US and PRC relationship & India

The Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum is a venue to discuss issues pertaining to India's security environment, her strategic outlook on global affairs and as well as the effect of international relations in the Indian Subcontinent. We request members to kindly stay within the mandate of this forum and keep their exchanges of views, on a civilised level, however vehemently any disagreement may be felt. All feedback regarding forum usage may be sent to the moderators using the Feedback Form or by clicking the Report Post Icon in any objectionable post for proper action. Please note that the views expressed by the Members and Moderators on these discussion boards are that of the individuals only and do not reflect the official policy or view of the Bharat-Rakshak.com Website. Copyright Violation is strictly prohibited and may result in revocation of your posting rights - please read the FAQ for full details. Users must also abide by the Forum Guidelines at all times.
Virupaksha
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 3110
Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Virupaksha » 24 Nov 2009 05:52

Dhiman wrote:
If I was running GoI, I would just allow people who get visas on a seperate piece of paper to stick the visa's on the passport with pucca Desi glue then let the Chinese deal with that Beijing Airport. :mrgreen:

Dhimanji,

What you are saying is true, if the flight is direct out of India to China. What if there is some other country in between and he goes out using that? Stopping completely "important" passengers is only a way of putting pressure- to stop that.

vina
BRF Oldie
Posts: 6046
Joined: 11 May 2005 06:56
Location: Doing Nijikaran, Udharikaran and Baazarikaran to Commies and Assorted Leftists

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby vina » 24 Nov 2009 12:17

Ouch.. Very Ouch. This Comment By MMS should really really hurt. Now this is sure to bring all the Drone Acharyas crawling out of the woodwork.

krishnan
BRF Oldie
Posts: 7342
Joined: 07 Oct 2005 12:58
Location: 13° 04' N , 80° 17' E

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby krishnan » 24 Nov 2009 15:18

http://www.expressindia.com/latest-news ... ma/545572/

The United States
has thanked India for extending hospitality to Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, a comment and a situation that isn't going to please China, which views the latter as a renegade and a splitist.

House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi on Monday thanked India for extending hospitality to the Dalai Lama, saying: "India is a country that is value based."

These were the welcoming remarks that she made while receiving Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at Capitol Hill.

She said that from Martin Luther King who received inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi, to the present generation, Americans have learnt "about non-violence and how to get results (by using non violence).

Pelosi invited the Prime Minister to revisit the US soon and address the joint session of Congress.

She also made a mention of the Mumbai attacks saying "Almost one year to the day when India suffered the terrible loss of Mumbai, we gather today to see how we can learn from that experience."

An awkward statement, but nonetheless an acknowledgement that the Mumbai attack is not being ignored in America.

Dressed in a grey trouser suit, Pelosi seemed almost deferential in her manner.

She reminded members of the press "the red carpet has been laid for the Prime Minister from the White House to the Capitol Hill" as Dr Singh "is perhaps one of the most respected leaders in the world."

The Prime Minister thanking the Speaker said that he was honoured and was here to give a new thrust to Indo-US relations.


Comment

by asha on 24 Nov 2009

The PM is enjoying state dinners in US and is skipping both attending parliament and the first 26/11 anniversary. He never misses paying homage to Sonia's relatives - Nehru, Indira and Rajiv.

Hari Seldon
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9255
Joined: 27 Jul 2009 12:47
Location: University of Trantor

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Hari Seldon » 24 Nov 2009 23:07

Pray, why are the Germans breaking out in an orgy of relieved celebration at Sri Obama's more successful than expected Asia tour that concluded recently??

Obama's Nice Guy Act Gets Him Nowhere on the World Stage (Der Spiegel)

The mood in Obama's foreign policy team is tense following an extended Asia trip that produced no palpable results. The "first Pacific president," as Obama called himself, came as a friend and returned as a stranger. The Asians smiled but made no concessions.

Lost Some Stature

Upon taking office, Obama said that he wanted to listen to the world, promising respect instead of arrogance. But Obama's currency isn't as strong as he had believed. Everyone wants respect, but hardly anyone is willing to pay for it. Interests, not emotions, dominate the world of realpolitik. The Asia trip revealed the limits of Washington's new foreign policy: Although Obama did not lose face in China and Japan, he did appear to have lost some of his initial stature.

In Tokyo, the new center-left government even pulled out of its participation in a mission which saw the Japanese navy refueling US warships in the Indian Ocean as part of the Afghanistan campaign. In Beijing, Obama failed to achieve any important concessions whatsoever. There will be no binding commitments from China to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A revaluation of the Chinese currency, which is kept artificially weak, has been postponed. Sanctions against Iran? Not a chance. Nuclear disarmament? Not an issue for the Chinese.

The White House did not even stand up for itself when it came to the question of human rights in China. The president, who had said only a few days earlier that freedom of expression is a universal right, was coerced into attending a joint press conference with Chinese President Hu Jintao, at which questions were forbidden. Former US President George W. Bush had always managed to avoid such press conferences.


Hmmm. If only the smart Harvardi Obama team had put Dilli on the Asia tour, if only for a few brief hours, the copious flood of attn, coverage, fun and fawn he would have gotten here (not to mention concessions - the entire concession stand would have been open 24x7 right at the airport tarmac, I tell ya....) would have turned this trip fromdeficit to surplus in the snap of a pair of chicken fingers.

But sadly, their Atlanti-cyst blinkers blinded them to the obvious only. Tch tch.

There are many indications that the man in charge at the White House will take a tougher stance in the future. Obama's advisors fear a comparison with former Democratic President Jimmy Carter, even more than with Bush. Prominent Republicans have already tried to liken Obama to the humanitarian from Georgia, who lost in his bid to win a second term, because voters felt that he was too soft. "Carter tried weakness and the world got tougher and tougher because the predators, the aggressors, the anti-Americans, the dictators, when they sense weakness, they all start pushing ahead," Newt Gingrich, the former Republican speaker in the House of Representatives, recently said. And then he added: "This does look a lot like Jimmy Carter."


The NEwt dude should try brevity once in a while. "because the predators, the aggressors, the anti-Americans, the dictators" could have been replaced with the "packees", no?

Sanjay M
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4892
Joined: 02 Nov 2005 14:57

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Sanjay M » 25 Nov 2009 04:47

It's quite possible that Obama will be a one-term president, perhaps even losing the Democratic nomination to Hillary. Maybe McCain or someone similar could get another shot at the Whitehouse.

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby svinayak » 25 Nov 2009 08:48

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfY1ISdABSw

Seeing is believing + Solid scientific proof

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 25 Nov 2009 09:04

The hilarious part of the above video is the remarks. The Chinese have totally bought into that and are now behaving like supreme racists. It's like the Pakistanis who think they are white.

biswas
BRFite
Posts: 503
Joined: 02 Nov 2009 20:42
Location: Ozzieland

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby biswas » 25 Nov 2009 16:28

I was watching the video, showed it to a mate of Chinese origins. He laughed and said these are the rednecks of China.

a_bharat
BRFite
Posts: 660
Joined: 07 Aug 2009 09:54

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby a_bharat » 25 Nov 2009 18:21

Steve Forbes on Obama's China policy:

vrags: Do you agree with obama when he made china the guardian of asia?

Steve Forbes : Obama didn't make China the guardian of Asia, although he might have left that impression. He is even less sure-footed on foreign policy than he is on domestic policy. He thinks being obsequious and making the U.S. appear weak will make the U.S. loved by one and all. We haven't seen anything like this since the days of Jimmy Carter. The next U.S. president will have to start to clean up the messes created by the current one, just as Regan had to do with Jimmy Carter.


Chat with Steve Forbes

Singha
BRF Oldie
Posts: 66601
Joined: 13 Aug 2004 19:42
Location: the grasshopper lies heavy

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Singha » 25 Nov 2009 18:41

I always believed the discredited republicans actually helped Obama to win this time , figuring a term by him was a the best way to regain strength and come back, not with the too old mccain but someone in 50s perhaps.

now only the republicans tendency to get into financial and love scandals stands between them and ramparts of whitehouse when obama mania ends.

deep in the dark woods of greenbriar, some poeple must be sitting around a fireplace, drinking the finest bourbon and chuckling...

