The real face of malaysia and its population is out here. India should strongly compile the dossier of abuse of Hindu's of Malaysia and open the can during meeting with them. It is about time that malaysia gets a lesson in human-rights and religious freedom particularly when it says its truely asia and not truely Arabia.
India and ASEAN / East Asia
-
ashish raval
- BRFite
- Posts: 1390
- Joined: 10 Aug 2006 00:49
- Location: London
- Contact:
Re: India and ASEAN
Could not find India-malaysia forum so posting it here :
The real face of malaysia and its population is out here. India should strongly compile the dossier of abuse of Hindu's of Malaysia and open the can during meeting with them. It is about time that malaysia gets a lesson in human-rights and religious freedom particularly when it says its truely asia and not truely Arabia.
The real face of malaysia and its population is out here. India should strongly compile the dossier of abuse of Hindu's of Malaysia and open the can during meeting with them. It is about time that malaysia gets a lesson in human-rights and religious freedom particularly when it says its truely asia and not truely Arabia.
BBC Backgrounder on India-Vietnam relations.
An article on the unfulfilled potential of Indo-Vietnamese ties by Iskander Rehman on BBC World:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/world/ ... ship.shtml
The English translation was retrieved from his blog:
http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/
The Indo-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership.
Over the past year, a chill wind has been blowing over the South China Sea, and the waters lapping the coast of Vietnam have grown choppy with tension. A distinct increase in the level of Chinese assertiveness in the region has led to multinational companies being pressured out of participating in offshore energy ventures with Vietnam, to the routine rounding up of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese patrol vessels for ‘fishing in Chinese waters’, as well as to a steady ramping up of Chinese naval activity which has, in some instances, led to tension-fraught stand-offs with the US Navy.
This upsurge in Chinese naval self-confidence has sent ripples of unease across Southeast Asia, and most particularly in Vietnam, which has been embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the possession of the Spratly and Paracel islands for several decades. Vietnamese officials, when in private, frequently lament what they perceive to be Vietnam’s relative isolation on the diplomatic scene, and fear for the future. When discussing these issues recently in Paris with someone with close ties to the Vietnamese leadership, I was issued with the following dire prediction: “We think that the Chinese will press for a final resolution of the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the next ten to twenty years. If Vietnam has not reinforced its strategic partnerships by then, while simultaneously strengthening its Navy, China will be able to just seize the islands without anyone abroad lifting a hand in protest or even batting an eye-lid. ”
Vietnamese dignitaries seem to believe that their window of opportunity to press an advantageous deal with China is rapidly closing and this has instilled their military diplomacy with a new sense of urgency.
Having taken tentative steps to reinforce its ageing and minute fleet, most notably by ordering a flotilla of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, Hanoi has also been endeavouring to reinforce its defence ties with several other regional powers such as Singapore, Japan, Australia (which Secretary General Nong Duc Manh paid visit to only a few weeks ago) and India.
A Partnership Grounded in History:
Vietnam’s relationship with India goes back a long way. Indeed, one could say that India, along with ex-Soviet Russia, has been one of Vietnam’s staunchest allies over the years. The Indian Prime Minister Jawahrlal Nehru was the first foreign leader to visit the newly independent North Vietnam in 1954, and throughout most of the Cold War, India and Vietnam were strong political allies. Both had very close ties to the Soviet Union, and both bore the brunt of Chinese border invasions; India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. India’s support of Vietnam during the Vietnam war and during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s came at a high political cost, injecting bitterness into Delhi’s difficult relationship with Washington, as well as delaying the process of Sino-Indian normalisation by almost a decade. In return, Vietnam supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize newly independent Bangladesh in 1971.
The Indo-Vietnamese relationship throughout the Cold War, however, remained mostly diplomatic and political in nature. Bilateral trade was minimal, and the security component of their rapport limited itself, by and large, to information sharing protocols. It was only with the profound restructuring of Asia’s security environment at the end of the Cold War, and the advent of India’s “Look East Policy” in the early 90s that the relationship gradually evolved into a genuine strategic partnership.
The Burgeoning of a Wide Ranging Strategic Partnership:
The abrupt disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on both countries’ diplomacies. Almost overnight, both Hanoi and Delhi lost their most reliable strategic guarantor in Asia. Both countries reacted to this radically new security environment by opening up to the world, liberalizing their economies, and taking steps to normalize their relationships with their neighbours, while making an effort to diversify their strategic partnerships. The end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia facilitated its integration into ASEAN in 1995, and in the early 90s India launched what it termed its “Look East Policy”, which heralded a new era of engagement,both diplomatic and economic, with Southeast Asian nations.
It was only with the advent of an intensely nationalistic government in Delhi in the late 90s, however, that bilateral ties began to really pick up speed and take on a genuinely strategic turn. With the nuclear explosions of Pokhran II, in 1998, the BJP governement of Atal Behari Vajpayee signalled to the world, and more particularly to China, that India had become a hard power to be reckoned with.Vietnam, for its part, was intent on extricating itself from an excessive dependence on its timeold Russian partner in terms of both arms procurement and military-to- military diplomacy .Leaders from both countries also recognized that, despite significant progress in their relations with Beijing, both India and Vietnam still share a natural strategic congruence on the need to restrain China.
Since 1998, both countries have thus been steadily shoring up their ties, whether it be on the military or on the diplomatic front.
Vietnam has come out in support of India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has lobbied in favour of India’s presence at the first East Asian Summit in 2005, and helped block Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum. India, in return, was in favour of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and helped Vietnam secure a temporary seat at the UNSC in 2007. Bilateral trade has also grown extremely rapidly, surging from little more than 72 million dollars in 1995 to more than two billion in 2008. Indian multinationals such as Tata Steel and ONGC Videsh Limited have started to heavily invest in Vietnam, in what many hope is just the beginning of a new trade pattern in Asia.
The aspect of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership that has known the most progress, however, is on the military one.
Strategically placed on the eastern fringe of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is viewed by India as the main obstacle to China’s southwards expansion. Much as China has attempted to constrain India by forming a military nexus with Pakistan, New Delhi has been involved in defence cooperation with, and provided military assistance to its rival’s smaller, militaristic neighbour.
In 2000, George Fernandes, the BJP government’s Defence Minister signed a 15-point Defence Protocol with Vietnam, which promised to provide Vietnam with assistance in the modernization of its armed forces and to intensify defence cooperation between the two countries. Three years later, India and Vietnam stepped up their military cooperation by signing a “Joint Declaration and Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the 21st century.” In 2007, this was followed up by a formalized Strategic Partnership.
India has been providing Vietnam with assistance in the shoring up of its naval and air capabilities in an attempt to deny China total supremacy in the South China Sea. This is greatly facilitated by the fact that Vietnam’s Air Force and Navy’s military hardware have the same Russian origin as their Indian counterparts, which has enabled the Indian armed forces to frequently help their Vietnamese partners overcome their operational difficulties by supplying them with spare parts and by providing advanced repair and maintenance services. New Delhi has repaired and upgraded 125 Mig 21 planes of the Vietnamese Air Force, and supplied them with enhanced avionics and radar systems. Indian Air Force pilots have also been training Vietnamese fighter pilots, and in 2005 the Indian Navy dispatched more than 150 tonnes of spares to Hanoi for its Russian Petya and OSA-11 class missile boats. The Indian and Vietnamese coast guards have engaged in joint patrols, and both navies participated in a joint exercise in 2007.
Indo-Vietnamese military cooperation also extends to their respective ground forces; as both countries have engaged in joint exercises, and Indian army officers have benefited from Vietnamese expertise in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency.
