Af-Pak -> Pak-Af Watch
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Strat's take
"Analysis
U.S. President Barack Obama outlined his administration’s strategy for the Afghan war in a March 27 press conference. Among the strategy’s elements are more trainers for the Afghan military, more troops to hunt the Taliban and al Qaeda, and deeper integration between U.S. troops and their Afghan counterparts.
The part of the plan that most caught STRATFOR’s attention was the sharp change in the tone of the rhetoric used toward Pakistan and the strategy’s inclusion of $1.5 billion in assistance to Pakistan’s civilian government annually for five years (subject to certain conditions, of course). This amount is more or less what the Bush administration spent on the Musharraf regime.
This adjustment in tone and funding marks a fairly sharp shift in recent U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and hints at a change of the overall focus of American foreign policy away from Afghanistan and toward Russia. But before understanding where U.S. policy is going, it is important to examine where it has been.
Until late 2008, the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was largely restricted because of power groups deeply enmeshed within the United States’ primary “ally” in the Afghan war: Pakistan. Pakistan has always been militarily inferior to its primary rival, India, and so has had to foster various militant Islamist groups in order to counter India’s conventional military strength. These groups also proved essential both in Pakistan’s opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the Cold War and in maintaining Pakistani influence both before and after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Herein lies the rub. In October 2001, the Americans essentially forced the Pakistanis to facilitate the American hunt for al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This resulted in many of the militant Islamists who are so critical to Pakistani foreign policy feeling betrayed. This in turn led them to either turn on their masters or ally with elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments to oppose American — and by extension, Pakistani — military policy in Afghanistan. Most of these militants were not Kashmiri or even Afghan, but actually from Pakistan’s northwestern regions. In essence, the American pursuit of al Qaeda in Afghanistan triggered a Pakistani civil war.
It is a war that the Pakistani government has not been particularly enthusiastic about fighting. Not only are most of the belligerents actual Pakistanis who retain deep links into the Pakistani military establishment, but many Pakistani policymakers see the militants as the most effective foreign policy tool Pakistan has ever had. Even those willing to hunt down their own have faced constant obstacles from those who disagree, which certainly saps the war effort. The result is that Pakistan is — at best — an unwilling participant in U.S. military operations, and lackluster Pakistani assistance has lessened American effectiveness in Afghanistan. This has also resulted in massive security complications for NATO convoys that are forced to transit Pakistan en route to the war in Afghanistan. Yet because Pakistan was critical to the war effort, there was little the Americans could do except bribe the Pakistanis to do more, a policy that — especially when one considers what the stakes are in a civil war — has met with understandably thin results.
The Mumbai attacks of November 2008 — in which some of these Pakistani-linked militants killed several hundred people in India — raised the possibility of a new strategy. The trick was to make Islamabad feel that it had no options but to more aggressively prosecute the war. This would require leveraging Indian anger to scare the Pakistanis on one hand, and forging an alternative supply route through Central Asia so that NATO would not depend so much on the Pakistanis on the other. Pakistan would be isolated, and would face the choice of cooperating more thoroughly or risk cracking apart under the strain of a civil war the United States no longer had a stake in. It was the ultimate bad-cop strategy.
With Obama’s announcement to grant $1.5 billion in annual aid — slightly more than 1 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product — for five years, the Obama administration appears to be emphasizing the good-cop strategy over the bad-cop one and switching back to attempts to influence Pakistan via positive incentives.
