A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 31 Jul 2009 23:45

X-posting from Future strategic scenarios thread:
nachiket wrote:
brihaspati wrote:India should reclaim Pakistan not only because Pakistan has failed in all its justifications for its existence. But because the entire idea of Pakistan was an imagination based on an alien and imported ideology that was imposed on the land at the point of military coercion, and that still holds its primary ideological identification and affiliation to a source and cultural centre outside of the subcontinent. Because the idea of Pakistan was a bluff pulled by dominant theologians and affiliated Islamic political leadership and implemented with the active encouragement and support of colonial regimes and powers external to the subcontinent.

Because the idea of Pakistan was accepted by the then prevailing regime and political leadership among the non-Muslims, and no leader or leadership at any point of time in a nation's history is greater than the nation itself. Therefore what the non-Muslim leadership accepted is not binding on the nation, and it can and should overturn any decisions taken in the past that is perceived to have been disastrous, unilaterally painful and costly on the common members of the nation (and not on the leadership who suffered little or nothing even in personal terms of the fallout of the creation of the artificial entity of Pakistan).

The Indian subcontinent must come under one single political authority and economic system that also gives primacy to the long standing indigenous Bharatyia culture of the majority of the populations as modified to suit current advances in knowledge and humanitarian concepts. For those countries in the "west" which have brought down on the peoples of the subcontinent untold hardship, trauma and pain, in their racist, colonial and theological paranoia by supporting and maintaining the terrorist rashtra of Pakistan - it is time for their leadership and their people to understand that an unified subcontinent, not under Islam, is in their long term interest. Such an unified entity will stop Jihadi terror exports to the west, help in erasing Jihad globally over the long term, provide a much larger, integrated market to "exploit", and stable strategic infrastructure to utilize to get access to IO and the central Asian energy sources.

Any Indian leader or leadership that fails to carry out this agenda will go down in history not only as blind, clueless, and poor caricatures as statespersons but also as traitors who helped prolong the alien and artificially constructed entity of Pakistan, thereby extending the suffering of subcontinental populations on both sides of the existing borders - Muslim and non-Muslim alike.


Sir,
I understand where you are coming from and your argument why India should reclaim Pakistan is sound from a historical perspective. But should'nt we be thinking practically?
Reclaiming Pakistan does not merely imply reclaiming territory wrongfully taken from us. It also involves accepting 200 million people with an high percentage of Islamist radicals known for exporting terrorism throughout the world. The population in general after decades of brainwashing and indoctrination hates India and everything Indian.
As an Indian citizen, I do not want my country overrun by such scum.
Further, how do you suggest an Indian leader actually go about trying to reclaim Pakistan?


ramana wrote:nachiket, What brihaspatiji is saying is a goal. What you are saying are the practical impediments to achieving the goal. What is needed is to take a wholistic view and work around the impediments. The key change that has come over TSP is from the Islamization drive launched in 1970s. And the support from West and PRC. As all social engineering projects it can be reversed.

If all we say is neti, neti, how can we bring about vasudeva kutumbam? Through out the ages there were visionaries who tried to square the circle and at crucial times there were interventions which subverted the process.


nachiket wrote:
ramana wrote:nachiket, What brihaspatiji is saying is a goal. What you are saying are the practical impediments to achieving the goal. What is needed is to take a wholistic view and work around the impediments.
...If all we say is neti, neti, how can we bring about vasudeva kutumbam? Through out the ages there were visionaries who tried to square the circle and at crucial times there were interventions which subverted the process.


I understand sir, but whatever goal, we might set for our country has to be feasible within a particular timeframe and more importantly the benefits obtained from realizing that goal must be quantitatively and qualitatively greater than the sacrifices we would have to make to achieve it.

ramana wrote:The key change that has come over TSP is from the Islamization drive launched in 1970s. And the support from West and PRC. As all social engineering projects it can be reversed.


Maybe, but how can we assume that they would want to be a part of a united India? Majority of Muslims who left India for Pakistan in 1947 wanted a separate country. Those who did'nt stayed back. What can cause this to change?
Do we even know for sure that our own people want to recliam Pakistan?
I am sure there is a sizable number like me who don't want to touch that sorry excuse for a country with a barge pole.


brihaspati wrote:nachiketji,
I appreciate your reservations. Ramanaji has already answered for me to a great extent. But in many pages of this thread in the earlier part we had thrashed out reasons and arguments for what I have stated above. May I request you to go over these earlier posts and give me your opinion to the specifics?



Prem wrote:Pathans, Sindhsi, Balochs etc are all secured in their identity . Onlee Pakjabis need "Sudhaar" and there are many way to do such "reforms; if you understand their history. the one way to straighten the dog's tail is to cut it it into small pieces.



brihaspati wrote:nachiketji,

I will try to briefly summarize the main points in favour of incorporation of the territories currently occupied by GOTSP.

(1) Strategic necessity:

(a) As long as a separate and independent entity of TSP remains it will continue to try everything in its power to bleed India, take over Kashmir, and further expand its dream of a Mughalistan. This means undercover operations, terror attacks, or even formal invasions on India.

(b) As long as TSP exists, it will be seen as an instrument to pressurize and manipulate India by outside powers like USA, UK and PRC. Which means certain weaknesses for India in international bargaining situations. Such bargaining can extend not only in purely foreign interests for India, but also have impact internally on India in its economy and internal security situation.

(c) Even if TSP is not trying to infiltrate, terrorize, or invade at any given instant of historical time, India has to maintain a large portion of its defence efforts and expenditure all along the western borders, from POK to Gujarat. This is more than a normal border maintenance operation becuase of persistent vicious hostility from the Paksitani side.

(d) Independent TSP provides alternative routes to the IO for PRC as well as a means of separating India physically from the CAR, and Iran - all vital for Indias future energy and further strategic needs.

(e) Independent TSP provides locations for nuclear weapons delivery system targeting India, by proxy, by PRC. Without this PRC is restricted to submarine based and Tibet based ones only. It also provides naval facilities to hostile powers like PRC at ports like Gwadar.

(2) Social necessity :

(a) destruction of TSP means the final acknowledgement that the original touted purpose of TSP as a beacon and hope for Muslims on the subcontinent was a false one. Muslims in India have to realize that they cannot have a non Bharatyia future, and none of their fondly looked forward cultural centres outside of India have ever done anything or will do anything positive for their future. As long as TSP exists, the political and military false hope remains and an alternative to integration with the mainstream remains. Submergence within the main Bharatyia stream can only be possible when no alternatives are left for social esteem through a separate and distinct identity.

(b) destruction of TSP and its incorporation finally paves the way for healing the trauma of Partition. Access to pilgrimage centres and cultural centres of the Sikhs and Hindus and possible resettlement options after potential "collateral damages". At the least we can expect "some" of our people to be liberal enough by tradition to "socially" heal trauma after conflict where the male population of Pakjab gets severely reduced in offering marriage to surviving women. :)

(c) the greatest destroyer of parochialism and ethnic/religious xenophobia is genetic and marital mixing. Opportunities for this can only be exploited within a single unified socio-political framework.

(3) Governance :

(a) Socio-economic reform striking at the base of Islamic retrogression can only be done under a unified state. The first reform is educational, striking at the base of the Madrassah based social control that generates terror on India.

(b) For a long time after reincorporation, there has to be strong administrative and legal mesaures that prevents or controls flow of people out of incorporated territories, and a staged and staggered intrdouction of democratic reforms. Prior to political reforms, economic and social reforms are necessary - especially land-reforms - that is the key to break the backbone of the feudal landowning class at the head of Pakistani politics right from the beginning and the chief criminals behind the trauma of formation of TSP and the Partition.

I do agree with you that a lot of Indians would have strong reservations against incorporations of the lands and peoples currently occupied by GOTSP. But the long term prosperity and peace for all peoples in the subcontinent is crucially dependent on unification under a common rashtra and world-view. I hope you understand why I am asking all to consider taking up this vision alongside the purely economic one we are pursuing now, and which is still not touching large sections of our own populations and which has every possibility of getting jeopardized in the long run if the TSP problem is not solved.

Kashmir or Balochistan is not the "problem" - there is no "Kashmir problem" or "Kashmir issue" but only a "TSP problem" or "TSP issue".



surinder wrote:B,

That was a great summary. I am afraid I was beginning to agree with Nachiketa, until I read what you wrote.

A few things to add:

destruction of TSP means the final acknowledgement that the original touted purpose of TSP as a beacon and hope for Muslims on the subcontinent was a false one.


This is vital. The idea of TSP has be killed and stamped out. It has to be stamped out in ways that it never EVER takes root again. 1971 wounded that idea, but did not shatter it completely.

Muslims in India have to realize that they cannot have a non Bharatyia future


I would rephrase it as follows: M's in India can have a non-Bhartiya future for sure, but without Bharatiya land. E.g. they can immigrate to KSA and adopt Arabic as mother tougue and listen to tinny Arabic music, we couldn't care less. :D But it has to be sans Bharatiya land.

