Understanding the Great Game and role of India & Asian stability

[Jarita]

Ramana,
Would Japan not fall into the same boat along with South East Asia - Thailand, Laos, Cambodia?
Also interesting is that Burma is not within the radar of the Indian population.

And I suppose if we had POK we could put a pipeline through Afganistan

[ramana]

This is a redux of the pre 1947 plan where the Brits wanted to keep Balochistan to hedge their bets but then chnged their plans as they convinced of Pakistani fidelity to their interests.

Any docs on this.

What do you think of this map. This is gigantic vision
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KR7OjC3KKBU

The real Great Game is the fracturing of the colonial areas (~50) into the many states(~190) we see now, while the population went from 1B to 6 B.

Thanks Acharya for the insight. That Chindia (Hindu Buddhist borg) was a nightmare for the colonial powers. Now I understand the books by Sarakar et al about China written in 1900s.

It can still happen if the PRC commies get of their high horse.

[Jarita]

Ramana,
To your statement that India is the last outpost, where do countries like Japan and fall?
What I find most interesting abt Japan is that despite rampant Americanization like South Korea they did not face rampant evangelization.
Very interesting mindset from the days of the Shogunate

[Johann]

Ramana,
To your statement that India is the last outpost, where do countries like Japan and fall?
What I find most interesting abt Japan is that despite rampant Americanization like South Korea they did not face rampant evangelization.
Very interesting mindset from the days of the Shogunate

Taiwan and Hong Kong are much like Japan in that respect.

[Jarita]

Johann,I don't know much abt HK but Taiwan is hyper Americanized and very evangelized too. It's no South Korea but Chiang Kai-shek was a methodist and his wife was quite Americanized and evangelical.
Somehow I don't see Taiwan as anything but a chinese copy of US culture.
Can you explain? I may have missed something

[Johann]

Jarita,

Christians in Japan are 2% of the population. In South Korea, they are 25%

They are 4.5% of the Taiwanese population and in Hong Kong they are 10%

Taiwan with regards to Christianity is much more like Japan than South Korea.

Mind you both Taiwan and South Korea were Japanese colonies for over 50 years, while Hong Kong was British for 140 years.

[Jarita]

Johann,
I am not communicating it properly - I don't suppose you speak an Indian language
Question is not of religion. Russia is also Christian.
The question is of how they have lapped up western construct and culture hook like and sinker or whether they are a stand alone independent country and civilization or as a lap dog of the empire.
Japan is a nation with it's own thought construct and culture (similar to and influenced by India). Even if the Japanese PM is Catholic, his dominant identity is Japanese (hoping:))
Taiwan is not in the same position. It is no Japan/India or even Thailand - Unique culture and construct that has sustained civilization for 1000's of years.
The outposts of Indic type thinking are far and few now. They've mostly been taken down by communism/evangelism.
There is no such culture remaining in the western hemisphere.
In South America I have seen first hand the hatred for the original inhabitants (a bit like the ajlafs) and a poor copy of Americana.
Africa is really undefinable with the mess it is in. Europe is far gone. North America - the reservations are a joke.
The last remaining indigen civilization in the world is India and a select few Indian influenced civilizations.

[Johann]

Jarita,

You could try an Indian language or two and we can see how it goes

In any case, your English is fine. Your original point was clear;

What I find most interesting abt Japan is that despite rampant Americanization like South Korea they did not face rampant evangelization.

You seemed to be distinguishing between the modernity, the embrace of western popular culture, and the embrace of particular religions and their world views.

A good distinction to make, but Japan is hardly alone in that respect in East Asia.

Taiwan is not in the same position. It is no Japan/India or even Thailand - Unique culture and construct that has sustained civilization for 1000's of years.

That is a very sweeping statement.

Taiwan, like Hong Kong and Macao are the last outposts of Chinese civilisation since Mao's Cultural Revolution came in and smashed the past on the Mainland.

Daoism, confucian thought, ancestor worship, local deities like Kuan Yin, Buddhism are all very much alive, and continue to shape the way those people see the world.

The traditional Chinese approach to this variety was once aptly described as being 'like a buffet - you take what you like and leave the rest for others'. It isn't tightly tied to state structures (usually the monarchy) in the way it is in Japan, or Thailand, or Tibet, but that is traditional for China. That does not mean it should be denigrated.

The compromises they have made are no worse than those made by any living culture including those in the West, India, Thailand and Japan in order to benefit from the economic and technological promise of modernity.