The Obama announcement, therefore, raises three questions:
1.Why go back to playing good-cop? Critics may charge that the new Obama plan is simply reverting to the Bush administration strategy, which has not done particularly well at “winning” the Afghan war. But there are two reasons the bad-cop strategy was always a shot in the dark. First, for the bad-cop strategy to work, the United States cannot be dependent upon Pakistan. It would require a robust supply line to Afghanistan that transits the Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia. In addition to the logistical difficulties of this alternative route to ferry supplies from the north, the Russians’ price for such a supply route is for the United States to abandon not just its ambitions for Central Asia, but to forge a new continental security relationship that would roll back much of the economic, political and military gains the United States has made since the end of the Cold War. The Obama administration seems to have come to the conclusion that getting a leg up in the Afghan war is not worth the reforging of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, even if the plan was perfectly executed and the Russians blamelessly cooperative, forcing Pakistan to act against its basic self interest would have led to sporadic cooperation from the Pakistanis at best. No matter what plan was used, Pakistan would still border Afghanistan, and the border region would still be critical to the war effort. U.S. forces were going to continue to pursue militants on both sides of the border, and that means U.S. forces would regularly violate Pakistani sovereignty. Pakistan simply could not be cut out of the process because it is a significant part of the problem. Put differently, the routes through Moscow’s sphere of influence are not an alternative to the ones from Pakistan, though there is likely to be limited cooperation with Moscow and the Central Asian states for one or more supplementary routes.
2.To what degree can the Pakistanis supply any assistance? Considering the depth of Pakistani opposition to U.S. policies, and the fact that the more recalcitrant members of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishments will see the Obama plan as a reason to continue resistance, in all practicality the best that can be hoped for is that Pakistan will supply more security to NATO convoys. Anything more is simply wishful thinking.
3.What is necessary to make the new strategy work? The answer to this one is simple: Troops, and lots of them. With Pakistan providing at best limited support, Obama is going to be utterly reliant upon the Europeans to provide more manpower. Which is why the announcement came on Friday, March 27; next week, Obama will be in Europe for the G20 summit and the NATO summit. These are the venues at which Obama will make his case for assistance.
Conceptually, the Obama plan is about as sound as a plan for Afghanistan can be, but then again, so was the Bush plan — which the Obama plan is essentially continuing. And as Bush discovered, “conceptually sound” and “operationally sound” are two very different things."
"Analysis
U.S. President Barack Obama outlined his administration’s strategy for the Afghan war in a March 27 press conference. Among the strategy’s elements are more trainers for the Afghan military, more troops to hunt the Taliban and al Qaeda, and deeper integration between U.S. troops and their Afghan counterparts.
The part of the plan that most caught STRATFOR’s attention was the sharp change in the tone of the rhetoric used toward Pakistan and the strategy’s inclusion of $1.5 billion in assistance to Pakistan’s civilian government annually for five years (subject to certain conditions, of course). This amount is more or less what the Bush administration spent on the Musharraf regime.
This adjustment in tone and funding marks a fairly sharp shift in recent U.S. policy toward Pakistan, and hints at a change of the overall focus of American foreign policy away from Afghanistan and toward Russia. But before understanding where U.S. policy is going, it is important to examine where it has been.
Until late 2008, the effectiveness of U.S. policy in Afghanistan was largely restricted because of power groups deeply enmeshed within the United States’ primary “ally” in the Afghan war: Pakistan. Pakistan has always been militarily inferior to its primary rival, India, and so has had to foster various militant Islamist groups in order to counter India’s conventional military strength. These groups also proved essential both in Pakistan’s opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the Cold War and in maintaining Pakistani influence both before and after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
Herein lies the rub. In October 2001, the Americans essentially forced the Pakistanis to facilitate the American hunt for al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This resulted in many of the militant Islamists who are so critical to Pakistani foreign policy feeling betrayed. This in turn led them to either turn on their masters or ally with elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishments to oppose American — and by extension, Pakistani — military policy in Afghanistan. Most of these militants were not Kashmiri or even Afghan, but actually from Pakistan’s northwestern regions. In essence, the American pursuit of al Qaeda in Afghanistan triggered a Pakistani civil war.
