Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

[Prem]

Mission creep on the part of the United States could break open the levies. Consider the recent comments of former CIA Islamabad station chief, Robert Grenier:


“… as we work out with [the Pakistanis] a rough division of labor, the U.S., I believe, ought to be taking the lead in addressing the issues in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.”The excerpt is from an otherwise very reasonable set of comments. Grenier’s proposal would further dilute whatever waning influence Pakistan has in the region. Local actors would either become loyal to the new power broker in the area, the United States, or to a third party, rendering the Pakistani state irrelevant or an enemy.

The logic seems to be that if Islamabad has no writ in territory X, it has effectively lost sovereignty, giving a free hand to other parties to take action in the area. That, however, serves to reify or exacerbate Islamabad’s distance from the region. And the authority vacuum, a requisite for stability, can only truly be filled by Islamabad.

The loss of local assets, the weakening (at least) of the malik system, and the alienation of locals (via drone attacks), makes that impossible. FATA, in fact, could fall permanently out of the hands of Islamabad.

That, combined for the spread of violence into Pakistan’s cities (particularly Karachi) could accelerate the breakdown of the Pakistani state. Indeed, there is the potential for a 1,001 separate wars to go on simultaneously (given the ethnic and tribal differences, the proliferation of criminal networks, and the role of badal, or revenge, in Pashtunwali). Like Iraq, Pakistan would witness the flight of capital abroad (Amman certainly benefited from Iraqi expats); the departure of the haves (doctors, bankers, and other professionals) to safer shores, such as Dubai, London, and Canada; and leaving the country to the have nots. Middle class and poorer Karachiites would be left to fend off militants and criminal gangs (not entirely difference from today!). Karachi, I fear, would burn incessantly.

There is no alternative to strengthening the Pakistani state. Pakistan must be the predominant agent on the ground; a big part of that is the requisite training and equipment (e.g. nightvision goggles and communications). Establishing the rule of civil law, from Karachi to Khyber, is also essential. The use of drones should be limited. Consider that the cost of a Hellfire missile shot from Predator/Reaper drones is roughly the same as that of building a school in a Pakistani village. Given the danger posed to Westerners, development aid might be better routed through more expressly Pakistani entities/persons. And finally, the fundamental contradictions in the U.S.-Pakistan partnership must be ironed out. This requires the Pakistan Army to redouble efforts to root out al-Qaeda and other transnational takfiri terrorists. And it also requires the United States to come to terms with the fact that a great number of important Pashtun actors quite simply oppose its presence in their lands. Washington should let them know it is ready, in a phased and conditionalized fashion, to say goodbye.

http://pakistanpolicy.com/2008/11/25/to ... -pakistan/

[brihaspati]

"Thoughtful Hindus, by contrast, have no such problem. They don't rely on numbers but on consciousness, the secret weapon which will blow Islam away. Let the Indian Muslims "breed like rats":.... All that is needed to avert the catastrophe of a Muslim take-over, is that these numerous children of Muslim parents are properly educated."

This relying on consciousness does remind me of the descriptions about the companions of Kalki, brahmin warriors who are supposed to be armed with "brahmastra" brought into existence by pure "consciousness". It is this reliance on preaching and "change of heart" by "education" and an innate belief (which I take to be a secret fear of anything "military" or having to play a military role) that allowed wholesale slaughter of non-Muslims of India. This comes out of a complete failure to understand the basic driving forces behind Islam and the reason it continues to be attractive to a large proportion of males in any modern non-Muslim society facing increasingly complex social/technological forms.

Education can be effective only for people who "want to be educated". I have to teach professionally and I know that in practice, you cannot educate a person beyond what his/her culture permits except for a few rare individuals. The assumption here is that Muslim society wants its children to be "educated" in material that will ultimately weaken the very hold of "Islam" on these children. (You can try out Pakistani texts where "Oxygen and hydrogen" combine by the "will of Allah" into water). What is your policy going to be on the madrassahs or parallel "Islamic" education going on in private by Imams or Alims and the all-pervading Jumma sermon?

"It is a well-known fact that most South-Asian Muslims are the descendents of converts from Hinduism. As for the Turkish, Persian or Arabic components of the Muslim community, they too are the descendents of converts, be it from Buddhism or Zoroastrianism or some other Kafir religion. There is nothing intrinsically Muslim even about Arabs, who were the first victims of Islam. Islamic scripture itself is quite unambiguous about the terror which Mohammed and his companions used to pressurize the Arabs into joining them; and about the national Arab revolt against Islam after Mohammed's death, a war of liberation which they only lost because they did not resort to the same ruthless style of warfare which Mohammed had introduced. The people known as Muslims have walked into Islam, and they are bound to walk out again as well. Powerful as the conditioning of Islamic indoctrination may be, it remains a superficial imposition susceptible to the law of impermanence. That is why any solution which starts by assuming the Muslimness of the Muslims, is mistaken."

A hypothesis - a nice wishful one, no doubt about it. But has the author observed Muslims at close quarters? I doubt it. I have intimately seen and interacted with at least three levels of Muslim society and from four different regions of India. I agree that there are Muslims who were forced to convert under duress, or descended from forced conversions (under various forms, passive toa ctive) or as children of enslaved women. They probably remembered this only for the first few generations - after that the Islamic clergy ensured that they grew up in inveterate hatred of the "Hindu", and identified with everything "Arabic", the centre of the world being "Mecca". There are Muslims who secretly wish to come out of Islam, but their number is negligible. And more importantly they will only "come out" when they are sure that no retaliation from the "muslim community" can come - that is only when the Islamic theology-theocracy and Islamic society has lost all military power, its back so completely physically broken that it can never retaliate.

Just because cockroaches evolved out of something else does not necessarily mean they will evolve into something else automatically - it will not change by genetic and natural selection as long as it remains an efficient form for the environment it thrives in. The quoted simplistic hope represents a lack of understanding of why a particular social form can continue in perpetuity and is a kind of illogical version of Hegelian "hidden hand of history" assumed by Hegel (and to a certain extent by Weber) to be always directed towards "progress". There are practical reasons why Islam can continue in its retrogressive societal forms - especially in modern societies where technology and total amount of required knowledge to be absorbed individually to function efficiently and gain biological satisfaction is increasing at an accelerating rate. Under the given situation for a male not able to keep up with the rat-race for education, skills, facing increasingly independent control over their own bodies by women - Islam promises "easy" land, wealth, and women - unlimited "physical satisfaction" in life and death without the hard intellectual efforts needed to "shine" in modern technologically complex societies. I would rather not go into the reasons for women to get attracted towards Islam on an open forum as this can bring up psychatric discussion based on actual research that still may be uncomfortable for many.

[gandharva]

What is your policy going to be on the madrassahs or parallel "Islamic" education going on in private by Imams or Alims and the all-pervading Jumma sermon?

First you want to take out the trench of Hindu Dhimmies which is around there to protect the fort of Islam.

[ramana]

Guys, The subjects you are discussing dont belong to this thread. They should be in the Islamic extremism thread. Thanks, please continue there.

ramana

[vsudhir]

Very interesting onleee.... excerpts from a recent panel discussion in Dilli

Former diplomat and strategic thinker M K Bhadrakumar, however, expressed a different point of view. He pointed out that the central issue was not Barack Obama's political personality, but certain new realities in the international system. Evidently, the crisis in the US economy cannot be viewed as a cyclical recession amenable to traditional remedies such as monetary and fiscal policies or 'spending the way' out of the depression.