In return, the Vietnamese have been supplied with advanced light helicopters (the Indian made AHLs) at “friendly prices”, and Vietnamese officers have been provided with English lessons at an Indian Language Institute.
A Feeling of Unfulfilled Potential:
Despite all this, there is a feeling, both in India and in Vietnam, that the partnership is far from having achieved its potential, and, what’s more, has started to lose its momentum.
Hanoi has been particularly disappointed in India’s unreliability as a weapons procurement partner. Although India has engaged in some token efforts to help modernize Vietnam’s military, the Vietnamese are frustrated by the fact that New Delhi seems so reticent to supply it with some of the missile systems it had initially promised. Indeed, in 2000 and at several occasions during the BJP governnment’s tenure, India had vouched that it would gift Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos missile systems. The Prithvi is an SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile), with a maximum range of approximately 200-350km,whereas the BrahMos Cruise Missile, co-produced by the Indians with the Russians, is a very advanced anti-ship missile, based on the Russian Yakhent anti-ship missile, which has a range of more than 300km and that can fly at more than twice the speed the sound. If the Vietnamese Navy were to acquire such a weapons system, it would prove to be a major challenge to Chinese naval dominance in the South China Sea, and greatly aid Vietnam in its strategy of sea denial and coastal defence. Various theories have been put forward to explain India’s failure to provide Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos. Some claim that India’s Congress government, which has increasingly focused on economic rather than military cooperation with Vietnam, does not want to run the risk of antagonizing China. Others blame it on traditional Indian bureaucratic sloth or have stated that, in the case of the BrahMos, it must first be fully inducted into the Indian Armed Forces before a surplus can be generated for friendly states such as Vietnam. Most analysts concur in saying that Vietnam will probably obtain the Prithvi system in the long run. When it comes to the vaunted BrahMos, however, things are far from certain.
It is believed that frustration at this, as well as at successive delays in amrs deliveries, is what led the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security to purchase sub machine guns and sniper rifles from Pakistan in 2007, in a veiled but nevertheless significant expression of its displeasure. The Indians for their part, are somewhat disappointed that the possibility of the Indian Navy gaining permanent berthing rights at the Vietnamese deep sea port of Cam Ranh Bay now seem to be increasingly remote. While the Vietnamese aired this possibility at the turn of the century, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien declared in 2004 when questioned on the matter that Cam Ranh was “no longer a military port”. Most analysts now concur in viewing Cam Ranh Bay as Vietnam’s strategic trump card, that it occasionally brandishes to balance China, but that it will most probably refuse to give up to a foreign power, unless it is compelled to in extreme circumstances.
Things are also far from perfect on the economic front. Indeed, while bilateral trade has grown substantially over the past decade, it is also increasingly unbalanced in nature, with Vietnam suffering from a crippling one billion dollar trade deficit with India. As a net benificiary of this imbalance, India has politely brushed aside the Vietnamese proposal to establish an FTA and has refused to grant tax reductions and exemptions to Vietnamese products.
An Uncertain Future:
While it is clear that ties in-between India and Vietnam have strengthened over the past few years, particularly in the field of defence, it is equally apparent that for it to endure it needs to be put on a more equal footing.
India should consider lowering its trade tarriffs and opening its markets to some Vietnamese products, and should encourage more Indian companies to invest in Vietnam. Indian policy makers that hesitate to provide Vietnamese ships with BrahMos cruise missiles should maybe wonder whether China was beset by the same moral qualms when it supplied Pakistan with its first state-of-the-art F-22P frigate this summer.
Last but not least, the future of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership will increasingly depend on both states’ attitude towards China. India’s Congress government, which has generally shown a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards Beijing than its BJP predecessor; is currently facing renewed tensions along its 4,057 km with China. It may not wish, therefore, to durably aggravate its transhimalyan neighbour by strengthening the military facet of its ties with Vietnam.
Vietnam’s leadership, for its part, is currently riven by factional in-fighting as a prelude to the 11th National Congress in 2011. The recent crackdown on nationalist Vietnamese bloggers and journalists seems to indicate that the China-aligned fringe of the Party, which controls domestic intelligence gathering via the military intelligence unit General Department II, is gradually gaining ascendancy in the struggle in-between conservatives and liberals. If the pro-China conservatives win this subterranean battle for power and influence, it will undoubtedly have a highly negative impact on the Indo-Vietnamese partnership.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/world/ ... ship.shtml
The English translation was retrieved from his blog:
http://indiangeopolitics.blogspot.com/
The Indo-Vietnamese Strategic Partnership.
Over the past year, a chill wind has been blowing over the South China Sea, and the waters lapping the coast of Vietnam have grown choppy with tension. A distinct increase in the level of Chinese assertiveness in the region has led to multinational companies being pressured out of participating in offshore energy ventures with Vietnam, to the routine rounding up of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese patrol vessels for ‘fishing in Chinese waters’, as well as to a steady ramping up of Chinese naval activity which has, in some instances, led to tension-fraught stand-offs with the US Navy.
This upsurge in Chinese naval self-confidence has sent ripples of unease across Southeast Asia, and most particularly in Vietnam, which has been embroiled in a bitter territorial dispute with China over the possession of the Spratly and Paracel islands for several decades. Vietnamese officials, when in private, frequently lament what they perceive to be Vietnam’s relative isolation on the diplomatic scene, and fear for the future. When discussing these issues recently in Paris with someone with close ties to the Vietnamese leadership, I was issued with the following dire prediction: “We think that the Chinese will press for a final resolution of the sovereignty dispute over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the next ten to twenty years. If Vietnam has not reinforced its strategic partnerships by then, while simultaneously strengthening its Navy, China will be able to just seize the islands without anyone abroad lifting a hand in protest or even batting an eye-lid. ”
Vietnamese dignitaries seem to believe that their window of opportunity to press an advantageous deal with China is rapidly closing and this has instilled their military diplomacy with a new sense of urgency.
Having taken tentative steps to reinforce its ageing and minute fleet, most notably by ordering a flotilla of six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, Hanoi has also been endeavouring to reinforce its defence ties with several other regional powers such as Singapore, Japan, Australia (which Secretary General Nong Duc Manh paid visit to only a few weeks ago) and India.
A Partnership Grounded in History:
Vietnam’s relationship with India goes back a long way. Indeed, one could say that India, along with ex-Soviet Russia, has been one of Vietnam’s staunchest allies over the years. The Indian Prime Minister Jawahrlal Nehru was the first foreign leader to visit the newly independent North Vietnam in 1954, and throughout most of the Cold War, India and Vietnam were strong political allies. Both had very close ties to the Soviet Union, and both bore the brunt of Chinese border invasions; India in 1962, and Vietnam in 1979. India’s support of Vietnam during the Vietnam war and during its invasion and occupation of Cambodia in the 1980s came at a high political cost, injecting bitterness into Delhi’s difficult relationship with Washington, as well as delaying the process of Sino-Indian normalisation by almost a decade. In return, Vietnam supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan, and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize newly independent Bangladesh in 1971.
The Indo-Vietnamese relationship throughout the Cold War, however, remained mostly diplomatic and political in nature. Bilateral trade was minimal, and the security component of their rapport limited itself, by and large, to information sharing protocols. It was only with the profound restructuring of Asia’s security environment at the end of the Cold War, and the advent of India’s “Look East Policy” in the early 90s that the relationship gradually evolved into a genuine strategic partnership.