It is a war that the Pakistani government has not been particularly enthusiastic about fighting. Not only are most of the belligerents actual Pakistanis who retain deep links into the Pakistani military establishment, but many Pakistani policymakers see the militants as the most effective foreign policy tool Pakistan has ever had. Even those willing to hunt down their own have faced constant obstacles from those who disagree, which certainly saps the war effort. The result is that Pakistan is — at best — an unwilling participant in U.S. military operations, and lackluster Pakistani assistance has lessened American effectiveness in Afghanistan. This has also resulted in massive security complications for NATO convoys that are forced to transit Pakistan en route to the war in Afghanistan. Yet because Pakistan was critical to the war effort, there was little the Americans could do except bribe the Pakistanis to do more, a policy that — especially when one considers what the stakes are in a civil war — has met with understandably thin results.
The Mumbai attacks of November 2008 — in which some of these Pakistani-linked militants killed several hundred people in India — raised the possibility of a new strategy. The trick was to make Islamabad feel that it had no options but to more aggressively prosecute the war. This would require leveraging Indian anger to scare the Pakistanis on one hand, and forging an alternative supply route through Central Asia so that NATO would not depend so much on the Pakistanis on the other. Pakistan would be isolated, and would face the choice of cooperating more thoroughly or risk cracking apart under the strain of a civil war the United States no longer had a stake in. It was the ultimate bad-cop strategy.
With Obama’s announcement to grant $1.5 billion in annual aid — slightly more than 1 percent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product — for five years, the Obama administration appears to be emphasizing the good-cop strategy over the bad-cop one and switching back to attempts to influence Pakistan via positive incentives.
The Obama announcement, therefore, raises three questions:
1.Why go back to playing good-cop? Critics may charge that the new Obama plan is simply reverting to the Bush administration strategy, which has not done particularly well at “winning” the Afghan war. But there are two reasons the bad-cop strategy was always a shot in the dark. First, for the bad-cop strategy to work, the United States cannot be dependent upon Pakistan. It would require a robust supply line to Afghanistan that transits the Russian sphere of influence in Central Asia. In addition to the logistical difficulties of this alternative route to ferry supplies from the north, the Russians’ price for such a supply route is for the United States to abandon not just its ambitions for Central Asia, but to forge a new continental security relationship that would roll back much of the economic, political and military gains the United States has made since the end of the Cold War. The Obama administration seems to have come to the conclusion that getting a leg up in the Afghan war is not worth the reforging of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, even if the plan was perfectly executed and the Russians blamelessly cooperative, forcing Pakistan to act against its basic self interest would have led to sporadic cooperation from the Pakistanis at best. No matter what plan was used, Pakistan would still border Afghanistan, and the border region would still be critical to the war effort. U.S. forces were going to continue to pursue militants on both sides of the border, and that means U.S. forces would regularly violate Pakistani sovereignty. Pakistan simply could not be cut out of the process because it is a significant part of the problem. Put differently, the routes through Moscow’s sphere of influence are not an alternative to the ones from Pakistan, though there is likely to be limited cooperation with Moscow and the Central Asian states for one or more supplementary routes.
2.To what degree can the Pakistanis supply any assistance? Considering the depth of Pakistani opposition to U.S. policies, and the fact that the more recalcitrant members of Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishments will see the Obama plan as a reason to continue resistance, in all practicality the best that can be hoped for is that Pakistan will supply more security to NATO convoys. Anything more is simply wishful thinking.
3.What is necessary to make the new strategy work? The answer to this one is simple: Troops, and lots of them. With Pakistan providing at best limited support, Obama is going to be utterly reliant upon the Europeans to provide more manpower. Which is why the announcement came on Friday, March 27; next week, Obama will be in Europe for the G20 summit and the NATO summit. These are the venues at which Obama will make his case for assistance.
Conceptually, the Obama plan is about as sound as a plan for Afghanistan can be, but then again, so was the Bush plan — which the Obama plan is essentially continuing. And as Bush discovered, “conceptually sound” and “operationally sound” are two very different things."