He pointed out that the US needs huge infusion of funds from outside, and China was the only real source available for that. He reminded the audience that China was finally becoming -- what World Bank President Zoellick once termed a 'stakeholder' -- in the international system.

This leaves the US with no option but to revisit the thinking behind the containment strategy towards China, which has been noted in today's discussion as a major impetus behind the US-India strategic partnership and the nuclear deal.

"The Americans may survive their closer relations with China," said Bhadrakumar.
He also opined that the nuclear deal has led to losses for the United States in the war in Afghanistan, as it had led to mistrust in Pakistan.

Bhadrakumar also believes that the war in Afghanistan will be the top priority for the Obama administration, as the outcome can well determine Obama's re-election bid. At any rate, Obama would want to avoid Lyndon Johnson's tragedy of inheriting a war that ended up consuming his presidency and destroying his political career, he added.

Given Pakistan's crucial role, Obama will be compelled to define its 'legitimate' interests. "At the every least, we should expect an even-handed US policy towards Pakistan and India. That is to say, another postulate behind the nuclear deal, namely, that the US is committed to make a great power out of India, may prove a chimera." He said.

Other panelists include Gen VP Malik, Lalit mansingh, and IDSA's Dr Surjit Dutta.

Link

[svinayak]

Very interesting onleee.... excerpts from a recent panel discussion in Dilli


"The Americans may survive their closer relations with China," said Bhadrakumar.
He also opined that the nuclear deal has led to losses for the United States in the war in Afghanistan, as it had led to mistrust in Pakistan.

Given Pakistan's crucial role, Obama will be compelled to define its 'legitimate' interests. "At the every least, we should expect an even-handed US policy towards Pakistan and India.

India may not survive the change in the International system including US China realignment.
India is again left out of the system unless India tests again. Testing will negate the new realignment between US and China in the new global economic order.

[Paul]

My post in geopolitical thread on sept 26,2008

SwamyG, you are right in saying the US and PRC economies are intertwined as PRC is the main supplier to US and buyer of US debt. However, I think if you look at the civilizational perspective and the sense of purpose the PRC leadership has displayed so far….they can be okay with incurring the loss of a few trillion dollars but will ensure they fill up the vacuum that the US may be forced to vacate. They can make up the money in a few years time but will ensure they will not let this opportunity pass by. US retreating back to the mainland and giving in to it’s isolationist tendencies will likely happen. The average American will have no interest in spending money to defend Taiwan at a time when his finances are in a mess.

PRC can jack up their price for supporting US debt – namely US withdrawal from western pacific, access to multilateral institutions etc. An arrangement like the one reached between England and the US in the 1920s where England had to cut down the size of the royal navy on US demand cannot be ruled out.

++++++++++++++++++

Added later, should the Chinese currency become a standard for global trade in the future along with Euro and dollar(which will likely lose ground in the future), the benefits for the PRC economy and heir prestige will be mind boggling.

and

Niall Ferguson is the first prescient analyst off the block in examining the effect of the wall street on US China relations (read his article in Standpoint mag). He contends China will be a prime beneficiary as a result of collapsing credibility of wall street institutions and it’s debilitating effect on the dollar.

Consequently the year when PRC is anticipated to overtake the US in GDP count has been moved up to 2027 from 2040. This will have grave implications for India PRC relations as PRC will seek to leverage it’s advantage in economic power into geopolitical gains. India will do well to relook at it’s defence five year plans and accelerate the induction of new weapon systems. For instance 400 aircraft for the Navy by 2022 will not be enough to hold the PLAN from bullying it’s way into the Indian ocean.

This article and the subject it is trying to address needs to be thought upon seriously by Indian analysts and leaders.

[brihaspati]

I think this is only focusing on certain factors, and not getting the global picture about PRC-USA dynamic. There are crucial intrinsic factors in the US side that will never allow it to leave the ground completely open for PRC. China's move to Indian Ocean has to go through the Pakistan corridor - the Indo-china area gives access to Indonesia but not a good access to the strategic South Asian and Indian Ocean naval arena. Getting access through Pakistan brings China much closer to strike at the Middle Eastern oil fields so crucial for the west. This also gets China closer in geopolitical proximity and therefore strategic military collaboration with Islamic countries like Iran - with whom China possibly has strong underhand relations already. USA loses the entire strategic plan if China gets Pakistan. In fact apart from the overt clause of "fighting Taleban" in Afghanistan, the main thrust in US policy can be found most consistently in pushing forward to exactly those areas that are important strategically to forestall Chinese "progress" - Afghanistan is strategically placed to block China's expansion into the middle East and linking up with Iran. Moreover part of the trade war which is in favour of China, can only be balanced partly by USA if it retains its military dominance on large parts of Asia.

Afghanistan will be the priority for any current and future US admin, but contrary to Bhadrakumar, I think US aim will be to strengthen its position in Afghanistan. This may not appear to be so formally, as there could be a show of scaling down of military presence by the US - but in reality western military presence will consolidate and extend into the Afghan government for a long time to come. Pakistan establishment understand this very well and their panic at the possibility of being cut off from their two main suppliers - China and Iran - has probably led to an escalation of "Talebani activity" in the grey zone of the north-western tribal belt. The US will deperately try to setup a "political" government in Afghanistan, but will not succeed. If Bhadrakumar is correct, US should try then to desperately leave Afghanistan handing it over to Iran and China. But this will not happen unless USA is militarily defeated. The USA also knows that had it not supplied SAM's to the Mujahideen, USSR would have very nearly won the Afghan war with its gunships. SAM's can only come from the defence industries of a modern well-armed nation - and to avoid the fate of the Red Army - USA has to prevent China and Iran to connect up in the North East of Afghanistan.

A third factor would be the presence of Russia in the area, and its possible alliance with China and Iran. It will be disastrous for the USA too. We should never look at the "finance" and the "military" as two separate "markets" - more so when the USA is apparently weaker in the finance sector it will use its military advantages to press bargains on the "financial" side. This implies not abandoning or relinquishing Afghanistan or Taiwan, or the Indian Ocean or the Pacific but increasing the grip on them further.

India in any case cannot always rely on outside powers forever into the future, but only in the short term. India has lost in the past because it did not have naval predominance in Indian ocean. But India actually needs to go into the Pacific, and strengthen relations with the non-Muslim countries of South East Asia, perhaps even think of not-highly visible military alliances with them. Relations and presence in the central Asian republics as well as Mongolia should be cultivated. What Pakistan is doing in Kashmir can and should be repeated for Tibet by India, as creation of Tibet is one strategic goal now more relevant to prevent Chinese expansion. And I will not be surprised if USA decides (after all these years of Cold War tomfoolery) to support formation of Tibet covertly if India agrees.

China has challenged US dominance, and USA will not rest until China retreats - we should never be fooled by the "apparent softness" of the USA towards PRC.

[chetak]

Chetak,
Do you think IM will accept this offer and not take shelter under the secular laws?
If they do they undercut the very divine decree , theological argument about their religion , complete way of life etc. The choice is same which Islam extend to kaffirs. Let this be the first step before " Means and Way" committe initiate other remedial methods. More Islam need to be givento Faithfuls so they can get taste of their medicine.