It is the hang-ups about change that have condemned the Muslim world to such an unstable and marginalised position in the world today.

[svinayak]

Jarita makes a good point and his point of view is being increasingly recognized now.
Eastern cultures are making differences between Modernization and Westernization.

[ramana]

I think we have been oblivous of the Eastern Great Game.
A couple of posts from Paul and a link.

Stan, King Rama VI in the last century did the country great service by forcing the Chinese who were assailimated into accepting Thai culture. They had to take Thai surnames and adopt Thai way of life. Most of the Chinese in Thailand are from Yunnan province and at one time were 10% - 11% of pop.

BTW....Thaksin's origin got me thinking on the background of the Chinese population in Thailand and I did some googling on Thai Chinese in Burma/Thailand. It turns out that the civil wars in Yunnan in the 1930s had a major bearing on thailand and Burma border and to prevent the Kuo Mintang from getting diverted from fighting the Japanese (hint:Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1937), the British demarcated the Yunnan-Burma border and hived it from India. They lay also have wanted a buffer protecting India from the threatening thunderstorms in East Asia. Note that Caroe in his papers had referred to Burma as the easter buffer state. The Brits may have been using the Kuomintang as their proxies against Japan.

Yunnan province and PRC in those days was not very different from Afghanistan today with warlords fighting each other for boys and land. There is a movie "High road to China" with Tom Selleck with this background.

Looks like this is the key reason for hiving Burma from India in 1937 (same year Burma was separated from India)....this question was asked on BRF many times. will post links later.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

PS: Thaksin is basically a street fighter and has the sympathy of the chinese origin Thais. PRC has opened a new front in the proxy war to get to the warm waters of the Indian ocean. India better get over it's dhmmified shell and reach across Myanmar to secure it's interests soon or else....

and

Looks can be deceptive. The Yunnan-Myanmar border has a history of acrimonious dispute. There are rich opportunities for India for the picking here. Again, this is part of the reason why Burma was separated as an adminsitrative province from India (eastern buffer state).

Conclusion
Between 1911 and 1937, the Yunnan-Burma border comprised a warlord frontier. The Yunnan provincial militarists, Cai E and Long Yun, were at the forefront of the frontier dispute. Their handling of this critical foreign relations issue demonstrated their differing views on the role of the central government versus that of the provincial government and the emerging influence of provincial militarists on foreign policy issues. Long’s provincial administration crafted the only coherent frontier policy regarding the border. The Chinese Nationalist government simply lacked the political power to influence
this remote province and was preoccupied with other more pressing matters. As a result, Long sought to define the frontier in a manner designed to enhance provincial autonomy and his control over the province. The nature of this frontier dispute and the role of provincial militarists in foreign relations and frontier policy is also a frontier of warlordism. Warlords have consistently been seen to either be the lackeys of foreign imperialists or not involved in foreign relations. The history of the Yunnan-Burma border dispute challenges both conceptions. Some militarists did indeed have extensive contact with foreign powers. Those militarists who ruled frontier regions, like Yunnan, had to maintain contact with foreign powers in order to manage a number of issues important to the preservation of the individual militarist’s base of operations. And when it suited their purposes, provincial militarists actively opposed western encroachment. To do otherwise, would have conceded potential resources that were vital to maintaining provincial autonomy and thereby the militarist’s political survival.

McGrath File

See map on page 9 of 23 for the disputed border between Burma and China.

Note Uty of Akron has a Center for study of Great Game.

Wiki on Thai Chinese

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thai_Chinese

And an abstract of a Phd thesis unfortunately will not be available till 2011 from Uty of Exeter in UK.

Development of a Colonial security state

No wonder we are clueless about Burma and Myanmar.

[svinayak]

One gora recently was only talking of Myanmar. He was talking as if he knew Myanmar very well and its mil govt and social structure.
It is the target of a color revolution as well as a EJ revolution

[Paul]

The nationalist chinese led a resistance movement against Mao from the Yunnan-Burma border region till the late 50s. They were finally pushed out into Burma. The possibility of a kuomintang symapthies lurking under the surface amongst the Thai-Chinese and amongst the Burmese junta cannot be ruled out. In the movie "American Gangster" Denzel Washington visits a warlord in this general region to direct source afeem to the US.

PRC will be not be oblivious to this. Rather than a springboard to launch offensives in the IOR, this is another chink in the panda armor. No wonder PRC was worried about troubles in Mynanmar.

It may be worthwhile to look up the background of Burmese junta generals of Chinese origin.