But the incorporation of TSP has to be done in practical ways. Lands across the Indus can be Vassal states, nominally Independent. Baluch can be a protectorate, or independent. Most of West Punjab will have to return to India. Regarding population, large scale expulsions (voluntary or involuntary) might have to occur. We cannot take in 200 million of momins. And most importantly Sikhs have to get back Lahore & their religious places.

Unfortunately, most of this requires a level of intensity and sacrifice that the Indic have not displayed in abundance in recent past. Something will have to change. That is the impractical part.

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Re: Terrorist Islamic Republic of Pakistan - July 07, 2009

Postby Anujan » 31 Jul 2009 23:51

Mr Ahmed does a remarkably poor job. Any rational buyer (India) will ask three basic questions

0. Do I want this deal ?

1. Am I getting a good deal ?

2. Is it advantageous for me to wait to get a better deal ?


To convince us about 0,1,2 a summary of Khaled Ahmed's (the seller) argument is as follows

Proposition 1: Fomenting terror through "non-state actors" is legitimate.

Proposition 2: We realize that fomenting terror against India is hurting us (paki RAPEs and pakiland) economically as well as threatening our very survival by upending the status quo. RAPEs are likely to get killed, feudals are likely to be sent packing, our way of life will no longer exist. But let me hastily add that we are not idiots and have our H&D intact, this fomenting terror business did not work out for reasons beyond our control. Let me reiterate that it was a brilliant and legitimate idea.

Proposition 3: We realize that terror is hurting India too. Your people are getting killed and you seem to be unable to do anything about it. You need to grow and build an economy.

Proposition 4: Bunch of psyops about India, about how India is helpless against big China and little Sri Lanka. Certainly cannot hope to take on Pakistan.

Conclusion: Ergo - lets work out a compromise. We stop terror, you give us as much leverage as we would have if we had continued terror. Settle cashmere in our favor, give a bunch of other things to us. We give you H&D and praise you


I would think Mr Ahmed should go, think about it and come back with a more convincing argument. Please note that I havent even added things like "Do I trust the seller ? Should I ask for more because I hate the seller ?"

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 01 Aug 2009 00:02

sanjaykumar wrote:I am aghast-departition indeed. That should be only as a last resort to pacify the wild tribes of the frontier ie reabsorb them and civilise them- a hundred year project. Only to be undertaken if there is an existential threat from demographic aggression/invasion.


I know the Pakistanis are secretly hoping for just this-that they create such havoc that India will be forced to accept them back. Please scan the press and commentary in Pakistan over the next 1-2 years as India's economy and technological base grow, I will be demonstrated correct.


Its a long term project and that why I said 30 years of UT sttus to be renewed as fit. The problem did not happen in last sixcty years but over last 1300 years.

And what do you want have them outside ready to become munnas for every two bit aspiring unnatural powers to be used against India as and when needed?

Peak oil will ensure that in next 50 years the support from Wahabized KSA will diminish. And by that time India will be G-2 if things go a certain way.Add to the mix the demographic mix changing in North America. And that will cut off the Anglo Saxon support for this rentier state.

And look at ancient history. The Indo-Gangetic plains subsidised the region upto Hindukush since Mahabharata times.

In the Gurjara-Paramara times unfortunately Bharatvarsah was fragmented and couldnt rally constantly. That is not the case now.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 01 Aug 2009 00:08

Action plan:
    - Non-war collapse is the best option after taking into account all the constraints
    - Increase Indian economy in order to
    - Increase funds to support other aspects of action plan
    - Increase IM stake in India
    - Stabilize Afghanistan
    A stable Afghanistan will divert Pak resources militarily, economically and culturally.
    Include aid to Afghanistan as line item in Indian budget as part of MEA
    Increase Afghan training in Indian academies- civil and military
    - Create de-facto cordon around Pakistan
    Include the countries in the immediate neighborhood and immediate area and reduce Pakistan influence in the area: Sri Lanka, Bangla Desh and Nepal
    - Take all measures short of war to reduce Pakistan
    Economic (trade, commerce and water, diplomatic and cultural

Action plan contd:

    - Increase Indian military preparedness
    - Increase IBG deployments to 10. Reduce Strike corps mobilization time or relocate in forward areas
    - Increase IAF squadron strength to handle two front war to preclude PRC intervention
    - Increase IN ship strength for enforcing a cordon sanitaire to mitigate fallout
    - Integrate internal security apparatus with military as required
    - Diplomatic offensive to lull and manage a fait accompli
    - Engage US in talks and PRC in other areas
    - Prepare action plan for post-Pakistan region
    Comprehensive and implementable
    Union territory status for broken up areas for thirty years to be reviewed every ten years. Final goal is reincorporation.
    Governors will be appointed with consent
    Reorganize NWFP as Pashtunistan Union Territory with contiguous areas from Baloch and Punjab.
    Reconciliation commission comprised of senior officers from three services of both countries to re-integrate the armed forces

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby sanjaykumar » 01 Aug 2009 00:29

In any such project IM will be essential to deprogram the praetorian culture of Pakistan, to deflate its millenial pretensions of being the shocktroops of Islam.

I have every confidence IM are not equal to this task and it is thus doomed to failure.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 01 Aug 2009 00:38

I also have another action plan which includes their role and will be posted after sufficient interest is shown.
-------
Actually to de-praetorise the TSPA my existing plan already takes care of it. To change the millenial mind set it needs restoration of Indian Muslim primacy in the mindspace.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby sanjaykumar » 01 Aug 2009 01:27

The word Should be millernarial, $;@&
proof reading software.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby shiv » 01 Aug 2009 17:38

Because nation-states are run by humans, relationships between nation states develop characteristics that are described in terms of relationships between humans. There can be trust or mistrust. There can be anger, a desire to fight (war), friendship, unity, wariness, fear and other similar descriptions of relationships between nation states reminiscent of descriptions of human relationships.

But because nation states are generally run by groups of humans rather than one single person, each of these "modes of viewing the other nation" are tempered by the views of many which may tend to mitigate or dilute the more extreme feelings that an individual may have.

Based on this premise we tend to have two basic types of relationship between nation states:

1) Rational trust: Here, both nation states (represented by their governments) understand that both nations have needs and demands, compulsions and motives, strengths and weaknesses. Each nation state negotiates with the other based on the realization and acknowledgement of these factors and tries to get as good a deal for itself in any dealing as possible with the least cost. Obviously - things can break down to the point of conflict, but even then many of the same factors will be at play.

2) Rational mistrust: In this case both nations may have just fought a war, or may be expecting war, or one nation may have had a violent government change or other revolution which may threaten another nation. In this case, there is no trust. Neither side accepts the other at face value. As long as there is enough rationality on both sides (with a little help from friends if necessary) to avoid conflict the relationship can be turned towards rational trust.

But there is a third relationship that occurs and can go unrecognized and that is Paranoia.

In a paranoid relationship one nation (the paranoid state) is convinced that the other is against its existence and that the other state/states are out to destroy them. The problem with this type of situation is that trust cannot be built up. If you have a paranoid state P and a normal state N there is no action that N can take to build up trust and reach a working relationship with state P. Anything that N does, or does not do is construed by state P as aggression or hostile intent.

Before I come to the obvious example, I want to point out that it would be easy to misconstrue he US-USSR relationship of the late 1940s and early 1950s as one of the US behaving like a paranoid state with regard to the USSR. This would have been true if the USSR was a completely innocent state that meant no harm to anyone. But that is hardly correct. The USSR was busy exporting revolution and the US had a legitimate and rational reason to mistrust the USSR. So the relationship was more of "rational mistrust" which gave way to "rational trust" after the START talks started.

Pakistan is the prototypal example of a nation state that maintains a paranoid relationship with India. There is nothing that India can do to reduce Pakistan's paranoia and mistrust of India. Anything that India does, or does not do, is construed as hostility to Pakistan and further proof that "India does not accept or acknowledge the reality of Pakistan" This is not rational mistrust. It is irrational mistrust. It is a case of believing that "You hate me, and nothing that you do or say will convince me otherwise"

Because this is a new paradigm among nation states there are no clear pre-existing guidelines as to how any nation can deal with a country that is in a paranoid relationship with itself. But it is certainly possible to think of ways of handling a paranoid nation state provided one understands what one is dealing with.

Trying to fit a paranoid county into the category of "rational mistrust" is trying to put a square peg in a round hole. India can attempt to address every one of Pakistan accusations imagining that trust can be built up. With a rational state this is possible. Not with a paranoid state.

The way to deal with a paranoid nation, first and foremost, is to stop denying the paranoia. If Pakistan says "You hate me" and India says "No we don't" - it only increases Pakistan's paranoia. Since Pakistan is a nation state and not an individual it has greater leeway of action than an individual and it responds to increasing paranoia by building up arms and allies and then being even more paranoid about any Indian response.