They will not touch the offer even with a bargepole..
As is their wont, there will be vociferous protests, loud protestations of their religion in khatra.
They will suddenly rediscover the virtues of the special Indian secularism.
Secularism works for them as long as they don't cross a critical mass in terms of percentage of the population. Then its only sharia!
The point is, why in a democracy, are we making so much accommodation for the "minorities".
Why are we made to feel guilty about their backwardness? Why are we responsible? Where else in the world are they so mollycoddled?
This is only because we have a remote controlled and motivated press and have allowed other countries to openly meddle in our family affairs. Why state control over only Hindu temples? and democracy for everyone else!
Inclusive growth, as defined by the minorities, means rob peter and jolly well pay paul. You cannot sit back and keep bleating "include me". Come, join the mainstream and put your shoulder to the wheel.
If only they are treated like they treat the majority in India, they are dead meat. But this will never happen because of our "culture"

Implement UCC and repeal Art 370 for a start.

Koi hai?

[NRao]

The End of 'Chimerica'

[Paul]

We need to go by the trends to make an educated estimate to see what the west's reponse will be.

UK giving up the pre-independent agreement between India and Tibet, the west's lethargy in combating looming threats - inability to fathom STalin's intentions in post WWII era, Bill Clinton's policy to make PRC the policeman of asia etc. shows that even if it is in the west's interests to restrict China's influence as much as possible, it will still take a few years to get it's act together.

It is in this period that India needs to make sure it does not end up as Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler's insatiable greed for territory.

[svinayak]

We need to go by the trends to make an educated estimate to see what the west's reponse will be.

UK giving up the pre-independent agreement between India and Tibet, the west's lethargy in combating looming threats - inability to fathom STalin's intentions in post WWII era, Bill Clinton's policy to make PRC the policeman of asia etc. shows that even if it is in the west's interests to restrict China's influence as much as possible, it will still take a few years to get it's act together.

It is in this period that India needs to make sure it does not end up as Czechoslovakia to appease Hitler's insatiable greed for territory.

It is not about trend but the actual relationship between China and the west in the last 200 years which needs to be studied.

[Paul]

Acharya, you need to explain that to Brishapati, not me.

[brihaspati]

Paul and Acharya,
I mentioned USA's interests in holding onto Afghanistan - and not the entire "West", the west may appear to go together in foreign policy but many times the Europeans are sort of dragged along to various degrees by the USA and there can be considerable divergence of opinions between the European partners. The Europeans in general have reasons to go soft on China, as recent estimates show that EU trade with China and the Middle East is nearly three times that of USA in certain vital sectors. The Europeans do not have the military muscle and the economy to back it up to face up to the costs of holding up China and freeing Tibet on their own.

It will however soon be clear about what I have written about real strategic considerations behind US presence in Afghanistan. They will retreat from Iraq to a certain extent, but they will virtually strengthen their position in Afghanistan - the key geo-politically to contain, Iran+China+Pakistan.

[Johann]

- With Afghanistan the perpetual headache remains - what to do with these failed states, and their populations which seem to be willing to shelter jihadis?

+ The US sees its role as guaranteeing the global market's (not just America's) access to the energy of the Persian Gulf. The UK was primarily responsible until 1971, and since then has only played a supporting role. Other countries like France are keen to participate, whenever occaisional US-French spats do not interfere.

Afghanistan in 1979 was seen as the last place to hold the Soviets before they broke in to Baluchistan or Iran, and the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf. Today Afghanistan, like Somalia or Yemen are simply too close to the energy producing centres of the world. Jihadi revolutionary contamination cant be allowed to spread and threaten the viability of the Persian Gulf, or North Africa, or Central Asia. While the level of of direct involvement may fluctuate with circumstances, that concern will remain.

+ Domestic Security and Law Enforcement in Europe sees the training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan no differently from their American counterparts. In the best case scenario, NATO forces intervention allow a functional Afghan state to emerge which can deny sanctuary to these types.

This was however precisely where the Soviet intervention (intended to be brief, like Hungary in 1956, or Czechoslovakia in 1968) failed - an effective Afghan state present down to the village level simply failed to materialise. However, Afghanistan was not seen as strictly vital to Soviet national interests - even in 1979, the Soviet General Staff resisted intervention, as did Yuri Andropov, the KGB boss. So a secret Politburo review panel was willing to call for withdrawal even in July of 1985.

If the Afghan state can not deny Pashtun areas to transnational jihadists, the West will attempt the next best thing - containment through alliance with those in and around. This may be no more effective than US and French efforts to contain Hezbollah since 1983 by cooperating with Israel, the Lebanese govt, and Hezb'allah's non-state rivals within Lebanon like the Catholic Maronites.

- America is a Pacific power, Europe is not. Hence the very different perceptions regarding the kind of challenge the growth in Chinese power presents. Taiwan really doesnt mean very much to them - on the other hand its a vital issue to Japan, and hence to anyone whose strategic security is linked with Japan's. Ditto with South Korea.

- American and European perceptions of Russia's nature diverge far less. The real difference is amongst European countries over just what risks are acceptable, and what are not in taming Russia. Germany, Italy and Belgium take the most dovish line, France and Turkey are in the middle, while the UK, Poland and other ex-Soviet satellites are on the toughest end.

[chetak]

- With Afghanistan the perpetual headache remains - what to do with these failed states, and their populations which seem to be willing to shelter jihadis?

+ The US sees its role as guaranteeing the global market's (not just America's) access to the energy of the Persian Gulf. The UK was primarily responsible until 1971, and since then has only played a supporting role. Other countries like France are keen to participate, whenever occaisional US-French spats do not interfere.

Afghanistan in 1979 was seen as the last place to hold the Soviets before they broke in to Baluchistan or Iran, and the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf. Today Afghanistan, like Somalia or Yemen are simply too close to the energy producing centres of the world. Jihadi revolutionary contamination cant be allowed to spread and threaten the viability of the Persian Gulf, or North Africa, or Central Asia. While the level of of direct involvement may fluctuate with circumstances, that concern will remain.

+ Domestic Security and Law Enforcement in Europe sees the training camps of Afghanistan and Pakistan no differently from their American counterparts. In the best case scenario, NATO forces intervention allow a functional Afghan state to emerge which can deny sanctuary to these types.

This was however precisely where the Soviet intervention (intended to be brief, like Hungary in 1956, or Czechoslovakia in 1968) failed - an effective Afghan state present down to the village level simply failed to materialise. However, Afghanistan was not seen as strictly vital to Soviet national interests - even in 1979, the Soviet General Staff resisted intervention, as did Yuri Andropov, the KGB boss. So a secret Politburo review panel was willing to call for withdrawal even in July of 1985.

If the Afghan state can not deny Pashtun areas to transnational jihadists, the West will attempt the next best thing - containment through alliance with those in and around. This may be no more effective than US and French efforts to contain Hezbollah since 1983 by cooperating with Israel, the Lebanese govt, and Hezb'allah's non-state rivals within Lebanon like the Catholic Maronites.

- America is a Pacific power, Europe is not. Hence the very different perceptions regarding the kind of challenge the growth in Chinese power presents. Taiwan really doesnt mean very much to them - on the other hand its a vital issue to Japan, and hence to anyone whose strategic security is linked with Japan's. Ditto with South Korea.

- American and European perceptions of Russia's nature diverge far less. The real difference is amongst European countries over just what risks are acceptable, and what are not in taming Russia. Germany, Italy and Belgium take the most dovish line, France and Turkey are in the middle, while the UK, Poland and other ex-Soviet satellites are on the toughest end.