The Burgeoning of a Wide Ranging Strategic Partnership:
The abrupt disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War had an enormous impact on both countries’ diplomacies. Almost overnight, both Hanoi and Delhi lost their most reliable strategic guarantor in Asia. Both countries reacted to this radically new security environment by opening up to the world, liberalizing their economies, and taking steps to normalize their relationships with their neighbours, while making an effort to diversify their strategic partnerships. The end of Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia facilitated its integration into ASEAN in 1995, and in the early 90s India launched what it termed its “Look East Policy”, which heralded a new era of engagement,both diplomatic and economic, with Southeast Asian nations.
It was only with the advent of an intensely nationalistic government in Delhi in the late 90s, however, that bilateral ties began to really pick up speed and take on a genuinely strategic turn. With the nuclear explosions of Pokhran II, in 1998, the BJP governement of Atal Behari Vajpayee signalled to the world, and more particularly to China, that India had become a hard power to be reckoned with.Vietnam, for its part, was intent on extricating itself from an excessive dependence on its timeold Russian partner in terms of both arms procurement and military-to- military diplomacy .Leaders from both countries also recognized that, despite significant progress in their relations with Beijing, both India and Vietnam still share a natural strategic congruence on the need to restrain China.
Since 1998, both countries have thus been steadily shoring up their ties, whether it be on the military or on the diplomatic front.
Vietnam has come out in support of India’s bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC, has lobbied in favour of India’s presence at the first East Asian Summit in 2005, and helped block Pakistan’s inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum. India, in return, was in favour of Vietnam’s accession to the World Trade Organization, and helped Vietnam secure a temporary seat at the UNSC in 2007. Bilateral trade has also grown extremely rapidly, surging from little more than 72 million dollars in 1995 to more than two billion in 2008. Indian multinationals such as Tata Steel and ONGC Videsh Limited have started to heavily invest in Vietnam, in what many hope is just the beginning of a new trade pattern in Asia.
The aspect of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership that has known the most progress, however, is on the military one.
Strategically placed on the eastern fringe of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is viewed by India as the main obstacle to China’s southwards expansion. Much as China has attempted to constrain India by forming a military nexus with Pakistan, New Delhi has been involved in defence cooperation with, and provided military assistance to its rival’s smaller, militaristic neighbour.
In 2000, George Fernandes, the BJP government’s Defence Minister signed a 15-point Defence Protocol with Vietnam, which promised to provide Vietnam with assistance in the modernization of its armed forces and to intensify defence cooperation between the two countries. Three years later, India and Vietnam stepped up their military cooperation by signing a “Joint Declaration and Framework of Comprehensive Cooperation between the Republic of India and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as they enter the 21st century.” In 2007, this was followed up by a formalized Strategic Partnership.
India has been providing Vietnam with assistance in the shoring up of its naval and air capabilities in an attempt to deny China total supremacy in the South China Sea. This is greatly facilitated by the fact that Vietnam’s Air Force and Navy’s military hardware have the same Russian origin as their Indian counterparts, which has enabled the Indian armed forces to frequently help their Vietnamese partners overcome their operational difficulties by supplying them with spare parts and by providing advanced repair and maintenance services. New Delhi has repaired and upgraded 125 Mig 21 planes of the Vietnamese Air Force, and supplied them with enhanced avionics and radar systems. Indian Air Force pilots have also been training Vietnamese fighter pilots, and in 2005 the Indian Navy dispatched more than 150 tonnes of spares to Hanoi for its Russian Petya and OSA-11 class missile boats. The Indian and Vietnamese coast guards have engaged in joint patrols, and both navies participated in a joint exercise in 2007.
Indo-Vietnamese military cooperation also extends to their respective ground forces; as both countries have engaged in joint exercises, and Indian army officers have benefited from Vietnamese expertise in jungle warfare and counter-insurgency.
In return, the Vietnamese have been supplied with advanced light helicopters (the Indian made AHLs) at “friendly prices”, and Vietnamese officers have been provided with English lessons at an Indian Language Institute.
A Feeling of Unfulfilled Potential:
Despite all this, there is a feeling, both in India and in Vietnam, that the partnership is far from having achieved its potential, and, what’s more, has started to lose its momentum.
Hanoi has been particularly disappointed in India’s unreliability as a weapons procurement partner. Although India has engaged in some token efforts to help modernize Vietnam’s military, the Vietnamese are frustrated by the fact that New Delhi seems so reticent to supply it with some of the missile systems it had initially promised. Indeed, in 2000 and at several occasions during the BJP governnment’s tenure, India had vouched that it would gift Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos missile systems. The Prithvi is an SRBM (Short Range Ballistic Missile), with a maximum range of approximately 200-350km,whereas the BrahMos Cruise Missile, co-produced by the Indians with the Russians, is a very advanced anti-ship missile, based on the Russian Yakhent anti-ship missile, which has a range of more than 300km and that can fly at more than twice the speed the sound. If the Vietnamese Navy were to acquire such a weapons system, it would prove to be a major challenge to Chinese naval dominance in the South China Sea, and greatly aid Vietnam in its strategy of sea denial and coastal defence. Various theories have been put forward to explain India’s failure to provide Vietnam with the Prithvi and BrahMos. Some claim that India’s Congress government, which has increasingly focused on economic rather than military cooperation with Vietnam, does not want to run the risk of antagonizing China. Others blame it on traditional Indian bureaucratic sloth or have stated that, in the case of the BrahMos, it must first be fully inducted into the Indian Armed Forces before a surplus can be generated for friendly states such as Vietnam. Most analysts concur in saying that Vietnam will probably obtain the Prithvi system in the long run. When it comes to the vaunted BrahMos, however, things are far from certain.
It is believed that frustration at this, as well as at successive delays in amrs deliveries, is what led the Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security to purchase sub machine guns and sniper rifles from Pakistan in 2007, in a veiled but nevertheless significant expression of its displeasure. The Indians for their part, are somewhat disappointed that the possibility of the Indian Navy gaining permanent berthing rights at the Vietnamese deep sea port of Cam Ranh Bay now seem to be increasingly remote. While the Vietnamese aired this possibility at the turn of the century, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien declared in 2004 when questioned on the matter that Cam Ranh was “no longer a military port”. Most analysts now concur in viewing Cam Ranh Bay as Vietnam’s strategic trump card, that it occasionally brandishes to balance China, but that it will most probably refuse to give up to a foreign power, unless it is compelled to in extreme circumstances.
Things are also far from perfect on the economic front. Indeed, while bilateral trade has grown substantially over the past decade, it is also increasingly unbalanced in nature, with Vietnam suffering from a crippling one billion dollar trade deficit with India. As a net benificiary of this imbalance, India has politely brushed aside the Vietnamese proposal to establish an FTA and has refused to grant tax reductions and exemptions to Vietnamese products.
An Uncertain Future:
While it is clear that ties in-between India and Vietnam have strengthened over the past few years, particularly in the field of defence, it is equally apparent that for it to endure it needs to be put on a more equal footing.
India should consider lowering its trade tarriffs and opening its markets to some Vietnamese products, and should encourage more Indian companies to invest in Vietnam. Indian policy makers that hesitate to provide Vietnamese ships with BrahMos cruise missiles should maybe wonder whether China was beset by the same moral qualms when it supplied Pakistan with its first state-of-the-art F-22P frigate this summer.
Last but not least, the future of the Indo-Vietnamese partnership will increasingly depend on both states’ attitude towards China. India’s Congress government, which has generally shown a slightly more conciliatory attitude towards Beijing than its BJP predecessor; is currently facing renewed tensions along its 4,057 km with China. It may not wish, therefore, to durably aggravate its transhimalyan neighbour by strengthening the military facet of its ties with Vietnam.