Hari Seldon
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9255
Joined: 27 Jul 2009 12:47
Location: University of Trantor

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Hari Seldon » 25 Nov 2009 19:25

^^^ Yup, and that new age GOP messiah will likely not be a certain Bobby Jindal of SDRE origins. Or maybe he may yet beat the odds, who knows? Either way, good PR for desis in yamerika.

Prem
BRF Oldie
Posts: 21172
Joined: 01 Jul 1999 11:31
Location: Weighing and Waiting 8T Yconomy

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Prem » 26 Nov 2009 00:36

Cross Posting
I think one of the title of Maharaja Hari Singh or his father was "Tibetdhiraj". Since he signed the accession documents to India,its makes Tibbet Indian terrirtory. His Holiness Dalai Lama and his Tiibetan council should make a public announcement that Tibbet belongs to India and demand plebicite so Mango Tibbetan can verify this accession so Tibbetan can live free to practice their culture and religion.

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 27 Nov 2009 05:14

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/worl ... 272692.cms

The latest emissions capitulation comes after the Obama China visit. Looks as if both China and US's cojones are in Atlantist hands


a_bharat
BRFite
Posts: 660
Joined: 07 Aug 2009 09:54

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby a_bharat » 27 Nov 2009 16:54

India is being careful not to reveal its hand
The US, China, Japan and Russia are seeking India's attention, but New Delhi is keeping all options open

India has been changing its position with regard to strategic issues primarily for two reasons. The first reason covers the ever-growing spectre of an increasingly assertive China. Secondly, India is looking to operationalise its status as an emerging power with regard to the global order. But the predicament for India is that it cannot demonise China and it should not trust the United States. These strategic realities are driving India's emerging strategic outlook.

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 28 Nov 2009 06:46

Had a completely bizarre encounter with this person whose close relative (X) worked for Unkils agency.
Seems like this person was posted in India from mid 40's to mid sixties :shock:
At that time (in mid 40's) portions of US administration did not want India to fall to communism and were tracking influence and fund raising within India. A major source of funds was the "Catholic Church of Beijing" :shock: (Wasn't China atheist).
By late 50's US portions of US administration in favor of communism had grown and they influenced China to invade India.

BTW, as per this individual Mao was not an atheist but a methodist. I have no reason to doubt the credibility but unfortunately, the complete picture is not avail as the close relative has passed away.

These are all random dots.

brihaspati
BRF Oldie
Posts: 12410
Joined: 19 Nov 2008 03:25

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby brihaspati » 28 Nov 2009 07:22

There was a substantial Catholic missionary presence in pre-Communist China. There were also curious collaborations from time to time between the "missionaries" of both sides - reds as well as EJ's. Mao in his early days shifted to a "western style" normal school. The first communists in Beijing University (one of them would be the influential co-founder prof who later became one of Mao's FIL's but was also executed under anti-communist purges under Chiang) had some influence by Christian ideals. But this area is very grey - for the early Chinese radicals were coming from a mixed bag of long-standing legends of peasant uprisings, Robinhoodian (and Bengali "dacait") robbing from the rich to give to the poor, and using remote mountain areas for guerrilla uprisings against repressive/exploitative central authroirties - mixed in with Confucian and Taoist concepts. Exposure to the west, also introduced Christian memes - some of which would have fit in nicely with Confucian and other prevalent attitudes.

There were some later collaborations from Maoist side - especially at one stage with American military officers. The Christian angle seems unlikely unless used by Mao to manipulate the overseas Chinese (many of whom had converted) as well as use the Church for his own plans.

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 28 Nov 2009 07:29

The whole affair is puzzling. Its not just the christian angle but also the fact that US administration was in favor of a communist influence in India by the late 50's.
Also that there were agency people stationed in India way back then.
I guess a complete picture would have helped but this person is swaha.

Pranav
BRF Oldie
Posts: 5280
Joined: 06 Apr 2009 13:23

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Pranav » 28 Nov 2009 09:11

Jarita wrote:The whole affair is puzzling. Its not just the christian angle but also the fact that US administration was in favor of a communist influence in India by the late 50's.
Also that there were agency people stationed in India way back then.
I guess a complete picture would have helped but this person is swaha.


The oligarchs who funded the Bolshevik revolution also own the USA. They also control the top echelons of many Church denominations including the Roman Catholics.

The general strategy is to fund all sides in all disputes.

svinayak
BRF Oldie
Posts: 14223
Joined: 09 Feb 1999 12:31

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby svinayak » 28 Nov 2009 11:31

Jarita wrote:
By late 50's US portions of US administration in favor of communism had grown and they influenced China to invade India.

BTW, as per this individual Mao was not an atheist but a methodist. I have no reason to doubt the credibility but unfortunately, the complete picture is not avail as the close relative has passed away.

Check out the Yale school of divinity and the connection to Mao. The entire revolution was based on Chinese Christian revolt against the Chinese Imperial class and against the Chinese nationalist.

US portions of US administration in favor of communism is actually the evangelical group within the us establishment including the US agencies.

Virupaksha
BR Mainsite Crew
Posts: 3110
Joined: 28 Jun 2007 06:36

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Virupaksha » 28 Nov 2009 11:43

Acharya wrote:Check out the Yale school of divinity and the connection to Mao. The entire revolution was based on Chinese Christian revolt against the Chinese Imperial class and against the Chinese nationalist.
US portions of US administration in favor of communism is actually the evangelical group within the us establishment including the US agencies.

http://books.google.com/books?id=pv62v4 ... ao&f=false

that particular link says that Mao was a staff at Yale divinity school in 1903. The only problem is, Mao is 10 at that time :!:

Though I have to give this much. Yale in China during 1910's had its HQ in Changsa, which was Mao was during that time.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yale%E2%80 ... ssociation

Well his wikipedia is most interesting. It says Mao never knew or even tried to learn mandarin :rotfl:
Last edited by Virupaksha on 28 Nov 2009 11:50, edited 1 time in total.

abhishek_sharma
BRF Oldie
Posts: 9664
Joined: 19 Nov 2009 03:27

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby abhishek_sharma » 28 Nov 2009 11:50

Jarita wrote:Had a completely bizarre encounter with this person whose close relative (X) worked for Unkils agency.
Seems like this person was posted in India from mid 40's to mid sixties :shock:
At that time (in mid 40's) portions of US administration did not want India to fall to communism and were tracking influence and fund raising within India. A major source of funds was the "Catholic Church of Beijing" :shock: (Wasn't China atheist).
By late 50's US portions of US administration in favor of communism had grown and they influenced China to invade India.

BTW, as per this individual Mao was not an atheist but a methodist. I have no reason to doubt the credibility but unfortunately, the complete picture is not avail as the close relative has passed away.

These are all random dots.



I read in George Perkovich's book that the Americans considered giving nuclear bomb to India in early 60s to contain Chinese influence (Of course, we did not need their help). Moreover, in those days the memory of Korean War must be fresh and India was never involved in direct/indirect war against USA.

Sanjay M
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4892
Joined: 02 Nov 2005 14:57

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Sanjay M » 29 Nov 2009 19:49

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/29/weeki ... r-web.html

"prickly response" blahblahblah

Just as for any great power, that would be an easier question for India to answer were it not for problems in its own backyard. Indeed, Mr. Mehta argues that India is in a sense caught in a “defensive crouch” — tied to its neighbors, forced to react to regional security threats, and held back in its aspirations as a global superpower by the volatility of its neighborhood.


