Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby svinayak » 25 Jun 2009 23:25

ramana wrote:So what interests are served for TSPA to reveal all these (old hat) in times of Pakiban stress? To me it looks like the PAF is the TSPA target. They are being painted as a jihadi force. Why? Are they getting the drones for control?

TSPA is the partner of US govt and US military. It will make sure that all govt institution follow TSPA

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 26 Jun 2009 21:41

TFT Nuggets from TSP thread...

FATA warlords and their armies {Order of Battle}

Writing in Jang, Hamid Mir stated that in North Waziristan warlords Maulana Sadiq and Hafiz Gul Bahadar have 10,000 men under arms. In North Waziristan the Dawar tribe of Mir Ali sided with Faqir of Ipi against British Raj but accepted Pakistan in 1947. Town of Mir Ali is the centre of war against Pakistan after 2004. In Bajaur, Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Ziaur Rehman have 5,000 men under arms and are affiliated with Baitullah Mehsud of South Waziristan. Baitullah has warlords Maulana Tariq in Darra Adam Khel and Maulana Hakimullah in Khyber. In Khyber there is Mangal Bagh too, a protégé of the state in the past, with his army called Lashkar-e-Islam, but whose commander Namdar was murdered on orders from Baitullah Mehsud. In Mohmand, the militia of warlord Umar Khalid is responsible for attacks on Aftab Sherpao and Asfandyar Wali. In Orakzai, warlord Qari Shakil and his men are allies of Baitullah Mehsud. Opposing him are Shia Haideri Taliban. In Kurram there is a Shia Mehdi militia. In North and South Waziristan there are six important warrior groupings now united against Pakistan after the military operation.


Good breakdown of the Pakiban forces.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 01 Aug 2009 01:25

Book Review:TO LIVE OR TO PERISH FOREVER: TWO TUMULTUOUS YEARS IN PAKISTAN

TO UNRAVEL A COMPLICATED QUESTION


TO LIVE OR TO PERISH FOREVER: TWO TUMULTUOUS YEARS IN PAKISTAN By Nicholas Schmidle, Random House, Rs 299

“But what’s the problem with that place?” The question was put to Nicholas Schmidle on telephone by his grandfather, who, like so many of his fellow Americans, must have become aware of Pakistan ’s existence post-9/11. Schmidle was in Pakistan then on an Institute of Current World Affairs fellowship that required him to report and write on what he saw, and could have taken the question head-on. But he must have hung up soon. A long-distance telephone conversation wouldn’t give him enough time to explain Pakistan’s complex realities. In fact, even after having written 261 pages in small print, Schmidle cannot be entirely sure if he has provided “any answers” to what is wrong with Pakistan .

The best way to go about this book, however, is to stop looking for answers and take in Schmidle as he comes — without any compulsion to provide a linear narrative and without the sombreness that usually marks all discussions on Pakistan and its killing fields. Schmidle even manages to give a face to each extremist in that swarm of bearded men in shalwar-kameez. The infamous Abdul Rashid Ghazi, who led the Red Mosque insurrection in 2007, is said to have looked like Jerry Garcia, and Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, who has never been photographed, is a short man with large gaps between his teeth and a “goofy smile”.

The reason why most of the chapters in this book — many of them self-sufficient articles — work so well is because Schmidle layers his narrative. The unexpected breaks — to recount meetings with tribal and political leaders, his experience of street clashes or tribal rituals, to recollect student politics or rehash history — give no chance for monotony to set in. The dramatic two years — 2006-08 — which included a regime change, in any case, wouldn’t let that happen.

Liberal Pakistan versus the Taliban is only one of the many conflicts that the nation has survived. Pakistan’s current preoccupation, however, also overshadows other irreparable sectarian and ethnic divides that make it almost impossible for Pakistan to hold together as a nation — the Shia-Sunni conflict, the Pashtun-Mohajir or the Punjabi-Sindhi divide, or the recalcitrance of Baluchistan to cohere with the nation. Schmidle goes deep into each of these fissures to show how conflicting identities and histories have complicated Pakistan’s political journey since its birth. The more Pakistan’s State-building efforts have tried to smother identities, the more intractable each problem has become.

Take Baluchistan, which seems to be currently worrying India more than Pakistan. Its incorporation into Pakistan happened more by accident than by design. Over the decades, the Pakistan government has intensified the feeling of alienation by its neglect of the region, its ill-devised financial system and its ham-handed policy of dealing with insurgency. The same myopia has deepened other divides. In a society as polarized as Pakistan’s, Schmidle says that any political problem gets transformed into an ethnic one.

Schmidle also shows that these problems are never simple. For example, the Pashtun Awami National Party may have given up on its dream of an independent Pashtunistan, but its politics is grounded in the belief that “Talibanization” is a “neocolonial” attempt of the Punjabi elite (read the Pakistan army) to rule the Pashtun lands through religious proxy. And, yet, it did agree to a “deal” with the pro-Taliban Sufi Mohammad. Has the ANP given in to the Punjabi design then? In 2009, Schmidle himself might be groping for an answer to that question.

Schmidle invests a lot of time, energy and patience in unravelling the mystery behind the inexorable Talibanization of Pakistan. This takes him repeatedly to the smooth-talking Abdul Rashid Ghazi in the Red Mosque, deep into Waziristan, to the mountain abode of the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province, to witness their summary justice. To begin to do all this, Schmidle had to do a lot of homework. He started off by reading about the country, learning Urdu, and then donning the shalwar-kameez and travelling by public transport to far-off places or riding on local journalists’ bikes and hatchbacks to slums, madrasas and Taliban territory. Schmidle never forgets the dangers of being an American, although his hosts, sometimes the feared Taliban, often do. As Maulana Fazlullah’s military commander, Sirajuddin, put it nonchalantly, “You are our guest.”

In his wanderings deep into Pakistan, Schmidle finds a tribal society in flux — centuries-old tradition of governance was being replaced by the violent “sharia-rule” of the Taliban, which, nevertheless, answered the people’s need for prompt justice and order. The brash, impatient, new entrants into the game of religious and political one-upmanship were pushing out the previous generation of conservative leaders like Maulana Fazlur Rehman of the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam. There was no time left for the democratic games that Rehman once played under the umbrella of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal.

One man in a real hurry to seize the moment was Abdul Rashid Ghazi, the imam of the Red Mosque and Schmidle’s friend, who gave him the key to enter the radical heartland. Schmidle suspects that Ghazi became a victim of the cult he had himself created but he cannot help blaming the Pakistan government/army for forcing Ghazi’s hand. Schmidle’s grief for Ghazi is genuine, and in grieving the “death of a friend”, he manages to give a human face to extremists like Ghazi and to his own tribe — the mediapersons scavenging on Pakistan ’s disorder to make a name and career.

Despite Schmidle’s interest in the Taliban, he does not explore Pakistan’s intelligence agencies’ links with them, although he constantly hints at them. After Daniel Pearl, that is probably now too dangerous a subject. Schmidle’s discretion, however, does not prevent him from being hounded by the intelligence agencies. He is forced to leave the country end of 2007, and again, more dramatically, after a hot chase in August 2008. Schmidle’s nail-biting account of the chase in 2008, broken only briefly by his visit to the annual urs for Lal Shahbaz Qalandar, helps the book transcend political commentary and become almost a thriller. But even without this ‘epilogue’, the book would have remained an enjoyable read.

CHIROSREE BASU

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 06 Aug 2009 00:59

shynee wrote:Pukistan bans JuD, LeT, JeM
Among the organisations included in the list of outlawed groups are JuD, LeT, JeM, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariah Muahammadi, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Al-Akhtar Trust, Al-Rasheed Trust, Tehreek-e-Islami, Islamic Students Movement, Khair-un-Nisa International Trust, Islami Tehreek-e-Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Islam, Balochistan Liberation Army, Jamiat-un-Nisar, Khadam Islam and Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan.



Need to correlate this list to the comprehensive list that SSridhar put up to find out who are still sarkari fundoos.

Also what does ban mean? They can change name and everything is halal?

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 14 Aug 2009 02:33

X-Posted..
RajeshA wrote:More of the same for Baitullah's fighters by Syed Saleem Shahzad: Asia Times Online

Some analysts say the TTP, the main Taliban militant umbrella group in Pakistan primarily in conflict with the central government, will fall apart and that its various groups will operate as stand-alone outfits.
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) embraces militants from Afghanistan and Pakistan who have pledged their allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. They therefore call themselves Taliban, although they have imbibed al-Qaeda's Takfiri ideology, which means the state of Pakistan is Darul Harb (a place of war) and the Pakistan army, being an ally of the United States, is heretical.
The TTP does not have a formal infrastructure, such as a central treasury, arsenal or war room, despite this being reported by the Inter-Services Public Relations Department.

Instead, various warlords with independent resources and strategies work for the same cause and share the same ideology. Occasionally, they cooperate with one another.
The binding force between these various groups is ideology and it is possible that should Baitullah be dead, they will not select a new chief and work even more independently, but pledging Mullah Omar as their figurehead and al-Qaeda as their ideology. There is no chance Fazlullah will lay down his arms.

The fact is, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan is already a shadowy, loose nexus of essentially independent groups without too many formal structures and hierarchies. As such it is a difficult group to pin down, let alone destroy, and this will remain the case with or without Baitullah.


No need to worry.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby RajeshA » 14 Aug 2009 02:46

X-Posted from TIRP Thread

"Pakiban Tactics"

Guessing games over Taliban leader by Syed Saleem Shahzad: Asia Times Online
They quickly agreed that Abdullah Mehsud, who was injured when the security forces tried to rescue the engineers, would be declared dead. His comrades issued statements to the media that he had been buried in Shawal in North Waziristan.

He laid low for several months and the army did not move into the tribal areas. Abdullah Mehsud then continued his activities until he committed suicide last year after being surrounding by the security forces in Balochistan province.
Al-Qaeda used this tactic with Osama bin Laden when the US invested heavily all around Pakistan and Afghanistan to catch him after he fled Afghanistan in late 2001. By 2005, several special forces operations were close on his trail. At this point, he disappeared off the map, only leaving in his wake speculation about whether he was dead or alive.
Rashid Rauf, a dual citizen of Britain and Pakistan who was arrested in Pakistan in connection with the trans-Atlantic aircraft plot in August 2006. He escaped and went to North Waziristan. London was incensed and turned the screws on Islamabad, which in turn rounded up scores of Rauf's family and jihadi colleagues. In November 2008, news was leaked that he had been killed in a drone attack and the pressure was off. Asia Times Online is aware that Rauf is very much alive and kicking in North Waziristan.
with the drones buzzing around and the army almost on the march against him, Baitullah might have decided to simply take the heat out of the situation by disappearing, much as Abdullah Mehsud did.

Next time you are in Copa Cabana, look around and see if you can spot Baitullah!

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 24 Aug 2009 23:44

From Nightwatch on the rise of Hakimullah, 23/8/09


Pakistan: “The 42- member” Shura council of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) meeting in Orakzai Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas appointed Hakimullah Mehsud as the new leader of the group, the BBC Urdu service reported 22 August. The Shura also appointed Azam Tariq as the group’s spokesman. The acting head of the TTP Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, told the BBC Urdu via phone from an undisclosed location and insisted that Baitullah Mehsud had not been killed and was instead ill. :?:


The appointment of Hakimullah Mehsud as his successor is in accordance with the living will of Baitullah Mehsud. Mohammad added that TTP rivals Maulvi Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadir are also pleased with the appointment of Hakeemullah Mehsud. Mohammad also said that his group was ready for negotiations with the Pakistani government but that Islamabad was not in a position to talk because of foreign pressures.

Pakistani intelligence officials said on 23 August that the naming of Hakimullah Mehsud as the new leader of the Pakistani Taliban on 22 August is likely a diversion to hold the movement together, Reuters reported. An unnamed Pakistani intelligence official said that while the announcement by the Taliban was authentic, Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a shootout days after Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud was killed by a U.S. air strike 5 August. :?:

Another intelligence official said the announcement was aimed at buying time until one of Hakimullah's brothers could return from fighting in Afghanistan to take over leadership of the Taliban.

According to Dawn news paper, which also quoted Faqir Mohammad, the shura had 22 attendees. The vote was unanimous. Faqir Mohammad again became a deputy to the leader and remained the Pakistani Taliban amir of Bajaur Agency in Pakistan.

According to The News on 24 August, the shura to replace Baitullah Mehsud has not yet met, but plans to within the next five days. A Commander Wali ur Rehman in South Waziristan claimed he was the acting chief.

None of the stories are credible. The Pakistani government version about Hakimullah dying in a shoot out has the merit of consistency in that the government has stuck to its version all month. Nevertheless all parties are dissembling. The government is engaging in information operations to aggravate leadership rivalries in the insurgency. The insurgency is trying to project its leadership is intact and its membership is not in disarray.

The leader, if one is selected, might not be know before the end of Ramadan, which began Saturday. Two things seem clear: the name of the movement did not change, as Faqir Mohammad announced; the threat has not diminished. All the lads claiming leadership are as vicious and less well-mannered as Baitullah.

Note: One of the more instructive reports from the weekend was disclosed by the Pakistani Interior Minister who claimed that the Pakistani Taliban executed an unknown number of Baitullah Mehsud’s blood relations and relations by marriage because they spied on him and ratted his movements to US and Pakistani authorities.