India can attempt to convert Pakistan's "irrational fear" into "rational mistrust" by not denying Pakistan's allegations and furthermore by attacking Pakistan and punishing Pakistan. The mistrust that Pakistan has for India is irrational only so long as India behaves innocent and claims no hatred for Pakistan. If India can show that it actually dislikes Pakistan and its actions, Pakistan's "irrational fears" will be realised and their fears will become true and rational.

Rational fears can be addressed in a different way. We can talk to Pakistan and say 'OK - you know we don't like you and intend to hit back as we have done. If you want to avoid that, this is how you must behave". If this is hegemony, so be it. Why should India feel embarrassed about regional hegemony?

But such a relationship cannot be built up with a paranoid state like Pakistan if Indian leaders live in denial and imagine that Pakistan will change if India behaves like a harmless sugar dumpling. Changing our relationship with Pakistan would be as much a lesson for Indians who need to learn that Pakistan offers no good intentions towards India and that any Indian good intentions are both misplaced and counter productive.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby JwalaMukhi » 01 Aug 2009 19:14

A stable,prosperous Pakistan is not the endeavour of Pakistan itself. Its actions are contrary to the notions of stable and prosperous. Why should India be trying to swim in counter currents to help pakistan to be what it doesn't desires to be. Why India should not be helping them to achieve what they excel at inside their borders? Because once Pakistan reaches its end goal which is; it ceases to exist, then the question of stable, prosperous pakistan will be moot.
Why should Pakistan exist at all in India's interest let alone stable, prosperous one?

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Bhima » 03 Aug 2009 00:09

I would categorise TSP a paranoid nation with a superiority complex. Stable or not such a country will only ever be trouble. Attempting to convert Pakistan's psychological disposition through a degree of honesty may simplify the relationship but still lead to the inevitable confrontation between ideologies. Reasoning with or threatening such a state will not produce the desired results as this has been attempted on numerous occasions. Conquering it in a military victory will have pyrrhic consequences and highly undesirable keeping an eye on China.

The problem, of course, is the foundation bigoted ideology keeping that unholy state together. My bleak assessment of the situation is that Pakistanis are taking their country to its logical conclusion - civil war. IOW it does not matter if Indian leadership engage with them or not. Those that can do something against terrorist organisations will not listen. And those who listen may not have the capability to do something about it. Pakistan will continue to be a threat as long as it has the capacity to be a threat. Sadly India's unique propensity for absorbing punishment may mean that this will not register in the minds of most citizens because the very ideology that unites Indians makes it difficult to come to terms with the reality of Pakistan. All in my opinion.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby NikhilB » 03 Aug 2009 02:40

I am not sure whether our Indian strategist are having any clues from this forum or not...but we need to learn from hisotry.

For last few days, I have been sensing some analogy between Prithiviraj Chauhan - Ghauri war and India - Pakistan war. Prthviraj Chaurah won two times, left Ghuari without crushing him completely, and Guari returned 3rd time with worst nightmare, and rest is history...800 years of misery, and destruction by one mistake.

India two wars so far (convincingly - 1971 and kargil) or say one, and might win one small lilliput war, but then don't think Pakis want peace...they will return with more fervor and venome...see how they are building their weapons...

It amazes me how congress govt plays with our nation...imagine what would have happened if size and might of India and pakis would have been reverse.

Next time - we must crush the enemy completely. No mercy. No internattional regulations etc crap. We might go back a decade or so in economic terms, but will save our future generations for centuries..

are there anyone listening...

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 04 Aug 2009 20:01

ramana wrote:
Its a long term project and that why I said 30 years of UT sttus to be renewed as fit. The problem did not happen in last sixcty years but over last 1300 years.

And what do you want have them outside ready to become munnas for every two bit aspiring unnatural powers to be used against India as and when needed?

Peak oil will ensure that in next 50 years the support from Wahabized KSA will diminish. And by that time India will be G-2 if things go a certain way.Add to the mix the demographic mix changing in North America. And that will cut off the Anglo Saxon support for this rentier state.

And look at ancient history. The Indo-Gangetic plains subsidised the region upto Hindukush since Mahabharata times.

In the Gurjara-Paramara times unfortunately Bharatvarsah was fragmented and couldnt rally constantly. That is not the case now.


Hari Seldon wrote:x-post from the perspectives thread.

Meanwhile old china hand Andy Xie calls its stock rally a bubble, again.

Chinese asset markets have become a giant Ponzi scheme. The prices are supported by appreciation expectation. As more people and liquidity are sucked in, the resulting surging prices validate the expectation, which prompts more people to join the party. This sort of bubble ends when there isn’t enough liquidity to feed the beast.

Liquidity isn’t a constraint yet. Even though loans grew by 24.4% in the first half or Rmb 7.4 trillion, loan-deposit ratio increased only to 66.6% in June 2009 from 65% in December 2008. It means that many loans have not been spent in real economic activities and have merely supplied leverage for asset market transactions. China’s property market is very similar to Hong Kong’s in 1997.

The origin of the asset bubble in China is excess liquidity as reflected in high level of foreign exchange reserves and low loan deposit ratio. The low interbank rate defines how serious excess liquidity s. The massive buildup of liquidity in China was due to weak dollar and strong exports. As dollar entered a bear market in 2002, China’s Rmb followed it down. The appreciation expectation drove liquidity to China. One fourth of China’s foreign exchange reserves could be due to this factor.


OK. So who exactly is andy xie and what are his credentials?

Many would argue that China isn’t experiencing a bubble. The high asset prices just reflect China’s high growth potential. One can never make an ironclad case to pin down an asset boom as a bubble. An element of judgment based on experience is inevitable when one calls a market boom a bubble. I have had a reasonably good record at calling bubbles in the past. I wrote my doctoral thesis arguing that Japan was a bubble in late 1980s, a long report at the World Bank in earl 1990s arguing that Southeast Asia was a bubble, research notes at Morgan Stanley in 1999 calling dotcom boom a bubble, and numerous research notes from 2003 onwards arguing that the US property market was a bubble. On the other hand I have never called something a bubble that turned out not to be a bubble.

I want to make myself perfectly clear on China’s asset markets today. They are a big bubble. Its bursting will bring very bad consequences for the country. However, as so many are enjoying what’s going on, I don’t think the government would act preemptively to eliminate the bubble. Indeed, many, if not the majority, in the policy circle argue that the bubble is good for reviving the economy. This sort of thinking seems to work because the dollar is weak, as the bubble can be revived with more liquidity when it cools off. When the dollar revives, China’s asset markets and, probably, the economy would have a hard landing. I hope that the people who advocate the benefits of the bubble would stand up then to accept the responsibilities for the damages.


link

Of course, std disclaimer holds. Take your own call. Caveat emptor.



Philip wrote:Oil running out-grim warnings.

Excerpt:
"One day we will run out of oil, it is not today or tomorrow, but one day we will run out of oil and we have to leave oil before oil leaves us, and we have to prepare ourselves for that day," Dr Birol said. "The earlier we start, the better, because all of our economic and social system is based on oil, so to change from that will take a lot of time and a lot of money and we should take this issue very seriously," he said.

"The market power of the very few oil-producing countries, mainly in the Middle East, will increase very quickly. They already have about 40 per cent share of the oil market and this will increase much more strongly in the future," he said.

There is now a real risk of a crunch in the oil supply after next year when demand picks up because not enough is being done to build up new supplies of oil to compensate for the rapid decline in existing fields.

The IEA estimates that the decline in oil production in existing fields is now running at 6.7 per cent a year compared to the 3.7 per cent decline it had estimated in 2007, which it now acknowledges to be wrong.



http://www.independent.co.uk/news/scien ... 66585.html

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RajeshA » 04 Aug 2009 22:42

Would a broken up Pakistan be in India's interest?

Much of that question would be answered on the plains of an independent Pakjab! However the question is, how would such a Pakjab really look like.

Most of the same people would remain influential, both from the Army and from the feudal families. Still Pakistan would be no more.

Most of the rhetoric of the Pakjabi people is derived from Nazariya-e-Pakistan. Without Pakistan how would that rhetoric change? What would be the state philosophy of Pakjab? Would it still see India as an enemy? Would it still remain in awe of Ummah and the Khalifah project? Or would it try to return to the Indic ancestry? Would it accept Indian influence or would it still continue its rebellion? Would it try to reestablish Pakistan, or would it accept the new reality? Who could be the power-brokers of such a future Pakjab? Would the Islamists still have a free run? Could Pakjab be taken over by the Islamists?

Just some hypotheticals for the Jirga to think over! I am eager for the wisdom! :)

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 04 Aug 2009 23:06

Try to look for archives of Hindu newspaper of the 1972 timeframe. Especially articles by G.K. Reddy.