And this is why the more the mechanisms of globalization emerge, the more they help to liberate us from the regional shackles. That's why maybe instead of capital-intensive undertakings like a joint Indo-US space collaboration for example, we should instead spend our capital on developing any new mechanisms for global trade that we can - eg. rapid intercontinental transit.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 29 Nov 2009 21:12

From KSgaru:


http://www.indianexpress.com/news/whats ... e/546347/1

INDIAN EXPRESS.COM, NOVEMBER 26, 2009
What’s indispensable?
K. Subrahmanyam

As happened in July 2005, it will take some time to grasp the full scope of the evolution in the Indo-US partnership that has been achieved as a result of the state visit of the Indian prime minister to Washington, DC. Looking through the rosy haze of the time elapsed, there is a widespread nostalgia about George W. Bush and his warmth for India. There is no denying that Bush very successfully persuaded the entire international community to agree to the modification of an international regime and give India waiver from the technology denial to which it had been subjected for three decades. The US at that stage recognised India as a responsible power with advanced nuclear technology. Today President Barack Obama accepts India as a nuclear weapon power, though it may still not qualify under the definition of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. That should set at rest the nightmares of some of our people who conjure up any number of Machiavellian tricks the Washington nuclear ayatollahs could play on India. The three Democratic Senators who lent powerful support to Bush in getting the Indo-US nuclear deal through, Obama, Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, are the leaders of the present administration and therefore are likely to ensure the fruition of the deal.

While Bush was extraordinarily friendly to this country and liberated India from nuclear technology denial, he was unfortunately extremely permissive of Pakistan nurturing terrorism as an instrument of state policy. General Musharraf used Pakistani terrorist organisations not only to perpetrate acts of terror on India but also to make a number of attempts on the US itself. Thanks to the efficiency of the US intelligence and security agencies none of them succeeded. It was necessary for Pakistani generals to keep the US under threat of terror to milk from it billions of dollars under the pretext of fighting terrorism. The maximum growth of terrorist capabilities of Pakistan took place on Bush’s watch. This is not to play down his extraordinary support to India in its attempt to become a world-class power, but to recognise a very unfortunate reality.

It is Obama who told Pakistan that India did not pose a threat to that country and that the extremist threat, if not tackled effectively, is a cancer that will kill Pakistan. He has identified not only Al Qaeda but also its associate organisations as the enemy. His administration has exposed the Lashkar-e-Toiba as a terrorist organisation operating in the US. Washington came in with full support to the Indian investigation in the wake of 26/11 and the cooperation in counter-intelligence between India and the US has made very significant progress. On Obama’s watch the Kerry-Lugar legislation has been tightened to ensure accountability of the Pakistan army. Finally Obama has been able to compel the Pakistan army to act against their own Taliban at present and is keeping up the pressure on them to act against others.

No doubt, for the US the bilateral relationship with China is the most important one at present because China has made itself the banker of the US and holds $800 billion in dollar assets and continues to buy US treasury bonds as the US is running monstrous budget deficits. It should be obvious that US-China bilateral relations are the most important not only to the US but to the world as a whole reeling under the financial crisis since the dollar is the world’s reserve currency.

Obama termed India as an indispensable nation for the 21st century the US wants to build. While China is the present nemesis of the US.
India is the future hope for the US if it were to realise what many Americans used to term “the American century”. Therefore the emphasis is on economic, technological and R&D cooperation and joint efforts to bring about a knowledge century, through partnership and on new emerging technologies, such as clean energy and green products.
An understanding to this end and follow-up strategic planning are perhaps the most meaningful result of this summit. That does not have the sex appeal of the Indo-US nuclear agreement with spectacular displays of Congressional hearings and voting. But this is the solid foundation on which the Indo-US cooperative effort to shape an international system based on values they share has to be built. It is fortunate that both countries have at present self-avowed liberals with commitment to pluralism as leaders. They are also pledged to work for a nuclear weapon-free world.

Much has been made in India and elsewhere of the reference to South Asia in the US-China joint statement. The reference read, “The two sides are ready to strengthen communication, dialogue and cooperation on issues related to South Asia and work together to promote peace, stability and development in that region.” The prime minister has brushed aside the whole issue with his remark that he was not concerned about what the two leaders did between themselves. The history of South Asia in the last 40 years is one of continuous Chinese intervention in favour of Pakistan, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons and strengthening Pakistani capabilities to use terrorism as state policy and the US looking away to the longer-term detriment of its own interests. If they are to engage in a dialogue to promote peace and stability, good luck to them.

A comparison of the joint statements issued between US and China last week and the present joint statement makes abundantly clear the qualitative difference in the two relationships. The Beijing statement mentioned that the two countries believed that to nurture and deepen bilateral strategic trust was essential to US-China relations in the new era, implying that is not available in abundance at present. It did not talk of partnership. While it mentioned interdependence it did not refer to indispensability or shared values. Though there is a large Chinese expatriate population in the US, they have not been cited as a vibrant linkage between the two countries as has been done in respect of the Indian-American community in the absence of shared values between the US and China.

Underlying all this talk of partnership is an unspoken understanding. The US is under challenge by China in respect of its pre-eminence as an economic, technological and military power. Inevitably in the next two to three decades, China will have the world’s highest GDP. Given China’s population and efforts to impart higher education and skills to its population four times the size of that of the US, the economic and technological pre-eminence of the latter is also likely to come under challenge. If the US is to forestall that, it needs a partner with a population approximately equal to China’s. India, English-speaking, democratic and pluralistic, has a vibrant people-to-people relationship with the US.
The writer is a senior defence analyst express@expressindia.com


tejas
BRFite
Posts: 768
Joined: 31 Mar 2008 04:47

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby tejas » 29 Nov 2009 21:57

HUH???? Obama voted against the deal on the Senate floor. Hilliary voted FOR killer amendments to the deal ( which was overwhelmingly defeated) and then voted for the final bill when it was obvious it would pass.

The US is untrustworthy whoever is in power but the democrats especially B. Hussein Obama are Panda lovers.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 01 Dec 2009 02:26

tejas wrote:HUH???? Obama voted against the deal on the Senate floor. Hilliary voted FOR killer amendments to the deal ( which was overwhelmingly defeated) and then voted for the final bill when it was obvious it would pass.

The US is untrustworthy whoever is in power but the democrats especially B. Hussein Obama are Panda lovers.


Tejas the Indian point of view was to allow the US to put whatever conditions or halahal in the bill to please their ego and in the end lift the NSG sanctions which enable India to import the needed fuel. Those conditions dont matter to india for its not effected by them. But they do matter to US for it was after India's PNE that the NSG etc were formed under US tutelage/leadership. So it provides them a fig leaf for the about turn.


Its not about untrustworthy etc its about hedging.

Some of us figured this out in 2006 itself and saw the issues play out as gamed.

tejas
BRFite
Posts: 768
Joined: 31 Mar 2008 04:47

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby tejas » 01 Dec 2009 03:37

The three Democratic Senators who lent powerful support to Bush in getting the Indo-US nuclear deal through, Obama, Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, are the leaders of the present administration and therefore are likely to ensure the fruition of the deal.


Ramana garu, this is what I am referring to with bewilderment. As long as we can import uranium and get reactors from France and Russia clearly we don't need US ( now essentially Japanese) products.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 01 Dec 2009 03:46

tejas wrote:
The three Democratic Senators who lent powerful support to Bush in getting the Indo-US nuclear deal through, Obama, Joe Biden and Hillary Clinton, are the leaders of the present administration and therefore are likely to ensure the fruition of the deal.


Ramana garu, this is what I am referring to with bewilderment. As long as we can import uranium and get reactors from France and Russia clearly we don't need US ( now essentially Japanese) products.


but if US doesnt support the lifting of the NSG sanction how will India import from the rest who are bound by the NSG rules? These three who are in power now channeled all that halahal into Hyde Act or else it wouldnt pass. And again they can help fruition the deal if they want jobs recovery in US. What he is saying is watch the actions of these three to help fruition the deal.

tejas
BRFite
Posts: 768
Joined: 31 Mar 2008 04:47

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby tejas » 01 Dec 2009 06:57

^^^^^^ But boss, Obama voted against the deal on the Senate floor.