[svinayak]

PRC will be not be oblivious to this. Rather than a springboard to launch offensives in the IOR, this is another chink in the panda armor. No wonder PRC was worried about troubles in Mynanmar.

It may be worthwhile to look up the background of Burmese junta generals of Chinese origin.

There may be joint coordination between PRC and Uncle on the junta.

[Paul]

Acharya, if we go by Shyam Saran's recent statement that entente is not holding still, the joint coordination for Burma may not be working out.

Reading the recent happenings...the recent noises being made in Beijing on Su Kyi's imprisonment, Thaksin ( thai version of Mulayam Singh Yadav) launching street battles against the Thai govt....indicates rather than joint management, there is a scrimmage going on in SE Asia.

[ramana]

Yes there are points of differences. We should not be misled by points of convergence.

SE Asia till Plain of Jars is Indic and we can reclaim that area it will make the PRC disengage from west of India.

If we bring up uncle everywhere it will lead to analysis-paralysis.

Ang San Su Kyii was first supported by India and then abandoned to West. Again the Generals of SLORC wanted Indian help to hedge against PRC hegemony. Again cold feet developed. Even now Burmese-Chinese have favorable view of India than PRC. Yet no dice because MEA thinks Westminister blessings needed for everything. Total self imposed well.
I do agree right after WWII there was apprehension in the region and stoked by UK and US that a resurgent India will claim old areas of Indian cultural presence and led to the ring of small puppies barking at confused Elephant. And an inward look by India.

But now after the fall of Asian Tigers and 2008 there is a need to recalibrate Indian foreign policy to align with evolving interests.

[svinayak]

Acharya, if we go by Shyam Saran's recent statement that entente is not holding still, the joint coordination for Burma may not be working out.

Uncle is keen on containment

Reading the recent happenings...the recent noises being made in Beijing on Su Kyi's imprisonment, Thaksin ( thai version of Mulayam Singh Yadav) launching street battles against the Thai govt....indicates rather than joint management, there is a scrimmage going on in SE Asia.

Rural thai from the North east are the main people agitating. Any specific thing to look for the north east Thai. Border?
They are accusing the thai govt not taking care of their local region. These govt have become private groups just like INC at home.

[Paul]

This was a good week for me....found a place for another piece of the puzzle that comprises "the great game".

"Why was Burma separated from India in 1937?" -

1. To create a buffer state to protect India from the eastern hordes. (Note: The Brits were anticipating trouble from Japan as early as 1937!!!! and they missed Pearl harbor??? too good to be true.)

2. They did not want the unsettled Yunnan-Burma border troubles from affecting the Jewel in the crown.

Answer: 1/2 or both!

Acharya, the Thai chinese may have nationalist symathies for China, but may not support the pRC wholesale. As usual, it is never yes or no. It is somewhere in between.

Ramana is right, it is better to leave the EJ angle out for the moment and first work on locl factors like Chinese diaspora's interests vis-a-vis PRC. Note: PRC and Chinese diaspora's interests are not necessarily the same, just as NRI and Indian govt objectives are not the same.

Jingos will do well to keep this nuanced difference in mind.

[brihaspati]

If Kuomintang sympathies are still lying somehwere beneath the skin, then Thaksin would not have moved against Taiwan so visibly (refusing visa to Taiwanese MP's). Thaksin and his group represents a rising Thai business establishment that profited from Chinese connections. So, the showing off or dusting off of "Chinese ethnic roots" fits in perfectly for the interests of both sides. China wants spreading around of "Han" ethnicity, and Thai businessmen who survived the 97-98 crash were the more successful sharks.

[svinayak]

Paul \This is for you.

Russia against India - 1900

http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-fr ... 946197D6CF

http://books.google.com/books?id=RhNpAA ... &q&f=false

RUSSIA AGAINST INDIA
THE STRUGGLE FOR ASIA
BY
ARCHIBALD R. COLQUHOUN
GOLD MEDALLIST, ROYAL GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY; FORMERLY DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BURMA ; FIRST ADMINISTRATOR OF MASHONALAND, AND SPECIAL CORRESPON-

[Paul]

Brishaspati, I will reply to ur post shortly.

Thanks
Paul

[Paul]

Acharya, if we go by Shyam Saran's recent statement that entente is not holding still, the joint coordination for Burma may not be working out.

Reading the recent happenings...the recent noises being made in Beijing on Su Kyi's imprisonment, Thaksin ( thai version of Mulayam Singh Yadav) launching street battles against the Thai govt....indicates rather than joint management, there is a scrimmage going on in SE Asia.