The Daily Times reported “No new strategy was undertaken while hunting Baitullah. Agents pin-pointed the TTP chief’s position and the CIA took him out through a drone attack,” officials familiar with training agents for tracking down targets told Daily Times. “He (TTP chief) was simply not spotted through the powerful lens fixed on the drone, rather the complete set of procedures laid down for such missions was followed,” the officials said

A belt wrapped above an agent’s waist carries two electronic chips, the officials said. “The agent pushes the first chip when he finds himself close to the target to intimate the satellite, which transfers the information to the control-room. The second chip is pushed only when the target is present and the agent has moved to a safer place. That is what happens when the drone is positioned and Hellfire missiles are fired,” officials explained.

The Taliban confirmed they had executed a resident of Mardan on charges of spying for the CIA, one week after the August 5 drone attack. The killed man’s family said he had served Baitullah as his driver, according to the Daily Times.

The BBC carried the same story. In Mardan, a driver for Baitullah Mehsud was buried a day or so after the 5 August attack, but the news at the time reported he was killed with Baitullah Mehsud.



I think the TSPA killed the Mehsud's relatives and blamed it on Pakiban to aggravate the tensions.


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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby Satya_anveshi » 27 Aug 2009 01:22

The Taliban confirmed they had executed a resident of Mardan on charges of spying for the CIA, one week after the August 5 drone attack. The killed man’s family said he had served Baitullah as his driver, according to the Daily Times.


But but...wasn't Hakimullah the "supposed" driver of Baitullah, whose photo was shown so different in pakistan and in India? He seemed to the classic case of the non-existant one.

I have to hand it to ISI this time, going by the media, at the level of confusion they have caused in Taliban and the results they have produced.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 27 Aug 2009 02:02

New Delhi based IPCS on After Baitullah Mehsud

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby Paul » 30 Aug 2009 11:18

Manufactured History in SAAG.

Sent this letter in the feedback section:
Dear Editor:

This paragraph is factually incorrect:

"Even after the liberation of Bangladesh Pakistan today consists of Punjabi, Baluch, Pashtuns and Sindhis where the Punjabis dominate while the rest account for 33% of the population but 72% of the territory. Apart from the Baluch grievance that their natural gas is being sent out of Baluchistan by the Punjabis on unfair terms, Harrison reminds us that "prior to the British rule the Pashtuns had been politically unified since 1747 under the banner of an Afghan empire that stretched eastward into the Punjabi heartland up to the Indus River. It was traumatic for them when the British seized 40000 square miles of ancestral Pashtun territory between the Indus and the Khyber Pass, embracing half the Pashtun population, and then imposed the Durand line formalizing the conquest."

The British conquered this territory from the Sikhs. It was Maharaja Ranjit SIngh who wrested the territories west of the Indus in the present NWFP from the Pushtuns. It is incorrect of the author to credit this to the British.

Will Pakistan break up

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 27 Oct 2009 10:09


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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 26 Feb 2010 21:05

X-post...
Avinash R wrote:Top Taliban commander droned in North Waziristan
...
According to sources, Zafar, a former member of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, headed a group called Badar Mansoor. Most members of this group are believed to be from Punjab.

Zafar, who had a five million bounty on his head, had joined the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan just before the Pakistani army launched an operation in South Waziristan against the banned extremists outfit.
...


So Pakiban now consists of mujradeen* from Pakjab also.

*Sarkari jihadis from Pakjab. Term coined by Hari Seldon....


Shuras in TSP....

Quetta Shura may still prevail

ANI
Quetta Shura may prevail despite arrest of 7 of 15 top Taliban leaders
Fri, Feb 26 06:00 PM

Kabul, Feb. 26 (ANI): After the arrest of seven of 15 top leaders of the Quetta Shura, the Afghanistan Taliban may have come under intense pressure, but the formation of other such terror council cannot be ruled out, the Christian Science Monitor reports.

The Quetta Shura is said to act as a nerve centre for all of the Afghan Taliban's operations, formulating military and political strategy, appointing field commanders, and managing a shadow government.

The paper quoted two Taliban figures and Afghan intelligence officials as saying that a roster of experienced Taliban leaders awaits to take over the role of their arrested comrades'.

The Taliban's control over some parts of Afghanistan is so strong that even United Nation's World Food Program has to seek permission from the Quetta Shura to enter the region.

In addition to the top council, the Taliban relies on a number of other shuras to oversee the insurgency, the report says.

Mullah Abdul Qayoum Zakir, who was arrested in Pakistan's recent crackdown, headed two such bodies.

Like the top council, these two shuras are based in Quetta, Pakistan, and are responsible for military affairs in southern and western Afghanistan, including resistance to the ongoing United States-led offensive in the town of Marjah.

A third council is based in the North Waziristan town of Miram Shah, where insurgent leader Sirajuddin Haqqani directs the Taliban's operations in the southeast, according to former insurgents and Afghan intelligence officials.

Haqqani is considered one of the most dangerous foes of the Western forces, and has been behind a number of high-profile attacks in recent years.

A fourth shura, based in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, serves as the hub for Taliban operations in the eastern and northern parts of Afghanistan.

While the recent crackdown may put pressure on the Taliban, the movement has survived the loss of senior leaders before. (ANI)

ANI


Most likely the ops in Marjah forced the crackdown on the Quetta Shura to ensure a modicum of success.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby Paul » 26 Feb 2010 23:40

I was thinking in the morning while deriving to work about how there are strong similarities between path traced by the Maratha leadership , it's fragmentation after Shivaji's death but all branches offering resistence to the Mughal empire, and the AQ morphing into localized movement but not losing sight of it's global objective.

Will post more on this later....

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 11 Mar 2010 08:30

Source


Analysis: Interpreting tribal leaders of FATA —Farhat Taj

Anger against the Pakistan Army and the Taliban is intense and getting more intense with every passing day and so is disappointment with the government of Pakistan

I am compiling a list of the tribal leaders of FATA who have been victims of target killings from 2003 onwards. This is still a work in progress and my estimate is that the names in the final list would be well over 1,000. There is a widespread perception in FATA that the intelligence agencies of Pakistan have killed the tribal leaders through their proxies, the Taliban. Those who have managed to stay alive have either fled FATA or face grave security threats. The media in Pakistan have generally ignored them. The wider society in Pakistan never looks into their predicament. Sometimes, however, the media do interview them. But they cannot speak openly. If they do, they would meet the same fate as their assassinated colleagues. But still they open up their hearts through connotations. One has to be very sensitive and thoughtful to extract the real message from what they say in media interviews.

To our good luck, Khan has made it easy for us to understand what the tribal leaders wish to communicate. Let me first introduce Khan. He is a son of Pakhtunkhwa and has written a revealing book, Armageddon in Pakistan: The Crisis of a Failed Feudal Economy. I suggest to the readers to read this book for an interesting perspective on the root cause of the socio-economic problem in Pakistan and its linkages with the current insecurity in FATA, i.e. the crisis of feudal democracy and a feudal military. Following is an extract from the book in which Khan is interpreting the words of two tribal leaders from a TV interview. The interviews were recorded following a deadly suicide attack on a mosque filled with worshippers in Khyber Agency.

“The mosque blast was done through a remote control device by some external hand.” The interpretation is that he surely does not feel it was the US (India or Israel) since otherwise he would clearly say it. The vague phrase of an external hand implies that he may be eliminated in case he spells out the truth.

“It was to create chaos by the Americans.” This implies that he can be killed saying otherwise.

“Presently all the development funds for FATA are used only to bring death and destruction in the tribal areas.” In this he wants to say that the military establishment gets dollars from the US for FATA development and fills its own pockets.

“All people have left tribal areas, look at the refugee camps.” Here the tribal leader is cautious. He speaks of peace and justice before any development. He wishes to say that all the governments, both military and civilian, have brought death and destruction in the tribal area for the last so many decades and no peace or development.

“Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), the old colonial law for the tribal areas, still remains in place.” This is a criticism of all rulers, whether civil or military, of Pakistan.

“The representatives of FATA (in parliament) cannot do anything for their people.” This means all the people of FATA, including their parliamentarians, are helpless.

“FATA needs democracy; it should be in control of political parties.” Here he takes pride in his early history of tribal democracy in the form of the tribal jirga (assemblies). All this has been destroyed by the intelligence agencies of Pakistan and the Taliban through assassination of tribal leaders all over FATA.

“Almost 10 million people live in FATA on the border with Afghanistan, but Pakistan does not consider their problems as the problems of Pakistan.” Here he implies that the tribal people almost hate the military and all governments of Pakistan for all the misery they have been in, whereas the tribal people sacrificed all the time for the state.

We rebuked Nehru when he came to our region after the colonialists had left India, even then Pakistan does not care for us.” This implies that the military and the governments of Pakistan are not friends of the tribal people.

“Most attacks are on houses, most of the people dying in the war are innocent.” Here he is not referring to drone attacks, otherwise he would say it clearly without any hesitation. He means to say that the Taliban and the army are killing innocent people.

“Wherever the Pakhtun go, they take their culture with them. The Pakhtun working in the Emirates have more facilities, more education for children. We cannot have such environment for our children in the Frontier province and FATA.” This means he has seen the world and wishes that he could have the same development and peaceful environment in FATA. He considers himself next to none. He is angry that the tribal children could not have all these things in their homeland. He hates going away from his people. That is why he says wherever he goes he takes along his culture and would always like to speak in Pashto with his own people in other countries. All civil and military governments did nothing for FATA.

“We Pakhtuns are not terrorists. We like to show love and empathy; we are not the way we are portrayed; we wish other people would understand.” By implication, the propaganda of the establishment and pro-establishment forces that all Pakhtuns are against the Americans is being disclaimed here. Anger towards the Taliban and the military is shown here. The predicament is very painful for a simple tribesman or woman.

“Hidden forces are creating insecurity in people’s lives.” This means the Taliban and the military. Any vague phrase like this means truth cannot be stated for fear of his life.

The reason why I reproduced these from the above-mentioned book is to warn my fellow Pakistanis, especially in Punjab, to pay attention to FATA. Anger against the Pakistan Army and the Taliban is intense and getting more intense with every passing day and so is disappointment with the government of Pakistan. FATA may soon be doing down the path on which East Pakistan went and became Bangladesh. Pakistanis on the eastern side of the Indus remain obsessed with anti-Americanism and Indian and Jewish conspiracies. All this is nonsense for the people of FATA. They are sick and tired of the Taliban, the establishment’s abuse of their land for strategic aims and the apathy of fellow Pakistanis in Punjab, the biggest federating unit of Pakistan. Any eventual damage to the integrity of Pakistan in FATA will also be the responsibility of influential Punjabis in politics, media, academia and civil society in general, for they have criminally chosen to ignore the establishment’s atrocities in the area.

The writer is a research fellow at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Gender Research, University of Oslo, and a member of Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy. She can be reached at bergen34@yahoo.co

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 16 Mar 2010 01:46

Old news but very relevant....


L-e-T and J-e-M



Lashkar e Toiba, Jaish e Mohammad�
Author:
Publication: The Indian Express
Date: December 31, 2000


Introduction: �Muzamil Jaleel on the men behind the mayhem.

Death is the only aim of their lives. In fact, they celebrate death. Surrender is out of question and even security agencies admit it is rare to trap such militants alive. Unlike the local indigenous outfits, their agenda transcends the demand for right of self-determination or the creation of independent Kashmir. The pan-Islamic militants seem to have changed the course of insurgency in Kashmir.

First came the foreigners - the Pakistanis, the Afghanis and the Sudanese recruits - but the complexion of these groups is fast changing now. Both the main out fits, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are emphasising on local recruitments. In the 17 months since last year�s July 13 fidayeen attack on a Border Security Force camp at Bandipore, which led to the killing of the deputy inspector general two other officers, the involvement of local recruits in suicide attacks has increased.

In fact, the Jaish launched its activities in the Valley with a suicide car bombing at the entrance of the 15 Corps headquarters in Srinagar last May. The car bomber was a class 12 student, Afaq Ahamd Shah.

The fidayeen groups were introduced by Lashkar-e-Toiba (The Army Of The Pious) as a post-Kargil strategy of the militants against the security forces. In a statement issued during a three-day annual congregation of the LeT at Murdike, 30km from Lahore, soon after the war, Lashkar chief Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi said: �These fidayeen missions have been initiated to teach India, which is celebrating after the Kargil war, a lesson.�

The fidayeens, in fact, are a special squad of the Lashkar, kept for the most dangerous missions. However, they are not like the suicide squads of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE) or other guerilla outfits active in other parts of the globe. The fidayeens do not go in missions where death is certain, like ramming a truck filled with explosives or where the riders are clearly fated to commit suicide by consuming cyanide. As Islam clearly forbids suicide, the fidayeens typically select missions where they do have a chance, however slim, of returning alive. They have conducted around 25 sneak in attacks on various army and security force installations since last year in the Valley alone.

The parent outfit of the fidayeens, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, has emerged as the most powerful pan-Islamic outfit, especially after the recent sneak-in attack in the Red Fort at Delhi, where three army men had been killed. Though the security forces in Srinagar believe that the outfit has been active since 1993 in Kashmir, there is little in formation available about its organisational setup, background and ideology. The group operates discreetly. According to a senior security force officer, it is quite difficult to keep track of the Lashkar militants as they �use a set of code names. And when a militant dies, he is replaced by a new recruit with the same code-name,� he says.

LeT is the militant wing of the pan-Islamic organisation Markaz-e-dawat-ul-Irshad, which has its headquarters at Murdike near Lahore and runs around 2,200 madrassas and training centres across the country. The Markaz has a clear agenda. Starting with the complete Islamisation of Pakistan and Kashmir, they hope that Islam will finally dominate the entire world.