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 03 Dec 2009 22:53

Superfusion
How China and America Became One Economy
and Why the World's Prosperity Depends on It

http://search.barnesandnoble.com/bookse ... 1416584049

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 03 Dec 2009 23:08

Unkil is a playa ..

http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_no ... es_1316567

Last week, Indian strategic thinkers were frothing at the mouth over a perception that China and the US were "ganging up" against India, following the insertion of a paragraph on South Asia in the joint statement issued during president Barack Obama's maiden visit to China.But following Indo-US articulations of a "strategic partnership" during prime minister Manmohan Singh's visit, and Obama's commitment to "finalise" the civilian nuclear agreement with India, Chinese commentators are cautioning India and the US against "ganging up" against China.

Jarita
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2466
Joined: 30 Oct 2009 22:27
Location: Andromeda

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Jarita » 05 Dec 2009 01:40

How China influences US academics

http://weeklystandard.com/Content/Publi ... 2kdzck.asp

As stated by one academic economist, "Academics who study China . . . habitually please the Chinese Communist Party, sometimes consciously, and often unconsciously . . . the incentives for academics all go one way: one does not upset the Party."

One of the punitive tools that the Chinese government may employ to intimidate foreign academics is the denial of visas to enter China to conduct research. Although the PRC will not officially acknowledge doing so, elements within the Chinese government have clearly placed a number of foreign academics on a visa denial "blacklist" due to their publishing on topics that hit a nerve with Beijing. One example may be seen in the case of several authors who contributed to a 2004 collection of articles about Xinjiang and subsequently found themselves denied visas to enter China. As described by one of the affected authors, no official explanation was given, other than, "You are not welcome in China. You should know why."

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 18 Dec 2009 22:32

A related snapshot on the thread topic.

From Nightwatch, 12/17/09

Israel-US-China: For the record. Haaretz reported today that senior Israeli officials said U.S. President Obama warned Chinese President Hu Jintao that the United States would not be able to keep Israel from attacking Iranian nuclear installations much longer.

“Sources” said Obama warned Hu as part of his attempt to convince the Chinese to support strict sanctions on Tehran. Israeli officials said China refused a Saudi-American initiative designed to end Chinese dependence on Iranian oil, which would allow China to agree to sanctions. The Israelis said Russian President Dmitri Medvedev shows greater willingness for sanctions on Iran, despite hesitations by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

This report does not seem to ring true, as reported at least. If it is accurate, the message to the Chinese would be extraordinary.


See the commentator's view on the news story.
Probable but not plausible.

Sanjay M
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4892
Joined: 02 Nov 2005 14:57

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Sanjay M » 03 Jan 2010 06:54


Sanjay M
BRF Oldie
Posts: 4892
Joined: 02 Nov 2005 14:57

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Sanjay M » 04 Jan 2010 01:51


ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 16 Jan 2010 03:49

X-posting

Masaru wrote:
SwamyG wrote:The Chinese and Japan continue to meet. The Chinese Vice President, Hi, says Hatoyama should visit China in 2010. Source Hi had visited several Asian countries in December, and had met the Japanese Emperor too. So you ask what is the big deal? Well Ichiro Ozawa actually forced Emperor Akihito to give an exceptional audience to Xi by passing some protocols.

Scratching each others backs is wonderful.


More details on the 'new' relationship is emerging based on the old model of suzerainty. Lots of speculation though.

Hatoyama to Nanjing, Hu to Hiroshima?

The French newspaper Le Figaro reported from Tokyo last Wednesday that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had delivered to the ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) the script of a spectacular reconciliation this year between the two countries. The report said the CCP had proposed that Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama begin the process by going to Nanjing, where a mass killing of Chinese civilians by the Japanese Imperial Army took place in December 1937 and subsequent months.

This first visit to Nanjing by a Japanese prime minister since the war would present to the Chinese people Tokyo's official apologies without ambiguity, easing lingering anti-Japan sentiment among the Chinese public. In return, some months later, on August 15, the anniversary of the Japanese surrender in 1945, Chinese President Hu Jintao would go to Hiroshima, the first city to experience atomic bombing, and declare the three non-nuclear principles: China will not make a nuclear first strike, will not attack any non-nuclear country and will not export nuclear arms. :rotfl:

China seems to have refrained from using the Japan historic card to control its own people since 1996, when then-prime minister Shinzo Abe chose Beijing for his first overseas visit out of a desire to strengthen ties with the leaders of Japan's important neighbor. Historically, the CCP's one-party regime has been legitimized, in part, by its struggle against the Japanese invader.Though KMT did all the fighting when Mao was hiding in the mountains :rotfl:

There are conflicting views among Japanese experts. Some say that in preparation for a succession of power in 2012 and beyond, Beijing's secret battles are intensifying. A faction of ex-president Jiang Zemin, who annoyed Japanese leaders by bringing up the history issue during a banquet with the emperor, has been gaining ground recently. Others believe Beijing wants to settle historic issues once and for all, to enable the two nations to build a future-oriented relationship of mutual trust.

Prime Minister Hatoyama will likely continue his promised efforts to "rebalance" Japanese relations with the US and China, but now that he's actually responsible for governing, Mr Hatoyama needs to ask himself: Which country would ultimately keep the Japanese people's best interests at heart - democratic America or authoritarian China? If the prime minister answers the latter, then the Japanese public - and the Obama administration - really will need to start worrying.



There is re-balancing going on since the powers see a chance to assert themselves away from Western dominance since Vasoc Da Gama's discovery of sea route.

Japan made a mistake in 1920 in not understanding they were going to get cut down to size if they continued to assert themselves without resources. Their grab of Chinese territory and later of SE Asia was to compensate for lack of resources and cut-off from British markets. Being drunk with their own power they did a lot of atrocities and paid the price in WWII. A Burmese villager said "The Nipponese soldier struts like the cock that thinks the sun rises because he crows!"

The Cold War exigencies kept them under check and in alliance with US. Now that CW ended and they see US financially over stretched they are taking corrective actions.

However their loss in early 20th centruy was due to being kept out of British Empire mercantile stmping grounds. And that is still to be redressed.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 18 Jan 2010 22:19

X-Post...


Meanwile here is SS Menon's speech I was talking about.

No link. Maybe go to Travancore palace and try it.




Three Years as Foreign Secretary

(Sree Chitra Thirunal Memorial Lecture,
Thiruvananthapuram, 14 November 2009)

S.Menon


Your Highness Padmanabhadasa,

Professor MD Nalapat,

Shri T P Sreenivasan,
Shri T Ravindran Thampi, General Secretary of the Samithi,
Ladies and Gentlemen.


Thank you for asking me to deliver this prestigious lecture. It is a double honour and pleasure, to come home and to have the privilege of delivering the prestigious Sree Chitra Thirunal memorial lecture. A most distinguished roster of previous speakers has set a very high standard for these lectures on aspects of our public life.

It is a particular honour to speak in memory of one who, more than most, was the father of much that is admirable in Kerala, -- our high educational standards, the preservation and development of traditional culture while we modernise, the democratic foundations of our political life, and the beginnings of social equality. For all this not just Kerala but India as a whole owes Sree Chitra Thirunal a great debt of gratitude.

But there is more for which we must be grateful to him and which makes it important that we commemorate his memory. For while achieving so much that was pioneering in the public sphere, he also set an example of modesty, humility, principle, and rectitude in the private sphere that one wishes were more widely practiced today in both public and private life. The stories are legion about his exemplary behaviour, which led to his being called a “modern Ashoka” or Buddha, and to Gandhiji paying him tribute as a true Mahatma. Sree Chitra Thirunal’s conduct remained the same throughout the long period when he was with us, whether he was the Maharaja, the Rajpramukh, or, as he himself reminded people, an ordinary citizen of the Republic. It is difficult for ordinary mortals to live up to the extremely high standards that he set. But his is an example that we should remind ourselves of often. Occasions like today’s are both fitting and necessary to remind ourselves of the great contributions and the example that he set for us.

It was suggested to me that I might speak on three years as Foreign Secretary. I can claim no credit for this topic. For this you have the indefatigable TP Sreenivasan to thank. But when he suggested it I thought it might be a useful tag to see whether Foreign Secretaries are actually capable of learning from experience.