Vietnam’s leadership, for its part, is currently riven by factional in-fighting as a prelude to the 11th National Congress in 2011. The recent crackdown on nationalist Vietnamese bloggers and journalists seems to indicate that the China-aligned fringe of the Party, which controls domestic intelligence gathering via the military intelligence unit General Department II, is gradually gaining ascendancy in the struggle in-between conservatives and liberals. If the pro-China conservatives win this subterranean battle for power and influence, it will undoubtedly have a highly negative impact on the Indo-Vietnamese partnership.
Re: India and ASEAN
Article from Thailand of China Asean ties
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/30514
New strategies
http://www.mysinchew.com/node/30514
New strategies
Of late, Asean-China relations are not what they seem. Deep down, there are signs of wariness and complacency. While both sides still value their hard-won friendship and economic-focused transactions, factors that keep their ties vibrant are completely missing these days. Worse still has been the new tendency for using aggressive rebuttals, emphasising sovereignty and nationalism, among claimants over the South China Sea disputes. They have forgotten they used to pledge self-restraint.
Furthermore, the Chinese policymakers have to consider other major powers, especially the US, new Japan, India, Australia, and their readiness to engage Asean on the same level playing field that China has enjoyed—but without pebbles in their shoes.
-
Stan_Savljevic
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 3522
- Joined: 21 Apr 2006 15:40
Re: India and ASEAN
India frees trade with Vietnam
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/n ... nid=111440
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/n ... nid=111440
Re: India and ASEAN
Rajiv Sikri's interview on the Look East Policy. It is a long interview and a good, serious interview.
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR85 ... Sikri1.pdf
http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR85 ... Sikri1.pdf
Have the objectives of the LEP been achieved?
Since the early nineties, there has been steadily
increasing cooperation on all fronts and India has begun
to figure in the strategic thinking of Southeast Asia.
When India became a nuclear power in 1998, major
powers like United States, Japan and many other
countries sat up and took note of this important
development. ASEAN wanted closer ties with India to
balance the influence of China. Singapore played a
particularly important role in creating awareness of
India’s strategic importance. You would have noticed
that there is a domestic political and public consensus
on India’s LEP. No party has ever questioned the
desirability of closer engagement with Southeast Asia.
More could have certainly been done to build relations
with the Southeast Asian countries, but the overall
balance sheet during this period is satisfactory.
Re: India and ASEAN
Chinese DDM or poor English? Since when did India and Indonesia have a border disupte????
Source:http://english.people.com.cn/90001/9078 ... 49377.html"Our main priority now is security in sea border areas and the outer islands of Indonesia," Agus [Suhartono, Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff Admiral said Monday]. "Crimes at Sea are not the only problems we have in the western waters. In these areas we also have border disputes with India, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia."
Re: India and ASEAN
Their claims have (at different times) included various islands that we consider to be part of the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. Never anything serious though.Omar wrote:Chinese DDM or poor English? Since when did India and Indonesia have a border disupte????
Re: India and ASEAN
Malaysian Prime Minister interview
Malaysia is a net exporter of oil and is also the second-biggest exporter of LNG. But its energy trade with India is not very significant. What needs to be done?
I think it is essentially a question of supply; also we are not amongst the major producers of oil and gas. We produce about 700,000 barrels of oil and in LNG we are committed to two long-term contracts, one with China and other with Japan. So whatever we produce is virtually taken away by our existing contracts. We would certainly like to supply more to India, but it is contingent to our finding new deposits.
About 35 Malaysian companies are already in India on road projects. But there is an expertise that Malaysia has in tolling, developing wayside amenities and other value-added services. There has been a government-to-government discussion on this. Can you throw some light on the latest development?
Well, we are planning to have a memorandum of understanding (MoU), a kind of an umbrella agreement between the two countries on this subject. This MoU would provide a framework for us to encourage the Malaysian companies including the established ones like Plus (Expressway Bhd Systems) for highway toll operation management to participate. Because it is not about just building highways, but the total management of the system, how to increase the economic and business activities. So there are good prospects that companies from Malaysia can explore here in India.
Re: India and ASEAN
Not really ASEAN related, but Korea
India is First Lady's Ancestral Home
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/na ... 59663.html
Korea's first lady Kim Yoon-ok is a descendant of one of India's royal families dating back two thousand years, according to the presidential office.
India is First Lady's Ancestral Home
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/na ... 59663.html
Korea's first lady Kim Yoon-ok is a descendant of one of India's royal families dating back two thousand years, according to the presidential office.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Vietnam and India
The Chinese, keen to expand and push back their borders, mention this area in their chronicles. But, only concerned with the materials imported into China or the tribute paid by the “barbarians,” they do not even explain how and in what language they communicated with these people. When Chinese troops led by General Ma Yuan occupied northern Vietnam in A.D. 42, the invaders carried off the drums, underlining their perceived importance, perhaps as symbols linked with sovereignty.
In the first centuries of our era, a state that sent embassies abroad and traded as far afield as the Middle East and Central Asia arose in the area. Contacts with India were sufficiently sustained for Hindu proselytism to spread, leading to the “Indianization of Fu Nan,” as Miss Tingley puts it. This is shown by inscriptions in Sanskrit as early as the mid-5th century. None, alas, yields the merest clue to who the people of Fu Nan were, nor to the circumstances in which Hinduism and Buddhism came to spread.
Vietnam's National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong visits Bodh Gaya and Bangalore
Nguyen Phu Trong attended ‘Vietnam Days in India’ which was opened in the Indian capital city of New Delhi on the evening of February 25. NA Chairman Trong expressed his delight at the development of Vietnam-India relationship and the increasing exchange among the two countries’ businesses.
The current visit to India by the Vietnamese NA’s delegation aims to convey an important message “Vietnam will exert its efforts to create a transparent environment for both countries’ investors and business people to conduct their business, contributing to boosting the development of the Vietnam-India traditional friendship, comprehensive co-operation and strategic partnership for ‘mutual, our and your benefits’,” stressed the NA leader.
The Chinese, keen to expand and push back their borders, mention this area in their chronicles. But, only concerned with the materials imported into China or the tribute paid by the “barbarians,” they do not even explain how and in what language they communicated with these people. When Chinese troops led by General Ma Yuan occupied northern Vietnam in A.D. 42, the invaders carried off the drums, underlining their perceived importance, perhaps as symbols linked with sovereignty.
In the first centuries of our era, a state that sent embassies abroad and traded as far afield as the Middle East and Central Asia arose in the area. Contacts with India were sufficiently sustained for Hindu proselytism to spread, leading to the “Indianization of Fu Nan,” as Miss Tingley puts it. This is shown by inscriptions in Sanskrit as early as the mid-5th century. None, alas, yields the merest clue to who the people of Fu Nan were, nor to the circumstances in which Hinduism and Buddhism came to spread.
Vietnam's National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong visits Bodh Gaya and Bangalore
Nguyen Phu Trong attended ‘Vietnam Days in India’ which was opened in the Indian capital city of New Delhi on the evening of February 25. NA Chairman Trong expressed his delight at the development of Vietnam-India relationship and the increasing exchange among the two countries’ businesses.
The current visit to India by the Vietnamese NA’s delegation aims to convey an important message “Vietnam will exert its efforts to create a transparent environment for both countries’ investors and business people to conduct their business, contributing to boosting the development of the Vietnam-India traditional friendship, comprehensive co-operation and strategic partnership for ‘mutual, our and your benefits’,” stressed the NA leader.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Looking East to Look West
Singapore was administered from Calcutta between 1819 and 1867. The city’s former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew’s standing invitation to India is that it should treat Singapore as the hub of its interests and activities in the region. Poor Lee during his Prime Ministership and even after trying to persuade one Indian Prime Minister after another to help protect Singapore because it is "the only possible Asian power that has the potential to stabilise the region against China and the Communists" did not succeed. Why?