Re: Af-Pak Watch
UK backs Pakistan offensive
Defence secretary insists Britain has to back American plans to hunt down al-Qaida leaders across the Afghan border
Re: Af-Pak Watch
The Real Afghan Issue Is Pakistan
Mr. Obama took a giant step beyond the Bush administration's "Afghanistan policy" when he named the issue "AfPak" -- Afghanistan, Pakistan and their shared, Pashtun-populated border. But this is inverted. We suggest renaming the policy "PakAf," to emphasize that, from the perspective of U.S. interests and regional stability, the heart of the problem lies in Pakistan.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Iran, India may join US war in Afghanistan 
A key US senator said on Thursday that the United States and Iran might begin their cooperation for stabilising Afghanistan after a meeting between officials of the two countries in The Hague next week.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
SCO: Towards a high profile role in Afghanistan - Vladimir Radyuhin in The Hindu
Excerpts . . .
Excerpts . . .
Russia and other SCO members have long argued that Afghanistan’s neighbours should have a stronger role in dealing with the grave security threats emanating from that country. . . . Russia’s anti-drug chief Viktor Ivanov last week called the coalition anti-drug policy a fiasco, noting that opium production in Afghanistan had soared 44 times since the deployment of U.S. and NATO troops in the country. . . . Interestingly, India’s envoy, in his address, directly appealed for granting SCO membership to Afghanistan. . . The idea of Afghanistan joining the SCO would be anathema to the U.S., and President Barack Obama’s proposal to create a NATO-dominated contact group with Afghanistan as part of his new strategy for the region is seen as an attempt to dilute the influence of the SCO, even as he has invited its members to the new group. However, at the Moscow conference the U.S. envoy joined the other delegates in vowing support for the SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan. Analysts linked the dramatic shift in Washington’s position, in favour of sharing its responsibility for Afghanistan’s security with the SCO, to the failure of the U.S.-led military operation. Alexander Lukin, a leading Russian expert on the region, says cooperation with the SCO offers the U.S. and NATO an acceptable format to somehow bring Iran into the dialogue.
The documents adopted at the conference declared support for the efforts of the Karzai government, which has recently fallen out of favour with the U.S. and NATO. Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin warned against creating a power vacuum in Afghanistan in the run-up to the presidential elections later this year. Russia also came out against appeasing the Taliban.
Commendable efforts to achieve national reconciliation must not be supplanted with attempts to strike a deal with the terrorist leaders, the Russian diplomat said.
The Moscow conference call for adopting a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan was consonant with Mr. Obama’s new emphasis on diplomacy, economic assistance, the building of a strong Afghan army and security forces and on shutting down the Pakistani safe haven for extremists. If anything, the Moscow Declaration came harder on Pakistan demanding that it find effective means to combat terrorism, including denying sanctuaries and dismantling the extremist and terrorist network and ideological centres.
. . . the Afghanistan conference reiterated the SCO’s position that while it is opposed to the expansion of U.S. military interests in Central Asia, it is willing to expand cooperation with the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan . . The conference reinforced the SCO as the leading regional security force. It will also strengthen the voice of Afghanistan’s neighbours, including India and Iran, at The Hague meet.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
X-Posted:
India hails U.S. Afghan plan, says ready for a role
Mon Mar 30, 2009 8:19pm IST
India hails U.S. Afghan plan, says ready for a role
Mon Mar 30, 2009 8:19pm IST
NEW DELHI (Reuters) - India said on Monday it was ready to play a role in a new U.S. war strategy for Afghanistan, welcoming what it said was a comprehensive plan to stamp out extremism that had roots in Pakistan.
"We welcome the very clear expression of will to carry through this struggle against extremism in Afghanistan and its roots in Pakistan, which is contained in the new comprehensive U.S. strategy," Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said.
"India has a direct interest in the success of this international effort and India is ready to play a constructive role as a responsible power in defeating extremism of all kinds."
Menon said the new U.S. strategy would come up for discussion between Obama and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh when the two meet on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in London this week.