From STratfor...

China Will Make It All Better
May 26, 2010: Growing Chinese investments in Burma are being threatened by Burmese military operations against ethnic Chinese tribesmen (the United Wa Army) living near the Chinese border. An army offensive last year sent nearly 40,000 Wa refugees into China. The Chinese did not like this, and was not able to control the news (of ethnic Chinese being "oppressed" by Burmese troops). This details got out via the Internet and people texting each other. While that sort of thing is no problem in Burma (which has much tighter censorship than China), the Chinese want the Burmese to calm down. To that end, some senior Chinese officials are going to visit Burma, to work out these problems. China considers Burma a valuable ally and client state. As a political outcast to most of the world, Burma needs this Chinese support. There is an informal ceasefire between the Wa and the Burmese troops, but fighting could break out at any time.
In the north, non-Chinese Karen tribes, that had made a peace deal with the government, are now having second thoughts. Over the last two decades, the government has worked out peace deals with many of the northern tribes (that were never really part of "Burma", but were incorporated in British colonial Burma, which became independent right after World War II.) But these peace deals have not gone well, as there is not a lot of love between the ethnic Burmese and the tribes (who are a mixed bag of ethnicities.) So some factions of the Karen army are resisting the Burmese army once more.

As I said before, there are rich harvest waiting for to be reaped by India.

Thanks Acharya, In more ways than one Russian and Anglo-saxon imperialism are two sides of the same coin, one domantes the asian land and the other at sea.

[Paul]

Suggested reading on the background on China-Burma relations before we have more discussions on this subjects.
Southern China:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hakka_people
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yunnan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Army_in_India
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... ern_Yunnan

http://www.drugtext.org/library/books/McCoy/book/29.htm

Influence of the Chinese influx in WW II on drug trade in SE Asia
http://www.takaoclub.com/opium/postjapan.htm

The Kuomintang, after their defeat by the Communists in 1949, fled in two directions. One group, led by Chiang Kai-shek, escaped south from Shanghai and via Hong Kong to settle in Formosa (Taiwan); the other group, led by General Lee, escaped through Yunnan to settle in northern Thailand and Burma.
The intention was to retake China from Mao and the Communists in a two-pronged attack. This never took place, but the remnants of the army in Thailand developed the heroin trade. They were useful to the Thai government, and to the West, who were pleased to have a fiercely anti-communist and well-armed group patrolling the northern borders. They turned a blind eye to the heroin trade, which consequently expanded.


With CIA support, the Kuomintang remained in Burma until 1961, when a Burmese army offensive drove them into Laos and Thailand. By this time, however, the Kuomintang had expanded Shan State opium production by almost 1,000 percent-from less than 40 tons after World War 11 to an estimated three hundred to four hundred tons by 1962.

From bases in northern Thailand the Kuomintang continued to send huge mule caravans into the Shan States to bring out the opium harvest. Until 1971, over twenty years after the CIA first began supporting Kuomintang troops in the Golden Triangle region, these Kuomintang caravans controlled almost a third of the world's total illicit opium supply and a growing share of Southeast Asia's thriving heroin business.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Civil_War

After losing mainland China, a group of approximately 12,000 KMT soldiers escaped to Burma and continued launching guerrilla attacks into south China. Their leader, General Li Mi, was paid a salary by the ROC government and given the nominal title of Governor of Yunnan. Initially, the United States supported these remnants and the Central Intelligence Agency provided them with aid. After the Burmese government appealed to the United Nations in 1953, the U.S. began pressuring the ROC to withdraw its loyalists. By the end of 1954, nearly 6,000 soldiers had left Burma and Li Mi declared his army disbanded. However, thousands remained, and the ROC continued to supply and command them, even secretly supplying reinforcements at times.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li_Mi_(ROC_general)

President Chiang Kai Shek tasked him to rebuild the 13th army and defend his home province Yunnan from the communist attacks. In late 1949, he withdrew his army to Northern Burma and continued to fight against the mainland authorities. Although the Burmese government tried to suppress their activities, the nationalist troops defeated the Burmese National Army with relative ease. In 1954 Chiang Kai Shek ordered General Li Mi to withdrew from Burma, many Yunnanese in his army refused to leave and started the opium trade in the Golden Triangle region and many others became citizens of Thailand. General Li Mi retired from military service in 1954 and entered politics, serving as a member of the nationalist legislative chamber and party's central committee, he died in Taipei on March 10, 1973.