This book is about the tremendous-and often main-efforts made by Lee Kuan Yew and his contemporaries and later, followers in the Prime Ministerial chair, to interest Indian leaders in Singapore. Sunanda Datta-Ray has done service to India by providing us the background to South East Asia’s needs. Of course, Lee has pointed out that "future mingling" between India and South East Asian nations will not be the same as in ancient times, which is understandable and obvious.
Singapore was administered from Calcutta between 1819 and 1867. The city’s former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew’s standing invitation to India is that it should treat Singapore as the hub of its interests and activities in the region. Poor Lee during his Prime Ministership and even after trying to persuade one Indian Prime Minister after another to help protect Singapore because it is "the only possible Asian power that has the potential to stabilise the region against China and the Communists" did not succeed. Why?
This book is about the tremendous-and often main-efforts made by Lee Kuan Yew and his contemporaries and later, followers in the Prime Ministerial chair, to interest Indian leaders in Singapore. Sunanda Datta-Ray has done service to India by providing us the background to South East Asia’s needs. Of course, Lee has pointed out that "future mingling" between India and South East Asian nations will not be the same as in ancient times, which is understandable and obvious.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Well, PRC is actively being courted for economic engagement, SG has significant investment there including major ventures such as the controversial Suzhou Industrial park. IIRC, the GIC also holds ~ 20% of Beijing Intl airport. But all said and done, when it comes to defence, they are very cautious about PRC; the west, primarily the US is still the 'protector' of SG. I believe the USN even has 'permanent' berthing facilities at Changi Naval base, and the USAF has refuelling facilities at Paya Lebar AFB. US-SG defense co-operation is very very tight.Airavat wrote:Looking East to Look West
Poor Lee during his Prime Ministership and even after trying to persuade one Indian Prime Minister after another to help protect Singapore because it is "the only possible Asian power that has the potential to stabilise the region against China and the Communists" did not succeed.
With Unkils waning clout in the Asian region, India is nicely poised to put it's foot in the door. If we can lease some facility for a listening post in the region it would be useful IMHO; it will complement A&N nicely, giving us eyes and ears on both sides of the shipping channels. An Air Force base or naval station does not appear to be feasible, due to lack of space. Another drawback would be the unwillingess of the govts there to allow hostilities against a third party from its territory unless SG itself is a target of a shooting war.
Some investment numbers (slightly dated, from 2006-2007)
http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/themes ... ummary.pdf
Currency in SG$.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Malaysia attracts Indian tourists
"Tourism Malaysia has a set a target of 650,000 visitors from India in 2010. This represents a growth of 10 per cent over 2009. The focus also includes increasing room nights. Besides, the tourists' receipts have increased from 1496.1 Ringgit Malaysia (RM) million in 2008 to 1601.8 RM million in 2009. We expect an increased growth this year," Dato' Mirza Mohammad Taiyab Beg, Director General of Malaysia Tourism said at a press conference in Ahmedabad today.
Malaysian Tourism expects a year-on-year growth of 15-20 per cent for the next five years. "With the advent of Air Asia as a carrier from select cities (Kolkatta, Cochin, Trichy and Trivandrum at present, and with plans to commence Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore in the near future), and Malaysian Airlines flying a daily service from five cities, we expect a growth of 15 to 20 per cent," Dato' Mirza said.
"Tourism Malaysia has a set a target of 650,000 visitors from India in 2010. This represents a growth of 10 per cent over 2009. The focus also includes increasing room nights. Besides, the tourists' receipts have increased from 1496.1 Ringgit Malaysia (RM) million in 2008 to 1601.8 RM million in 2009. We expect an increased growth this year," Dato' Mirza Mohammad Taiyab Beg, Director General of Malaysia Tourism said at a press conference in Ahmedabad today.
Malaysian Tourism expects a year-on-year growth of 15-20 per cent for the next five years. "With the advent of Air Asia as a carrier from select cities (Kolkatta, Cochin, Trichy and Trivandrum at present, and with plans to commence Mumbai, Delhi and Bangalore in the near future), and Malaysian Airlines flying a daily service from five cities, we expect a growth of 15 to 20 per cent," Dato' Mirza said.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Terror threat issued for tankers in Strait of Malacca
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/0 ... l?hpt=Sbin
A terrorist group might be planning attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Malacca, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, Singapore's navy warned Thursday.
"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group," said an advisory issued by the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre (IFC).
It did not name any groups or indicate how the tip was obtained.
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/0 ... l?hpt=Sbin
A terrorist group might be planning attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Malacca, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, Singapore's navy warned Thursday.
"The terrorists' intent is probably to achieve widespread publicity and showcase that it remains a viable group," said an advisory issued by the Singapore Navy Information Fusion Centre (IFC).
It did not name any groups or indicate how the tip was obtained.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
NALCO project in Indonesia
The Indonesian government is said to have approved the Indian company's multi-million dollar investment project in the coal-rich East Kalimantan region, said media reports. "We have projected an investment of around Rs1,500 crores (RM1.05 billion) a year in Indonesia, starting 2012-13. The investment will be made in tranches and the amount will go up in step with the progress of the project," A.K. Srivastava, Nalco chairman and managing director, was quoted by the Economic Times in Kolkata.
The Indonesian government is said to have approved the Indian company's multi-million dollar investment project in the coal-rich East Kalimantan region, said media reports. "We have projected an investment of around Rs1,500 crores (RM1.05 billion) a year in Indonesia, starting 2012-13. The investment will be made in tranches and the amount will go up in step with the progress of the project," A.K. Srivastava, Nalco chairman and managing director, was quoted by the Economic Times in Kolkata.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Indian banks get Malaysian banking licence
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKLA00208820100416
Malaysia awarded on Friday a commercial banking licence to a locally incorporated bank to be owned by India's Bank of Baroda, Indian Overseas Bank and Andhra Bank.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKLA00208820100416
Malaysia awarded on Friday a commercial banking licence to a locally incorporated bank to be owned by India's Bank of Baroda, Indian Overseas Bank and Andhra Bank.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
The fading popularity and influence of Thailand's king.
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/05/17/the-king/
http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2010/05/17/the-king/
-
sanjaykumar
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 6110
- Joined: 16 Oct 2005 05:51
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010 ... rship.html
India’s influences are not only felt in Bali but throughout the islands of the Indonesian Archipelago as Indonesia’s first meeting with India was not just an information and technology revolution.
It was a profound awakening of our creative soul that paved the way for great development of the arts and culture.
Even today, India touches our hearts and inspires our creativity in a way that leaves the Indonesian soul deeply happy.
India and Indonesia should join hands to create dances, dramas, textiles and stories as we did so many centuries ago.
But Pakistanis don't think this way-contemptible creatures that they are.
India’s influences are not only felt in Bali but throughout the islands of the Indonesian Archipelago as Indonesia’s first meeting with India was not just an information and technology revolution.
It was a profound awakening of our creative soul that paved the way for great development of the arts and culture.
Even today, India touches our hearts and inspires our creativity in a way that leaves the Indonesian soul deeply happy.
India and Indonesia should join hands to create dances, dramas, textiles and stories as we did so many centuries ago.