Besides, the three years when I was Foreign Secretary, from 2006 to mid 2009, were years when the world situation underwent what can only be described as a phase transformation or a fundamental change. This was a period when boom turned to bust in the West, when the unprecedented expansion of the world economy and world trade and investment came to a sudden end in the worst global economic crisis since the Great Depression of the thirties. It was also a time when political developments in our immediate vicinity, (like the rise of China, the transformation of India and other powers, and internal crises in our neighbours), changed our geopolitical situation, creating both challenges and opportunities for our diplomacy.

I therefore thought that I might speak about the international situation in this period, describe the major challenges that we in India faced, and then try to see whether one can draw conclusions from the experience of those three years.


I. The International Situation

In many ways, the period after 1991 was the most favourable to our quest to develop India. As you know, the primary purpose of India’s foreign policy is to create, to the extent possible within our means and the given situation, an external environment that enables the domestic transformation of India into a modern, democratic, secular society in which each citizen has the opportunity to achieve their potential. To do this we require an environment of peace, free of external entanglements, and with the access to technologies, markets, raw materials and capital that international trade and economic cooperation provide. As a necessary and essential corollary, we also require security, a stable environment, and strategic autonomy for ourselves if we are to have a chance of growing equitably at the 8-10% we require until at least 2020 if we are to abolish mass poverty in India.

Why do I say that the post Cold War external environment after 1991 of a globalizing world without rival political alliances was the most supportive of our quest that we have known since independence? The breakup of the two Cold War blocs gave India the opportunity and strategic space to take initiatives with her neighbours, to improve relations with major powers, and to rapidly develop beneficial external economic and other links. The risks of direct conflict between two or more major powers had diminished due to interdependence created by globalization. And the unprecedented growth and strength of global capital and trade flows was directly beneficial to emerging economies like India, China and others.

It was therefore possible for India in this period to engage much more actively with her neighbours, through repeated attempts by successive governments to improve relations with Pakistan, the border related CBMs with China, free trade agreements with neighbours starting with Sri Lanka in 1998, the Ganga Waters Treaty with Bangladesh and several other steps.

And yet, by mid-2006 the first signs were visible that this, historically speaking, brief and unprecedented moment of opportunity for India (and others) might be coming to an end. Why do I say so?

1. The situation in our neighbourhood was deteriorating. What had begun promisingly in 2004 January with Pakistan had come to a stop after the multiple bombing of Mumbai suburban trains in July 2006, and ceasefire violations and infiltration by terrorists from Pakistan. Bangladesh seemed to be heading for an election where, (as was later proved), 10 million voters amounting to almost 15% of the persons on the electoral rolls would have been fictitious! In Sri Lanka the civil war seemed endless in its toll of human suffering. And in Nepal the double transition to democracy and mainstreaming the Maoists was stalled.
2. It was also clear that the Asian balance was shifting. While the US was engrossed in Iraq and Afghanistan, thirty years of reform and 10% growth in China, over twenty-five years of 6% growth in India, and changes in Indonesia and South Korea had changed the geopolitics of the region fundamentally.
3. And more perceptive observers were already seeing an end to the economic boom in the west, though no one foresaw the nature or extent of the crisis that would hit the heart of the capitalist system in 2008.


On the positive side, we had the benefit of the gains of several years of successful diplomatic effort, and the capacities that India had built thanks to sustained effort over sixty years. India’s engagement with the world economy was already of the order of over 250 billion USD a year. Unlike the seventies, we were no longer the issue in our neighbours’ internal political crises, though attempts continued to drag us in. Our relations had improved with all the major powers. The fact that we had done so simultaneously with both China and the USA was a matter of some admiration abroad, and some concern in Pakistan. The civil nuclear initiative, which was unfinished, was the most visible example of a much broader relationship on sensitive issues of substance that we enjoyed with the USA and with each of the major powers. And, most important, we had the confidence and weight that comes to a power that has grown her GDP at 6% for over twenty-five years, thus creating capacities, markets and social change at a rate that not even Britain had matched at the height of the industrial revolution. And this was happening simultaneously in India and China, (where double digit growth in the defence budget and investment in infrastructure and heavy industry was their chosen use for their money).


II. The Challenges

Given this evolving situation around us, it was clear in mid 2006 that our twin tasks were to maintain and grow the gains for India of the post Cold War era, (for want of a better term to describe the period from 1991 to 2006), and to prepare for the changed situation that might be coming. (To be honest, the first person who spoke to me about the likely changes in the situation was Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who foresaw the deterioration as early as 2005.) :!:

In practical terms what we were faced with in the Foreign Office was, as usual, a series of day to day decisions and actions that only cumulate to a grand strategy in the eyes of subsequent observers. Allow me to briefly describe the main challenges that arose, how we attempted to deal with them, and the situation we face today, beginning with our neighbours.

III. The Neighborhood

1. Pakistan
In mid-2006, we had made considerable progress in all three tracks of the dialogue process with Pakistan begun in January 2004. Some progress had been made in addressing difficult issues, including J&K, Siachen and Sir Creek; trade, travel and other links had been restored and, for the first time, had also been set up across the LOC; over 100,000 Pakistanis visited India in 2005; and trade had grown rapidly from 200 million USD in 2003 to 1.5 billion USD in 2006. But the entire process was premised on General Musharraf’s solemn promise not to permit terrorism in any manner against India from territory under Pakistan’s control, and on the ceasefire that had been declared in November 2003. Both were being brought into question by Pakistani actions which began in 2006 but have since culminated in the 26/11/2008 attack on Mumbai. The horrific serial bombing of Mumbai suburban trains in July 2006 was the most visible of these events. Infiltration of terrorists across the LOC and the first ceasefire violations by Pakistan had also begun to rise again by this time.
Our response was to effectively suspend the dialogue while telling Pakistan that she had to prove her bonafides on the issue of terrorism. When PM Manmohan Singh met General Musharraf in Havana in September 2006 on the sidelines of the non-aligned summit, we gave Pakistan one more chance to do so by setting up a Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism to address the crucial issue of terrorism. I will not go into the tortuous story of the next three years, where Pakistan failed each successive test and could not bring herself to act against the terrorists who targeted India from her soil with support from elements at the core of the Pakistani establishment. The story of Pakistani behaviour and links to the successive attacks in our cities through 2007-8, in the bombing of our Embassy in Kabul in July 2008, and the attack on Mumbai on 26/11/08 is too well known. Less well known is the story of Pakistani prevarication and dissembling in the official exchanges in the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism and during other meetings when the subject of terrorism was formally raised by us with Pakistan.
Simultaneously, Pakistan was sinking into a domestic crisis of her own making. The lack of legitimacy of regimes in Pakistan has led them to extreme measures of political manipulation in 1971, 1977 and again in 2007-8, each time with unfortunate results for stability and the polity. By the end of 2007, Benazir Bhutto had been assassinated, and by March 2008 President Musharraf’s own political future was in question. In these circumstances, a democratic government came to power after the elections in Pakistan with promises of better relations and of action against terrorists. Our dilemma remained. Who in Pakistan would, or could, deal with our issues and relationship in a realistic and practical manner, abjuring terrorism as an instrument of Pakistani state policy against India (and Afghanistan)?
We still have no easy answer to that question and that is one reason why Pakistan policy occasions so much debate in India, with more heat than light, (apart from the fact that I cannot think of an Indian who is not an expert on Pakistan). :rotfl:

But, seriously speaking, Pakistan’s quest for an identity of her own has led powerful parts of her establishment to do violence to her own culture and to try to impose a radical Islamic identity and polity on a South Asian society and economy. Portions of the Pakistani establishment have found it useful to propagate an extreme version of political Islam; the Pak Army has found this useful against mass-based democratic parties and the left, and has found anti-Indian rhetoric a patriotic cloak for their own actions.
The results of this futile attempt to fight the facts of geography and history are apparent to all, including thinking Pakistanis today. Today Pakistan is internally besieged by the very jehadi and terrorist groups which were nurtured by the Pakistani state and Army to attack India.
It became clear after 1971 to Pakistan and the world that India had successfully overcome the strategic disadvantages imposed by Partition by creating an integrated polity and growing economy, and had removed the existential threat of further communal division and separatism. The Pakistani establishment’s reaction to this fact was two-fold. Prime Minister Bhutto decided to “eat grass” if necessary to build nuclear weapons, and the Pakistani establishment began the use of terrorism and political Islam in their most extreme forms against India in Punjab and Kashmir and against Afghanistan.

