or, in higher concentration, power a bomb. A Nov. 15 report by the International Atomic Energy Agency verified that 3,000 centrifuges are online at Iran's Natanz underground enrichment plant, and that Iran is in the final stages before the production of enriched uranium. While IAEA officials suggest privately that technical hurdles remain, the fact is that Iran is on the verge of enriching uranium on an industrial scale.

Iran could not have gotten this far without critical help from Khan. Beginning in 1987, the ring he led provided Iran with plans and prototypes for centrifuges, the tall, cylindrical machines that spin at twice the speed of sound to enrich uranium. Frankly, it is surprising that it took Iran this long to begin enrichment -- Khan did it far faster in Pakistan, where he first used the designs he stole from a Dutch research center in 1975, when he was employed there.

Nonetheless, Iran is on the cusp now.

Even more troubling, and less noticed by the media, was Iran's admission to the IAEA in November that it had made substantial progress in testing an advanced type of centrifuge, known as the P-2. Iran's enrichment plant now uses P-1 centrifuges, but investigators have learned that the P-2, like its predecessor, the P-1, came to Iran directly from Khan. This machine would cut in half the time it takes to enrich uranium, moving up a showdown with the United States and its allies. Estimates on when Iran might be capable of developing a nuclear weapon have ranged from two to 10 years.

Iran, of course, did not simply volunteer to the IAEA that it was working on the P-2; it's never quite that simple. The IAEA's dealings with Tehran are replete with examples, ever since Iran's secret nuclear program was exposed by an exile group in 2002, of officials denying the existence of one program after another, only to acknowledge them when confronted by evidence to the contrary. The IAEA has credited Iran with cooperating on some key issues, but viewed in context, the repeated evasions undermine Iran's credibility on virtually everything it has said about nuclear issues, including whether there is a military side to its program.

The history of the P-2 is instructive. In October 2003, Iran grudgingly turned over to the IAEA a document that supposedly cataloged all of its previously clandestine nuclear activities dating back to 1986. The report acknowledged assistance from unnamed foreigners, including help with the P-1 centrifuge, but omitted any mention of the P-2.

Then, in December 2003, Col. Moammar Kadafi surprised the world by acknowledging that Libya had been secretly pursuing a nuclear weapon with Khan's help. Kadafi abandoned his program and opened Libya's doors to IAEA inspectors. When they examined sites in Tripoli, the Libyan capital, the inspectors found equipment that matched much of what they had been seeing in Iran. More alarmingly, they discovered technology from Khan that they had not yet seen in Iran, including P-2 centrifuges and detailed designs for a Chinese nuclear warhead.

IAEA inspectors were already suspicious that Khan and Pakistan had been Tehran's foreign suppliers. Comparing the Libyan inventory with what they had seen in Iran, it was clear that the links were stronger than imagined. The question was whether Khan had sold more to Libya than he had to Iran -- or whether the Iranians were holding back?

Olli Heinonen, the chief IAEA inspector for Iran and Libya, dispatched one of his experts to Tehran to confront the Iranians over the apparent omission of the P-2. Faced with the evidence from Libya, the Iranians admitted buying P-2 drawings in 1994 from what they coyly described as "foreign sources." Unfortunately, they said, the records of the transaction were missing and the official who arranged the deal was dead.

The existence of the P-2 designs troubled Heinonen and others at the IAEA, and they pressed the Iranians for months over whether they had translated them into actual machines. Eventually Iran conceded that work had been done on the P-2 by a private contractor, but insisted that the project had been abandoned. U.S. intelligence and skeptics at the IAEA doubted the claim, speculating instead that the P-2 could be the nucleus of a parallel enrichment project still hidden from the IAEA.

Fast forward to April 2006. That's when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad acknowledged to the media that Iranian scientists were indeed working on the P-2, which he boasted would quadruple Iran's enrichment capability. The IAEA had to wait until Nov. 7, 2007, for formal acknowledgment from Iran of the work. By then, Iran was running mechanical tests on the P-2s, a step short of introducing uranium hexafluoride -- the final stage before the production of enriched uranium.

The story of the P-2s is a case study in how Iran has managed to make substantial gains in enrichment technology despite international scrutiny and pressure. In what is now a familiar pattern, the progress occurred entirely in secret and in defiance of the IAEA. And it reflects the early assistance provided to Iran by Khan.

Today, the IAEA is still awaiting answers on other critical aspects of Iran's nuclear efforts. Traces of weapons-grade uranium at one of its plants remain unexplained. So does the revelation that Iran has experimented with nuclear materials that the IAEA says have no civilian application. Even before Khan sent over the P-2 designs, he and his associates provided Iran with a 15-page document describing how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres for nuclear devices. That too is something the Iranians assert they have never pursued.

Finally, there is the matter of those Chinese designs for building nuclear warheads that were found in Libya in 2003. Khan passed them to Kadafi sometime in 2000 or early 2001. Did he also provide them to his customers in Tehran? The answer would go a long way in proving whether Iran will soon be enriching uranium for a civilian reactor or a nuclear weapon.

Khan is finishing his fourth year under house arrest at his estate in Islamabad, the Pakistani capital. The Bush administration has never pressed to interrogate him. Clearly the world would be safer if Khan had somehow been stopped before he turned into the world's single worst nuclear proliferator. The challenge for the next president of the United States will be to undo the damage Khan did and enforce tough, uniform prohibitions on the spread of nuclear weapons in hopes that a new Khan does not emerge.

Douglas Frantz, a senior writer at Conde Nast Portfolio and former managing editor of The Times, and Catherine Collins, a writer based in Washington, are the authors of "The Nuclear Jihadist: The True Story of the Man Who Sold the World's Most Dangerous Secrets . . . and How We Could Have Stopped Him."

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arun
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Postby arun » 31 Dec 2007 16:21

Interesting article given the source.

The author is an academic at Fudan University in Shanghai.

One that slipped past the PRC press censors or reflective of the PRC’s pique that the Pakistani’s let spill the beans that the PRC had passed on nuclear weapon design’s to Pakistan ? :

[quote]December-31-2007

World: Bhutto's death and Pakistan's Crisis

Safeguarding Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

BY:Shen Dingli

Ever since Pakistan demonstrated its nuclear weapons capability, through nuclear explosion in 1998, the credibility of security of its nuclear arsenal has been queried by the West. For America, it has been a perennial question if the state government in Islamabad can be in full charge of its nuclear arsenal.

The “911â€

enqyoobOLD
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Postby enqyoobOLD » 31 Dec 2007 16:30

At one point, the Pentagon was understood to have prepared for taking over the physical control of Pakistan’s military nuclear assets. It will not be a surprise if the American special operation forces are now fully ready to executive such mission. However, one has to act calmly while actually is pretty otherwise.


Interesting statement given the source, hey?

Gerard
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Postby Gerard » 06 Jan 2008 04:35



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