Johann ji,
Sheltering jehadis is a paying business.
The unofficial economies of many of the smaller out of control / failed islamic countries seem to run off
the jehadi funding.
Given the feudal nature of such societies, dealing with a few warlords usually keeps the natives in line and makes for a more efficient and deniable hands off management strategy.

This loose system of funding does not come with any recognized or enforced accounting standards.
Why do you think that puppet regimes in pakistan and afghanistan are so eager to cooperate with the US despite the large scale opposition of the natives to the said cooperation?
Swiss and cayman island banks are a favorite of such puppets.
The writ of the afghan government does not run more than a few kilometers beyond kabul and some major cities. Karzai is fast reaching his sell by date. Non state actors seem to be gaining in strength.
The shortsighted and very narrow focus of the "all knowing" pakistani ISI is cramping everyone's style.
They ISI know of far too many CIA shenanigans to be easily bullied by the US.
The fear is that in attempting to coerce pakistan to do more on the war on terror, India might get dragged into the abyss by a short sighted Obama.
Pakistan sees the "war on terror" as a once in a life time chance to "deal" with India. Fat chance!
This thought is much removed from US and NATO objectives.
Obama may now feel the urge to sweep with a new broom, especially when advised by the poisonous and unpronounceable zbigniew brzezinski.

Russia has regrown big cojones under Putin, as georgia recently discovered and Europe has been forewarned.
May not be so easy for a weakened US to contain Putin anymore.
Europe sourcing energy from Russia has further gummed up the works for the US. Pacifist after WWII, they are not keen to court misadventure. US is a lone ranger by default.
We are in for some interesting times!

[chetak]

After the Mumbai operations,
I don't want to rain on anyone's parade but...

Surely the pakis knew that this operation would greatly help the NDA, especially the BJP, Timed as it is, so close to the elections. Sure, it may just be an incidental spin-off but nevertheless its advantage BJP now.
Genetically speaking, the congress has always been an implacable enemy of the pakis . They are privy to all of the pakis shenanigans since before independence. Many secrets from the muslim league and much more about chicaneries from england.
In actual fact, the congress has not given the pakis anything much after they came to power by displacing the BJP, or even since independence for that matter. Minor aberrations like MMS and sonia notwithstanding.
The porkies were very upset when the BJP lost the elections the last time around. Much easier for them to run rings round the inexperienced BJP than the wily congress. And since the BJP is seen as a nationalist party, its so much easier and much more credible for the pakis to extract an "out of the box' solution on kashmir, IWT, Siachen et al. They figure that the country is more likely to accept as legit, "national compromises" from the BJP rather than from any other party.
It was musharraf's constant refrain, litany and whine that India as a big brother should give away much more than smaller pakistan.

The congress, much as I would not like to accept the fact, is used to governing the nation.
THe BJP comes across as a bunch of inept old codgers in a hurry, who all fear that they have missed their place in the sun and that history will not remember them favorably much less acknowledge them. One foot in the grave, they see every chance as their last one. Eager to do good deeds, they are urgently in search of earth shaking opportunities.

They are all legends in their own minds and this personal yearning for greatness has been exploited by the pakis in the past. Recall the disaster (almost!) of Agra.

Note the sophistication of the paki attack on Mumbai, the meticulous planning, the great attention to detail and finally the ruthless and single minded execution of the project.

Apart from every thing else, would the pakis be scheming primarily to influence the forthcoming elections? bring the BJP back and using the new govt of obama to do irreparable damage to India's position on kashmir? and wrest it away?

[RajeshA]

X-Posted from 'Indian Response to Terrorism':

There is a need to decrease USA's dependence on Pakistan for supply route for US forces in Afghanistan and for Pakistani Forces on the Durand Line for support, if India hopes to get US help to destroy Pakistan.

After 7 years of NATO/US deployment in Afghanistan, the war has reached a stalemate. Maybe it is time for USA to rethink its strategy in Afghanistan.

o Make the enemy visible: As long as NATO tries to hold on to land in the Pushtun Areas, the Taliban will fight a guerrilla war, and NATO will be at a disadvantage. It is far better to let Taliban take over Pushtun Areas and form the administration in the towns and villages. Then USA can go into guerrilla mode and attack the Taliban, who will become more visible as they will have to take care of administration. In towns, where one can have more effective humint resources, it is much easier to track down the enemy. Also the drones and fighter jets can be used more effectively.

o Contain the enemy: This is one area in which the interests of all regional players (even Pakistan's) coincide. We all, i.e. India, Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, NATO and USA need to bolster the defenses of the non-Pushtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan, in which the Northern Alliance (now as Afghanistan Army) forms the nucleus. They need training, organization, weaponry (both heavy and light). These should really form the defenses of the region.

o Penetrate the enemy: Both US and India need a voice within the Taliban, some tribes that fight with the Taliban but have strong Pushtun nationalist roots, who abhor the Durand Line, and would want to cooperate with the tribes on the Eastern side of the Durand Line, to form an independent nation of Pushtunistan. Pakistan should not be able to exert influence of this very strong faction. We need such on both sides of the Durand Line. In return, we can see to it, that these tribes remain the strongest within the Taliban, and Pushtunistan.

o Redefine pressure on the enemy: Of course one goal of the Taliban should be to capture all Pushtun lands and unite them. Another goal should be that we should challenge the consolidation of those gains, and not the conquering of those lands. Landowners are far more susceptible to blackmail, who have something to lose, than fighting the landless, who have everything to gain. Only when the Taliban are landowners in Afghanistan, can one pressurize them to cough up OBL and AAZ.

o Give self more space: Afghanistan has a long held policy, that the Durand Line is illegitimate. The UN should also come to this view. That would mean, that Pakistani sovereignty in FATA will become disputed. One the one it will allow, US to carry out its drone attacks in FATA as and when they like (this time proven legally), on the other hand it will put pressure on Pakistan to show, that it really controls the lands through cooperation with NATO.

o Ensure alternative supply lines: USA and NATO should give the thought some real consideration, whether it will not be a better idea, to be supplied through Northern Areas, under Indian control, or some independent Baluchistan. It will be a far more durable arrangement, especially if the area is secured by Indian forces and Indian control.

It should begin in the UNSC or ICJ, where the legitimacy of Durand Line is contested, and India should provide Afghanistan with all help India can. UK's help here can be useful.

[renukb]

South Asia’s Deadly Dominoes
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/weeki ... ooper.html

WASHINGTON — The Mumbai attacks may have begun with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani guerrilla group known in the West mostly for its preoccupation with Kashmir. But by the time the crisis finally ends, foreign policy experts say, the fallout may have expanded to include the United States, NATO, Afghanistan and Iran.

President-elect Barack Obama during the campaign laid out an intricate construction for what might happen in South Asia with the right American push. He advocated increasing American troops in Afghanistan and pressing Pakistan to do more to evict foreign fighters and to attack training camps for radical terrorists along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Such actions, Mr. Obama said, would help prevent the Taliban and Al Qaeda from using Pakistani soil as a staging area for attacks in Afghanistan or on the United States or other Western targets.