For this, the organisation established the Jamia Dawat-ul-Islam, or University of Dawat-ul-Islam, in 1989. Located on a four-acre campus, it imparts religious education and military training. According to an essay that appeared in the Lashkar mouthpiece Jihad Times last year, around �50 of the students of this University had died fighting in Kashmir.�

The jihad Times, a weekly focussing on the activities of the Lashkar and its parent organisation, the Markaz, is published from Islamabad and is edited by Abdullah Muntazir, Secretary (Information) of the group. The basic ideology of the group states that religion is not the private affair of Muslims and politics cannot be separated from religion.

Explaining the background of Markaz, Muntazir wrote that it was established as an anti-democracy platform by the clergy when General Zia-ul-Haq was in power.

Launched in 1985, Markaz rejects democracy as a western concept of governance which is full of flaws. As a corollary, it disapproves of all sorts of democratic means of political expression like peaceful protests, demonstrations and sloganeering as un-Islamic. The organisation is also averse to electoral politics in Pakistan and elsewhere.

In 1987, Lashkar-e-Toiba was launched by Markaz with an aim to take part in the Afghan war. The militants of the outfits fought against Russians in the Haji area of Paknea province along with the Afghan Mujahideen outfit Itihad-e-Islami of Abdul Rab Rasool Sayaf. This was before they turned their attention to Kashmir.

While the Lashkar-e-Toiba has made its presence in Kashmir felt for some time now, the Jaish-e-Mohammad is a much more recent organisation, launched formally from Masjid-e-Falah, Karachi on February 3. Founded by Maulana Masood Azhar (the man held responsible for IC-814 hijacking) soon after his release from Jammu Central Jail, the Jaish�s first attack on the Valley was the suicide car bombing outside the 15 Corps headquarters. A few days later, a 24-year-old British national, also a militant again blew up the explosive-laden vehicle he was sneaking inside the camp.

Azhar created the Jaish by bringing together his supporters from the two factions of the erstwhile Harkat-ul-Ansar, which was put on the list of terrorist organisations by the US State Department after the alleged abduction of five foreign tourists in 1995. The group managed to gather 300 Afghan commandos and launch its own training camps in Murri and Domana. The camps are led by Safdar Bhai and Kamran Ali, both veterans of the Afghan war.

Azhar, an ideologue, motivator and fund raiser of the pan-Islamic Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had earlier been arrested along with another top Harkat militant commander, Sajjad Afghani, from Anantnag in 1994. After several unsuccessful attempts to get Azhar out of prison, the Harkat was able to get him and two others - Mushtaq Latrum, a local militant commander of Al-Umar Mujahideen and Omar Sayeed Sheikh, a British national who was also jailed for kidnapping three foreign tourists, Miles Croston, Rhyes Partridge and Paul Rideout - out of jail. London School of Economics, had left London to join Harkat, and had carried out the failed kidnapping attempt to get Azhar out of jail.

Azhar, who hails from Bahawalpur, is the son of Allah Bakhsh Shabir, who runs a poultry farm. Azhar has six sisters and five brothers. The youngest, Jehangir Akbar, 23, is pursuing religious studies at a madrassa.

Both the major suicide attacks carried out by Jaish were car bombings, where the militant drove the explosive-laden car towards the entrance of the Corps headquarters and blew it up when challenged. The militant involved in the suicide car bombing on Christmas was a British national from Birmingham. The Jaish identified him as Mohammad Bilal, 24, a former college student in the UK. Born into a Pakistani family in Birmingham, he was supposedly a �nightclub going lad until he became a born-again Muslim at 18 after seeing the Prophet Mohammad in a dream.�

Bilal flew straight to Pakistan for training after joining the Harkat-ul-Ansar, though he went back to England briefly in 1995. According to the Jaish mouthpiece, Zarbi-e-Momin, Bilal, who volunteered for the bombing, �always aspired to martyrdom and God fulfilled his desire.�

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 26 Mar 2010 02:17

X-posted by Vivek_A.....
Militants in the Punjab: contradictions galore



TFT special report
The task of fighting terror becomes particularly difficult due to the presence of a provincial government which has failed to acknowledge the serious threat posed by these militant groups

The recent spate of deadly attacks in the city of Lahore , which killed 80 innocent civilians and injured more than 200 people, has once again demonstrated the presence of an effective militant network in the province of Punjab. At the same time, these attacks have exposed the tall security claims of the federal and provincial governments as well as the country’s intelligence apparatus. Despite an increasing number of terrorist attacks in the province, the Punjab government is unfortunately still in a state of denial regarding the existence of militant networks in the province.

Intelligence reports have identified two major militant organisations as the main culprits for the rising number of incidents of terrorism in Punjab. These include Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), an offshoot of the sectarian Sipah-e-Sihaba Pakistan, and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), which was created by intelligence agencies to fuel the insurgency in Indian-held Kashmir. Reports suggest that both these militant organisations are co-ordinating their efforts in order to attack sensitive areas in major cities such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad.

Intelligence reports have further suggested that the primary targets for these organisations are the security forces, military convoys, check posts and busy public spaces such as market places, universities, and bus stands.

What is of great concern is that there is a clear link between the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and these Punjab-based organisations which have often worked together in carrying out various terrorist attacks in Punjab. Examples of such coordinated attacks include the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore on March 3, 2009; attacks on the security forces in Multan; attacks on the Rescue 15 and ISI offices in Lahore in May 2009; attacks on Moon Market; Allama Iqbal Town Lahore; and most importantly, the attack on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in Rawalpindi in October 2009.

These militant organisations have been banned by the government , but continue to work openly as the Pakistani state fails to enforce its own laws. Even the leadership of these organisations is actively participating in political and recruiting activities , which reflects the inability and unwillingness of the Pakistani state in taking action against these militant outfits.

An example that illustrates the helplessness of the security apparatus is evident in the way Malik Mohammad Meraj was flown in from a jail in Punjab to the GHQ in order to “request” militants not to attack the security apparatus and to gain clues about the activities of the LeJ. In fact, the investigation into the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore last year has confirmed that the LeJ carried out this terrorist attack in order to put pressure on the federal government to release its leadership which is currently jailed in Lahore and Karachi.

That some of the main leaders of these militant organisations have been operating from Punjab is no longer a secret. Abu Zubaida, a top Al Qaeda leader, was arrested in Punjab in 2004. The sons of the fugitive Taliban leader , Jalaluddin Haqqani, lived in Lahore and were caught planning attacks in the city alongside a senior army official.

Another important figure in Al Qaeda, Sheikh Isa Misri (Egyptian) alias Qari Ismael alias Sheikh Arshad, who is ranked fourth in the FBI‘s list of most wanted terrorists, had been living and working in Lahore. He was an instrumental figure in setting up a coalition between Punjab-based militant groups, such as the LeJ and Al Qaeda. Recently, it was reported that Sheikh Misri has formed a militant organisation in Punjab known as Lashkar-e-Ismaeel with the stated aim of targeting the security forces for their co-operation with NATO forces in the “War on Terror.” He also merged eight different militant groups working in Punjab under an umbrella organisation. One of these groups planned the attack on the ISI office in Lahore in May 2009, while another one was linked to the attack on the GHQ office last year. Aqeel Ahmed alias Dr Usman, the mastermind behind the attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the GHQ, was also a member of one of these groups.

“The presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in Punjab should not come as a surprise. Many of them are working in Punjab and , who knows, maybe even Osama bin Laden also travelled to Punjab at some point in a different guise,” :mrgreen: claimed Khalid Khwaja, as ex-ISI operative turned Mujahid who has worked closely with Punjab-based militant organisations. “Only the ignorant feel surprised at the presence of Mujahids in Punjab” he asserted.

These examples do not stop here. There is a lengthy list of such examples, but the Punjab government seems to have buried its head in the sand. This state of denial already has had dangerous repercussions for those living in the province. According to the former police chief of Punjab , Shaukat Javed, militant organisations such as LeJ, JeM, Haraktul Ansar, Janadullah (working in Pakistan, mainly Karachi), and Harakatul Jihad-ul-Islami have organised themselves under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. “It is now clear that these organisations are responsible for most of the attacks on the security forces and civilian targets and they are planning on carrying out such attacks on a much larger scale in Punjab,” claimed Shaukat Javed, who was also a member of the Intelligence Bureau.

Despite these threats, the PML-N, which is known for having a soft corner for militant groups, has so far refused to acknowledge the existence of such organisations in Punjab. The recent controversial remarks made by the Punjab chief minister, Shahbaz Sharif, at Jamia Naeemia in which he “requested” the Taliban not to attack Punjab has exposed the reluctance of the Punjab government in undertaking tough measures against these banned groups. Apart from causing immense embarrassment for the PML-N for appearing to be too Punjab-centric, this statement also raises concerns on whether the international community can trust the PML-N as a reliable partner in its fight against extremist elements.

This is not to suggest that the federal government’s record in this regard has been any better, as it has also consistently denied the existence of terror outfits in Punjab, keeping its focus only on the TTP in the NWFP. The good news, however, is that the federal government has finally acknowledged that there is a strong network of militant organisations in Punjab that needs to be dismantled. Interior Minister Rehman Malik has publicly stated that terror groups in Punjab form the backbone of the TTP especially since the military operation in Waziristan. Contrary to this position held by the federal government, there remains a series of denials by the Punjab government. In fact, it has ‘condemned’ the statement by Rehman Malik and has tried to absolve itself from any responsibility by asserting that “terrorists have no territory.”

“A terrorist is a terrorist and he has no regional identity,” claimed Punjab‘s law minister Rana Sanaullah. He concedes, however, that all those who have committed terrorist attacks in Punjab have been affiliated with these banned groups. Yet, at the same time he claims that every individual who was once part of these banned groups cannot be termed a terrorist. “We are doing our best but we cannot arrest all members of banned organisations without any reason,” he said. Unfortunately, Mr Sanaullah failed to realise that the very fact that these organisations were declared illegal is enough of a reason to question those who are affiliated with such organisations.

The federal government has so far only concentrated on fighting terror in the NWFP and Balochistan. It is becoming clear, however, that the focal point of this war has now shifted to the province of Punjab where these militant organisations are consolidating their power. If the federal government continues to ignore the security situation in Punjab, not only will it create resentment in other provinces which have witnessed large-scale military operations, but will also jeopardise the security of the entire country.

The task of fighting terror becomes particularly difficult due to the presence of a provincial government which has failed to acknowledge the serious threat posed by these militant groups. However, we have no choice but to take on this challenge as not doing so would have dire consequences , not only for the province of Punjab, but for all 180 million people living in this country.
-----------------------
Doesn't make sense. Is he trying to say that TSPA's own irregulars(S-eS and all of their ilk) are turning on them in Pakjab? And blaming it on incapacity of PML(N) to govern in Pakjab?
It could be the sarkari terrorists are being used to destabilize the Sharif govt in Pakjab?

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby SSridhar » 26 Mar 2010 09:06

ramana wrote:Doesn't make sense. Is he trying to say that TSPA's own irregulars(S-e-S and all of their ilk) are turning on them in Pakjab? And blaming it on incapacity of PML(N) to govern in Pakjab?

It could be the sarkari terrorists are being used to destabilize the Sharif govt in Pakjab?


I have been thinking lately about how to make sense out of a seemingly confusing situation in the Punjab. Let me collect my thoughts and post here after some time.

But, I do not think that sarkari terrorists are being used to destabilize Shehbaz Sharif. For one, Nawaz & Shehbaz have played themselves into the good books of the PA in recent times. Kayani interceded immediately to restore the CJP after Nawaz started the Long March from Lahore to Islamabad last year. Shehbaz and Kayani have met secretly several times recently. After making concilliatory India comments early after the assumption of power by the democratic government, Nawaz has started mouthing anti-India statements. Shehbaz has gone many steps ahead and sees Indian hand in every bad thing happening in his province. All these should please the PA. The relationship between PPP and the PA, never pleasant even at the best of times, is particularly fragile now save for Gilani's efforts. Kiyani knows that politically, Nawaz holds all the aces today. With a remote possibility of frontally usurping power, Kiyani & Co can only hope for a backseat driving at present and would therefore need to be closer to the imminent Prime Minister, Nawaz. Besides, Shehbaz is close to Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) which holds quite a sway over LeJ & JeM.

I believe that if we look carefully at targets attacked in the Punjab, they are against federal interests, not provincial interests. For example, the Mar. 8 attack in Model Town on the Special Investigation Unit (SIU) of the Punjab police appears to be on provincial interests. But, they were interrogating people arrested for the GHQ, Pindi attack. The RA Bazar attack was in the Cantonment and directed at the PA. Collateral damage is inevitable and acceptable in the Cause of Allah.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 26 Mar 2010 20:37

Sankuji, Your questions are being explored here for ages. Dont just hang out in the TSP thread or you will not get the signals int eh noise over there. 8)

Sanku wrote:Folks; help me out with this one. Why are there terrorist attacks in Pakistan? I mean the question seriously.

As I see it there exists the following varieties of Inner Pakistanyat on display which I do understand.

1) General inner Pakistaniyat, admirable law and order, peaceful neighborly disputes.
2) Factional, Pure sunni's trying to spread the light to shia's, ahmadia's etc
3) General Sindhi, and Mohajir bhaichara with PakJabi establishment, pappi-jhappi etc
4) The TFTA FATA regions giving a warm welcome to the SDRE visitors from Pakjab etc.
5) Baloch's still trying to discuss the terms of treaty merging into Pakistan.

Phew, a long list for a moth eaten rag of a rentier state.

However, I do not understand who does all the IED mubaraks in PakJab, elevating hundreds of pure marital PakJabi to jannat ?

LeT, TTP, Hetmatyar?

What is their motivation? What do they want to achieve? (I understand what the these guys are trying to achieve when they do that sort of stuff in India, since they are so kind to call our media and explain exactly, taking great pains about it)

But why in purest part of the land of the pure bhai?