Brihaspati ji and Acharya, The CIA spend number of years trying to revive the Kuomintang resistance in SEAsia before giving up in the mid 60s. Shades of COntragate scandal for support to Sandinistas through drug money (Suggest watching "American Gangster" in a new light).

The drug trade in SEAsia and most of the chinese underworld activity is a legacy of the Chinese civil war. The present struggles in Burma is just the next chapter in this proxy struggle. The west probably has a number of hidden dormant assets that can be called upon to activation if required.

As I said before, SEChina probably looked not very different from present Afghanistan’s civil wars.

If Kuomintang sympathies are still lying somehwere beneath the skin, then Thaksin would not have moved against Taiwan so visibly (refusing visa to Taiwanese MP's).

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Santikhiri

The soldiers' war did not end after their own "Long March" from Yunnan to Möng Hsat in Burma's Shan State. The Burmese soon discovered that a foreign army was camped on their soil and launched an offensive against them. The fighting continued for 12 years, and several thousands of the KMT soldiers were eventually evacuated to Taiwan. When China entered the Korean War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had a desperate need for intelligence on China. The agency turned to the two KMT generals, who agreed to slip some soldiers back into China for intelligence-gathering missions. In return, the agency offered arms to equip the generals to retake China from their bases in the Shan State. The KMT army tried on no less than seven occasions between 1950 and 1952 to invade Yunnan, but was repeatedly driven back into the Shan State.[5] The ending of the Korean War in 1953 was not the end of the KMT's fight against the communist Chinese and Burmese armies, which continued on for many years, supported by Washington and Taiwan and subsequently funded by the KMT's involvement in the Golden Triangle's drug trade.[6]
.
.
.
The former soldiers had already settled down, some of them having married ethnic Chinese brides who crossed the border after the fighting stopped, and others having married local Thais. The old soldiers and their descendants, carry on their normal lives peacefully now, but still retain their Chinese identity; the main language spoken remains Mandarin. As of 2007, General Lue Ye-tien, aged 90 and Tuan's former right-hand man, is the leader of the group, after taking over the leadership on Tuan's death in 1980.[3]

Kuomintang remnmnts have moved on to more profitable ventures, but they are still there.

BTW…. Thaksin’s ancestory must be different as he is a Hakka Chinese. He is not from the Kuomintang group.Secondy, speaking of Thaksin's actions against Taiwanese MPs is like saying beacuse NWFP Chief minister is a Pakhtun, he will be looking out for Afghan interests in Pakistan.


This game is a lot more complicated to deserve such a simplistic explaination.

[Paul]

and BTW...Burma's creation as the eastern buffer state perfectly served the very purpose it was created for...to bog the Japanese army in a meat grinder campaign and prevent them from getting too close to the Jewel in the crown.

Had the INA been able to get to Assam and eastern Bengal, the revolutionary fervor would have spread like incendiary fire throughout eastern India in the 1943-45 period. They could have created an Independent state in this region with Shri S C Bose at the helm.

[Paul]

IOW...what happened in Afghanistan since 1979 is a replay of SEAsia drug business.

The western great game is a reply of the eastern game which started 20-30 years earlier.

[Paul]

Rural thai from the North east are the main people agitating. Any specific thing to look for the north east Thai. Border?

We may have a partial answer now! What are the PRC officials visiting Myanmar (or NE Thai, are they both Shan?) upto these days...vis a vis the remnants of the Kuomintang.

Are they being seen as an asset or a re-emerging threat?

[Paul]

Turning to Brobst again to provide answers...this time for Burma.

The potential trouble lies in the distraction from the eastern wing of the rimland system. The VSG argued that the Russian threat on India’s west so consumed British strategy that too little thought was given to the east. When the long-expected great power attack on India’s frontiers actually materialized in World War II, it came not from Russia through Afghanistan but from Japan through Burma. In the context of the Cold War, the
VSG’s erstwhile director argued that intelligence assessment must not find itself choosing between “leaving the Himalayas open to China and the Indian Ocean to Russian fleets.”

http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/events/conf ... Brobst.pdf

Applied to the current scene, the insight is surely
that the Islamist threat in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere not come to so define the morphology of future enemies that we are left surprised by say state-against-state competition igniting flashpoints in the eastern rimland.

Simila trends are seen in BRF to this day...