These attempts failed, but that required considerable effort by us, an effort that we are still forced to expend. Pakistan is the epicenter of global terrorism and remains a source of constant concern for us.
In Pakistan today there are multiple power centers. Extremist and terrorist organizations have gained power not just across the Indus but in Pakistani Punjab. State organs work with them and the resulting threats to us are multiple, not just of other attacks like Mumbai but also of the consequences of state failure in Pakistan on the custody of their nuclear weapons and material.
There is no easy way forward out of this situation. A stable Pakistan at peace with itself is clearly in India’s interest and would be better than all the alternatives. That is an outcome that one would hope for. But the struggle in Pakistan will ultimately have to be settled within Pakistan itself, preferably by the Pakistani people. We must continue to engage with those in Pakistan who like us stand against terrorism and extremism and believe in the potential of good relations between India and Pakistan.

2. Bangladesh
In the second half of 2006 Bangladesh was drifting towards an election that no-one believed would be fair or free or reflect the people’s will. It was at that moment that the Bangladesh Army stepped in, cleaned up the electoral rolls and process under a civilian caretaker government, and kept its word by holding elections in less than two years, (an achievement that very few military regimes have matched in the world). Both with the caretaker government and with the new Awami League government that won the election by an overwhelming margin, we attempted to rebuild our bilateral relationship, and have had considerable success.
Why was it possible for Bangladesh to create the present moment of hope in her internal political evolution? Bangladesh has several advantages that comparable states lack. These include an active civil society, real mass based political parties, a popular commitment to democracy, and, most important, a strong and vibrant Bengali culture and identity. Bangladesh has made great progress towards democracy, and has a remarkable economic record of success in this decade, though fragilities in her polity offer extremists and others opportunities.
Our task through this period was to create the enabling international environment that permitted this smooth transition in Bangladesh, without interfering in her internal affairs.

3. Nepal
In Nepal, by mid-2006 it seemed that the peace process had stalled and that there was a real risk of a return to anarchy or civil war. Nepal is attempting a difficult double transition, mainstreaming the Maoists and writing a Constitution for a new republic. Neither of these is easy by itself, and the consequences of failure in either attempt will affect India directly. [Clearly if the Maoists are not mainstreamed, it could impact our Naxalite problem. If the democratic project fails, the door would be open for inimical influences to operate again in Nepal.]
Our task was therefore to work with all the forces in Nepal and those abroad with influence in Nepal to try and restart the peace process so that there could be agreement on elections to a Constituent Assembly, and on terms under which the Maoists would sequester their arms and combatants, thus returning to the mainstream.
This was largely achieved, though no agreement can ever be proof against the normal operation of individual ambition in the subcontinent, particularly when issues of such fundamental and long-term significance are being settled in Nepal. The road ahead therefore seems unclear at times, but such regression as has occurred has not completely derailed the process or sent the Maoists back into the jungle as insurgents yet.
Our role in Nepal is particularly sensitive. We are asked by all the Nepalese political forces and parties to intervene and play a role in producing the outcome they desire, and we become the issue if the outcome deviates from their preferences! This is a true test of diplomatic skill, complicated by the fact that there is an open boundary, free trade and movement, and so many links between us that Nepal, like our other neighbours in the sub-continent, is also a domestic issue in India.

4. Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka is the other example of a foreign policy issue that is also centre stage in domestic politics. The dénouement of the Sri Lankan civil war with its grisly human toll coincided with a period of heightened political sensitivity in Tamilnadu and the build-up to our general elections in 2009.
Throughout the period from 2006 to 2009, we were engaged in multiple tasks: trying to protect and assist the Tamil civilian population who were the major victims of the LTTE and the civil war; defeating LTTE terrorism; and, working for a political dispensation within the Sri Lankan framework in which all the communities of Sri Lanka could feel that they are in control of their own destiny. If this was not complicated enough there were also external interests added to the mix.
It is for history to judge how successful we were in this effort to pursue India’s interests in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka itself, the civil war has ended militarily, but the hard political work remains, to rebuild and rehabilitate a multi-ethnic society destroyed by twenty-seven years of civil war. President Rajapaksa is committed to resettle the 230,000 internally displaced Tamil civilians who are in resettlement camps, and we will do all we can to make this possible. At the same time a lasting settlement requires a political dispensation in Sri Lanka within which all her communities feel comfortable. This is an attempt in which we have tried to assist Sri Lanka since the early eighties. There is an opportunity after the end of military hostilities, but it needs to be taken by all the communities in the country. Whether they will do so is still an open question.

5. China
Our largest neighbour is China. Fortunately, as a result of several years of effort we had, by mid 2006, arrived at a modus vivendi in which we were able to manage difficult issues like the boundary problem in practice (through CBMs and the 1993 and 1996 Agreements); we had agreed not to let the difficult issues prevent the growth of our bilateral relations; our economic and commercial links were rising exponentially until China became our largest single trading partner in 2007; and we were working together on international issues where we found congruence.
The rise of China is probably the major geopolitical development of our times. But it has happened in a very different way from the rise of previous powers in the international system. If China is rising, other Asian powers like India, Korea and Indonesia are also being transformed, in an already crowded Asian balance of power. And China is intimately linked to the US economy for her growth and development. We are not the only power affected by the rise of China. Like the others, we have opted to build on cooperative elements in our relationship with China while trying to solve difficult bilateral issues like the boundary and trans-boundary rivers, and to embed China in positive international relationships.
There are elements of both competition and cooperation in our relations with China. To oversimplify, we have economic complimentarity and China is our largest trading partner with over 52 billion USD of trade last year. We also have considerable congruence in our approach to major global issues such as climate change and energy security. At the same time we have significant bilateral issues such as the world’s largest boundary dispute. We also differ in our approach to handling some regional issues such as terrorism from Pakistan.
We are dealing today with a new China, a China that has grown by over 10% for over thirty years. The result is a young, assertive and confident China, which is looking to consolidate her position in the international hierarchy. We see this on issues like Tibet, the boundary and Tawang.
Dealing with this complex of issues and our relationship with China will be the greatest test of our diplomatic and strategic skill in the immediate future.


IV. Global Issues

1. The USA & the Civil Nuclear Initiative
By mid 2006 our relationship with the USA had been transformed and was steadily growing in scope and significance. PM Manmohan Singh’s July 2005 visit had set the parameters for a wide ranging engagement in areas of mutual interest. Over twenty eight dialogue forums in areas as diverse as energy, agriculture and high technology were making steady progress. But the one aspect of the relationship that assumed extreme salience in the political and public mind in India was the civil nuclear initiative. In this the US pledged to work with us to remove restrictions on international cooperation with our civil nuclear programme, without insisting, as before, on our placing our entire programme, including the strategic programme under international safeguards to guarantee its peaceful use. This amounted to de facto recognition of our strategic nuclear programme and of our status as a nuclear weapon state. It also opened up the possibility of our cooperating with the US and other friendly countries to access a clean, safe and economical source of energy for our energy hungry economy. Our first task was to negotiate a 123 agreement with the USA that embodied these understandings in legal obligations by both sides. That was achieved satisfactorily, as even opponents of the initiative admitted subsequently. You are all familiar with the political firestorm that followed, and the rather tortuous process by which our domestic decisions were ultimately taken. From the Foreign Office point of view it took professionalism of the highest order to deal with the complicated negotiations with the USA, other countries, the IAEA, and ultimately to get a clear and unconditional clearance from the Nuclear Supplier Group countries as a group. At the same time, as civil servants, we had to stay out of the domestic political process in India, leaving that to the politicians. I think we succeeded in both. And I am proud to have had a small part in bringing about the moment when India actually broke the nuclear apartheid that we had suffered since 1974.
There were moments when one thought that the civil nuclear initiative might suck all the oxygen out of the room, leaving little energy for the rest of our wide ranging relationship with the USA or our other preoccupations. Fortunately, the Indian system has infinite resilience, and this never happened. Today, the India-US developmental agenda is going well, levels of bilateral consultation and cooperation are unprecedented, and the US is working with us on issues of concern to us. Of course, the health of the relationship in the future will depend at least partly on how US policies globally and regionally affect India’s security.
The domestic controversy around the civil nuclear initiative also revealed one very significant feature of our system. After an initial phase of learning about the complex arrangements and agreements that constitute the initiative, including the 123 agreement with the USA, the controversy was primarily political. It was about the merits of trusting the USA or the consequences of a particular line of policy rather than about the substance of the agreements themselves. And this political controversy was conducted as it should be among the politicians and political opinion in the country without dragging in civil servants. For us as apolitical civil servants, it was possible throughout, no matter how high the emotions or the stakes, to give calm, reasoned, professional advice, not just to my Minister and the PM as government, but to leaders from the opposition who sought clarifications --- leaders from the BJP, CPM, CPI and others. For me this is one of the great strengths of our system: That civil servants can and must be apolitical, giving calm, reasoned, professional advice in private, speaking truth to power, and that power seeks that advice. That was an extremely heartening experience. Not many countries can make this claim.