Soon after 1971 war there were centrifugal tendencies in the provinces and a lot of speculation : NWFP -> Afghanistan, Balochistan -> Independent or with Iran (recall it was under Reza Shah Pahlevi), Pakjab and Sindh -> India as there was no feasibility of independent existence. In fact there was raging Baloch insurgency in the mid 70s which India couldnt take advantage of due to the Emergency stigma.

However IG's giveaways to ZAB at Shimla to prop up a non-Pakjab leader ended up allowing the centrifugal forces to be reversed and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan sealed those aspirations. What we are seeing is a resumption of the atmosphere of those days.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Anujan » 04 Aug 2009 23:20

ramana wrote:Peak oil will ensure that in next 50 years the support from Wahabized KSA will diminish. And by that time India will be G-2 if things go a certain way.Add to the mix the demographic mix changing in North America. And that will cut off the Anglo Saxon support for this rentier state.


ramana-ji
To early to write of N America. There is a huge (christian) young population in mexico for work and for warfare. Vast swathes of land, natural resources and water in Canada. Enough elites in massa who dont want a change in status-quo of unkil's corporations ruling the roost. Together they represent a mix who is better educated, with better opportunities on a system which is already established. Very high competitive advantage vis-a-vis SDREs and Cheenis.

Every (non military) powerful empire* declined due to loss of territories, or a loss of control by the "central" state to maintain cohesion of its union. None have declined by gaining territories, young populations or by forming a union by signing a document. I am sure this lesson is not lost on Unkil. But of course there are hurdles.

*I dont count the mongolian empire to be based on any system of economics.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 04 Aug 2009 23:27

Anujan wrote:
ramana wrote:Peak oil will ensure that in next 50 years the support from Wahabized KSA will diminish. And by that time India will be G-2 if things go a certain way.Add to the mix the demographic mix changing in North America. And that will cut off the Anglo Saxon support for this rentier state.


ramana-ji
To early to write of N America. There is a huge (christian) young population in mexico for work and for warfare. Vast swathes of land, natural resources and water in Canada. Enough elites in massa who dont want a change in status-quo of unkil's corporations ruling the roost. Together they represent a mix who is better educated, with better opportunities on a system which is already established. Very high competitive advantage vis-a-vis SDREs and Cheenis.

Every (non military) powerful empire* declined due to loss of territories, or a loss of control by the "central" state to maintain cohesion of its union. None have declined by gaining territories, young populations or by forming a union by signing a document. I am sure this lesson is not lost on Unkil. But of course there are hurdles.

*I dont count the mongolian empire to be based on any system of economics.



The key to future 50 years from now is the Anglicization of the Hispanic population and a shifting of the political center southwards. The old centers might be retained for continuity but the dempgrpahic power is shfiting towards the south. I dont mean the South.

Will discuss this in the US and the World thread.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 05 Aug 2009 21:52

X-post...
Hiten wrote:
kuffr Yindoo predicting disintegration of the land of the pure and formation of Akhand Bharat, all while studying at M.I.T


2022 AD: India and Pakistan


However, even with sincere hopes, all this is unlikely to happen. Pakistan will continue to descend into a hyper-Talibanized jihadi vortex throughout the 2010s as minority independence struggles will reach a crescendo. By 2022, Pakistan will be imploding. Its nuclear assets are likely to fall in the hands of jihadis, who will use them to threaten India’s infrastructure and energy supplies from the Middle East and central Asia and eventually, through some miscalculation, launch them to penetrate Indian and possibly Israeli missile-shields, drawing in a massive Indo-American invasion.

The ensuing war will assuredly be traumatic for Indian aubcontinent. India, due to its enormous population and strategic depth will be able to absorb the after-effects of this war, which might include a limited nuclear exchange. Pakistan will dissolve into separate ethnically homogenous nations and by 2030 it is likely that there will be some strategic security, energy and economic partnership agreement between India and the southern provinces of Sindh and Balochistan. North Pakistan might continue as the successor state, but it will be difficult to prevent the ethnic domino effect in Southern Central Asia. Pashtun areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan might merge by erasing the British era Durand line to form Pashtunistan, while Uzbek and Tajik areas of Afghanistan will merge with their ethno-linguistic cousins in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It is difficult to predict the extent of Chinese involvement in this saga, but it will not be insignificant. Russia would probably have minimal involvement.

By 2040, after a transformative reformation of entire power structure in former Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan will formally merge into a United States of India. This union might eventually include Nepal, Sri Lanka, possibly Pashtunistan and other minor political entities. It is difficult to say if Punjab and Bengal will merge just as Germany did and Korea will, but if they do, the Hindi speaking states will also merge to contain any centrifugal tendencies. Hindi, Bengali and Punjabi in that order will be the three most spoken languages in a united India.

By 2050, the USI with its 2.3 billion inhabitants, one fourth of planet’s population, will emerge as the dominant economic, technological, political and cultural power in Eurasia and hence the world. To prevent hyper centralization of power, regional ambitions and colonial parasitism, the federal power structure of the USI will be vested with minimal powers, which will include armed forces, foreign policy, minimal federal taxation, and perhaps a single currency. All other powers will be vested in the various ethno-linguistic provinces, which will chart their own independent course commensurate with their temperament and talents. There will be a high degree of individual freedom. While English might remain the official language, India might see an unexpected and unprecedented revival of ancient Sanskrit language.

realist me - errr ummm hmmm!!

jingo me - rejoicing :twisted:


Atleast he is using his brains to figure out the future trajectory of the sub-continent.

And

Philip wrote:Two things are evident in Pak,one that the US is as predicted,here to stay for as long as it can defend itself.The "surge" in US diplomatic staff,with most of them part of the covert and overt US security/intel appratus,indicates that the US has decided to "rule" Pak,as its rulers cannot handle the country themselves and the outsourcing of this rule has been tacitly agreed to by the Pakistani military and political elite.The US game of hardball is that if they don't get their way,they will withdraw all eco and military aid and Pak will collapse,with the US threatening to make Pak's nukes "inoperable".

US aid will keep it afloat and a combination of US and Chinese military aid will keep it going as a permament nuisance to India.The management of Islamist terrorists to keep hitting us from across the border,is the only matter of debate and dispute between the Pakis and the Americans.The idea is to pursue and prosecute only those terrorists who do not obey US diktat.The US are not bothered about cross-border terrorism into India as long as India does not upset the aplecart and go to war with Pak.That would defeat their purposes of ruling the Indian sub-continent by stealth,having two vassal entitites in in place. Our ex-World Bank rabbit is "your obediently" already to the US.It just needs to bring under control the messy lot across the border.


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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Prem » 05 Aug 2009 22:49

The US stay in Pakistan increases the chances of civil war . Pushtoons, Islamists and others will keep both Uncle and PA on the move . This kind of destablization and permanent dissatification among Napaks serves mid term Indian interests and come with added bonus of Chinese discomfort in CA with US presence in the region.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RajeshA » 05 Aug 2009 23:15

I am personally fine with USA moving into Pakistan with a big 'diplomatic' mission.

This gives the Pakistanis more of a feeling that they are getting colonized all over again. They never got to fight the Indian War of Independence. Jinnah never went to prison like the Congress leaders. So this would be their chance finally to have their own War of Independence. :wink:

A bit more seriously, USA is obviously willing to become the most hated country in Pakistan, even trying to surpass hate for India there. Let them do it. Let LeT do target practice on US interests in Islamabad, Tarbela and elsewhere. If LeT, under orders from TSPA, fails to do target practice on the Americans, then LeT would be losing credibility very quickly on the street, especially as all the Islamist militant outfits would all be tripping over each other to have a go at the Americans right in the heart of Islamabad, the capital of the Land of the Pure, the seat of the new Khilafat.

What India wants most is for the Islamist militant groups in Pakistan to have a more juicier target than India. The State Department is doing us a favor. True the Americans would be giving more aid to TSPA and more military toys, but they would also be contributing to the centrifugal and entropic forces in Pakistan.

During Obama's rule, there will be a steady increase of American bases in Islamabad. TSPA would be living off the rent. This is next phase of becoming a rentier state. In the 80s, Pakistan got rent from the War against Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan, in the first decade of this century it got rent for transit routes into Afghanistan and mercenary services of TSPA, in the next decade the Americans are moving into full time into Pakistan, and TSPA will get its rent from that.

So there are going to be many instances when Pakistan would doing :P to India, because America love Pakistan more, and has moved in with Pakistan into the same flat, but India knows better. :mrgreen:

Some day, when Pakistanis would all be hopping mad, all with loaded guns and killing each other, Americans will simply decide it is time to take the last helicopter home and they will take the nukes in tow while leaving.

Leave it to Pakistanis to always have a shovel to dig a deeper grave for themselves!