Seldom did Mr. Obama mention or include India in his roadmap to peace in South Asia. During an interview with Time magazine, Mr. Obama did hint at trying to make a diplomatic push to mediate the Kashmir issue. But most of his South Asia focus has been on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The trouble, South Asia experts say, is that just about every issue in the region is somehow interconnected, and they all have a tendency to set each other off. The Mumbai attacks killed 163 civilians and members of the security forces, , and terrorized India’s most populous city for more than three days. But when the dust had cleared, “there was a lot more wreckage than just that,” said Teresita C. Schaffer, a South Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Strategically, the Mumbai massacres have brought into stark relief just how tenuous are American hopes for any kind of calm in Pakistan and Afghanistan, let alone victory over militant forces in the region.

Forget worrying about the hunt for Osama bin Laden along their shared border, and the battle against a resurgent Taliban. After Mumbai, it is suddenly all anyone can do just to keep Indians and Pakistanis from war.

“Step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created,” said George Friedman, chief executive of Stratfor, a geopolitical risk analysis company.

Mr. Friedman laid out a frightening domino theory of possible repercussions of Mumbai. Warning: it gets scary fast.

1. India’s already weak government decides it has to retaliate against Pakistan or risk falling.

India didn’t retaliate after the deadly bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul July 7. But many Indians view the Mumbai attacks the same way Americans viewed the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and the Indian government is under enormous pressure to retaliate, perhaps by bombing training camps in Pakistan. Seven years ago, when gunmen attacked India’s Parliament in New Delhi, the Indian government moved forces close to the Pakistani border and brought its nuclear forces to a higher alert level, prompting a similar response from Pakistan and an intense crisis between the two nuclear rivals. Since then, the Indian government has been more restrained. But you can’t expect that restraint to dissolve were a firm link between the Mumbai attack and Pakistan’s intelligence service to emerge.

2. Pakistan responds by withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, where they can fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban, to the India-Pakistan border.

Pakistan security officials have already warned that if the situation with India worsens, they will shift troops from western areas, and pointedly noted during a news conference that such a step would likely upset the United States because it would mean resources were being moved from the fight against Islamic militants along the Afghan border. The Americans have been pressing Pakistan for more military action against the militants, not less.

While part of Pakistan’s threat was “half designed to scare the daylights out of the United States,” part of it was serious, Ms. Schaffer said. “The serious part of it is, as far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, India is still the existential threat. If it looked as if India was going to take some kind of military action, there would be a re-deployment so fast it would make your head spin.”

3. Taliban forces, freed from having to watch out for Pakistani troops, are strengthened along the Afghan border; Qaeda operatives are more secure.

A resurgent Taliban that is freed from having to fight a two-front war will turn its full attention to American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Mr. Obama has already said he wants to send two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan, where violence has climbed — allied military deaths there have reached 267 this year, the most ever. The American military plan for the war in Afghanistan assumes some help from Pakistani troops on the border. It also assumes that the United States can continue to use Pakistan for logistical support for the Afghanistan war.

4. The United States’ situation in Afghanistan goes from bad to worse.

For the American military effort in Afghanistan to succeed, the Pakistani military needs to establish control of the lawless territory between the two countries. It is virtually impossible, South Asia experts say, to envision a scenario where American soldiers themselves could establish control of the border regions, with their mountainous terrain and a local population that is sympathetic to Islamist militants. So America is seeking a greater willingness from Pakistani leaders to go after Qaeda and Taliban operatives along the border; a Pakistani government that is distracted by a new flare-up with India would not figure into those plans.

5. Iran, watching Pakistan and India rattling their nuclear sabers, concludes that it is in a better position to insist on pursuing its nuclear program.

Mr. Obama has said he will do whatever he can to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, including breaking with years of American foreign policy and sitting down with Iran’s leaders, if necessary. But for decades, some Iranians have argued that their country needs a nuclear weapons capacity to match the influence of, or deter, neighbors like India, Pakistan and Israel — not to mention Russia and China. Foreign policy experts say that persuading Iran’s leaders to stop their current uranium enrichment program before it makes such a goal attainable would only get harder if they could point to a nuclear standoff taking place between Pakistan and India.

The Mumbai attacks, said Mr. Friedman, of Stratfor, “could leave Obama’s entire South Asia strategy in shambles.”

Turkish officials have stepped in to try to help, summoning Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, and Pakistan’s president, Asif Ali Zardari, to Istanbul for talks. A senior Turkish official involved in the talks expressed optimism that diplomacy could somehow avert a further ratcheting up of tensions in South Asia. Speaking on condition of anonymity under normal diplomatic rules, the diplomat said that the Mumbai terrorists “wanted to create a problem for the whole region, because they knew this could radicalize the population more.” But, he said, none of that has to happen — if the Indian government resists the domestic pressure to hit back at Pakistan.

“It would be too much,” he said, “to start a war just to keep a government in place.”

[brihaspati]

Mr. Friedman laid out a frightening domino theory of possible repercussions of Mumbai. Warning: it gets scary fast.

As if it is not yet scary!

1. India’s already weak government decides it has to retaliate against Pakistan or risk falling.

Was this the calculation Mr. Friedman, behind possible involvement of "free-spirits" like you, in the black-ops department from western agencies to help the Pakiban to mount this attack?

2. Pakistan responds by withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, where they can fight Al Qaeda and the Taliban, to the India-Pakistan border.

Assuming they were fighting anyway the Talebs - assuming that they do not risk losing their entire northern army deserting to the Talebs if they keep the army in the North - assuming that they have not already come to an agreement with the Talebs to turnover Pakistan completely into the hands of the Talebs.

Ms. Schaffer said. “The serious part of it is, as far as the Pakistan Army is concerned, India is still the existential threat. If it looked as if India was going to take some kind of military action, there would be a re-deployment so fast it would make your head spin.”

The key to undestanding what drives Pak - not willingness to liquidate Islamic terror - any more eye-openers as to what you are propping up Ms. Schaffer?

3. Taliban forces, freed from having to watch out for Pakistani troops, are strengthened along the Afghan border; Qaeda operatives are more secure.

Assuming that Talebs are not actually benefiting from the "contact" with the Pak Army - it is the Pak Army which takes all the supplies to them.

4. The United States’ situation in Afghanistan goes from bad to worse.

It was supposed to be bad anyways - should have remembered the fallouts of teaching the Jehadists how to fight modern western armies to prevent "Communism". Should have understood Islam sufficiently to realize the true agenda of Pakistan, and that it will inevitably come together with Islamic Jehadi forces all over the region to push for subjugation of the subcontinent under Islam.

5. Iran, watching Pakistan and India rattling their nuclear sabers, concludes that it is in a better position to insist on pursuing its nuclear program.

This is a good one - try to raise the spectre of Iran to muzzle India!

But, he said, none of that has to happen — if the Indian government resists the domestic pressure to hit back at Pakistan. “It would be too much,” he said, “to start a war just to keep a government in place.”

No of course not, Mr. Friedman - why should Indians no longer romantic about the true nature of Islam, start a war on themselves - trying to find out non-Muslim phantoms behind Islamic terror and taking it out on them to keep a US or Pakistani government in place and keep people like you feeding off the suffering of victims of never-ending ideologically sourced Islamic terror?

[vsudhir]

For the first time, moi heard western think tanks talking about the threat of biological and nuclear weapons in the same breath, emnating from Pak's stateless actors.

[svinayak]

South Asia’s Deadly Dominoes
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/07/weeki ... ooper.html

The Mumbai attacks, said Mr. Friedman, of Stratfor, “could leave Obama’s entire South Asia strategy in shambles.”