2. Global challenges and the World Economic Crisis
Not all our attention in the Foreign Office was concentrated on bilateral relationships. In 2006 the world was poised on the cusp of great changes, and this was reflected in various ways in discussions in the G-8 and other forums. Climate change as an issue was probably first discussed at the highest level again after many years at the G-8 Summit at Heiligendamm in 2007, when we made it clear that dealing with the consequences of the developed world’s profligacy with our atmosphere could not be at the cost of our development. Energy security became an issue with oil prices soaring in 2007, as did food security for several other developing countries.

By 2008, however, it was clear that the world was facing a major recession, possibly another depression, and that for the first time this was caused by the heart of the Western financial system. The problem is still only partially dealt with, since the stimulus solution to recession has actually worsened the deficits that were a structural cause of the crisis. For our Foreign Office, the task remains to understand and deal with the geopolitical consequences of the global economic crisis.

One immediate consequence, recognizing a more even distribution of the power to deal with the crisis, is the new role of the G-20. Five years ago macro-economic coordination and regulatory reform after a crisis would have been dealt with in the small Western club of the G-8. It is now being coordinated in the G-20, where re-emerging economies like China and India are present. These are signs of the times.



V. Conclusion
Can one draw lessons from this rather prolix description of some of the challenges we faced in an eventful three years? It would be presumptuous on my part to do so, and three years is too short a period. But it is hard to resist the temptation after thirty-seven years in the profession of diplomacy. So, to provoke a discussion, let me suggest some themes:

I have tried to show you how great the change and flux in India’s situation has been in just three years. Over the longer term, such as my generation’s lifetime, it has been truly staggering. In 1948, waving expansively at a map of the world, Nehru exclaimed to a young Indian Foreign Service officer, “We will have forty missions around the world!” Today we have over one hundred and sixty-three missions and posts abroad.

(i) If our foreign policy experience teaches us one thing it is that change is inevitable, rapid and often discontinuous. There is hardly an international boundary between two states that is where it was two hundred years ago. The speed of the rise of China and India in the last quarter of the twentieth century is proof of the rapidity of change. History has accelerated but not the speed of our thought. We invariably underestimate its pace and the fact that it is almost always discontinuous. It is hard to think of a single major political development which is a straight line extrapolation of existing trends and therefore predictable. And yet we continue to do precisely that, analysing politics and the international situation as though they will follow a linear course extrapolating present trends.

(ii) Since the balance of power is relative, small shifts have exaggerated effects on the international system. Today we are in a completely changed situation. Whether it is the Asian balance or the global economy, both have been so transformed in the last three years that we probably need to rethink our assumptions. There is no going back to the earlier pattern of the global economy. Nor are we at the end of the crisis.

(iii)There are opportunities in this situation for India. We have been relatively less hurt by the crisis. There are opportunities in terms of access to technologies and commodities, and to achieve other economic goals, even though international markets may turn increasingly protectionist. Lower commodity prices work to our advantage at this stage of our development, and global excess capacity, particularly in capital goods and infrastructure building, could be tapped.

(iv) Our subcontinent has shown a remarkable paradox. Multiple, serial, internal political crises in the Indian subcontinent have been accompanied in the last few years by considerable economic vitality, growth and development in the same economies. How does one explain this? This shows that official figures only reveal a small part of the real story of economic exchanges in the subcontinent. To a great extent, the continuing growth of the Indian economy is what has enabled smaller South Asian economies to grow during such a deep global recession. And this represents an opportunity for us all.
(v) This is not to underestimate the dangers and factors of instability. How can we, situated as we are next to the epicenter of international terrorism?
(vi) After several centuries, once again the state is not the sole or necessarily the predominant factor in the international system. In some cases, like technology for instance, it is businesses and individuals who now determine the future, and it is these units that a successful foreign policy must now increasingly deal with.
(vii) India’s foreign policy today no longer deals only with existential threats to our security or with subsistence issues. Today our future will be determined by how effectively we adapt to change, and how we deal with cross-cutting global issues, with questions of energy security, water, low carbon growth, technology issues and so on. An open rule-based trading system is in our interest now that we have sizeable equities in international trade. We have moved from statements alone to working for and crafting desirable outcomes.
(viii) On global issues like non-proliferation and climate change, the crisis could theoretically provoke either a hardening of entrenched positions or a willingness to re-examine fundamentals to find new solutions that work better. In non-proliferation at least the latter may be the case. For the first time the world’s most powerful state has accepted a nuclear weapon free world as the goal of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, precisely the same goal that then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi put to the UNGA special session on disarmament in 1988. On climate change it is too early to say which way the developed countries will go, though the crisis seems to have made them nervous and hardened their positions.

If India is to deal with these issues in this new world, it is essential that we further elaborate our own culture and tradition of strategic thought. So long as India’s situation and needs are unique, we must encourage our own ways of looking at developments, and develop our own strategic culture, vocabulary and doctrine. Fortunately for us, there is no isolationist streak in our strategic thought so far, and we have a rich tradition to draw on. Ironically, the greater our capabilities, the more we need the world and are integrated into it. So if anything, the joys and challenges of Indian foreign policy will grow with time.

I am confident that if we continue as we have, with a realist policy leavened by our ideals, India will continue to make steady progress towards our goal of transforming India. History teaches us that India has been most prosperous, successful and at peace when she was most connected to the rest of the world. My generation has seen a remarkable change in India’s place in the world. I hope the next generation can improve upon our happy experience.

[Thank you for this opportunity to share some thoughts, and for the patient hearing.]


Read this with Shyam Saran's speech in Feb 2009 which is in the US-PRC relationship and India thread.
Key Points to note:

- MMS by 2006 had figured out there is a potential for the change in global balance. And took steps to get out of the strait jacket.
- No one figured out the extent of damage to the global system.

Syham Saran's speech is a continuation of the GOI thinking once the extent of the coallpse and the new realities were understood.

ramana
Forum Moderator
Posts: 54776
Joined: 01 Jan 1970 05:30

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby ramana » 21 Jan 2010 02:25

One year reapparisal of Barack Obama's Presidency by GP in Pioneer

http://www.dailypioneer.com/230811/A-ye ... -tall.html

EDITS | Thursday, January 21, 2010 | Email | Print |


A year later, not so tall

G Parthasarathy

Just over a year ago, when Mr Barack Obama was sworn in on January 20, 2009 as the 44th President of the United States, he was seen at home and abroad as a catalyst for ‘change’, someone who would usher in a revival of the economy and national self-confidence at home and a new era that would see his country provide moral leadership for global peace, security and cooperation. He had an approval rating then of 68 per cent. Barely a year later, Mr Obama’s popularity has plummeted to 46 per cent.

Former President Jimmy Carter had a 57 per cent rating for a comparable period of his presidency while the charismatic John Kennedy’s popularity rating was 77 per cent at the end of his first year as President. Given the dominant global role of the US and the crucial influence of domestic events on American foreign policy, how will these developments affect the American leadership’s approach to international issues?