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Prem » 05 Aug 2009 23:42

Uncle causing Thousand Mutinies among Napaks beats any Nataunki. Unclelogs are known for making whole country Hira Mandi with truck loads of Greenpacks. Easy job for them becuase of Bikau nature of Bakistanians.The most intriguing part is the major heartburn will be limited to Pakjabs and Frontier aka PA nursery. The Piss Process (PP), i perceive in different light now. This Pee Pee is going to be sugar coated poisonous pill for Pakistaniats. Acharaya San's fear about india are actually coming true in Pakistan.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Rkam » 06 Aug 2009 05:20

Not Sure if this has been posted before:

http://www.brookings.edu/speeches/2009/0409_pakistan_cohen.aspx


Rising India has a Pakistan Problem
Pakistan, India, South Asia
Stephen P. Cohen, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy
International Development Research Centre
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APRIL 09, 2009 —
Stephen Cohen spoke before the International Development Research Centre in Ottawa, Canada.

President David Malone, and Ladies and Gentlemen, I am honored to be invited to speak in this series on India. My approach will certainly be different from that of M.S. Swaminathan and Amartya Sen—both of whose work I came to know in 1993 when I spent a wonderful year in the Ford Foundation’s New Delhi office. My hope is that it offers an equally valid way of looking at India’s “emergence” or “rise,” and that what I have to say is relevant to our shared interest in seeing a more prosperous, equitable, and democratic India.
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India’s Revolutions

India is a revolutionary power in many ways. India is not only undergoing several domestic revolutions—that of its economy, its caste system, and its federal structure, but also in how it sees its place in the world.[1] India’s revolutions are different than those of China, and comparisons must be made very carefully. I can save some of you a lot of trouble by letting you know that much of the literature on “Chindia,” exemplified by two books I saw in Chennai last December—The Dragon and the Elephant and The Elephant and the Dragon, is with a few exceptions, mostly useless.[2]

The end of the Cold War forced India to reconsider how it configured its relations with major states, notably America. It is still a free-rider to the extent that, without being a member of any American-organized alliance, it benefits from the stability provided by these alliances. At best, Indians describe their relationship with the US as a “natural alliance,” a content-less term. India has an interest in a stable international order, but it has so far been only a bit player when it comes to global order issues.
With the end of bipolarism the long-held dream of becoming one of the world’s four or five centers of power and authority seemed to move closer, but other than run of the mill peacekeeping operations under UN auspices—just like Bangladesh—it shows few signs of playing a larger role. Perhaps maintaining its own integrity is enough for the time being, but the chronic conflict with Pakistan is another reason why India remains confined to its region.

India’s dispute with Pakistan is one of the reasons why the reforms sought by Amartya Sen, M.S. Swaminathan, and such eminent businessmen as Nandan Nilekani will be slow in coming. Ironically, this is not because of Pakistan’s strengths, but because of its weaknesses. Let me develop this idea further.

Globalization and its Discontented Victims

The cold war masked a process that was just as corrosive to many states as the US-Soviet rivalry. Pakistan got the worst of both worlds: its cold war ties retarded its political development, they allowed for the perpetuation of a military and strategic rivalry with the much larger India, and gave it false comfort in the belief that its cold war allies would help them in time of crisis.

However, often hidden by the rhetoric of the cold war, another process was moving forward. This was variously termed “non-military security,” or ‘human security,” labels that were invented to compete with the cold war paradigm of “hard” or “real” security, that is, the security of states themselves.
There was a widespread belief, promulgated by the foundations and some governments, that states were themselves the threat -- that too strong states repressed their citizens, and that human rights groups and NGOs could, and should, fill in where the state was repressive. There was also a belief that too much attention had been given to the security of states, not enough to their citizens. The state was the problem, non-state forces, backed by international watchdogs, were the answer.

I think this was a misdiagnosis—states that were too weak were also a problem, and over the last ten years we have seen the further weakening of many new states, and some old ones, such as Nepal and Afghanistan, states that have been unable to adapt to the accelerating process of what we call globalization, defined as the increasingly rapid movement of ideas, people, and goods around the world at an unprecedented rate. The three technologies at the heart of this latest spell of globalization were the transistor, the wide-bodied jet, and the container ship. They enabled revolutionary applications such as the cell phone, satellite communications, and (a mixed blessing, indeed), global finance networks.

Of course, the world has always been globalizing, people, ideas and goods have been in motion since prehistoric times. Four hundred years ago globalization entered its modern era with the invention of navigational aids and new forms of military organization that allowed the exploration and conquest of the world by a few Western states and later Japan. Two hundred years ago globalization hit the middle classes, and allowed ice from Walden Pond to cool drinks in the clubs of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, and as Henry David Thoreau wrote, would mix with the holy waters of the Ganges. A hundred years ago steam technology and international mail service enabled my grandfathers to hopscotch around the world until they settled in the United States—one of them, incidentally, made a stop in Canada.

India had the resources and the infrastructure to take advantage of the most recent surge of globalization. It has become a global player in the software industry, a major center for advanced research (often funded by others, not necessarily in response to critical Indian needs, such as agriculture), a cultural superpower, and an efficient processor of services. As Thomas Friedman and others have noted, India (and China) have lifted the largest number of people in history out of poverty—yet India still has half of the world’s poor.

Misreading the World

Indian leaders misread the end of the Cold War. They correctly saw that they had to re-balance Indian strategic policy—after all the chief international supporter, the Soviet Union, had disappeared. Leading Indian strategists argued early on that some accommodation with the United States was necessary. Now, just about every party, except a few on the Left, agree with this shift.

However, there was a slow and inadequate response to the unleashing of new forces set free by the decline of communist and left ideology. We forget that the Cold War was not just a struggle between major states—the so-called superpowers—but a struggle between ideas on how the world would be organized. Young people are almost always idealistic, and a generation ago usually rallied to a leftist, pro-Soviet, or even pro-China cause.
The end of the cold war, plus China’s conversion to market economics and a cynical single party state pretty much removed the appeal of left ideas as far as the young, the backbone of any revolutionary movement that opposed injustice, even if Maoism without Mao lingers on in South Asia.

By the early 1990’s it was easy to predict that ethnic identity movements and religion would replace communism as the Polar Star of the young, the disenfranchised, and the angry.[3] As a state, India is familiar with ethnicity and identity: it is an important element in India’s relations with all of its neighbors. A short list would include Tibetans, Kashmiris, Bengalis, Sikhs, Sindhis, Nepali speakers, Mohajirs, and Tamils. Indeed, every one of India’s neighbors has a major overlap with it in terms of ethnic identity movements.

New Delhi early on learned how to manage ethnic movements, using force when necessary, then accommodation. In the words of an Indian police official, “we hit them over the head with a hammer, then we teach them to play the piano.” It works, in the same way that the Romans kept peace in their far-flung multi-ethnic empire. It also works as an instrument of foreign policy, and a number of South Asian states, including India, have used ethnic separatist movements to keep a rival off-balance. India (backed by the US) did this for a while with the Tibetans of China, it certainly did this in Sri Lanka, supporting Tamils, with tragic and unanticipated consequences, and its most significant use of ethno/linguistic discontent was its support of East Bengali separatist against Pakistan. There is ample evidence that India uses its presence in Afghanistan to not only balance radical Islamists there, but to undercut Pakistani efforts.[4]

Of course, Pakistan had long fished in troubled Indian waters. Even today it officially draws a distinction between Kashmir and India proper. China actively supported Naga separatists and other irredentists for many years.

Two, three, four, or five wrongs not only do not make a right, but they create a morally muddied situation. If everyone is to blame, no one is to blame. The alphabet agencies—ISI, RAW, and so forth—are often the chosen instrument of state policy when there is a conventional (and now a nuclear) balance of power, and the diplomatic route seems barren.

Frankly, this would not matter very much in the larger scheme of things, especially with an India that is acquiring real economic power. In the case of India’s other major Asian rival, China, they have a long border dispute, they have supported separatist and irredentist groups in each other’s territory for years, they are economic rivals, and they are nuclear weapons states—yet they have moved to a level of accommodation and understanding that seems impossible in the case of India and Pakistan. China is expected to soon become India’s largest trade partner, whereas Indian trade with Pakistan (except via the smuggling route), is negligible.

The India-Pakistan Conundrum

There are many reasons why India and Pakistan are seemingly incompatible, despite their shared history and geographical space. Let me present an explanation, and then note how other trends impinge upon an already-dangerous situation.

Structurally, the India-Pakistan relationship is toxic. It is a classic case of what I call a “paired minority conflict.” In these situations both sides see themselves as vulnerable, threatened, encircled, and at risk. They have a “minority” or “small power” complex, which also means that conventional morality does not apply to them. Sri Lanka and the Middle East are the other two outstanding cases of a “paired minority conflict.” All three are self-contained, internally powered conflict machines.
It is easy to see why Pakistanis have a classic small power complex: they are indeed smaller than India, increasingly less capable, their friends are fickle, and when from time to time Indian politicians and officials concede that Pakistan is a legitimate country, Pakistanis feel even more insecure.