[Paul]

Facing Tough Choices
Comment by Igor Torbakov
Special to Russia Profile
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Kyrgyzstan: a Perfect Storm, By Roland Oliphant

A Ticket to Silicon Valley, Comment by Irina Aervitz

A Double Dose of Espionage, By Tom Balmforth

For Local Use Only, By Svetlana Kononova




Fighting His Corner
Kyrgyzstan: a Perfect Storm
Poppy Diplomacy
Flexible Friends
The Summit
Saakashvili’s Second Spring
White Russian Supremacy
Breakaway Democracy
A Double Dose of Espionage
An Unaccustomed Union
Russia Is Facing a Post Imperial Crisis in Central Asia That it Can’t Ignore

The ongoing turmoil in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan – the worst violence to hit the country since independence – underscores the rise of instability in strategically located Central Asia. The Kyrgyz crisis also highlights the difficult choice Russia will have to make: whether it should or should not intervene to help settle the flaring conflict.

The turbulent events in Kyrgyzstan, touched off by the toppling of the clannish and corrupt government of Kurmanbek Bakiev in April, demonstrate just how volatile the local authoritarian regimes are – they appear to be still going through the tortuous period of post-imperial readjustment almost 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

But Russia is also haunted by its imperial legacy. The fact that Russia was an empire for a major part of its history is something which cannot be emphasized enough. For a huge land-based empire, protecting its extremely long and often porous borders is a security issue of paramount importance. In fact, constantly expanding its outer periphery, absorbing new lands, and creating buffer zones is a set of policies that a land-based empire usually resorts to in order to make its vulnerable frontiers secure. This strategy was also a key factor behind the continental empires’ territorial growth: the same pattern brought Russia into Central Asia in the middle of the 19th century and has kept it there ever since.

Although, unlike the Soviet Union, present-day Russia is no longer an imperial state, the former continental empire finds it infinitely more difficult to disengage from its former colonies than maritime empires do. The interpenetration of the imperial metropole and colonial periphery is much more intimate and intensive in the first case. Even after the demise of the empire, territorial contiguity leads to a situation where many challenges presented by the former colonies should be seen and analyzed not only as phenomena exclusively pertaining to the sphere of foreign policy, but also as factors directly affecting the domestic situation in the former imperial center.

Russia’s principal concern in the region remains the preservation of the internal stability of the Central Asian nations. Any local turmoil that might potentially be caused by a botched succession crisis or the escalation of political confrontation, by resurgent Islamists challenging the region’s secular regimes, or by inter-ethnic clashes is going to be viewed by Moscow as a direct threat to Russia’s own stability and security.

Making stability their top priority, Russian policymakers are intent on keeping the local regimes afloat by trying to contain the advance of Islamic fundamentalism and prop up the region’s secular authorities. But these two sets of policies appear to run at cross purposes – Moscow is going out of its way to support those regimes which are, in effect, secular dictatorships pure and simple: they are clannish, corrupt, repressive and utterly averse to any kind of democratic reform. With their political base remaining very narrow and claims to legitimacy rather flimsy, the Central Asian regimes are potentially very brittle (as Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated in 2005 and again this year) – with the ever more alienated and impoverished populace becoming increasingly radicalized.

Yet Russia, fixated as it is on the struggle against “terrorists,” appears to be completely unprepared to deal with any kind of large-scale political turmoil caused by the rising popular discontent and the growing Islamization of the region. Arguably, the Kremlin finds itself in a trap of its own making: for Russia, the only way to make the region truly stable is to be able to act as an agent of change, as a force for genuine modernization, cautiously nudging the local authoritarian regimes to transform, democratize and broaden their socio-political base. But the nature of Russia’s own political regime effectively acts as a brake on this progressive kind of policy. As a result, Moscow is compelled to act rather as a conservative force, which seeks to forge ties with the local rulers and back up those regimes that appear to be geopolitically loyal to the Kremlin.

The repeated collapse of government in Kyrgyzstan (seemingly the “weakest link” among the region’s authoritarian regimes) appears to indicate that Moscow’s previous policies toward Central Asia have been deeply flawed. Now, as the death toll in Kyrgyzstan mounts and the number of refugees fleeing across the border into neighbouring Uzbekistan rises steeply, Russia is faced with a painful policy dilemma. As Russia has long been casting itself as the main provider of security in the post-Soviet space, the Kyrgyz crisis appears to represent a moment of truth of sorts when Moscow has to deliver. All the more so since the hapless leadership in Bishkek openly acknowledged that it had lost control over the situation and directly appealed to Russia for aid, asking for peacekeeping troops to be urgently sent in.