Just revenge and frustration? Or more? Any strategic goals or aims? Messages? Purpose?

I never really saw this discussed on BRF, so I ask.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby SSridhar » 27 Mar 2010 11:02

X-post rom TSP thread
abhishek_sharma wrote:One jab in Punjab —Salman Tarik Kureshi

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010/03/27/story_27-3-2010_pg3_2

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa has written in a recent op-ed piece that Shahbaz Sharif was so dumbfounded by the recent terrorist attack in Lahore that he was unable to hide his surprise at the jihadis “breaking their promise yet again”. Dr Siddiqa suggests that the PML-N struck a deal over a year ago with the terrorists, not to attack Punjab, in return for certain concessions.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby SSridhar » 06 Apr 2010 14:50

SSridhar wrote:I believe that if we look carefully at targets attacked in the Punjab, they are against federal interests, not provincial interests.


The Peshawar attack on the ISI's regional HQ, which resulted in its total obliteration, confirms my above hypothesis that the AQAM are carefully choosing their most important federal assets to retaliate.

It was not a simple attack. Two Vehicle Borne IED cars were used to breakthrough, followed by grenade & RPG attacks, shootouts that went on for several hours. Col. Imam's & Sq. Ldr Khalid Khwaja's arrests were in anger. Possibly, they have played a role too. In any case, it further helps to isolate the Quetta Shura.

Interesting developments these. To me, it appears that a powerful section of the PA (headed by Kayani & Pasha) have decided that the Taliban have reached the stage of 'diminishing returns' and they should no longer travel in their boat. The AQAM are retaliating.

We need to see how and which Punjabi components of the AQAM will do what now. LeT is a different kettle of fish, but we need to carefully see what JeM, HuJI, HuM & LeJ will do. These units are strongly identified with AQ & Taliban.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby Johann » 06 Apr 2010 22:05

When the PA allowed global jihad to set up shop in Af-Pak it was largely to tap its funding, and its ability to rally worldwide Muslim support to causes, and its IED expertise. The PA wanted to channel these benefits to the jihads that it supported in Afghanistan and India.

The PA has always tried to play a fine game here - to allow the local jihadis to have enough contact with global jihad to draw its support, but not so much as to attract the enemity of Western and Arab states (Al Qaeda's next biggest enemy).

The result throughout the 1990s was alternating between pressure and benign neglect of global jihadis. That became harder after Al Qaeda formally declared war on the US in 1998, and impossible after 9-11.

The PA can continue to direct terror to India, but is it in either ideological or operational control over the majority of jihadi groups in Af-Pak?

The problem the PA has faced is global jihad's ability to hijack its local jihads and jihadis and draw them towards global jihad. It has been steadily slipping away over the last 15-20 years.

Al Qaeda's ability to rally and recruit Pashtun and Pakjabi tanzims to the global cause means that Pakistan's desire to preserve jihadi instruments and avoid conflict with both them and with the US has been impossible. It has narrowed the PA's strategic choices, and its only going to get worse for them. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, etc *must* widen and deepen the conflict in order to match US pressure on the Pakistani state, and to draw the US deeper in to mobilise jihadi opinion and bleed America as much as they can. The salafi and deobandi groups in Af-Pak have a hard time saying no their brothers when the great kaffir America is clearly behind the PA's pressure, and the attacks on them and their brothers.

The Pakistani establishment will put off its choice for as long as it can, but the intensification of the conflict will bring them to a fork in the road - either come out and identify with global jihad, or turn on global jihad and all its local affiliates, including its jihadi clients.

The latter choice will no more mean that Pakistan is likely to reconcile with India than Hamas's crackdown on Salafi groups in Gaza means reconciliation with Israel. It just means the state will have to disassemble the local jihadi groups just to maintain strategic autonomy and control.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby RamaY » 09 Jul 2010 04:29

Who is "Punjabi Taliban?"

Read it away... http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss4.pdf

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby vic » 12 Jul 2010 20:21

It seems that Pakistan is supporting the Haqqani network for a long time. It is also belief is lot of quarters that Haqqani Network “is AlQueda” itself. Won’t that mean that Pakistan has medium term plan to take over the Crown of Saudi Arabia under the façade of Osama Bin Laden’s name?

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby RajeshA » 12 Jul 2010 21:20

RamaY wrote:Who is "Punjabi Taliban?"

Read it away... http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss4.pdf


You can't stop an idea whose time has come! :D

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 16 Jul 2010 20:16

X-post...

Has good taxonomy of terror outfits in TSP

SSridhar wrote:'Mission Impossible' in TFT
At last the Shahbaz Sharif-led Punjab Government has decided to crackdown on 17 banned organisations in the Punjab through special-purpose task forces in each district. Reliable sources suggest that the decision was made by the federal government while the resolve of the provincial government is half hearted.

The banned organisations include Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Jaaferia Pakistan, Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi, Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (previously known as Sipah-e-Sahaba), Khudamul Islam, (previously known as Jaish-e-Muhammad) Islami Tehreek Pakistan (formerly Tehrik-e-Jaaferia), Hizabut Tehreer, Jamiatul Ansar (formerly Harktul Mujahideen), Jamaatul Furqan (a breakaway faction of Jaish-e-Muhammad), Kherun Nas International Trust, Islamic Student Movement, Balochistan Liberation Army and Jamaatud Dawa.

Interestingly, Ghazi Force, named after Abdul Rasheed Ghazi, Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami (Qari Saifullah Akhtar and Ilyas Kashmiri’s group) and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan are not included in the provincial list despite reports by intelligence agencies that these three interlinked groups are playing havoc in the Punjab.

There are other problems with the so-called crackdown as well. Most of the targeted 17 organisations are highly active under new names. Allama Sajid Naqvi, chief of the banned Tehrik-e-Jaaferia and Islami Tehrik Pakistan, is using title of Quaid-e-Millat Jaaferia and is taking part in political activities. The SSP (Millat-e-Islamia) is operating under the name of Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, and its Chief Maulana Ahmad Ludhianvi is also openly taking part in politics. Jamaatud Dawa is using the platform of platform of Tehrik-e-Tahafuz-e-Namoos-e-Risalat and its charity wing is also active. Jaish-e-Muhammad is also operative under the disguise of its charity wing, Al-Rehmat Trust.

Sources close to the Chief Minister of Punjab disclosed that for unknown reasons Shahbaz Sharif never wanted a crackdown in Punjab, but Data Darbar bombing and public reaction forced him to succumb to federal government’s pressure.

To keep a permanent watch on terrorist outfits, the provincial government, with approval of the federal government, has formed the Anti-Terrorism Board. Special task forces of the Anti-Terrorism Board, setup in each district of Punjab have initiated the crackdown. Punjab Chief Minister would head the board, while Punjab Law Minister, Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Inspector General Police, Secretary Prosecution and a couple of provincial parliamentary secretaries would be members of the Board. Over 300 highly skilled official combatants will coordinate with police and intelligence agencies in operations against terrorists. District Police Officers are supervising functions of the task forces of their respective districts.

So far, the police have arrested dozens of activists from the major militant groups. Spokesman of Punjab Police DIG Akram Naeem Bharoka believes that the crackdown will prove purposeful and will help reduce militancy and terrorism from the province. However, intelligence officials express very little optimism about the success of the crackdown. “Militants have safe hideouts in various parts of the province, and now they are making their base in Sindh as well,” said an intelligence official.

Another intelligence officer remarked, “My past experience with crackdowns tells me that it would be another fruitless exercise. In the past, we arrested many militants and terrorists but the police failed to provide evidence that they were guilty. Resultantly, the courts released them due to the lack of evidence.”

Recently, an anti-terrorism court bailed out Hijratullah, accused of an attack on Manawan Police Training Centre. Likewise, top militants of different outfits were released on bail by the courts in most cases due to the lack of evidence against them. During the last seven years, Pakistan launched four country-wide crackdowns against militant groups, but most of the activists were released or bailed out after a few days and restarted their activities.

The case of Master Riaz Ali of Mian Channu is most instructive. In July 2009, a huge explosion took place when explosives stored at his house detonated accidentally, razing dozens of neighbouring homes. An injured Riaz was arrested from his destroyed house. Later, investigators came to know that he was arrested twice during previous crackdowns for being an activist of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi but was set free by the local police. When this incident took place, he was working for Harkatul Jihad-e-Islami. It was Master Riaz, who revealed that militants were planning to attack GHQ.

“Crackdowns are not the solution. Real solution is bringing terrorists and militants to task which is not possible without well-trained police and fearless judges” remarked a retired big gun of a civilian intelligence service.

However, Punjab Law Minister Rana Sanaullah says the crackdown would bear positive outcomes.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 31 Aug 2010 02:33

A crazy Paki's( pagal kutta) rants about YYY axis. However amidst the ravings he reveals the ground situation in TSP badlands.
What I suggst is print or download full article and cross out all the rants. Then highlight what we already know and see what remains.

Good exercise for new analysts.....

Acharya wrote:Did not realise that such article can be published in such area. CT by a Pak military in a US veterans mag
Indo-US-Israel-Afghan collaborative game against Pakistan
August 30, 2010 posted by Michael Leon · 4 Comments
By Asif Haroon Raja
http://www.veteranstoday.com/2010/08/30 ... -pakistan/
9/11 dramatically converted Pakistan from an international outcast under a military dictator aligned with extremist Taliban regime in Kabul to become a key strategic partner of America ’s war on terror. This change in status brought about by USA did not come about out of the blue but under a well conceived design. While Afghanistan was already on the hit list of USA since 1997, 9/11 gave a ready made excuse to forcibly occupy it and bring a regime change of its liking and to then work upon the laid down regional objectives.
In its pursuit to denuclearize and secularize Pakistan , the US in concert with Israel , India and Britain worked out several contingency plans which ranged from coercion combined with inducement to destabilization, balkanization and fragmentation. Gen Musharraf was successfully coerced to ditch friendly Mullah Omar led Taliban regime in Kabul, to help US in militarily occupying Afghanistan, and to become a frontline state to fight US war on terror. Pakistan had to accept anti-Pakistan and pro-India Northern Alliance regime under Hamid Karzai in Kabul.


Brig Asif Haroon Raja is Staff College and Armed Forces War Course qualified, holds MSc war studies degree; a second generation officer, he fought epic battle of Hilli in northwest East Bengal during 1971 war, in which Maj M. Akram received Nishan-e-Haider posthumously. He served as Brigade Major, Directing Staff Command & Staff College, GSOI Operations, Defence Attaché Egypt and Sudan, Dean of Corps of Military Attaches in Cairo. He commanded heaviest brigade in Kashmir, revolutionized a sensitive directorate in GHQ and acted as Army’s spokesman in Sindh where he conducted daily press briefings. In recognition of his services he was awarded Sitara-e-Imtiaz Military. After his retirement he was appointed Honorary Colonel of a regiment for eight years. He is lingual and speaks English, Pashto and Punjabi fluently. He is author of books titled ‘Battle of Hilli’, ‘1948, 1965 & 1971 Kashmir Battles and Freedom Struggle’, ‘Muhammad bin Qasim to Gen Musharraf’, Roots of 1971 Tragedy’, and has written number of motivational pamphlets. Draft of his next book ‘Tangled Knot of Kashmir’ is ready. He is a defence analyst and columnist and writes articles on security, defence and political matters for numerous international/national newspapers/websites.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 10 Sep 2010 04:49

From James B post in TSP thread


viewtopic.php?p=937827#p937827

Fait accompli

Senior officials in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are of the view that the whole of FATA is in effect a Taliban state, in all but name. Distinctions between South Waziristan, which our khakis claim to have purged of the Taliban, and North Waziristan where they have a hands off policy, are immaterial, say those in the know. Similarly, there are no differences between the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban. They are one network and they've been joined in their mountain redoubts by jihadists of all hue. This potent organisation, under the leadership of the Haqqanis, has established its emirate as a fait accompli and Swat, from which it has retreated for the moment will be reoccupied the minute our khakis withdraw from it. KP officials also believe that the world's most wanted terrorists, OBL included, are holed up in the forests of North Waziristan. It's also felt that if the Americans withdraw from Aghanistan, the country will be partitioned with the north going to the Alliance, and the south going to the Taliban. After that, FATA will be a natural first domino to fall. And the Taliban will not stop at that. They will covet the settled areas of KP too. May God have mercy on us all.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 07 Dec 2010 01:13

New wikileaks claim L-e-T module working:

Shafiq Khafa

Has anyone heard of this guy?

Do we need a separate thread for TSP's India focussed terrorist groups or should they be with the ISI thread as the irregular TSPA? 8)

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 07 Dec 2010 01:19

CTC Sentinel Issue on Jihadi Ideology and role of L-e-I in Khyber Agency.

LINK

And there is an article by Luv Puri(?) on steps that India can take to reduce home grown support for terrorists.

Could be Chindu type suggestions.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 26 Jan 2011 09:42

X-posted...
sum wrote:MKB on "Col Imam":
How will the angels greet ‘Colonel Imam’?

The mystery of the death of ‘Colonel Imam’ has been removed. After all, he died a natural death, following a heart attack, while in apparent captivity in the lawless tribal regions of Pakistan. Earlier speculations that he was executed have been laid to rest. Correctly so. It was almost unthinkable that the Taliban would allow their mentor to be killed in cold blood. That would have gone against the grain of Afghan traditions. Besides, ‘Imam’ had always been one of them. He had personal equations with Mullah Omar dating back to the 1980s. He was with Mullah Omar in Kandahar in the final countdown to the American air strikes in October 2001, when they dispersed, with Omar famously climbing on to a motorbike and driven away into the darkening mountains as the dusk fell. ‘Imam’ never hid the fact that he urged Omar to fight on and drive the Americans out of Afghanistan.