But why India? There is a powerful and emerging Indian identity, one that transcends regional differences, a continental-sized economy, and the plaudits of the world, now including the United States. India also has a world-class popular culture and its political parties are constantly redefining and refining a new Indian identity. But the fact remains that until very recently the self-identity of India’s elite was that they were citizens of a loser state? Those who were able to do so left it for more promised lands, to America’s benefit and that of Canada. This is changing rapidly, just as there is new thinking in Pakistan about India, but the core antagonisms still drive the overall relationship, hampering efforts to develop trade, people-to-people, and economic and institutional ties of a level that exists, say, between Taiwan and China.

In their quest for an identity, some Indians tried to replicate Pakistan’s failure by manufacturing a “Hindu” Indian identity—the so-called Hindutva movement. But there is no all-Indian Hindu identity—India is riven by caste and linguistic differences, and Aishwarya Rai and Sachin Tendulkar are more relevant rallying points for more Indians than any Hindu caste or sect, let alone the Sanskritized Hindi that is officially promulgated.

India is groping now for a national identity that would allow it to approach Pakistan with confidence, but there is no consensus on how to mesh India’s identity with that of Pakistan’s. Indians do not know whether they want to play cricket and trade with Pakistan, or whether they want to destroy it. There is still no consensus on talking with Pakistan: sometimes the government and its spokesman claim that they do not want to deal with the generals, but when the generals are out of the limelight, they complain that the civilians are too weak to conclude a deal. The default option seems to be that Pakistan is now someone else’s problem--in this case the United States’. Not a few Indian generals and strategists have told me that if only America would strip Pakistan of its nuclear weapons then the Indian army could destroy the Pakistan army and the whole thing would be over. This of course is both silly and dangerous—and could lead to a catastrophic misjudgment when the fifth India-Pakistan crisis does come. We were close to one last year, I have no doubt that the people who tried to trigger a new India-Pakistan war will try again.

The structural contradictions in the relationship explain much of the problem. Put in terms of raw politics, India’s political parties do not make this a central issue in governance. In Pakistan there is not much support in the Establishment (or ruling oligarchy, to use the proper Aristotelian label) for an end to South Asia’s cold (and sometimes hot) war.

As the years pass, India and Pakistan have traded places in being insecure and vulnerable: like two sides of a teeter-totter, when either side is down it fears that any concessions will lead down a slippery slope, when it is up, it expects the weaker side to bow. India is presently “up,” but there is no serious consideration of a deal that would bring to fruition the process begun by Atal Behari Vajpayee in the 1990s. Interestingly, it has been the BJP that seems to be more willing to redefine Pakistan in such a way that India could live at peace with it. Both Jaswant Singh and L.K. Advani have talked of “Jinnah’s Pakistan.”

Let me list a few other factors that reinforce this paired-minority complex:

There are groups on both sides that try to disrupt the process when it seems to be reaching a positive conclusion. Some of the bureaucracies and covert agencies on each side need the conflict for their own self interest—the two armies, in particular, would have very little to do (except, perhaps to fight separatists and terrorist groups) if the international border were normalized. On the right, when Jaswant and Advani appeared soft on Pakistan they were roundly berated by the Hindutva hard-liners.
The introduction of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of India and Pakistan have not promoted peace—although they may have made all-out war virtually impossible.
The presence of bureaucratic pathologies should be noted, in particular the Pakistan army’s narrow vision, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs’ absence of vision.
The so-called track II dialogues, are more often than not a way of avoiding serious strategic dialogue between Indians and Pakistanis. They often involve those people who were responsible for past bad decisions, yet the same people who ten years ago were eager to do nothing now preach the importance of dialogue and further meetings—conference building measure. As one Indian journalist properly observed during one of these marathon talk-fests, both governments should consider extending the age of retirement by five or ten years since so many of yesterday’s hawks had morphed into today’s doves.
There is also an absence of imaginative strategic thinking in India—most officials and politicians seem to follow the advice of P.V. Narasimha Rao, who said that inaction is always preferable, that time will fix most problems.
Prime Minister Rao may have been right in some matters, but I don’t think this is the case with India’s chief strategic and foreign policy problem, one that penetrates to the core of Indian politics—the crumbling state of Pakistan. I won’t go into details, but all of the long term indicators for Pakistan are very negative: economic growth, population, demographic trends, sectarianism, governmental coherence, rising discontent among non-Punjabis, and an increase in sectarian extremism within the Punjab itself.

There is one positive trend: for the first time all of the major, relevant powers of the world are concerned about Pakistan. China, the EU and NATO states, America, and others understand that their Pakistan problem is not simply one of containing terrorism, but the integrity of the Pakistani state.

I think that Indians sense this, but the moment for action was five or six years ago. Here, Washington and New Delhi failed each other as they were falling over each other in an attempt to complete an agreement on civil nuclear energy. I supported the deal, but it certainly distracted the United States from what was happening before its eyes. “De-hyphenation” was an Indian objective, and it was successful in the short term—but it contributed to American disinterest in internal developments in Pakistan just as these were becoming pathological.

Exactly six years ago I published a book on Pakistan, and the last sentence concluded: “Before writing Pakistan off as the hopelessly failed state that its critics believe it to be, Washington may have one last opportunity to ensure that this troubled state will not become America’s biggest foreign policy problem in the last half of this decade.”[5] Just before that the 2000 CIA “Global Trends” report, looking ahead to 2015, suggested that “Pakistan will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement. . . . Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change . . . . and domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesion of the military. . . . In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government’s control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.” Most recently, the Australian/American strategist David Kilcullen, predicted that Pakistan might collapse in six months.

Is it too late? It might be, but politics is an empirical science, not a theoretical one, and there has to be one last comprehensive effort to answer the question of Pakistan’s viability.

As for India, it is both part of the problem and part of the solution, but I know that if it does not act in a positive and creative fashion its hopes of becoming a comprehensively great power cannot be achieved. There may be some gratification in seeing your major enemy and rival go up in flames, but not if your house catches fire.

What to Do?

Let me conclude with a small “to do” list, addressed mostly to India but also to outsiders who want to be of help:
Kashmir is both the cause and effect of this paired-minority complex, it can’t be “solved” because there is no solution as long as present mind-sets prevail. Read the superb new study by Ambassador Howard Schaeffer of America’s many failed attempts coming out shortly from the Brookings press, and instead, look for ways that turn Kashmir into a non-zero sum problem. My suggestion would be to address, more broadly, the looming environmental and water issue, of which Kashmir is an important component. This affects India, China, Nepal, and Bangladesh, this is properly dealt with on a regional basis. Kashmir, as such, is not “ripe” for resolution, but parts of the problem are.
Regional trade is another area where India and Pakistan need an excuse to do only what is in their self-interest. In this case there is the problem of the big fish-little fish: Pakistan is big fish as far as Afghanistan is concerned, but a little fish when it comes to India. India of course is the whale as far as Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. India stands to gain a lot by giving up a little, a mind set that is common in the business community but not among the bureaucrats.
Nuclear proliferation provides us with anotherff opportunity, and if missed, all parties will suffer. India tirelessly avoids the issue by pious accusations in the direction of Pakistan on how not to be a responsible nuclear weapons state. All that India needs to do is to rediscover the Rajiv Gandhi action plan, which not only called for global disarmament—a politically safe thing to with the Bush administration gone—but Rajiv also addressed, if briefly, the prospect of movement at the regional level. This now means China, India and Pakistan, and it should not take more than ten minutes to figure out how many nuclear weapons would preserve deterrence stability for India. Given that India was rewarded with an incredibly generous agreement by the Bush administration, India should do more than simply reiterate its own excellent record. Such a region-wide agreement might include better verification and assurances regarding national protection of weapons and fissile material; it is not that Indian practices are bad (although there is little evidence that they are good), it is that India’s vulnerability to a nuclear weapon from Pakistan is self-evident. It is astonishing that the same Indian officials and “formers” who decry Pakistan as a rogue state and the epicenter of terrorism, seem perfectly happy with Pakistan’s control over a growing nuclear arsenal.
Finally, India needs to engage in introspection about he full range of military power that it wields. India is certainly Asia’s third great state, but the book I am now completing will argue that its strategic weight and its military power have been misjudged. Just because a state has done well in one or two areas does not necessarily mean that it will do well in all of them. There are no more than a handful of political and administrative officials who really understand the use of force and the instruments of military power. India cannot remove key threats by force, yet it maintains a huge army and an equally large paramilitary force that are strategically dysfunctional. It sometimes behaves like a timid state for good reason—yet it wants its neighbors to be in awe of its power. No big state will ever be beloved by its smaller neighbors, but India has failed to capitalize, especially in the case of Pakistan, on its real assets—these are its great cultural and economic power, not its army or its nuclear weapons.
To summarize, India is the dominant power in South Asia, but it is the putative leader of the least-integrated region of the world; its neighbors all struggle, and at least one of them, Pakistan, defines itself in anti-Indian terms. While India must concentrate upon its domestic reforms and restructuring, this process must be accompanied by fresh thinking about India’s regional relations, and the role that outside powers can play in helping these to become more normal.