While Mr Obama has lost popularity primarily because of growing unemployment, criticism has also begun to mount on his conduct of foreign policy. Even his supporters acknowledge that rather than focussing on a few critical areas, he has lost momentum because of simultaneously taking on too many issues — ranging from climate change and nuclear disarmament to West Asian peace initiatives and challenges posed by existing crisis points like Iran, North Korea, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The fiasco in Copenhagen placed the US in the embarrassing situation of being unable to provide moral leadership by agreeing to fulfil the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol on the one hand while expecting emerging and developing countries to make unacceptable sacrifices on the other. Hopefully, realism will prevail in 2010 and the US will realise the need for equity in dealing with others.

Globally, promises to ink a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia and close the Guantanamo Bay detention centre in Mr Obama’s first year in office remain unfulfilled. Recently, the US faced its first airborne terrorist threat since 9/11 following intelligence shortcomings. Yemen has emerged as a new centre of global terrorism. The West Asia peace process has come to a halt, with Israel continuing settlement activity. North Korea remains adamant in retaining its nuclear programme while demanding that the US conclude a peace treaty, whereas the world remains averse to calls for new nuclear sanctions on Iran, even though Mr Obama has shown considerable flexibility in fashioning a new approach to the Islamic republic.

Mr Obama has crafted his entire approach to global relations on the mistaken belief that he can build a new world order based on a Sino-American condominium in which the US and China would work cooperatively and jointly guarantee world peace and security. What has emerged instead is an assertive China, emboldened by the belief that the US has been weakened by the economic downturn and that it was losing its military edge in the Western Pacific.

Moreover, China’s increasing assertiveness has been making its neighbours like Japan, Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, and India, with whom it has differences on maritime and land boundaries, quite edgy. With China asserting that the US should recognise the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as its sphere of influence, it is only a matter of time before the starry-eyed approach to Beijing starts being questioned in American circles. The decision of Internet giant Google to review the continuance of its operations in China, the suspicions evoked in Japan’s Hatoyama dispensation, and China’s development of anti-missile capabilities have led to uncomfortable question marks about some of the basic assumptions of Mr Obama’s foreign policy team.

If the Obama Administration’s policies to India’s east have been marked by miscalculations of China’s imperatives, its policies towards Afghanistan and Pakistan have been marked by uncertainty and vacillation. Even as the Pentagon was calling for reinforcements, Vice-President Joe Biden urged that his Administration should avoid involvement in counter-insurgency against the Taliban and focus exclusively on eliminating Al Qaeda. Mr Obama, in turn, tried to placate domestic criticism by declaring that he would begin scaling down troop levels in Afghanistan by mid-2011.

The net result is that the Taliban leadership and the Pakistani military establishment appear convinced that it is only a matter of time before the Americans cut their losses and run from Afghanistan. No amount of effort by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Defence Secretary Robert Gates in stressing that the Americans will stay in Afghanistan as long as it takes to stabilise the situation there has changed this perception. This approach also appears to have convinced the ISI that the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy against Afghanistan and India should be sustained.

India has emerged relatively unscathed from the dithering in Washington, DC. Suggestions by sections of the Obama Administration to nominate a Special Envoy to meddle in India-Pakistan relations were scotched. But concerns over Mr Obama’s quip — “Say no to Bangalore and yes to Buffalo” —remain. Similarly, during his visit to Beijing, he appeared ready to concede to China, a country that continues to supply nuclear weapons and missile know-how to Pakistan, a special role in relations between India and Pakistan and to “strengthen dialogue and cooperation” in South Asia. It is to the credit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that he did not mince his words about developments in India’s neighbourhood, whether it was on terrorism or on the Obama Administration’s earlier illusions about China, during his US visit.

At his joint Press conference with Mr Singh, Mr Obama described India as a “responsible power”. He added: “The US welcomes and encourages India’s leadership role in helping to shape the rise of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Asia.” Moreover, the Manmohan Singh-Barack Obama Joint Statement reiterated their “shared interest in the stability, development and independence of Afghanistan and in the defeat of terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan and Pakistan”.

The India-US relationship has vast potential for expansion in key areas ranging from agriculture, education and energy to space, defence and high technology cooperation. But New Delhi will have to bear in mind that it is dealing with a US Administration that is anything but sure-footed. Despite this, the world’s two largest democracies can work together on global issues like climate change and in facilitating a global economic recovery, apart from countering terrorism, building an inclusive architecture for cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and establishing a stable balance of power in Asia.


Masaru
BRFite
Posts: 242
Joined: 18 Aug 2009 05:46

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Masaru » 22 Jan 2010 04:07

Excerpts on the new thinking in US DoD regarding PRC pioneered by a reformed cold warrior

The Harold Brown bet



Gates often quotes Jimmy Carter's secretary of defense, Harold Brown, on America's strategic arms race with the Soviet Union in the 1970s: "When we build, they build; when we cut, they build." What's interesting here is that Gates doesn't use this quote to justify a continued conventional buildup to counter a rising China — which is definitely in build mode, no matter our choices — but rather to describe the Pentagon's continuing need to adapt itself to the ever-morphing threat of radical Islam. To those in the Pentagon eager to reengage with resurgent Russia or to slot China into that threat box, Gates answers calmly: "One cold war was enough."



A new term, "strategic reassurance," emerged last fall as the State Department's preferred description of the administration's new strategic approach. The term, introduced in a speech by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, quickly generated a lot of diplomatic buzz around the world but especially in Beijing, where, in general, experts found the phrase less offensive than the Bush-era term for China's future role in global affairs as a "responsible stakeholder," primarily because it suggested a two-way contract that admitted each side needed to reassure the other about its strategic intentions: In a nutshell, America needs to reassure China that it won't seek to prevent its rise, and China needs to reassure the world that its rise will not come at the expense of other nations' security or prosperity.


In truth, Washington thinks that it has already done plenty of strategic reassuring, and this new idea consists mostly of us asking China to reassure the world of its intentions. And while it is true that the Obama administration has scratched many of China's persistent itches recently (e.g., showing deference to Chinese leadership at recent G-20 summits, resuming high-level military talks with the PLA, and delaying any meeting with the Dalai Lama until after Obama's November trip to Beijing), the most crucial ones, according to the Chinese themselves — explicitly backing off on Tibet, ending arms sales to Taiwan, and ceasing military surveillance within China's exclusive economic maritime zone — remain unaddressed.



But now that these wars belong to Obama and the Democrats, who most clearly do not seek to maintain American primacy through their continued vigorous prosecution and indeed are looking for ways to unwind them responsibly, the neocons are more than happy to demand the White House stand up to all manner of Chinese "aggression" and "perfidy" so as to signal America's long-term resistance to the threat of authoritarian capitalism. Please!

And so Gates has laid the Harold Brown Bet on the table, making him almost completely unrecognizable from his former self. While the United States of America has stopped mindlessly stockpiling a military force destined to fight another great power, China has not and will not anytime soon.


The assumption here is that somehow PRC is the new USSR even though at the outset it has been denied, and things will sort out themselves in the medium term in the favour of US. In reality though the opposite seems to be the case with PRC looking more like the US/Germany of early 1900s and US like Great Britain of that era. Will PRC go the German way or the US way only time can tell. May be this would be a better frame work to analyze this emerging dynamics than the cold war analogy that sec-def is using.

Chinmayanand
BRF Oldie
Posts: 2585
Joined: 05 Oct 2008 16:01
Location: Mansarovar
Contact:

Re: US and PRC relationship & India

Postby Chinmayanand » 22 Jan 2010 19:47

Internet freedom becomes a sore point in US-China relations

This time it is not the irksome 3Ts- Tibet, Taiwan and trade-that has set China and the US at loggerheads. It is internet freedom, the only area where the Communist leaders face some kind of political challenge.


Return to “Strategic Issues & International Relations Forum”

Who is online

Users browsing this forum: Lisa, sanjayc and 78 guests