This is fallacy. Pakistan is the real problem. Without changing Pakistan no solution can be found.

“It would be too much,” he said, “to start a war just to keep a government in place.”

This is such a bogus psy ops. India needs action to protect itself. It is not about the govt or the ruling class.

[ramana]

Mr. Friedman of Stratfor suffers from head as*itis. He doesn't know which end he is talking from. And he is the best they have in the civilian side.

[SaiK]

We need SLAP to counter the real pakis.

State Less Anti-terror Power.

[Keshav]

We need SLAP to counter the real pakis.

State Less Anti-terror Power.

What are you going to do, arm the Sindhis?

[renukb]

Everything 'Hindu' has been changed to their convenience.... Now it is not even 'Indian'...but rather 'South Asia'

We are Hindustanis, British termed us as Indians and we simply take pride in it now. These times around, the Americans call us as South Asians! Why do Indians take this crap from outsiders? If things continue the same way, just like Pakis, even the Hindustanis will have no 'identity' left for ourselves.

Obama Says He Seeks ‘Strategic Partnership’ With South Asia
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= ... efer=india

By Edwin Chen and Viola Gienger

Dec. 8 (Bloomberg) -- President-elect Barack Obama said he wants to develop a “strategic partnership” with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan to help protect the U.S. and South Asia from terrorism.

“We can’t continue to look at Afghanistan in isolation,” Obama said in an interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press” program broadcast yesterday. “We have to see it as a part of a regional problem” that includes Pakistan, India and Iran, he said.

The broad approach, Obama said, must ensure that India and Pakistan normalize their relationship, even as their historic enmity is being inflamed as a result of the recent attacks in Mumbai by terrorists with ties to Pakistan. Both nations have nuclear weapons.

Obama ducked a question about whether India now has a right of “hot pursuit,” though he cited a “basic principle” that a country that’s attacked “has the right to defend itself.”

The president-elect, who takes office Jan. 20, reiterated his intention to quickly begin -- as “one of my first acts” -- a “responsible drawdown” of U.S. troops in Iraq.

Afghanistan, which harbored the al-Qaeda terrorist network before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. and is struggling against a resurgent Taliban, remains the “central front” in the war on terrorism, Obama said. It’s vital to continue pursuing al-Qaeda “fiercely in the years to come,” he said.

Effective Military Action

In addition to calling for “more effective military action” in Afghanistan, including additional U.S. troops and greater coordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops, Obama said new diplomatic initiatives are needed.

“We can’t solve Afghanistan without solving Pakistan and working more effectively with that country,” he said.

Obama also said the U.S. must “ramp up” efforts in Afghanistan to promote infrastructure development and combat drug trafficking.

“Our number one goal has to be to make sure” that Afghanistan “cannot be used as a base to launch attacks against the United States,” Obama said. “And we’ve got to get bin Laden, and we’ve got to get al-Qaeda,” he said, referring to al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.

On other foreign policy matters, Obama said he would “re- set” the relationship between the U.S. and Russia.

Russia has become “increasingly assertive,” especially toward Georgia and other neighboring countries, “acting in a way that’s contrary to international norms,” he said.

While there are areas of bilateral cooperation, such as combating terrorism and limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Obama said that “we also have to send a clear message that they have to act in ways that are not bullying their neighbors.”

Iran’s Nuclear Program

On Iran, Obama said he intends to “ratchet up tough but direct diplomacy” with the Islamic Republic and make clear that development of nuclear weapons would be “unacceptable.”

At the same time, he said, he would present Iran with “a set of carrots and sticks” in the form of economic incentives or tougher sanctions, in concert with countries that now do business with Iran, such as China, India and Russia.

Also on television talk shows yesterday, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Pakistan must take action with India and other nations against militants on its territory who may be linked to last month’s terror attacks in Mumbai.

U.S. officials have said early evidence suggests that the Mumbai attackers were tied to the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which is fighting to oust India from divided Kashmir.

Rice met with Indian and Pakistani leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad last week to urge cooperation between the nuclear- armed rivals in the wake of the attacks, which killed 163 people.

‘Not Acceptable’

Rice, appearing on ABC’s “This Week” program yesterday, said she told the Pakistanis that “the argument that these are non-state actors is not acceptable.”

“Non-state actors in your territory are still your responsibility,” she said. “This is a time when Pakistan must act. They must act in concert with India, with the United States. Great Britain is helping.”

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari said last week he is still waiting for “concrete proof” that the Mumbai attacks originated within his borders.

Rice said she has stressed the death of Americans in the attacks when discussing the issue with Pakistani leaders.

“It is a matter for our relationship,” she said on Fox. “It is a very serious matter that Americans were killed in that attack. When something like this happens, the United States expects Pakistan to act.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Edwin Chen in Washington at echen32@bloomberg.net; Viola Gienger in Washington at vgienger@bloomberg.net;

[Keshav]

renukb -

If you look at previous Obama statements about South Asia, you find very little mention about India at all. When he talks about South Asia, he is talking specifically about Pakistan and Afghanistan, not India.

This has been cited as a foreign policy flaw, as any problem in that area is bound to tie up India. He seems reluctant to involve India in a problem he feels he can clean up himself. Perhaps he is worried about a war between Pakistan and India. Could be apathy. Could be a way of continuing American dominance in that region.

[renukb]

Could be a way of continuing American dominance in that region.

This is what should be India's major concerns. This is our region. There should be no place for the US or any other western nations.

[svinayak]

renukb -

If you look at previous Obama statements about South Asia, you find very little mention about India at all. When he talks about South Asia, he is talking specifically about Pakistan and Afghanistan, not India.

This has been cited as a foreign policy flaw, as any problem in that area is bound to tie up India. He seems reluctant to involve India in a problem he feels he can clean up himself. Perhaps he is worried about a war between Pakistan and India. Could be apathy. Could be a way of continuing American dominance in that region.

ANy more war in the region will create many uncertainty and unknowns. US will have reduced influence in the outcome of the events and future course of history. They have put the seeds of course of history in the region for the past 50 years.
s

[Keshav]

ANy more war in the region will create many uncertainty and unknowns. US will have reduced influence in the outcome of the events and future course of history. They have put the seeds of course of history in the region for the past 50 years.
s

Maybe, maybe not.

With Obama pulling American troops from Iraq, he might just go back and strengthen the base in Afghanistan, since (as some have forgotten), there are indeed American soldiers fighting there.

Obama seems much less willing to use force than Bush, but doing a post-WWII Berlin style operation seems unlikely since the USA is in economic doldrums at the moment.

That could scale back any major operations in the area. I think for the time, it'll be more posturing and less action.

[R Vaidya]

Steps to Shock and awe the TSP's Economy

http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1212468

R Vaidya

[RajeshA]

R Vaidya,

great article, I was greatly heartened to see, that some of the non-military destabilization points, which I have been vigorously espousing in the "Indian Response To Terrorism" Thread found a place in your article. It does not matter to me, whether those points inspired you or not, I am just glad, they are there.

narayanan is also letting people know of a petition to stop US Congress funding of Pakistan.

Getting Pakistan declared as a state sponsor of terrorism by the US Administration, would go a long way getting their assets frozen, especially those of their Jarnails and so on.

R Vaidya,
I am simply delighted with your article. Keep up the good work, Sir!