The remaining mystery is why the Pakistani military didn’t move heaven and earth and get him released. It is hard to believe that the requisite ‘influence’ was lacking - or the political will. A million dollar question remains: Was Imam indeed in ‘captivity’, or was he on some sort of special assignment to steer the Taliban safe and dry in the final lap of their triumphant return to power in Kabul?
I first heard about his presence in the Kandahar-Herat region sometime in late-1994 from an Afghan who came to Delhi for medical treatment. It wasn’t too difficult to put 2 and 2 together and make it 4 - that Taliban was indeed an outfit of the Pakistani security establishment, contrary to the myths that were being propagated from Islamabad. For, Imam’s presence in that complicated region inside Afghanistan right at that point in time could only have meant that some bloody serious business was afoot. Curiously, Pakistan was also sponsoring Gulbuddin Hekmatyar at that time and Gen. Hamid Gul was active on that front. Amazing that two such vastly different streams of Pakistani ’strategic assets’ were in operation simultaneously - and they finally ‘coalesced’ in 1996 near Saroki in the outskirts of Kabul when Taliban drove Gulbuddin out of Afghanistan into exile in Iran. No doubt, Imam plotted fastidiously the Taliban’s ‘pilgrim’s progress’ from Kandahar via Herat and Jalalabad to Kabul.
Stories about Imam as the Pakistani consul-general in Herat used to filter down to the Tashkent bazaar when I served in that ancient oasis town in the Central Asian steppes. I invariably asked about him while walking the dusty streets of Mazar-i-Sharif. By the mid-1990s, he was already of the stuff of legends. I began harbouring a secret longing to meet him sometime, somewhere. It never happened. But it was also as if I already knew him so well that there was no more any real need to meet. One never got tired of devouring stories of his feats that were handed down. Indeed, at a certain point one even stopped bothering to check out the veracity of the stories surrounding the working life of this secretive man. It became pointless to segregate the kernels of hard facts and fiction. They blended so well. Imagine, this was the man who was received in the Ronald Reagan White House and presented with a piece of the Berlin Wall with a plaque commending him for striking the ‘first blow’ that brought the Soviet Union tumbling down.


He probably considered himself a ‘jihadi’ handpicked by God and bestowed with the special skills he acquired as a special forces officer of the Pakistani army trained in Fort Bragg in the US. Rock-like faith was what made this austere man so hugely effective on the operational plane - unlike Gul who talked too much, lived rather well, dressed nattily, partied and sought publicity. Wouldn’t the angels be saying Salaamun ‘Alaykum as the Colonel enters the gates of paradise?


Actually he wont get any of the 72 rasins as those who hallaled him are closer to the book!

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 17 May 2011 20:24

Farhat Taj's version of origins of Taliban and Pakiban (anti-Taliban)

http://criticalppp.com/archives/49207


Farhat Taj’s rebuttal to Ejaz Haider’s misleading information on Taliban

More misleading information — I —Farhat Taj

Mr Haider’s most misleading information about the Ali Khels is that the Pakistani state supported their resistance to the Taliban. The fact is that the state abandoned the Ali Khels by design so as to punish them for their anti-Talibanism

Mr Ejaz Haider responded to my article ‘Misleading information’ (Daily Times, April 2, 2011) via his two-part column ‘Responding to Farhat Taj’ in another daily (April 10, 2011). I had said in my article that, “Mr Ejaz Haider, as a political analyst, is expected to be honest and not to mislead people.” I regret to say that Mr Haider has produced even more misleading information in his response. The range of his misleading information is so wide that I cannot accommodate it all in one column. Therefore, today, I will comment on some of it, leaving the rest for my columns in the coming weeks.

Mr Haider says that the Shia section of the Ali Khel tribe stayed away from the tribe’s armed resistance to the Taliban because the Shia Ali Khels had left the area before clashes with the Taliban had begun and were internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kohat.

It is true that the Shia Ali Khels were IDPs at the time of the armed clashes with the Taliban. But they were not IDPs on the other side of the globe. They were IDPs in next-door Kohat and Hangu. In a matter of a few hours, one can reach from Kohat and Hangu to Orakzai. Shia women, children and the elderly stayed on in Kohat and Hangu as IDPs but able-bodied Shia Ali Khel men did participate in armed clashes with the Taliban. A direct interaction with Shia and Sunni Ali Khel families will reveal to any investigator that Shia Ali Khels were killed as well as injured in the suicide attack on the grand Ali Khel jirga in 2008. Mr Haider says that “not one Shia” died in the attack. Let me mention a prominent Shia Ali Khel who was killed: Mir Askar Shaheed. Mir Askar was a well-known Shia Ali Khel tribal leader and an active member of the grand Ali Khel jirga leading the anti-Taliban lashkar. Due to a lack of space I am not giving more names of the Shia casualties in the suicide attack but some of the Shia casualties may also be confirmed from the Orakzai political administration.

Over generations, the Shia and Sunni Ali Khels have intermarried. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find Ali Khels coming from mixed Shia-Sunni families. I have come across Ali Khels who were even ‘unclear’ about their sectarian affiliation. Such unclear Shia and Sunni Ai Khels also participated in the clashes with the Taliban.

Moreover, the Shias could not have remained unaffected by the aftermath of the suicide attack on the Ali Khel jirga even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that they never took part in tribal clashes with the Taliban. As rightly pointed out by Mr Haider, the suicide attacks killed 100 and injured over 300 Ali Khels. Due to their intermarriages with Sunni Ali Khels, the Shias would still have their sisters and daughters widowed and nieces and nephews orphaned in a tragedy of this scale. The fact is that Shia and Sunni Ali Khels jointly resisted the Taliban and both sides suffered deaths and injuries.

The anti-Taliban resistance was a united Ali Khel tribal move beyond any sectarian differences. The Ali Khels proved with their blood that they have the ability to set aside any sectarian differences and stand up as a united tribe against the extremist Sunni Taliban. All Muslim societies across the world that may be affected by any Shia-Sunni tension could learn a lesson in sectarian harmony from the Ali Khels of FATA. It is regrettable that the Pakistani media as well as the docile Pakhtun nationalists from the ANP and Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party have failed to present the Ali Khel tribe to the world as an excellent example of sectarian harmony in a Muslim society.

Furthermore, Mr Haider says that Malik Momin Khan, leader of the Ali Khel anti-Taliban lashkar died in the suicide attack on the jirga. This is factually wrong. Momin Khan survived that deadly attack that killed some of his close relatives. Some weeks after the jirga attack, Momin Khan was target killed by the Taliban along with several of his relatives. Even the grand tragedy at the jirga had not broken his will against the Taliban. A man of strong determination, Momin Khan had already declared to reorganise the Ali Khel lashkar after the jirga attack to carry on tribal resistance. He had to be eliminated to definitively crush the Ali Khel resistance to the Taliban.

Mr Haider’s most misleading information about the Ali Khels is that the Pakistani state supported their resistance to the Taliban. The fact is that the state abandoned the Ali Khels by design so as to punish them for their anti-Talibanism. The state had the full capacity to inflict a crippling blow to the Taliban and the Ali Khels had provided an excellent opportunity to the Pakistan Army to do just that. Mr Haider’s argument that the Pakistan Army could not come to help the Ali Khels because it was overstretched due to military operations elsewhere, is thoroughly hollow. The Ali Khel tribe had encircled the Taliban, killed several of them and destroyed their centres. How could some soldiers of the professionally trained Pakistan Army not achieve what ordinary farmers and drivers from the tribe were about to achieve — elimination of the Taliban — if their jirga had not been bombed and the political administration had not conveyed to them, in the aftermath of the jirga bombing, that they had been “too harsh” on the Taliban and now must face the music?

The argument that the military operation was unpopular is also baseless. How could a military operation against the Taliban be unpopular in an area where the entire tribe is ready to take up weapons against the Taliban? It seems the military operations were unpopular in the GHQ, Rawalpindi and in the pro-GHQ media of Pakistan as well as among the natural allies of the GHQ — the religious-political parties of Pakistan. A targeted military operation against the Taliban has never been unpopular on the mountains and plains of Tirah where the Ali Khels live, and indeed all over FATA from day one of the war on terror.

The other reason, seemingly, put forward by Mr Haider against a Pakistan Army intervention in support of the Ali Khel resistance to the Taliban is that the then Governor of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Ali Jan Orakzai, also a former general of the Pakistan Army, was against military operations in FATA. This pretext is good enough to mislead people on the eastern side of the river Indus and in the wider world. In FATA, no one takes it seriously.

Was Ali Jan Orakzai so powerful that he singlehandedly overruled all the serving generals of the Pakistan Army, if indeed they were in favour of the elimination of the Taliban through targeted operations? Why was Ali Jan even appointed as governor if his views were so opposed to the will of the military-led government of General Musharraf? Did the Musharraf government search all over FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and find no person with pro-military operation views to be appointed as governor? General Ali Jan Orakzai’s appointment as corps commander, Peshawar and later as governor, despite being a pro-Taliban individual, can only be logically seen and reasonably described as an individual best suited for executing state policy in FATA — not one undermining it.

Whatever General Orakzai’s views on military operations, he could never be more pro-Taliban than a Punjabi fellow general, Safdar Hussain, who even signed a ‘peace deal’ with the al Qaeda-led Taliban in South Waziristan. Hardly anyone in FATA believes that Safdar Hussain, just like General Orakzai, was doing so without the full backing of the military high command.

(To be continued)

Note: Mr Haider reported that Malik Waris Khan has died. No, he is alive and well. I spoke to him on the phone after I read about his death in Mr Haider’s article.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban.

Source: http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?pa ... 2011_pg3_4

……..

More misleading information — II —Farhat Taj – Saturday, April 23, 2011

The state patronage, previously extended to the tribes and tribal leaders, has been extended to the Taliban to overpower the tribes through state-sponsored violence and blackmailing. Through sheer force, FATA has been converted into a black hole where reality is constructed in a manner that suits the security establishment of Pakistan

In his article, ‘Responding to Farhat Taj — I’ in another daily (April 10, 2011), Mr Ejaz Haider also provided misleading information about the Story Khel and Feroz Khel tribes of Orakzai and today I will comment on this.

Story Khel is a mix-Shia-Sunni tribe. The Sunni Story Khel tribesmen who clashed with the Taliban belong to Chamanjana, a village in Lower Orakzai. Chamanjana is located on the borderline separating the Shia Story Khel area from the Sunni Story Khel villages. The Shia Story Khel did not directly participate in the clashes with the Taliban, but provided a good deal of indirect help to the Sunni Story Khels. Some of the Shias provided some weapons to the Sunni Story Khels to assist their armed resistance to the Taliban. During the fighting all women and children of Chamanjana fled to Aand Khel, the neighboring Shia Story Khel village. A few days later, the Chamanjana lashkar-men, who could not stand up to the Taliban any more, also retreated into Aand Khel. For several weeks the Sunni Story Khel internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chamanjana were kept as guests by the Shia Story Khels in their houses and villages. Without the Shia help, the Sunni villagers would have suffered more at hands of the Taliban than what they had already encountered.

Following the lashkar’s defeat in Chamanjana, the Pakistan army entered the village to take control of it. Malik Waris Khan, the man who led the Story Khel resistance to the Taliban, has been awarded a Tamgha-e-Imtiaz (Medal of Distinction) by the government of Pakistan in a strange manner. A document accompanying the award says that he has been posthumously given the Tamgha. But Malik Waris Khan is alive and well in Orakzai. The award was actually handed over to another tribesman who is his namesake but not from the Story Khel tribe. The other Waris Khan has now handed the award to the real Story Khel Waris Khan. He, however, complains that a part of the award, Rs 800,000, has not been given to him. The money must be given to him as soon as possible because his family needs it to rebuild their houses destroyed by the Taliban.

The whole issue concerning the award looks a mess. Only the government can explain why it turned out that way. It is indicative of how non-seriously the government of Pakistan handles the tribesmen, especially anti-Taliban tribesmen. But, above all, this award to Malik Waris Khan or any other compensations or prizes to any anti-Taliban tribesmen do not necessarily imply the government or Pakistan Army’s support for any indigenous and popular anti-Taliban resistance among the tribes. Both the army and the government must answer tough questions before the so-called awards or compensations are even referred to. Take, for example, their handling of the armed resistance in Chamanjana and the events before and after that.

For over a week the Chamanjana villagers clashed with the Taliban and no help from the government arrived to prevent the Taliban from defeating the villagers. Before the clashes, the Taliban had unleashed terror in Chamanjana through killings and kidnappings, but no attempt was made by the government to restore the state’s writ in the village by responding to the Taliban atrocities. The lack of state response finally forced the villagers to clash with the Taliban in self-defence. No help from the government was granted to the Shia Story Khels for looking after the Chamanjana IDPs for weeks. Following the lashkar’s retreat from Chamanjana, the Taliban burnt down almost all houses in the village along with the belongings that were left by the residents as they fled in a hurry to save their lives. The villagers inform that an army helicopter was hovering in the air as the Taliban were putting Chamanjana on fire. They complain that the helicopter never fired at the Taliban. Firing from the helicopter, they say, could have stopped the Taliban from burning down the entire village.

The current situation in Chamanjana is that, in the presence of the army, several IDPs have come back to the village where they live in tents on the sites of their destroyed houses. The government has done nothing to assist the villagers in rebuilding their houses. Many, if not most, of the villagers simply cannot afford to rebuild the houses and need immediate help. Several of the villagers are staying with their relatives outside the village mainly because they have lost everything and do not have the means to restart a new life in the village. So far it looks as if the government has nothing to offer to assist the villagers who suffered great human and material losses in fighting the supposed ‘enemy’ of the Pakistani state — the Taliban.