But Pakistanis don't think this way-contemptible creatures that they are.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
India condemns sinking of South Korean ship
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/article435252.ece
http://beta.thehindu.com/news/article435252.ece
India has condemned the sinking of the South Korean frigate Cheonan on March 26 and commended Seoul for handling the issue with maturity and restraint.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Vietnam helps Indian fishermen
“The original plan was to send the fishermen to Scotland. But it failed to materialise. We opted for the training programme in Vietnam, which proved beneficial because it is an Asian country,” explained Benjamin Cherian, Chairman of the Relief Committee. “Even Chennai hotels are getting fish from Vietnam. We have not fully exploited the marine resource. It is not just fishing or fish farming. Our fishermen should also be trained in fish processing. Preservation is very important,” he said.
“The original plan was to send the fishermen to Scotland. But it failed to materialise. We opted for the training programme in Vietnam, which proved beneficial because it is an Asian country,” explained Benjamin Cherian, Chairman of the Relief Committee. “Even Chennai hotels are getting fish from Vietnam. We have not fully exploited the marine resource. It is not just fishing or fish farming. Our fishermen should also be trained in fish processing. Preservation is very important,” he said.
-
ashish raval
- BRFite
- Posts: 1390
- Joined: 10 Aug 2006 00:49
- Location: London
- Contact:
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Reflecting Indonesia's Hindu past. Wahabi's are setting their sights on brainwashing Indonesians now after successfully doing so with Malaysians. India should be proactive in promoting the cultural ties with Indonesians and make Indonesians aware of their "real past". Indian government is totally rubbish in projecting "soft power". Stupid babu's who know textbooks by heart but not the real world reality.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_1-3IC6X34
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n_1-3IC6X34
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
I am simply disgusted by the nikamma MEA. They are so shit scared of China that they need permissions from Beijing to do business with Taiwan while the Chinese happily trade nuclear reactors with pakistan.Only the Narshimha Rao administration and BJP led Vajpayee administration recognized the importance of Taiwan.
India’s Taiwan Snub
India’s Taiwan Snub
On April 23, Taiwanese Prime Minister Wu Den-yih announced that the KMT government wanted to make India and Indonesia priorities for manufacturing investment. Although Taiwan has thus far invested about US$ 310 billion in China, US$ 57 billion in South-east Asia and only US $ 1 billion in India (mostly through small enterprises), the announcement was ignored by India's economist-led government.
Except for the six years when the BJP was in office (1998-2004) and an effort to reach out by the Narasimha Rao-led team in 1993 (which ironically was rebuffed by Taipei), all governments in India have kept Taiwan at arms length, afraid of annoying Beijing.
Even today, while countries such as Singapore and Malaysia (neither of which could be termed hostile to China) allow the Taiwanese diplomatic ‘representative’ in their capitals to meet even with cabinet ministers, in India the Taiwanese have to remain satisfied with meetings at a much lower level--a joint secretary to the Indian government (a position four rungs lower than the highest in the civil service, which itself ranks below the most junior ministerial position). In contrast, the Indian representative in Taipei has access even to President Ma Ying-jeou, should he be given permission by nervous mandarins in Delhi.
Although a Double Taxation Agreement has been discussed by both sides for six years (dating from when the BJP was in office), and was initialled two years ago, thus far it hasn’t actually been signed due to fears in South Block (the home of the External Affairs Ministry) that China would look askance at the development (one senior official told me disgustedly that it will likely only get signed after China and Taiwan sign the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement).
Another essential policy action (for enhancing investment) that has remained on the back burner for five years is the Taiwanese request that a branch of their mission be opened in Chennai, a southern city where the bulk of Taiwanese investment in India has been clustered, and preferably also in Ahmedabad, the capital of a BJP-run state whose chief minister (Narendra Modi) has made Taiwanese investment a priority.
South Block has also ignored promptings that a second office of the Indian mission be opened in the Taiwanese manufacturing city of Kaohsiung so as to attract more investment into India. According to another official, this is unlikely unless the Chinese ‘informally’ give their consent. {simply unbeleivable} its importance as a production hub, authorities in India have discouraged Indian delegations from venturing to Kaohsiung, even though both chemical and petrochemical units there are looking at setting up plants in India. Here the reason seems to be the hold that some Indian corporates have on Indian policymakers.
Although Taiwan has a well-developed banking and finance industry, thus far only the Chinatrust Bank has been allowed to set up an office in Delhi, and it hasn’t been able to venture elsewhere, although all but two of its fifty officers are Indian citizens, including the country head. This is in contrast to the favoured treatment shown by the Reserve Bank of India (an institution known for its Anglophile ways) to Western banks, many of whom have become involved in the financing of speculative activities.
Only the Education Ministry is fighting the policy of ignoring Taiwan. It has recently allowed Indian universities to recognize Taiwanese degrees, thus opening the door to the tens of thousands of Indian students who want a foreign education but can’t afford to go to the US or the UK. Sadly, despite Taiwan's attractiveness as a gateway to the west coast of the US, thus far the Ministry of Civil Aviation has ignored Taipei (as it has the fact that flights from Europe to India are priced higher than those from Europe to East Asia). Indeed, the only airline flying directly to Taiwan from India, China Airlines, prices a Delhi-Taipei ticket more expensively than it does one from Taipei to Los Angeles.
During the period (2004-2009) when the Manmohan Singh government depended on the two (very pro-Beijing) communist parties for its majority, this placing of the relationship with Taiwan on hold could be explained away as a reaction to pressure from pro-China parties. However, since the last general election that excuse no longer holds, as the government has a majority.
Clearly, those seeking a relationship between India and Taiwan that parallels the relationship between the island and the South-east Asian tigers may need to wait until the Chinese leadership finally gives permission to South Block to engage vigorously with Taipei.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
The India in Indo-China
On a stone pillar in My Son, an ancient, now-ruined temple town in central Vietnam, is a long inscription in Sanskrit. It records that Bhadravarman, a king who ruled at the cusp of the 4th and 5th centuries, donated wealth to the nearby temple of Shiva. After declaring exactly what land and people were gifted, the inscription ends with a royal admonition:
If you destroy it, all your good deeds in your different births shall be mine, and all the bad deeds done by me shall be yours. If, on the contrary, you properly maintain [the endowment], the merit shall belong to you alone. I again declare... he who maintains, the merit belongs to him. He who does not maintain but destroys, will himself be destroyed.
My Son, unhappily, was heavily bombed and mined by the Americans during the Vietnam War, who surely earned themselves no merit by their deeds. The place is now a Unesco World Heritage Site drawing thousands of tourists, as well as restoration experts from Japan, Germany and Italy.
But not from India, says Geetesh Sharma, an elderly amateur scholar and Indo-Vietnam friendship activist. He has written a short, polemical book called Traces of Indian Culture in Vietnam (Banyan Tree, Rs 450), and in it he explains why it is almost certain that the Champa people of Vietnam — whose ancestors lived at My Son — have their roots in ancient south India. King Bhadravarman’s inscription above is from Sharma’s book, which also laments that official and scholarly India have so little interest in all this readily available evidence of India’s glorious past in a distant land.
The story of My Son is tragic but also impossibly romantic. Once known as Simhapura, capital of Amaravati, it had a long history as a power centre of the Hindu kings of what is now Vietnam. Sharma says, insightfully, that “It was due to regular worship, building and maintenance of more than a thousand years that MySon [sic] could retain most valuable remains of past architecture, sculpture and steles [stone pillars] that could not be found elsewhere.”
The last big temple there was built, says Sharma, by a Hindu king in the 1200s. After that, the town was abandoned and eventually swallowed up by the jungle. In 1898 — in what must have been a classic colonial explorer moment — My Son was rediscovered by a Frenchman. A few years later, French scholars counted 70 surviving temples. Now there are just 20, all of which have either received or still need restoration, and a host of scattered but imposing shivlings.