"I think the situation in the region including what happens in Afghanistan, what's happening in Pakistan, will certainly come up during discussions," he said.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
My man Brahma Chellaney again tells it like it is: Fobbing off the burden. Obama's latest AfPak BS will be a disaster for India. As I have been mentioning several times, US initially set its target pretty high, namely, the unachievable goal getting rid of all the west-specific terrorists in AfPak, but now have settled for a more reasonable and practical goal: Make sure anti-US, anti-west AfPak terrorists are bottled up, and the rest stick to attacking SDREs. And for this, billions of $s reward for TSP.
Obama wants to regionally contain rather than defeat terrorism, as if the monster of terrorism can be deftly confined to the Afpak belt — a blinkered approach that promises to bring Indian security under added pressure. His aides contend that by refocusing US power to contain and deter, America can diplomatically encircle the terrorist threats from Pakistan and the Taliban. Distant America may be able to afford this, but next-door India will bear the consequences.
given that al-Qaeda already is badly splintered and weakened and in no position to openly challenge US interests, Obama can declare ‘mission accomplished’ any time he wants.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Bush Wine In Obama Bottle...
Obama's new strategic broth, to which many cooks have contributed, has shown a clear understanding of the problems confronting him in Afghanistan-Pakistan. Bush and his advisers were not as articulate but they too had come to a similar conclusion though not in as smart a language...
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Obama's AfPak Strategy - Mirza Aslam Beg
Having lost the war in Afghanistan, he has come hard on Pakistan to take-up the cudgels, whereas, Pakistan army itself has lost nerves in Swat, Dir-Bajaur and Waziristan, taking cover behind the political government, to strike accord with the tribals. Keeping the American nation in the dark is no statesmanship. The war in Afghanistan is lost and that truth must be told to the people, i.e. 'the exit strategy and the plan to implement it'. Obama has not shown the magnanimity to rise above what ordinary mortals tend to do, when they encounter the painful reality.
Despite the best efforts made by the army, it could not achieve success in its operations within the Pakistani territory, in Waziristan, Bajaur and Swat. They rightly felt that the best option was to engage into a dialogue and come to a truce. . .If Pakistan breaks the peace treaty, it would result into a debacle and humiliation for the army, simply stated: Pakistan cannot deliver.
The Islamic Resistance emerged from the Pak-Afghan border region and is relentlessly struggling for freedom for the last thirty years, first to defeat the Soviet Union, a very formidable power, and now the USA and their allies, who are encountering the same fate in Afghanistan. The Islamic Resistance is the 'Divine Intervention' and a reality. Denying its existence has proved self-defeating.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Place holder. Watch for developments on this:
X-post...
X-post...
samuel wrote:
Is anyone interested in writing a computational model for the Afpak scenario involving AFPAK, IR, US, UK, RUS, CHN, IND? If necessary, we could increase the state size to all nations in CAR and even the far east. This is a direct offshoot of questions in the future strat thread.
We could develop a model by
a) articulating strategic objectives for individual nations.
b) developing modes of interaction between nations with consequences, in points.
c) a fitness measure on points that becomes probability of attaining goals.
d) strategy for increasing (relative) fitness.
We can use model to ask some questions:
For example, if India were able to hold China by dangling "Aksai Chin for Tawang," hold the north in Afg, have back ups through to RU and IR, can it pincer PoK successfully?
What games can India win?
Anyone want to have a go. It will take a few weeks of work, I think.
S
Re: Af-Pak Watch
From Nightwatch 4/2/09 on the negotiations with Taliban
Afghanistan: Yesterday multiple suicide bombers detonated near a government complex in Kandahar in an apparent attempt to kill President Karzai’s brother who is the Provincial governor. The daylight attack killed 14 civilians and injuring 17 others. Three bombers disguised as police officers broke into the complex after a fourth detonated a truck outside the gates during a meeting of tribal leaders.