From Mr Haider’s description, the tribal leaders of Feroz Khel seem to be some kind of ‘sovereign authorities’ making deals with another ‘sovereign authority’ — the Taliban — outside the contours of the Pakistani state authority for the release of the militants captured by the tribesmen. The FATA tribesmen including their tribal leaders have always been subjected to the state authority under Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) laws. Assuming that Mr Haider’s version of the story is correct, what did the Pakistani state do when the tribal leaders released the militants? The state precedent has been to immediately transport tribal leaders from cold areas like Feroz Khela to jails in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa’s warmest districts, like D I Khan, to over-punish them for even small acts of defiance to the political administration. It is remarkable that the state authorities did nothing to stop or at least punish the Feroz Khel tribal leaders for making deals with the Taliban.

Regardless of the debate over whether the militants were released by the Orakzai political administration or the tribal leaders, the fact remains that the Pakistani state had abandoned, by design, the Feroz Khel tribe to collectively punish it for its heroic anti-Taliban resistance and to force it to give up the resistance. In fact, all tribes across FATA have been willfully deprived of the established state patronage to force them to submit to the Taliban — the state proxies for the strategic game for control over Afghanistan. The state patronage, previously extended to the tribes and tribal leaders, has been extended to the Taliban to overpower the tribes through state-sponsored violence and blackmailing. Through sheer force, FATA has been converted into a black hole where reality is constructed in a manner that suits the security establishment of Pakistan. This fake reality is then communicated to the larger Pakistani society as well as the wider world as the ground reality through media persons and religious right-wingers linked with the establishment.

(To be continued)

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban

Source : http://dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011\04\23\story_23-4-2011_pg3_4

………

Misleading information — III —Farhat Taj

Since 9/11 and the US attacks on terrorist positions in Afghanistan, the authority of the political agent has been replaced by the Pakistan Army officers in a de facto manner. The officers are neither capable of nor legally authorised to deal with tribal or sectarian disputes

This is the last part of my comments on Mr Ejaz Haider’s article ‘Responding to Farhat Taj — II’ published in an English daily on April 11, 2011.

Mr Haider recommends Patrick Porter’s Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes so that I understand how the Taliban overpowered FATA. The problem is that a great deal of international research and journalistic literature authored on FATA in the context of the war on terror is misleading, at times marred with factual mistakes and tarnished with serious ethical and methodological mistakes. Readers of Daily Times are aware that I have been challenging some of the literature on this forum. My published research papers as well as my forthcoming book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban, question the work of some of the most famous FATA ‘experts’ around the world. The literature is based on information and assumptions that, at the very best, have only insignificant presence in FATA’s ground reality. By producing such blighted knowledge about FATA, the famous FATA experts in the US and Europe have defiled the West’s own tradition of scholarship.

I have not read Porter’s book and so I am in no position to comment on it. But I will never judge the situation in FATA on the criteria set in this or any other book; I will do things the other way round. Mr Haider’s own understanding that, due to internal socio-political changes, the traditional tribal structure led by the tribal leader has been battered leading to the rise of indigenous religious power embodied by the Taliban, is baseless. The tribal leaders have not been outdated through internal changes in society. They have been out-manoeuvred and even killed by the security establishment that engineered, through terrorism and blackmail, the Taliban takeover of tribal society in pursuit of strategic goals.

Kurram is a complicated story, quite different from the rest of FATA. There are also long standing tribal disputes over land, forests and water between Sunni and Shia tribes. Some of the disputes have been pending since colonial times. Some of the disputes are dormant and some have been causing occasional tribal clashes. There are also controversial sectarian disputes. But never before have any tribal clashes in Kurram’s history led to so much violence and mass scale human displacement such as those in the deadly cycle of sectarian clashes since 2007.

Traditionally, there have been two authorities that prevented all previous tribal clashes from causing large-scale violence: the jirga led by tribal leaders and the political agent. Since 9/11 and the US attacks on terrorist positions in Afghanistan, the authority of the political agent has been replaced by the Pakistan Army officers in a de facto manner. The officers are neither capable of nor legally authorised to deal with tribal or sectarian disputes. Most of the non-local tribal leaders, who used to play a constructive role in managing disputes in Kurram, have been target killed, like Khandan Mehsud of South Waziristan. The remaining tribal leaders have limited their activities due to security concerns or they toe the establishment’s line and are hence irrelevant for the well being of the tribal people. Within Kurram, moderate Shia and Sunni tribal leaders are hostage to armed gangs and occasionally get target killed — the latest example is that of Iqbal Hussain, an important moderate Sunni tribal leader from Parachinar as well as historian of Kurram, who was target killed in January 2011.

With the authority of the tribal leaders removed and the state reluctant to impose its writ, the Shia and Sunni militant groups have been given a free hand to commit as many atrocities as they please. No one in Kurram believes that the state does not have the capacity to rein in the militant groups.

Almost all Sunnis from Parachinar have been displaced by the Shia militant groups. Why did the army stationed in the area not provide security to the Sunni residents of the city by confronting the Shia attackers with full might? The fact that some Sunnis were linked with the Taliban is no justification for the army to remain silent spectators over the carnage and displacement of the Sunnis, most of whom were innocent civilians. There are more people linked with the Taliban in Lahore. Would that be a reason for the army to silently allow a violent eviction of an entire section of the population from the city?

Instead of harshly dealing with the Sunnis linked with the Taliban, the local state agents have been publicly giving them VIP treatment. For example, during the sectarian clashes in 2007, a military helicopter airlifted the injured Eid Nazar Mangal, leader of the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba in Kurram to a hospital. No other injured Shia or Sunni was given that facility on the occasion. All the government could do for the assaulted innocent Sunnis was to ‘facilitate’ their forced eviction by providing them transport that dumped them just outside the Shia-dominated area to lick their wounds.

Why did Colonel Tauseef even hold the jirga in which he invited a controversial anti-Shia personality from Kohat? He does not have any legal authority to do so. His move achieved nothing for peace in Kurram but contributed towards a bad tribal perception about his institution. The Sunni tribal leaders now say that Colonel Tauseef’s plan to repatriate the Sunnis was the army’s plan to trap the Parachinar Shias in violence. Without having appropriate security arrangements in place to protect the repatriated Sunnis from aggression by Shia militant gangs, the returned IDPs would be slaughtered by the Shia armed groups. This would provide a pretext to the military to conduct a fake military operation in the name of elimination of the Shia groups, but would actually result in the carnage of innocent Shia families.

The text of the Murree Agreement clearly identifies three parties to the crisis in Kurram — the local Shia, Sunni populations and the government of Pakistan — and, depending on the case, any of the three will be responsible for any violation of the agreement. It is only the government of Pakistan that has failed to fulfill its responsibility under the agreement. Both Shias and Sunnis from Kurram hold the government responsible for non-implementation of the agreement. Rather than implementing the Murree Agreement, the government is holding media circuses, like the jirga in March 2011 as referred to by Mr Ejaz. The jirga was boycotted by an important stakeholder of the Kuram crisis, the Sunni IDPs from Parachinar. There has been more violence in the area against innocent Shias and Sunnis since that jirga.

Due to space constraints, I will not be able to discuss more about Kurram, but I wish to inform that, together with another author, I am writing a report about Kurram, which will elaborate most of the issues touched upon by Mr Ejaz. Therefore, I would request the readers to wait for the report.

The writer is a PhD Research Fellow with the University of Oslo and currently writing a book, Taliban and Anti-Taliban.

Source:http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2011%5C04%5C30%5Cstory_30-4-2011_pg3_4

………..


Some more on the Pakistani Taliban
By Ejaz Haider
Published: March 13, 2011

Interesting article by Brig Asad Munir (retd) titled “The real agenda of the Pakistani Taliban” (March 9), except that it ignores some important aspects: The subtle and not so subtle changes that have taken place in the tribal society and also the TTP phenomenon. Let’s consider them in this order.

Two of the three categories the brigadier has described, Pashtuns and Mian Mulla, were never very distinct — as, for instance, in a different way in Punjab — and began to merge into each other fairly early into the Soviet-Afghan war. Not without reason either. Leadership in Pashtun society is unlike the Baloch tribal structure where the sardar sits at the apex and where even inter-tribe relationships are hierarchically determined. The Pashtun leadership is a matter of who can negotiate effectively with the outside world for the solidarity group — tribe, sub-tribe, sub-sub-tribe and clans.

It is for this reason that with the war the traditional structures began to break down, giving way to new power centres. This did not happen so much on our side but it impacted the Afghan traditional elite directly. A similar phenomenon began in Fata in the early 1990s.

When I went to Hangu in 1998 to report on the sectarian riots which saw Orakzai lashkars descend into the Miranzai Valley, I realised that a major shift was happening. Sunni Orakzai tribesmen were linking up with Sunni Bangash to attack Shia Bangash. Never before was it possible for tribal affiliation (the qaum or solidarity group) to be undermined by some supra-tribal ideology.

Imagine my surprise when in Hangu city, on one of the northern hills, I saw emblazoned in white lime the name of a Punjabi — Azam Tariq, the since slain leader of Sipah-e Sahaba Pakistan. Something was afoot and I reported it in The Friday Times along with the interview of Javed Piracha, the then PML-N MNA from Kohat and rabidly anti-Shia. For a Piracha to be able to influence the Pashtun and link up with the Orakzais was another telltale sign.

Fast forward to now. Sabir Mehsud, whose group captured Khalid Khawaja and Colonel Imam, kills Usman Punjabi, the man who was negotiating with the families and also the government. Within days Sabir, a Mehsud, is killed in Razmak by Hakimullah Mehsud’s men to avenge Punjabi’s killing. In the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa I spent my childhood in, that would have been unheard of.

There’s much more to this shift, but given space constraints let’s leave it at this and move on to the TTP. Brig Munir is right; much before 9/11 and the US attack on Afghanistan, the Taliban had begun to ingress into Fata. They not only came to Mirali but also went into Mohmand. A few times there was fire exchange between Frontier Corps troops and the Taliban because the latter considered the Durand Line as disputed as previous Afghan regimes.

But, and this is important, the TTP, for all its rhetoric, is not linked to the known Afghan groups operating in Afghanistan. If anything, in Bajaur we had Afghans fighting Pakistani forces. There is no knownTTP operation inside Afghanistan, with the possible exception of the video that emerged of the Jordanian that attacked FOB Chapman in Khost in January 2010. If the TTP had deep linkages with the Afghan Taliban, frenetic efforts by their jirgas to save first Khawaja and later Imam would not have failed.

North Waziristan, Mohmand and now Kurram are areas where multiple groups operate and each offers a deterrent to other groups. Haji Gul Bahadur, who controlled most of the area in North Waziristan, is now under pressure from the TTP, whose elements have relocated to Mirali and Datta Khel and many are Punjabis. It is interesting to note that this is primarily Wazir area!

It is, therefore, important to analyse what the TTP agenda is. While it may want to control Fata, as a military officer Brig Munir knows that it does not have the capacity to capture territory elsewhere; or even retain it in Fata before a superior force. However, it has the capability to bleed the army and become a diabetic case for the state. Also, by forcing the army into a forward deployment mode in Fata, it extracts a price that can be costly both in tangible and intangible terms.

Published in The Express Tribune, March 14th, 2011.

Source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/132054/some ... i-taliban/

……..

Responding to Farhat Taj — I
By Ejaz Haider
Published: April 10, 2011

Farhat Taj, a PhD Research Fellow at the University of Oslo, haswritten an article in Daily Times which takes up issue with what Iwrote in this space on March 13. Although she has chosen to cast aspersions on me by saying that I have “been providing misleading information about the Pakhtuns”, which implies that I might be doing so at someone’s behest, a calumnious and libellous statement, I will stick to the issues she has raised and avoid the low cut and thrust.

There are two sets of observations she makes. One set relates to the more abstract question of whether Pakhtun tribal society has undergone some changes, the second to a few specific incidents from the Orakzai and Kurram Agencies. There is a third set also, allegations against the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, which are easy to make but difficult to prove. They are generally made partially because we can rightly trace many of our current troubles to the military’s policies, the original sin, and partly because army bashing, instead of offering issue-based criticism, is now the vogue and finds many buyers on all sides.

I intend, in this space, to pick up a few of her concrete observations and leave the rest to subsequent articles.

Firstly, Ms Taj is wrong in conflating my article with Brigadier Asad Munir’s piece because I specifically took up issue with some observations made by the brigadier. Just because I concur with the brigadier on one point does not mean I endorse what he wrote by penning a sequel to his piece.

Ms Taj says I made some observations on the basis of my visit to Hangu 12 years ago. I quoted that visit because some things on that visit struck me as odd; it does not mean that I have stayed away from that area or Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas since then. Heavily invested in the region over many years, I have made several trips there. But I was not filling out a form listing the number of visits I have made to that area; I was making a point and mentioned that visit to do so.

Now to the issue of the Alikhel, Ferozekhel and Stoorykhel tribes in Orakzai, starting with the Alikhel. The tribe has five tappas or branches, out of which the panjam is half Shia and half Sunni. The Shia branch is called Babanamasi. Contrary to what Ms Taj says about the Alikhel Sunnis and Shias fighting the Taliban together, the Shia branch left the area before the conflict with the Taliban began in the Agency. This fact can be corroborated from the IDP camps in Kohat. Some of them returned to their homes after the political agent held a jirga and issued a warning to the Taliban through the Alikhel lashkar led by a former JCO, Subedar Momin Khan.