[Rye]

http://www.istockanalyst.com/article/vi ... 44758.html

Uzbekistan closed borders with Tajikistan on Dec. 1

[Rye]

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008- ... 458029.htm

Ukraine and Tajikistan sign bilateral agreement.

[ShauryaT]

Steps to Shock and awe the TSP's Economy

http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1212468

R Vaidya

R Vaidya: Any reason you have largely limited the response to economic measures only?

[ramana]

they dont trigger useless discussion of redlines etc., etc... These are doable and within India scope and dont have to aks uncles and aunties.

[Philip]

Here's Bhadrakumar again and a roadmap to containing the Taliban/Pashtuns.
http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/10/stories ... 581000.htm

Pakistani military and the Afghan problem
M.K. Bhadrakumar

Current developments in the three-way equations involving the United States, Pakistan and India highlight that for the foreseeable future, they would need to factor in a “sleeping partner” — Afghanistan. India, in particular, needs to be cognisant of this strange coupling.

To be sure, the number 1 priority in the U.S.’s regional policy for the coming 4-8 years is going to be the war in Afghanistan. The Afghan war is a high stakes enterprise in the U.S.’s global strategies. Many profound questions are already intertwined, namely, the entire future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the 21st century, the U.S.’s containment strategy towards Russia, and indeed the efficacy of unilateralism and war as means of conflict resolution.

Yet, there are complexities, which surface fleetingly, but mostly remain invisible to the naked eye. First and foremost, in the present tense phase in Indo-Pak relations, Pakistani military has gently held out that it might be compelled into a redeployment of its nearly 100000-strong crack divisions from Pak-Afghan border regions to eastern border with India. The threat veiled in innuendos has been stunning, cutting deep into the geopolitics.

Simply put, the GHQ in Rawalpindi underscored that if it sniffed, Afghan war will spin out of control. One, all bets are off regarding what General David McKiernan, commander of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan, admitted a few weeks ago as “a shift in thinking at the senior levels in Pakistan that this [Taliban] insurgency is a problem that threatens the very existence of Pakistan, and that they have to deal with it perhaps in ways that they didn’t contemplate a few years ago…a willingness and capacity, although they have a long way to go to conduct counterinsurgency operations on the Pak side of the border.”

We need to factor what went through General McKiernan’s thought process this week. Preserving the Pak top brass’s “shift in thinking” and encouraging its “willingness and capacity” to cooperate with NATO forces will be Washington’s main diplomatic agenda at the moment. Quite obviously, it can’t be otherwise as 32000 American troops are currently deployed in Afghanistan and 20000 more combat and support troops are possibly on their way to the Hindu Kush in the coming weeks.

Two, Pakistani military is literally holding the jugular veins of the NATO as without its troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the alliance would be facing the spectre of the Taliban running berserk, which would bring on its trail more armed clashes and death and destruction for western troops. Three, over three quarters of the supplies for the US troops transits through Pakistani territory. The U.S. is unwilling or unable to use alternate Russian or Iranian transit routes. Four, in the absence of Pakistani military presence in the tribal areas, the US will be compelled to press its Special Forces into operations those badlands, which is fraught with frightening downstream consequences.

The geopolitical salient, therefore, remains highly complex. Simply put, the US cannot countenance a nasty Indo-Pak confrontation. The US and Indian interests and concerns at the moment are similar, though their priorities are dissimilar. Clearly, there are serious limits to U.S.’s capacity and willingness to exercise leverage over Pakistan. (Gen. McKiernan also admitted that U.S. and Pakistan militaries are coordinating on the Predator swoops over the tribal areas despite that being a hugely controversial issue in the Pakistani domestic opinion.) All in all, therefore, India needs to engage Pakistan bilaterally at the political and diplomatic level.

No doubt on that score. However, that isn’t all. A contingent of American “experts,” including a few who are distinctly identifiable as cold warriors of the Afghan jihad in the 1980s, have begun coming out of the woodwork lately. They advance the thesis that Afghanistan cannot be stabilized unless Pakistan’s security concerns vis-À-vis India are addressed, namely, the “core issue” of Kashmir, which the incoming Barack Obama administration should mediate. What motivates this melodramatic kite-flying is still unclear or who its real mentors are. There is the haze of a twilight zone with 5 different U.S. agencies – White House, Pentagon, CENTCOM, State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency – ploughing independent furrows toward a new Afghan war strategy. All sorts of wire-pulling and behind-the-scene manipulations are going on in the run-up to the incoming Obama presidency.

Fortunately, except for a few jingoists in our midst who pedalled the idea of an Indian military intervention in the “war on terror” in Afghanistan, we have all along understood that such a course would be an entrapment that would inexorably internationalise the Kashmir issue. Prudence, therefore, continued to prevail in our policy towards Afghanistan.

Indeed, the leitmotif of Pakistan’s Afghan policy has never been Kashmir. Instead, it always was and continues to be the unresolved Pashtun nationality question, which leaves the Durand Line a disputed border with over 8 million Pashtuns straddling it on both sides. To compound, the 100-year treaty, which brought Durand Line into being also lapsed in 1993. Let us remember that the Shah of Iran mediated on the issue, and it was much before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto got the then Afghan Islamist student leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to take up residence in Peshawar to carry out subversive activities against the Kabul regime. India had nothing to do with all this, though by the mid-1990s, we couldn’t take anymore the incessant bleeding engendered by ISI’s hostile activities from militant camps located on Taliban-controlled territory.

In short, unless Kabul recognizes the Durand Line, Pakistan will prefer a weak, disunited Afghanistan. When this entire co-relation is very obvious, the intriguing part is why influential "Afghan experts" – the most glaring is the article in Foreign Affairs magazine by two Pentagon consultants Ahmed Rashid and Barnett Rubin – still pedal the thesis that Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan is driven by its adversarial relationship with India over the Kashmir problem.

Conceivably, these “experts” are worried about Delhi’s Afghan policy in the post-UPA era and aim at rattling Indian nerves by holding out a “Kashmir card.” Or, they intend to pressure Delhi from coordinating with regional powers such as Russia, Iran and the Central Asian republics, which may undercut the U.S. objective of possessing the Hindu Kush as its exclusive geopolitical turf. Of course, Pakistan also stands to lose if a regional consensus on Afghanistan’s stabilization emerges.

Delhi needs to navigate choppy waters. The coming period will be turbulent when the Obama presidency settles in and Washington’s new Afghan strategy is yet to gain traction. What complicates the geopolitical manoeuvring is the underlying reality that Pakistani military remains petrified about Mr. Obama’s Afghan strategy. Mr. Obama subscribes to the Pentagon strategy the US military adopted in Iraq with success in vanquishing Al-Qaeda — “surge” coupled with “Awakening” of Iraqi Sunni tribes.

The Afghan variant of this “kinetic” strategy devolves upon bribing select Pashtun tribes to bear the brunt of the fighting against the large number of insurgent groups, which include the Taliban and the al-Qaeda. The move is controversial as it may let loose more violence and anarchy in the Pashtun tribal areas bordering Pakistan and will likely stoke the fires of Pashtun nationalism. Secondly, Pakistani military will be nervous about Mr. Obama’s tough posturing toward the Pakistani military’s doublespeak on the war — saying one thing and acting contrarily. Mr. Obama has threatened he wouldn’t hesitate ordering US forces move into Pakistani territory if the security situation so warranted.