The UK newspaper The Independent reported today that the Taliban have agreed to soften some of the restrictions on personal behavior as part of negotiations with the Afghan government. Taliban representatives said they are willing to commit to refraining from measuring the length of men's beards, stopping girls education, banning music and making burqas mandatory for women (a representative said they would be "strongly recommend" in public). The Taliban demand in return the withdrawal of foreign forces within six months, rule in part by religious scholars, and guarantees of safety for their delegation.
The Independent is the first news outlet to report these tentative concessions. {UK link in Af Pak cauldron?}Others, such as the Hindustan Times, are repeating the report. Thus, far Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura has denied that such talks are taking place, much less any inclination to relax the Taliban’s fundamentalist application of Sharia. However, the Washington Post and other news services report the Karzai government is holding talks with Taliban faction leaders. All major Taliban factions reject talks with the US.
The extent of Taliban dominance of districts in Pashtun provinces of the south compels a search for a power sharing mechanism with some Taliban just to reduce the violence, casualties and the strain on the government’s resources. The contradictory press reports about talks and violence are characteristic of convergence, the phenomenon of groping for a power sharing formula. The reporting suggests that the many parties to this group grope have considerable concessions to make before power sharing that makes a difference in the violence is achieved.
Convergence is one of the two most dangerous and deadly periods in an instability problem. The other is divergence, when one or other party in a power sharing arrangement attempts a break out to grab total control. The period of power sharing itself is relatively calm.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Uzbekistan allows supplies for Afghanistan
Uzbekistan agreed Friday to allow the United States to use it as a transit point for the shipment of "non-lethal" supplies to Afghanistan.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
Deleted....
Last edited by ramana on 07 Apr 2009 00:13, edited 1 time in total.
Reason: Deleted.... ramana
Reason: Deleted.... ramana
Re: Af-Pak Watch
US bill tells Pakistan to stop aiding terror in India
As the Obama administration steps up assistance to Pakistan, a leading lawmaker has introduced a legislation that would authorise a tripling of economic aid but expects Islamabad to stop supporting terror groups targeting India.
Howard Berman, who heads the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said his Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act (PEACE), would establish a new framework for US-Pakistan relations.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
US General apologizes to Afghan tribes for past mistakes and promises to read the Holy Koran
The top US general in Afghanistan, Gen David McKiernan, is reaching out to influential Afghan tribesmen in regions where US troops will soon deploy, apologising for past mistakes and saying he is now studying the holy Quran. McKiernan met villagers in Helmand and Kandahar - two of Afghanistan’s most violent provinces - in an attempt to foster good will ahead of the US troop surge that will send 21,000 more forces here this summer to stem an increasingly violent Taliban insurgency. He said he wanted to explain to the tribal elders some of the mistakes US forces have made in the past.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
ExpressIndia :: Apr 11, 2009 :: Obama proposes $2 bln aid to Pak
A supplemental request - in addition to what else has been proposed.
A supplemental request - in addition to what else has been proposed.
Re: Af-Pak Watch
From the conomist rag....
Look carefully at the bolded part. Does seem as if orbat and its reflection discussion on BR erased many a jarnail's sleep in izloo....
Pakistan's murderous extremistsAt dinner, Admiral Mullen repeated the long-held view that the Taliban leadership is hiding in the province of Baluchistan. In turn, Pakistan is deeply suspicious of America’s plans for India to play a central role in the region. Far-fetched rumours that 150,000 Indian troops are to be deployed in Afghanistan are rife in Islamabad. More plausibly, Pakistani intelligence officials accuse India of fanning a burgeoning nationalist insurgency in Baluchistan.
Look carefully at the bolded part. Does seem as if orbat and its reflection discussion on BR erased many a jarnail's sleep in izloo....
Re: Af-Pak Watch
X-Posted:
Charlie Rose - Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger April 6, 2009 - 56:01 - Apr 7, 2009
Pakistan - Iran - US Foreign Policy - Obama Administration
Re: Af-Pak Watch
X-posted..
VinodTK wrote:From Deccan Chronicle:
Russia: N-threat from Pak
From NDTV:
Pak principle nuclear threat: Russia