The other four tappas allied to resist the Taliban. The army was stretched, military operations were not popular, this being before the public buy-in came and resulted in Operation Rah-e-Raast in Malakand and Frontier Corps’ Operation Black Thunder in Lower Dir and Buner. The operations that had been conducted in South and North Waziristan were weak in the higher direction of this war and generally consisted of extraction operations and snap actions.

(NB: Trouble had been brewing in the agency for quite sometime, the provincial governor from May 2006-January 2008 was Lt-Gen Ali Jan Orakzai (retd). He belonged to the area, and became known for opposing military operations against the Taliban, a stand generally popular with both the right and the left wings.)

Alikhel resisted until their jirga was attacked by a suicide bomber. The attack killed Momin Khan along with more than 100 others, while over 300 tribesmen were injured. Interestingly, not one Shia was killed in this attack, which would not have been possible if the Shia branch were part of the anti-Taliban lashkar. This was the Taliban warning to the Sunni Alikhel for raising a lashkar against them, a campaign which was duly supported by the then political administration of the Agency.

Momin Khan was awarded Sitara-e-Shujaat posthumously. The dead were given Rs300,000 in compensation while the injured got Rs100,000.

The story of the Ferozkhel tribe is even more interesting. They raised a lashkar and their initial campaigns against the Taliban were very successful. Ms Taj mentions that the Ferozkhel captured six Taliban who were handed over to the political administration, which released them after a week. This is amazing disinformation. The Ferozkhel, in fact, captured 14 Taliban (I can give to Ms Taj the names, domiciles and other information on these people) from the Gwin checkpoint in central Orakzai. After this, the lashkar also cleared the Chhapri Ferozkhel area bordering Bara in Khyber Agency. The pressure got the Taliban to start negotiating with the Ferozkhel. They gave the Ferozkhel guarantees that they would not operate in the area and, as a goodwill gesture, the Ferozkhel should release the captured men.

Four Maliks of Ferozkhel, Adil Khan Ferozkhel, Sardar Ferozkhel, Abdur Raheem and Bismillah Ferozkhel allowed the release of these men. Three of these four have since been killed. Bismillah was killed on Oblan Road that goes from Hangu to Kohat; Adil Khan killed in Meerobak; and Abdur Raheem recently killed in Peshawar.

But before this, and after the release of their men, the Taliban attacked and killed seven Ferozkhel Maliks in an ambush, sending a warning to the tribe to stay clear of them and not interfere with their campaign against the government.

The Stoorikhel also raised a lashkar. The tribe has one branch which is Sunni and one that is Shia. The government supporting the effort asked the Shia branch to leave the area to avoid the Taliban painting this in sectarian terms. The Sunni Stoorikhel gathered under the banner of Malik Waris Khan and fought the Taliban for 10 days or so before being defeated. Waris Khan was killed, as were personnel of Levies. Sepoy Qismat Khan was awarded the Sitara-e-Shujaat and Rs800,000 posthumously, while Waris Khan was given the Tamgha-e Imtiaz.

The compensations and awards would not have come if the tribes were fighting the Taliban against the wishes of the government and the security forces. What I have narrated here is a bird’s-eye view of complex details. There is a sectarian dimension in the area that goes back into deep past and to which is now added the Taliban factor. There’s more to it which I shall try and touch upon in the follow up to this.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 11th, 2011.

Source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/146898/resp ... farhat-taj–i/

…….

Responding to Farhat Taj — II
By Ejaz Haider
Published: April 11, 2011

In a March 13 article in this newspaper, I wrote that Pakhtun society has been undergoing changes. Intertribal support along sectarian lines, as well as the activities of Punjabi extremists in Pakhtun heartland, bear testimony to that. Ms Taj says the mullah does not enjoy primacy in the tribal hierarchy. That is only partially true; Maulvi Abdullah in Orakzai, who died last year, was the leading sectarian troublemaker in collusion with Javed Ibrahim Piracha.

But more than the mullah, it is the young self-styled Taliban commanders who have done much to change the norms of Pakhtun society. For strategic and operational reasons they have indulged in acts that, despite feuds among Pakhtuns, were revered. Attacks on jirgas, funerals and shrines are a manifestation of this change. Indeed, because Ms Taj is writing a book, I strongly recommend that she read Patrick Porter’s Military Orientalism: Eastern War through Western Eyes to understand the significance of this phenomenon.

The same phenomenon is at work in Kurram, which I just visited and where I spoke not only with the Commandant of Kurram Militia (it is not Kurram Scouts, as Ms Taj mentions in her despatch) Colonel Tauseef Akhtar, but also former Senator Syed Sajjad Hussain and Sunni leader from Sadda, Haji Saleem. Far from acting against Shia interests, as alleged by Ms Taj, Colonel Akhtar, in trying to clear the area and the road, as part of Operation Khwakh Bade Sham, got shot himself (his right leg will never fully recover). The Frontier Corps (FC) and army have lost 80 personnel, including 10 officers, which is a very high officer-to-jawan casualty ratio.

Sajjad Hussain and many other common people who I met and talked to in Parachinar explained that trouble began from Mira Jan Colony after Sunnis supported by sectarian elements held rallies and made provocative speeches. A few Sunni villages were attacked and properties looted and burnt. These people had to leave the area. This sparked trouble down south in Sadda. Sunnis were also supported by Taliban elements, a fact accepted by Haji Saleem, though he said that this is more out of fear than conviction. The Sunnis closed down the road.

Colonel Akhtar has held three peace jirgas. When I pointedly asked him why he had invited Javed Ibrahim Piracha, he said that it was an effort to get everyone on board but that after the first meeting when some Shia leaders objected to Piracha’s presence, he was not invited to the other two meetings. To corroborate this, he gave me videotapes of the jirgas held. I then independently asked Haji Saleem and he confirmed this fact. I still have to speak with MNA Munir Orakzai on this issue.

I have raced through this narrative again for reasons of space and eschewed many details. But it should be an amazing fact that Colonel Akhtar, supposed to be supporting Sunnis against Shias, as also his officers and men, should get injured and die in battles against Sunnis!

Equally absurd is the contention that ISI is playing a game which is not only getting civilians killed but also, empirically speaking, army and FC officers and men. The current Corps Commander Peshawar served in the ISI as DG of one of the wings. Going by Ms Taj’s argument, then major-general, now Lt-General Asif Yasin Malik, pursued policies while in the ISI which got men in the field killed but now, having become the Corps Commander, would be interested that the operations succeed because he is no more in the ISI!

The Murree Accord had several points, most important being the return of Sunnis and Shias to their respective villages. In the March 2011, meeting of leaders from the area with Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, the order of the points was reversed, making road opening a priority. Sunnis say they want agreement on other points before the road can be opened. MNA Orakzai has got a Rs1.7 billion package from the prime minister for rehabilitation and development. People in the area told me they think disbursements should begin shortly. My own sense is that while this money is important, it would also be necessary to clear central Kurram of Taliban elements through another operation. It is important for security forces to control the physical space to keep the road secure and open.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 12th, 2011.

Source: http://tribune.com.pk/story/147569/resp ... farhat-taj–ii/


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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 18 May 2011 22:05

X-Post....


Nightwatch comments 17 May 2011:


Nightwatch 5/17/2011

Al Qaida: In a recent meeting, presumably in Pakistan, al Qaida's council elected Saifal Adel (Abu Saif), one of the early members of al-Qaida, as chief of the party Command of Control for the time being, sources told the Pakistani news service, The News. However, Muhammad Mustafa Yamni is likely to be made al-Qaida chief after a grand consultation. Yamni is currently residing in an African country. :?:

Saifal Adel is an Egyptian and has served at key posts in Egypt terrorist groups. He worked with Ayman al-Zawahiri in the al-Jihad group of Egypt. Zawahiri was bin Laden's number two. The News reported that Zawahiri would continue holding his posts of al-Qaida patron, and the chief of the al-Qaida Militant Command. Zawahiri also will monitor the international contacts, a task that had been done by Saifal Adel.

The News' sources reported that Adnan al-Kashri had been placed in charge of general information affairs. Muhammad Nasir al-Washi (Abu Nasir) is now in charge of al-Qaida Africa affairs and Muhammad Adam Khan Afghani was appointed to direct Afghanistan-Waziristan affairs. Fahad al-Qava had been appointed as the Urgent Operational Commander.

{Can someone draw up an org chart based on this info and blog it?}

Comment: The day after bin Laden's death, an Asia Times on Line analyst reported that the Saudi (bin Laden) faction and the Egyptian (Zawahiri) faction had had a falling out over leadership and policy direction. The full details of the policy split are not known, but what is known is that Zawahiri publicly supported the Pakistan Taliban in their moves to try to overthrow the government of Pakistan, under Musharraf and under the elected civilians. This included the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.

Bin Laden never associated himself with that policy. Bin Laden seems to have favored sensational attacks against Western targets over consolidating a base in Pakistan by taking over the government.

The Egyptians marginalized bin Laden. The lack of security and staff at Abbottabad - a single body guard - indicates bin Laden was a figurehead and a symbol, more than a hands-on commander. The computer disks and thumb drives, in this theory, call to mind Hitler with his war maps in the bunker in Berlin.

According to the Asia Times report, the Egyptian faction delivered the identity and movements of bin Laden's trusted courier to US intelligence and the courier was aware that he was being tracked so that he could lead US intelligence to the Abbottabad house. The courier was a key actor in an al Qaida intelligence operation to eliminate the Saudi faction and permit the Egyptians to take control.

The operation appears to have worked. The leadership selections, reported by The News, support the hypothesis of betrayal by the Egyptians. No Saudis are in senior leadership positions. Until the promotion of Abu Saif and other non-Saudis to leadership positions, the Asia Times report was just one hypothesis.

Based on statements by Zawahiri, al Qaida may be expected to help the Pakistani Taliban to try to seize control in Pakistan. For them, Pakistan is the objective, not Afghanistan.



So goal of born again Al Qeeda is to take over TSP and not Afghanistan.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2011 08:51

shaardula wrote:i think we ought to get to the bottom of 'understanding paki taliban'. pakistan created one taliban. and that was intended to be afg centric. but the current reality is there are good talibs and bad talibs. in my mind good Ts are those who operate within TSP and bad Ts are those who operate in AFG. official account is opposite.

but why did the Ts split? and how have they managed not to cross each others path? and how come TSP has managed to force/convince its munna Ts to act against the other camp?

mushi bending over backwards in 2001 is said to be one reason. but lal masjid also seems to a seminal event.

i think getting to the bottom of this good taliban thingie is likely to be insightful.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2011 09:03

Shaardula, If you go thru this thread you will get your information.
also add timelines to you questions.
I term the Taliban as those Afghan Pashtuns who are working for ISI and attack the Kabul regime.
Three reasons:
- They are mostly Ghilzai, the Kabul regime is mostly Durrani
- They are Islamists and want to fight the Karzai regime that seeks crusaders help
- They are Pashtun Nationalists who want to overthrow foreign occupiers

I call the Pakistani Pastuns in Khyber-Pakhtunwa and fighting against TSP authority in FATA/WANA as Pakiban. (to me these are good Taliban)
- They do not want TSP authority in FATA/WANA ( Fazlullah, Meshud etc)
- They are Islamists who are against the less pious (Lal Masjid)
- They want to retaliate against TSP collusion in drone strikes by striking in Pakjab

You see emergence of Pakiban only after 2005 onwards. One event was the return of GITMO detainees who were bakraed and handed to US and released after finding out these were marginal players. These releases started in 2004-2005. Baitullah Mehsud's cousin or brother was one such guy. BM got angry with the treatment and turned on the TSPA. Fazullullah was already on the go.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 14 Jun 2011 23:34

X-Post.. This is raelly about combatting the Pakiban....

LINK

Nightwatch reports:

Pakistan: According to a report in The Express Tribune, the government plans to urge local tribal elders and tribesmen in North Waziristan to form lashkars (tribal militias) to target al Qaida militants as well as the Tajik, Uzbek and Chechen militants hiding in the tribal agency. An unnamed Pakistani military official said US CIA Director Panetta and Pakistani Chief of Army Staff General Kayani discussed the idea of facilitating the formation of pro-government tribal laskhars.

The anti-US and anti-Afghanistan insurgent syndicate led by the Haqqanis, however, will not be targeted. Islamabad's priority is to remove anti-Pakistan government militants from the area first. Another source said once Pakistan enlists the aid of the tribes, it will be easier for the army to drive the militants out of North Waziristan. :rotfl:

Comment: There is less here than the report suggests. The constitutional provisions governing the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas, of which North Waziristan is one, restrict the Army from operating freely in the tribal agencies, except by invitation, in the event of an insurrection and to defend the national borders. The tribal leaders already have the authority, working through the federal government's political agents, to invite the Army to operate or to form tribal militias. The major drawbacks are concerns about local autonomy and lack of organization, financing, weapons and training.

Musharraf used lashkars to help suppress anti-Pakistan groups in the agencies, but they usually tipped off the targets of federal operations. They all live together in the neighborhood under Pashtun hospitality customs.

The announcement of the plan is mostly for public relations purposes, but the exemption of the Haqqanis as targets proves the point that Pakistan has no quarrel with anti-Afghanistan groups who operate from Pakistan but otherwise cause no trouble for Pakistan. These groups include Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Moreover, a crackdown on the large Afghan Pashtun population in Pakistan risks causing even more unmanageable internal instability.


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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 25 Aug 2011 07:01

X-posted...

A_Gupta wrote:
Purports to be a conversation between a Pakistani army person and a Taliban (Don't be misled by the "Iraq Mideast collection")
http://www.archive.org/details/Mufti_733


The Taliban is TTP. The conversation is very much trading of accusations and justifications by quoting scriptures and hadith.

