Different strokes for different spokes
Moeed Yusuf
Indian and Pakistani visions are structurally out of sync and thus not only this thaw but all future thaws are likely to hit dead ends at some point
President Asif Ali Zardari’s meeting with Indian Premier Dr Manmohan Singh offers the first thaw in Indo-Pak relations since the Mumbai attack and raises the obvious question: will the next phase of talks be any different from previous rounds or will they remain shy of normalisation?
Short answer: the latter is more likely. Here are the reasons.
To understand the complexity of the bilateral relationship, it ought to be studied at three distinct levels – the conceptual, the strategic, and the tactical.
The rub is in the way the two sides view themselves conceptually. Consider that the South Asian region is one where member states are bound by a hub-and-spoke model. Historically, culturally, and geographically (with the exception of the Maldives), India can be envisioned as the pivot with the spokes leading to each of the states on the periphery.
Inter-state relations within the region have tended to follow a rather elegant logic. Accounting for almost 76 percent of South Asian GNP, 64 percent of the export trade, and 74 percent of the region’s population, India justifiably sees itself as a hub that ought to be allowed to retain substantial influence over the foreign policies of the periphery. Indeed, whichever state on the periphery has fallen in line with this logic has managed to improve ties with New Delhi, albeit at the cost of substantial interference by the latter.
It is remarkable how neatly the trajectory of Bangladeshi, Sri Lankan, Nepalese, Bhutanese, and Maldivian relations with India fits an inverse relationship with the level of assertiveness by the states on the periphery at any point in time.
The only country in the periphery that has persistently attempted to stand up to the hub is Pakistan (others have only done so at particular moments). Indeed,
Pakistan’s regional policy has been driven by this singular goal: not to allow India hegemonic influence over itself, and even the region. Conceptually, then, Pakistan’s stance creates a fundamental disconnect, thereby throwing the hub and one of its spokes out of harmony. While the hub supports a hegemonic coexistence on its own terms, one spoke wants to defy exactly that.
The conceptual feeds into tangible strategic decisions taken by both sides: throughout history, India and Pakistan have been involved in one-upmanship, each attempting to force the relationship in a direction that would suit its conceptual outlook. In fact, a number of key strategic decisions are easily traceable to the conceptual.
The direction of strategic alliances is a pertinent example. The Pakistani and Indian tilt towards opposing camps during the Cold War was a means to balance the other. Pakistan’s all-weather friendship with China was also conceived as a mutually beneficial arrangement aimed at keeping India at bay. Further, Pakistan’s excessive attention to Indo-centric defence expenditures is borne of the same logic, as is the fact that Pakistan and India have always opposed the expansion of each other’s clout at world fora. Pakistan’s objection to India’s UN Security Council bid and India’s reluctance to allow Pakistan entry into groupings such as the Indian Ocean Rim Countries Association are obvious examples.
Next, Pakistan has traditionally favoured a ‘look west’ policy in a quest to escape the South Asian hub-and-spoke model. A self-portrayal of the polity as a Middle Eastern rather than a South Asian one is one of the aspects of Pakistan’s identity crisis and an outcome of the obsession to avoid Indian hegemony. Pakistan’s recent reluctance to allow integration of the two economies can be explained through the same lens. Success of liberal peace theory, which argues that trade could push all other concerns to the backburner, would amount to a failure of Pakistan’s vision of itself as more than just a “peripheral” entity.
As for India, there has been no let up in attempting to establish influence over Pakistan and punishing it for not falling in line. The break-up of Pakistan in 1971 is a good example of an instance where New Delhi saw cutting Pakistan to size as a major achievement. From New Delhi’s perspective, it was one step closer to weakening Pakistan to the point that it would be forced to behave like a pliant spoke. The current Indian policy of reaching out to Pakistan’s western neighbours – the encirclement policy as perceived in Pakistan – while aimed at extending Indian presence westward also squeezes Pakistan’s manoeuvring space as a diplomatic spin-off for New Delhi.
Finally, the strategic disharmony in outlook means that both sides have seen stirring trouble in the other’s territory as perfectly legitimate. For much of their histories, support to insurgencies and periodic acts of violence perpetrated against the other have been a major part of the terms of reference for intelligence agencies on both sides.
The causal chain is completed by the third-tier of analysis: tactical policies on specific issues. If the conceptual thesis has merit and if the inferred strategic implications are valid, then tactically, a disconnect on major issues is inevitable.