A third aspect of the US strategy that makes Pakistani military extremely nervous is Washington’s game plan to rapidly build up a 134000-strong Afghan National Army as part of the U.S. “exit strategy.” The Afghan army’s officer corps is predominantly Tajik, who are more professional and motivated in fighting the Pashtun-dominated Taliban.

But, then, Tajik nationalism has always been an obstacle before Pakistani domination of Afghanistan – which largely explained the Pakistani ISI’s deep, irreconcilable hostility toward the late Ahmed Shah Massoud. If the NATO agenda of building up an Afghan army officered by Tajiks really gets under way, that will upturn the entire Pakistani agenda to dominate Afghanistan. As the former Pakistani Foreign Secretary Najmuddin Sheikh (who served under Benazir Bhutto) recently warned, “It would in fact be the realisation of Pakistan’s worst security fears.”

The unstated Pakistani fear is also that the Afghan Tajiks have cordial ties with Russia and Iran – and India. Thus, Pakistani military may need a Plan B, if Mr. Obama gustily plunges into the Pentagon’s new Afghan strategy. A viable Plan B will be based on finding an alibi to disengage from the “war on terror” so that the U.S. strategy doesn’t work, the present stalemate continues, and as the Taliban would say, the Americans keep the watch while time works in favour of the insurgents. India has to be on guard from being projected on to the chessboard as the Pakistani military’s alibi.

(The writer is a former ambassador and an Indian Foreign Service officer.)

PS:There can be NO tradeoff ,Kashmir for an elusive "peace" in the region! These worms and termites appearing "out of the woodwork" as MKB says have to be put down with extreme prejudice.Any US envoy,either Clinton or whoever,must be shown the fastest exit route out of India if they dare to braoch the subject.In the final analysis,India has to get of its ass and understand that we are at war,have been for two decades+ and need to plan and act to dismember Pak's pawns and pieces on the chessboard.No Nimzo-Indian or Queen's Indian defence required,The Ruy Lopez,Torre attack and hope that the enemy falls for the trap.

[ShauryaT]

they dont trigger useless discussion of redlines etc., etc... These are doable and within India scope and dont have to aks uncles and aunties.

In addition to economic measures, how about the following?

- Increased funding and discretion to RAW to gather intelligence and conduct disrupt activities of Jehadi groups in TSP through direct or indirect means?

- Increased capabilities of SF and enable cross border raids in plausible deniability mode?

- Increase contact and support for dissatisfied groups in NA, Baluchistan, Sindh & NWFP

- Increased funding for Afghanistan with boots on the ground

- Stop all people to people and political contact with TSP, until such time that terror apparatus has been dismantled

- Increased funding and training for internal security

- Increase funding for defense from 2.7% to 4% of GDP for 20 years (can be done without raising taxes)

- Adopt a string of pearls strategy to build pressure against China with assets in Taiwan, Vietnam, Mongolia.

- Change our nuclear doctrine against rogue states, and keep the nuclear arsenal mated

I do not think any of the above will cross any imagined red lines. It is important that India acts in a strong manner, which requires going beyond economic actions, UN resolutions and begging the US to put pressure.

Let us take this discussion to an appropriate thread.

[GopalVaidya]

Here's Bhadrakumar again and a roadmap to containing the Taliban/Pashtuns.
http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/10/stories ... 581000.htm

Pakistani military and the Afghan problem
M.K. Bhadrakumar

I feel that Bhadrakumar consistently overstates and distorts the issues. I am never certain where he is coming from.

Yet, there are complexities, which surface fleetingly, but mostly remain invisible to the naked eye. First and foremost, in the present tense phase in Indo-Pak relations, Pakistani military has gently held out that it might be compelled into a redeployment of its nearly 100000-strong crack divisions from Pak-Afghan border regions to eastern border with India. The threat veiled in innuendos has been stunning, cutting deep into the geopolitics.

This is an example of the overstatement. The threat of moving the divisions back would have very little impact on the Afghan war. It is actually engaged in a war against people who are mostly a threat to Pakistan (and NWFP in particular). It has really not taken on the major groups that are involved in Afghanistan. As far as calling them "crack divisions" is concerned, based on their performance they are more likely to be on "crack".

Two, Pakistani military is literally holding the jugular veins of the NATO as without its troops on the Afghan-Pakistan border, the alliance would be facing the spectre of the Taliban running berserk, which would bring on its trail more armed clashes and death and destruction for western troops. Three, over three quarters of the supplies for the US troops transits through Pakistani territory. The U.S. is unwilling or unable to use alternate Russian or Iranian transit routes. Four, in the absence of Pakistani military presence in the tribal areas, the US will be compelled to press its Special Forces into operations those badlands, which is fraught with frightening downstream consequences.

Since the supply lines pass through Pakistan, it would have a major impact. If the lines were to be closed, and US had to cutback down to say one third of the current level, they would be forced to consolidate and their offensive capability would be curtailed. Afghanistan would still not be a walkover for the Taliban. Instead, parts of Afghanistan would descend into anarchy. Pakistan simply lacks the necessary military, financial or administrative strength to maintain a client Taliban state. Besides, other nations such as Iran, Russia and Central Asian republics would also rush into the void as well.

However, most importantly, he is missing a major point. The real theatre for this war against terrorism is in any case Pakistan, not Afghanistan. Loss of Afghanistan would simply bring US and Pakistan into open conflict. Economic sanctions would follow. Pakistani exports into US and Europe would halt. Weapon deliveries would stop. Pakistan would have to ally much more closely with Iran which would have serious consequences to its relationship with Saudi Arabia. It is quite clear that Pakistan is not ready to pay this price. If it was, it would never have given up on its conquest of Afghanistan in the first place.

The geopolitical salient, therefore, remains highly complex. Simply put, the US cannot countenance a nasty Indo-Pak confrontation. The US and Indian interests and concerns at the moment are similar, though their priorities are dissimilar. Clearly, there are serious limits to U.S.’s capacity and willingness to exercise leverage over Pakistan.

Some times, it appears that this guy goes looking for complexity simply to arrive at the wrong conclusion. The current Indo-Pak confrontation has given US tremendous leverage. It helps India to the extent that there is a convergence of interests. Several US experts have said that a great opportunity to turn Pakistan around was missed in 2002 when US did not put enough pressure on Pakistan. That is one reason why you see concerted media briefings from India and US to lay the evidence in front of the world. So far, this has been a public relations disaster for Pakistan because the complicity of the Pakistani govt and terror groups has been exposed. Both India and US will and should obviously use this opportunity to force Pakistan's hand as much as possible. Of course, there is likely to be divergence between US and India on how far to go.

[RajeshA]

I feel that Bhadrakumar consistently overstates and distorts the issues. I am never certain where he is coming from.

In my analysis, M.K. Bhadrakumar is a man who strongly feels, that we, as Indians, are neglecting our Asian neighborhood and not consolidating our historical ties. He does feel that our security should remain anchored in Indo-Russian strategic partnership. He sees the Muslim countries to our West, countries like Iran, Turkey, Central Asia Republics, etc. as generally benign to India's strategic interests. He believes that our current terrorism predicament probably comes from our tilt towards the Anglo-American-Judaic Axis.

I do believe, that his views taken in isolation, do not capture the totality of India's strategic choices, but his voice does act as a balance to our head-over-heals rush into the American camp.

With our media becoming a pool saturated with pro-American sentiment, his voice is useful, especially as he presents not just idle ideological rhetoric but detailed information and a relative good analysis of the play-field.