Sharma is right to complain: the Archaeological Survey of India should offer its skilled services, Indian researchers should be much more curious about the shared past of India and Vietnam, and Indian schoolchildren should be given the chance to learn much more about Indo-China, our cultural neighbour. After all, for the government’s ‘look east’ strategy to work it has to involve more than just trade, aid and military agreements. Ordinary citizens can be a powerful tool of international relations.
Ordinary people in Vietnam are already working to save this Indian heritage. Vu Kim Loc, for example, has set up a small museum for his important collection of Champa artifacts, especially jewellery and pottery. He has also co-written a book on Champa material culture — that is, all the things the Champas used and made — which weighs the Indian influence and speculates about how artisans and ideas travelled back and forth. All this useful work gets virtually no recognition or gratitude here in India.
“He who does not maintain but destroys, will himself be destroyed,” says king Bhadravarman’s inscription. In this case the phrase ought to be modified thus: “He who does not remember but forgets, will himself be forgotten.” In the long term, which is worse?
-
r_subramanian
- BRFite
- Posts: 255
- Joined: 17 Mar 2009 11:18
- Location: Australia
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Disturbing signs in a tolerant Islamic society
Indonesia's Islamic society is usually cited as a tolerant one. The news item quoted below (from the on-line edition of The Age published in Melbourne, Australia) talks of anti-Christian violence in Jakarta's satellite cities. The group behind the violence seems to have the backing of the military.
The report also states that the majority of the Christians affected are of Chinese origin. So, there could be a racial factor as well in the violence.
Indonesia's Islamic society is usually cited as a tolerant one. The news item quoted below (from the on-line edition of The Age published in Melbourne, Australia) talks of anti-Christian violence in Jakarta's satellite cities. The group behind the violence seems to have the backing of the military.
The report also states that the majority of the Christians affected are of Chinese origin. So, there could be a racial factor as well in the violence.
linkPerilous days for Christian churches on Jakarta's fringe
TOM ALLARD
July 24, 2010
A SURGE in anti-Christian violence in Jakarta's satellite cities, almost always unpunished, has exposed alarming new fissures in Indonesian society.
Over the past few months, churches have been stoned, burnt, closed or demolished in Bekasi, Bogor and Tangerang, cities that ring Jakarta and have witnessed an influx of migrants from across the archipelago.
The forces behind the attacks are Islamic hardliners widely believed to be led by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), a group with links to criminal syndicates and the military and a long record of attacking Christians, liberal Muslims and others who don't share its vision of a society ruled by sharia.
...
"We have written to the President, we have written to the parliament, we have written to the national police chief but none of them have given us a response", said Palti Penjaitan, a priest at the HKBP Filadelfia church in Bekasi that was shut down in January.
...
-
abhishek_sharma
- BRF Oldie
- Posts: 9664
- Joined: 19 Nov 2009 03:27
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
12 Muslims Fined for Malaysia Hindu Temple Protest
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/07 ... otest.html
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/07 ... otest.html
A Malaysian court Tuesday fined 12 Muslims and sentenced one of them to a week in prison for illegally protesting the construction of a Hindu temple and parading a severed cow's head.
Some of the protesters also stomped and spat on the head and made fiery speeches that deeply offended Hindus. The cow is the most sacred animal In Hinduism.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Such a shameRony wrote:The India in Indo-China
All this useful work gets virtually no recognition or gratitude here in India.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Vietnam hedges its China risk
As Vietnam and China celebrate an official "Year of Friendship" marking the 60th anniversary of diplomatic ties, Hanoi is quietly pursuing a balance of power plan against its neighbor to the north. The contours of the still-evolving strategy consist of developing a common position vis-a-vis China within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), engaging the United States and forging security ties with other key regional powers.
Asian allies
On the other hand, Vietnamese leaders have no qualms about partnering with Russia, a former Cold War communist ally. A deepening security relationship with Moscow now provides an additional hedge against China and has helped to modernize Vietnam's military, which is still largely reliant on Russian equipment dating from the 1970s.
Hanoi is now among Russia's top arms clients, including recently signed contracts for six Kilo-class diesel submarines and 20 Sukhoi Su-30 multi-role fighters. Later this year, Vietnam will take possession of two Russian-made Gepard-class frigates, and discussions are underway for Russia to build and help operate a new submarine base in Vietnam, possibly in the strategic Cam Ranh Bay.
India is another regional player finding common strategic cause with Vietnam. On July 27, the countries agreed to strengthen their defense cooperation during a visit by Indian army chief General V K Singh. New Delhi is wary of Beijing's efforts to extend its reach into the Indian Ocean. China and India also have a longstanding border dispute, which flared into war in 1962.
New Delhi and Hanoi share China-related strategic concerns and have enjoyed historically close ties forged from their common anti-colonial struggles. Both militaries also operate similar Russian equipment.
An ostensibly commercial deal could deepen India-Vietnam strategic ties. BP, which is raising capital to cover the cleanup costs of its oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, has put various of its global assets up for sale, including an investment in the Nam Con Son basin off the southern coast of Vietnam. According to press reports, Vietnam's government has given approval to a consortium of state-owned Indian energy firms and Petro Vietnam to buy out BP's stake.
Significantly, this large-scale natural gas project is located in an area of the Nam Con Son basin where BP announced in March 2009 that it would cease exploration in response to pressure from China. By turning to Indian firms less likely to be intimidated by Beijing, Vietnam is now strongly asserting energy rights in its 200-mile exclusive economic zone.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ ... 3Ae02.html
India scores high on pragmatism
By Simon Roughneen
India scores high on pragmatism
By Simon Roughneen
The main success of "Look East" "is clearly economic", with East and Southeast Asia now key trade partners for India, according to Amitendu Palit, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and previously an Indian Finance Ministry official. However, India's FTA is much more limited than the deal ASEAN signed with China, and India-ASEAN trade is growing from a comparatively low base. While the FTA is a milestone, it needs work, Palit said. "India needs to work with its eastern neighbors for improving trade facilitation and enabling greater export of services.'' Beyond economics, India has extensive defense dealings with Singapore, Australia and Japan, and emerging strategic relationships with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. As China rises, its nuclear and strategic relationship with the United States fits Washington's lurch from accommodation to confrontation, with Washington perhaps hoping to build up India as a hedge against China's rise in an act of old-school balance-of-power politics.
China's new port and pipeline facility on Myanmar's west coast will not only allow it to pipe gas from the Shwe field into its southern hinterlands, but will also involve Beijing building a terminal designed to pipe oil and gas shipments from the Middle East and Africa into China. This will allow China to avoid the need to send tankers through the heavily congested Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, where US naval power is likely to be dominant for the foreseeable future. Indian energy companies are investing in the Shwe field nonetheless, which is expected to generate almost US$1billion per annum in additional revenues for the Myanmar regime once it comes on stream. Myanmar is a lynchpin - or "arrowhead" - for the "Look East" policy as it represents the land bridge between India and ASEAN. The two neighboring countries sharing a porous 1,640 kilometer border across which rebel groups have historically crossed at will. Up until 1993, Myanmar's junta supported ethnic and leftist rebel militias in retaliation for India's pro-democracy, pro-Aung San Suu Kyi policy stance towards Myanmar. The policy has since shifted from moralism to pragmatism.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
After 60 years of independence and being a eastern nation - India is trying to build relationship with East!Prem wrote:http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_ ... 3Ae02.html
India scores high on pragmatism
By Simon Roughneen
The main success of "Look East" "is clearly economic", with East and Southeast Asia now key trade partners for India, according to Amitendu Palit, a visiting research fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and previously an Indian Finance Ministry official. However, India's FTA is much more limited than the deal ASEAN signed with China, and India-ASEAN trade is growing from a comparatively low base. While the FTA is a milestone, it needs work, Palit said. "India needs to work with its eastern neighbors for improving trade facilitation and enabling greater export of services.'' Beyond economics, India has extensive defense dealings with Singapore, Australia and Japan, and emerging strategic relationships with Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. As China rises, its nuclear and strategic relationship with the United States fits Washington's lurch from accommodation to confrontation, with Washington perhaps hoping to build up India as a hedge against China's rise in an act of old-school balance-of-power politics.