Kashmir is undoubtedly the bone of contention. Traditionally, maximalist stances flowed out of concern about the hub-and-spoke model. Giving up on Kashmir would in and of itself have meant an irreparable loss to the loser’s South Asian vision.
Interestingly, the severity of divergence on the issue is evident from the fact that when Pakistani domestic troubles have forced it to show considerable flexibility and essentially leave it amenable to solutions that provide a face-saver, the Indian calculation still does not warrant any concessions.
The fact is that Indian political realities do not support any solution that involves a Pakistani role in Indian-occupied Kashmir. India’s progression in terms of its global stature has made it even less accepting of balanced negotiations with Pakistan. Moreover, with most external actors weighing in on its side, it sees no need to alter the status quo. Stubbornness on its part strengthens its vision of the South Asian hub-and-spoke model; concessions would imply a weakening of the pivot.
Trade between India and Pakistan is another much-debated concern. For one, realising that the integration of economies on India’s terms is a non-starter, New Delhi has sought to punish Pakistan by isolating it from the trade regime. Consider that all sub-regional or extra-regional trade arrangements involving India keep Pakistan out. Pakistan on its part has looked westward and engaged bilaterally with regional actors to avoid Indian clout.
Also, trade complementarities between the two sides are not a foregone conclusion. Despite widespread rhetoric, a number of recent studies point to the similar production structures of the two economies to dampen some of the euphoric pronouncements.
For Pakistan, the bad news is that the short run will entail disproportionate gains for India. While long term balancing is possible, this may require a virtual transformation in production structures across various sectors with attendant domestic negative spin-offs. Not to mention, given that a bulk of the near-term gains in bilateral trade are likely to come through the switching of current trade relationships to new customers within the two countries, in a scenario where past experiences point to unreliability of the adversary in terms of fulfilling trade obligations, business communities in Pakistan (and for that matter India) are sure to consider such diversion a high-risk proposition. In short, enhanced trade does not fit Pakistan’s South Asian vision neatly.
To cite another current example,
India’s transit trade facility to Afghanistan is contentious for the same reason. Rhetoric aside, India itself is reluctant to use the land route without extensive guarantees by Pakistan. This is understandable given that under no circumstances does it want to be held hostage to Pakistan. Neither does it want to give Pakistan such a central position in its outreach to Central Asia. This is why India has chosen to invest in an economically uncompetitive land route from Iran to Afghanistan, thereby foregoing the available option of utilising the Karachi port.
On transit trade, Pakistan’s concerns are the opposite. It would be amenable as long as it is not asked to furnish any special guarantees to India. Doing so would imply losing an important leverage point vis-à-vis New Delhi. Moreover, even a successful arrangement would ultimately imply increased Indian clout in Afghanistan, a possibility Pakistan is highly allergic to at present.
Let us now come back to the question posed at the outset: is the current thaw different?
The above analysis provides a clear answer: Indian and Pakistan visions are structurally out of sync and thus not only this round but all future rounds are likely to hit dead ends at some point. How can this change?
There are
two possibilities: One, the Indian vision succeeds in that Pakistan becomes so weak that it has no option but to fall in line. The Kashmiri status quo would then become permanent, trade would be liberalised, transit trade with excessive guarantees provided, and so on so forth. Judging by Pakistan’s obsession not to allow this to happen despite its life-threatening problems at present, such a scenario would require a further deterioration of the Pakistani state. Essentially, we are talking state collapse.
This can be ruled out for the time being for two reasons. First, militarily, nuclear weapons and India’s growing concern about projecting maturity as a global actor have taken away all force-based Indian options. Second, the world, including India, realises the consequences in terms of the spread of terrorism should Pakistan implode. No one is willing to take that risk.
The
second option is that Pakistan asserts itself successfully by closing the gap between itself and India’s might. Here, India may see the need to alter its South Asian vision lest it be permanently held back from its global aspirations, thanks to continuing tensions with Pakistan.
By all accounts, India’s growth trajectory makes this unrealistic.
Pakistan is even unlikely to be able to keep its current level of disparity vis-à-vis New Delhi in the coming years. In short, outright conflict remains unlikely; yet complete normalisation is a far cry at the moment.
The writer is a research fellow at the Strategic and Economic Policy Research (Pvt Ltd.) in Islamabad. He can be contacted at myusuf@sepr.com.pk
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