If Russia doesn’t step up to the plate, referring, as it recently did, to the crisis as an “internal conflict,” it risks losing face, prestige and the right to claim the leading role in the post-Soviet Eurasia. Yet finding the most appropriate way to intervene is not an easy matter. Given Uzbekistan’s wariness of any Russian move in the region, the Kremlin seems to understand that any deployment in Kyrgyzstan is conceivable only within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

However, if Russia does decide to get involved into the Kyrgyz imbroglio it will face different kinds of problems – not unlike those the U.S.-led coalition is currently grappling with in Afghanistan. After all, today’s Kyrgyzstan is a truly failed state: its interim central government is extremely weak, lacks legitimacy and depends heavily on external aid, while the impoverished population is suffering from a deepening economic crisis and is harassed by all sorts of local thugs, criminal kingpins and drug barons. On top of that, the country is divided along ethnic fault-lines – particularly in the southern regions where the sizeable Uzbek minority is concentrated. The continuing inter-ethnic violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan risks undermining the already precarious stability of the entire country and, in the worst-case scenario, the stability of the neighboring countries as well.

Given the stakes involved in any of the policy options, the choice Russia is facing is tough indeed.

Igor Torbakov is a senior researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

Russia's inability to put down the ethnic troubles in CA point to it's declining influence in CA. Again, before others jump in with their pop analysis of how China will fill in the coming void, bear in mind that this question applies to the caucasus as well. China is too far east to play a role here. Iran will look to recover it's lost influence there as a result of 1812 treaty of Tilsit. This struggle will play out between the traditional rivals Turkey and Persia. Crimea may also be open on the table for the scrimmage with the Slavs.

Basically, what happened in 1950s will Britian at sea is going to happen to Russia on the land. This will pave the way for the old powers of the 1200 AD - 1600 AD - Persia, Turkey, and India to reassert their influence. I would not overestimate the influence that the west may have on this struggle. Technology does provide an edge but can be blunted with demographics.

India I suppose will have to be content in the first few stages if it can get it's lost lands till amu darya back in it's backyard. This will open the next phase of the struggle where the old rivalry with the perisans will come to the fore.

[Klaus]

This will pave the way for the old powers of the 1200 AD - 1600 AD - Persia, Turkey, and India to reassert their influence. I would not overestimate the influence that the west may have on this struggle. Technology does provide an edge but can be blunted with demographics.

India I suppose will have to be content in the first few stages if it can get it's lost lands till amu darya back in it's backyard. This will open the next phase of the struggle where the old rivalry with the perisans will come to the fore.

So do you think India will be the prop against which Israel (Jews) as well as the Armenians rest and seek support from?

Judging from what you have said, this future tussle will have ethnicity as its main focus rather than religion or culture. Turkey will be the bulwark of the Turkic clans, Persia will look to assert the ethnic dominance it had during the days of the Achaemenid empire (it might even succeed in drawing the Kurds and Hittites to its side). Of course, India will not be making any particular moves based on the ethnicity factor alone!

In the above case, India might be the last refuge for dying ethnicities such as the Armenians. Although I find a long drawn struggle based on ethnic factors rather awkward (primarily because ethnicity pales as a conflict causing factor ahead of religion/territory/other social causes).

[Venkarl]

..India might be the last refuge for dying ethnicities such as the Armenians....

I am sorry that my post is completely out of context. After reading the above line in Klaus's post...just googled if there were any historic connection between Armenians and Indian during ancient times....found zenob's account on Hindus in Armenia in 4th century AD..its an interesting read..sorry if posted already..

[Kanson]

^ there are many Armenian Churches and streets named as Armenian in India.

[SSridhar]

There is a famous Armenian church and the Armenian Street at Parry's Corner in Chennai.

[Venkarl]

Sridhar Garu,

wtf are these folks talking here? Is there a thread on BRF disproving what is being discussed there?....as I don't believe in AIT...I find their discussions disturbing..should I ignore them as a bunch of white supremacy racists? sorry for hijacking this thread.

Thanks,
Venkat

[pgbhat]

^with stormfront do you really have to ask?