Main points:

1. TTP quotes scripture - if they fight you in the masjid, kill them there.

2. TTP considers Pak. Army to be murtad (apostate) (because they kill Muslims, scorn the Sharia, and take aid from the kafirs against Muslims).

3. TTP says taking aid from kafirs to fight kafirs (e.g., American or <b>ISI</b> aid for jihad against Soviet Union) is permissible, but to take aid from kafirs to fight other Muslims is not.

4. Army man accuses TTP of killing ulema who don't agree with them. TTP says they kill and will kill such mullahs that are darbari mullahs, that serve taghut (false belief) and are on the wrong path. Killing of other mullahs, TTP accuses the army of killing them.

5. Army man says you are killing people who say they are Muslim, pronounce the Kalima. You can't call them murtad (apostate) at worst munafiq (hypocrite). TTP says that you are born in Muslim family, you know better, you are not munafiq, you are murtad. Renouncing by speech is not the only way to be murtad; actions such as opposing Sharia make one murtad. In any case killing munafiq is permissible, though not compulsory.

5. TTP says the market bombings are done by Pak army and Blackwater.

6. TTP says we consider Americans and Pakistan Army to be the same. Americans make 80000 a month and Pakis 300 a month but apart from them, not difference as far as killing them.

7. Army says during Soviet Jihad you did not fight for Sharia, you took money from us, etc., why didn't you take this stand back then? TTP says, yes, that was our sin, we accept our mistake.

8. TTP says, America uses you like tissue paper, and pays you peanuts.

9. TTP says, it became apparent that Pakistan is kaffiriya country not Islamic country only after the jihad against the Soviet Union was over. We should have known since 1947.

10. Army man says that you all called Jinnah Kafir-e-Azam for fighting for Pakistan, and after Pakistan was formed you took over Pakistan. TTP says, Jinnah, Karzai are all Kafirs of the same type. Jinnah was an Ismaili Shia, not a Muslim. Army man says he was "Muhammad Ali Jinnah". TTP says, yes, Ali signifies Shia, Shia are kafir.

11. TTP argues from the great flood, and from hadith, that if attacking a legitimate target in jihad (e.g., army school) results in the killing of women and children, that is permissible. The Prophet himself killed women or had women killed.

12. TTP says that the hadith quoted by the Army man that if any hadith contradicts the Quran, then discard the hadith is a false one.

13. TTP justifies aggressive jihad. Justifies weapons in the masjid.

14. TTP accuses Pakistani army of destroying many masjids.

15. Army man accuses TTP of slitting throats and cutting off noses and ears. TTP says that slitting throats is the Sunnat of the Prophet. Cutting off of noses and ears is haraam.

16. Army man accuses TTP of fitna (causing conflict), and going against Allah. TTP says you had earthquake where lots of Army died and destruction of Nowshera army camp and elsewhere last year, we believe TTP's sacrifices are accepted by Allah. You are murtad and Allah will make you barbaad. We estimate you're 80% done, and when your Uncle America leaves your ruin will be complete.

17. Army man says you guys haven't been successful in 11 years, Hezbollah with good niyat rocked Israel in Lebanon conflict in one year. TTP says the Sahaba (companions of the Prophet) who were shaheed are considered successful. We are fighting for Sharia or martyrdom. (Later he says, that if we succeed in Afghanistan only after 50 years, when we come before Allah, He will not taunt us.)

18. Army man accuses TTP of stealing money from Pakistani banks. TTP man says that such banks with American or Paki army money are legitimate jihad targets.

19. TTP: "Deen ki baat akl se nahi, nakal se chalti hai" (i.e. matters of religion are decided not from reason but from imitating (the examples of Prophet and Sahaba).

20. Army man accuses TTP of considering all Pakistanis as kafirs. TTP says, any government of Pakistan money, not just army money is permissible to loot. We do not target children. Army man accuses TTP of kidnapping and extortion for ransom. TTP says, we only kidnap people like you.

21. Army man says why haven't you gone and fought in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan? TTP says just as the Prophet did jihad first in Medina and later in Mecca after he gained strength, similarly Uzbeks, Turkmens will do. Eventually TTP will do jihad there. Like the Ansar of Medina, we welcome Uzbek, Turkmen mohajirs.

22. Army man returns to accusation of fitna. TTP says we are fighting fitna. Army man accuses them of not engaging ulema in debate but killing them. TTP says, any maulvi who sides with the government against Sharia, are legitimate to kill, and TTP will continue to kill them.

23. Army man says as reported in the news, Mullah Omar has disavowed any involvement with Taliban in Pakistan. TTP says, that Mullah Omar's words comes to us through tape recordings, paper with signature or by authorized messenger, not by internet or newspaper. We know him better than you.

24. Army man accuses TTP of taking Indian money. TTP asks - are you sick. On being pressed, TTP says, it is your foreign minister who goes to India. You gave Bangladesh, Kashmir to them, took defeat in Kargil, surrendered 90,000 to them, you are slaves of India.

25. Army man says you said you'd liberate Kashmir, rid Afghanistan of Americans, etc., you have had no success (implying Allah does not favor you). TTP says we measure success by bringing about Sharia or martyrdom. TTP reminds army man that at the time when Prophet predicted Ghazawa-e-Hind, Pakistan was part of Hindustan (i.e., TTP is fulfilling prophecy by jihad in Pakistan).


Arun Great job!!!!

Authenticates this thread....

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 25 Jan 2012 01:10

X-Post....



Pioneer Review: God's Soldiers

I would have used a different title for the review. God implies some divine sanction for their terrorism.

The Caliphate’s Soldiers: The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba’s Long War

Author: Wilson John

Publisher: Amaryllis

Price: 450

Wilson John’s book takes a close look at Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyeba and exposes its links with the ruling establishment in Islamabad, writes Ved Marwah

Today, Islamist terrorists pose the most serious threat to world peace. The September 11 attacks shook the US out of its complacent belief that Al Qaeda and other jihadi outfits had a limited agenda and the Western world was safe from their barbarous brand of terrorism.

Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) is one such group. Its devious role in spreading its tentacles across the world has been carefully hidden by its public posturing of focusing only on India. The US conveniently indulged in doublespeak and invited Pakistan, the epicentre of terrorism, to be the frontline ally in its war on terror. It intentionally ignored the fact that LeT was the creation of Pakistan.

It also chose to disregard all evidences regarding the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) supporting the jihadi network in Pakistan. This delusion was shattered after the killing of Osama bin Laden by the US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, the garrison town near Islamabad, in May 2011. Pakistan is a problem and not the solution.

Wilson John, a Senior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation, a public policy think tank in New Delhi, has written this well-researched, well-argued and timely book to give authentic information about how LeT and its sponsors — the ISI and, in fact, the entire ruling establishment in Islamabad — is nurturing these jihadi groups to re-establishing the Caliphate and the domination of Islam in the world. Their main targets “include, beside India, the Southeast Asian countries in the Indian Ocean, across the Pacific to the US and ultimately Pakistan itself”. The book has been rightly called “a primer in the best sense of the word” by Ashley J Tellis, a well-known security expert.

John has given facts and figures to underline LeT’s role as the strategic ally of the Pakistan Army, its deep anchorage in the society, and its power to influence public opinion and events in the subcontinent. The book exposes the clandestine but extensive network of terror that runs through the corridors of power and politics in Pakistan. It reveals how LeT shares more than ideological affinity with Al Qaeda. Hafiz Saeed, the founder of LeT, was greatly influenced by Laden. LeT’s links with Al Qaeda have largely remained obscure, but the author has given enough tell-tale details about its genetic links and its strategic posture to keep a low profile while focusing on India. There is no other terrorist group that is so popular among the Pakistani people and enjoys total support of the army and the ruling establishment.

According to the author, LeT has trained more than 500,000 men and women since the late 1990s. It is deeply involved in strengthening its ideological base. Besides schools, colleges, madarsas and technical institutes, “it produces graduates and technically-skilled personnel in hundreds every year who find employment in government, private sector and self-owned business”. It has been especially targeting the military by getting many of its cadres recruited in the armed forces. It has also strengthened its role in the politico-administrative system of Pakistan.

LeT has been quite successful in building a network of recruitment centre across the world. And, its training camps are openly run in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir, West Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan. A number of retired Pakistani military officers are among its trainers.

LeT, the armed wing of Markaz Dawat ul-Irshad, was formed in 1990. It is “more nuanced, layered and hidden deep within the moorings of the group, its beliefs, its strategic objectives, tactical goals and its leadership”. While Al Qaeda derives ideological inspiration from the Sunni Wahhabi movement, LeT is closer to Ahl-e-Hadith that is today active in spreading extremism and communal divide in Jammu & Kashmir. LeT’s primary focus is to free Kashmir and Palestine from the ‘non-believers’. But let there be no mistake that, like Al Qaeda, the Muslim domination in the world is its ultimate objective.

After the Markaz was banned in 2001, except the change in its name to Jamat-ud Dawa, nothing else was changed. The LeT network is as active as before the ban. The terror footprints revealed in the David Headley case give a glimpse of the group’s evolution from a local organisation to transnational one, with capacity to network with disparate elements across the world. It continues to be the most active jihadi group in India. It has successfully created a number of home-grown Islamist outfits in various parts of the country to hide its footprints. Its strong links with Indian Mujahideen (IM) have been revealed in more than one recent terrorist incident. Amir Raza of LeT is one the key masterminds behind IM. The author has given details about how it has spread its tentacles in Bangladesh. It is close to HuJI, and has base in Nepal. Its recent forays into the Maldives have sounded alarm bells in both Male and New Delhi.

According to John, LeT is today the most potent force in Asia, capable of destabilising the region and pushing the world into a nuclear confrontation. He fears “great possibility of Al Qaeda acquiring nuclear weapons” sooner rather than later through the help of groups like LeT and their sponsors. The world should prepare for any such eventuality even if some security experts do not take the possibility too seriously. The chapters — ‘Command and Control’, ‘Commando Training Centre’, ‘Recruitment and Terror as Strategy’ — give a lot of useful information about the outfit and its operations, but the one on the ‘Business of Jihad’ is the most revealing as well as interesting.The activities of LeT in view of what is happening in Pakistan today should be of special interest in India, not only to the security experts and policy-makers but also lay readers interested in knowing about the region. My only criticism is that the book should have had stricter editing to avoid a few repetitions.

The reviewer, a retired IPS officer, is former Governor of Manipur and Jharkhand



SSridhar,

I wish you write the book on this subject.

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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby RajeshA » 20 Apr 2012 15:30

PTH for some unexplainable reason deleted this post of mine

Code: Select all

http://pakteahouse.net/2012/04/19/17108/comment-page-1/#comment-87254



I presume when Pakistani occupation of Pushtun lands will end, the Pushtuns too would give the Pakjabis some rest.

1) The Paki Army thought it could keep Pushtun Nationalism under control by keeping them busy having them attack Kashmir, or fighting the Soviets, or fighting among themselves, or fighting the Americans.

2) The Paki Army thought if they islamize Pakistan calling Pakistan is Islam and Islam is Pakistan and in parallel islamize the Pushtuns channeling Saudi funding into radicalizing Pushtun madrassas, then Pushtuns would forget separatism. So stupid Pushtuns are caning their daughters who want to go to school, and the Pakjabis are watching Bollywood movies.

3) The Pakis have made the Pushtuns the cannon fodder for their wars. The Pushtun die on the front and the Paki Army gets to keep the Coalition Support Funds. The Pushtuns gets the Hellfire missile rained on them by the drones and the Pakistani Army gets to encash the blood money checks.

4) The Paki Army has employed the Pushtuns to do the harvesting of poppy, even as they do the wholesale of hashish to various markets.

So that is what the Pushtuns have got out of Pakistan - radicalization by design, poverty, drug peddling, target practice for others!

If the Pushtuns wake up and start demanding Pushtunistan again from Pakistan, then Pakis would be down the gutter.

ramana
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Re: Pakiban- Origins, Composition, Tactics and Leadership

Postby ramana » 12 Jun 2012 21:36

Two x-posts for refs.

Anujan wrote:http://dawn.com/2012/06/12/tirah-capture/
A FACTION of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has defeated the local Kukikhel tribe to take over one of the last bits of Khyber Agency’s Tirah Valley that had not already fallen into militant hands. Remote as it is, Tirah is no insignificant mountain hideout. On the one side it shares a border with Afghanistan. On the other it leads to the plains of Bara, which connect the agency to the outskirts of Peshawar. Khyber also links several agencies to each other, serving as a north-south route within Fata. So it has long been fought over by a mix of militant organisations, including the TTP, the Ansarul Islam and Mangal Bagh’s Lashkar-i-Islam.



and

Dilbu wrote:Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan asks Mehsud tribes to leave South Waziristan
In view of an ongoing war in the FATA (Federally Administrated Tribal Agency), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) issued final warning to the local residents to leave South Waziristan at the earliest.

According to the media reports, the TTP issued a pamphlet in South Waziristan, issuing final forewarning to the local tribes.


The pamphlet noted, “No NGO or any NGO contractors were allowed to operate in the area. Rather it termed them as legitimate targets. The employees associated with educational activities, health, and members of the Khasadar force (volunteer force) are also included in the lists.”

The press note stated that these people, if caught working will be treated as criminals. It also forewarned that house owners and others who assisted Mehsud tribe members in settling in South Waziristan had committed a crime.

The pamphlet also had a warning for those operating transportation enterprises, saying these people were committing an unpardonable offense.



So TTP is consolidating the area and has declared it a war zone.

A question for SSridhar, Are the Mehsuds not local to South Waziristan?


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