The agenda I have outlined is already too long, and the problems that India faces in its relationship with Pakistan are very great. I remain optimistic that India will change -- it has done so at astonishing speed in many spheres—and somehow convert an enemy into a partner. India may have to give a little, but it has a lot to gain. The rest of us can stand by, offer suggestions where asked. However, we must also be prepared for strategic failure—another serious crisis with Pakistan, the further fragmentation of that state, or the expansion of the radical Islamist agenda to India itself. I am no Cassandra, but prudence suggests that we not just hope for the best, hope is not a policy.


[1] For an elaboration of these revolutions, and others, see Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington: Brookings, 1999).

[2] For a useful discussion of how to compare India and China see Pranab Bardhan, “China, India Superpower? Not so Fast!” Yale Global Online, Feb. 6, 2009, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/article.print?id=6407

[3] Stephen P. Cohen, “A Season of Separatism,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August, 1992

[4] For a discussion of the role of the Indian consulates in Afghanistan, while real, but much exaggerated by pasta, see the comments of C. Christine Fair, in the Foreign Affairs roundtable on Pakistan, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/discussio ... h-pakistan

[5] Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington: Brookings, 2004), p. 328.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby SwamyG » 06 Aug 2009 06:27

Neither War nor peace
The real issue is this: by talking about an open book, we are taking a moral position instead of being driven purely by the country's long-term interests. And this has been true for us since the time of Gandhi and Nehru. Manmohan Singh is only the latest leader in a long line of people to believe that somewhere, sometime, Pakistanis will want peace as much as we do.

They won't. There are several reasons why there won't be real peace in our time. One is a civilisational issue. The second is ideological. And the third has to do with geopolitics.


A very good analysis, read it full - the gist is for India to prosper Pakistan must go down. But the author does not say it in those words.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby svinayak » 06 Aug 2009 06:43

To summarize, India is the dominant power in South Asia, but it is the putative leader of the least-integrated region of the world; its neighbors all struggle, and at least one of them, Pakistan, defines itself in anti-Indian terms. While India must concentrate upon its domestic reforms and restructuring, this process must be accompanied by fresh thinking about India’s regional relations, and the role that outside powers can play in helping these to become more normal.


He fails to mention that least integration in the subcontinent was deliberately achieved by the Former Colonial power from 1900 to 1947 in such a way that there is no one unified country in the subcontinent.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Anujan » 06 Aug 2009 07:07

RajeshA wrote:I am personally fine with USA moving into Pakistan with a big 'diplomatic' mission.


Ofcourse ! a "green zone" around the embassy should be halal onlee.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby SwamyG » 06 Aug 2009 08:04

I don't think it is reasonable expectation on our part - that being the authors pushing or not pushing all the right buttons to our liking. For instance, I found one point sticking like a sore thumb in that article - he needlessly brought in an issue and the way he brought it he seems to have a different opinion.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Hari Seldon » 06 Aug 2009 08:10

Stephen Cohen's bilge above is so full of holes and demonstratable inconsistencies and falsehoods, that my head spins only.

My first enthu attempt at taking it apart logically got inundated with overabundance of raw material. The most stark is the misdiagnosis of the problem itself. Am yet to hear a convincing logic for why India needs to agree to the western need to preserve TSP's 'integrity'. Cohen assumes this as an article of faith.

Cohen then attempts (poorly, I must add) to flatter to deceive. India==rising power blah blah BUTT concede to TSP's legitimate demands first to realize your true greatness and potential etc etc. Tons of == liberally sprayed as if Indian actions are == TSPs.

Suffice it is to state my conclusion that Cohen is not India's friend in the sense that his prescriptions reek of a lose/win for India/rest rather than a win/win that one would expect great strategic and geopol thinkers to come up with. Take Cohen's utterances with wariness only.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby brihaspati » 06 Aug 2009 08:42

Cohen fails to state or realize that, paired-minority complex appears to be universal in nature. The Americans and the Europeans started this game of paired minority complex. Who promoted the Hindu-Muslim antagonism actively leading towards creation of Pakistan? This was UK locked in a paired minority complex with Russia. The whole of Cold War itself is a classic case of paired-minority complex. India-Pakistan in fact is not a case of paired-minority complex. Indian behaviour never indicates that it considers Pakistan to be a "permanent" and the most important enemy, anger against whom can be internally self-sustaining. In fact the buzz overwhelmingly always seems to be India melting in "kindness" and "fraternal feelings" to both TSP and PRC. This euphoria and exuberance of "kindness" increases markedly before actual attacks by these countries.

Cohen does not show us why is it important to preserve TSP at all. He does not show what are the assets that are really worth saving in TSP. He does not show why and how Indian stands to gain from helping continue and prolong TSP's life.

And, criminally, Cohen omits to analyze how continuing UK+US+PRC meddling affects and constantly changes the game or goalpoasts, which also India has to constantlya ccount for or anticipate.

Cohen identifies only one problem correctly - that is the Indians as yet failing to come to a decidion as to what to do with TSP - destroy it or help preserve it. This is indeed the fundamental question to be settled - but not in the direction Cohen wants us to take. And before asking India this question, Cohen should first ask it of the forces he represents, that of the "west".

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby shiv » 06 Aug 2009 09:00

Cohen is an insufferable fool who genuinely believes that the "bigoted Hindu state of India is out to destroy Muslims" and therefore Pakistan itself is a justifiable reaction to Hindu bigotry. From such a starting point - anything Pakistan says is fine for Cohen.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RayC » 06 Aug 2009 09:51

Whether it is in the interest or not of India to have a stable Pakistan is not really the issue. The nub of the issue is whether Pakistan is interested in becoming stable.

Historically, there has hardly any indication that Pakistan wanted stability. Pakistan has been chaotic since Independence. Balochistan and the NWFP declined joining Pakistan, but were coerced. Then without stabilising a nascent State, they embarked on war with India. The Bengalis started the Bengali Language Movement since they refused to accept Urdu being imposed on them and there were also the anti Ahmediyya riots! Thus, Pakistan was a motley amalgam of peoples who were reluctant players of Pakistan, and as if that was not enough indication of a divided society, they also divided society and encouraged sectarianism. They struggled for 9 years after Independence to formulate a Constitution indicating that they were fuzzy as to what are their Nation’s aims and aspirations!!

The confusion called Pakistan further muddied the waters of confusion by the drama and the merry go round of marital law governments and civil govts. Not versed in governance or statesmanship but purely based on self survival, Zia encouraged the rise of fundamentalist Islam and its instruments of enforcement. Chaos became the synonymous to Pakistan. Thereafter, the various Shia Sunni sectarian killings, the various liberation movements, the supremacy of the ISI over the govt etc dug into the innards of Pakistan, and made Pakistan but a nation only in name. In short, there has been no stability in Pakistan ever and that the psyche is merely sub national and individual and organisational one-upmanship!

Therefore, if after 60 odd years after Independence, Pakistan is yet trying to find its identity and stability, it is a moot point that stability in Pakistan, which is their will o’ the wisp, will be in the interest of India.

However, one also wonders if such chaotic people who are keener on destroying each other are worth embracing by India.

Many attempts have been made by India to have a lasting peace with Pakistan and many promises have been made by them, but each time, such promises proved hollow. And yet we chase the Holy Grail of Peace with Pakistan and still continue to do so and landing ourselves in a pretzel shaped confusion as was experienced even as late as the Sharm al Sharif meet! The problem with India is that our statesmen want to outdo Nehru as men of peace and stature, without realising that compared to Nehru (with all his faults), most such statesmen are pygmies! And yet they pursue their pipedream to out Nehru Nehru!

Ideally, India should play by the ear and leave issues loose ended but charged with high moral rhetoric, just the way Pakistan is doing as is evident in the release of Hafiz Saaed and at the same time carrying out cosmetic arrests of no import.

Our statesmen should stop playing to the gallery with strong words and then eat crow. That causes a loss in credibility, both internally and in the international arena.

Given the turmoil in Pakistan and if the Taliban gets a foothold, there will be chaos and in this chaos, if the various liberation movements are encouraged, then Pakistan will be history.

Then and then alone will there be stability in the area known as Pakistan!

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RayC » 06 Aug 2009 10:06

Yesterday, I saw a programme (can't remember which) where the person being asked if Pakistan was a failed state and a rogue state, very diplomatically stated, that it was a 'failing state and slightly roguish'!

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Rkam » 06 Aug 2009 10:58

Not writing as a defender of Cohen, but what he says could make sense from the American perspective, with the intention of preserving and promoting American interests. Even though he couches his advice in a manner as to seem to be seeking to help India help itself, this is secondary to his primary objective which is naturally to promote American interests (no matter that they are defined or prioritized incorrectly).