[Venkarl]

ok my bad ...I am so new to all this

[SwamyG]

While it is the nature of jingoes to want more out of desi leaders and desh, look at how some others see us:

Look at the nation of India. They produced an incredible, transformative leader by the name of Mohandas Gandhi. Yes, my discussion is overly simplistic, but you know your way around the Web to find more detailed articles. Gandhi not only brought political independence to India, but also gifted the world with his humane, non-violent philosophy. The result of his work made peaceful methods for co-existence attractive, mainstream. Of course, even though Gandhi brought political independence to India, they still did not have economic viability, which is equally important for prosperity and peace. That process took many more decades. But as India progressed in their ruling philosophies, so did the general attractiveness of their culture. Other nations wanted to emulate them. This is a critical element of soft power, i.e. using cultural mores to heal rifts. The natural, forward progression would be that through political, economic and especially cultural dissemination of ideas, peace would ensue. Here is a video of Shashi Tharoor, a member of the Indian Parliament, that so clearly outlines the benefits of soft power:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiTrl0W1QrM

Source: http://www.dailykos.com/storyonly/2010/6/18/124118/689

[Sanjay M]

Kyrgyzstan uprising: What is behind it?

Personally, I'm thinking that the collapse of multi-ethnic states in Central Asia would be a blessing in disguise. Think about it - if these states begin re-drawing themselves along ethnic lines, then the same will propagate to Afghanistan, which will effectively fragment it into 4.

Once the Pashtun rump state of Afghanistan is fully separate from the other former parts of Afghanistan, then Pak will face Pashtunistan pressures anew.

[RamaY]

^ This is not correct.

The current ethnic strife has its roots in Stalin's policy to mix different CAR ethnic societies by mass replacement and forcing Russian on them. After the collapse of CCCP the local ethnic populations are harassing the settler ethnic populations. Without govt (like Stalin) help such mass-scale replacement cannot avoid IDPs.

USA and NATO are utilizing these fault lines to harass/control Russia.

[chetak]

This was a good week for me....found a place for another piece of the puzzle that comprises "the great game".

"Why was Burma separated from India in 1937?" -

1. To create a buffer state to protect India from the eastern hordes. (Note: The Brits were anticipating trouble from Japan as early as 1937!!!! and they missed Pearl harbor??? too good to be true.)

2. They did not want the unsettled Yunnan-Burma border troubles from affecting the Jewel in the crown.

Answer: 1/2 or both!

Acharya, the Thai chinese may have nationalist symathies for China, but may not support the pRC wholesale. As usual, it is never yes or no. It is somewhere in between.

Ramana is right, it is better to leave the EJ angle out for the moment and first work on locl factors like Chinese diaspora's interests vis-a-vis PRC. Note: PRC and Chinese diaspora's interests are not necessarily the same, just as NRI and Indian govt objectives are not the same.

Jingos will do well to keep this nuanced difference in mind.

Paul saar,

Does the atom bombing of hiroshima and nagasaki by the americans form a continuation of this premise?

One bomb would have been more than enough with just the threat of the other to cool the japanese ardour. Why the deliberate(?) overkill?

The EJs normally follow, initially in the guise of medical and social services, after the army has established a beach head, so to speak. There was hue and cry in afghanistan on this issue sometime back.

This seems to be a set procedure in the case of american military campaigns, followed by considerable and select issue of refugee visas. There is a deeply synchronised and well oiled machine in operation.

[Sanjay M]

^ This is not correct.

The current ethnic strife has its roots in Stalin's policy to mix different CAR ethnic societies by mass replacement and forcing Russian on them. After the collapse of CCCP the local ethnic populations are harassing the settler ethnic populations. Without govt (like Stalin) help such mass-scale replacement cannot avoid IDPs.

USA and NATO are utilizing these fault lines to harass/control Russia.

Certainly, we all know about Stalin's mass deportations of various peoples hither and yonder, and the policies of demographic mixing, etc.

However, regardless of US/NATO intentions towards Russia, the fact is that India would benefit from ethnic reconsolidation in Central Asia, because this would trigger a domino effect that could lead to pressure for altering Pakistan's borders. Let these ethnic shifts then gather momentum, until they fall on Pak like an avalanche.

That's my point.

[svinayak]

^ This is not correct.

The current ethnic strife has its roots in Stalin's policy to mix different CAR ethnic societies by mass replacement and forcing Russian on them. After the collapse of CCCP the local ethnic populations are harassing the settler ethnic populations. Without govt (like Stalin) help such mass-scale replacement cannot avoid IDPs.

USA and NATO are utilizing these fault lines to harass/control Russia.

A friend of mine who used to trade in Khazakhstan, and all the stans (for 20 years) told me all the stories about this.
KGB is still powerful and they can keep most of the population under control. Under KGB interrogation everybody falls into place. This friend also was questioned when he went for visa. They asked him if he was a brother of Dev Anand.