China's new port and pipeline facility on Myanmar's west coast will not only allow it to pipe gas from the Shwe field into its southern hinterlands, but will also involve Beijing building a terminal designed to pipe oil and gas shipments from the Middle East and Africa into China. This will allow China to avoid the need to send tankers through the heavily congested Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, where US naval power is likely to be dominant for the foreseeable future. Indian energy companies are investing in the Shwe field nonetheless, which is expected to generate almost US$1billion per annum in additional revenues for the Myanmar regime once it comes on stream. Myanmar is a lynchpin - or "arrowhead" - for the "Look East" policy as it represents the land bridge between India and ASEAN. The two neighboring countries sharing a porous 1,640 kilometer border across which rebel groups have historically crossed at will. Up until 1993, Myanmar's junta supported ethnic and leftist rebel militias in retaliation for India's pro-democracy, pro-Aung San Suu Kyi policy stance towards Myanmar. The policy has since shifted from moralism to pragmatism.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Malaysian 'Muslim' woman fails in bid to become Hindu
A Malaysian woman who was converted to Islam as a child failed Wednesday in a legal battle to change her religion back to Hinduism, in the latest conversion dispute in the multi-ethnic nation.
http://news.malaysia.msn.com/regional/a ... id=4256730
A Malaysian woman who was converted to Islam as a child failed Wednesday in a legal battle to change her religion back to Hinduism, in the latest conversion dispute in the multi-ethnic nation.
http://news.malaysia.msn.com/regional/a ... id=4256730
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
40,000 Indians 'disappear' in Malaysia, visa on arrival scrapped
http://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/40 ... cid-1.html
http://www.siliconindia.com/shownews/40 ... cid-1.html
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Wahabism is playing a big havoc in both Malaysia and Indonesia. Malaysia used to be a very progressive country couple of decades back. Mahathir Mohammed born to a malayalee muslim father and a malay mother effectively played religion and race card to hijack Malaysian politics. This badly polarized the society with everything reserved for Bhumiputera or sons of the soil. The rich and the connected Malays have used this to get rich quick. Chinese who control the business have done well. But Indians have been marginalized and sidelined. MIC which represents mostly Indians of Tamil origin has not done much rather the leadership has lined their pockets.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Interesting thing is modern Japan is taking responsibility for the actions of Imperial japan . This is a step in the right direction towards restoring Asia to Asians.
Koreans warm to historic Japan apology on colonial rule
My reason is Imperial Japan drank the Western racial superiority kool-aid and resorted to Western concepts of colonies etc and subjugated their neighbors. They believed the propaganda that they were the "Britain of the East" and such nonsense.
The misery of the WWII in Asia was a result of this brainwashing. Next they have to apologise to Chinese people for the invasions and the rest of the East Asian people.
Koreans warm to historic Japan apology on colonial rule
My reason is Imperial Japan drank the Western racial superiority kool-aid and resorted to Western concepts of colonies etc and subjugated their neighbors. They believed the propaganda that they were the "Britain of the East" and such nonsense.
The misery of the WWII in Asia was a result of this brainwashing. Next they have to apologise to Chinese people for the invasions and the rest of the East Asian people.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
ASEAN plus 6 nations approve $290 bil Asian development plan
$290 billion plan to integrally develop infrastructure in a region covering ASEAN, China and India, government officials said. The approval came at an unofficial meeting of economic ministers from ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, held in the Vietnamese city of Danang.
It is designed to build ground, maritime and air transportation networks, power stations and telecommunications facilities and develop energy resources in the Mekong basin, the Mekong-India corridor between Chennai, India, and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand zone and the eastern ASEAN comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Priority projects under the plan include airport construction in southern Vietnam, geothermal power generation in Indonesia and seaport expansion in India.
$290 billion plan to integrally develop infrastructure in a region covering ASEAN, China and India, government officials said. The approval came at an unofficial meeting of economic ministers from ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand, held in the Vietnamese city of Danang.
It is designed to build ground, maritime and air transportation networks, power stations and telecommunications facilities and develop energy resources in the Mekong basin, the Mekong-India corridor between Chennai, India, and Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand zone and the eastern ASEAN comprising Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Priority projects under the plan include airport construction in southern Vietnam, geothermal power generation in Indonesia and seaport expansion in India.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Antony’s South Korea visit to boost defence ties
The visit comes in the backdrop of reports of a massive Chinese military presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and a recent Pentagon report that details the Chinese build-up. “Antony was supposed to visit South Korea later this year but the fact that he is going now, so close after Krishna’s visit, indicates that there is some urgency in countering China’s military build-up by forging stronger military and strategic ties with South Korea,” said Rajaram Panda, senior fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Idsa). Since May, Antony has visited Oman and Seychelles and is scheduled to visit the US in late September and Vietnam in October as part of a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).
“Both the South Koreans and the Japanese are equally dependent on the IOR as their maritime trade routes run via the IOR. Considering the fact that India is the predominant naval force in the IOR, co-operation with India becomes inevitable,” Bhaskar said.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
Adding to what krisna has posted above, an excerpt from The Hindu.
A range of issues, including defence cooperation for peace and stability in Asia-Pacific and bilateral cooperation in Research and Development for manufacture of military equipment, will figure during the discussion between Mr. Antony and South Korea's top leadership.
Mr. Antony, who left here on Wednesday night, is accompanied by a high-level delegation that includes Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar, Vice Admiral R.K. Dhowan, Lt Gen. K.T. Parnaik, DRDA Chief Controller C.K. Prahlada, and Sundaram Krishna, Special Adviser to the Defence Minister. The delegation will visit some defence establishments, says an official release.
Re: India and ASEAN / East Asia
India, Korea sign pacts on defence training and production
The first MoU envisages an exchange of defence-related experience and information, a mutual exchange of visits by military personnel and experts, including civilian staff associated with the defence services, military education and training and the conduct of military exercises.
It also envisages an exchange of visits of ships and aircraft, as jointly decided between the two countries.
The Second MoU signed by the Chief Controller of Research and Development of DRDO, Dr Prahlada and Vice Commissioner, Defence Acquisition and Procurement Agency (DAPA) of South Korea, Kwon Oh Bong will seek to identify futuristic defence technology areas of mutual interest and pursuing of research and development works in both countries.
Co- development and co-production of defence products with Indian industry through DRDO are also envisaged.
"India and South Korea share common perception of maintaining peace as well as ensuring safety and security of sea lanes of communication in the region. He said regular exchanges towards ensuring maritime security is important to both countries, especially in securing vital energy supplies that pass through the Indian Ocean," said Antony.
hope there are regular visits by INS ships to asean nations along with trade and commerce."India is a founding member of East Asia Summit and as such, looks at the emerging architecture in East Asia as open and inclusive. 'That is why we welcome the decision of ASEAN Foreign Ministers to move towards the inclusion of the United States and Russia as members of the East Asia Summit," said Antony.