For Cohen, its not about assisting the rise of India, its about saving what ever is left of Pakistan. This requires India to do the heavy lifting on the Pakistan file in a way that supports the US - rather than the US supporting India on Pakistan. The Rise of India may be inevitable (time being the great variable) but the US is going to ensure that it happens in a manner consistent with its own objectives - and its need for balance in Asia (India to balance China, Pakistan to balance India, etc.)

Is he actually arguing for re-hypenation of the relationship, when he criticizes Bush for treating India separate from Pakistan? Is he arguing that only by dealing with India and Pakistan as a package, can Pakistan be salvaged.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 06 Aug 2009 21:56

Shiv, I need you to deconstruct the Cohen article for further dissemination.

Thanks, ramana

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 07 Aug 2009 21:21

X-posted for data gathering....

brihaspati wrote:R Jaganathan writes
http://www.dnaindia.com/opinion/column_neither-war-nor-peace_1279995

It is tempting to believe that Manmohan Singh's Sharm el-Sheikh goof-up was all his own. He certainly must take a large share of the blame. But, in a fundamental sense, he hasn't done anything that other Indian prime ministers haven't.

The real issue is this: by talking about an open book, we are taking a moral position instead of being driven purely by the country's long-term interests. And this has been true for us since the time of Gandhi and Nehru. Manmohan Singh is only the latest leader in a long line of people to believe that somewhere, sometime, Pakistanis will want peace as much as we do.

They won't. There are several reasons why there won't be real peace in our time[...]

The civilisational issue [...] The Indian approach is influenced by the largely Hindu ethos of letting things be. The Abrahamic civilisations, including the Islamic one, have a binary approach. It's either 0 or 1, black or white. One is either wrong or right. There is little scope for grey, where we can retain our separate opinions and get on with life.

[...]We could not reconcile the Islamic way of looking at reality with ours. This is why, even today, we can't understand how the Pakistanis think about Kashmir and why they are not interested in peace with status quo.

Even before Partition, a major issue on which the Congress and the Muslim League fell out was the right of the League to represent all Muslims. They couldn't comprehend the greyness of secularism. Pakistan, the inheritor of the Muslim League mantle, remains in that mould.

This brings us to ideology [...] Pakistan was created on the basis of religion and it has defined itself as anti-India, anti-Hindu -- which for them is one and the same thing. Unlike conflicts relating to economic interests, ideological tussles cannot be settled through give and take. The US-Soviet cold war was an ideological conflict that was resolved only when one party collapsed.
[....]The same goes for the India-Pakistan conflict. The battle is ideological, between a state that believes that religion is the basis for national identity and another (that's us) which says that the state has to be neutral on identities. This essential ideological tug-of-war can only be resolved by victory or defeat: either we accept that secularism is the only way to go, or we accept the Sangh Parivar's views on Hindu Rashtra.


The third issue is geopolitics.[...]The US-India alliance is intended to contain China. But this equally means that a China-Pakistan axis is inevitable. Even if, ideologically, Pakistan becomes a secular republic, its ties with China will force it to be anti-India.

If we take these three realities into account, Indian policymakers should prepare for long-term antagonism from Pakistan. Pakistan wants peace only when it wants some rest between high-cost conflicts or war.


From the leadership viewpoint Jaganathan is saying something very similar to what I have tried to say before that - Sharm should not be surprising for it is consistent with the background of the "leaders" and their attitudes towards TSP.

But where Jaganathan raises a serious issue, and I differ from his interpretation is that he thinks such behavious in our leadership comes from "Hindu" viewpoint of "letting be". There are two serious problems with this statement - first is philosophical and ideological. As a guide to practical action in politics and "rashtraniti", two texts that cannot be deleted from the list of what can be considered "Hindu" viewpoint on this matter, are the Mahabharata, especially the "survey of the battlefield" chapter and Arthasastra. But neither says anything about "letting be". Where does the author gets support for this claim about the "Hindu" attitude?

The second problem I have with him is that, there are both "Hindus" and also some Indian "Muslims" who have taken a position against the sentiments manifested by the GOI at "Sharm". BJP as a political party has taken a stand against the GOI position on this. Are they not Hindu? Many BRFites have been lambasting the GOI position. Are they going out of "Hindu"-think? Then the reference to Sangha-Parivar etc - are they taking up a non-Hindu position in opposing the Sharm fiasco?

Is all this a result of confusing the modern version of "secularism" with ancient "Hindu"? Is Jaganathan unwittingly revealing all the theoretical pitfalls of not being able to separate the two - or see where the differences lie? Does he realize the irony of saying that those who take pride in declaring themselves "secular" are actually thinkers along "Hindu"-lines?

A greater question - are the problems of GOI really in a utter misinterpretation, perhaps subconscious, of the "Hindu" way of thinking as it has been reconstructed in colonial times?



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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RayC » 07 Aug 2009 22:38

Why should we 'reclaim' Pakistan as a part of India?

What do we gain?

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby ramana » 07 Aug 2009 22:43

So we are back to who is Sita? Please see top of this page!

Whether we reclaim TSP or not the entitiy in its present form shouldnt be allowed to exist. We can argue later what to do with the fallout.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby KLNMurthy » 07 Aug 2009 23:10

shiv wrote:Cohen is an insufferable fool who genuinely believes that the "bigoted Hindu state of India is out to destroy Muslims" and therefore Pakistan itself is a justifiable reaction to Hindu bigotry. From such a starting point - anything Pakistan says is fine for Cohen.


I was struck by the irrelevant introduction of the slam against "sanskritized Hindi". Am I the only one who thinks that the lamentations about sanskritized Hindi are stupid and foolish and stem from a misguided idea that this is somehow anti-Muslim? As far as I can tell, it is precisely this sanskritized Hindi that dramatically lowers the barrier for south Indians to gain a working knowledge of official Hindi.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby KLNMurthy » 07 Aug 2009 23:13

ramana wrote:So we are back to who is Sita? Please see top of this page!

Whether we reclaim TSP or not the entitiy in its present form shouldnt be allowed to exist. We can argue later what to do with the fallout.


Can we have a rigorous discussion of the nuclear threat scenario, under the present US dependent army rule versus a potential rump Pakistan ruled by people that have no obligations towards America (meaning there is no US to stay the hand on the button)?

It seems to me that this should be the core question in considering a future fragmented Pakistan.

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby RayC » 08 Aug 2009 00:15

ramana wrote:So we are back to who is Sita? Please see top of this page!

Whether we reclaim TSP or not the entitiy in its present form shouldnt be allowed to exist. We can argue later what to do with the fallout.




Sita is not material nor what has been written.

My contention is simple - why should we add to our burden?

It is not worth discussing later as to what the fallout happens.

Prevention is better than Cure.

We should not have to cry over spilt milk!

Let it split into a 100 parts, but there is no need to take them in our embrace!

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby nachiket » 08 Aug 2009 00:21

RayC wrote:
ramana wrote:So we are back to who is Sita? Please see top of this page!

Whether we reclaim TSP or not the entitiy in its present form shouldnt be allowed to exist. We can argue later what to do with the fallout.




Sita is not material nor what has been written.

My contention is simple - why should we add to our burden?

It is not worth discussing later as to what the fallout happens.

Prevention is better than Cure.

We should not have to cry over spilt milk!


Brig. saab, what ramana is trying to say that there has been a lot of discussion over why TSP needs to be reclaimed/destroyed/merged with India in multiple threads including this one. There is pages of stuff written. he was probably wondering whether you went through all of it... (Hehe.. I say so because made the mistake of arguing about why we need to do it with brihaspati before I had read all the previous posts in the scenarios thread :oops: )

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Re: A stable, prosperous Pakistan is NOT in India's interest

Postby Rudradev » 08 Aug 2009 01:34

ramana wrote:So we are back to who is Sita? Please see top of this page!

Whether we reclaim TSP or not the entitiy in its present form shouldnt be allowed to exist. We can argue later what to do with the fallout.


No, we have to determine the fallout (to the maximum extent that we can hope to "manage" it). Everything... our methods, our risks, our resource allocation, our timeframe, our fallback options... depends on how we want the FINAL picture to look (not merely on the destruction of Pakistani entity in its present form).

FWIW, I am perplexed by suggestions that we should actually bring all of present day TSP within our national borders and assume the burdens of providing governmental services, socioeconomic restructuring and law and order to its population... however laudable the motives for doing so might be, I can't imagine a practical implementation to accomplish such goals in the near to medium term.

For anything this side of 2050 the best solution, IMHO, would be the establishment of a Monrovian hegemony by India over the subcontinent, including Pakistan's successor states (each of which would fall within the weight class spanning SL and Bhutan in terms of comprehensive national power). Yes yes I know about Talikota and all that... but if the Americans could learn something from Custer, we can learn from Rama Raya as well.


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